Exploring Judgment and Decision Making Behaviors Among Alpine Climbers

A thesis presented to

the faculty of

The Gladys W. and David H. Patton College of Education and Human Services

of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Science in Recreation and Sports Sciences

Alan P. Rousseau

June 2011

This thesis titled

Exploring Judgment and Decision Making Among Alpine Climbers

ALAN P ROUSSEAU

has been approved for

the Department of Recreation and Sport Pedagogy and The Gladys W. and David H. Patton College of Education and Human Services by

Bruce Martin

Assistant Professor of Recreation and Sports Pedagogy

Renée A. Middleton

Dean, The Gladys W. and David H. Patton College of Education and Human Services

ABSTRACT

ROUSSEAU, ALAN P.,, M.S.R.S.S., June 2011, Recreation Studies,

Exploring Judgment and Decision Making Among Alpine Climbers

Director of Thesis: Bruce Martin

This research identifies trends in both good and poor decisions made by a population of expert alpine climbers. The researcher conducted 13 interviews resulting in

24 identified decision points. Each semi-structured interview used the critical decision method. The model of goal directed behavior was used as a theoretical framework to look at potential motivators and influences in decision making. The constant comparison method and line by line coding was used to generate emerging themes. The results section was organized based on Heuristic Traps; seven previously identified traps and one previously unidentified trap were found in the data. The results align with Hammond’s cognitive continuum theory, which suggests decisions will fall somewhere between intuitive, and rational, depending on factors present in the situation. The strongest trend in poor decision making was a lack of emotional attachment.

Approved: ______

Bruce Martin

Assistant Professor of Recreation and Sports Pedagogy

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT ...... 3 LIST OF TABLES ...... 6 LIST OF FIGURES ...... 7 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...... 8 Alpine Climbing ...... 9 Dangers ...... 10 Model of Goal Directed Behavior ...... 11 Purpose ...... 12 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 13 Edgework ...... 13 Judgment and Decision Making ...... 15 Rational Decision Making...... 16 Heuristics & Biases...... 18 Naturalistic Decision Making...... 21 Model of Goal Directed Behavior ...... 29 Attitudes ...... 31 Subjective Norm ...... 32 Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC) ...... 33 Anticipated Emotions ...... 34 Past Behavior ...... 34 MGB in JDM ...... 35 Conclusion ...... 37 Research Expectations ...... 38 CHAPTER 3: METHOD ...... 41 Site ...... 41 Sample Characteristics ...... 42 Cognitive Task Analysis ...... 43 Critical Decision Method ...... 43 Data Collection ...... 46 Data Analysis ...... 48 CHAPTER 4: RESULTS ...... 49 Decisions ...... 49 Poor Decisions...... 50 Positive Decisions...... 50 Heuristic Traps ...... 51 Acceptance...... 51 Victims of the Acceptance Trap ...... 52 Overcoming Acceptance Trap...... 55 Familiarity...... 57 Ignorance Trap...... 59 5

DeMinimus...... 60 Falling Victim to Emotional Attachment...... 61 No Emotional Attachment...... 66 Consistency...... 67 Victims of the Consistency Trap...... 67 Overcoming the Consistency Trap...... 68 Positive Outcome Trap...... 69 Satisficing...... 72 Victims of Satisficing...... 73 Accurate Satisficing...... 75 Partners...... 76 Strong Clients...... 76 Weaker Clients...... 77 Balance Scale...... 78 CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION ...... 80 Model of Goal Directed Behavior ...... 80 Differences ...... 81 Heuristic Traps ...... 82 Underestimation of Risk ...... 83 Emotional Attachment ...... 84 Decision Making Debate...... 85 Limitations of this Study ...... 87 Suggestions for Future Research ...... 88 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ...... 90 REFERENCES ...... 92

LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1: CDM Interview Probes ...... 45

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1: Model of Goal Directed Behavior ...... 31

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Alpine climbing is an activity that has captivated the imagination of many people.

Popular novels (i.e. Into Thin Air, No Shortcuts to the Top, The climb, Mountain

Madness) and television programs (i.e. Discovery Channel’s Mt. Everest) have contributed to this increased interest in the sport. According to the 2009 Outdoor

Recreation Participation Report, participation in alpine climbing has been increasing over the past few years, with a 10% increase in the past year alone (The Outdoor Foundation,

2009). With increased interest, improvements in climbing technology have made climbing safer than it has ever been before; however, in the past two years alone six prolific members of the climbing community have died (Craig Luebben, Micah Dash,

Johnny Copp, John Bachar, Wade Johnson, and Joe Puryear); with countless others having near misses. Why is it that these experts have been lost while in their element?

Often, the desire to complete an objective can blur a climber’s judgment and decision making ability about when to stay and when to go. Decisions climbers make and styles they use are always going to be subject to criticism. The question of “to go” or “not to go” is one the climber must always ask her/himself, and when things go wrong, all we can do is reflect, and ask why?

This study will look at the decision making process of expert alpine climbers.

Correct decisions are critical in alpine climbing. Poor decisions will result in injury and fatality. It is the researcher’s intent to contribute to the exploration of judgment and decision making (JDM) in alpine climbing. In areas of high risk, the decision making 9

process must be finely tuned. Ability to mitigate risks associated with alpine climbing

depends on fast and accurate decisions.

Alpine Climbing

First, alpine climbing should be defined. How does alpine climbing differ from

rock climbing, backpacking, and ice climbing? According to Freedom of the Hills, which

is often referred to as the mountaineers bible: “There’s no hard-and-fast definition of an alpine climb, but you can usually count on a venture that requires a variety of climbing techniques in reaching a summit that is at least several miles from the trailhead”

(Graydon & Hanson, 1997, 408). For the purpose of this study, alpine climbing must

meet several criteria: 1) The area must be located in an alpine environment, 2) technical

terrain must be encountered, and 3) the climbing party must be self-sufficient. An alpine

environment is one that is above the tree line, where the coldest temperatures and most

severe weather of an area are encountered. Often alpine climbs will consist of traveling

expansive glaciers, large rock faces, or steep snow and ice climbs; sometimes all of the

above, to gain the top of a feature such as a peak, tower, ridge or wall. Alpine climbing

mentioned in the following study consists of technical terrain. This includes navigating

crevasses, steep snow, vertical ice and rock. When traveling through technical terrain

climbing party members are “roped up” and additional safety measures are taken. Alpine

climbing is a style often regarded as the purest form of ascent. To be considered alpine

style, the party must be self sufficient. This means the climbers are carrying all their own

food, tents, and equipment. Everything they need for the ascent will be taken in by them

and taken out by them. Alpine climbing is often described as “light and fast”; to carry 10 everything that is needed for the ascent, one must bring the bare minimum. Moving quickly allows the climber to avoid bringing additional food and water needed for extended trips. In the alpine environment changes occur quickly. One poor decision can result in severe injury or death. This is exacerbated when one is traveling with minimal equipment in vertical terrain.

Dangers

Climbing is an inherently dangerous activity, especially when taken into alpine environments. This is an activity with many complex subjective and objective hazards.

Subjective hazards are intra or interpersonal issues that place a group at risk. Examples of subjective hazards include failure to communicate fatigue to other group members, and/or fear of disagreeing with other members of the group. Objective hazards are external factors that produce a risk to the climber. This includes but is not limited to rock fall, ice fall, avalanche, and adverse weather.

Much research has been conducted over the years to find out how many have been injured or killed by climbing (Accidents in North America Mountaineering series). The goal of this previous research was to raise awareness of dangers associated with climbing and discover what the main causes of injury are. One such study was conducted over a four year time period in New Zealand (Monasterio, 2005). The study took 49 climbers and interviewed them about previous accidents. Of the climbers interviewed forty-four had at least five years of experience. Twenty-three of these climbers had been involved in a total of thirty-three accidents. After four years had passed, these same climbers were contacted (45 of the original 49). The sample had experienced a total of nine new 11 accidents and four deaths related to climbing (the four who were not contacted at T2).

Although this is a small sample, the results are staggering. Regardless of the extent of generalization, one out of twelve climbers in this experienced sample died while climbing. In Scotland, a country where 5% of citizens participate in alpine climbing, an accident related to climbing occurs just less than once per day (Sharp, 2007). In the

United States in 2008, a total of 112 accidents were reported resulting in 96 injured and

19 dead (Williamson, 2009). The risks are high in alpine climbing, and errors in judgment often result in death.

Many perceive climbing as a safe activity. As an experienced climber and mountain guide the researcher promotes interest and inspires confidence while teaching climbers to effectively mitigate hazards and minimize risk. In the avalanche safety community there has been much research on decision making and analyzing accidents

(Adams, 2005; Atkins, 2004; McClung, 2002; McCammon, 2002, 2004). In the climbing world, much has been done to look at what technical equipment malfunctioned or what action was taken to cause the accident. Little research has been done to look at why decisions were made, and what the climber’s motives/influences were. The judgment and decision making process needs to be analyzed. Until climbers understand what causes poor decisions it is impossible to avoid these traps.

Model of Goal Directed Behavior

One way to understand the decision making behaviors among alpine climbers may exist within the model of goal directed behavior. This model states the following motivators will account for end behavior in decision making contexts: Attitude, 12 subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, anticipated emotions, past behavior, and desire. The attitude variable assesses one’s positive or negative connotations associated with a given behavior. Subjective norm explores who influences the participant.

Perceived behavioral control measures the extent to which participants believe they can complete a given behavior. Anticipated emotions identify the participant’s emotional attachment to the completion of a goal. Finally, past behavior looks at how frequently and recently the participant has exibited said behavior. These aforementioned variables are said to motivate a desire within participants to create an intention to act. MGB has been used to break down and further understand the rational decision making process.

The model of goal directed behavior has only been applied to rational decision making processes (Taylor, 2007). Many decisions made by climbers are believed to be based on intuition, and follow more of a naturalistic decision making frame as opposed to a purely rational model (Galloway, 2005; Klein, 2008). This will be the first study applying the model of goal directed behavior to a decision making context that is not purely rational.

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to explore the various factors and motivations that influence judgment and decision making behaviors among alpine climbers. Through identifying motivators in alpine climber’s judgment and decision making process, climbers may become more self-aware. Thus potentially avoiding poor decisions influenced by motivators shown to cloud an accurate judgment and decision making process. 13

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

In our exploration of judgment and decision making in alpine climbers we begin by reviewing the edgework literature, which documents voluntary risk taking in an attempt to understand potential motivations for risky pursuits. After a review of edgework the literature review shifts it’s focus to judgment and decision making (JDM) literature. JDM literature from both cognitive psychology and outdoor education/adventure recreation is reviewed. The third component of the literature review is the model of goal directed behavior, to understand how it can possibly explain behaviors in decision making contexts.

Edgework

Historically risk has been studied as something people want to avoid. Subjects will shy away from risky endeavors, and the unknown. This makes sense for the majority of society; however it does exclude several populations. There are many people in the world that play with risk; these people willingly partake in situations where the “edge” is explored. The body of literature documenting these voluntary risk takers is known as

Edgework. The subjects studied include: Sky divers (Wolfe, 1979), rock climbers

(MacAloon, Csikszentmihalyi, 1975) motorcycle riders (Austin, 2010), and substance

abusers Thompson, 1972) are the edgeworkers, and they are motivated by emotional

states derived from participation in risky pursuits. Alpine climbing is a situation where

participants voluntarily place themselves in situations of risk. Climber’s have been

shown to be motivated by the emotional states associated with risk taking (MacAloon,

Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Mitchell, 1983; Simon, 2002; Simon, 2005). 14

One prominent theme in edgework literature is creating an illusion of control, or controlling the uncontrollable. Edgeworkers, or at least those who successfully work the edge have a unique skill set, “…the ability to maintain control over a situation that verges on complete chaos… the ability to avoid being paralyzed by fear, and the capacity to focus one’s attention and actions on what is most crucial for survival” (Lyng, 1990, p.

872). Alpine climbers place themselves in environments with high winds, low visibility, and steep terrain with high consequence. When things begin to go wrong in these situations, they soon spiral out of control. The alpine climber must stay mentally tough, to mitigate risks quickly. The saying, “speed is safety” is prevalent in alpine climbing and applies to the edgeworker in all contexts.

After participating in edgework, the participant often experiences self- actualization. Being free from societal constraints allows those “crowding the edge” to experience their true self (Allman, Mittlestaedt, Martin, Goldenberg, 2009). It is this feeling of discovering the true self that often motivates this population to continue to push risks further and further. Each time the seemingly uncontrolled is controlled edgeworkers feel a sense of mastery and self discovery (Lois, 2005). This is exemplified in an excerpt included in Mitchell’s book “Mountain Experience”,

“You are enmeshed in a bright web of thoughts, on which you climb ever higher, pulling yourself upwards from hand-hold to hand-hold, foot-hold to foot-hold, towards an ever-increasing freedom, while everything below you falls away…” (Mitchell, 1971, p. 67).

All edgeworkers consider themselves calculated risk takers. A member of Lupton and Tulloch’s (2002) study expressed his outlook on risks he encountered as a sailor.

The respondent saw sailing as consisting of some elements one could control and others 15 outside of one’s control. He mentioned how he has “control” over his boat, and his “fate” is in his hands. Brian meticulously prepares his vessel before each outing and educates himself. He maintains the ability to turn around when elements begin to escape his control. He is seeking a risky experience; this is when he feels most challenged and focused to remain safe. In MacAloon and Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) study a participant commented, “No, I don’t consider it [rock climbing] dangerous. The variables are subject to evaluation” (p. 84). This participant had a low perception of risk related to climbing. They believe that the variables which pose a danger can be controlled through observation. An edgeworker does not respect those that become injured by risks that could have been mitigated, they pride themselves as skilled to handle the conditions they face.

