Russian Military Almanac by Tamar A

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Russian Military Almanac by Tamar A Russian Military Almanac By Tamar A. Mehuron, Associate Editor, with Harriet Fast Scott, William F. Scott, and David Markov Organization of the RussianHE Russian military’s most recent year Putin also Armedretained control over the power cut theForces number of Russia’s nuclear warheads had three highlights: Consolidation ministries (which have their own troops) and to 1,500 and transfer the savings to strengthen of military and political power in the the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice. its conventional forces. Furthermore, as the hands of the newly elected Rus- The Security Council approved a new land-based nuclear arsenal shrinks in the next sian President, Vladimir V. Putin, military doctrine in April 2000. It provided five years, the separate status of the Strategic renewed fighting in the breakaway province for the use of nuclear weapons not only in Rocket Forces will also be re-evaluated. The of Chechnya, and the loss of the submarine response to a nuclear attack but also in the decision follows a public dispute between Min- TKursk and her crew. case of a large-scale conventional weapons ister of Defense Marshal Igor D. Sergeyev and Russian authorities blamed Chechens for attack against Russia or its allies. The doctrine Kvashnin concerning the future composition the September 1999 explosions in Moscow also highlighted terrorism within Russia as a and size of the Russian armed forces. To gain apartment buildings and in other cities. Putin, military threat. more funding and support for the conventional then Prime Minister, strongly supported a Armed forces under the Ministry of Defense forces, Kvashnin, a tank officer, argued for a military response to these “acts of terror- consisted of four military services: Strategic sharp cut in the number of land-based ICBMs ism.” After President Boris Yeltsin resigned Rocket Forces, Air Forces, Navy, and Ground and the merger of the separate elite Strategic Dec. 31, 1999, Putin, a former KGB officer Forces. In 1999, their authorized personnel Rocket Forces into the Air Forces. By contrast, and former Director of the Federal Security strength totaled 1.2 million, although the actual Sergeyev, former Strategic Rocket Forces head, Service (FSB), the domestic successor to figure was 1.01 million. advocated a separate strategic deterrence force the KGB, became acting President. He was Russia’s previous war with Chechnya had composed of all nuclear forces. subsequently elected President March 26, ended in 1996. In the aftermath of September’s But the decision to reform the military 2000. explosions in Moscow, Russia’s armed forces was quickly overshadowed by the sinking of In May 2000 Putin created seven federal moved on Chechnya in October. The General the Kursk, Russia’s newest and most modern districts to consolidate his political power. Staff for the first time exercised operational attack submarine, on Aug. 12 in the Barents These districts correspond closely to the control in actual combat conditions in Chechnya Sea. The nuclear-powered submarine, built seven military districts. He appointed seven over all Russian forces involved: troops of the in 1994, had been participating in exercises Presidential Representatives (five of whom Ministry of Defense, Internal Troops, Border when it suffered apparent explosions and sank, were retired general officers) for the federal Guards, and other power ministries. In May and its 118 crew members perished. Rescue districts. These actions provided Putin with 2000, the First Deputy Chief of the General efforts by Russians, Norwegians, and British centralized top–down control throughout the Staff, Gen. Valeriy Manilov, stated that there were hampered by severe weather and the 89 regions making up the Russian Federation. were 80,000 Russian army troops and police 60-degree tilt of the submarine on the seabed. Putin also designated the federal district officers in Chechnya with “a maximum of 3,000” The tragedy highlighted the deterioration of representatives as new members of the separatist rebels facing them. In June the Rus- Russia’s military forces. Security Council, a body he chaired. Over- sian military leadership announced that, for all Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN). A second all direction of Russia’s military forces was practical purposes, the war was over. regiment of the new SS-27 Topol-M missile provided by the Security Council. The “per- Less than a week after these assurances, system was placed on alert duty. The Com- manent members” of the Security Council, Chechen forces killed more than 100 Russian mander, Gen. of the Army Vladimir N. Yakovlev, in addition to the President, were the Prime soldiers. The conflict continued. asserted that the new missile