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News and Views from the Economics Department at Rice Spring Break Spring 2019 RICE ECON News and Views from the Economics Department at Rice Spring Break! We hope that you are planning a great in Teaching, four Brown Awards for If you haven’t checked out our website spring break and will return refreshed Superior Teaching, the Sarah Burnett recently, you might take a look at our listing and eager to finish out the rest of the Teaching Prize, and was named a Piper of various student opportunities, as well semester. And, to anticipate things a bit, Professor. Our faculty spotlight shines on as some pointers on conducting research we congratulate our some one hundred Professor Mallesh Pai, who received the in economics, and on getting your work ECON and MTEC graduating seniors who Ralph O’Connor Award for Distinction in published in undergraduate economics will be walking in May and beginning their Teaching and Research in Economics in journals. adventure beyond the hedges – best of luck 2018. We are also delighted to announce Hoping the rest of your spring semester to you all! the next in our series of RISE (Rice goes well, Initiative for the Study of Economics) In this issue of our newsletter, we continue George Zodrow featuring our undergraduate offerings, as Lectures by Nobel laureates, as we bring we focus on one of the most essential of Professor Christopher A. Sims of Princeton Director of Undergraduate Studies our core courses, ECON 200, Intermediate University, recipient of the 2011 Nobel Microeconomics, taught by Professor Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, to James Brown. Jim is a renowned instructor Rice on March 21. And, if you haven’t done who recently received the most prestigious so already, please stop by the Economics teaching award presented by Rice, the Department offices and meet Joan George R. Brown Certificate of Highest Guthrie, our (relatively) new department Merit, culminating a career in which he undergraduate program coordinator, who won two Brown Prizes for Excellence can help out with problems large and small. Meet Joan Guthrie, our new Undergraduate Advising Corner Program Coordinator Spring 2019 Joan Guthrie is our new Undergraduate Program Advising Office Hours Coordinator. Her office is Baker Hall 277, and you can Monday reach her by email at [email protected] or by phone at 1:00–3:00 p.m. 713-348-4381. Please feel free to drop by her office Peter Hartley, BKH 262 anytime for assistance with or questions regarding Tuesday our ECON and MTEC majors. If you are interested in 1:15–2:15 p.m. curricular advising, such as creating a degree plan or Maria Bejan, BKH 251 course selection, please visit one of our major advisors during their office hours, which are posted on the Wednesday Economics Website under Advising/Contact and are 4:00–5:00 p.m. always displayed under the “Advising Corner” feature of James Brown, BKH 250 this newsletter. Thursday Born and raised in Houston, Texas, Joan first began 2:30–3:30 p.m. her career at Rice in the Information Technology department in 1990. In 1992, she Mahmoud El-Gamal, BKH 240 transferred to the office of the Vice President of Information Technology and then moved Friday on to the Center for Technology in Teaching and Learning in 2000. She left Rice in 10:30–11:30 a.m. 2016, taking a short retirement, but returned in the fall of 2018 to begin her current George Zodrow, BKH 260 role in the Economics Department. Joan has enjoyed her long career at Rice, and she especially likes attending Rice baseball and football games. 1 Spotlight on our Faculty Mallesh Pai, Assistant Professor of Economics Research Interests: Mechanism Design/Auction Theory, Economics of Privacy, Social Networks/Social Learning, and Statistical Decision Theory Mallesh Pai came to Rice in 2016 from the University of Pennsylvania. He is a prominent researcher and outstanding teacher, and received the Ralph O’Connor Award for Distinction in Teaching and Research in Economics in 2018. Mallesh’s research focuses on issues in mechanism design, auction theory, the economics of privacy, social networks, social learning, and statistical decision theory. He received his Ph.D. in 2010 from Northwestern University. Mallesh has taught two undergraduate courses at Rice: Econ 470, Market Design, an upper-level elective, and ECON 496, Research in Economic Theory, a capstone course for MTEC majors. Both courses examine various aspects of how innovations in modern economics, as an empirical science, are used to understand any system or process that determines who gets what by matching demand with supply as a market. How did you first become interested in Can you give a brief summary of your the answer to this question fundamentally economics? field of research? depends on the design of the algorithm, but I majored in computer engineering in Broadly speaking, I’m an economic it also