EU Action Plan Against Migrant Smuggling

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EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling

Evidence Volume

Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) ...... 2 Amnesty International UK—Written Evidence ...... 18 Amnesty International UK—Supplementary Written Evidence ...... 25 British Red Cross—Written Evidence ...... 29 Dr Franck Düvell and Migration Policy Institute Europe —Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39) ...... 32 Eurojust—Written Evidence ...... 44 European Commission and FRONTEX—Oral Evidence (QQ 64-72) ...... 46 European Council on Refugees and Exiles—Written Evidence ...... 60 Europol—Oral Evidence (QQ 13-22) ...... 68 Europol—Written Evidence ...... 78 Frontex—Written Evidence ...... 82 Frontex and European Commission—Oral Evidence (QQ 64-72) ...... 89 Home Office—Oral Evidence (QQ 52-63) ...... 90 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International UK—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) ...... 107 Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association—Written Evidence ...... 108 International Organization for Migration—Written Evidence ...... 118 Migrants’ Rights Network—Written Evidence ...... 127 Migration Policy Institute Europe and Dr Franck Düvell—Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39) ...... 131 National Crime Agency—Oral Evidence (QQ 40-51) ...... 132 National Crime Agency—Written Evidence ...... 148 Refugee Council—Written Evidence ...... 152 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-12) ...... 162

Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31)

Evidence Session No. 3 Heard in Public Questions 23 – 31

Members present

Baroness Prashar (Chairman) Lord Condon Lord Cormack Lord Faulkner of Worcester Baroness Janke Lord Jay of Ewelme Baroness Massey of Darwen Lord Morris of Handsworth Lord Ribeiro Lord Soley ______

Examination of Witnesses

Steve Symonds, Programme Director, Refugee and Migrants Rights, Amnesty International UK, and David Mepham, UK Director, Human Rights Watch

Q23 The Chairman: Good morning, Mr Mepham and Mr Symonds. Thank you for your time this morning. As you know, we are looking into the EU action plan against migrant smuggling. You have been notified of the questions that we are likely to ask. The session is open to the public, and a webcast transmission goes out live. A verbatim transcript is taken and you will be sent this. Please let us have any corrections that you would like to make. If you want to give us any supplementary evidence after you receive the transcript, please feel free to do so. Would you like to introduce yourselves? If there is anything you would like to say by way of introduction, that would be helpful. David Mepham: I am happy to kick off. Thank you for the invitation to give evidence to the Committee today. I am David Mepham. I am the UK Director of Human Rights Watch. I suspect that many of you are broadly familiar with the work of Human Rights Watch, but in terms of the perspective and the contribution that we can make to your Committee's discussions and deliberations, we have done an awful lot of work on the countries from which many asylum seekers and migrants are coming—really detailed documentary investigation and research into the human rights conditions in those countries. Most recently, we have done a lot of work interviewing of and talking to people who have arrived off the ships in Italy and Greece, who have a very good understanding of the factors that have contributed to their movement. I do not know whether Steve wants to introduce himself. I have a couple of introductory comments that I wanted to make, but maybe we should do the introductions first and then I will come back to them. The Chairman: Yes.

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Steve Symonds: Hello. My name is Steve Symonds. I am the Programme Director for Refugee and Migrant Rights at Amnesty International UK. That is the UK section of an international movement. We have several sections across Europe that are being coordinated by the international secretariat on those issues concerning the agenda. Similarly, as with David, our organisation has partaken in a lot of research both in countries of origin and in reviewing what is happening in the Mediterranean with those arrivals. David Mepham: Perhaps in terms of introductory comments, we could frame our contribution to your session this morning. The Chairman: It would be helpful if you could speak up a little. David Mepham: Of course. I will speak up and speak slowly. While recognising that smuggling is an important issue per se and obviously the focus of your Committee’s inquiry, it is important to say at the outset that we at Human Rights Watch do not think that smuggling is the primary cause of the migration crisis that is facing Europe, or that it can be addressed in isolation from the broader context and the broader factors that are contributing to this multidimensional, complex phenomenon. We think that it is particularly important to understand the factors that are leading people to make the choice to take the great risks involved in making the perilous sea journeys to Europe. That is not to say that some smugglers do not act in abusive ways. We have documented examples of that and we can come back to that in the session if that is helpful. But we think that focusing on smuggling to the exclusion of the wider context would not help to address this problem very effectively and might lead to an unbalanced policy response that does not address satisfactorily the major drivers—the major causes—of large-scale migration flows. It might also inadvertently minimise Europe’s human rights and humanitarian legal obligations towards some very vulnerable people. It is fair to say that that is the context, because the Committee is looking at UK government policy as well as EU policy, but we think that there has been a tendency on the part of the Government, including James Brokenshire, who addressed your Committee a couple of weeks ago, to portray this crisis as primarily an issue of law enforcement and border control. We disagree with that analysis in our approach. We think that the UK and the EU should be focusing much more on the underlying causes and underlying drivers and have a policy that is more consistent with legal obligations. I will make just two more quick points that are relevant to this discussion and this issue that you are grappling with as a Committee. Of course, in this session and in the other sessions that you are having, you will have debates about smuggling and trafficking and the legal distinctions between them. But it is very important that we do not lose sight of the human dimension to this. It is true, of course, that in the last couple of months there has been a big reduction in the number of people dying at sea and that is obviously welcome. That is the result of the fact that, belatedly, European states got their act together and enhanced the search and rescue capacity that had been wrongly scaled back a year before, but people are still dying at sea. The media have moved on now, but actually people are still dying. Just on 7 July, a boat with 30 to 40 people going from Turkey to Greece went down. There are other examples of crossings to Italy where people are still dying. Enhancing, strengthening and maintaining the search and rescue capacity remains essential. I was a bit worried by Mr Brokenshire’s comment that the role of the HMS “Enterprise”, which has replaced HMS “Bulwark”, is primarily about trying to get intelligence on the smuggling networks. He seemed to play down its contribution to actually saving people and rescuing people at sea. That is an issue of concern.

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Finally, a contextual point that is very important for your Committee to think about is the desperate conditions that asylum seekers and migrants are facing when they arrive in Europe, particularly in Greece. The focus has switched to Greece a lot and more people are coming to Greece now than to Italy. We have done some research on this in the past couple of months. The conditions are very bad. There is an unfolding humanitarian crisis, in a way. Greece obviously has much wider economic problems that it is grappling with but it simply does not have the resources or the capacity, it seems, to provide appropriate reception facilities or appropriate conditions to greet the asylum seekers and migrants who are arriving. We have seen examples of overcrowding, insanitary conditions and inadequate access to healthcare and food. The conditions are so poor that in our judgment they may amount to inhuman and degrading treatment facing those asylum seekers. We should not lose sight of that human dimension. There is a very real crisis, particularly in Greece, facing these people who are coming across to Europe at the moment. The Chairman: Thank you very much for that. Do you wish to make any introductory comments, Mr Symonds? Steve Symonds: Perhaps I can add just two things. First, we completely agree with that analysis, so I will not repeat any of it. The one matter that is perhaps worth adding is to think back to about 18 months ago, when the Commission was looking at a similar problem following the tragedies at Lampedusa in October 2013, where 500 migrants died. The Commission then set out a series of proposals, which included tackling migrant smuggling and the need for safe and legal routes and resettlement programmes. There were also proposals around border security and co-operation with third countries around that. Last time, the member states, as David has alluded to, concentrated on border security matters and did not address the safe and legal routes. We have seen that the market for people smuggling has grown significantly, so the strength of those networks and the degree of movement have grown and the problem has become much more difficult and more intractable. So here we are again with the Commission again proposing a suite of measures that need to be addressed holistically. Unfortunately, member states, and not just the UK— there are others—are similarly minded to concentrate on the more policing aspects of these at the exclusion of some of the wider issues and certainly some of the issues of creating safe and legal routes, which would reduce, if implemented, the demand for people smuggling.

Q24 The Chairman: Thank you. You have already touched on this, but someone was questioning what the term “irregular migration” means. What are the causes of it? Mr Brokenshire suggested to us that those who are involved in irregular migration are normally economic migrants and not refugees. What is your view? David Mepham: I expect that we will both have a fair bit to say about that. We produced a report, which we published in June: The Mediterranean Migrant Crisis: Why People Flee, What The EU Should Do. If Committee members have not seen that, I am obviously happy to share it with you. It was based on interviews with a whole range of people who arrived in Italy and Greece, research that we carried out in May and June. We have also drawn on research that we have done for many years in the big countries from which these people originate: Syria, Eritrea, Somalia and Afghanistan. Actually, up until May this year, those four countries accounted for more than 60% of the people arriving in Italy and Greece. I should say a brief word about each of those countries. I do not want to spend very much time on Syria because you will be very familiar with how awful the situation is there. I know that you saw a representative from the UNHCR last week, who talked about the 4 million Syrian refugees outside the country—mostly in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan—and the 7.6

4 of 175 Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) million internally displaced people, i.e. the one in two Syrians displaced from their homes as a result of this conflict. There is no let-up in that, as we all know. Arguably, in many ways the humanitarian situation within the country is deteriorating further, which is a big part of the explanation of why people continue to leave Syria in very large numbers to seek refugee and safety outside the country. Eritrea is perhaps surprising. It is not a country that gets a lot of public, political or media attention, but considering it is such a small country it accounts for quite a large proportion of the people seeking to come to Europe on these boats. Some members of the Committee will be aware of the really appalling human rights situation in Eritrea. We and others have documented that over the years. It is very hard to get access to the country, but on the basis of the work that we have done talking to people who left Eritrea we get a bit of a picture as to what is happening there. There was momentum behind establishing what was called a commission of inquiry by the UN Commission on Human Rights. That was set up in 2014 and it reported in June this year, so very recently. It found that there were, “systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations”. It concluded that, “violations in the areas of extrajudicial executions, torture (including sexual torture)”, compulsory “national service and forced labour may constitute crimes against humanity”. UN reports do not get much more damning than that. It is a pretty good indication as to why so many people seek to leave Eritrea to find security elsewhere. Again, that comes through from the testimony. When we speak to Eritreans, as we have done in Italy and Greece, they tell us very much about these atrocious conditions. Compulsory military service is a big thing that people want to avoid, and it is a very brutal part of the very brutal Eritrean regime. On Afghanistan, again I suspect that we in the UK are very familiar with what is going on there. Perhaps people have forgotten that human rights conditions in the country remain very poor. The Taliban and other groups have captured some territory and people have been displaced. In 2015, tens of thousands of people have been displaced. Again, that is probably a good part of the explanation for why Afghans continue to seek safety outside the country. A very large number of Afghans have left and continue to leave Afghanistan for the reasons to do with human rights conditions that we are perhaps well familiar with. Lastly, there is Somalia. Again, people are aware that the Government of Somalia exercise very little control outside Mogadishu. In south-central Somalia you have the problem with al- Shabaab, which is responsible for really egregious human rights abuses such as attacks on children and sexual violence. That is a big factor. Again, on the basis of the testimony that we have from Somalis who arrived in Italy in Greece, that is a big part of the explanation for why they left. There is perhaps a final factor that is very important for your Committee to think about: the transit country, Libya. A lot of people coming to Italy do so in particular from Libya. As we know, since 2014 in particular there has been a rapid and very serious deterioration in the situation in Libya, with a conflict between the two competing Governments of the country, very widespread human rights abuses and violations, lots of people killed and an estimated 430,000 people displaced. Again, I will just share some testimony with you. This is interesting in a context in which the Prime Minister talked about turning back the boats, suggesting perhaps that people should go back to Libya. But that is a good question: turning back the boats to where? The testimony that we have on the way in which some detainees have been treated in Libya includes these kinds of comments: detainees told us that the guards beat them with iron rods, sticks and rifle butts, and whipped them with cables, hosepipes and rubber whips made from car tyres or plastic tubes. They also said that the guards burnt them with cigarettes, kicked and punched them on their torsos and heads, and used electric

5 of 175 Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) shocks on them. This is going on in Libya now. It is a big part of the explanation of why so many people who were in Libya as a transit country—who had left possibly Syria, Somalia or Afghanistan—then decided that the risk was worth taking to make the crossing to Europe. I want to bring Steve in as well, but overall the testimony that we have and the work that we have done in those four countries in particular suggest to us that there are very powerful drivers and push factors that lead people to do this. People as a general rule do not want to leave their homes. They do so if they feel they have no other choice and if the circumstances are just so violent and dangerous for them that they feel they must flee. That is a big part of the explanation for the flight and migration crisis that we are grappling with. The Chairman: Mr Symonds, do you want to add anything? Steve Symonds: I will add a little but not much. Essentially, our analysis is the same as David’s. I think it is essentially the same as you heard from the UNHCR last week, too. There are other conflicts in the region that David might have referred to: the ongoing conflict in South Sudan and in the Central African Republic, and obviously a repressive regime still in Sudan. So there are other places you might look for similar experiences. The one thing I would say a little more about, though David rightly said a lot about it, is the context of Libya. On the whole, Libya is not a root cause, but it is a particularly cruel additional dimension to what we are seeing. Perhaps it is worth stressing in particular in relation to Libya that a whole range of refugees and migrants have ended up there, not all of whom have been seeking to move to Europe. Libya has been a destination country for people seeking safety with family connections but also for migrant workers for many years. Because of the crisis in Libya and the deterioration of that state, we have seen large numbers of people who have essentially become trapped there. Neighbouring countries have closed their borders. The situation is particularly grave for migrants in Libya. That is the evidence that we have seen. We documented that in our report. Libya is full of cruelty, to which I referred in the written submissions I sent to the Committee. You received those only yesterday, so I doubt Committee members will have seen them yet, but they are there and I refer you to them. That means that in relation to Libya, whether you are talking about refugees—I completely agree with David’s and the UNHRC analysis that the majority of the people we are talking about with these movements are indeed refugees—or those who are not refugees, and there are significant numbers of those, many of them are leaving Libya for reasons that are just as strong as everybody else’s. They are just as at risk in Libya as any other foreign national migrant. They do not have any other options. Essentially, if the focus on tackling migrant smuggling in relation to the Libya crisis in particular is simply to stop the option of escaping by sea, that will leave tens of thousands of people in a particularly dire and dangerous circumstance—in some instances in the hands of government officials, in others smugglers and armed gangs, but those who have perpetuated extreme human rights abuses, many of which David listed. Other abuses might be listed, many of them to be found in both David’s and our reports. The Chairman: It was suggested to us that the way to tackle the causes of migration was to provide safe and legal routes for refugees. What is your view? Steve Symonds: We have strongly urged that, and as I said that featured in proposals from the commission, and not just this time around. It featured strongly, although in less detail, in proposals from the commission 18 months ago. You also heard this, although perhaps less clearly expressed, from the director of Europol last week. He essentially told you that an holistic approach is necessary, and that critical to achieving a significant reduction in people smuggling is reducing the numbers of people who turn to people smugglers. Clearly a primary effort in achieving that must be to establish routes for those who have legitimate

6 of 175 Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) reasons for travel to seek safety in Europe. That will certainly mean safe and legal routes for refugees. It certainly means an increase in resettlement programmes. Yes, we have emphasised that for many months and will continue to do so. David Mepham: We would agree with that. Maybe this takes us into the discussion about both resettlement and the relocation of people. There was a meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council in Brussels on Monday. We are still very disappointed that the British Government continue to refuse to participate in that. We think it is in many ways a modest measure to try to ease the burden faced by Italy and Greece. Given the kinds of conditions I described in Greece, it seems a very reasonable and responsible thing that a country such as Britain ought to participate in and say, “We have a sense of solidarity here and we will help to ease the burden and take some of these people to the UK”. The reasons that have been given for not doing so are not convincing. There is also the resettlement issue that Steve referred to. As you know, and as you will have heard from the UNHCR representative, they asked about 130,000 Syrians—let us talk just about Syrians for a moment—who have particular needs. Anybody who has left Syria has needs, but they identified 130,000 Syrians as particularly vulnerable, and they asked the international community to agree to resettle them. Europe’s collective response to that has frankly been pitiful, and the British Government’s refusal to take those people is also unacceptable. Lord Ribeiro: I ask both of you: why Europe? Why not Africa? In other words, many of these people are from sub-Saharan Africa. You have described those who have come to Libya as migrant workers and then they are trapped. But it seems to be in one direction only: to Europe. Discussions and accords are taking place under the Khartoum process. There is a suggestion of areas in Niger; there are camps in Kenya. Why should we not look at other routes for these people rather than focus on Europe? David Mepham: Just to understand the question, when you say look at other routes, do you mean that Britain and Europe should be trying to return people to those countries? Lord Ribeiro: No, I am saying that Britain and Europe should be having a dialogue with the African Union to find other ways of preventing a push to Europe as opposed to the pull factor we have heard about; in other words, if there is opportunities to find refuge for people on the African continent, why should those not be explored? Your argument seems to be one-dimensional. David Mepham: It is not one-dimensional. Everyone is in favour of dialogue. It is important that the European Union is talking to countries in Africa about these issues, and perhaps talking in a more intensive way than it has done in the past. Our concern would be whether the conditions in some of these countries are such that migrants and asylum seekers will get appropriate protection. Lord Ribeiro: The world is not a perfect place. David Mepham: It is certainly not a perfect place, as we know from our work, but we have some responsibility not to encourage people to go somewhere they are likely to be put in further jeopardy. In those kinds of places we would be very concerned about whether individuals who had been displaced from one conflict, such as Syria, would end up being treated very badly. I am not against the dialogue. I am definitely not against the European Union talking to African countries about strengthening and improving their systems and helping with capacity. The caution that we would bring to it from a human rights perspective

7 of 175 Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) is whether there is a slight danger of pushing people away to a place where they are unlikely to be given the kind of protection that they need. Steve Symonds: It is worth adding that it is important to remember that something like 87% of the world’s refugees—not displaced people, which includes a much larger number of people internally displaced inside states—who have left their home country because of persecution are to be found in the poorest nations around the world, many of which are African nations. Ethiopia is currently hosting around 650,000 refugees. Kenya has the largest refugee camp in the world, and has done so for years and years. The situation in other sub- Saharan African states is similarly extreme. So it is not as though there is simply one route in one direction; in comparison with the global refugee crisis, we are talking about a relatively small number of people. Yes, we also agree that the EU and individual member states should be talking to and seeking to co-operate with the African Union and individual African states. But as David says, just as if we want the co-operation of member states such as Italy and Greece, we have to show some solidarity with what they are experiencing, the same goes for African states. It is no good the European Union thinking that it can simply demand of African states—or, indeed, Asian states that are much poorer than Europe—that they can continue to bear by far the greater numbers and pressure without some greater degree of sharing of responsibility here. David Mepham: I agree with all that. I would just add that, as we know, the countries that are hosting the vast majority of Syrians are Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. Frankly, they are creaking under the strain, particularly Lebanon, where refugees make up one in four of the population, but even in Turkey there is a huge number of people—1.7 million is the latest figure, I think. In terms of burden sharing, the countries that are currently bearing the burden of hosting Syrians are the neighbouring countries, not the European Union. As Steve says, the proposition on the table is actually that a very small percentage of those people, who have particular needs, might come to Europe and be given some support in Europe. The Chairman: We need to move on. Lord Faulkner.