can be equipped Minister, Secretary of the Security Council, The Chechnya conflict exacerbated the poor “with a powerful set of means to breach anti- Director of the Federal Security Service, and condition of Russia’s armed forces. Students missile defense.” Weapons and supporting Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense. at several military institutes graduated early equipment deteriorated throughout the Stra- Other members included the Directors of due to a shortage of young officers. Moderniza- tegic Rocket Forces. More than 70 percent of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal tion of military weapons and other equipment its missiles require extensive work to extend Border Guard Service, and Ministers of slowed, except for prototypes. Forty percent their operational life, as do the majority of fixed Internal Affairs and Emergency Situations. of the men discharged from the armed forces command-and-control facilities and 60 to 70 The Chief of the General Staff (Gen. of the had no pension security. Military housing percent of battle management assets. Army Anatoliy V. Kvashnin) was, for the first remained critical. Air Forces (VVS). The 37th Air Army gained time, made a member of the Security Council. In August, the Security Council decided to one Tu-160 bomber and three Tu-95Ms in 1999 72 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2000 US Secretary of Defense William S. Co- hen (left) is greeted by Russian Federa- tion Minister of Defense Marshal Igor D. Sergeyev on arrival at the Ministry of Defense building in Moscow in June. The visit was part of Cohen’s week-long Ward R.D. DoD photo by trip to meet European government and defense leaders. from Ukraine. In early 2000, Ukraine returned an additional seven Tu-160s to Russia. One additional new Tu-160 is being completed at the Kazan plant. Russia modified its Kh-55 nuclear armed cruise missile, now designated Kh-55SM, to carry non-nuclear war heads. The Kh-55SM missiles can be launched by either the Tu-160 or Tu-95. Fighter aircraft develop- ments included the first test flights of Sukhoi’s Berkut S-37, with its swept-forward wings, and the MiG prototype Project 1-44. The average annual flying time was 10 to 16 hours for fighter pilots, 18 to 24 hours for pilots in ground-attack aircraft, 12 to 26 hours Russian and US Grades for bomber pilots, 20 hours for long-range aircraft pilots, and 44 to 60 hours for military transport pilots. Exceptions to this were the Naval grades in italics bomber, ground-attack, and reconnaissance Russia US Minister of Defense Sergeyev currently pilots flying missions in Chechnya. holds the rank of Marshal of Russian Five Stars Navy (VMF). Repairs on the missile cruiser Federation. Four Marshals of Soviet Slava, which began in 1990, were completed in Marshal of ...................... General of the Army Union are alive today: S.L. Sokolov, November 1999. It was re-designated the guard Russian General of the Air Force V.G. Kulikov, V.I. Petrov, and D.T. Yazov. missile cruiser Moscow. The first in a series of Federation Fleet Admiral All four are officially listed as advisors nuclear surface ships, the heavy guided missile Four Stars to the Russian Federation Ministry of cruiser Admiral Ushakov is undergoing repairs. General of the Army ..................General (USA) Defense. The Yuriy Dolgorukiy ballistic missile subma- General of the Army ............... General (USAF) rine, under construction at the Severodvinsk Admiral of the Fleet ................... Admiral (USN) yard, is 47 percent completed. It is the first of the Borey (Arctic wind)–class fleet. Three Stars Ground Forces (SV). The Chechnya war General Colonel .................Lieutenant General exposed weaknesses in Russia’s ground forces. Admiral .........................................Vice Admiral Conscripts were poorly trained; contract troops Two Stars were little better. Equipment generally was in General Lieutenant .................... Major General poor condition, and most was obsolete by NATO Vice Admiral ............ Rear Admiral (Upper Half) standards. Chechen fighters, with manpower odds of 10-to-1 against them, and lacking artil- One Star lery, air support, or tanks, remained in the field. General Major ...................... Brigadier General Russian helicopter gunships flew approxi- Rear Admiral ........... Rear Admiral (Lower Half) mately 40,000 missions, striking Chechen O-6 forces, providing air cover for ground troops Colonel .................................................Colonel and transporting personnel and supplies. Five Captain (1st Class) .............................. Captain military transport helicopters were equipped with Global Positioning System satellite navi- O-5 gation, which significantly improved their ef- Lieutenant Colonel ............. Lieutenant Colonel fectiveness, especially during night operations.