The theme of edgeworkers innate survival ability can be seen in Tom Wolfe’s

(1979) test pilot ethnography. When a pilot would crash, members of that group claimed the late participant lacked “the right stuff.” Those navigating the edge believe they possess certain traits allowing them to control situations which others would deem complete chaos (Lyng, 1990). A participant in a study of rock climbers stated, “The right decisions are made, but not rationally. Your mind is shut down and your body just goes.

It’s one of the extremes of human experience” (MacAloon et. al., 1975, p. 87). This touches on a highly debated topic, how people in risky situations should make decisions.

Judgment and Decision Making

There has been much debate in judgment and decision making (JDM) literature, especially in the field of outdoor education. Many advocate a rational decision-making 16 model for the outdoor leader. These models involve analytic thought weighing pros and cons of options, prior to implementing the final decision. A body of research questioning the applicability of rational decision-making is naturalistic decision making (NDM). In

NDM there is time pressure, and consequence, as a result intuition is heavily relied on in the decision making process. In most NDM models the first workable solution is implemented. In the last ten years a body of theory known as dual process has emerged attempting to unify both rational and naturalistic approaches into one theory. In dual process theory automatic processes or intuition are referred to as system 1, slow deliberate analytic thought is referred to as system 2 processes. Despite the emergence of dual process, the following questions remain unanswered: Which cognitive processes result in a better decision automatic intuition, or slow deliberate rational thought? Is a rational process realistic in an outdoor leadership context? When should intuition be trusted?

Rational decision making.

Historically in judgment and decision-making research, experiments occurred in controlled laboratory settings. The most dominant rational decision making theory has been the expected utility theory (EU theory), made famous by Von Neumann and

Morgenstern (1947). The EU theory, and other related variations (prospect theory, subjective utility theory, multi-attribute theory) focus on rational analytic thought. In these theories the decision maker generates several alternatives, and determines which will bring them the greatest benefit. This is often done through a cost benefit analysis scenario. The best option is selected by, “weighting its global expected satisfaction- 17

dissatisfaction with the probabilities that the component consequences will occur and be

experienced (Hastie, 2001, p. 658).”

In many outdoor education texts, rational decision making models are used. One

example of this lies in The Backcountry Classroom, where the decision making process is referred to as, “a series of steps toward making a rational choice (Drury and Bonney,

1992, p. 25).” Drury and Bonney state that, decisions will fall somewhere on a scale that ranges from simple to complex. Based on this model the more complex a decision, the more analytic thought should be involved. Martin, Cashel, Wagstaff, and Breunig (2006) adopt this idea of a continuum between simple and complex decisions. In their text, the decision making process begins by gathering data on situational variables, options will then be evaluated, an option will be chosen, implemented, then reflected upon.

According to Martin et. al., (2006) experience and reflection are key for honing the judgment and decision making process.

Graham (2002) provides another outdoor leadership text offering a rational

model. According to Graham, “Making a decision too soon can be as bad as making one

too late (p.65).” Graham suggests gathering all necessary information before weighing

costs and benefits of options. According to Priest and Gass (2005), “Decision making is

choosing the most probable option from a collection of possible ones (p.280).” This is

another text where a rational model is adopted. There are two major stages in the Priest

and Gass model, a diverging stage and a converging stage. In the diverging stage,

various brainstorming activities are done to create a variety of options. After the

alternatives have been generated, a process of gathering, weeding out, organizing, 18

weighting, and choosing is executed. During the convergence phase, benefits or utilities

are taken into account either quantitatively or qualitatively.

In this debate on rationality vs. intuition, heuristics and biases is an area of research that sides with rationality. The central theme of Heuristics and Biases is fast intuitive decisions will lead to errors. This has been proven in many heuristics and biases studies.

Heuristics & biases.

Heuristics and biases research stems from the work of Herbert Simon (1956) on

“bounded rationality.” Bounded rationality states that it is not possible for humans to be completely rational. There will always be factors introducing bias. The boundaries of rationality have evolved into heuristics and biases. This body of literature believes mistakes will be made from the overuse of system 1 processes. There are many times where seemingly straightforward processes are too complex for system 1. This can be seen simply in the following example:

“A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 699)?

Many intelligent people gave into system 1 processes and did not bother to use system 2 processes to check their fast response. About 50% of Princeton students and 56% of

University of Michigan students answered this question incorrectly saying the ball costs

$0.10. This is one of many examples where expert intuition can fall short. If the ball cost $0.10 the bat must cost $1.10, and combined they would equal $1.20. The correct answer is easily seen when system 2 processes are used. The ball costs $0.05 the bat costs $1.05, and combined they equal $1.10. 19

In the field of adventure recreation, one well known and respected heuristics study can be found in avalanche education literature. This is the work of McCammon

(2003). In McCammon’s studies he identified six heuristic traps, from reviewing an extensive sample of avalanche incident reports (n= 715). McCammon defines a heuristic trap as, “When a rule of thumb gives us a grossly inaccurate perception of a hazard, we fall into what is known as a heuristic trap (McCammon, 2003, p, 1).” The traps identified are: Familiarity, consistency, acceptance, the expert halo, social facilitation, and scarcity.

In his study, familiarity was assessed by levels of exposure groups allowed for in familiar versus unfamiliar terrain. In 211 of the cases an accident occurred when groups had a lower perception of risk due to traveling in familiar areas. The second trap is consistency, in 235 cases groups with a high commitment to skiing a slope were caught in an avalanche. The consistency heuristic comes into play when original assumptions are maintained despite new information that comes to light. Acceptance heuristic is the third trap identified. This was shown by increased incidents when members were motivated to impress others or gain the respect of others in the group. The expert halo heuristic showed that groups with a designated leader continually placed themselves at higher levels of exposure. The social facilitation heuristic manifests itself when a member of a group is confident in their abilities. The confident member is likely to voice a liberal stance on safety, and potentially downplay the severity of a situation. The final heuristic identified is scarcity, when people believe a resource is finite, they will likely take higher risks to obtain it. This is found in the avalanche world through the search for untracked powder. Many incidents occur when groups accept a higher level of risk to ski the 20

perfect untracked slope. Almost all avalanche victims in hindsight see many red flags that should have prevented them from traveling on the slope in question.

Many other authors have written about heuristic traps (Clement, 1997; Galloway,

2005; Stremba, 2005). Galloway (2005), discusses several more heuristics. One of which is satisficing. Satisficing is choosing the first option and then implementing that

option. This can lead to poor decision making if there are unforeseen consequences, or if

there is a better option available. This was first proposed by Simon (1957) in his initial

exploration of bounded rationality. Another powerful heuristic trap is DeMinimus, this

occurs when there is emotional attachment to a goal. Information that appeals to this

emotion will be given priority. This is closely related to information accessibility.

Clement, (1997) proposed the ignorance trap; this occurs when someone is simply

unaware of a hazard. If someone is ignorant to a hazard they will not be able to protect

themselves from it. In an article Stremba (2005) authored, the positive outcome trap is

discussed. This occurs when someone believes a positive outcome is more likely than a

negative one. This trap is also known as the “It won’t happen to me” trap. These

heuristics place limits on a human’s ability to be fully rational or unbiased.

Much of the outdoor leadership JDM literature focuses on teaching aspiring

outdoor leaders the various heuristic traps they may face. A lot of this literature is based

on the concept of awareness. If a person is aware of a common trap they will be less

likely to become a victim of it. Common themes in heuristic traps include, group think

(Clement, 1997), and inaccurate situation awareness from familiarity, commitment, or

social proof (Galloway, 2005). Stremba (2005) suggests when teaching students about 21 decision making in high-risk environments asking the following three questions may lower the risk of heuristics:

(1)What human and environmental hazards are present, and how dangerous is this situation for the group? (2) Which decision making traps might be present, and what unconscious factors might obscure your ability to see the hazards? (3) How do the hazards and the decision-making traps combine to suggest the best decision in this situation with this group at this time (p.129)?

Although education of possible heuristics may aid in the avoidance of decision- making traps, brainstorming heuristics is only so useful without testing. Also strings of questions to find out what bias one may possess has limited applicability in the naturalistic context of outdoor leadership. Much time and energy has been spent brainstorming heuristic traps and ways to avoid them; unless the decision making process is broken down, and heuristics are tested, the field of adventure recreation will be left with a motley crew of untested heuristics.

While rational decision making models are simple, and easy to understand, many have criticized rational models as unrealistic (Klein, 1989; Kosseff, 2003; Galloway,

2005, 2007). One main area of study criticizing rational models is naturalistic decision making. These studies focus on situations with time pressure, and unstable environments, conditions often found in adventure recreation.

Naturalistic decision making.

The initial naturalistic decision making (NDM) research conducted by Gary Klein

(1989) were the first judgment and decision making studies to look outside of the laboratory. The introduction of NDM was instrumental; the research went against a large amount of previous research based on “rational” decision making (e.g. expected utility 22

theory, multi-attribute utility theory, prospect theory). In NDM, much of the JDM process relies on previous experience and reflecting to similar experiences. The decision maker relies heavily on intuition in naturalistic decision making. NDM is a dynamic process in which there is not one decision point, “It continually evolves as new information comes to light” (Warwick & Hutton, 2007, p.432). In NDM the subject is generally finding the fastest workable solution, not acquiring information and making a rational choice between two options.

In Klein’s (1989) study, he looked to a population of fire ground commanders and asked how they make decisions. The results from this study showed that instead of fire commanders evaluating options analytically, they implemented the first workable solution. This workable solution was generated from automatic pattern matching, or intuition. The participant would recognize situational cues, and match these cues with past experiences. Although these decisions were not made rationally, they were consistently accurate.

Naturalistic decision making (NDM) looks at intuition in a positive light and has been widely accepted and used in real world applications since its introduction in 1989

(Zsambok, 1997). According to Klein (2008), “A major contribution of the naturalistic decision making community has been to describe how people actually make decisions in real-world settings” (p. 456). NDM has been used in JDM research for populations such as fire fighters, police, nuclear power plant workers, pilots, and the armed forces (Klein,

2008). According to Zsambok (1997) a method can be considered NDM if it meets four criteria: 23

The method focuses on 1) Experienced agents, working in complex, uncertain conditions, who face (2) personal consequences for their actions. The method (3) tries to describe rather than prescribe, and (4) it addresses situation awareness and problem solving as a part of the decision making process (p.5).

An example of an outdoor leadership text in support of naturalistic decision

making can be found from Kosseff (2003). In this text he points out that it is often not

possible to use analytic models for decision making in outdoor leadership. Kosseff

suggests outdoor leaders should be exposed to NDM techniques:

Often, especially in crisis situations, you will have insufficient time to gather all the necessary information. Many decision-making models presume all the necessary information is available. Outdoor leaders must have a high tolerance for ambiguity and be comfortable making decisions based on less-than-complete knowledge (p. 114).

In Kosseff’s text he also presents a rational decision making model. He suggests

that a rational model may be useful when a leader is consulting the entire group to make a

democratic decision. However, when a leader is making crisis type decisions

independently Kosseff (2003) argues it is unlikely and unrealistic that this individual will

be able to rationally choose between several options, due to time pressure.

Another outdoor recreation researcher with a similar view is Stephen Guthrie

(1996). He believes that in order to make good decisions an outdoor leader needs to

develop and use tacit knowledge. This is knowledge that experts in a certain field will

have. This differs from intuition as is seen in most NDM models. Tacit knowledge

refers to abilities in skill or perception that a group of experts have. Such as the ability to read rapids on a river, or determine why someone continually falls down while skiing.

Guthrie says that development of tacit knowledge will allow for a faster decision making process. Issues and solutions are easily seen to the expert with tacit knowledge. 24

Most naturalistic decision making models currently employ dual process theory.

In many NDM models system 2 (rational) processes monitor system 1 (intuition) to

reduce errors (e.g. model of cognitive control, and recognition primed decision making)

(Klein, 2008). However, the first workable solution is implemented in the above models.

NDM relies mostly on system 1 thought to find a workable solution.

A conducted by Boyes O’Hare (2003) focuses on situation awareness. Accurate situation awareness is a key for safety in the outdoors. Situation awareness is also a key component in naturalistic decision making models (Means, et. al., 1993). This study looked to a group of highly experienced outdoor leaders familiar with their area of operation. Findings from this study showed individuals made use of environmental or behavioral cues to determine whether action should be taken. At this time one possible course of action would be generated. This course of action was then evaluated based on associated benefits and consequences. After one scenario was thought through another possible course of action was generated. This decision making strategy uses a dual process approach as well. The recognition of cues falls into system 1 processes. The process of thinking through potential consequences and benefits as well as generating other alternatives falls into system 2. If there was more time pressure involved less alternatives would have been generated and likely the first workable solution would have been implemented. These findings line up with Klein’s work with recognition primed decision making (1989).

Galloway (2007) looked at a population of outdoor leaders and explored their decision making in an outdoor medicine context. JDM in this study was discussed in 25

terms of analytic vs. intuition, they were juxtaposed, not looked at together. Galloway is

an advocate of NDM and believes that the ultimate goal is to promote the use of

naturalistic techniques in our leaders. The findings suggest that novice decision-making involves more structural and procedural aspects of the task (Galloway, 2007). These novices are without experience and tacit knowledge to draw on so they are forced to slowly and analytically make decisions.

So do people make decisions analytically, or automatically? Which results in the best decision? According to dual process theory people use both intuition and analytic processes to make decisions. This is a growing area of study. Judgment and decision making is often framed in terms of dual process (Klein, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Evans,

2008; Martin et. Al., 2009). Dual process theories take both automatic unconscious processes (system 1) as well as slower sequential rule based thought (system 2) into account.