Q25 Lord Faulkner of Worcester: My question is one to which your answer is going to be no, which is: are European Union member states currently doing enough to meet their obligations? Mr Mepham, can you elaborate on what your colleague Judith Sunderland was quoted as saying in the Wall Street Journal yesterday, where she called the process disgraceful and described “unseemly haggling over the numbers”? David Mepham: I have not seen Jude’s article but she is a dear colleague of mine. She was probably referring to the Justice and Home Affairs meeting on Monday, I suspect—unless there is more information from the article—where, as you know, the question of numbers was discussed, the issue about the 40,000 that we have just been talking about was discussed, and Europe argued with itself and still failed to agree to take this very small number of people to Europe and give them some safety, security and protection and to agree a responsibility-sharing arrangement across the European Union. Of course, the British Government are in the position of not wanting to participate in that. They have been very clear that they are not going to participate. As I said a moment ago, I do not see the rationale for that and why they are so obstinate in refusing to do so. Recognising the scale of this crisis, it strikes me as a sensible way forward for the European Union as a whole to say, “This cannot be dealt with by one European country on its own or a handful of European countries on their own. This is going to require some kind of collective response”. Rather than having a sort of Dublin arrangement, where you are supposed to lodge your asylum claim in the first European country you land in—we are stuck with that for the foreseeable

8 of 175 Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) future, I suspect—it would make a lot more sense to transition to a better arrangement where Europe took some collective responsibility for looking after those people who are in need of protection and shared that out equitably among member states. That is our critique of what was discussed on Monday.

Q26 Baroness Janke: Does the existing framework strike the correct balance between immigration control and refugee protection? If not—as you are likely to think—how could future EU action address this imbalance, other than going over the same ground? Steve Symonds: As I understand it, the question is directed to the international framework regarding— Baroness Janke: The EU action plan. Steve Symonds: I will just briefly critique the action plan. First, it is important to recognise that it is a fairly high-level document, so I do not want to be too pedantic in my criticism. There are aspects of it that are very important. In its introductory paragraphs, before you get into the specifics around the four areas of action that are proposed, there is a clear reference to the need for more safe and legal ways into the EU, which is also addressed in the agenda. We strongly agree with that, and it is good to see that in the action plan. A problem with the action plan, however, is that when you get into those four objectives, first of all, there is an eliding of prevention of smuggling with assistance/protection for vulnerable migrants. If you look at international documents to do with tackling migrant smuggling or trafficking—indeed, if you look at the EU’s strategy in relation to trafficking—you will see that objectives that are directed to assistance and protection are always separated from those directed to prevention because they are separate and distinct issues. Of course they have to be looked at alongside each other, but they are not simply two sides of the same coin. Indeed, prevention of smuggling can lead to serious human rights abuses and further exacerbation of the vulnerability of, for example, refugees. If refugees do not have routes to seek safety, and you prevent options of smuggling, you potentially leave them in situations where their lives are at risk. It is important, as in other international instruments, to separate these issues out. Then when one looks at the detail of the action plan under the heading “Enhanced Prevention of Smuggling and Assistance to Vulnerable Migrants”, one sees that there is very little that deals with the issue of assistance or protection. Indeed, the one proposal under that heading is itself not specific. It is a proposal for a consultation about amending a directive, without any clarity as to what direction the amendment might take. Indeed, if one looks more broadly at the other objectives, protection is largely absent. That is a great worry in respect of the action plan. It is also a great worry in how this appears to be influencing the attitudes and approach of individual member states to the situation. It is this – action against migrant smuggling - that many of the member states have prioritised. Certainly our own Government have done so but the Spanish Government, the Dutch Government and many others, at least in their vocal statements, have prioritised this as the measure they want to engage in. If this measure is going to be prioritised in that way but itself does not adequately address issues of protection, it means that the rather depressing analysis that David and I started with of, if you do not take a holistic approach, what happens to the vulnerable people you are concerned with, is at risk of happening again, because this is essentially what happened last time around. The Chairman: How does the action plan stack up with the United Nations instruments?

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Steve Symonds: I can give the Committee a bit of a steer in relation to that, but I have to make it clear that Amnesty has not undertaken any sort of detailed analysis of the international legal position in respect of people smuggling, not least because people smuggling in and of itself does not constitute a human rights abuse and so traditionally it has not been a particular focus of our work. However, certainly one area of focus that would be of interest is that clearly the UNHCR representative referred the Committee to the work of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. It takes the lead on both the issue of trafficking of human beings and the issue of tackling people smuggling. In relation to people smuggling, there is an international framework for action to implement the relevant UN protocol. That again sets out four pillars differentiating, as I have said, prevention and protection. In relation to the international framework for action, there is a series of objectives and individual measures, and indeed of individual indicators, that go into great detail which all states are invited to engage with to assess whether their efforts to tackle people smuggling are meeting international standards. Included in that is the provision of protection for the human rights of people who are the victims in all of this. That is a good framework to start with. I am not an expert and I cannot offer expert evidence in respect of it, but it provides some basis for analysis. David Mepham: This is not an additional comment on the UN programmes but, similarly, that is not a particular focus of our work. I wanted to make a comment in response to your earlier question, which was about the plan. I agree with what Steve has said about this, but perhaps one point to highlight and flag up is the emphasis that ought to be given to the legal framework—Europe’s legal obligations and international obligations. There is a whole body of European Convention on Human Rights case law about this. There was a very interesting case back in 2012 called Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy in which the European Court of Human Rights found that the Italians had violated human rights by sending people back to Libya. So there are a lot of legal responsibilities on member states which they need to make sure are properly reflected in any kind of framework. My sense at the moment is that it is not given the prominence and priority that it ought to have in a document of this kind. The Chairman: Do you have a list of all the cases? David Mepham: I can certainly send you some details of that case and some others, if that would be useful to you. The Chairman: Thank you very much. Lord Soley: I do not have a problem with your overall analysis. It has been my view for many years that failed and failing states are going to drive this problem for a long time to come; that is, until we find a better way of dealing with failing states. But what I am struggling a bit with is something that you have referred to several times, which is creating alternative routes. I am aware of what the French do in some of the camps in the Middle East, but actually it is not very much. I am not sure how, at the end of the day, you really deal with this unless Europe in some way, either in Europe itself or in some of these other states, sets up and administers holding centres of some type. Otherwise, you will again be putting your finger in the dyke. David Mepham: I am happy to take that one first. I do not think that any of us is saying that just the creation of a legal route will solve this problem in and of itself. Lord Soley: If at all. David Mepham: It is a complex problem that requires a whole series of different policy responses. Amnesty has just argued that reducing the burden on some of the neighbouring

10 of 175 Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) states—let us take Syria as an example—that is, easing the burden on Jordan and Lebanon by taking some of these people would help and would be an important demonstration of solidarity. Lord Soley: A demonstration of support. David Mepham: Of course, in addition to that, the European Union and the international community need to do a lot more to address the underlying drivers. In a funny kind of way, if as a result of this migration crisis the world wakes up to the human rights crisis in Eritrea and the unfolding tragedy in Syria, as well as the situation in Afghanistan, and focuses much more attention on those things, as well as focusing much more attention on a political solution for Libya, that would be a good thing because those are the underlying drivers. Lord Soley: Can I stop you there? I agree with you and people are arguing that case. However, I do not think that it is going to happen any time soon. So when you refer to creating safer routes, is not part of what is necessary for that is for Europe to create holding centres where we can look after these people, if you like, and protect them in some way? The alternative is what I would call the finger in the dyke. David Mepham: It depends on where the centres are, which is the answer I gave to Lord Ribeiro. We would be concerned if they were in a country which has a very bad human rights track record— Lord Soley: Who would protect them when they are there? David Mepham: —but where the protection was being provided. But also, in practice, of course, and again coming back to Syria, a lot of these people are in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Those countries are taking on the responsibility of hosting Syrians. Another question around how we address this problem is whether enough resource and support is being provided for those countries to do that. Mr Brokenshire will say that we have given £900 million, and that is true. Britain has made a very substantial contribution to address this problem in those countries, but I think that more is probably needed, and more is needed by Europe as a whole and the international community as a whole to reduce the pressures on those countries that are leading to people saying, “We cannot stay here any longer. These conditions are unsustainable. We need to move on”. Actually, it can be argued that if Britain wanted to reduce the pressure, more focus on that might help in some way to ease the need and the desire for people to move on to Europe. Lord Soley: So you would agree that if the UK or Europe was able to persuade the United Nations and Libya to allow Europe to put a holding centre in Libya and lease it, in other words to look after people while the safer routes bit is dealt with, would that be a way forward? Otherwise, you are still saying that they have to stay in the countries where they are, and they are unsafe. I am not sure that you have thought through properly the issue of creating safer routes. It is a small part of the answer. David Mepham: I want just to be very clear and unambiguous on Libya: absolutely and emphatically not in Libya. One of the things that we have said very strongly in our public statements—Amnesty has said the same—is that Libya is so dangerous, violent and insecure, and migrants and asylum seekers are treated so appallingly in that country, there should be no scenario in which European leaders or the British Prime Minister are suggesting that people should go back to Libya. Libya should be beyond the pale in these terms. Lord Soley: We could defend an area in Libya if the United Nations gave us permission to do so.

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David Mepham: I think that that creates a whole new debate about whether you can carve out an area of Libya and police it with UN peacekeeping forces. We are not going to make that recommendation. We do not think that Libya is a place for that at the moment. One hopes that there will be some kind of political resolution in the next couple of years, but at the moment it is not a place where people can be protected. The Chairman: Lord Soley, we need to move on. Lord Soley: I want to make one last point. What worries me is that this is being discussed in the United Nations. There is a lack of thinking about safer routes.

Q27 Lord Condon: Good morning. Perhaps I may take you back to the third objective of the EU action plan. You have broadly answered our questions, but the action plan’s third objective, which is the enhanced prevention of smuggling and assistance to vulnerable migrants, has already been referred to by Mr Symonds when he described his unease about the linking of those two issues. We want to explore whether the third objective suggests the correct measures to achieve it. It is set out in bullet points such as providing information and running prevention campaigns in third countries on the risk of smuggling. Are there any broad headings that you feel should be in the action plan which are not there and that we have not explored or even gone into today? I ask that particularly in relation to assistance to vulnerable migrants. What are the big issues that are still missing from the action plan? Steve Symonds: Perhaps I can suggest two things, starting with the caveat that I gave about our ability to provide a more detailed analysis of this. The first, which slightly harks back to Lord Soley’s inquiry, so he might feel a little disappointed, is that it is disappointing to us that safe and legal ways are identified in the action plan but there is no positioning of that as a proposal in any of the objectives, and clearly this is the one that you would think it would appear in. That is certainly missing. With regard to the other, it is worth slightly elaborating on what I touched on earlier in relation to the international framework for action. That identifies a lot of capacity-building measures for law enforcement and other agencies to understand and identify risks and vulnerabilities of individuals and what to do about them. It identifies the need to understand the broader national frameworks that David was referring to and ensure that they are signed up to and indeed implemented. It is again disappointing that while there is much in this plan about co-operation with third countries, none of the co- operation that is referred to refers to anything about capacity-building on those lines in relation to those third countries, which would clearly be a valuable and important aspect of any working with African or indeed other states in relation to this. Lord Condon: How should that capacity-building be articulated in the plan? Steve Symonds: I do not want to get into too much detail because I think that would be for the experts, but the way to go about it would be to go to the framework: you could virtually lift the measures, objectives and indicators from that detailed framework and put them into a plan like this. They are designed to be adopted in that sort of way. They are there on paper. I have the paper here, if anyone wants to take it afterwards, rather than my trying to elaborate on it myself. David Mepham: I agree. I do not want to duplicate what Steve has said. I think that is a sensible way forward.

Q28 Lord Ribeiro: We have clear strategies and indeed regulations in place to deal with human trafficking. How does the approach to tackling migrant smuggling differ from that, and how should that be tackled?

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David Mepham: I shall kick off, although, for the reasons that Steve has given, I think we have relatively little to say on that. There is the legal distinction between smuggling and trafficking, which you talked through with the UNHCR representative last week, so we do not need to rehearse that argument. As a human rights organisation, we have been very focused on the trafficking issue, which is a direct human rights violation if someone is forced against their will to move across the country and all the rest of it. Smuggling is a different concept, because people often seek out smugglers to get from A to B. Even though it is a criminal act to breach an international border without the appropriate certification and so on, it is a different category and is not necessarily a human rights abuse. We do not have specific recommendations for how the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants should be enhanced. I am afraid it is just not something that we have looked at in any detail. Baroness Massey of Darwen: Could I follow this up? I would welcome your comments on my three questions here. First, how big is the trafficking problem in relation to migrant smuggling, and where are trafficked people from, compared to people being smuggled as migrants? Secondly, I am not sure how the policy approach that you talked about at the beginning could apply to people who are trafficked—for example, what would safe and legal routes be, and how would underlying causes effect trafficking? That seems to me to be quite a different thing from human smuggling. Thirdly, you mentioned that you have talked to people who have been smuggled, but have you talked to any people who have been trafficked about how they see it? David Mepham: Again, I am happy to answer first, although I may have relatively little to say. The short answer about how you deal with trafficking is that trafficking is very clearly a criminal act and human rights abuse, and you need effective international co-operation to deal with it in a way that is consistent, proportionate, focused and all the rest of it. That is a bit beyond what we have been asked to comment on here. Where do they come from? That is a good question. I do not know. I certainly do not have the figures to hand about where people come from who are being trafficked. There are probably bodies out there that have guesstimates. Baroness Massey of Darwen: Is your impression that it is mainly Africa and the Far East that people are trafficked from? David Mepham: Outside our focus today on the Mediterranean, we at Human Rights Watch have done a lot of work on the phenomenon in Burma and the Rohingya who have been taken to Thailand in these appalling camps, so there is all of that going on, and of course this phenomenon is not confined to that part of the world. Off the top of my head, though, I could not give you figures. You asked how big the trafficking problem is. Again, I am not sure that Amnesty or Human Rights Watch are in a position to say how big this phenomenon is. By its nature, it is a very difficult practice to quantify the scale of. There may be figures somewhere for the number of traffickers who have been prosecuted, but I am not sure that we could put a number on the number of trafficked people. Steve Symonds: I am afraid that my answer is very much the same as David’s, although I would add that some of the people who we see making these journeys will have been in the hands of people smugglers and will have been trafficked as well. People move—we can tell this from some of the stories that we hear and have researched—from situations of smuggling to situations of trafficking. Indeed, it would appear that in some instances they may even move back from being trafficked to being smuggled. Certainly, to our eyes, some of the exploitation that we have seen perpetrated in Libya would constitute trafficking, but those

13 of 175 Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) individuals may then be able to move on at some point as people being smuggled. So there is a degree of overlap in relation to these phenomena. It is also important to emphasise that not just refugees but the refugees who we have largely talked about are in many ways particularly vulnerable to being trafficked, because of course they are desperate to move for obvious reasons, and traffickers will take advantage of that. One of the phenomena that have to be addressed by anyone thinking about holding centres or reception centres is that we know that a modus operandi of traffickers is to go to such centres looking for victims and finding them there. They are distinct criminal offences and, as David says, one is a clear human rights abuse while the other may entail human rights abuses but need not do so. However, individuals may experience both in their journeys, so it is not easy to distinguish the two from a holistic approach to tackling the wider problem. Baroness Massey of Darwen: But the root causes might be different. Steve Symonds: They might, but then again they might be the same. In a sense, the vulnerability of a refugee who has been trafficked has the same root cause as that of the refugee who is smuggled to his or her destination. David Mepham: I do not want to take us too far from the Mediterranean, but that comes out particularly in the work that we have done on the Rohingya from Burma, who are in Thailand only because they desperately want to get out of Burma. So there is a sort of coming together of smuggling and trafficking in that context in a way that is very messy, and a lot of abuse is associated with that. Lord Ribeiro: Steve has demonstrated his lack of confidence in the action plan. Do you think the action plan defines the differences between those two crimes? Steve Symonds: I do not think it does, but in fairness I would not necessarily expect it to. As I am sure the Committee knows, there is a separate EU strategy on tackling trafficking, and that strategy is from 2012 to 2016, so it is still live. I am not necessarily surprised that the distinction has not been drawn specifically in the action plan. I am a bit more concerned about the rhetoric from member states, including our own, that has tended to focus on human trafficking, which appears to be all part of the more general intention of describing this as a policing/law-enforcement matter as opposed to a significant refugee crisis.

Q29 Lord Morris of Handsworth: You will both be aware of the dialogue and the discussions currently taking place around the 2004 directive. What is your opinion of the proposals for extension in respect of residence permits for third-country nationals? All of these human beings are victims of smuggling. Steve Symonds: Just to be clear about the 2004 directive, as a starting point, it is not simply a directive targeted at victims of human trafficking but includes victims of migrant smuggling within it. The crucial distinction, which leaves room for discussion, is that the measures in relation to residence permits and to victims of people smugglers are discretionary, whereas those in relation to victims of trafficking are mandatory. There is room to do something in the directive, but the directive encompasses both phenomena and the victims of both. In terms of the proposal for a consultation next year, it is very difficult to comment because I do not know what is at the heart of the thought behind that. I am not aware of anything concrete in respect of it. It is probably worth emphasising that EU legislation has moved an awfully long way on victims of trafficking since 2004. We now have the 2011 directive aimed solely at victims of trafficking—it does not deal with victims of migrant smuggling—which sets out a whole range of protective measures. We have seen those to be necessary to

14 of 175 Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) provide the protection for victims of trafficking that perhaps was originally intended to be secured simply by the residence permit. I cannot make any further comment because I am not sure what ultimately will be proposed. Simply addressing aspects of the residence permit has not proved sufficiently fruitful in terms of protecting victims of trafficking, which is why EU legislation has moved on so far, which is good. Although it is a different phenomenon, there is a question as to how much can be gained from the 2004 directive in respect simply of victims of people smuggling. But we will wait to see what comes from it. David Mepham: I have nothing to add. That is a very good summary of the situation. Lord Jay of Ewelme: I want to come back to the question about returning people, which we have already talked about a bit. First, what do you think about the Commission’s intention to make it easier to return people, for example by amending the FRONTEX legal base to strengthen the agency’s role? Is that is a sensible thing for the Commission to do? Secondly—this touches on some of the things we were talking about after Lord Soley’s question—is it sensible for the Commission to return people to wherever? David Mepham: I am happy to take that one first. On the general principle, maybe it is worth stating that if— Lord Jay of Ewelme: But I do want you to answer the specific question. David Mepham: Indeed, I will. But if people have had an opportunity for their asylum or protection claim to be fairly assessed, in a proper manner, and it has been concluded that they have no protection need whatever in Europe, of course European Governments are entitled—they have the legal right—to return those people if that can be done in a humane, dignified and sensible way. The reason there is such a big disconnect between the people who are turned down and the people who are returned is often because Europe, to the best of my understanding, does not have appropriate agreements with countries so that it can safely return them. But the legal right is clearly there, and if it can be done safely and humanely, people can be returned. I have not gone through the FRONTEX proposal in great detail but our instinctive response is one of scepticism about whether you would want to give a bigger role to FRONTEX in this. We would be worried about anything that tried to minimise or diminish the obligation on European Governments to assess very carefully not only the asylum and protection claims of individuals but the circumstances in which they might be returned. It is a sensitive matter. They have a right to do it, but it needs to be thought through very carefully and properly rather than pushing it on to a border control agency—I am not sure FRONTEX is necessarily the most appropriate body to have a bigger role in that. Lord Jay of Ewelme: Why? David Mepham: Because it is a job for Governments. I am worried about pushing that responsibility on to an operational agency. Steve Symonds: I think we would share that scepticism. If these proposals are to be developed, we would certainly want to see transparent mechanisms built in to ensure compliance by FRONTEX with the international obligations that the member states have individually. David referred earlier to the important Strasbourg decision in Hirsi v Italy. That builds on Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the European convention, which bars collective returns and therefore requires, essentially, individual assessment of asylum claims that people are seeking to make rather than just having collective push-backs. That is what happened in the Hirsi judgment—a whole group, mainly Somalis and Eritreans, had simply been pushed

15 of 175 Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) straight back to Libya, without any opportunity for them either to make claims or to have their individual circumstances assessed. Indeed, the court went further on their individual claims and found that they had then been subjected to a breach of their Article 3 rights—the prohibition, which I am sure the Committee is aware of, on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment—both in Libya and because they had been placed at risk of being pushed back by Libya to Eritrea and Somalia, where they faced similar degrees of risk. We would therefore be very anxious to ensure that if FRONTEX is to be given such an expanded role, the EU starts by building into that how FRONTEX will avoid, and be seen to avoid, conducting such actions. It is oftentimes much easier to monitor the actions of individual states than the agencies that they subcontract or delegate their authority to. That would be our concern.