Recommended publications
  • Rossiskaya Zabota (Russian Care)
    Counterpart Foundation, Inc. 910 17"Sbeet,NWSrite328 ~DC#]006 Final Report Partnership Project vwth Rossiskaya Zabota (Russian Care) Submitted to: World Learning, Inc. Table af Contents Executive Summary Program Activities Significance of Activities Comments and Recommendations Attachments Financial Report Russian Care Brochure Board of Trustees Listing . Pilot Project Evaluation Questionnaire Kaliningrad Bakery ~quipmentList CHAP Distributions through Russian Care CHAP Memorandum of Agreement -- February 1996 Photographs from Project Activities Counterpart Foundation Rossiskaya Za bota 9 10 17th Street, NW, #328 Vozdvizhenka ulitsa Washington, DC 20006 Dom 9 Tel. (202) 296-9676 Moscow, Russia 12 10 19 Fax. (202)296-9679 Tel./Fax. (7095) 290-0703 --- - " 7 2=-3z- DOT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY With a subgrant from World Learning in 1993, Counterpart formed a partnership with Rossiskaya Zabota (Russian Care) - an indigenous non-governmental organization (NGO) created in 1992 to address the growing economic and social needs of the Russian military family. Followi~gtwo years of targeted training and technical assistance, Rossiskuya Zabota has emerged as a more effective, self-sufficient social service provider. Through staff development, direct investment in pilot projects, and humanitarian aid for children, Counterpart has helped to increase the viability and capacity of its local partner to design, implement and monitor its own programs. Joint project activities, conducted under the auspices of the World Learning grant, have played a unique role in enabling Rossiskaya Zabota to expand its outreach to greater numbers of high risk children, fpilies, and communities. Building upon the program's success, Counterpart and Rossiskuya Zabota successfully leveraged an additional $1.7 million in financial and in-kind contributions to the initial half-million dollar grant.
    [Show full text]
  • Views of Five Khanh Hoa Viet Cong Prisoners of War On
    —n '(f "’ , • -----~• ... _, ..• .,_~ •.., ~ \ _____,_......:-..a,.\._LrUJ•...:»..---.......,____.....:.... __ -~,.a: -- • ‘17:" '- unsung ... _- ,'. ... .‘ ' . _ l I *-u ’| ,- -. :3??? -" I. *find ".' .' r, “'- 'W'b’FOVe’proved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772377 "T; I. 1: y. _..a 1'. .. I‘ T‘JZ'YI‘H“ '5‘, ‘TO‘FMWS‘EO'OTO‘HH 0877237 iffi%{2?%1.EKHRTJ¢¥Wifififlfifiififlfififi¥33Ru3» u -w.._«whfifififlgfifiVVNfijfifififii§§fifiggflg •• • EO ' ‘ 13526 ' •o PRIORITY 3.3(h)(2)3.3(h)(2 CENTRAL iNTELLIGENCEINTELLIGENCE AGENCYACENCY EO . IN 44916“#916 . IntelligenceIntelligenCe InfInformationonnation Cable 13526 PAGE 1 OF12OF 12 PWig-5(0) ~.5(c) STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MCMC CSECDEF{SECDEP JCS.Ics ARM?ARMY NAVYHAW AIR>AIR) CIA/NMCC NICmc NSANBA SDO500 ONEcm: (Tiny ssgr/zfmnDD/ t BIAEXO mace! OER FBISF319 DCSncs IRSms AID 1A Thts mntcrlnl '9Pcontalnsmin lnforme.tloni BH'ectlngeflectin the NationalNe.Uonol Defense of thothe 'OnttedUnited States wttblnwithin the meanlni;meaning Ofor tbethe EsDlonngeionnge Laws,Lawn. Tlt.leTitle 18,18. t1.B.O.0.3.0. secs.Ehecig fl793z‘ggcgwi and C73.794, tbein: gnégrsntl'IUlllmlB&Onfiaiésg?‘ or revelationreve Titian of wblcbwhich IDin 110.:,an? mannermanor to an unautborlZcdunauthorized per&0nperson 1Bis prohlbltedprohibited byy lnw.law. GROUP I ' !Ild:§::'°l::¥nog:i:n:jI ■d..d•d fro• 0111t0fft0tif N~EMN0 F 155m cl01fllP19•adi111g o,id I dHl011.1 foe a 16011 - ' -- THIS IS AEJNFORMATIONAN NFORMATION REPORT,REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. ---”MT--- -c- -- ·: - I CITE(315% 3.5(c) 5 CONF IALIALE l 0G14os06n+ ' z ~~~~~~ ECONF. A . .. — ' 05 Z DIST[”51- 6 FEBRUARY 1968 COUNTRYcwmm ' SOUTH%MHWUMM‘ VIETNAM 1110/7/09 fl✓wv9545-II 9-13 DOI 3.3(h)(2)3911112) SUBJECT VIEWS OF FIVE KHANH HOA VIET‘JIET CONG PRISONERS OF0F WARMAR ON OBJECTIVES OF CURRENT VC MILITtRYMILITARY ACTI~ITY~ACTIVITYQ ' ' THEIR RESPONSI~ILITIESRESPONSIEILTTIES HAD T~ETHE VC TAKEN NHA C'-.