Dual process.

When both automatic and deliberate thought are used the term “dual-process approach” is applied. In dual-process approaches rational, or more rule based thought, and intuition work together to make a decision. To analyze dual process approaches,

Stanovich and West (2000) developed a classification of the intuitive and rational cognitive processes labeled System 1 and System 2 respectively. System 1 approaches are described as automatic, effortless, and largely unconscious. “System 2 approaches are rule-based, analytic, and slow cognitive processes requiring effort” (Stanovich &

West, 2000, p. 659). Intuitive has been defined as, “applied to judgments that directly 26

reflect impressions, they are not modified by system 2” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 699).

According to Evans (2008), consciousness is foundational in dual process theories.

Consciousness is often thought of in terms of a working memory. “System 2 thinking

requires access to a central working memory system of limited capacity whereas system 1

does not. What we are aware of at a given time is represented in this working memory,

through which conscious thinking flows in a sequential manner” (Evans, 2008, p. 259).

Since system 2 is tied to conscious thought, and a working memory, system 2 is logically

a slow sequential process.

In the cognitive continuum theory (Hammond, 1993), intuition is placed on one

end of the continuum and analytical thought is placed on the other. In this theory the

decision making process will land somewhere on the continuum. Hammond studied

highway engineers to determine what conditions catered to the intuitive end of the

continuum. He found the more cues available, the shorter the time span, and the stronger

the relationship between cues and criteria, the more intuitive the decision. When longer

periods of time were available, with objectively measureable cues that were less reliable a

more analytic rule based decision was made. A study of avalanche forecasters (Adams,

2005) found similar results. The main factors influencing the use of intuitive versus

analytic thought were time and uncertainty. According to Adams:

When avalanche forecasting (e.g. office based morning meetings), these experts had more time and information resources available, and used analysis as their primary mode of decision making. While in high-stakes, time pressured field decisions, intuitive processes prevailed (2005, p. 8).

Martin et al. (2009) looked to a group of novice outdoor leaders to examine their decision making process. Martin et al. (2009) also placed intuition and analytic thought 27

on a continuum. Saying that a decision will fall somewhere between intuition and

analytic thought based on the situation. The results from this study lined up with

Hammond’s cognitive continuum theory. These participants were new to leadership roles

in a naturalistic environment. Students mostly used rational decision making strategies.

Martin’s study also went on to look at variables that influence decisions of the outdoor leader. The findings suggest levels of group cohesion have a greater effect on the novice decision maker compared to the expert as seen in Galloway (2007). This may be attributed to relatively high levels of confidence associated with experts compared to novices.

Dual process theory shows us that people often use both intuitive and rational thought inside of one decision. The question still remains, when should we rely on our intuition and when should we use system 2? Recently Klein and Kahneman joined forces to attempt to answer this question. They believe the answer depends on the validity of the environment one is working in.

Validity of environment.

In order to make decisions quickly from pattern matching and recognition there

must be a base of experiences to draw from. Although there is disagreement among those

students of heuristics and biases and those of NDM, both sides agree there are times

where expert intuition is exceptional and times where it is extremely unexceptional. The

question arises, when can expert intuition be trusted? Simon (1992) proposed we think

about intuition in the following light, “The situation has provided a cue: This cue has

given the expert access to information stored in memory, and the information provides 28 the answer. Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition” (p. 155).

Means, Salas, Crandall, and Jacobs (1993) suggest an expert’s ability to chunk information together aids in pattern recognition. Experts in contexts like chess are able to see the important pieces of the puzzle and ignore the insignificant ones.

Both sides agree the idea of valid cues in an environment and a chance to learn these valid cues will make intuition more reliable (Kahneman, Klein, 2009). For example recognition primed decision making has been applied to fire ground commanders and chess masters. In both of these expert populations the participants in question have had time to see the valid cues. There are many visual cues for an expert fire fighter to know when a building is about to collapse. Just as there are many cues a chess master will see before his/her queen is in jeopardy. Intuition in the above cases is referred to as skill intuition, and is found to be highly accurate. Professionals in unstable environments, with fairly low validity often become overconfident from correct judgments made by chance. If an outcome is determined by chance, inaccurate feedback is obtained through a non-event. This increases confidence, and creates an illusion of control when control is not present. One example of this may be stockbrokers. Most people would trust the intuition of a veteran nurse about a sick child, before they would trust the intuition of a stockbroker on where to place money. The outdoor environment is one of high and low validity. For example, serac (freestanding tower of glacial ice) fall is often unpredictable and follows little pattern in many areas. It is difficult to judge this hazard unless very warm temperatures are present. Higher validity hazards can include, rock fall, avalanche, and electrical storms. Most would trust an avalanche expert’s intuition regarding the 29

stability of a slope, before a guide’s intuition about ice fall. This is because there are

many more valid cues associated with avalanche.

As mentioned previously edgeworkers claim an innate ability to act effectively in the face of risk. According to Lyng (1990) “They find support for this belief in the instinct-like character of edgework, the fact that the people respond automatically without thinking” (p. 859). A participant from Lyng and Snow (1986) recalled his experience of a parachute malfunction, “I wasn’t thinking at all, I just did what I had to do. It was the right thing to do too. And after it was over, I felt really alive and pure” (Lyng, 1990, p.

860). Intuition literature would say that this skydiver has intimate knowledge of the activity and recognized cues which immediately triggered a response. Since this skydiver was conditioned to the activity, he was able to understand what was happening and immediately recall from his training what needed to happen. This account lines up with characteristics of system 1 processes mentioned above. In this case the first workable solution was the best, and there was no time for analytic rule based thought. Edgework literature alludes that the sky diver survived based on innate survival abilities. It may be a mix of the two. In order to learn more about the JDM process of climbers in the high risk pursuit of alpine climbing this study used the model of goal directed behavior to further understand how decisions were motivated.

Model of Goal Directed Behavior

The model of goal directed behavior (MGB) was created in an attempt to further understand motivators in the judgment and decision making process. Introduced by

Perungini (2001), the model of goal directed behavior is based on the widely accepted 30

theory of planned behavior (see figure 1). The Theory of Planned Behavior was

introduced by Ajzen (1991) and is a predictive behavior model from social psychology.

The theory states that one’s behavior is determined by attitude, subjective norm, and

perceived behavioral control. These three factors will motivate an intention to complete a

given behavior. MGB adds to the theory of planned behavior with several new factors:

Anticipated emotions, desires, frequency of past behavior, and recency of past behavior.

Anticipated emotions were included to incorporate the decisions made based on goal

directed situations that take into account emotional consequences of achieving and/or

failing. Perungini explicitly states that this model is not meant to discredit or replace the

theory of planned behavior. MGB is simply a model deepening the theory of planned

behavior to make findings significant in more scenarios. From the studies conducted

(Perungini, Bagozzi, 2001; Taylor, 2005; Taylor, Bagozzi, Gaither, 2005; ect.), MGB is

best applied in decision making where behaviors are performed to attain a specific goal.

When a behavior is preformed with no larger goal in mind, the theory of planned

behavior and MGB are expected to account for the same amount of variance. However

when an action is taken as part of a larger goal, MGB accounts for more variance, and is potentially a better tool for understanding the judgment and decision making process

(JDM) (Perungini, Bagozzi, 2001). Alpine climbing is a goal directed activity. All the individual actions taken are done in an attempt to complete the larger goal, which is often reaching the summit. 31

Figure 1: (Perungini, Bagozzi, 2001, p. 80)

Attitudes

The use of attitude and beliefs in MGB is based heavily on the attitude/belief

(AB) scales research conducted in the early 1960’s (Fishbein & Raven, 1962). The focus of the study was to further define and separate attitude and beliefs. Attitudes were defined as evaluative dimensions of a concept. Is the concept positive or negative?

Belief was defined as the probability of a concept’s existence. Is the concept likely to exist? In later research Fishbein described how beliefs and attitudes are linked: “A person’s attitude toward any object, issue, behavior or event is determined by his salient beliefs linking the object to various attributes, and by his evaluations of those attributes”

(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 235). These findings are foundational in MGB’s definition 32

and uses of attitudes and beliefs. In climbing many have pre-existing attitudes toward areas, routes, and styles. For example, someone may have the attitude that climbs in a certain area should always be done in a single day push. They will likely intend to perform the climb in a single day, even if other factors suggest bringing additional equipment to spend a night out. This is similar to the consistency trap, when an attitude or assessment is believed to be true despite new information.

Subjective Norm

The second variable used in MGB is subjective norm. Subjective norm refers to perceived pressures the subject experiences from different referent groups. This construct will affect motives leading to the end behavior based on several factors. First, how influential are the referents to the subject? Second, what is the subject’s opinion of the referents? How many referent groups are there? Do their views conflict? What are the effects of following or going against theses norms society has imposed? It is both situation and person dependent on whether attitudes/beliefs or subjective norms will be the primary motivator, but they are often interrelated (Fishbein, Ajzen, 1975). Climbers are a tightly knit group with strong opinions about how things should be done and why.

Fellow climbers act as strong referents in influencing behaviors. This can range from reactions to style of ascent, to a climber being disappointed in a partner’s sub-par performance on a climb. A climber is likely to be influenced heavily by the desire and intention to impress rather than disappoint friends and community. This often becomes a motivator to push one’s limits and therefore increases the chance for error due to clouded 33

judgment from extrinsic factors. This can be seen in McCammon’s (2004) acceptance

heuristic.

Perceived behavioral control (PBC)

Perceived behavioral control is the third variable and has both external and internal components. An example of an internal component is if a climb is above your ability level, you will have much difficulty completing it and will most likely fail. Often this will change your intention and you will look for a new route. External factors include unpredictable weather, or sections of your route prone to icefall. These are factors that add to your uncertainty in likelihood of goal completion.

PBC has attracted a lot of attention since its inclusion because it is often the highest predictor of intention (Ajzen, 1991). Currently most are measuring PBC as a two-dimensional concept. This can be seen in Taylor’s study (2007) where he divides

PBC into perceived difficulty and perceived control. (Taylor, 2007). Perceived difficulty asks the participant how easy or difficult they perceive completing the task at hand to be.

Perceived control asks the participant how easy or difficult they perceive partaking in the

task at hand. In climbing, difficulty would be assessed by asking, “If you approached this

climb on a perfect day in prime conditions how easy or difficult would you perceive the

climb?” The factor of controllability would be assessed by, “This area is notorious for

poor weather and avalanche hazard; how likely will it be that you will approach this

climb when it is in safe climbing condition?” Difficulty addresses internal factors and

controllability assesses external factors. 34

Anticipated emotions

Anticipated emotions (AE’s) differ from attitudes toward an action as seen in the theory of planned behavior and MGB. Attitudes toward a behavior or action focus on what one can do and the opinions of that action. Anticipated emotions are created when one looks toward an end goal and looks to how success or failure will affect them emotionally. Attitudes are often predetermined, and are hard to change; AE’s will change for each situation, and each goal. Emotions are large motivators, especially when they are strong (Kahneman, 2003). Successes and failures in major events will cause

emotions to run high. People will do anything in their control to avoid negative emotions.

According to heuristics and biases JDM literature, “The hot states of high emotional and

motivational arousal greatly increase the accessibility of thoughts that relate to the

immediate emotion and current needs, as well as reducing the accessibility of other

thoughts.” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 701). This is also closely related to Galloway’s (2005)

deminimus heuristic. Many of the infamous catastrophic accidents have occurred as a

result of anticipated positive emotions from the goal of summiting, or completion of a

climb (i.e. 1996 Everest disaster).

Past behavior

The second factor added to MGB from the theory of planned behavior is recency

of past behavior and frequency of past behavior. This hopes to account for habit behavior

and reflecting back on past experiences to form intentions. In 2002, Ajzen commented

on this idea of past behavior, as related to habituation to an activity. According to Ajzen

(2002), when attitudes and intentions are strong, prior behavior will most likely not have 35 much of an influence over future behavior. When attitudes are not completely developed or people feel indifferent toward a certain activity, empirical evidence has shown past behavior is a valid predictor of future behavior (Oullette & Wood, 1998).

Past behavior is necessary for pattern recognition. Pattern recognition is a prevalent idea in NDM literature in system 1 processes. In expert decision making, intuition often plays a large role in theoretical and conceptual work (Klein, 2008; Reyna,

1998; Kahneman, 2003). In some NDM models (i.e. fuzzy trace and recognition primed decision making) recognizing similarities between the current problem and past problems is the first step of decision making. A meta-analysis from Ouellette and Wood of 64 studies suggests that previous behavior is instrumental in influencing intentions and future behavior (Ouellette & Wood, 1998). In alpine climbing, climbers often reflect to past behavior. Reflecting on past behaviors, can aid in the recognition of hazards and therefore facilitate hazard avoidance for alpine climbers. However past behavior can lead us to the heuristic trap identified by McCammon (2004), known as familiarity heuristic, where climbers perceive less risk in areas they are familiar with.

MGB IN JDM

Taylor (2007, 2005) provided two interesting studies; in which he applied MGB directly to judgment and decision making. MGB is the first behavior model to incorporate a variable for emotions. In these studies, Taylor used MGB to predict and understand the behavior of gathering information to make an informed decision (2007), as well as the decision to self-regulate hypertension (2005). Taylor (2007) used this model to incorporate/account for emotions in JDM. In the two studies Taylor used 36

rational decision making methods. He specifically discussed utility theory. The utility

theory says the subject will be presented with options and they will pick the one that they

expect to benefit them the most (Moser, 1990). Taylor used the variables of MGB to

further explore the information gathering process to make an informed choice. In the

discussion of Taylor’s results he states, “The findings first generally support the MGB as

a significant step forward in attitude models, particularly in terms of adding affect to

models of JDM” (Taylor, 2007, p. 756). Taylor used MGB to look at a decision making

process and answer why decisions are made.