Q30 Lord Jay of Ewelme: I will just come to the second part of my question. On the assumption, for the moment, that all those sorts of issues have been resolved, and people are to be returned in the appropriate fashion in accordance with law and so on, what are the circumstances in which you think it would be sensible for that to take place? What would need to be the position in the returning state for it to be a reasonable thing for FRONTEX to do? Steve Symonds: Clearly, the primary concern for us is the human rights situation for the individual in the state of return. Assuming that all the assumptions that you started with were met—and that may be a very big question, but none the less if they are—like David, we have no objections to returns. It is not wrong for the EU to see returns as an important part of the overall plan. The question in many ways is whether, just like the issue of migrant smuggling, the issue of returns fits into a holistic picture. For instance, when I mentioned co- operation with African Union states, which means having solidarity with them and sharing some of the pressures they face, that applies to this issue as well as to migrant smuggling.

Q31 The Chairman: I think that that is all from us. Are there any supplementary things that you want to say? Would like to make any concluding comments? David Mepham: We had a discussion about the causes of the migration movements. Also, in the questions that we were sent, we were also asked to give a view as to whether the Government were right to say that they were economic migrants and not asylum seekers. We have moved on a bit but I had something important that I wanted to share with the Committee on that. Basically, as the Committee may know—and this is important for you to look at—on 3 June, in Prime Minister’s Questions, David Cameron said: “The vast majority of people who are setting off into the Mediterranean are not asylum seekers, but people seeking a better life”. In the period since, he has presented no evidence or analysis that underpins that statement. It would be appropriate for this Committee or other parliamentarians to ask him to provide the evidence that supports that bold and strong claim. In fact the evidence, such as we have it, would suggest that it is not right. Actually, if you look at the UNHCR figures, Syrians, Afghans, Eritreans, Iraqis and Somalis make up 66% of all the people who have arrived in Europe since 1 January this year. If you look at the recognition rates—the rate at which European Governments give asylum status or protection to people of those nationalities—you find that the figures for those countries are: 95% for Syrians, 92% for Eritreans, 90% for Iraqis, 67% for Afghans and 59% for Somalis. If you do the calculations, if people whose claims were being assessed in the latter part of this year were to be given protection status on the same basis as people from those nationalities in the recent period—in the last six months—you actually have 56% of people being given protection in the European Union. You could say that the cohort coming in was slightly

16 of 175 Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) different from the cohort that came in in the last six months, but nothing substantial has changed in Syria, Somalia or Eritrea for that to be likely, so at the very least the Prime Minister and the Government should explain the analysis. Indeed, Mr Brokenshire said the same thing before your Committee. What is his analysis for making that claim? Lord Soley: That is right and I do not believe it for a moment. Frankly, I know that it is failed states. I was pushing you hard on the other issue because I do not think that even if you answer that question you begin to solve the key problem. That is why the United Nations has a key role here. It is very difficult because the Security Council is split on the ability to intervene effectively. You do not need to occupy a whole state but you do need to do something to create safe havens. I say this as an MP who had masses of immigration problems, over many years. I know the complexity, and you can return a person. For example, in Afghanistan, some areas are very safe and other areas are not safe. You can return someone who you think is Somalian who may be Kenyan and you have umpteen problems of that type. When you have a massive increase in refugees as a result of collapsing states you need to focus on how you deal with them in a safe way. I understand your concern and I share it. I share your anger, in a way, with the Government saying that it is economics. It is not. But I am not sure that we have an answer that deals with the problem. Some of this has to be about permission for Europe to deal with the problem in some of the countries of origin. I would not rule out Libya, by the way. I think you are mistaken about that. Baroness Janke: Could I ask for any work that you have done on the safer routes argument or anything that you can point us to in terms of the practical developments that Lord Soley referred to? Could we have those in the form of written evidence to consider? Steve Symonds: Shall we both take that away? There may be something further that we can provide. Baroness Janke: That would be very helpful. The Chairman: I think that your point about unsubstantiated evidence about whether they are refugees or people seeking better lives is well taken by this Committee. The assertion was repeated by Mr Brokenshire when he gave his evidence a couple of weeks ago. David Mepham: This is very relevant to what you were just saying. Lord Bates, who speaks for the Government in the House of Lords on these matters, was asked in a debate not long ago on 14 July about precisely this. He seemed to backpedal when he said that he thought Mr Brokenshire was referring to “the central Mediterranean … That is not the case—and I am sure we would agree on this—in the eastern Mediterranean”, so I think they are changing their story somewhat in response to the patterns. The Chairman: Indeed. Baroness Massey of Darwen: How can we get a copy of your report? David Mepham: I shall send it to the Committee. The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed for your evidence. If you can let us have your report, the information requested by Baroness Janke and the detail of the case that you referred to, that would be very helpful. Obviously, if there is anything that, on reflection, you would like to add to anything you have said, or if you would like to provide further evidence, that would be very welcome. Thank you.

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Amnesty International UK—Written Evidence

Introduction:

1. The Select Committee’s Call to Evidence makes clear the aims of the inquiry are to assess the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling in the context of the EU Agenda on Migration. At the Oral Evidence session on 8 July 2015 with James Brokenshire, Minister of State for Immigration, the questions and answers ranged across the scope of the EU Agenda. In this submission, Amnesty International UK (AIUK) seeks to provide the Committee with a broad context appropriate to the aims of the inquiry and having regard to the range of questions and answers at that evidence session. Key issues are briefly addressed under discrete headings.

2. AIUK’s key recommendations arising from the following discussion are:

2.1. The scale and complexity of the current refugee and migrant crisis requires a multifaceted and coordinated approach in cooperation with others. Isolated responses – whether individual nations acting alone or limited responses to discrete measures such as targeting people smugglers – will not be effective and may lead to the crisis becoming more intractable. UK government should revisit its response to UN calls (particularly as regards Syrian resettlement, in respect of which it should increase its commitment of places to thousands not hundreds) and to the EU Agenda on Migration, in which it should fully participate.

2.2. UK government should revisit and correct its analysis and narrative concerning the current crisis. Its understanding and approach, as evidenced by Ministers’ public statements, is inconsistent with available evidence; and will, if this narrative takes hold in general political and public discourse, increase the barriers or disincentives to adopting comprehensive and collective strategies commensurate with the nature and scale of the crisis.

2.3. UK government, as other Member States, needs to recognise that a more equitable sharing of responsibility for refugees (including hosting them) is required within the EU and with countries outside the EU. This is necessary to provide a sounder basis for international cooperation and to reduce pressure on refugees to make or attempt secondary movements due to insecure and unsustainable conditions in countries which are unable or unwilling to cope with the disproportionate number of refugees they are hosting.

Amnesty International’s engagement with this subject matter:

3. The growing refugee and migrant crisis at Europe’s borders, including in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas has been a focus for Amnesty International for many years. In 2014 and 2015, in particular, we have produced several reports and briefings relating to issues now relevant to the EU Agenda and the Committee’s inquiry. These include:

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 The Human Cost of Fortress Europe: human rights violations against migrants and refugees at Europe’s borders, July 20141  Lives Adrift: refugees and migrants in peril in the central Mediterranean, September 20142  Struggling to Survive: refugees from Syria in Turkey, November 20143  Left out in the Cold: Syrian refugees abandoned by the International Community, December 20144  Hardship, Hope and Resettlement: refugees from Syria tell their stories, February 20155  Europe’s Sinking Shame: the failure to save refugees and migrants at sea, April 20156  Libya is Full of Cruelty: stories of abduction, sexual violence and abuse from migrants and refugees, May 20157  Pushed to the Edge: Syrian refugees face increased restrictions in Lebanon, June 20158  The Global Refugee Crisis: a conspiracy of neglect, June 20159  Europe’s Borderlands: violations against refugees and migrants in Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary, July 201510

Background:

4. In October 2013, three shipwrecks off the shores of the Italian island of Lampedusa claimed the lives of more than 500 people attempting to cross the Mediterranean to Italy. Many of the dead were children. In the aftermath, the European Commission proposed five actions to prevent deaths – (i) increased border surveillance; (ii) increased support and assistance to frontline Member States, including Italy, to improve reception, processing, screening and registration capacity; (iii) increased efforts to fight human traffickers and people smugglers; (iv) increased refugee resettlement, enhanced regional protection programmes and opening of safe and legal routes to the EU; and (v) increased cooperation with third countries.11

5. In the absence of any concerted and effective commitment to search and rescue operations by the EU, the Italians alone introduced Operation Mare Nostrum (OMN). For over a year, the Italians delivered a coordinated search and rescue operation in the central Mediterranean in the course of which 166,000 people were rescued at sea at a cost of around €9million per month. This compares to the additional €8.2million allocation of EU

1 http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Reports/EUR_050012014__Fortress_Europe_complete_web_EN.pdf 2 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR05/006/2014/en 3 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR44/017/2014/en 4 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE24/047/2014/en/ 5 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE24/0004/2015/en/ 6 http://www.amnesty.org.uk/webfm_send/1345 7 http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/libya_is_full_of_cruelty.pdf 8 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/1785/2015/en/ 9 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol40/1796/2015/en/ 10 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur70/1579/2015/en/ 11 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the work of the Task Force Mediterranean, COM(2013) 869 final, December 2013

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funds to the EU’s Frontex operations in the central Mediterranean in response to the October 2013 tragedies.12

6. In 2014, other Member States – including the UK – increased their calls upon the Italians to withdraw OMN on the grounds that the operation was acting as a draw to more refugees and migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing.13 In that year, the Mediterranean crossing – the world’s deadliest – saw around 3,500 deaths. The claim that the Italian operation was a draw was made despite a host of compelling factors driving the increase in refugees attempting the crossing. These factors included the ongoing and deteriorating crisis in Syria; the increasingly unsustainable position of neighbouring states and for Syrian refugees in those states; and the failure of EU Member States to collectively provide resettlement and/or other safe and legal routes for refugees to seek and attain asylum in the EU. Of those reaching Italy in 2014 by this route, Syrians and Eritreans accounted for 46% of the total. Sudanese, Afghans and Iraqis were also highly represented among those making the journey. At the end of October 2014, Italy agreed to phase out OMN.

The effect of the withdrawal of Operation Mare Nostrum (OMN):

7. The withdrawal of OMN did not lead to a reduction in the numbers of people journeying to Europe across the Mediterranean. UNHCR has shown that in each month over the first half of 2015, the number of people making this dangerous journey was significantly higher than in 2014. The rise in numbers making the journey over the months of 2015 reflects the same pattern as in 2014 that as the weather improves more people attempt the journey. Over the period, the single largest group by nationality remained Syrians – constituting 34% of the arrivals to the EU by sea in the first half of 2015 (as compared to 32% of the arrivals during 2014). The next two largest groups by nationality were Eritreans (12%) and Afghans (11%).14

8. OMN’s withdrawal did lead to a massive rise in the number of deaths over the early months of 2015. In the first three months, 479 people drowned or went missing as compared to 15 over the same period in 2014. In April, the number of drowned or missing was 1,308 as compared to 42 for that month in 2014.15

The introduction of an effective EU search and rescue operation:

9. The scale of the tragedies in April 2015 led to an urgent EU summit at which the Rt Hon David Cameron, the Prime Minister, stressed the focus must be saving lives. The EU agreed to triple funding of the Frontex operation Triton in the central Mediterranean. Additionally, several individual Member States – including the UK – committed ships and aircraft to aid the search and rescue operation. The resources of the current operation are now at a level beyond OMN. The operating area of Frontex has been significantly extended ensuring more vessels are available to respond to boats in distress. Still ahead are the peak months during which crossings are attempted, but the numbers of deaths at sea has greatly reduced. In

12 Frontex General Report 2013, p47 13 The Minister of State, James Brokenshire, set out the UK government’s position in a debate in the House of Commons on 30 October 2014, see Hansard HC, 30 Oct 2014 : Column 397 14 UNHCR, The sea route to Europe: The Mediterranean passage in the age of refugees, 1 July 2015 15 UNHCR, op cit

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2015, to 26 April, those drowned or missing in the central Mediterranean numbered 1,721 (around one in every 16 people attempting the journey). From 27 April to 29 June, the figure stood at 99 (around one in every 427 people). It is vital that this commitment to saving lives persists.

Who are making these journeys?

10. As indicated above, the single largest nationality group making these journeys is and has for some considerable time been Syrians; and the second largest, Eritreans. The overwhelming majority of these people are refugees. Other nationalities highly represented include Afghans, Iraqis, Somalis, South Sudanese and Nigerians. Many of these too will be refugees. UNHCR has stated the majority of people making these journeys are refugees.16

11. While single young men make up the largest group by age and gender, there are many families, women and children making these journeys. For example, in his statements on the rescue operations conducted by HMS Bulwark, Captain Nick Cooke-Priest said significant numbers of children and pregnant women were among those his crew had rescued.17

Why are these journeys being made?

12. Root causes for refugees who make up the majority are conflict, failed states and brutal regimes. These lie behind the initial decision of refugees to flee their home countries. A compounding feature is the insecurity and unsustainability refugees are facing in countries that for many are destination countries and for others are or become transit countries. For example, the unsustainable growth of Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey (now over 3.5 million collectively) compels many to move on, including those whose original intentions or wishes may have been to stay closer to communities and their home in Syria.

13. Similar sorts of pressures are present in other regions. For example, Ethiopia is hosting close to one million refugees; Kenya hosts the world’s largest refugee camp. Hostility, violence and discrimination directed towards refugees and other migrants have grown globally.

14. The dire situation in Libya adds a further dimension for refugees and other migrants who have travelled there – whether primarily looking to find safety in Libya, to work there or seek to cross to Europe. The internecine conflict has put them at especially heightened risk of extreme violence and abuse, and with borders closed and crossing the desert not an option, a journey across the sea is all that remains for many to escape the situation.

15. When the Prime Minister in his speech to the Global Security Forum on 19 June 2015 identified external factors as “driving desperate migrants across the Mediterranean in the hope of reaching our shores”,18 the analysis he gave in a very general sense was correct – people are being ‘driven’. The external factors he identified were failed states and criminal

16 UNHCR, op cit 17 See e.g. https://modmedia.blog.gov.uk/2015/05/13/latest-from-hms-bulwark-in-the-mediterranean/ 18 However, later in his speech the Prime Minister reverted to a mistaken albeit more familiar emphasis on ‘pull’ factors.

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gangs, to which he might have added repressive regimes, conflict, deteriorating conditions for refugees in third countries and the absence of safe and legal routes.

Getting on a boat provides no guarantee of settlement in Europe

16. One aspect of the UK government’s analysis and narrative, which is especially troubling, is the assertion of a need to break what is claimed to be a link between getting on a boat and attaining settlement in Europe. There is no such link. Arriving in Europe provides no more certainty or opportunity for settlement than does arriving in the UK. Article 24 of the recast Qualification Directive (Directive/2011/95) requires that a residence permit of no less than three years be granted to those who qualify for international protection (which includes refugees and those who face similarly grave risks in their countries of origin). Other migrants may not qualify for any residence permit.

17. It is surprising that Ministers should be making this incorrect claim so frequently and publicly. If it is thought that false beliefs as to what may be available to a person who successfully reaches Europe play a significant part in people smugglers’ ability to attract migrants, repeatedly and publicly advertising this claim might be regarded as a potentially self-defeating policy.

Tackling people smuggling or human trafficking:

18. As UNHCR’s Senior External Relations Officer and the Director of Europol indicated to the Committee last week,19 the majority of people attempting the crossing are not victims of human trafficking. Human trafficking, as distinct from people smuggling, necessarily involves the movement of a victim, often using coercion or deception, for the purpose of her or his being exploited by the trafficker. Whereas most people smugglers financially exploit a person’s need or desire to migrate, there need be no further intention to exploit the person whether by forced labour, forced prostitution or other abuse for services or financial gain.

19. The overall picture is, however, complex. Firstly, many of those being smuggled are seriously abused by people smugglers. There have been grave abuses by smugglers in and en route to Libya, in addition to forcible overcrowding onto unseaworthy vessels to attempt the crossing. Secondly, refugees and other smuggled migrants may be especially vulnerable to traffickers; places where these people are congregated are known to be favoured targets for traffickers. Some people may move from situations of being smuggled to situations of being trafficked. Indeed, some may move between such situations more than once. For example, this would appear to be the case of some of those who have been subjected to sexual exploitation, forced labour or held by smugglers in Libya to extort money from families.

20. Nonetheless, it remains important to distinguish these two phenomena – both in the context of the current crisis and in other contexts (e.g. the UK government’s commitment to tackling modern slavery). Failure to properly distinguish them risks undermining understanding of, and responses, to each. The emphasis upon human trafficking in political rhetoric is also dangerous insofar as it is or may be used as a means to paint the current crisis as one

19 Uncorrected transcripts of oral evidence sessions on 15 July 2015 with Andrej Mahecic (Q2, pp3-4) and Rob Wainwright (Q21, p8) respectively.

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primarily of criminality requiring a policing and border control response; rather than acknowledging and addressing the importance of conflict, brutal regimes and other driving forces behind people’s movement and the lack of safe and legal routes which lead to refugees and other migrants turning to smugglers or falling prey to traffickers.