    [Show full text]
  • Türkçe Öğreniyoruz 3
    TÜRKÇE ÖĞRENİYORUZ 3 Türkçe - İngilizce Anahtar Kitap Türkçe Öğreniyoruz HI Türkçe - İngilizce Anahtar Kitap Nur Yamaç - Isabella Akıncı engin yayınevi TATİL PROGRAMI HOLIDAY PROGRAMME tatil yapmak to have a holiday, to go on holiday aynı şekilde in the same way konuşmak to talk karar vermek to decide ısrar etmek to insist on hem... hem de both... and... (...and..., too) tarihî eser historical works birkaç a few, a couple bir yerde kalmak to stay somewhere yakın yerler nearby places gezmek to go about, to travel, to cruise (on a ship) uzun uzadıya extensively tartışmak to discuss turizm acentesi travel agency bir şey sormak to ask a question dikkatle dinlemek to listen carefully gülerek smilingly, with a smiling face tavsiye etmek to advise yat yacht yata binmek to board a yacht sahil boyunca along the coast antik kent antique city bir şeye rastlamak to come across something ıssız ada desert island gürültü noise kafa dinlemek to rest in a quiet place anlaşmak to come to an agreement MAVİ YOLCULUK THE BLUE CRUISE güneşin doğması sunrise teknek boat uyumak to sleep güneş the sun altın bir küre gibi like a golden sphere gece night karanlık darkness bir şeyi yok etmek to make something disappear köpük foam ilerlemek to move, to go forward rüzgar the wind saç hair bir şeyi okşamak to caress (or stroke) something balık fish güneşin ilk ışıkları the first rays of the sun bir şeyle yarış yapmak to race against something teknenin sağ yanında on the right side of the boat yunus balığı dolphin, porpoise gözlerine inanamak not to be able to believe
    [Show full text]
  • Gerasimov Doctrine’: Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch
    King’s Research Portal Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication record in King's Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Fridman, O. (2019). On ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’: Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch. Prism, 8(2), 101- 112. Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. •Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research. •You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain •You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
    [Show full text]
  • Factors Influencing Russian Force Modernization Dr
    Changing Character of War Centre Pembroke College, University of Oxford With Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation Factors Influencing Russian Force Modernization Dr. Lester Grau and Charles K. Bartles1 September 2018 A wide-spread Russian perception is that Russia is back as a significant Eurasian power whose opinions and desires need to be understood and accommodated. Russia has regained its national pride, confidence and sense of destiny. Russia still feels threatened from the south and the west and is taking political and military steps to deal with that unease. Historically, Russia feels most secure when it has a strong leader and a strong military. Russians are willing to forego much in order to ensure their security. There are perceived internal and external threats to the Russian state and Russia is addressing these through military reform, military restructuring, force modernization, equipment modernization as well as domestic security restructuring and modernization. Understanding those factors that drive these actions facilitates and potential forms of future war may assist understanding Russian official statements and actions. External Factors The Character of Future War Russia and the Soviet Union have always been primarily a ground power, with the Navy and Air Force functioning as supporting services. After the Second World War, the Soviets believed that future modem warfare would closely resemble the battles they had fought in the last years of the war, albeit with nuclear weapons.2 The military that the Russian Federation inherited in the 1990s had a bloated command structure designed for the command and control of literally thousands of divisions, regiments, and battalions, with the vast majority of these units being ‘skeleton units’ manned by small cadres that would help flesh out the unit with conscripts and reservists in the event of a mass mobilization.