There were several limitations to Taylor’s (2005; 2007) studies. The most

prominent of which was the method of data analysis. Measuring statistical significance

with reliability (R2) for attitude models, has been called into question (Trafimow, 2004).

It is believed that in the case of MGB adding variables to the model that R2 may not

accurately explain the results. Trafimow (2004) states that a change in R2 due to an

addition of variables does not always mean a better model. He instead calls for researchers to look for unique variance. This accounts for variance that would not be addressed by another already included variable. Trafimow states:

Because many predictor variables are correlated with each other, researchers have been faced with the problem of deciding which of them should be credited with variance in the criterion variable that they share…. Because there is no clear way to make this decision, researchers have chosen instead to talk about ‘unique’ variance in the criterion variable that can be attributed to particular predictor variables. The idea is to show that, even after crediting all shared variance to the other predictor variables, the predictor variable that is being touted by the researcher nevertheless accounts for an important amount of unique variance in the criterion variable (2004, p. 515)

This suggests that MGB may not add as much variance as is claimed. It also suggests

MGB’s variables may have overlap, and be difficult to separate objectively.

The model of goal directed behavior was created to better explain behaviors involving JDM (Perungini, et al., 2001) and has been applied to rational JDM (Taylor,

2007). This was done to further explain why behaviors are done in the JDM process.

Since MGB incorporates variables such as past behavior (often viewed in regards to intuition), and anticipated emotions (emotions limit our ability to be rational), the researcher believes the model may be better applied to a dual process context like naturalistic decision making, as opposed to rational choice. All of the studies that have used the model of goal directed behavior have been quantitative, and looked at rational processes. The processes explored are not naturalistic in nature. They are linear and relatively straightforward, when compared to decisions made alpine climbing.

Conclusion

Alpine climbing is a high risk activity that is growing in popularity (The Outdoor

Foundation, 2009). The activity entails traveling with minimal equipment to often remote areas, in an attempt to successfully climb technical terrain. Many accidents/deaths have occurred, even among climbing’s most elite. Given the severe consequences that a lapse in judgment may have in alpine climbing, the issue of errors in judgment and decision making (JDM) must be explored to find what trends exist, in an attempt to increase awareness and lower accident rates. Naturalistic decision making, 38

may provide an effective framework from which to explore JDM among alpine climbers.

This method lends itself to alpine climbing due to its real world application, dynamic

nature, and its ability to describe decision making in stressful and risky situations.

Naturalistic decision making attempts to describe how decisions are made in real

life. This still leaves the question of why decisions are made. The model of goal directed behavior (MGB) attempts to understand what variables influence end behavior. In MGB anticipated emotions, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and past behavior have been shown to significantly predict goal attainment (Taylor, 2005, Taylor,

Bagozzi, Gaither, 2005, Perungini, Bagozzi, 2001). Using these variables we can look deeper into JDM in alpine climbing from a second perspective. Using the variables of

MGB to structure probing questions will facilitate a better understanding of how people make decisions, and ensure that we look at all facets of the issue.

Neither naturalistic decision making nor MGB have been applied to the context of alpine climbing. Also MGB and naturalistic decision making have never been looked at together. In 2007, a study used MGB to further explore a rational JDM (expected utility theory) with success (Taylor, 2007). Using these variables to address a variety of influences may increase understanding of how and why decisions are made among alpine climbers.

Research Expectations

In the research of judgment and decision making among alpine climbers it was expected that trends would emerge around positive decision points and negative decision points. Edgeworker’s are most focused on safety while on the verge of chaos (Lupton, 39

Tolluch, 2002). The researcher expects that accidents will likely occur when risk is

underestimated and the participant is not fully focused on the activity at hand. Alpine climbing requires constant attention and accurate risk assessment; if either of these are not present, accidents will occur. Heuristic trap research also provides us with common examples of decision making traps people fall into because of an inaccurate risk assessment.

A second expectation is the climber will overlook potentially negative conditions if they are emotionally attached to the completion of the objective. This expectation is based on heuristics and biases literature (Kahneman, 2003; McCammon, 2004). This is exemplified in the following quote, “The hot states of high emotional and motivational arousal greatly increase the accessibility of thoughts that relate to the immediate emotion and current needs, as well as reducing the accessibility of other thoughts.” (Kahneman,

2003, p. 701). The DeMinimus heuristic identified by Galloway (2005) also shows participants overlook cues when highly committed to an objective.

A third expectation was the Model of Goal Directed Behavior would provide a theoretical model appropriate to dissect judgment and decision making in a dual process context. This expectation is based on the work done by Taylor (2005, 2007). He successfully applied MGB to a rational decision making theory (Expected utility theory).

Since the model of goal directed behavior incorporates anticipated emotions, it is the researchers belief the model will account for limits in human rationality, as seen in heuristics and biases literature. The variable of past behavior will allow a look at pattern recognition and validity of environment, concepts foundational to naturalistic decision 40 making. MGB is expected to take both conscious and unconscious cognitive processes into account.

The researcher had the three following expectations prior to conducting research:

-Underestimation of risk will result in an accident.

-Emotional attachment to a goal will result in an accident.

-The Model of Goal Directed Behavior will provide a framework to look at the

JDM process in alpine climbers.

CHAPTER 3: METHOD

To explore the judgment and decision making process among alpine climbers the researcher looked through a naturalistic decision making lens. Cognitive task analysis, more specifically the critical decision method was used to ask climbers: “What is the closest call you have had, or perhaps an accident you or your partner were involved in while alpine climbing?” After this question was asked, the participant told their story from beginning to end. A timeline was constructed identifying all times where multiple courses of action existed, or a deliberate decision was made. Upon identification of these points, probing questions were asked (See DATA COLLECTION). After this flawed decision making process was examined, the participant was asked to discuss a time where their decision making process was excellent. The same process was followed for the second account.

Site

The tourism industry is a large part of Washington State’s economy. In 2009,

$14.2 billion dollars were spent by visitors in the state. This created 147,000 jobs, as

83% of visitors travel to Washington for leisure. Recreation represents 10% of visitor’s spending. In 2008, 9% said visiting the outdoors was the main purpose of their trip to

Washington, and 11% of all visitors participated in hiking, backpacking, or mountain climbing on their vacation to Washington (Longwood, 2008). Many of these visitors likely would have visited other areas if Washington did not have mountain guide services ready to safely introduce the inexperienced to mountain environments. 42

This research took place in Washington State. There is a concentration of expert alpine climbers in this geographic area. In addition the researcher is a part of this population allowing access to a sample. Based on guides from four major mountain guide services of the Washington State (Mountain Madness, American Alpine Institute,

Alpine Ascents, and Rainier Mountaineering Inc.) basic demographic characteristics of mountain guides were obtained. There is not much diversity in the mountain guide population. After viewing 204 mountain guide profiles, approximately 84% were white males, 11% were white females, and 3% were Latino males. Ages of guides range from

22 to 59, the majority of guides are in their late 20s.

Sample Characteristics

There were 13 participants interviewed, 12 males and 1 female. All participants met the following criteria: (1) Completed over 40 alpine objectives, (2) climbed for over

7 years, (3) have guided technical terrain for at least 2 years, and (4) completed over 10 commitment grade IV routes. The sample aligned with demographics of mountain guides in the North West. All participants either currently guide or have guided in Cascade

Range of Washington State. The interviews resulted in 24 identified decision points. Of these decisions, 13 were poor decisions and 11 were positive decisions. Six and a half hours of audio was captured resulting in 107 pages of transcription. Participant’s age ranged from 24 to 61 years of age. The mean age was 36.6 years of age. The sample has a cumulative 248 years of climbing experience with the mean years of experience at 18.9.

Personal accomplishments of the sample include: Ascents of Mt. Everest without supplemental oxygen, ice climbs rated WI 6, aid climbs rated A5, one day ascents of El 43

Capitan, and numerous alpine first ascents world wide. Guiding accomplishments include major expeditions to every continent, as well as successful guided ascents of each of the seven summits.

Cognitive Task Analysis

A prominent process in naturalistic decision making research is cognitive task analysis (CTA). This often exploratory technique seeks to describe the decision making process. Klein defined CTA as, “methods for capturing expertise and making it available for training and system design” (Klein, 2001, p. 179). This technique is derived from task analysis, and behavioral task analysis; which are used in professional settings to describe the roles of workers, and actions workers take in their job (Gordon & Gill,

1997). Cognitive task analysis therefore explores cognitive processes in completing tasks and diagnosing/solving problems. This technique can be applied to both expert and novice alike, and is often used as a research tool to promote expert processes in professional settings. CTA is appropriate for activities requiring:

(a) The use of a large and complex conceptual knowledge base; (b) the use of complex goal/action structures dependant to a variety of triggering conditions, or (c) complex perceptual learning or pattern recognition (Gordon &Hill, 1997, p.133).

Critical decision method

In CTA there are many different methods used based on what type of information and situation is involved. One method applicable to exploring JDM in alpine climbing is the critical decision method (CDM). This method consists of a semi-structured interview that emphasizes incidents the subject was involved in. It is found that using non-routine incidents can uncover more than running through routine incidents (Hutchins, Pirolli, 44

Card, 2007). Data from this method can be represented in flow diagrams, lists, or

decision tables (Gordon & Gill, 1997, p. 137). Influential NDM models (e.g. Klein’s

recognition primed decision making model) have been created using a CDM approach,

by asking experts how they make decisions under pressure (Klein, Calderwood,

Macgregor, 1989).

CDM uses the following steps: (1) An incident is selected by the subject, (2)

obtain an unstructured incident account, (3) construct and incident timeline, (4) decision

point identification, (5) and decision point probing (Klein, et al., 1989, p. 456). In this

approach it is important that the subject pick a difficult situation that they have

experienced. This allows for reflection on events that actually happened as opposed to

contrived reasoning based on simulation exercises. Once an incident has been decided

upon it is important to allow the subject to run through the incident uninterrupted.

During this time the researcher is making a timeline of the incident and noting all places

where there were several possible courses of action. Finally, probing questions are asked at each decision point to find out why these decisions were made (Klein et. al., 1989, p.466). Examples of probing questions often used can be found in Table 1.

Table 1: CDM Interview Probes (Klein et al, 1989, p. 466).

Probe Type Probe Content Cues What were you hearing, smelling, seeing, feeling? Knowledge What information did you use, how did you obtain it? Analogues Were you reminded of any previous experience? Goals What were your specific goals at this time? What other courses of action were considered by or Options available to you? How did you select or reject this option? What was the Basis motive? Experience What specific training or past experience did you use? If this decision was not best what knowledge or info would Aiding have helped? Time Pressure How much time pressure did you experience? Situation Awareness How would you summarize the situation to a peer? If a key feature was different would it have changed your Hypotheticals decision?

Cognitive task analysis (CTA), specifically CDM has been used recently to look at expert judgment and decision making (JDM) in the avalanche community (Adams,

2005). Through a mixed methods approach (electronic survey, and focus groups) thirty- seven Canadian avalanche professionals participated in the research. From this electronic survey given at the first contact point (T1) prominent themes emerged as foundational elements needed to make solid decisions (experience, knowledge/skills, info relevant to systems of influence). In the second wave of the study, focus groups, decision making modes were identified. These ranged from situation awareness (SA), to pattern recognition. Finally, a JDM model for avalanche professionals was presented. With success seen applying CTA to the avalanche community, it was thought that CTA techniques could be applied effectively to alpine climbers, a population that has not been 46 studied in the context of NDM. CDM is of interest in the study of alpine climbing because its purpose or goal is to describe and understand the decision making process. It does not attempt to determine right or wrong. The process is dynamic and ongoing.

There is not one decision point, but many as the situation evolves.

Participants were selected based on convenience sampling. The researcher asked all people he came in contact with that met the pre-requisites. Of the 20 people the researcher asked 13 had stories to share and agreed to participate.

Data Collection

Interviews were held in informal settings including; participants homes, guide service offices, and the mountains. Interviews began with the researcher telling a story about a close call they encountered and what caused their less than stellar decision making process. This served two purposes. First, it showed the participant an example of the types of incidents the research hopes to explore. Secondly, it showed the participant that the researcher is not claiming perfection. This helped reinforce that the goal of this study was to inform and increase awareness not to place blame.

After this the participant was asked, “What is the closest call you have had, or perhaps an accident you or your partner were involved in?” As discussed above the participant then began telling their story. As the story unfolded a timeline was constructed identifying decision points along the way.

For each decision point decided upon, several probing questions were asked.

These questions addressed the variables from the model of goal directed behavior

(MGB), which have been shown to significantly account for behavior in decision making 47 contexts. In addition to the variables in MGB, other motivators were asked to potentially open the research up beyond any limitations of the model.

The following are probing questions that were selected from at each identified decision point.

What were the options?

Were you reminded of any previous experience?

What specific past training or knowledge did you use?

What knowledge do you wish you had?

What was your attitude toward the objective at this point?

Was there emotional attachment to the objective?

Was there emotional consequence associated with failure or completion of the objective?

Did opinions of others influence you? If so whose opinions?

Did you feel you had the skills, knowledge, and abilities to complete the objective?

Were there external factors lowering your control?

Was anything else playing into your decision?

What was your primary influence in choosing this course of action?

Would you make the same choice again?

Describe your decision making process. Was it fast or slow?

In addition to interviews, data was collected through participant observation. The researcher was an active member in this group during the data collection process. While 48

spending time with this population additional stories and phenomenon were encountered, helping the researcher to better interpret the data.