EU Agenda on Migration and Action Plan against migrant smuggling:

21. The EU Agenda on Migration emphasises the current crisis cannot be addressed by individual Member States acting alone and it proposes a suite of measures. Certain of the proposals are too modest given the scale of the global and regional refugee crises, e.g. the proposal on resettlement; and others are in need of further elucidation, e.g. the need to develop other safe and legal routes. It is nonetheless significant that the Action Plan against migrant smuggling includes: “Smuggling networks can be weakened if fewer people seek their services. Therefore, it is important to open more safe, legal ways into the EU.” This is a vital aspect of the overall plan. The Agenda constitutes a good starting point for Europe to respond effectively to this crisis, but it will need to be implemented expansively and with the full backing of the Member States.

22. As other witnesses before the Committee have emphasised,20 prospects of success for the Agenda and Action Plan are dependent on Member States recognising the interconnected and interdependent nature of the suite of proposals the European Commission has advanced. Thus, the Action Plan is dependent on cooperation between Member States and third countries. Proposals on relocation, resettlement and safe and legal routes are critical to more fairly sharing responsibility among all affected countries, thereby fostering an environment in which mutual cooperation and commitment is most likely to be secured.

23. The Action Plan is also dependent on significantly reducing the factors driving people into the hands of smugglers and/or making them vulnerable to traffickers. Proposals on resettlement and safe and legal routes are critical to reducing the need for large numbers of refugees to turn to smugglers to escape increasingly intolerable and unsustainable situations in countries which remain destinations for the overwhelming majority. Countries such as Lebanon might then more sustainably remain as destinations as opposed to places of transit if relieved of a more significant proportion of the very much larger numbers of refugees they host as compared to European countries.

24. For example, opening up wider family reunion opportunities could reduce pressure upon refugees to move on in the hope of joining up with extended family members in Europe. Increased response to UNHCR’s call for resettlement of Syrian refugees,21 whose needs are most acute and cannot be met in the region, would have a particularly positive effect in relieving pressure on Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. As indicated above, although the scale of the Syrian crisis demands particular attention similar concerns relate to refugee crises affecting other countries including Ethiopia and Kenya.

20 Uncorrected transcript (Andrej Mahecic, XX; Rob Wainwright, XX), op cit 21 UNHCR has called for 130,000 resettlement places from the region to be offered by the international community by the end of 2016, see http://www.unhcr.org.uk/news-and-views/news-list/news- detail/article/unhcr-calls-on-international-community-to-resettle-130000-syrian-refugees.html albeit the agency has in June 2014 estimated as many as 378,684 Syrian refugees to be in need of resettlement.

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25. By significantly increasing its commitment to provide Syrian resettlement places, the UK could provide much needed leadership in encouraging others to contribute to meeting UNHCR’s call and to match the UK’s commitment in providing humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in the region.22 Such a response to the Syrian crisis would enhance the value and effectiveness of the UK’s current financial commitment.

26. Moreover, if the Action Plan is not to increase risks to refugees and other migrants, it is vital to avoid exacerbating or extending people’s dependence on smugglers or susceptibility to traffickers. A particular concern relates to the situation of those in Libya where risks to all migrants are especially acute because of the ongoing internecine conflict and lack of options to escape the country. Trapping people in Libya is not a means to saving lives.

Concluding observations:

27. Nearly two years ago, after the October 2013 Lampedusa tragedy, the European Commission proposed a suite of measures. These were less extensive than those in the 2015 Agenda but included increased resettlement, opening of safe and legal routes and increased efforts to tackle people smugglers. The Member States failed to respond to these proposals then, preferring to focus their efforts on certain measures and not others – particularly increased border surveillance and control. The outcome has been a very substantial increase in the scale of the crisis. It is vital that Member States, including the UK, do not repeat the same mistake.

21 August 2015

22 Since 2012, the UK has allocated £900million in humanitarian aid in response to the Syrian crisis, see https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/443830/DFID_Syria_Crisis_R esponse_Summary__2015.07.09_.pdf but has provided only 187 resettlement places under its Vulnerable Persons Relocation Scheme (available for Syrian refugees with acute needs in the region), begun in 2014.

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Amnesty International UK—Supplementary Written Evidence

Introduction:

1. This further submission addresses two matters which arose at the July 2015 oral evidence session at which Steve Symonds gave evidence for Amnesty International UK (AIUK):  people moving between situations of being smuggled and of being trafficked  safe and legal routes

2. By way of brief update: By 14 August, 264,500 refugees and other migrants had crossed the Mediterranean to the EU this year.23 Syrians remained by far the single largest group by nationality (more than one third). Afghans and Eritreans were the next largest. With Sudanese, Somalis and Iraqis, these nationalities constituted around two thirds or more of those arriving across the sea.

3. For comparison, the ten countries hosting the largest refugee populations at end 2014 were Turkey (1.59 million), Pakistan (1.51 million), Lebanon (1.19 million), Iran (982,000), Ethiopia (659,500), Jordan (654,100), Kenya (551,400), Chad (452,900), Uganda (385,500) and China (301,000).24 These figures do not include the 5.1 million Palestinian refugees registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), who fall outwith UNHCR’s remit. There are around 450,000 such refugees in Lebanon and over 2 million in Jordan.25

People moving between situations of being smuggled and of being trafficked

4. In response to a question from the Baroness Massey of Darwen, it was explained that people may move between these distinct situations. On Monday, 27 July 2015, London Evening Standard published an article entitled ‘A migrant boy’s escape from hell’.26 That article describes the experiences of a 15 years old Nigerian boy (named for the purposes of the article, Solomon), and despite sketchy details appears illustrative.

5. On the face of what is described, this boy’s journey includes periods of being smuggled and periods of being trafficked. It appears that during his journey (or at least part of it) to Libya, he was smuggled. At some point he was sold in Libya to a ‘work camp’, where he was enslaved. Were he transported at any point – whether into or within Libya – for the purpose of being sold, that would constitute human trafficking. His journey across the Mediterranean, having escaped his enslavement, appears to have been facilitated by people smugglers.

Safe and legal routes

23 http://www.unhcr.org/55d3098d6.html 24 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014, June 2015, available at http://unhcr.org/556725e69.html 25 http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work 26 http://www.pressreader.com/uk/london-evening-standard-west-end-final- b/20150727/281870117140154/TextView

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6. At the close of the oral evidence session, the Baroness Janke asked if we could provide further written evidence in respect of safe and legal routes. What follows identifies some of the options for providing such routes.

7. The general position, which applies to the great majority of those who wish to and those who do claim (and receive) asylum in the EU, is that they must get to the EU in order to make a claim for asylum; and there are no safe and legal routes permitting them to do that. This situation is compounded by the application of visa requirements (i.e. the need to obtain advance permission for lawful travel to the EU) to all of the main countries of refugees’ origin. This – coupled with the extension of external border policing and related third country cooperation27 – means that the great majority of refugees who seek and attain asylum in the EU are compelled to make clandestine and often dangerous journeys in order to do so.

8. One way to extend safe and legal routes would be to increase resettlement places. Resettlement programmes are generally operated in concert with UNHCR, and tend to involve annual quotas set by individual participating countries as to places to be filled. They provide a route for a refugee (i.e. someone at risk of persecution who has already fled his or her country of origin) to resettle (relocate) from an often precarious situation in a third country to a more durable situation in the country of resettlement. Individual Member States give indications as to the numbers of places they are willing to offer, and any other criteria they wish to apply, and UNHCR makes referrals of refugees – individuals or families – which the Member State then considers. If accepting the referral, the individual or family will be resettled in the Member State with no requirement to enter the asylum system there. Thus, resettlement allows for effective integration from the point of arrival.

9. Within the EU, resettlement places are generally very few in number. The leading EU/EEA Member States are the Nordic countries. The US, Canada and Australia each provide far more resettlement places than EU Member States.28 These countries have also been more generous than most EU countries – the exceptions being Germany and the Nordic countries – in response to the separate matter of resettlement of Syrian refugees from the region.29

10. Another option would be to broaden the scope of refugee family reunion e.g. to include extended family members. Essentially, refugee family reunion permits a refugee in a Member State to be joined by his or her family member. As operated in the Member States, this is generally restricted to partners and children; or in the case of child refugees to parents – but note the UK does not formally recognise a child refugee’s entitlement to

27 Relevant measures include carrier sanctions, deployment of immigration liaison officers at ports of departure, financial and other support/encouragement to third countries to enhance border control systems, the work of FRONTEX at EU borders, and unlawful forced ‘push backs’ at borders or at sea (e.g. what was described in the oral evidence session by David Mepham of Human Rights Watch in relation to Case of Hirsi, Jamaa & Ors v Italy [2012] ECHR 1845, Grand Chamber. 28 In 2014, the USA, Canada and Australia set themselves targets to achieve 70,000, 13,900 and 11,000 places respectively. The Nordic countries were by far the most generous European nations as regards resettlement, with Sweden, Norway and Finland adopting targets of 1,900, 1,620 and 1,050 places respectively. The UK target was 750. More information is available at: http://www.unhcr.org/4a2ccf4c6.html 29 More information is available at http://www.unhcr.org/52b2febafc5.html

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refugee family reunion with a parent.30 Refugee family reunion may assist the integration of the refugee who is being joined by his or her family member, and conversely the arrival of that family member to a place where he or she is joining someone may assist his or her integration.

11. These first two options would constitute extensions of existing routes. Most other options would open up new routes within existing immigration control systems. One alternative would be to remove visa requirements (e.g. in relation to countries in particular crisis), thereby permitting someone to travel and claim asylum on arrival. This would only assist those with access to travel documentation – e.g. a passport. Removal of visa requirements would not in itself permit entry, but would enable lawful travel to a potential country of asylum.

12. Another option would be to introduce some form of protected entry procedure. This is a means by which someone can apply for and be granted permission in advance to travel and enter a potential country of asylum. There are various possible types of such a procedure. These range from granting a visa permitting travel for the purpose of making an asylum claim on arrival, to fully assessing and recognising a person’s refugee status (or other protection needs) prior to permitting travel.

13. No EU country currently operates a protected entry procedure. Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands abandoned their procedures in the early 2000’s. In 2012, the Swiss Federal Assembly approved amendment of the Asylum Act to abolish the option of applying for asylum in Switzerland from outside the country. However, it remains possible to apply for a visa at a Swiss diplomatic mission for travel to Switzerland on asylum grounds.31 A challenge in respect of protected entry procedures – particularly where these are based on conclusive determination of the applicant’s refugee status prior to travel – is to maintain standards of procedural fairness and substantive decision-making. Concerns surround such matters as access to legal assistance, interpretation and translation services, and remedies for flawed decision-making; and capacity and quality of decision-making.

14. As reflected at the evidence session, we strongly support the development of safe and legal routes. However, in doing so, we have not adopted a policy position favouring any one measure over others. There are several reasons for this. There would likely be value in developing all or several of the outlined possibilities rather than treating these as if mutually exclusive. We would want to assess the detail of any particular proposal that may be forthcoming – to ensure there was appropriate attention to procedural safeguards and quality of substantive outcomes. Subject to the adequacy of procedural safeguards and quality assurance, we remain open to any proposals the European Commission and Member States may develop in relation to one or more options.

15. As emphasised in our oral evidence to the Committee, the provision of safe and legal routes is required as part of a holistic approach to a global refugee crisis. It is not an alternative

30 Thus Appendix FM of the immigration rules includes refugees for the purposes of their being joined by partners and children, but not their being joined by parents. UK Visas and Immigration asylum process guidance on ‘Family reunion’ expressly excludes parents of child refugees in the UK from eligibility. 31 https://www.bfm.admin.ch/bfm/en/home/asyl/asylverfahren/asylgesuch/asylgesuch_aus_ausland.html

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either to supporting refugees in third countries or the need for individual assessment of those arriving in the EU and presenting asylum claims via other routes. Rather the adoption of safe and legal routes is a key means to reducing both the need for refugees to make unsafe journeys and the demand for people smugglers. It is also a means to manifesting real and effective solidarity with generally much poorer, third countries currently hosting very much larger refugee populations; and – in tandem with humanitarian assistance to refugees in those countries – to enhancing their capacity to support the refugee populations they host.

16. The Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament has recently published Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and alternatives to Dublin, which includes further discussion of safe and legal routes in chapter 1.32 The Committee may find that discussion of assistance.

1 September 2015

32 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519234/IPOL_STU(2015)519234_EN.pdf

28 of 175 British Red Cross—Written Evidence

British Red Cross—Written Evidence

1. Executive Summary

1.1. We are grateful that the committee is focussing on an issue of such humanitarian importance and are pleased to submit our views as to the priorities in this regard. 1.2. Whilst we recognise that committee inquiry is toward the EU action plan, we feel, however that the proposals in the plan are woefully inadequate in addressing the situation. 1.3. We advocate that the prioritisation should be on providing safe and legal routes into the EU for humanitarian protection, rather than on smuggling, which is the core emphasis of the plan. 1.4. As such, this submission talks more to core issues and general humanitarian principles to which we urge EU member states, including the British Government, to work collectively to achieve. These include:  Ensure that people fleeing conflicts have effective access to asylum procedures in the EU.  Ensure effective access to family reunification procedures to make the right to family life a reality.  Commit to resettling more refugees on a regular basis.  Develop mechanisms for identifying and addressing the additional vulnerabilities of migrants linked to the migratory trails 1.5. The key recommendations outlined have been formulated in collaboration with our EU Red Cross office colleagues (Brussels) and jointly agreed by all EU member National Societies. 1.6. The BRC will join with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in their new campaign entitled “Protect humanity – Stop indifference” (to be launched shortly in September) in order to re-emphasise these issues outlined below. We can provide the committee with further details in due course. 2. General Principles

1.7. In the past few years, the number of people embarking on dangerous journeys by sea, land and across borders to seek protection or better life opportunities has grown exponentially. Their journey has become more perilous greatly due to the migration policies and border control practices that limit their access to protection. With it, the risks faced by these people, as well as the episodes of xenophobia, discrimination, exclusion and violence have also grown. These contribute to increasing the vulnerability of people on the move, their families and, eventually, host communities. 1.8. We renew our call on the 194 State Parties to the Geneva Conventions to ensure that people on the move fully enjoy Human Rights and protection as anyone else. Specifically, we ask them to:

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 Protect the dignity and ensure the safety and wellbeing of all migrants, wherever they may be and regardless of their legal status  Grant migrants access to international protection determination procedures and ensure their access to relevant services, such as Restoring Family Links  Stop labeling migrants as ‘illegal’  Promote respect for diversity, non-violence and enhance social cohesion between migrants and host communities.

3. Key Recommendations

1.9. Outlined below are the key Legal avenues

A. Legal avenues to access international protection

 Allow for exemptions from EU visa regulations and promote the issuing of humanitarian and protection visas. Visa obligations should be suspended for nationals and residents of countries in a significant humanitarian crisis and where there are no opportunities for issuing visas within the country of origin, as in the case of Syria at the moment. The EU should consider exempting from EU visa regulations refugees who are formally recognised by UNHCR and whose protection needs cannot be fully covered in their country of residence or are in situation of protracted displacement. Their legal entry for the purpose of lodging an asylum application in a Member State should be facilitated.

 Ensure that people fleeing conflicts have effective access to asylum procedures in the EU. EU Member States should keep their borders open to people fleeing conflicts and set up appropriate and effective legal avenues for potential asylum seekers so they can reach EU territory and lodge an asylum application in safety and dignity.

 Do not penalise irregular entry of asylum seekers. Irregular entry for the purpose of seeking international protection must not be penalised in accordance with Article 31 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees.

More information: Legal Avenues to Access International Protection in the EU and Access to international protection in the EU for people fleeing Syria.

B. Family Reunification

 Ensure effective access to family reunification procedures to make the right to family life a reality. This requires further reflection so as to ensure effective access to embassies and consulates abroad, without unnecessary obstacles such as disproportionate documentary evidence or unjustified presence requirements. This also implies allocating resources for legal assistance and travel costs, and scrutiny of the practices employed by consulates and embassies.

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 Family reunification procedures should be protection-oriented. Rules and conditions should be applied flexibly, with better understanding of the realities of forced migrants being promoted, in particular through adequate resource allocation by national authorities and training of the staff dealing with these issues.

C. Resettlement

 Commit to resettling more refugees on a regular basis. Not all EU Member States have adopted a national resettlement programme, and many of those with a programme have the potential to increase their quotas. Resettlement is a concrete and accessible legal avenue to accessing international protection in the EU. EU Member States should increase their share of the global resettlement intake with a view to resettling larger numbers of refugees.

 Establish additional dedicated resettlement places to respond to emergency humanitarian situations. Member States should establish additional dedicated resettlement or humanitarian admission places in response to emergency humanitarian situations. The case of persons fleeing the Syrian conflict illustrates the need to provide an immediate response to an unfolding crisis, while ensuring the continuity of resettlement opportunities for refugees from the rest of the world.

 Prioritise the most vulnerable in resettlement programmes. Resettlement programmes should benefit the most vulnerable based on an assessment of their humanitarian needs according to UNHCR’s resettlement submission categories: legal and/or physical protection needs, survivors of torture and/or violence, refugees with medical needs, women and girls at risk, children and adolescents at risk, and any other groups in urgent need.

 Ensure high quality reception conditions and integration measures, in particular through local and civil society engagement. Member States and local authorities in charge of the reception and integration of resettled refugees should work in partnership with migrant communities and civil society organisations, including National Red Cross Societies, to improve integration and reception practices.

2.1 Vulnerabilities along the migratory trail

In October 2015, RCEU will publish a new position paper on the vulnerabilities faced by migrants along the various migratory trails to the EU. Given the current context and pressing need for action, the paper will outline concrete steps for the EU and its Member States to take in order to reduce the risks and resulting vulnerabilities associated with these migrant journeys to the EU.

Recommendations will be along the lines of calling for developing mechanisms for identifying and addressing the additional vulnerabilities of migrants linked to the migratory trails; setting up dedicated search and rescue operations and supporting assistance to migrants in distress. 3 September 2015

31 of 175 Dr Franck Düvell and Migration Policy Institute Europe —Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39)

Dr Franck Düvell and Migration Policy Institute Europe —Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39)

Evidence Session No. 4 Heard in Public Questions 32 -39

Members present

Baroness Prashar (Chairman) Lord Condon Lord Cormack Lord Faulkner of Worcester Baroness Janke Lord Jay of Ewelme Baroness Massey of Darwen Lord Morris of Handsworth Baroness Pinnock Lord Ribeiro Lord Soley Lord Wasserman ______

Elizabeth Collett, Director, Migration Policy Institute Europe, and Franck Düvell, Associate Professor and Senior Researcher, COMPAS, University of Oxford

Q32 The Chairman: I welcome you both to the Committee. Thank you for your time. By way of introduction, this is a public session. It is being recorded, the recording will be on the website and you will be sent a copy of the transcript. If there are any corrections that you want to make, please do so, and if you feel you want to add anything further to the evidence that you have given, please feel free to do so. Perhaps you can begin by introducing yourselves. If there is anything that you want to say by way of introduction, please do so. Elizabeth Collett: Thank you for the invitation to be here today, and my deepest apologies for being late. It was largely down to the Changing of the Guard and being stuck in traffic. I am the director of the Migration Policy Institute Europe. An enormous amount of our time over the last 18 months has been spent thinking about the function or dysfunction of the global protection system and the future of the common European asylum system and its future functioning within that. That means that we have been looking at this issue but from several different angles with regard to the nature of smuggling and how it will develop. I am very interested to hear your questions today and answer them to the best of my ability. Franck Düvell: Thank you very much for the invitation. I have been associate professor and senior researcher at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society at the University of Oxford for the last nine years. I have also been working for several years for the International Centre for Migration Policy Development in Vienna, an international organisation advising EU member states on migration policy. I am currently also acting as consultant expert to the Turkish Government’s director-general for migration management on improving the migration management system in Turkey. I have been researching irregular migration for, I guess, 25 years. I have been to most of the relevant countries—EU member states, frontier countries, transit countries, source countries, Ukraine, Turkey, Hungary, Moldova, the

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Greek islands—and conducted hundreds of interviews with irregular immigrants, smugglers, border guards, police officers, intelligence officers, NGO representatives: a whole range of actors in the field. So I suppose what I would bring in is a bit of a reality check to policies, ideas and suggestions floating in the current of debates.