    [Show full text]
  • Asevelvollisuuslakia Uudistettiin Julkiset Suomen Sotakoira
    Ruotuväki, PL 25, 00131 HKI MP2 Itella Oyj Asevelvollisuuslakia uudistettiin Erikoistapauksissa kertausharjoituksiin aiempaa nopeammin. uutiset, sivu 4 puolustusvoimien uutislehti 54. vuosikerta n:o 13 (1190) 14.7.2016 verkossa > www.ruotuvaki.fi Kuva: puolustusvoimat Maailma on turvallisuuspoliittisessa myllerryk- sessä. Ulkoministeri Timo Soinin mukaan suoma- laisten sotilaiden läsnäolo Lähi-idässä esimerkiksi Tulevaisuus ja kouluttajina luo turvallisuusriskin myös Suomeen. – Vaikka emme osallistu taisteluihin ja omia tap- pioita ei toistaiseksi ole, toimintaan liittyy aina riskejä. Jonkun on kuitenkin noustava Daeshia turvallisuus vastaan, Soini painottaa. UUTISET, SIVU 3 Suomen Sotakoira Julkiset EUBG-joukot löytää saunat lähtövalmiudessa räjähteen ovat noususssa UUTISET, SIVU 6 KENTÄLLÄ, SIVU 10 VAPAALLA, SIVU 15 2 ruotuväki 13/2016 PÄÄKIRJOITUS NURKKA 14.7.2016 Viholliskuvia Ylpeästi yhdenvertainen usein vääris- Ylikersantti Juho Pylvänäinen avasi mel- poliittisia tavoitteita. toteutuvat varuskunta-arjessa. koisen Pandoran lippaan osallistuttuaan Yhden puolustusvoimien työntekijän pu- Ylikersantti Pylvänäisestä julkaistu kuva Pride-kulkueeseen Helsingissä. Häntä kriti- keutumisen sijaan täytyisi keskustella isom- sai monet suomalaiset lähettämään hänelle tellään soitiin erityisesti sotilaspuvun käytöstä. Eri masta kysymyksestä: tasa-arvosta ja yhden- vihaviestejä, joissa kyseenalaistettiin hänen mieltä oltiin siitä, onko univormussa esiinty- vertaisuudesta. kykynsä toimia sotilaana. Sukupuoli, ihon- Maanpuolustuksen tarpeisiin on
    [Show full text]
  • The North Caucasus: the Challenges of Integration (III), Governance, Elections, Rule of Law
    The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (III), Governance, Elections, Rule of Law Europe Report N°226 | 6 September 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Russia between Decentralisation and the “Vertical of Power” ....................................... 3 A. Federative Relations Today ....................................................................................... 4 B. Local Government ...................................................................................................... 6 C. Funding and budgets ................................................................................................. 6 III. Elections ........................................................................................................................... 9 A. State Duma Elections 2011 ........................................................................................ 9 B. Presidential Elections 2012 ......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Kazakhstan Missile Chronology
    Kazakhstan Missile Chronology Last update: May 2010 As of May 2010, this chronology is no longer being updated. For current developments, please see the Kazakhstan Missile Overview. This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here. Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation. 2009-1947 March 2009 On 4 March 2009, Kazakhstan signed a contract to purchase S-300 air defense missile systems from Russia. According to Ministry of Defense officials, Kazakhstan plans to purchase 10 batteries of S-300PS by 2011. Kazakhstan's Air Defense Commander Aleksandr Sorokin mentioned, however, that the 10 batteries would still not be enough to shield all the most vital" facilities designated earlier by a presidential decree. The export version of S- 300PS (NATO designation SA-10C Grumble) has a maximum range of 75 km and can hit targets moving at up to 1200 m/s at a minimum altitude of 25 meters.
    [Show full text]
  • ON the EFFECTIVE USE of PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 © 2021 Andrew Peek All Rights Reserved
    ON THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 2021 Andrew Peek All rights reserved Abstract This dissertation asks a simple question: how are states most effectively conducting proxy warfare in the modern international system? It answers this question by conducting a comparative study of the sponsorship of proxy forces. It uses process tracing to examine five cases of proxy warfare and predicts that the differentiation in support for each proxy impacts their utility. In particular, it proposes that increasing the principal-agent distance between sponsors and proxies might correlate with strategic effectiveness. That is, the less directly a proxy is supported and controlled by a sponsor, the more effective the proxy becomes. Strategic effectiveness here is conceptualized as consisting of two key parts: a proxy’s operational capability and a sponsor’s plausible deniability. These should be in inverse relation to each other: the greater and more overt a sponsor’s support is to a proxy, the more capable – better armed, better trained – its proxies should be on the battlefield. However, this close support to such proxies should also make the sponsor’s influence less deniable, and thus incur strategic costs against both it and the proxy. These costs primarily consist of external balancing by rival states, the same way such states would balance against conventional aggression. Conversely, the more deniable such support is – the more indirect and less overt – the less balancing occurs.