Data Analysis

The interviews were transcribed through the constant comparison method. This

method entails hand transcription from audio tape. After the transcription process the

researcher began line by line coding. The constant comparison method consists of

reviewing the transcription and identifying themes and trends as they emerge in the data.

Using the constant comparison method allowed for a close intimate relationship between

the data and researcher. This method also allowed the researcher to identify themes as

they repeat through the data. Each interviewee gave two stories one positive and one

negative. The unit of analysis is the story, not the interviewee.

Due to the large amount of previous research in judgment and decision making,

the researcher chose a deductive approach to organize the data. Themes were initially

generated through an inductive process. All but one theme that emerged was identical to

previous heuristic trap research. The results were then analyzed based on these traps.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

The purpose of this study was to explore the decision making process of alpine climbers. Thirteen interviews were conducted discussing climbers best and worst decisions while in alpine terrain. This resulted in 24 identified decision points, with 13 stories depicting poor decisions and 11 exemplifying good decision making.

After employing the constant comparison method to analyze the transcription, it became clear to the researcher that the Model of Goal Directed Behavior could not adequately explain the findings. The themes that emerged upon analyzing the transcription instead aligned with previous heuristic traps identified by: Clement

(Ignorance trap), Galloway (DeMinimus, Satisficing), McCammon (Acceptance trap, familiarity, consistency), and Stremba (Positive outcome trap). Since many heuristic traps have been proposed already, the researcher found it most beneficial to organize the results section around these already identified traps. However, one prominent theme in the data was not found to align with a previously proposed heuristic trap. A new heuristic trap named “partners” is proposed. The researcher looked through a great quantity of heuristic traps, to ensure no unnecessary new traps were created. After a summary of the decision points in this study, the several heuristic traps identified in the data will be explored. In the stories included in this study all names have been changed.

Decisions

Of the decision points discussed by the sample, participants felt 13 were examples of poor decisions, while 11 of the decision points were examples of good decisions. 50

Participants were asked to describe their decision making process (Was it fast or slow?

Did you think through many options? Etc.).

Poor decisions.

In examples of poor decision making 31% of the stories told described a fast or

intuitive thought process. The mistakes were generally made from not understanding the

potential consequences of an action; generally related to a lack of experience. This was

coupled with a high energy when parties were moving quickly. Of decisions identified,

69% explained a slow process, where options were analyzed and discussed on either an

inter or intra person level. The mistakes in four of these cases resulted from emotional

attachment, which limited the participant’s ability to process information. In three of

these cases, the participant’s belief an area was benign led to an underestimation of risk.

Positive decisions.

From the positive decisions discussed 27% used a fast intuitive process. In these

three cases each participant described a reflection to past experience, and immediately

knew what needed to be done. This aligns with research on accurate pattern matching

from skill intuition (Klein, Kahneman, 2009). In 73% of the cases a rational process was

described. In these cases participants accurately interpreted available information and

determined the best course of action. This often involved talking with other people, and

gathering outside information. Of the eight good decisions that were made rationally,

only one participant had emotional attachment to the objective. A quote from Seth

discussing his decisions both good and bad summarizes many of the decision points to be

reviewed in this study. 51

I think with all these judgments on a micro or macro scale, when things went well it was when I was true to my instincts. And true to the details and information that was there. It was when I allowed ulterior motives, and I wasn’t true to myself, or what I saw that problems occurred.

The poor decisions discussed in the heuristic traps below show times where participants were not true to the information present. The positive decisions included below show times where participants overcame pressures and were true to the information available to them.

Heuristic traps

After reviewing transcriptions, and employing the constant comparison method,

the emerging trends in this study paralleled heuristic traps research (McCammon, 2001;

Galloway, 2005; Clement, 1997). Examples of good decision making in this study

provide real life examples of how some of these heuristic traps can be avoided. The

previously identified heuristics are: (1)acceptance, (2)familiarity, (3)ignorance trap,

(4)consistency, (5)DeMinimus, (6)positive outcome trap, and (7)satisficing. One

previously unidentified heuristic found in this study is (8) partners.

Acceptance.

The acceptance heuristic (McCammon, 2001) manifests itself when an individual acts in a way they feel will make them accepted by the group. This often shows itself in climbing when a person is contemplating a summit attempt. This heuristic effected mountain guides looking for acceptance from other guides, and their clients. It has also effected non-guided groups, when climbers looked to be accepted by their peers. The

acceptance heuristic was often revealed as a motivator when the researcher asked probing 52

questions regarding subjective norms. For example, “Did anyone have an influence on

your decision that was with you that day?”

Mountain guides often highly respect co-workers. They sit together and sip warm drinks, discuss weather, route conditions, clients, and hazards of the day; they confide in one another. Many times on commonly guided routes, there will be multiple guided parties planning to summit on the same day. When one guide is going to summit with his group, it is hard to justify why you are not going to as well. This can be seen in the example below where Pat felt pressure to guide a mountain.

Victims of the acceptance trap

Pat was a young guide on Denali, the highest peak in North America. There were three other guided groups with the same itinerary as Pat. They were all waiting out low pressure, and talking to one another about conditions, and when to make the summit push. Pat commented on how this impacted his decision to climb the peak:

Another factor, the fact that we were with a huge group of highly experienced guides. That was big, and pushed us into going up. We had safety in numbers, which gives you some security, or at least perceived security. Also, George was going up, who has done 12 Denali expeditions. So, it was like if George is doing it, I better do it.

Pat felt pressured to guide the mountain because experienced guides were going to

attempt a summit push with their clients. Pat comments further on his decision to push

for the summit despite threatening weather.

We are guides. We get paid to bring people up and down the mountain. You try to have that not be a decision maker, but it is there for me at least. You get the typical ‘Into Thin Air’ shit, where you are risking things because you are getting paid.

Cody had a similar experience when a guide ventured past him up the final summit pyramid in high winds, cold temperatures, mixed precipitation, and low visibility.

He was guiding a peak in the North Cascades with three clients.

At that point, the weather took a pretty serious turn for the worse, we were pretty high up on the ridge, and winds were much more extreme than on the north side of the mountain. The visibility was also much worse.

The route Cody was guiding involves crossing three glaciers, and ascending 1,400 vertical feet of technical rock climbing terrain. Below the summit pyramid, another guided party was seen for the first time.

We had never seen the other guided party until then. We ran into them, [and] I asked if they were going for the summit. The response I got was they decided to ‘go for it.’

At that point Cody felt pressured to summit:

I saw someone else go for it in those crappy conditions I kinda went for it at that point. I felt obligated to do it. Our goal was to climb the mountain. They did it; now we need to do it.

Cody had a high respect for the guide (Jim) who was continuing on.

So Jim was guiding 1:1 [one guide with one client] and he is a super solid guide. I think I let his decision enter into my decision making. I knew he was strong. I know he is well trained. I know he is just real solid in the mountains. I felt like his decision was maybe a good one. Moving with one client, Jim was able to move much faster through technical terrain. Cody had to move three clients through the same terrain, which takes much longer. The storm built over time, and Cody’s team faced an epic 21-hours in harsh mountain conditions. When asked about his decision to continue to the summit Cody answered: 54

It was quick; it wasn’t much of a decision. It was just go. I didn’t put enough thought into that decision. Like how much more time it would take to move three clients up the summit pyramid and down the route. The acceptance heuristic was also seen in groups composed of young members.

In three similar cases these non-guided groups of young climbers had a higher tolerance

for risk. One of these cases will be explored: Tim was in the Canadian Rockies, and

excited to complete a route on Mt. Athabasca. Tim and his group began the route despite

high avalanche conditions.

We were super psyched, and very young, two lethal combined factors. We were fired up in only the way 18 year olds from Tennessee can be fired up. We were head strong and ready to get after it.

Tim mentioned that everyone knew the situation they were in was dangerous, but no one wanted to be the person that spoke up and turned everyone around.

So we were all pretty young and none of us wanted to be the conservative one putting a damper on the experience. We were all fired up to get up there, get to the top and go mountaineering. So there was the human factor, no one wanted to be that guy. All of us knew in the back of our minds, hey snow conditions are kind of funky and maybe this is not a great idea, but none of us wanted to be that person.

As they continued, an avalanche was triggered on low angle terrain. Had it been

triggered higher up on a steeper slope they all would have been buried. After this event

they all turned around and “snuck” off the mountain.

That decision [to turn around] was made for us. We almost got taken out. It was apparent that it was a couloir with a lot of snow. It would act as a terrain trap. We had enough knowledge to know it was bad, and we had just gotten lucky. We decided we didn’t want to be on that mountain. We felt like we had just been spared.

The acceptance heuristic often led to poor decisions in this study. However, the next two examples show guides battling with and overcoming the pressure of acceptance.

They were able to control the pressure from clients by speaking to other groups and referring to personal rules of safety they uphold.

Overcoming acceptance trap.

Having rules in place and staying true to those rules showed to be a catalyst for

good decision making. Jim’s story exemplifies how reflection to his rules ensured the

safety of himself and his clients.

Jim was feeling pressured to summit with his clients.

They had attempted this mountain three other times on their own, and this was their fourth time. So they really wanted to get to the top, and I really wanted to get them there.

While nearing the summit he began feeling nervous about poor snow conditions on an

exposed ridge. He was making his decision to continue or turn back as a party climbed

past him.

I feel the pressure like here we are, these people (Jim’s clients) want to go up, other people are going to the top, but I want to go down because it is really sketchy.

Other climbers were moving past him on the summit ridge. Snow conditions

were poor and numerous point release avalanches were moving down the face. Another

climber interacted with Jim providing validation to his fears.

One of the four [other climbers] who climbed the Price [another route on the mountain] also decided the whole situation was fucked, and he is one of the leaders of the group. He was an ex-Outward [Bound] instructor. He had worked for them for like seven years, and it sounded like he had climbed a whole bunch 56

of stuff. He thought the situation was messed up, and I made the decision and started lowering my clients and let him rappel on my lines.

This climber voiced the same fears Jim had, providing validation to his concerns. Jim was

150 feet away from the summit when he made his decision to turn around.

We were at the moment of commitment, where you know you are in harms way. Especially in the guiding world, I feel like I can keep a certain amount of safety. Obviously there is always some danger in climbing, but there is a gray area you try not to go into. But I felt like I was going to a place where I no longer had control of their safety. I always tell clients ‘If you are on a rope with me you know you are safe. You can fall at any time and it will be alright’. I no longer felt that was the case. So my only choice was to go down.

Although Jim felt pressure from his clients to reach the summit, and others were climbing past him to the top, he knew there was not an appropriate amount of security. He realized he could not insure the safety of his clients if they continued.

Max also had a rule that no objective is worth the risk of injury. This rule was formed after several close calls, and a friend’s death. He would not climb committing objectives when there was a chance of storms or high avalanche danger. Because of this,

Max did not guide the north face of a 7,000 meter peak in Russia, despite relentless pressure from a client.

He [the client] told his coworkers he was going to climb this peak, and he wasn’t going to come home until he was successful. So I had to deal with pressure from him. Essentially he was saying that he should have gotten another guide and I didn’t know what I was doing. He said I didn’t know the mountain well enough and he couldn’t understand why we weren’t going.

A neighboring peak’s north face released a massive climax avalanche killing 53 people days earlier. Max spoke with some local guides and based his decision on the 57

information he gained. Similar to Jim, others provided validation to his concerns. Once

Max realized the danger, he stayed true to his rule that no objective was worth injury.

So, basically I conferred with the Russians and they felt like it was crazy to go up on the mountain. These Russians I conferred with were all friends of mine and I had done a bunch of personal climbing with them before. So I trusted their judgment. It was kind of slam dunk for me once I knew what conditions were like, and the risk of a catastrophic event if we stepped on that face. No one was going anywhere near it.

Max had the attitude that climbing was not worth death. He explained why he did not consider guiding this face once he knew the conditions:

I had kind of reached a point in my climbing and guiding career where there was no objective worth risking my life for and certainly no objective worth risking a client’s life for… So looking at it from that perspective climbing is a great thing but in the bigger scheme of things it is not essential. Climbing is not worth getting you or your friends killed over. Enjoy it but don’t make it out to be more than it is.

Even though Max struggled with the pressure from a high profile client, he remained true

to what he felt was right. Making rules and staying true to your rules of safety can help

mitigate the heuristic trap of acceptance. When climbers had others around them with

sound judgment this facilitated hazard recognition, and good decisions.

Familiarity.

When climbers perceived less risk in areas they have been to many times before

the familiarity heuristic (McCammon, 2001) is encountered. Guides often lead trips to

the same mountain many times. After summiting a mountain with clients a dozen times it

is easy to become overconfident on these “trade routes.” When participants were asked

about past behavior, such as, “How many times had you climbed this route? Did that 58

have an impact on your decision?” The familiarity heuristic became an obvious influence

on participants decision making process.

In the excerpt below Cody explained how his familiarity with the route impacted

his decisions.

I felt pretty confident with the route finding, because I had done the route before. I had climbed the mountain several times… Being able to navigate in totally bad white out conditions. This was a route that I knew well. That had distinct landmarks. I think that, and then knowing I had made it up there so many times, I had that going for me. Just familiarity of the route, I had done it before.

This excerpt is from the same story found in the “acceptance” section. In addition to watching another guide bring his client to the summit, Cody’s familiarity with the climb made him feel more comfortable with the task at hand. He felt confident climbing the route in white out conditions.

Taking higher risk in familiar terrain can be seen again from Henry who ventured into an area he was highly familiar with, during high avalanche conditions.