Q33 The Chairman: Perhaps can I start with a question. What in your opinion are the root causes of irregular migration to the EU? Is it a balance between push and pull factors? Franck Düvell: I am sure you are aware that we face a refugee crisis of historical proportions, with 59 million to 61 million refugees worldwide. We have a displaced population of about 22 million in the neighbourhood of the European Union alone, and I am talking only about Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and some north African countries. Of these 22 million displaced people, 7 million already live in another country so they are international refugees. We know that most of them are concentrated in a very small number of countries, with 2 million in Turkey and roughly 1.5 million each in Jordan and Lebanon. We have a displaced population of 1.5 million. This is one side of the problem. The other side is that not only do we have 232 million international migrants globally but an IOM/Gallup study found that another 630 million people have a desire to migrate. A desire is of course a very vague wish. Lord Jay of Ewelme: Six hundred and thirty million? Franck Düvell: Yes. These are the people who have a desire to migrate. If we break this down to the number of people who are planning to migrate, that is only 7.6% of the total, so 48 million people. In the survey that was then broken down to those who were actually making preparations—applying for an international passport and/or a visa, booking tickets— and that was only 3% of the total, so 19 million globally. Of those people, a certain proportion—roughly one-quarter—have the ambition to move to the EU. We know that each year roughly 1.4 million people are admitted to the European Union on legal grounds on a longer-term permit. Another 13 or 14 million are admitted on a short-term visa, which is normally a tourist or visitor’s visa. So if we look at the opportunities available to them—a Schengen short-term visa or the permit on the one hand, and the large number of people who have a desire to migrate on the other—we see a significant gap between those who have a desire and those who are finally admitted. A small proportion of the people in this gap decide to move on in an irregular fashion. I ask myself, though I do not have the answer: how many people would that be? We do not have this research or these data. However, if we ask how many people who desire a car but cannot afford one would actually go and steal one, we come up with a very small proportion. People either wait or buy another kind of car. In our case, it means that they would go somewhere else—the second-best option. Most migrants who desire to migrate to Europe or America realise that it is only a dream, so they take the second-best or third-best option. Such countries could be Russia, Turkey, Libya, the Gulf countries, Brazil or other booming BRICS countries. If we talk about the root causes, though, then there is the political dimension of forcefully displaced people—7 million international refugees in the neighbourhood of Europe—and then the economic motivation for people to migrate. In both cases, you have a gap or tension between aspiration and what is legally possible. To some extent this feeds irregular migration, if that answers your question. Elizabeth Collett: I would just add one comment. I completely agree about the complexities of understanding the desire to move versus the ability to move, and the ability to effect plans to move. We often look at immigrant populations through the lens of our existing immigration system, so we tend to divide people up into refugees, economic migrants and

33 of 175 Dr Franck Düvell and Migration Policy Institute Europe —Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39) family migrants on the basis of the system that we already have. Motivations are still very poorly understood but far more fluid and complex. Motivations may change over time. They also may have multiple drivers attached to them, and it is worth understanding that many of the people who are coming from places of conflict today are not necessarily coming directly from Syria or Afghanistan, but may have been displaced for some period in a region of protection—maybe Lebanon, Turkey or Jordan, to take the Syrian example. We should understand and question what is not being offered to those people in those regions of protection that is then impelling them to seek a new life within the EU. We need to understand not just the complexities of the decision-making process itself but the context and the circumstances that large numbers of displaced people are finding themselves in, meaning they want to take that decision to move. The Chairman: Taking that point, the Government suggest that the majority of the irregular migrants reaching Europe are economic migrants rather than refugees. What does your research show? Franck Düvell: If we look at the figures from the national authorities in the “frontier countries” as I call them—Italy, Greece, Malta, Hungary and, to a much lesser extent, Poland and Spain—they show that the majority of people, perhaps 60% or 70% of them, certainly come from countries in trouble, where there is civil war, war, fighting and destruction. One would assume that on the basis of nationality these people at least have a claim, or believe they have a claim. That is of course untested. In the asylum procedures it is tested and challenged in court. The recognition rate varies from nationality to nationality, from 30% to 70% or 80%. However, the majority of people, 60% or 70% of them, come from troubled countries and believe they have a claim that they take forward. The rest is of course decided in the asylum procedures and courts. Elizabeth Collett: I just emphasise that there is huge variance in recognition rates across the European Union, which also adds to tension with second removal within the European Union. But also the reverse is true. Some people who might be considered eligible to claim asylum choose not to do so because they see the asylum system as not particularly helpful to go into when there might be alternatives such as informal working. We see this in Spain for example: people choosing to find their way into the informal economy rather than necessarily claiming asylum. You do not necessarily see it just from the formal figures of who has done what on arrival. Lord Cormack: I think it was very interesting what Dr Düvell said, but we must be careful not to be diverted by this 630 million figure. We all have hopes and aspirations in our youth—or old age—to settle on the Costa del Sol and how that might be a wonderful idea. However, we are seeking to address a particular crisis. The numbers are obviously extremely high but very significantly less than this 630 million. In your view, from your studies and investigations, what is the real figure we are looking at? Franck Düvell: The real figure of what? Lord Cormack: Of those who are displaced, because they either feel the conditions in which they are placed are intolerable or have been effectively driven out. Franck Düvell: As I said, the number of refugees we know pretty well: 59 million worldwide, with roughly 22 million displaced populations in the nearer neighbourhood of the European Union. Of these 22 million, 7 million are internationally displaced and the others are displaced within their countries: Iraq, Syria and Ukraine are the main countries. The 7 million are those who are forcibly displaced from their country to another place, seeking protection there.

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Lord Cormack: And it is their plight that we should specifically focus on. Franck Düvell: I would like to add one argument to my point because you made this clear. We have a blurred situation of economic migration and asylum. I am referring to economic migrants who are becoming sandwiched in a war or civil war situation specifically in Libya. They arrive as labour migrants, they become refugees and they need to escape the country. For economic reasons, they often decide that they are not able to move back, so there is some economic element in the political situation. They arrive in the European Union as refugees but then they seek to continue their previous life as workers. Like many of the people in the boats, who would be of Gambian, Senegalese, Nigerian or Malian nationality, they could be taken as economic migrants even though they are escaping a war situation. So this fluidity of category—labour migrant becoming refugee becoming labour migrant again— complicates enormously the case that we deal with. We have 1.5 million to 2 million labour migrants in Libya because it is an immigration country suffering now from war.

Q34 Lord Soley: Both the European Commission and the United Kingdom take the view that the actions against smugglers is particularly important, using law enforcement. Do you think that method is sufficient in dealing with this migrant crisis? Elizabeth Collett: If we start in mid-April, when the terrible tragedy occurred in the Mediterranean, this was suddenly on the agenda of heads of state. In late April there was an extraordinary summit. From that moment, we have really seen an emphasis on countersmuggling. The 10-point plan had that front and centre. It is certainly there as a partly political narrative as well. If you are going to do search and rescue, you want to show that you are trying to break down smuggling networks. I think there is still a poor understanding of what those smuggling networks are. I am not convinced that the military operation that has been proposed in the Mediterranean will be sufficient to achieve some of the goals articulated. There is a mismatch between ambition and the tools being placed on the ground. I can go into that in more detail. Lord Soley: What would you want to do that might make it more effective? I share your view that there is not enough there. Do you have other suggestions to add to this policy of dealing with migrant smuggling through law enforcement? Elizabeth Collett: Unfortunately, the answers are not simple or fast. When this becomes an extraordinarily highly sensitive political issue, people want to see immediate change, but that will be very difficult to do. So much of smuggling is horizontal networks. We are talking about sometimes very local networks. Sometimes migrants themselves participate in the facilitation of smuggling to fund the next stage of their journey. We have a very weak evidence base for understanding smuggling networks. We recently published a paper by an expert called Jacob Townsend who noted that existing evidence is based on a destination bias. We tend to interview the ones who made it and do not look at the ones who did not. We have small samples and I think Frank can add a lot more to this in terms of the smuggling networks, but it is an extraordinarily complex industry with many different types of actors. One thing that strikes me about the EU response which might be slightly naive, in particular in the action plan on countersmuggling, is that it does not really mention corruption and rule of law in the countries where smuggling is taking place. It is extremely difficult to talk about robust countersmuggling activities without taking into account the governance structures within which you are working. It would mean really thinking about how smuggling links to corruption, law enforcement locally, the facilitation of those networks and how local economies often depend on smuggling networks. We have maybe depicted this as a series of

35 of 175 Dr Franck Düvell and Migration Policy Institute Europe —Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39) bad and pernicious actors but that does not necessarily describe the totality of smuggling networks. Lord Soley: And that might go right back to the country of origin, not just in Libya or something like that. It might go back to Nigeria or wherever. Elizabeth Collett: Yes, a complex chain. Baroness Massey of Darwen: Can I ask a quick question as a supplementary to Lord Soley’s? Do we know how many people do not make it, approximately? What are the data like? Elizabeth Collett: There are efforts to approximate the numbers of people who lose their lives specifically in the Mediterranean. The IOM produced statistics on that, though obviously they are imprecise because unfortunately we do not know the full numbers, but it is an almost impossible data set to collect. Franck Düvell: We do not have that information. When I consider the question, I would look at the issue and the necessary policies in a much broader context. The main crisis of course occurs in the countries which are at war: Syria, Iraq, Libya and Ukraine. They are countries in crisis, and that is where the crisis lies. Then we have a crisis in the first country of arrival—the so-called transit countries of Turkey, Lebanon and Libya. We have a crisis of much smaller proportions, to be honest, in the European Union. Last year, we had 600,000 asylum seekers and 250,000 arrivals as compared with the 7 million refugees in other countries. When I look at the policy proposals, I wonder to what extent they are an adequate response to the complexity and scope of the crisis, in particular the action plan on smuggling. Obviously, that addresses only a very small element of the crisis—the small proportion that arrives or aims to arrive on the doorstep of the European Union. How many people do not make it, indeed, we do not know. I have never seen or myself conducted a large-scale survey that goes beyond the usual case studies which would tell us what the deterrent effect of these policies is. This is all based on intuition and assumption because we have absolutely no evidence of any deterrent effect. Over all these years, I have never met anyone who did not make it. At the end of the day, the people are interviewed sooner or later. I have found them on Facebook and they have sent me an email saying that they are now in Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Germany or wherever they wanted to go. This is not representative, but it tells me that having the resources, skills and commitment, along with a strong need or urge to move away from an unviable situation is a powerful motivation. What is neglected in the agenda on migration and the action plan on smuggling is, I would argue, the demand side. It focuses on the smugglers because they provide the service. The supply side is addressed, but the demand side, which is made up of the people who feel a very strong urge to leave a country and therefore need others to help them get out, is neglected. If we do not address the demand side, which is the humanitarian crisis of the people who need to leave the place where they are, I cannot see how this can be comprehensive.

Q35 Baroness Massey of Darwen: Can I go back to another issue? You said earlier on that the motivation of the migrants themselves may change over time, a comment which I found very interesting. The Commission intends to transform migrant smuggling networks into high-risk, low-return operations. Are the measures in the action plan likely to deter smugglers? Further, what about the motivation of the smugglers themselves? Does that change over time? What is going on there?

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Elizabeth Collett: The majority of the initiatives set out in the countersmuggling plan demonstrate to me at what an early stage EU thinking is. There is a lot of talk about setting up networks and contact points in the different states, as well as inter-agency collaboration and intelligence gathering. These are the sorts of things that we would have hoped that by this stage we were building on. The action plan to counter smuggling is to some extent a preparatory document in terms of setting up the institutions within the EU that will think about these things. There is not a huge amount that talks about increasing understanding of the smuggling networks themselves. There are some interesting things in terms of addressing the financing, but not necessarily building into a solid understanding of what that financing is. When it comes to understanding smuggling networks, there is an enormous amount of research to do, but Governments are not necessarily the right actors for conducting the interviews and establishing the research. We have seen the development of the hotspots and that the stated core goal of the military operation in the Mediterranean is intelligence gathering. That is done through the use of immigration liaison officers and EU delegations. Governments are not necessarily the most trusted actors to do intelligence gathering with people who may have grown up with a deep mistrust of the Governments of the countries they come from. They are also concerned that anything they tell the authorities may lead to retribution from the smuggling networks themselves. We also face a challenge in the sense that there is a need for an evidence base, but the actors most interested in gathering that evidence are not necessarily the ones who will get robust evidence. There is a big of a gap. Finally, when it comes to motivations over time, that speaks a lot to the smuggling network itself. If someone is taking a slow route from, say, sub-Saharan Africa up towards Europe and is trying to fund themselves on the way, it can take anything up to five years to make the journey. People take jobs along the way and they encounter different communities. People may decide that it is actually too difficult to try to get that far. For example, a lot of the people in Libya may initially have wanted to go to Europe, but then found that until recently there had been a reasonably thriving economy in Libya, so they found jobs in that country. The work was sufficient to send money home. People may change their motivation, as Frank has said. There are people of other nationalities coming from Libya. There are Bangaldeshis and Pakistanis, for example, who had been migrant workers but who now see no other way out of Libya than to take the boats because the border with Tunisia is closed and there are no other ways to exit the country. That is a motivation which has certainly changed. Baroness Massey of Darwen: Can we have a copy of your report? Elizabeth Collett: I will be happy to send you one. Baroness Massey of Darwen: Thank you.

Q36 Lord Condon: You have both spoken about the fluidity of the situation where economic refugees are willing to change. You have spoken about the absence of adequate address being given to the demand side of the problem and that corruption is not being looked at properly. In your opinion, are the priorities of the EU action plan and the actions it suggests sufficiently evidence based, or is there a huge gap in the statistics? If there is a gap, and what you have said so far suggests that there is, how do we address that? What more can be done to close the gap so that the policies are more evidence based? Franck Düvell: Everything we know is based either on small-scale case studies made at a certain point in time and thus reflecting a very specific situation or is based on evidence gathered by state agencies. The people we talk about know very well what the discourses are and what the game is: what they are expected to say. They do not talk about their real

37 of 175 Dr Franck Düvell and Migration Policy Institute Europe —Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39) background motivation and experience; they give what we call a morally adequate account of what they are expected to say. Even for researchers it is very difficult, if not impossible, to go beyond that. One needs to put the puzzle together. So the evidence base we have is pretty weak in terms of the motivations and the background situation in the transit countries, and in particular in the transit countries which are further away from the European Union and thus not in the immediate neighbourhood. Now we even see FRONTEX reports no longer referring to nationality but to region—sub-Saharans. Even there, there is no certainty about where these people are coming from, even though nationality can say a lot about whether or not they come from a country that is in trouble. I also wonder when I read these policy documents what evidence is taken into account and what is not. A lot of convenient arguments are used to support one position, but not to support the other. The talk of “high risk, low return”, for example, seems to imply that these days there is a low risk and a high return. That is not the case. The risk is already high. Lord Condon: Is the biggest problem in terms of EU policy-making ignorance of the complexity, or is it political selectivity and misinterpretation? Franck Düvell: It is both. There is so much rhetoric and there are so many narratives. The use of certain words tells me that the writer would rather narrate a particular story than look at the complexity of the issues. When I look at this document, it is not what is out there. The situation seems to be rather different, but the motivations of the writers of the report seem to be driven by emotions and political thinking that is inspired by these narratives. It is hugely difficult to untangle the elements that reflect the reality from those which reflect a narrative or a certain discourse. Elizabeth Collett: The characterisation of smuggling as a bad actors’ game that is somehow superimposed on an otherwise functioning country, and is separate from and laid over a particular country—something that happens to a transit country rather than being integrally involved in its economy—is misleading, I think. Many smugglers are also acting legitimately at the same time as facilitating smuggling networks. Some excellent reportage came out last week in the Wall Street Journal which looked at Agadez in Niger and at how the economy was, essentially, utterly dependent on facilitating the movement of people. It is slightly naive to think that countering smuggling through intelligence-gathering and then a targeted response will address something that is so integrally involved in the development and stability—or instability—of those countries. You have to really take that broader context into account. Just to add to that, we have to look at the countersmuggling action plan in the context of the broader shift that is occurring in the European Union, which is about understanding migration policy as part of foreign policy. Right now, the two are slightly detached from one another but there has been an acknowledgement, particularly in the last three months, that EU policies will get nowhere without deepening and strengthening an honest dialogue with third countries. There is then an enormous step from understanding that to being able to affect it in practice. That will be one of the major challenges. Baroness Massey of Darwen: On the question of the evidence base, you mentioned case studies. Are there case studies of smugglers themselves or are they just of the migrants? Franck Düvell: It is normally of the migrants. The smugglers are often studied through the narratives of the migrants, who are instructed to say this rather than that—they are aware of the narratives and give a coloured account. There has been some limited research on the smugglers, which one could comment on. The smugglers are depicted in a specific, negative narrative, even though the migrants in need of a service—I put it in those neutral terms— that takes them from one country to another rely on these networks and smugglers. There

38 of 175 Dr Franck Düvell and Migration Policy Institute Europe —Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39) is an enormous discrepancy in terms of the quality and safety of the services and, accordingly, in the prices. There is almost a Ryanair, easyJet-type of service where you travel without luggage, because luggage means fewer people on the boat, or you can pay more. There are a number of self-made smugglers—opportunists—for whom this is an opportunity to make a bit, or quite a lot, of money. There are people who have been in the business for several years, who cannot afford to lose their reputation and their customers and who would provide a relatively higher-quality service. I miss, for example, a distinction between the rogue smugglers and the smugglers who provide a more genuine service. We should not forget—this is also downplayed in the rhetoric—that 99% of the people who embark arrive in the EU alive, even though we have a significant number of fatalities. The risk of losing one’s life is around 1% and the migrants know that. We talk about risk and ask why they engage in this—but they know that 99% of them make it and, once they arrive in Europe, they find many more opportunities than they have in their own countries. They also know that it takes them six months, 12 months or one to three years before they secure a living. So if we look at this as a trade-off, the risk is 1% and you end up somewhere in the EU after a couple of years with asylum, tolerated status or irregular status, but with a network and some employment. That seems much better for people than life at home, where there are zero opportunities

Q37 Lord Faulkner of Worcester: Following on from that, do you think the member states and the EU institutions could do better at gathering, analysing and exchanging information on migrant smuggling? Are they doing enough to co-operate with each other? Franck Düvell: What we have is a mess. I have an A4 list of agencies, institutions, programmes and intelligence-gathering mechanisms, at EU level and UN level. There are international organisations and national agencies, along with project-based short-term intelligence being put together. We have all these processes, such as the Khartoum process, the Budapest process and the Prague process, including processes that we have not even heard about—the list is not complete. We have conflicting operations: FRONTEX, with Triton and Poseidon, EU navy force operations and four or five private rescue operations in the central Mediterranean with another one in the Aegean. We have a lot of round-table meetings. This cannot provide a comprehensive picture. We also have conflicting mandates and divergent definitions of the type of problem. We have competition over funding for these activities and projects. The bodies talk ad hoc to one another in the field and on the ground, but not necessarily at a higher level. Lord Faulkner of Worcester: That is a very helpful answer. Thank you very much. Elizabeth Collett: To add to that, I completely agree about the multiplicity of institutions. You also have senior officials resorting to informal channels of communication with each other and using the working groups and the council to exchange information, because the formal processes are not working for them in many cases, but also because they do not necessarily want all the information they have to be published. So we speak as researchers aware that there might be information that is not available to us. One thing to add to that is about the fluidity of smuggling networks and routes over time, which means that even if you had a robust snapshot of the routes from, say, October last year, when the primary maritime route was through the central Mediterranean, it would not really help you understand what is happening now through Greece and Turkey and up throughout the western Balkans. There has been a complete shift in routes, operators, networks and populations. It is not just that there are lots of different institutions working in lots of different geographies and constellations, with different levels of mandate and

39 of 175 Dr Franck Düvell and Migration Policy Institute Europe —Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39) resources, but the picture is constantly changing. It is not possible to say, “We have done it now; we have mapped all the smuggling networks”, and sit back. Because, as we said, Governments are not necessarily best placed to gather that material, one of the enduring challenges will be how you find that localised, reliable information on a consistent basis that can be fed back to policymakers. That is an extraordinary challenge.