relates crucially to the type of market undergrad and liked it, but there were a theorist, which means that I believe in the and economy in which these algorithms are lot of policy changes going on in India power of theory and simple models to give operating. during that time that fascinated me. In the us real insights into the real world. I work You have recently been appointed fall of my junior year, I attended a game in a field that’s called mechanism design, Director of Managerial Studies. What theory conference in Mumbai. All of the which focuses on designing institutions that are your plans for that program? big names in game theory were there; John help us achieve goals we set as a society in Nash, who had already won the Nobel situations where the necessary information Lots of exciting things ahead! In the short- Prize by that point, and Lloyd Shapley, and actions that people need to take in term, the plan is to refresh the curriculum. who everyone predicted would (and did order to achieve those goals are disparate. Several departments around the university soon after) win the Nobel Prize, were both Essentially, I work on figuring out how have revamped their course offerings, there. Before that conference, I had taken to design institutions that align people’s and in light of that we’re tweaking the zero courses in game theory and only incentives with the incentives of society. major a little: using the practicums offered one elective in economics. Afterward, I by the school of social sciences as the ended up moving some things around and What are some of your own research capstone class, updating the core statistics applying to graduate school in economics! projects? requirement, etc. In the longer run, we’re My own research looks at the impact of exploring offering a “full” major, that is Do you think your computer engineering computers and the internet on modern a major that can be taken as a standalone, background has helped you as an society. With the innovations of the while keeping the interdisciplinary flavor of economist? information and internet revolutions of the major. There’s also a few social events Research in economics has become the past 20 years, we can design and planned so majors and prospective majors very quantitative, and my engineering execute markets that we couldn’t dream get to meet and mingle. Professors Schaefer training provided me with math skills, of implementing previously. Recently, (CAAM), Schwindt-Bayer (Political which has helped a lot. Moreover, the I’ve been interested in the question of Science), and Zodrow (Economics) have research that I’m most interested in sits whether machine learning algorithms graciously agreed to be part of an advisory at the intersection of economics and that are designed to help humans make committee and provide adult supervision computer science. I find it beneficial that important decisions, such as approving a while I tinker with things. If you have I can understand both the economics and person’s loan application, can learn how thoughts or suggestions, stop by! computer science aspects of my work. As to discriminate. Part of the reason that we an example, in the past I’ve worked with have moved away from people making Google and Microsoft on ad auctions that these decisions and toward machines For more information on Professor Pai’s they designed for their search engines. making them is accuracy; another is that research projects, including his current working machines presumably do not suffer from papers and his C.V., see the Faculty Page on the the same biases that humans do. Of course, Economics Department website. 2 Great Course on the Menu! Microeconomics, or ECON 200, is the second core course in economics for both ECON and MTEC majors. In the RICE ECON interview below, Dr. James Brown, the instructor Menu for ECON 200, provides some helpful advice for students who are planning to take his course in future semesters. In particular, he recommends several ways that students can Main Course: ECON prepare themselves to succeed in and fully enjoy the material presented in ECON 200 (in 200, Intermediate Microeconomics addition to completing the required prerequisites of MATH 102 and ECON 100). How does ECON 200 build on ECON 100, and how are the two courses different? Appetizers: ECON 100, MATH 101, MATH 102 As an introductory course that covers both microeconomics and macroeconomics in a way that is suitable for majors and non-majors, ECON 100 is necessarily limited in depth. In Master Chef: Professor contrast, ECON 200 focuses intensively on a smaller set of topics in microeconomics and James Brown does so with an emphasis on analytical methods and mathematical modeling. ECON 200 is designed specifically for ECON and MTEC majors and is intended to prepare them for Dinner is Served: Fall more advanced economics courses they will encounter later.
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