I go to that section of the Wasatch front 20 times a year. It is close to where I live. I had been there several times in high avalanche danger. That day was particularly bad. I didn’t realize how bad it was till I triggered an avalanche.

Since Henry had been to this area in high avalanche danger before without incident he felt he could mitigate the hazard again. This decision will be looked at in greater detail in the “Positive outcome trap” (Stremba, 2005) section.

The opposite of this was found when climbers were in terrain unfamiliar to them, they felt less confident. This can be seen from Pat when he contemplated guiding a summit day on Denali. 59

I had never been past high camp. So that was all new terrain for me. I was inclined to be very cautious.

Pat was the assistant guide on this expedition. The lead guide came down with

Acute Mountain Sickness (AMS) at high camp and was unable to go on the summit day.

Pat was now looking at guiding the mountain at a 4:1 ratio, without the experience of the senior guide. When a person has never seen terrain before it is easy to understand they will be inclined to exercise more caution, especially when visibility decreases.

Ignorance trap.

The ignorance trap (Clement, 1997) refers to times when climbers fall victim to hazards they are unaware exist. A lack of experience was a common thread in poor decision making. When climbers are not informed on the hazards at hand it is not possible to effectively mitigate them; making it appear that there is no substitute for experience based judgment. This heuristic was also uncovered when participants were asked about their past behavior. Questions like, “Had you attempted anything like this before?” often prompted the participant to speak about how inexperienced they were in this type of terrain. Tim speaks about a near miss in high avalanche conditions on Mt.

Athabasca.

The biggest factor was inexperience. None of us had a lot of mountain experience. We did not have direct exposure to the consequences of poor decision making. So we didn’t realize how out of control the situation was.

He explains the group’s thought process on the approach:

I think one factor that led us to going up there is we convinced ourselves that we were mitigating the avalanche hazard by staying on a ridge. What we didn’t take 60

into account is that we would be traveling through avalanche terrain to get to our stated objective.

On the approach, Tim’s group triggered a small avalanche on low angled terrain. If they

had understood the consequences of triggering an avalanche on the approach, they likely

would have taken more precautions.

Seth also blames inexperience as the biggest factor in a near miss with an air blast on Gasherbrum II.

On Gasherbrum II we got hit by an air blast that leveled our camp. I think inexperience caused us to place our camp too close to a zone where that could happen. We didn’t expect something that could come down and have that kind of an impact on us. Everyone was fine it was [an] air blast but it leveled our camp. In that case there I would say inexperience is a huge factor. Hopefully you survive your inexperience.

When parties do not understand the hazards in an area, it is impossible to

effectively mitigate the hazard. In order to adequately prepare for a route, climbers must

obtain route information regarding objective hazards.

DeMinimus.

The DeMinimus heuristic (Galloway, 2005) effects judgment when climbers have

a high emotional attachment to an objective. Information that aligns with these emotions

is given priority. This can negatively impact decisions when climbers ignore important

signs that disconfirm previous assessments. This heuristic was discovered from asking

participants about the variable referred to as anticipated emotion in the model of goal

directed behavior. Questions like, “Were you emotionally attached to this climb?”

resulted in climbers discussing how much they wanted to gain the summit, or talking 61

about how they did not really have an emotional reward associated with completion of

the objective. Strong emotional attachment and a flawed decision generally went hand in

hand.

Falling victim to emotional attachment.

Vince and his partner were two young climbers eager to cut their teeth on a large

alpine rock objective in the North Cascades. They decided the West Ridge of Forbidden

Peak would be a challenging objective within their skill set. They were attracted to the

rock climbing portion of the route, which climbs moderate rock on a narrow ridge for 700

feet. The majority of the summit day is spent negot iating this ridge. Vince admits this

had their attention:

You get this tunnel vision where the main objective becomes blinding, and you can forget some of the other things. The approach to this ridge can be as challenging as climbing the ridge itself in adverse conditions. To gain the ridge, a gully is normally used. Early in the season the approach gully is safe because the spring snow pack holds the loose rock in place. When snow is not present in late season the approach gully acts as a funnel for rock fall. They were attempting this route in late August, when the gully was free of snow. Vince explains how they gained information about this objective:

I would say we were pretty adept rock climbers. We had been rock climbing a lot in Arizona and around the states. So we felt pretty good with technical skill and then other information we had was route beta and word of mouth. Then what we had collected from guidebooks. We had made photocopies and felt like we had a good amount of information; we might not have interpreted it well. We didn’t think too much about rock fall, or hazard from rock fall on the approach.

The climbing party was focused on the rock climbing portion of the route. It was

one of the longer rock climbs they had attempted. When Vince was asked if he was

committed to the West Ridge of Forbidden Peak he replied:

Oh yeah, it was the first big alpine rock objective you are just totally stoked and want to make it happen. You can forget some of the other things like getting to the top is only half way basically and getting down is a whole other thing. It wasn’t like oh is there an alternative to this crappy gully? It was like we are going up this gully and that’s all that matters.

Vince associated positive emotions with completing the objective. He and his partner were affixed on completing this route. Vince did not think of the difficulties prior to gaining the rock ridge, or about external factors lowering their control over the situation. Vince and his partner did not mitigate rock fall hazard. They were approximately 200 feet apart when Vince dislodged a block, which broke his partners foot. If Vince had been less committed to the route, he likely would have chosen an approach more appropriate for low snow conditions.

Emotional attachment to an objective also effected Alex on Mt. St. Elias. Alex

had a high emotional attachment to completing a first ascent of a large alpine wall. He

admits this attachment was increased because of pressures another guide had given him

after past failed attempts:

At the same time I flash back to a couple years earlier. To telling a friend one of the guides about a trip to St. Elias earlier, a couple years before, and he said, ‘Well did you make it [to the summit]?’ I said, ‘No we didn’t make it.’ And he goes, ‘God when are you going to climb something?’ That just chaffed my hide so bad that that effected my judgment on going up or not.

The guide’s joking comment had a large impact on Alex’s decision making. According

to Alex, it played a role in fueling his desire and emotional attachment to the objective.

Alex, and his partner took large risks on this attempt to climb Mt. Saint Elias.

They had never climbed together before. A mutual friend introduced them, and they met

in the airport. Alex’s partner, Tony was hoping to rest for a bit before they started climbing, however the weather was clear. Alex decided they needed to go right away:

We had good conditions in a mountain range where you don’t get good conditions. In St. Elias when the weather is good you don’t just sit around. As the expedition progressed Alex began to realize his partner was weaker than

he anticipated:

Clearly the signs were that he was not as fit. I was kicking steps the whole way through thigh deep snow, its real wet and heavy snow. He couldn’t keep up. So we dug a snow cave to camp and he couldn’t contribute and couldn’t dig tent platforms.

At the team’s high camp, Tony in a confused state ate half of the team’s drug kit,

almost killing himself. Tony slept most of the next day in camp. The following day they

made a summit attempt. As the day progressed it was obvious to Alex that Tony was not

well.

He started showing significant signs of altitude sickness. Again it was a poor decision to listen to him when I could see what was happening and evolving. I had seen it many times before on Mt. Rainier. He kept saying, ‘If we could just slow down a little bit.’ That is the classic statement at altitude.

As the team progressed Tony began to hit a wall:

Then we get to high ground, he just says, ‘I can’t go.’ So I turn us around and he says, ‘No, if we could just go slower.’ I had said, ‘No we’re done lets go back.’ But he convinced me to keep moving it didn’t take much.

Alex pushed to the summit of a new route on St. Elias, Tony was unable to continue a few hundred feet below the summit. Alex reflected back on his decision to push for the summit:

Then right there the bottom line is as much as I wanted to climb the first ascent of a big mountain wall, one of the highest walls in the world. I should have turned around. But he convinced me without a whole lot of effort that he was ok and we could push forward and go higher.

When Alex returned to Tony it was obvious he had HAPE, and severe frostbite.

The frostbite was so severe the majority of his fingers and toes were amputated. This incident occurred during clear weather. Alex knew Tony was dangerously ill, and his judgment was inaccurate; due to Alex’s emotional attachment all Tony had to say was,

“lets keep going” and Alex was convinced.

From that point on Alex had to begin a one man rescue to get Tony down off the mountain. Alex comments on his decision making:

From there on I believe the decision making process was crisp acute and pretty darn excellent.

Once the emotional attachment of summiting the peak was gone, Alex was able to accurately assess the situation. He focused on Tony and both climbers survived the expedition.

All members of Adam’s group (non-guided) wanted to continue descending in the dark after completing the SW ridge of peak 11,300; a grade V route in the Alaska Range.

The descent involves 10 traversing rappels back to the glacier. They all convinced one 65

another that they could find the rappels, and everything would work out. Below he

discusses the climbers shared desire to return to their camp.

And we got to the bivy site, and everyone [other parties] was digging out their bivies and we are like, ‘No we are going to go for it.’ It was just this feeling of wanting the suffering to go away. We just wanted to get to camp that’s all we could think about… Things had gone super good, we had moved real fast, real efficient. We didn’t factor in how tired we were, so we started descending.

Adam’s group all voiced the desire to continue descending. They all convinced one another it would be alright. Members of the team found validation that descending was the right thing to do. When asked if they thought about bivouacking for the night

Adam answered:

We thought about it, our initial plan was to spend one night up there, but since things were going so well, we thought how could anything go wrong?

Once the route was over they felt the difficulties were over; unfortunately this was not the case. The team lost the rappel route, and had to descend 1000 feet on weak anchors in loose rock. They nearly succumbed to hypothermia on their 7-hour descent in the cold

Alaskan night.

Pat’s judgment was also clouded by some emotional attachment associated with successfully guiding Denali.

I was a young guide. I had never been to the top. I wanted to get to the top. I was consciously trying to make that not a part of the mentality. Trying not to make it an influence, but I want to be a lead guide in the future. You need to have a summit under your belt before you can be a lead guide.

Pat discussed how groups read weather on Denali, as forecasts are often ambiguous or inaccurate. 66

So if you see a lenticular over Foraker, you know that the jet stream is descending. It means weather is coming in; low pressure for Denali. Often while climbing Denali you cannot see the summit. So every time we would see a lenticular we would keep our eyes open. Sometimes it would lead to bad weather, other times it would not. It was kind of a crap chute actually. That complicated things.

Pat and his clients began their summit day in perfect weather.

But it was as nice as you could ask for. I was not even in my big puffy or big gloves. It was really nice. We kept waiting for this low pressure to come by. We are ready to turn around at the first sign. And no first sign appeared, until a lenticular appeared over Foraker (laughs). But like I said before there were a number of times when a lenticular had formed and nothing happened.

While traveling in warm clear weather, Pat convinced himself that the weather would hold. His emotional attachment to climb the peak limited his ability to correctly process the information being presented. The group was caught in a descending storm, and a nerve-wracking descent in total whiteout conditions followed.

No emotional attachment.

When climbers did not have an emotional attachment to the climb it was easier to look at objectives and hazards more rationally. Henry turned away from a summit because of dark clouds, after completing a long technically difficult ice climb in Peru.

When asked if he had emotional attachment to the summit he said:

Henry: No, I had no emotional attachment to the summit. I was there to do the route. I was excited by the technical difficulties presented by the route. And I was satisfied, I considered the mission accomplished by the time we got there. Interviewer: Would your process have changed if you were one pitch away from the top? Henry: That is an interesting question. Yes, I suppose it would have been harder.

It would have been much harder for Henry to retreat one rope length away from the end

of the climbing route compared to 100 feet below the summit after the technical route

was completed.

Consistency.

When a person remains true to an earlier decision despite changing information

the consistency heuristic (McCammon, 2003) is encountered. It is easier to continue with

a decision than to overturn one, and select a new course of action. When Participants

were asked about their attitude towards climbing a particular peak, or external

components of perceived behavioral control, participants often explained a prevailing

assessment or attitude towards the area they were climbing. When this assessment was

not modified for changing conditions accidents occurred.

Victims of the consistency trap.

Sarah and another guide had made the decision to lead clients up the North Ridge of Mt. Baker. The route had a lot of snow on it, and colder weather than normal was present with low clouds. Sarah felt this would make the route safer, as everything would be frozen in place. A second guide Bill agreed, and they began the climb.

I had been in the lead for the first part. Then I said, ‘Hey Bill do you want to go in front?’ Because he was pretty psyched to be there. He was like, ‘well sure’… I wanted Bill to be out in front. Based on his experience levels that might not have been the place to do it. He is really good in the mountains he is perceptive. There is always the risk of giving someone more credit, or turning ones brain off in regards to the hazards. Like oh he will figure it out.

As Sarah followed Bill in the white out they walked into a rock fall hazard. She let down her guard approaching the ridge and a bowling ball sized rock whizzed past her head. According to clients, the rock missed her by only inches.

I see it as a route with low objective hazard… In terms of hazards you cannot control, its pretty low… There is a risk of not paying attention in areas like that.

Sarah went on to explain how her decision was flawed.

I was aware of the hazard and looking at it as we walked over to it. But it was still early and cold. It had rained then frozen. I thought that rock fall wouldn’t be as much of a problem, because it is still early. Then we popped into the clouds, and the temp changed. So I think it was a combination of it not being as frozen as I thought it would be, and we were in the wrong place.

Sarah and Bill had already made assessments about the character of the route, and about the hazards that day. The guides had decided it was a safe route in safe conditions.

They remained true to these evaluations even when the temperature increased as they entered the clouds.

Overcoming the consistency trap.

The consistency heuristic was combated with accurate situation awareness. In the two following examples, climbers went against previously made plans because of poor weather. Seth discussed a positive decision he made, after summiting Broad Peak, as he saw a bank of clouds approaching.