Q38 Lord Jay of Ewelme: My question follows on directly from that. You talked a lot about the different approaches to smuggling, the different people involved, the different source and destination countries, and the different routes and methods of transportation used. It is clearly an extremely complex and rather confusing picture, but a question that arises from that is whether it is really feasible to reach a single, common approach at the EU level for dealing with quite such a complicated and diverse set of issues. Elizabeth Collett: It is a major challenge, not just from the point of view of co-ordination and institutional coherence but because EU member states may not have an interest, given their national political narratives, to find that level of co-ordination. They may not have equal levels of resources but their geography and their politics may mean that they would—the best example right now is Hungary building a wall on the Serbian border. That serves Hungary’s interests very well, but it does not serve the EU’s interests; it does not reduce the number of people crossing the border, but it does displace them to other external borders of the European Union. Lord Cormack: It builds the pressure points. Elizabeth Collett: We have seen this happening at various moments. Maritime migration across the European Union is not a new phenomenon. It is at least two decades old and we have seen the flows and the numbers shift quite sensitively according to policy responses. In the middle of the last decade the Spanish Government saw a large number of arrivals and so took steps to work with key transit states, notably Morocco and Senegal but other countries as well, to start managing that flow. So the route shifted towards the central Mediterranean and later to the eastern Mediterranean and back again. So we see those changes in response to what tend to be unilateral policies by particular Governments. That will be one of the major challenges and it is consistent with the biggest tension that is facing the European Union in constructing its own policies, which is that the benefits provided by the Schengen system of internal mobility are increasingly coming under tension from the enduring dysfunction that occurs within asylum and immigration policies writ large and external border management. Until we resolve those things, we will not find that level of consistent co-operation across the European Union, even aside from geography and resources and the more pragmatic aspects. Lord Jay of Ewelme: That could be quite a long “until”. Elizabeth Collett: I have been in Brussels 10 years. I will let you know when it is finished. Lord Cormack: To pick up your last point, one could really say that Schengen is being exploited by people externally, and the point I want to take up with you is one that came up in evidence last week, when the director of Europol said that smuggling is predominately carried out by organised crime syndicates. Does that accord with your understanding? Franck Düvell: No. We have heard this narrative for many years from certain organisations, Europol and IOM in particular. What we find on the ground are loosely connected networks, loosely connected individuals, telephone numbers and email addresses circulating, websites with certain information, all of which rather point to loosely connected contact persons in the various countries.

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Lord Cormack: They can be loosely connected and still be part of an organised crime network, surely? Franck Düvell: Well, if we look at smuggling from, say, Somalia, there is a tribesman who knows someone who knows how to get someone out of the country into Cairo or Dubai. The traveller is provided with a telephone number to call someone. That could be the taxi driver waiting outside the airport, calling someone else, arranging local accommodation, waiting on migration—it could be Moscow. There is another telephone number, another taxi driver taking the person to a safe house. They wait there for some time. Someone else provides some food. At some point some other people turn up with a car, take them to the border and drop them in the middle of the night at a certain point. Someone else is waiting there to take them across the border, where someone else is waiting—it continues like that. Lord Cormack: That sounds highly organised to me. Franck Düvell: So the person in Somalia would not know what has been going on in Moscow or Ukraine. It is a step-by-step organisation where you have a loosely connected network of communication which is not a network where each point knows every other point. It only connects one point to the next to the next. More often than not there is no flow of money from point A to point Z but people pay along the road to the local individuals or networks. Lord Cormack: Can I just ask one final question? The most arresting statistic I have heard today is when you said only 1% do not make it. How far do you think these organisations have as their sale pitch, “99% of you will win the lottery”? Elizabeth Collett: It is important to recognise that the risks inherent in any particular journey vary considerably and will be taken into account when someone makes that decision. They are not thinking about the journey. They are thinking about the destination and what happens at the destination. This comes to your point on Schengen. People may be exploiting secondary movement within the European Union. The information is often incomplete about where to go within the European Union. Sometimes it is very complete. There is a lot of knowledge about what particular processes will allow. Some people know enough but are just told by the networks, “Don’t stay in Italy because conditions aren’t good in Italy. Move on. Where you go after that is your choice”. Some people pay for a package that takes them to specific countries, so the smuggling network goes on through the European Union. There is sometimes knowledge of the processing within asylum systems. We noted a few years ago, when visa facilitation was offered to the western Balkan countries, that there was a sudden rise in the numbers arriving and applying for asylum in certain EU member states. When those EU member states adjusted their asylum systems to be able to do very fast processing, particularly in Belgium, for example, the numbers then dropped as people recognised, “Okay, this is not a place where I can go and make my way through the asylum system. This won’t work for me, so I will try another country”. So there is that kind of knowledge throughout the European Union, but it is incomplete. Some people have good knowledge and some people do not. One of the things that we often forget is the credibility of the EU system. People are taking extraordinary risks to reach the European Union because they know that once they arrive in the EU, the chances of them ever being deported or returned home are very low. So smugglers can talk about the risks and dangers along the routes, but they know that the prize is extraordinarily attractive. There is a question about how we manage all of these aspects. How do we offer protection to people both in the region of origin and in countries? How do we deal with the demand side of this, but also how do we create a credible system that also reduces the certainty of the prize. Maybe that would make people reflect on the risks they were willing to take for what might

41 of 175 Dr Franck Düvell and Migration Policy Institute Europe —Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39) be an uncertain prize at the end. The fact that the prize is certain right now is an incredibly attractive marketing tool.

Q39 Lord Soley: I think you partly answered this, but do you want to add anything? Clearly, some European Union member states will have more difficulties putting the action plan into effect than others. Do you want to say any more about what sort of difficulties they will have? You talked about Hungary, and clearly Hungary has a political policy at the moment, but I wondered if others would just not have the resources or ability to carry out the action plan. If so, which countries would struggle? Franck Düvell: I think I would extend the question and ask not only about the resources but the national interests these countries may or may not have, and what policy priorities they have: what else is going on in the country? What comes to mind immediately is the economic crisis in Greece, for example, where the Government would most obviously focus on resolving that issue, looking after their own people, when they need to decide where to put resources. All these variables are also subject to change. We have the resources; we have the priorities. We also have public opinion, which changes. We now have a much more sympathetic response to the migration crisis on the Greek islands, where whole communities—village populations—welcome and support the arrivals. We see similar responses in Italy. We see a media in Germany that are hugely critical towards a more repressive pushback approach and engaging the military in the Mediterranean. All that changes, influences policy and determines where the resources are put and how they are used. Elizabeth Collett: I want to add just a short point, which is that some EU member states have a very strong, established foreign policy infrastructure and strong relationships with countries of transit and origin. They may be regional or historical but there are often those strong relationships that facilitate them in thinking about countersmuggling and maintaining a dialogue with different countries, to a greater or lesser degree. So those countries that do not have those strong networks will struggle because this is something that has to be thought of in a foreign policy context and not one of simply deploying resources to address a particular target. Lord Ribeiro: My point is a very simple one. You talked about the prize. Do you think the prize is one of the reasons why the British Government have taken some of the positions they have on migration into the UK? It is quite clear that many of the people speak English and understand the English way of life, through colonialisation and all those processes in the past, and therefore life would be a lot easier in England than in other European countries. Elizabeth Collett: We do not have a very strong evidence base for motivations either but we commissioned some unpublished work earlier this year which started to look into that. Really, people choose particular countries based on existing family links they might have— diaspora groups—and this is where you see a reinforcement of particular asylum flows to particular countries because you have built up a diaspora. People talk about language: French and English are notable examples. Also, there are employment and education opportunities. What we misunderstand sometimes is that we assume that that decision-making process is the same for anyone regardless of where they come from. But if you are 18 years old, your goals and aspirations will be very different from if you are 54 years old. So it changes by gender, origin, age group—there are lots of different things that go into that, which is why so many different countries are involved. There is a strong impetus on behalf of the UK Government but also the European Union to try to communicate a very robust narrative that you should not be trying to come to the European Union irregularly, and I think that has

42 of 175 Dr Franck Düvell and Migration Policy Institute Europe —Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39) a great deal to do with the pre-eminence of countersmuggling conversations. However, that has to be backed up with credible policies that follow that through. I think we have a strong narrative. I do not necessarily think we have the robust policies that break that link. The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. It has been very helpful to have your views. As I said at the outset, if there is anything you wish to add once you have seen the transcript, please feel free to do so. Thank you very much for your time.

43 of 175 Eurojust—Written Evidence

Eurojust—Written Evidence

The current crisis caused by the unprecedented number of migrants seeking asylum in the European Union demonstrates the need for Eurojust to increase its support to Member States investigating and prosecuting illegal immigrant smuggling networks. New and intensified tasks (e.g. mission, tactical meetings, coordination meetings) require additional manpower and budget.

Additional resources would support Eurojust specifically in its strategic and operational activities in the flied of illegal immigration smuggling, and ensure proper implementation of all the points in the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling that require follow-up actions by Eurojust.

Improving gathering and sharing of information

Article 3(1)(c) of the Council Decision on Eurojust provides that, in the context of investigations and prosecutions concerning two or more Member States, Eurojust shall ‘support otherwise the competent authorities of the Member States in order to render their investigations and prosecutions more effective’.

Article 13 of the Council Decision on Eurojust sets forth an obligation of Member States to report to Eurojust cases of serious cross-border crime, including attacks on information systems. Eurojust has set up a Task Force on Cybercrime, consisting of College members and Administration, which enhances expertise in cybercrime matters at Eurojust.

Eurojust is currently considering supporting the creation of a network of specialist cybercrime prosecutors to respond to the needs of the national authorities in the Member States. The development of the aforementioned knowledge base could potentially fall within the mandate of Eurojust and would be of relevance to practitioners in the Member States.

Eurojust’s role in the hotspot approach

The Commission has consulted with Eurojust when preparing the concept paper on the hotspot approach and has invited Eurojust to ‘consider’ deploying staff on the ground, depending on the situation and based on a case-by-case assessment.

Eurojust has been invited to participate in the Operational Frontex Regional Team in Catania and has already agreed to support Italy in facilitating mutual legal assistance requests and in coordinating between Member States’ national authorities, also in cases involving third countries. One Italian prosecutor from the National Antimafia and Antiterrorism Directorate (DNA) is Eurojust’s contact point and will be regularly present at the hotspot.

Eurojust has also been involved by the Commission in the discussions to set up a hotspot in Greece. A Greek prosecutor from the Court of Appeals of Piraeus has been appointed as Eurojust’s contact point at the hotspot.

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Accordingly, Eurojust will continue supporting frontline, transit and destinations Member States and coordinate its efforts with relevant EU Agencies. Eurojust will closely monitor the developments and consider further assistance in accordance with current circumstances and needs.

Cooperation with JHA agencies in the fight against migrant smuggling

The College of Eurojust has appointed a contact point for illegal immigrant smuggling to participate in the Contact Group of EU Agencies on Migrant Smugglign.

Eurojust maintains cooperative relations with the main JHA partners, including, Europol, the EJN, and Frontex.

Eurojust attends the JOT MARE and JOT COMPASS meetings to ensure proper judicial follow- up of Europol’s findings.

18 September 2015

45 of 175 European Commission and FRONTEX—Oral Evidence (QQ 64-72)

European Commission and FRONTEX—Oral Evidence (QQ 64-72)

Evidence Session No. 7 Heard in Public Questions 64 – 72

Members present

Baroness Prashar (Chairman) Lord Condon Lord Cormack Baroness Janke Lord Jay of Ewelme Baroness Massey of Darwen Lord Morris of Handsworth Baroness Pinnock Lord Ribeiro Lord Soley Lord Wasserman ______

Examination of Witnesses

Fabrice Leggeri, Executive Director, FRONTEX, Dana Spinant, Head of Unit, Irregular Migration and Return Policy, DG HOME, EU Commission, and Richard Baumgartner, Head of External Relations, EU Affairs Team, FRONTEX.

Q64 The Chairman: Good morning. Thank you very much for your time. I think it would be helpful if you started by introducing yourselves and telling us a little bit about what you do. Fabrice Leggeri: Lord Chairman, thank you very much for the invitation. My name is Fabrice Leggeri. I am executive director of FRONTEX, the EU agency in charge of border management of the external borders. I was appointed executive director in January this year, so some months ago. Dana Spinant: Lord Chairman, thank you very much for this invitation. My name is Dana Spinant. I am head of the unit in charge of irregular migration and return policy at the European Commission in Brussels. My team drafted and is in charge of the implementation of the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling. Richard Baumgartner: Good morning. My name is Richard Ares Baumgartner. I am head of the team dealing with EU affairs at FRONTEX. We are in charge of co-operation with other EU institutions, EU agencies and international organisations. The Chairman: Before asking a question, I should explain that this session is public and it will be broadcast live on a webcast. You will be sent a transcript of the proceedings. If there are any corrections you wish to make or any supplementary evidence you wish to submit, please feel free to do so. Perhaps we can start by talking a little bit about the safe and legal routes for refugees. Can you tell me what is being done at the EU level to ensure that you are creating safe and legal routes? Perhaps you can also explain what is understood by “safe and legal routes”.

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Dana Spinant: Thank you very much for this question, which is very important in opening our discussion. Probably the surest way of disrupting the activities of migrant-smugglers is taking business away from them by bringing safely to the EU those who need protection. This is where the question of legal routes comes into play. The European Commission has identified ways to introduce legal routes for asylum seekers to the European Union and has taken action on that over the past months. The clearest legal route is through resettlement. The European Commission made proposals in May for a recommendation to bring to the EU through a resettlement scheme 22,000 asylum seekers who are clearly in need of international protection. The Commission was very pleased to see that the member states accepted the imperative of contributing to this resettlement effort. They pledged even above the number suggested by the Commission: they pledged to bring through resettlement 22,504 asylum seekers. Of course, the UK also announced that it agreed to bring refugees through that resettlement scheme. The Commission was even happier to see that since July, when the member states made their pledges for resettlement, additional efforts for resettlement have been announced by the member states and the UK. We believe that this is the safest way to bring refugees to Europe and to take business away from migrant- smugglers. Of course, an additional way is relocation. Through relocation efforts, the asylum seekers are brought safely from the front-line states—the countries of disembarkation—to the rest of the EU, thus cutting away the business of intra-EU secondary movement, which is a big business for the smuggler networks. The Chairman: Do you wish to add anything? Fabrice Leggeri: Yes, I would like to point out in parallel to what has just been explained that in the Schengen border code the rule applying to migrants or people in need of protection is that border guards have to make sure that the people who arrive at the external border have the possibility to lodge an application for asylum. This is embedded in the fundamental rights of the European Union, and FRONTEX, as an EU agency, is committed to enforcing and promoting these fundamental rights. For instance, in the FRONTEX training portfolio for border guards, the agency insists on a special model specifically dedicated to the question of how to identify or recognise migrants in need of protection who may then be referred to authorities in charge of asylum. The Chairman: Did you want to ask a supplementary question, Lord Cormack? Lord Cormack: Yes. I am very grateful for what you have just said and, to some degree, reassured by it, but are you satisfied that adequate steps are being taken to try to ensure that ISIS and other nefarious organisations do not infiltrate the process? Are you confident that you are dealing with that effectively with your various partners? Fabrice Leggeri: As the head of the EU agency in charge of the external border, I can give you some information on that. In FRONTEX activities so far, I have no evidence that potential terrorists have crossed the external border of the EU, taking boats with irregular migrants. Anyway, in co-operation with the member states, we are increasing awareness among the so-called screeners and debriefers deployed by FRONTEX at the external border. This is in line with the overall policy deployed by the EU against terrorism, so that we can increase the awareness of this phenomenon as much as possible. Lord Cormack: It is very surprising that you have no evidence at the moment. Is this because of a lack of vigilance? Fabrice Leggeri: I would say that this is because FRONTEX, as an EU agency, has no access to intelligence.

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Lord Jay of Ewelme: I am sorry, I did not quite hear that. The Chairman: Could you speak up a little? Fabrice Leggeri: FRONTEX, as an EU agency, has no access to this kind of intelligence. FRONTEX is not an intelligence agency. There are some other authorities at EU level, other stakeholders, and of course the competence lies with the member states when it comes to the fight against terrorism. This may be why we cannot trace evidence of people who might be involved in terrorist activities. Lord Cormack: It might indicate that more co-ordination is needed.