    [Show full text]
  • Policing in Federal States
    NEPAL STEPSTONES PROJECTS Policing in Federal States Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler (Eds.) Policing in Federal States Edited by Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) www.dcaf.ch The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces is one of the world’s leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG). DCAF provides in-country advisory support and practical assis- tance programmes, develops and promotes appropriate democratic norms at the international and national levels, advocates good practices and makes policy recommendations to ensure effective democratic governance of the security sector. DCAF’s partners include governments, parliaments, civil society, international organisations and the range of security sector actors such as police, judiciary, intelligence agencies, border security ser- vices and the military. 2011 Policing in Federal States Edited by Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler Geneva, 2011 Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler, eds., Policing in Federal States, Nepal Stepstones Projects Series # 2 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011). Nepal Stepstones Projects Series no. 2 © Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011 Executive publisher: Procon Ltd., <www.procon.bg> Cover design: Angel Nedelchev ISBN 978-92-9222-149-2 PREFACE In this book we will be looking at specimens of federative police or- ganisations. As can be expected, the federative organisation of such states as Germany, Switzerland, the USA, India and Russia will be reflected in their police organisation, though the extremely decentralised approach of Switzerland with hardly any central man- agement structures can hardly serve as a paradigm of ‘the’ federal police organisation.
    [Show full text]
  • Manpower Problems of the Russian Armed Forces
    Conflict Studies Research Centre D62 Manpower Problems of The Russian Armed Forces M J Orr Introduction On 15 January Lt Gen Vasiliy Smirnov, deputy head of the main organization- mobilization directorate of the Russian general staff, announced the preliminary results of the autumn 2001 conscription period. "The plan of the autumn call-up as laid down in the Russian Federation's President's decree No. 148 has been carried out. Between October and December 2001 more than 194,000 Russian citizens, aged from 18 to 27, were sent to the army and fleet … (T)he quality of the conscript contingent is getting worse. Out of every 100 potential conscripts last year the military commissariats were only able to draft 12 young men; the remainder had legal reasons for being excused military service. Today in Russia every third potential conscript proves unfit for service on health grounds … more than 50% of the conscripts sent to the forces have health limitations on their fitness for service."1 Such statements emerge from the organization-mobilization department twice a year, as a sort of ritual bringing the conscription campaign to a close. Each time the decreed quantity of recruits has been found and each time their quality has declined. Within these standardized announcements there is no suggestion that the whole system for recruiting the Russian armed forces is steadily collapsing. Last autumn, however, there were indications that, at long last, the Russian government has accepted that the system must be changed. Programmes to phase out conscription are being considered although it is not clear that the general staff has accepted that a professional army is desirable or practical.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies
    September 14, 2020 Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies Russia has an extensive internal security system, with Competition frequently leads to arrests and prosecutions, multiple, overlapping, and competitive security agencies often for real or imagined corruption allegations to undercut vying for bureaucratic, political, and economic influence. targeted organizations and senior leadership both Since Vladimir Putin assumed Russia’s leadership, these institutionally and politically. agencies have grown in both size and power, and they have become integral to the security and stability of the Russian Law Enforcement and Internal government. If Putin extends his rule beyond 2024, as is Security Agencies and Heads now legally permissible, these agencies could play a role in (as of September 2020) the leadership succession process and affect the ability of a transitional regime to quell domestic dissent. For Members Ministry of Interior (MVD): Vladimir Kolokoltsev of Congress, understanding the numerous internal security National Guard (Rosgvardiya, FSVNG): Viktor Zolotov agencies in Russia could be helpful in assessing the x Special Purpose Mobile Units (OMON) prospects of regime stability and dynamics of a transition x Special Rapid Response Detachment (SOBR) after Putin leaves office. In addition, Russian security agencies and their personnel have been targeted by U.S. x Interior Troops (VV) sanctions for cyberattacks and human rights abuses. x Kadyrovtsy Overview and Context Federal Security Service (FSB): Alexander Bortnikov
    [Show full text]