I had a bad feeling, there was a wall of clouds, kind of a divide between Pakistan and China. It went along Broad Peak over to K2, and so on. There was this wall of cloud it was very odd. It was clear on one side and very dark on the other it was very strange. I didn’t feel very comfortable with it.

Seth moved his group to a lower elevation on the mountain instead of only descending to high camp, as they had planned. Members from other expeditions perished on neighboring peaks in the storm that ensued for the next two days. Due to their lower position on the mountain Seth’s group remained safe:

I felt like that was a time where my instincts came in. I utilized environmental factors and I made calls that were based on experience, and observation and proper instincts…

Seth went on to explain that from the time he has spent on large peaks in the Himalaya and Alaska Range he knew that high altitude, storm potential, and tired people was a

“recipe for disaster”.

Henry overcame the consistency heuristic when he turned around one snow mushroom away from a 6,000 meter summit in Peru, due to worsening weather conditions. He explains below how deteriorating conditions changed his course of action.

When things start to develop like that you can sense a loss of control. When you are the master of your environment you have many options. When you are not you have to make choices. And those choices are very eminent. In a safe backcountry environment you can do many different things. You have to be smart. But it is more important to be smart when the conditions are not good. The margin for error diminishes when conditions worsen.

When climbers were able to accurately interpret the environmental cues and change their course of action, positive decisions were made. When climbers ignored new information and relied on previous assessments incidents occurred.

Positive outcome trap.

The positive outcome trap (Stremba, 2005) is also known as the, ‘it won’t happen to me trap’. It is when one believes that positive outcomes will occur instead of negative 70 outcomes. Similar to the Consistency trap, this theme was identified in the data when the researcher asked about attitudes towards a climb, or what factors were increasing their perception of control.

Early in Max’s climbing career he and a friend were excited to climb another route on Mount Stewart. Despite waking up to dark skies and low clouds, Max thought it was not going to storm. Mount Stewart is located east of the crest in the Central

Cascades. As moisture moves off the Pacific Ocean, the west slopes of the Cascade

Range receive large amounts of precipitation, while the east slopes receive much less.

They are much drier, and experience more stable weather. Max explains, “I thought

Cascades east of the crest are a little more forgiving weather wise.”

Based on this belief, he and his partner decided to attempt the route despite threatening clouds. Max and his partner were caught that day in a large rain and hailstorm with 50 mph winds, high on an alpine rock route.

When asked what factors played into his decision Max laughed and with a smile said:

First of all we didn’t think it was going to rain the way it did! I think we were just at an age where I was way more into risk taking than I am now. I was way more into risk and going for it... I had this weird faith it was all going to work out.

An interesting conversation was held with Max discussing how acceptable levels of risk are formed. Max discussed how his military background changed his perception of risk.

It’s kind of like these Bosnian Muslims. So they had been living in Sarajevo and they would walk all over the Gasherbrum glacier unroped. We became friends and I confronted them about it and asked why they didn’t rope up. They said we 71

are used to being shot at every day. From a risk standpoint this is nothing compared to what we just came from. They were just used to living in a situation where you are constantly threatened with death. The odds of being shot by a sniper in Sarajevo were so much higher than falling in a crevasse. Our concern about it didn’t make sense, so I think coming out of a Marines background I had kind of a twisted perspective on risk.

Henry also fell into the positive outcome trap. He had planned to take a day trip into an alpine area near his home and complete a traverse. The avalanche forecast he read for the day was “high”; when an avalanche forecast is “high” backcountry travel is not recommended. Henry is highly experienced in avalanche terrain and has taught avalanche courses for several years. He made the decision to go to an area known as

“White Pine.” He visits this area often and views it as a safe place. Henry figured he would read conditions as he moved up into the alpine zone and would mitigate hazards as the day progressed. He explains below:

I felt it was a friendly place when I started. I know it can be deadly if you are not careful, but I was not thinking about the risk as much as I was thinking I could prevent the risk

As Henry moved out of the safety of the trees and onto more exposed slopes, his instincts were telling him to turn around. He saw signs of snowpack instability; however he felt like he was taking a “safe line” he explains:

It [my thinking] wasn’t good enough of course because behind that thinking was the intrinsic belief that nothing would happen. I was counting on my good luck basically.

Henry continued on his traverse. As he moved into the middle of the slope, past the point of commitment he realized he made a big mistake: 72

I realized that this slope is going to slide, but I didn’t know why. I decided it was going to go and I can’t tell you why. My instincts were telling me it would collapse, and five to ten seconds after that, the thing collapsed and I triggered an avalanche. It carried me 100 to 150 ft.

Henry was caught in an avalanche and buried waist deep while alone on an alpine traverse. Fortunately, he was able to stay upright and dig himself out of the slide. Henry comments below on his decision:

One of the main lessons I learned was I had to follow my instincts. Obviously there is a rational process but the rational process didn’t work. I went through an intricate rational process that took me nowhere but the bottom of an avalanche slide. It was a flawed process from beginning to end.

Since Henry viewed this area as safe, he had the “Intrinsic belief nothing would happen.”

This clouded his judgment and almost ended his life. Even in relatively safe areas, dangerous conditions can develop. It is of the upmost importance climbers understand that hazardous situations arise and no one is impervious to the consequences of poor judgment.

Satisficing.

Satisficing (Galloway, 2005) refers to a quick decision where the first workable option is implemented. This option is often selected before potential consequences are explored. Satisficing is similar to naturalistic decision making strategies such as

Recognition Primed Decision Making, where intuition is used to generate possible solutions. Satisficing showed to result in both good and bad decisions. 73

Victims of satisficing.

Vince made a fast decision based on reflection to a past experience; it resulted in

negative consequences. Early in Vince’s climbing career he decided to pitch out a loose

rock gully. In this situation, using the rope exacerbated the hazard instead of providing

safety. A large block of granite was dislodged, careened down the gully, and collided

with his partner’s foot. This resulted in a severely broken foot several miles of rough

terrain from the road. Vince explains his reasoning:

Putting the rope on was the first workable option. You know I’ve been in rock terrain where I was scared. Then I put on a rope and it was ok. So, that is just how we went about it. Learning from past experience was a key in many good decisions. This can be

seen from Vince after this incident. He discusses how on future steep loose gullies he

kept people close together instead of spreading out. By doing this the rocks have less time to gain speed, and can do less damage.

I feel that the decision making process there is, I took into account that you need to manage for that type of hazard more effectively. So it seems like I took one experience and learned from it and took the knowledge from that first experience and applied it to future experiences.

Jim also had a close call from a quick decision made. While descending in the

Waddington Range, he took a fall on a steep ice minutes away from base camp. Jim felt down climbing the ice step was easy, and underestimated the likelihood of a fall.

We had a large crevasse we had to rappel over that was kind of our main concern. So we were really focused on that it took a long time. We were tired and soaked which didn’t help. The ice step was secondary…so I wasn’t even thinking that ice step was a big deal. I even know it almost has a higher consequence. But I wasn’t thinking of the ice step as this big hazard. And so I started facing out for the upper part, which is pretty freaking steep. In retrospect it would have been safer to face in and down climb. 74

Jim was concerned with the crevasse, and once tired and wet was not focused nor taking

this ice step seriously. Jim also admitted to being distracted by his partner who was

exhausted when they reached the final ice step.

My partner knows I am a guide. I think he almost lets me take on that alright time to be a guide mode. As we got to the base of the tower he wanted to go to sleep. And I was like okay, I will make sure we get down; kind of taking on the guide role. I knew I was tired but I was more focused on my partner.

When Jim was descending the step he was not completely focused on the

objective. Jim caught his crampon front point on his pants and tripped. His mistake

resulted in a 70-foot fall down 50-degree ice. When Jim was asked how he made his decision to down climb he responded.

It seemed like an easy fast solution. I felt like I would have no problem down climbing it. I knew I could lower him 70 meters real fast then he would be down most of the ice step. Then we would repeat the process to get to the bottom. So in my mind it was an easy fast solution. But I was tired. I guess I just didn’t understand how tired I was.

Joe had a similar descent story. He had just soloed a grade V alpine route in a day. He was now on his way down off the mountain.

I followed the normal way you would think to go. Then I ended up probably only 200 feet or so above where I wanted to be. But it was all slabbed out. I brought a short rope with me to be safe. But I didn’t really see any good anchors or trees. So I decided to go back up and I saw this little cliff band on the other side, and I decided I’ll go down that.

Joe began descending the cliff band, by rappelling on a 100-foot rope leaving behind pitons and nuts. He realized that he was beginning to run out of materials to build 75 anchors. Joe thought he could make it to the ground with one, 100-foot rappel. So he fixed his rope and rappelled on a single strand.

So I’m sitting here at the end of the rope, there is some snow down below. I don’t know how high above the ground I am, maybe 20 to 30 feet. The snow below me is a totally undercut moat. But I had to jump basically. There was lots of water coming down, and I couldn’t ascend my line. So I launched.

Fortunately, for Joe the moat didn’t break, nor did his legs. He hit the snow landed on his feet and regained control. If the moat broke it would have meant serious injury or death.

When Joe was asked how his decision was made he replied:

I didn’t look over at it when I could have to see that it really cliffed out and was vertical with no bushes to rap off of. A lack of clearly thinking [through] the options I had. I made my decision rapidly, I remember doing that climb; I was just cruising and really pushing myself. I was going for it. So I think I probably got to that point, the first option and said, ‘Oh fuck it.’ Then I was like I’m going to find an easier way. Whatever was faster, I thought going to find another way was going to be quicker.

After soloing this large alpine climb Joe just wanted to move fast. He looked for the first workable option and pursued it. When teams perceive a time pressure, or just want to get back to camp, often fast decision are made.

Accurate satisficing.

When conditions for accurate intuition are present (Kahneman & Klien 2009;

Hammond, 1993), satisficing or employing the first workable option can result in positive outcomes. Paul used his intuition for hazard recognition, when he asked to be put on belay moments before a massive cornice collapse. This incident occurred on the SW ridge of peak 11,300. A climb that involves rock climbing, ice climbing, and travel on heavily corniced ridges. Paul explains why he decided to be put on belay: 76

Just having been on a lot of ski trips where you play it cautious around corniced ridges, you don’t want to get too close. You know they can break further back from the apex of the cornice. Something about how the ridge tapered from both sides; it threw up a red flag to me. It was like, this has a lot more potential consequences on both sides if something goes wrong. I don’t want to expose my partner or myself to either of us being pulled off, and killed. It was a sudden realization, looking forward, the observation of what was right in front of me made me pause and think about it, and back off.

The cornice did collapse as Paul’s partner was putting him on belay. Paul took a 40-foot fall off the ridge, fortunately he was able to continue and finish the climb. After inspection by a doctor it was found that his only injury was muscular damage to his shoulder. From this review it appears experience and valid cues are a pre-requisite for good decisions to be made quickly.

Partners.

The skills, abilities, and fitness levels of participant’s clients or climbing partners affected their perception of risk, which ultimately effected the end decision. When other members of the climbing party were strong, and respected participants were more likely to take risk. The opposite was also seen, when participants had weaker clients, or partners they were inclined to be more cautious. Participants spoke about their partners when they were asked about subjective norms, as well as perceived behavioral control.

External and internal aspects of perceived behavioral control increased when participants were paired with a strong partner/client.

Strong Clients.

Pat was guiding a strong group on Denali. He explains below how that effected his risk propensity: 77

Next factor, we had a strong group so I was more willing to take chances, compared to if I had weaker clients. If I had a weak client I would have seen the lenticular and called it. But because we had such a strong group, I was willing to push it a bit further.

Low pressure did move in on Pat’s group, and even though they were a fit group, they were almost pushed to their breaking point.

Cody was also willing to enter into the storm with his clients, whom all had previous experience, and did not seem intimidated by the ominous weather. The guided party summited in a 21 hour push in conditions prime for hypothermia.

I think that no one in my group had complained or said anything while we were taking our break for lunch. They were all just kind of eating and good to go. So I didn’t get any sense of nervousness from any of them going into it. They all seemed okay with it. So I felt alright with that. This same feeling can be seen in a non-guiding context from Paul who expressed his comfort when climbing with his well-matched climbing partner. The two climbed together on Peak 11,300 where he experienced his near miss from cornice collapse.

He is probably the best personal partner I have. We both feel pretty evenly matched for our skills. We compliment each others weaknesses quite a bit. We feel real good about committing to objectives that are hard for us because we both know we will not have to pull the other one through it or carry more of the weight.

Weaker clients.

Sarah experienced the opposite of this with a weaker client: She felt a lowered perception of control, and was less likely to take risk. Sarah was guiding a client on the

West Ridge of Forbidden Peak. She was nervous guiding this client on the objective for two reasons. The first he outweighed her by 120 pounds. 78

He outweighed me by a ton, and the West Ridge of Forbidden, as you know is a very exposed ridge where you are often moving together. You use terrain belays instead of gear belays. So now all of a sudden the possibility of him taking a fall using that type of security is a different thing.

When guiding large alpine rock routes, to save time advanced rope techniques are

often used. These include short roping, simul-climbing, and using terrain belays (running

the rope around blocks or horns) instead of placing traditional forms of protection. These

techniques are much safer and easier when the client does not outweigh the guide. The

second reason Sarah was nervous in guiding this client was his pace:

He is very slow on the uphill. So movement in the alpine terrain safety is speed, some people say. So the idea of being able to put down the accelerator when you need to as one way to mitigate risk, we didn’t really have that with this guy. He had one speed uphill and downhill. Speed is safety in the alpine, if you are in high objective hazard, or caught in a storm it is

essential that members of your team move quickly to minimize time spent in the hazard.

Due to these two factors, Sarah was feeling on edge the whole day.