Q65 Baroness Pinnock: Thank you very much for that very clear response. Our previous witness suggested that creating safe and legal routes would simply encourage people- smugglers to take advantage of that by creating alternative routes but also by using safe and legal routes to transport more people through into the EU. What is your view on that? Dana Spinant: First, I believe that legal routes are the safest way to bring asylum seekers to the place which can offer shelter in the EU, in its member states. It is possible that organised crime groups involved in migrant-smuggling would try to take advantage of those routes and abuse them but that is not a reason for us not to contemplate the opening of legal routes. Organised crime groups go where the business is, where the profit is, so they might try to take advantage of those routes because it might be an easier way for them to do their business. We will have to remain vigilant and ensure that in the implementation in practice of those legal channels, we are able to detect that and to take action against it. But it should not deter us from opening safe, legal routes to bring those people to Europe. Lord Ribeiro: To put this in context, we are talking about migrant flows this year that may well exceed 1 million people in different areas around the Middle East, Africa and so on. You are saying that the European contribution is going to be 20,504. That is the total that will go through legal routes. Putting it in context, legal routes involve a very small number of people. Is that right? Dana Spinant: To put it in context, we are talking about around half a million people who have reached the EU through irregular ways since the beginning of this year. Whether we are heading towards 1 million remains to be seen, but indeed the numbers we have seen so far are the highest in comparison with previous years. The resettlement scheme that I mentioned involving 22,500 people is the one that has been proposed by the Commission EU-wide. In addition, EU member states have their own pledging schemes, which the Commission strongly encourages. They can make use of other instruments, including humanitarian visas and permits, government and non-government sponsorships, family reunification schemes and so on. In addition, we should mention that the EU is making efforts outside its borders to build the capacity of transit factories for migrants so as to address the problem at that level. This is done through what we call regional development and protection schemes in the Horn of Africa and north Africa. Lord Jay of Ewelme: I want to go back to the question of the information gathered by FRONTEX in the course of its duties. I imagine that it receives data and information about smuggling networks. What conclusions have you been able to draw about changes in the nature of smuggling networks over, say, the last few months or so, and about how that information is shared among EU agencies in the Commission? I ask that partly because some other witnesses that we have had have rather left us with the impression that information which is received is not effectively or efficiently shared with others to enable them to act on it. I would be interested in your views on that.

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Fabrice Leggeri: In the course of FRONTEX operations such as Poseidon Sea in Greece or Triton in Italy, FRONTEX deploys officers called screeners and debriefers. The debriefers can get information and intelligence on the way that migrants have come to Europe so that they can collect information on the traffickers and smugglers. This information is forwarded to the host member states’ law enforcement agencies—say, the Italian police or the Greek police. Then it is up to the host member state—Italy or Greece in this example—to forward the information to Europol. That was the old pattern of the exchange of information. The new one, which we are working on, involves forwarding information directly from FRONTEX to Europol. Lord Jay of Ewelme: When did that start? Fabrice Leggeri: In the context of the so-called hotspots proposed by the Commission, we have already set up an EU regional task force in Catania, Italy. We are now working on a new EU regional task force in Piraeus in the FRONTEX liaison office near Athens. The concept is that we have EU inter-agency co-operation between FRONTEX and Europol, especially in order to trace the migrant smugglers and traffickers. Now, because we have liaison officers on the spot, they can start the smooth exchange of this information. The next step is the automatic exchange of personal data from FRONTEX to Europol. FRONTEX is now in touch with the European Data Protection Supervisor, who has already approved the general principles of this exchange, and we have now submitted to the European Data Protection Supervisor the precise implementation measures. I hope that by the end of this year we will get a green light that will make it possible to fine- tune the ICT settings and then we will be able to directly forward to Europol personal data such as the names, or the alleged names, of traffickers and smugglers, phone numbers and the licence plate numbers of vehicles. I am talking about really individual and personal data. Dana Spinant: What Fabrice has talked about is the beginning of a very promising way of addressing irregular migration in the EU through the hotspot concept, which the Commission proposed as part of its European agenda on migration. What is the hotspot concept? Precisely, it is a way to provide concerted support from all relevant EU agencies to the member states that experience very high and unexpected migratory pressure. That means that all the relevant agencies would deploy experts there and would co-ordinate the deployment of national experts from other EU member states to the hotspots. The resulting fusion and concentration of information and operational co- operation should maximise the impact of the support provided to that member state. Smuggling is a very important aspect of the hotspot concept. We would expect strong co- operation between FRONTEX and Europol, as well as Eurojust, to enable long-term investigations into cases of migrant smuggling and the identification of the smugglers. In addition, as part of the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling, the Commission has launched a counter-group of EU agencies on migrant smuggling. It meets regularly and brings together all relevant agencies—FRONTEX, Europol and Eurojust, as well the European Maritime Safety Agency and CEPOL. The next meeting is tomorrow and we are going to discuss in Brussels the setting of criteria for the identification of suspect vessels. For instance, we will discuss launching work together on financial aspects in order to achieve better co-operation in tracing, tracking and freezing smugglers’ assets. A third way in which we imagine there will be stronger inter-agency co-operation is through the setting up of co- operation platforms in key third countries, such as Turkey, or in other important transit countries for irregular migration. We are planning to bring together from around the EU delegations all relevant actors deployed in that region or country, be it FRONTEX liaison

49 of 175 European Commission and FRONTEX—Oral Evidence (QQ 64-72) officers, Europol liaison officers, member state liaison officers, immigration liaison officers or European migration liaison officers, who will be deployed soon. Again, the idea is to ensure that information circulates and that we achieve maximum impact through the dissemination of that information. Baroness Massey of Darwen: Could you say more about the use of ICT, including social media, in all this? I am not clear how widely spread this is, although I guess that it is widespread. Is it possible to track down who the smugglers are by hacking into their systems? How widespread is it? Fabrice Leggeri: For the time being, what FRONTEX has found out is that smugglers are doing organised advertising on the internet; in Turkey, for instance. They act like travel agencies—selling tickets and giving the schedule of the boats. So this is really organised like a normal business, a travel agency. This is what FRONTEX can monitor every day and then, of course in co-operation with the countries of origin and Europol and in the context of the so-called JOT Mare operations, we can exchange information and this kind of risk analysis in order to help and support law enforcement agencies to investigate the cases. It is also a way for FRONTEX to anticipate how irregular migrants will arrive at the external borders.

Q66 Lord Soley: In the action plan, the European Commission said: “Additional actions to fight migrant smuggling will be undertaken over the next years to target this rapidly changing crime”. Do you have any idea of the nature, scope and extent of what it anticipates doing? Dana Spinant: Thank you for this question. We put that in the action plan on smuggling in order to clarify that we were going to remain alert in order to adapt the actions that need to be taken to the rapidly changing nature of this crime, and in order to indicate that we will be adapting and introducing new actions as necessary. For the moment, the focus is on the implementation of the 25 or so actions that we specifically proposed in the action plan. However, changes have already happened. For instance, after the initial focus or concentration of activity in the Mediterranean, now we are seeing more and more instances of smuggling concentrated within the Schengen area, on land, due to secondary movement and due to the fact that the migrants have a different destination in mind as their final destination. Of course, Calais has become much more prominent over the past months. This was why we wanted to communicate that we were going to stay vigilant and that other actions may be necessary. We discuss all these developments in the contact group with EU agencies to see what actions are necessary. Lord Soley: I am not quite sure what else you are going to do. I do not know if you can give examples of particular things you are planning on doing. Also, is it going to be financed by the Commission? Is extra finance going to be available or are you going to have to redesign your current budget? Dana Spinant: Some of the actions included in the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling will be financed through EU financial instruments; for instance, instruments under the home affairs policy area, such as the ISF. Fabrice Leggeri: Internal Security Fund. Dana Spinant: Internal Security Fund, thank you. We use so many acronyms in-house, one has to ask somebody from outside to know the real name! But others are to be financed by the member states themselves because the action plan on smuggling does not set out only the actions that will be taken at EU level but the actions to be taken at local, regional, national and international level. This is why the financing will be mixed, as the efforts will be.

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Lord Soley: It is a sort of evolving pattern that you are describing. I still can’t see any thrust. When you say you are going to do these extra things, that is a bit of a general statement. Dana Spinant: Yes, but it could also mean that many new evolutions will unfold the need for differentiated action. For instance, in November we will have a major summit with African countries where we will have discussions with countries that are members of the Khartoum process, under which trafficking in human beings and migrant-smuggling is a priority for action. We may together identify the need to launch a form of co-operation or action which we had not foreseen. Lord Soley: That is a good, helpful example and I am grateful for it but it would also need quite a bit of money to help those countries. Dana Spinant: It might but quite a bit of money is already foreseen for supporting co- operation with African countries. The summit in Malta is likely to approve a trust fund with a sizeable budget to finance co-operation not only on migrant-smuggling and trafficking in human beings but on other aspects of irregular migration, including the return, readmission and reintegration of migrants to their home countries. Lord Cormack: Can I just ask how sizeable is “sizeable”? Dana Spinant: That is outside my team’s hands. We are in the preparation stage but the latest figure I have heard in relation to the trust fund to be approved at the Valletta summit is something like €1.5 billion. The Chairman: Billion? Dana Spinant: In that area, yes. Fabrice Leggeri: If I may add something on the co-operation with African countries, at the operational level FRONTEX has already started AFIC—the Africa-FRONTEX Intelligence Community—which works at operational level to exchange relevant information on trafficking and smuggling. It is the beginning but if it is then backed by this broader political support by the EU, as mentioned by my colleague, we will have a full range of activities from the political to the operational level.

Q67 Lord Condon: We would like to understand a bit more how FRONTEX is changing. The EU action plan foresees a strengthened role for FRONTEX. We would like to understand how that change process is taking place. How will your mandate and your resources change? Perhaps you could give us some idea of the current staff numbers you have, your budget and how those will change over time to deliver the new mandate. Fabrice Leggeri: The means dedicated to FRONTEX have increased this year. This was the first increase of the budget. For instance, in December last year the plan was to have a budget up to €95 million in 2015 but in April, after the European Council conclusions, the EU budget authority decided to increase FRONTEX’s budget. For this year, it is €142 million. For next year, it is planned to be up to €176 million. Lord Condon: And staff numbers now—and then? Fabrice Leggeri: Staff numbers have already increased this year. The EU budget authority authorised FRONTEX to recruit 16 additional temporary agents. Because of that, FRONTEX is also allowed by the management board of the agency to recruit more contract agents, which is another category. It can also recruit other seconded national experts, which is another category.

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Taking into account all the different categories of staff members, this year we will have approximately 330 or 340 staff in the headquarters in Warsaw. In addition, the officers who are seconded by the member states and who participate in operations are not staff members of the agency. For instance, in Italy approximately 100 officers are deployed by FRONTEX at the moment. In Greece between 85 and 90 officers are co-ordinated by FRONTEX. If we include the crew of the trawlers and aircraft, there are more people. Regarding the future, I had talks with, let us say, high-level officials in the Commission. In the light of the Council meeting that took place this week, my guess is that FRONTEX will very likely be authorised to recruit more staff members. Concerning the mandate, of course it is up to the Commission to table new legislation, but we are co-operating closely with the Commission. It has already been announced that a returns policy will be one of the main changes in order to increase the mandate of FRONTEX to return people but also to support member states in their pre-return actions. For instance, the screening of migrants could be used to ascertain their nationality. It is extremely important that that is done upon arrival of the migrants at the external borders so that we can start negotiations with the countries of origin and get the travel documents. To return migrants, we need the travel documents. This is an area of activity where it is very likely that the mandate will be extended. The Commission—this was in the migration agenda produced by the Commission earlier this year and it was also in President Juncker’s speech last week—proposed going forward with a European system of border guards that could also be linked with an EU coastguard function. These are proposals or ideas which are being discussed by the Commission and FRONTEX in an informal and co-operative way. In my view, as the Executive Director of FRONTEX, there is a need to strengthen the agency and a need for better and enhanced integrated border management. Integrated border management would also cover actions in third countries. We are also in touch with the Commission and member states. For instance, this year FRONTEX will deploy, for the first time, a liaison officer in Ankara. It was introduced four years ago in a FRONTEX regulation but it has never been implemented, so this will be the first case. Next year, FRONTEX will have the opportunity and the means to deploy additional liaison officers in very strategic areas—probably in north Africa and the western Balkans, for instance. Lord Condon: With regard to a change of mandate in relation to the return of irregular migrants, when is the earliest that you think you would get a lawful mandate to carry out that return policy? Dana Spinant: I think I can answer that. We are looking at expanding the involvement of FRONTEX in the returns policy under its current mandate with additional resources, as Fabrice has said—both funding and human resources. We are also looking at expanding the legal mandate to substantially scale up its support to member states in carrying out returns. The Commission has already started work on revising the legal mandate of FRONTEX and we are planning to put the legislative proposals on the table before the end of this year.

Q68 Baroness Pinnock: Thank you for the very clear description of expanding FRONTEX in relation to irregular migrants. How do we ensure that there are sufficient safeguards so that the humanitarian rights of refugees and asylum seekers are not infringed? Fabrice Leggeri: As far as FRONTEX activities are concerned, there are different ways of ensuring that. The first is that the European Charter of Fundamental Rights applies to FRONTEX. Then there is democratic control through the European Parliament. For

52 of 175 European Commission and FRONTEX—Oral Evidence (QQ 64-72) instance, yesterday I was interviewed by the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament in Brussels. We had in-depth discussions on the implementation of the new regulation on maritime borders. What was at stake, among other issues, was precisely the fundamental rights of migrants at sea. Internally in FRONTEX, we have a Fundamental Rights Officer. This person is independent but works in the agency, and her role is to make recommendations to the Executive Director of FRONTEX on fundamental rights issues. For instance, when I get so-called serious incident reports, these are shared with the Fundamental Rights Officer, especially when there is an assumption that fundamental rights might have been violated, and the Fundamental Rights Officer can carry out an independent investigation into what happened. This is also a way of promoting and enforcing the fundamental rights of migrants. In addition, there is a so-called consultative forum composed of different NGOs, as well as institutions such as the Council of Europe and a fundamental rights agency, so that we can also get a strategic recommendation. For instance, when the plan for operations is being prepared, I can consult the forum. The Fundamental Rights Officer is in the loop anyway and can make recommendations. Dana Spinant: I want to go beyond FRONTEX’s involvement in and written policy on ensuring the protection of the fundamental rights of migrants or returnees. This is a very important question and it is one of the key concerns of the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling. One of its stated aims is to prevent the exploitation of migrants by ruthless criminal networks. There are several ways in which this is ensured throughout the key aspects of the action plan against smuggling. For instance, it is envisaged that the Commission will explore whether it is necessary to expand the scope of a key EU instrument—Council Directive 2004/81/EC—on residence permits granted to victims of trafficking in human beings in order to enable it to be used more extensively, including in cases of smuggled migrants. It would enable member states to provide temporary residence permits to smuggled migrants who co-operate with authorities in investigations into migrant smuggling. On the other hand, EU legislation foresees protection for migrants, as well as particular protection for the vulnerable, being dependent on their legal status. The EU legislation on asylum has very specific provisions regarding assistance to asylum seekers, including healthcare, subsistence support and so on. Irregular migrants need to be returned to their countries of origin, and this is part of a written procedure. There is also EU legislation—the returns directive—which envisages the provision of emergency healthcare and the meeting of basic needs. Beyond that, existing EU legislation already provides for the protection of rights, particularly for the vulnerable.

Q69 Baroness Janke: You gave a very full answer when you were talking about the legal powers for FRONTEX regarding returns. On safeguards, you have mentioned support and rights in connection with healthcare. What sorts of rights will migrants have under the new legal procedure on returns? Dana Spinant: We already have EU legislation on the way in which returns of irregular migrants are organised from EU member states to their countries of origin. For the moment, we are not planning to touch that legislation, which is the EU returns directive. However, we will be conducting an evaluation of this instrument in 2017 at the latest. If it is proved necessary and appropriate, we will then make legislative proposals to amend that legislation. This is the legislation that provides the protection, rights and safeguards to ensure that returnees go through a process that is fair and transparent and that their fundamental rights and dignity are respected. The procedure and safeguards regarding returns will not be part of the revision of the legal framework of FRONTEX. Of course, any provision regarding the

53 of 175 European Commission and FRONTEX—Oral Evidence (QQ 64-72) involvement of FRONTEX in the process of the return of irregular migrants will be matched by safeguards concerning fundamental rights, as is already the case in the FRONTEX legal basis. The Chairman: The action plan also proposes the involvement of FRONTEX in asylum assessments to gather information on smuggling. How would that work in practice? Fabrice Leggeri: In practice, the assessment is made by FRONTEX on the spot because we can debrief migrants in operations such as Operation Triton in Italy and Operation Poseidon in Greece. We can assess the situation and changes in the migration routes, for instance. We can get this kind of intelligence and then we can prepare some analytical reports, which are shared with the member states and EU stakeholders—the Commission, Europol and especially Eurojust—so that FRONTEX as an agency can contribute to the overall assessment of the situation. The Chairman: What I want to get clear is that when the assessments are being made, will a FRONTEX person be in that meeting or will they be getting the information later? How would that work in practice? Fabrice Leggeri: FRONTEX is invited to attend meetings in Brussels. We have meetings every week at different levels—the Commission, DG Home Affairs, some other agencies in Brussels and now the new EU Regional Task Force. The Chairman: I understand that a pilot project is under way on how this intelligence will be gathered. Fabrice Leggeri: A pilot project on trafficking? The Chairman: It is the pilot activity of the EASO—the European Asylum Support Office—aiming to gather information and intelligence on smuggling. Fabrice Leggeri: On smuggling, we have co-operation with Europol in the context of JOT Mare. We also have the EU Regional Task Force, which now provides in Catania—and, I hope, very soon in Greece—the opportunity to exchange information in real time. We also have interagency co-operation with EASO in order to share the aggregated data so that we can have an overall assessment of the situation. The individual personal data will be shared with Europol, as I mentioned earlier, and the overall analytical situation is shared with EASO. Lord Wasserman: Does FRONTEX fingerprint the people as it is interviewing them? Do you have the power to take people’s fingerprints? Fabrice Leggeri: FRONTEX is preparing a pilot project in co-operation with eu-LISA—the EU agency in charge of ICT—and EASO. The purpose of this co-operation is to make devices available for FRONTEX operations so that we can use them and we can deploy skilled officers who can fingerprint. FRONTEX contributes to the registration but, for the time being, for technical reasons the registration does not use Eurodac everywhere at the external borders. Lord Wasserman: So at the moment when you interview people, you do not really know who they are. Fabrice Leggeri: It is the first contact. For instance, when FRONTEX supports search and rescue or detects irregular migrants at the external border, there is a first screening to identify name and nationality. Then there is a debriefing, also supported by FRONTEX, and what we have in mind now is to properly register the people in Eurodac.

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Lord Wasserman: It is a bit late, is it not? I will tell you where I am going with this: you are quoted today in one of the English papers as saying that trafficking in Syrian passports is extremely lucrative and many people use them. Therefore, I wonder whether, without the fingerprints—I happen to be very interested in fingerprints—is it not difficult for you. You ask people something, they give you the answers but you do not know who you are talking to. Fabrice Leggeri: That is true and that is why FRONTEX will improve the support to the host member states in this regard. In principle, according to EU law, the first responsibility for fingerprinting lies with the host member state. But, as it turned out last month—I was appointed in January so I could witness it—there were some shortcomings in projects such as this in some host member states. Lord Wasserman: That is what I heard. So the answer is that you are going to have the power quite soon but not just now. Fabrice Leggeri: We are working on the technology. The Chairman: Lord Ribeiro, to some extent your question has been answered but you have a supplementary?