The objective hazards for that route were as low as they could be. The weather was great, the rock was dry, the snow was good… but I was just gripped the whole time. It clicked for me the reason I was so stressed was just because he outweighed me by so much.

Balance scale.

If the weather had been poor, or if the rock was wet, Sarah likely would not have

gone. During the day she kept track of time and changing conditions. Sarah and her

client successfully reached the summit and returned to camp safely. If one factor is

lowering the perception of control there must be other factors increasing the perception of

control. Looking at perceived risk in this situation, it appears to resemble a balance scale.

For example, if a guide has a weak client they will not guide the peak unless weather and 79 conditions are excellent. Climbers either consciously or subconsciously weigh these different factors to make a decision. Stronger climbers can often succeed in adverse conditions, however the hazards of a whiteout, and hypothermia do not discriminate.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to explore the various factors and motivators that influence judgment and decision making behaviors among alpine climbers. The researcher had three expectations prior to conducting this study: (1) The model of goal directed behavior would provide a framework to look at the judgment and decision making process in alpine climbers. (2) Underestimation of risk would result in an accident/near miss, and (3) emotional attachment to a goal would result in an accident/near miss. In addition to reviewing these expectations, the naturalistic vs. rational decision making debate will be discussed, as well as limitations of this study, and suggestions for future researchers.

Model of Goal Directed Behavior

The model of goal directed behavior (MGB) was used as a theoretical framework to organize each interview. A question was asked about each variable included in the model. Using the variables as a framework was helpful; asking questions about each variable often revealed a motivator the participant had not discussed when telling their story. The primary researcher did not come across any phenomenon unexplained by

MGB. This being said, certain variables were found to inter-relate differently than the model depicts.

The results section was initially organized in terms of this model. After several attempts the researchers decided the findings were not best explained by MGB. Alpine climbing takes place in a naturalistic setting; the Naturalistic Decision Making approach suggests that the process of decision-making is complex, non-linear and does not follow 81

what has become known as the ‘rational’ or clinical decision-making process (Galloway,

2005). The model of goal directed behavior is very linear and does not appear to

accurately portray non-linear processes such as naturalistic decision making. The studies successfully conducted with the model of goal directed behavior (Taylor, 2007; Taylor et al., 2005) analyzed strictly rational processes with a quantitative analysis. When looking at a naturalistic setting, with a qualitative analysis, the model of goal directed behavior did not provide a parsimonious framework to organize the results.

Differences

Variables from the model of goal directed behavior were found to interact differently than the model suggests. Both subjective norm and past behavior were shown to impact the formation of a participant’s perceived behavioral control. This was seen when other guides were attempting a peak; participants felt the task at hand was possible, and therefore experienced an increase in internal aspects of perceived behavioral control.

Other climbers also possessed the ability to provide validation, confirming or denying participant’s fears. This showed to impact external aspects of participant’s perceived behavioral control. Past behavior was also shown to impact perceived behavioral control

in the Familiarity heuristic. Climbers felt more capable in terrain they had previous

experience with. These are simply the researcher’s observation after employing the

model. The Model of Goal Directed Behavior, has previously been shown to

significantly account for behavior in a rational or clinical setting (Taylor, 2005; Taylor,

Bagozzi, Gaither, 2005; Perungini, Bagozzi, 2001). The model appears to work well

analyzing more straightforward processes, such as the decision to study for a test, or 82 choosing to exercise. The model does not include a feedback loop, or an explanation for interrelated variables. To add validity to these observations additional studies viewing the formation of each variable is necessary. The results of this study may act as a seed for further research to come to life, and further revise and/or deepen the model of goal directed behavior.

In a recent article from Galloway (Forthcoming) he suggests that rational decision making models may be useful retrospectively, to analyze the events of the day. The model of goal directed behavior could also be a very useful retrospective tool.

Practitioners and facilitators could run through the different variables inside the model to determine where motives for any given decision were derived from. This would insure that a set list of variables were explored. The variables were useful in questioning participants in this study, using the variables in this model in personal or group debriefs would likely provide a clearer picture of why a particular course of action was implemented.

Heuristic Traps

As stated above, the model of goal directed behavior did not provide an accurate format to organize results. Instead what emerged from my results were eight heuristic traps; to remain true to my data the results section was organized based on heuristic traps.

There are many heuristic traps in existence. I was able to explain the phenomena found in this study with eight traps. The eight traps identified were: (1) Acceptance

(McCammon, 2003), (2) familiarity (McCammon, 2003), (3) ignorance trap (Clement,

1997), (4) consistency (McCammon, 2003), (5) DeMinimus (Galloway, 2005), 83

(6) positive outcome trap (stremba, 2005), (7) satisficing (Galloway, 2005) and (8)

Partners. Each of these traps resulted in inaccurate situation awareness, and an underestimation of risk. The first seven traps aligned with the research as cited. The eighth trap, was created by the researcher after they were unable to find a previous trap that explained a higher risk propensity when traveling with strong partners. In addition to proposing this new heuristic, and further validating several previously identified traps, this study adds to heuristic trap literature by providing real life examples of participants mitigating these traps. Previous research has identified traps, and provided suggestions for overcoming these traps. However these suggestions have been based on brainstorming sessions, not testing. This study provides the reader with real examples and techniques experts used to overcome these traps.

Underestimation of Risk

As expected, underestimation of risks resulted in accidents and near misses.

Most cases in this study dealt with complex situations, where many variables played a role in the decision. Some of these variables lowered the participant’s perception of risk while other variables increased it. Participants often spoke about weighing these factors to make a decision. This process was mostly rational, and resembled a balance scale, as mentioned in the “partners section.” When risks were underestimated it was often because one factor was given more weight than it should have been; and tipped the

“scale” in the wrong direction. Three instrumental factors in this study were: (1)

Familiarity with the terrain, (2) skill level of the climbing party (partners), and (3) weather. 84

As discussed at length in the results section, when participants found themselves

in familiar terrain they perceived less risk, and felt more able to mitigate hazards. This is

consistent with McCammon’s (2004) avalanche heuristic study. In his study he found

just less than one in three avalanche incidents occurred in familiar terrain that parties were comfortable with. In this study one in four accidents occurred in familiar terrain.

This shows backcountry users are prone to underestimate risk when traveling in terrain they have been in many times before. When factors like bad weather were lowering

Cody’s perception of control, it was his familiarity with the terrain that increased his confidence.

The skill levels of the climbing party also effected perceived risk. This is a new heuristic, discussed under the “Partners” section of the results. Stories told by Cody,

Sarah, Pat, Paul, and Alex all show that when assessing risk the fitness level of the participant’s partner(s) or client(s) came into question. When Pat was on Denali he was

unfamiliar with the terrain, saw a potential for poor weather, but had strong clients and

figured they could succeed. Any time a complex decision was made, climbers thought

either briefly or at length about several factors and perceived risk was determined. The

three most prominent factors were weather, familiarity with the terrain, and the skill level

of the participant’s climbing partner(s).

Emotional Attachment

The third research expectation, “emotional attachment to a goal will result in an

accident” was also confirmed. All but one positive decision made rationally was void of emotional attachment. When participants had a high emotional attachment to an 85 objective, they would convince themselves they could mitigate the hazard. Information that did not align with this emotional attachment was widely ignored. This is congruent with information accessibility, found in bounded rationality literature (Simon, 1956;

Kahneman, 2003; Lowenstein, 1996).

Rational processes were often flawed and inaccurate when climbers were emotionally attached to an objective. This can be seen in the “DeMinimus” section. In these instances, climbers often said they should have followed their instincts. Most participants mentioned they knew what they were doing was dangerous, but convinced themselves they would be okay. It is difficult to suggest anything practical in response to this decision making theme. In times of high emotional attachment, climbers can convince themselves they are not at a serious risk. Participants convinced themselves the situation was safe by using an intricate rational process. When one is entering this conscious process Seth’s reflection regarding being true to information present (see results section), may be one helpful idea to keep in mind. When participants had a voice in the back of their head saying, “this is dangerous” the voice was always correct. This voice was almost always ignored when there was emotional attachment to completing the objective.

Decision Making Debate

There have been many pages written debating a rational decision making model versus a naturalistic one for outdoor leaders. Rational decision making advocates argue system 1 (automatic) processes are more likely to result in mistakes. They argue that to find the best solution one must think through options weighing the pros and cons. 86

Intuitive based models often found in naturalistic decision making advocate reflection to past experience to generate solutions. These models focus on making quick decisions.

Supporters of intuitive models argue there is not enough time to make purely rational choices in an outdoor setting.

In this study, few participants discussed scenarios where there was extreme time pressure. Most decisions made quickly were from a perceived time pressure, when parties were very excited and tried to move fast. Fast decisions were accurate when participants reflected to past experience, and valid cues were present. These included cornice collapse, dark clouds, and loose rock. Fast decisions led to consequences when participants underestimated risk, misread environmental cues, or lacked related previous experience. These findings agree with Klein and Kahneman’s (2009) article regarding conditions for accurate pattern matching. Among the pre-requisites for accurate pattern matching are valid cues, and time to learn those cues. This suggests that pattern matching cannot be taught, and only after years of experience should climbers begin to trust their intuition.

Good decisions were made in this study when participants were aware of the hazards, as well as the potential consequences those hazards posed. The researcher suggests it is not possible to say one type of process will always result in a good decision.

Both rational and intuitive processes led climbers astray; and both processes also resulted in good decisions. The conditions present when the decision is made will determine which process is most appropriate. When a decision must be made immediately, obviously a decision based on intuition must be used. However, the reality of the 87

situation is, decisions other than “jump” or “duck” rarely need to be made

instantaneously. The findings show there were times when climbers should have slowed

down to avoid poor decisions (Vince, Joe); as well as times when climbers should have

listened to their intuition (Henry, Tim). These findings support Hammond’s (1993)

cognitive continuum theory, which suggests decisions fall somewhere between analytic

and intuitive. Hammond found the more cues available, the shorter the time span, and the

stronger the relationship between cues and criteria, the more intuitive the decision. When

longer periods of time were available, with objectively measureable cues that were less

reliable a more analytic rule based decision was made.

Limitations of this Study

This study had a small sample size, and data was only collected at one point in

time from an interview. If a second point of measurement, such as a survey were issued,

the data would be stronger. The use of a survey would have allowed for a larger sample

as well, further strengthening the data. A second limitation was the tightly knit nature of

the guiding community. Some participants were nervous about participating in this

study. They feared employers would read this study, recognize the stories, and guides

may loose their jobs as a result. Some members of the guiding population refused to

participate for this reason. This likely impacted the way stories were told, or altered

when conveyed to the interviewer. A third limitation of this study is the researcher’s pre-

existing relationships (friends, colleagues, co-workers, student-instructor) with several participants. This also likely impacted the data received by the researcher. Fourth, all experts are opinionated in regards to how people should conduct themselves in their 88 domains. Climbers are no exception. As a member of this population the researcher came into this study with opinions, and biases. The researcher remained aware of this through the process to present the information as it has been presented to them; relatively void of limiting biases the researcher may possess.

The semi-structured interviews in this study employed the model of goal directed behavior (MGB) to organize interviews. It has been acknowledged that using MGB may have brought more attention to the information that fits neatly within one of the variables included in this model. Questions as seen in the methods section, asked for other motivators effecting decisions. MGB was used to structure interviews because it has significantly accounted for behavior in decision making contexts (Taylor, 2007). It was not the intent of this study to re-invent the wheel. Using this model as a basis helped ensure the study looked to a variety of potential motivators; additional motivators were asked for and explored once identified. The researcher utilized existing theories, and looked for phenomenon that was beyond the scope of current theory. When it was found the model did not accurately portray the results, a new organizational strategy was adopted. Once the primary researcher saw the emerging themes paralleled many previously identified traps the results section was reorganized based on these heuristic traps.

Suggestions for future research

Judgment and decision making (JDM) is a fascinating area of research with studies being done in many areas. There are several suggestions to the future JDM researcher: (1) Use the model of goal directed behavior only when a process is linear in 89 nature. The researcher found this model unsatisfactory when applied to a naturalistic setting. (2) There is a daunting mass of literature currently in the field. It is suggested researchers look to already existing theories, and test/modify those, before proposing entirely new theories and models. This will decrease competing theories and help to unify as opposed to further diversify JDM literature.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

After conducting 13 interviews and reviewing the corresponding 24 decision points eight heuristic traps were found to introduce bias and flaw judgment. These traps included: (1)Acceptance, (2)familiarity, (3)ignorance trap, (4)consistency,

(5)DeMinimus, (6)positive outcome trap, and (7)satisficing. The one previously unidentified heuristic trap found in this study is (8) partners. The researcher could not find evidence of a heuristic trap that explains a higher risk propensity when climbers have competent or strong partners. The “partners” heuristic explains this.

The results of this study were congruent with Hammond’s Cognitive Continuum theory. This suggests there is not a best way to make a decision. Instead the situation will determine which process is best. Incidents and near misses occurred from both intuitive and rational decision making. As long as the conditions for accurate intuition are present it is expected many good fast decisions will be made. The opposite is also true.

It is suggested that outdoor leaders are taught to be objective. They should be well educated on potential hazards, including: How to identify hazards, how/when it is possible to mitigate these hazards, and finally the dire consequences that often result from misinterpreting hazards. Mentors to the new wave of outdoor leaders, should preach a sermon of responsibility. From the media most young climbers have the idea that climbing is a glorious exploit, where you are risking everything in a battle for the summit. The strongest trend in good decision making was not the cognitive process used; 91 it was the lack of emotional attachment to the objective. If the goal is to train leaders to make better decisions, train them to be objective, and true to the information present.

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