Q70 Lord Ribeiro: To some extent, it has been answered, but you mentioned Catania— hotspots are the hot topic at the moment, it seems—and I wanted to know what lessons you have learned from Catania. You are moving on to Greece. One thing that was very obvious in Greece, which you touched on just now, was that many of the migrants were refusing to have their fingerprints taken, for the specific reason that they did not wish to use the Dublin arrangement to take refuge in the first port of call; they wanted to move on. So from what you have done in Catania, what lessons have you learned and how are you going to apply those in Greece when you set up your next hotspot, and then the next hotspot after that? Fabrice Leggeri: Catania will be used as a pilot project in order to learn lessons. The main lesson so far is that there is a daily exchange of information, which is extremely careful, on the spot between FRONTEX and Europol in order to address the need for this exchange of personal data and operational and tactical data. There is also a need to co-operate with EASO to have a smooth work flow from FRONTEX to EASO. For instance, FRONTEX’s role is to screen and to debrief—that means to interview the migrants—so FRONTEX is in the front line because we rescue them or detect them at the borders. Then, depending on the substance of the interview with the migrant, FRONTEX officers can assume that this specific person is in need of protection and we hand them over to EASO. If this person has been abused by traffickers or smugglers and has useful information for the investigation, we hand the information over to Europol. So the lesson so far is that this is extremely useful to have on the spot. This is in addition to the more institutional co-operation that exists between the headquarters—but this is on the spot in real time. Lord Ribeiro: So you do not feel that what you have described, which I think is a very straightforward process, in any way intimidates or has some impact on those refugees who may well feel intimidated by it? Fabrice Leggeri: I think that we need to explain clearly what will happen when the person is detected at the external border or has disembarked after search and rescue operations. If we explain that they have access to asylum if they are in need of protection, this should encourage people to talk and to tell the truth about what has happened to them.

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Lord Ribeiro: I ask that specifically because there is a concern from some human rights organisations that this places undue stress on them. You have clarified that very carefully. I think, Dana Spinant, that you wanted to come in but you mentioned hotspots earlier. Dana Spinant: In addition to what Fabrice has said—this is one of the lessons to retain regarding the implementation of hotspots—co-operation with the host countries is essential. The agencies are there to support those front-line member states, and the experts deployed by the other EU nations are also there to provide support. That is why it is important to have a very good and permanently open communication channel with the front-line countries. They are key as regards smuggling because they are the ones that will launch the investigations. The agencies will provide the information, smooth the information exchange and bring their analytical and operational capacities to bear, but it is the host member states that are in the front line, even as regards the investigation of smuggling. Regarding the stress that this would place on migrants, the agencies all act within their mandates and with all due respect to the safeguards which are included within their mandates. Migrants are treated with dignity, again respecting the procedures and the safeguards. Lord Chairman, earlier you mentioned the pilot project involving the European Asylum Support Office, whose aim is to see whether it can collect useful information on migrant smuggling in the asylum process. Very many safeguards are included. The search for information on migrant smuggling is carried out at the appropriate stage without interference and with due respect for the asylum process so as not to interfere with the rights of, and safeguards for, the asylum seekers. That is a very important point which we try to ensure is adhered to throughout the process from the moment the migrants are rescued or brought to land until the end. It is very important to provide them with information about their options and to be able to enlighten them about the possibility of returning to their home voluntarily and with dignity if they do not have a chance of claiming asylum in the EU. This is why we put an emphasis on, and new efforts into, providing information to migrants reaching the EU, not only on their options regarding asylum but also on their option of taking up assisted voluntary return instead of again falling prey to smugglers while making secondary movements within the EU. Lord Ribeiro: Finally, there is a very clear statement from the Council President that, if the Catania pilot proves a success, you may have additional sites. Do you see these going upstream? I note in particular the suggestion that there may be centres in Niger and so forth that may act as transit camps. Do you see this as something that you can extend further up the field? It is a challenge. Dana Spinant: The hotspot concept is devised for the European Union as a means of providing support to the front-line EU member states that have an external border of the EU. That type of support, with involvement by the agencies, is for the EU. You mentioned Niger, which is a different kind of pilot project—a laboratory. It involves another type of concentration of information and support with a multi-purpose centre through which the differentiated and necessary assistance is provided. Yes, we are looking at Niger as a laboratory, and if necessary—it probably will be necessary—we will be replicating that experience in other parts. The Chairman: Time is rushing on. I think that to some extent the next two questions have been covered. Is there anything that you want to ask briefly? Baroness Massey of Darwen: Very briefly, I have a question about co-operation. You have both spoken quite a bit about this. We have had some criticism from different

56 of 175 European Commission and FRONTEX—Oral Evidence (QQ 64-72) witnesses about information-sharing and I would like to press you on this. The Commission regards integration and co-operation as key to success. Do you have anything to add to what you have said already, other than regarding hotspots, about FRONTEX and its co-operation with other EU agencies in the fight against smuggling? That has also been criticised as being a bit of a mess, with conflicting agendas and that kind of thing. Is there anything that you want to add to that? Dana Spinant: As I mentioned briefly before, the other very important and very direct channel for co-operation and the exchange of information between EU agencies and FRONTEX on migrant smuggling is the counter-group on migrant smuggling, which the Commission launched earlier this year. It has already met once—in May—and it will meet again tomorrow. The aim is precisely to bring around the table all relevant agencies so that they can inform each other about what they have done and what information they have got their hands on regarding migrant smuggling, and so that together they can launch projects— for instance, setting up a list of matters of interest on migrant smugglers—and discuss how to deal with websites through which information about migrant smuggling is being exchanged and through which customers, so to speak, are recruited for smuggling purposes. We believe that this has huge potential. It is basically a way of bringing the agencies together once a month or every second month. They, together with the Commission, have the possibility of setting the agenda and adapting it to evolutions. We believe that that is a very direct, straightforward and efficient way of co-operating. Baroness Massey of Darwen: That sounds very good. Could we get minutes of that meeting? Dana Spinant: I see no problem with that. Baroness Janke: On the existing European policies—for example, the current defence policy—in relation to the statements about destroying smugglers’ boats and so on, some of the people who have given evidence are concerned about any potential militarisation. What is your view on that? Fabrice Leggeri: On an operational level, I stress that FRONTEX is a civilian agency, as you know. Nevertheless, in our operational plan it is clearly stated that the patrolling boats coordinated by FRONTEX should not leave migrants’ boats adrift, so that they cannot be used again by smugglers or traffickers. However, FRONTEX cannot destroy the migrants’ boats so it is up to national authorities in the host member states—Italy or Greece—in line with EU regulations and national law, to take steps to destroy, if this is necessary. Usually they first have to tow the boats to the shore and then destroy them in the port, in compliance with the legislation.

Q71 The Chairman: Moving on, what is the scope and timing of the facilitators package? Do you think the Commission intends to bring the EU legislative framework against migrant- smuggling more in line with the United Nations Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air? Dana Spinant: Thank you for this question. The Commission is working at this very moment on the evaluation of the legislative framework on migrant-smuggling—the so-called facilitators package, although the word facilitator may be slightly misleading because of its positive connotations. But we are having an in-depth look at the effectiveness, added value and value in general of this EU legislation. If necessary, we will come forward with fresh legislative proposals to amend it some time next year. This is the plan. It is for 2016. I cannot prejudge the result of the current evaluation but I can tell you that we are looking at ways to

57 of 175 European Commission and FRONTEX—Oral Evidence (QQ 64-72) bring it in line with the UN protocol against migrant-smuggling. We are also looking at ways to strengthen the criminal sanctions—the penal framework—against migrant-smugglers, while at the same time making it more differentiated in order to clearly exclude from criminal sanctions organisations that provide humanitarian assistance to migrants, for instance. Clearly, this is one of the aims but we are in the process of evaluating and assessing the impact of the options we have and will come forward with the proposals next year. The Chairman: When are you likely to finish the evaluation? Dana Spinant: I think it will be mid-next year. At the same time we will publish the results of the evaluation, the impact assessment and the fresh legislative proposals.

Q72 Lord Soley: Thank you. I think you have given us a good idea of the funding issues. I want to ask about stronger co-operation with third countries because it is a very important but very complex area. The way you might co-operate with a country that has a structure of government and law is very different from how you might co-operate with one that does not, such as Libya. Can you give us any idea as to how you differentiate and how you plan to work with virtually collapsed countries such as Libya? Dana Spinant: Co-operation with third countries is one of the key pillars of the action against migrant-smuggling. It is the fourth part of the action plan on migrant-smuggling and it is a cross-cutting issue. Very few of the actions that we envisage are possible without co- operation from third countries because this is an international business that we are dealing with. We need to end impunity for smugglers across the whole migratory route. How do we intend to do that? The exchange of information with those countries is essential. Capacity building for those countries is crucial. We are planning to use the ability that we have under existing EU financial instruments, either in the home affairs area or under development co- operation, to build the capacity of those countries to identify, trace, investigate and prosecute migrant-smuggling cases. Of course, for that you need to have a Government in place. You mentioned Libya—this is one of the problematic issues because lots of smuggling takes place through Libya. Under the EU policy cycle on organised crime, one of the actions envisaged was a pilot project to deploy a person to Libya to help with the investigation of and the exchange of information on those cases. That has not been possible so far. We have very established co-operation under the Khartoum process with countries in the Horn of Africa. We get together regularly; for instance, a senior officials’ meeting is planned to take place soon in the UK. We very much support and substantially finance that co-operation with those countries and the building of their capacities on migrant-smuggling. We need a Government in place in order to be able to share information and co-operate operationally. The Chairman: I think that is all. Is there anything you want to add? Fabrice Leggeri: Just to confirm what Dana has said concerning Libya, for the time being FRONTEX has had to suspend the co-operation. FRONTEX had been working to a certain extent with EUBAM but this co-operation was suspended two years ago because of the insecurity in Libya. At operational level, of course, where we have counterparts in third countries—I have mentioned Turkey; there are also the western Balkans, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt soon probably, and other countries on the African continent—FRONTEX develops operational co-operation in the field of training and the exchange of intelligence, risk analysis and good practice in terms of border management and migration management but also the rule of law and fundamental rights. Usually as a matter of principle, FRONTEX develops co- operation which aligns with EU external policy.

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The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed for your very full and comprehensive answers. We are very grateful that you have taken the time this morning. As I said, if there is anything further you wish to send us, please feel free. If you do not mind, if we feel there is further information we want to elicit from you, we may write to you. Thank you very much indeed.

59 of 175 European Council on Refugees and Exiles—Written Evidence

European Council on Refugees and Exiles—Written Evidence

Introduction and Summary 1 The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) is a European network of 88 member organisations in 38 countries protecting and advancing the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and displaced persons. Our mission is to promote the establishment of fair and humane European asylum policies and practices in accordance with international human rights law.

2 ECRE welcomes this much needed inquiry into the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling, at a time when unprecedented numbers of people are fleeing conflict to Europe. Nearly 340,000 people had arrived in Europe by the end of July,33 with Greece and Italy coming under particular pressure. UNHCR has called the situation in the Mediterranean a refugee crisis as those arriving are predominantly fleeing war and persecution in Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea and other countries.34 Numbers of refugees and migrants arriving in Greece have soared 750% above those recorded last year.35 Due to a lack of legal routes to Europe, the overwhelming majority of those fleeing have been forced to use the services of migrant smugglers.

3 There is no doubt that those who use the services of smugglers to arrive in Europe put their lives in grave danger. IOM has confirmed that whilst 188,000 people had been saved in the Mediterranean by the beginning of August this year, there were 2,000 people at least who died.36

4 ECRE considers that the Commission’s European Agenda on Migration includes a number of measures that constitute a move in the right direction, such as boosting resources to save lives, increasing the number of resettlement places and measures that enhance solidarity. However, ECRE is concerned about other aspects of the European Agenda on Migration which are predominantly security-driven and risk undermining a rights-based approach, including certain measures relating to tackling migrant smuggling as discussed below.

5 The EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling provides several useful initiatives to improve cooperation between EU institutions and Member States and to tackle new areas such as the financial and communication means of smugglers. However, the Action Plan focuses much of its energy on security and responses to the supply side of smuggling.

6 Unlike the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), the person making the journey is largely absent from the Action Plan apart from passive references to people being victims of smuggling, labour or sexual exploitation and as the target of deterrence strategies. The lack of acknowledgement of why people need to migrate, the situations they are fleeing, their motivations and needs, including for international protection, means that there is a large gap in the policy, and this includes any real analysis of the links

33 http://frontex.europa.eu/news/number-of-migrants-in-one-month-above-100-000-for-first-time-I9MlIo 34 http://www.unhcr.org/5592bd059.html 35 http://www.unhcr.org/55c4d1fc2.html 36 https://www.iom.int/news/deadly-milestone-mediterranean-migrant-deaths-pass-2000

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between smuggling and trafficking and vulnerability at different stages of the journey, and consequently, how policies will need to be tailored to reflect this reality.

7 The EU and Member States need to recognize more openly that the majority of those using smugglers are fleeing war, conflict and persecution, that people have a right to seek asylum and that because there are so few legal routes to Europe, using smugglers is often the only way people have of reaching safety. The EU also needs to be clear that any naval operations do not put the lives of people fleeing war at risk, and that they do not limit people’s ability to reach Europe to seek asylum.

One of the priorities of the European Agenda on Migration is the prevention of migrant smuggling, with the goal of transforming migrant smuggling networks into “high risk, low return” operations. Are the four objectives of the Action Plan the right ones to achieve this goal? Which, if any, of the proposals in the Action Plan should be prioritised in this context?

1 The EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling sets out specific actions to implement both the European Agenda on Migration,37 which identifies the fight against migrant smuggling as a priority, as well as the European Agenda on Security,38 which singles out cooperation against migrant smuggling inside the EU and with third countries as a priority in the fight against organized crime networks. The two agendas of migration and security come together in the four objectives highlighted in the Action Plan: enhanced police and judicial response; improved gathering and sharing of information; enhanced prevention of smuggling and assistance to vulnerable migrants; and stronger cooperation with third countries.

2 The Action Plan is based on a multidisciplinary approach and acknowledges the cross- cutting nature of migrant smuggling, at the juncture between migration, security and external relations policies. Most policies and activities undertaken at international and EU level currently tackle the supply side of the smuggling of migrants and are concerned with improving the detection and apprehension of smugglers at EU borders (through capacity building/border management; data exchange, including data systems and joint operations). New activities have been included in the Action Plan to step up EU assistance and fill gaps in taking action against money laundering and financial investigations; targeting smugglers’ means of communication with migrants by cooperating with internet service providers; targeting business operators and means of transport used by smugglers for their activities. The Action Plan also foresees an increased role for the EU Agencies (Frontex, Eurojust, Europol) and the EEAS, and greater integration of migration in foreign policy including stronger cooperation with third countries, for example on capacity building and information exchange.

3 ECRE welcomes the renewed focus of the EU on saving lives at sea in the EU Agenda on Migration, recognizes that the smuggling of people may constitute a crime that endangers human lives and that smuggling networks need to be tackled.

37 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background- information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf 38 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic- documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf

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4 ECRE has concerns about the possible impact of the EUNAVFOR Med39 naval operation to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, now fully operational and undertaking monitoring missions as mandated under phase 1 of operations.40 The EU needs to be clear that any naval operations do not put the lives of people fleeing war at risk, and that they do not limit people’s ability to reach Europe to seek asylum. ECRE is also concerned that without the necessary increases in legal ways to reach Europe, the focus on disrupting vessels may lead to refugees and migrants taking even more dangerous routes. In terms of its impact on smuggling, smuggling has proven to be an extremely fluid network that adapts to changing circumstances and there have to be concerns that smugglers will simply resort to more dangerous routes, charging higher prices, with little or no regard for the safety of those they are transporting. The EU and Member States need to recognize more openly that the majority of those using smugglers are fleeing war, conflict and persecution, that people have a right to seek asylum and that because there are so few legal routes to Europe, using smugglers is often the only way people have of reaching safety.

5 There are far fewer activities by the EU or Member States that currently directly tackle the demand side of the smuggling of migrants (i.e. aimed at decreasing the need for smugglers’ services or discouraging migrants from using smugglers), such as the opening up of legal channels for people to come to Europe safely, or awareness raising activities.

6 On information campaigns (highlighted as a flagship measure), little evidence exists about the impact campaigns have in influencing migration plans. It is often argued that migrants know that there are risks involved or that those who want to migrate will not listen to negative information on the journey ahead and will undertake the trip regardless. Awareness raising campaigns to inform people about legal migration possibilities are limited in their usefulness. Legal migration channels are almost non-existent, so there is very little information that can be provided.

7 International organisations, the UN and civil society have called for the establishment of more legal channels for migrants and refugees to reach Europe as a way to address people smuggling. In its Ten Point Plan to Save Lives at Sea41 ECRE calls on EU institutions and Member States to significantly increase the numbers of refugees admitted to Europe through resettlement programmes and humanitarian admission; give refugees the possibility to apply for safe entry and international protection through EU embassies in countries neighbouring refugees’ regions of origin; make use of the possibility to grant humanitarian visas in accordance with Articles 19(4) and 25(1) of the EU Visa Code42 to help those in need of international protection to leave areas of conflict in a safe and legal manner; facilitate family reunification for people in the region who have family members living in Europe so that they can easily join their loved ones; and expand legal channels for migration beyond highly skilled workers.

39 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D0778&qid=1435825940768&from=EN 40 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/press-releases/20150728_en.htm 41 http://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1034-ecres-ten-point-plan-to- prevent-deaths-at-sea.html 42 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32009R0810&from=EN

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8 The EU Migration Agenda stresses the need to “open more safe, legal ways into the EU” and mentions sponsorships, humanitarian permits, and family reunification. However, these are only mentioned in relation to persons in need of protection. The EU Action Plan against smuggling tries to put forward a balanced approach in terms of intentions and objectives. However, the main way to decrease demand for smuggling – opening legal channels to Europe – is only a small part of the introduction to the section on a Stronger European Response to Migrant Smuggling in the Action Plan, and no concrete plans have been brought forward by the EU or MS so far.

According to the European Commission, the Action Plan “should be seen in the broader context of EU efforts to address the root causes of irregular migration”. Does it suggest the correct set of measures to bring this about?

1 Member States to date have been primarily addressing human smuggling from the point of view of law enforcement. There is a need for the EU to put smuggling in a wider context, which the Action Plan recognizes by referring to the need to address other issues such as information, cooperation with third countries and assistance to migrants.

2 The EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), adopted in 201143 has already sought to address the root causes of migration and the relationship between migration and development through a general framework for cooperation between the EU and third countries. The GAMM stresses that policies should be migrant-centred, and that the human rights of migrants are a cross-cutting issue. It aims to strengthen respect for fundamental rights and the human rights of migrants in source, transit and destination countries alike.

3 The EU Action Plan should not be pursued in isolation, as a targeted cooperation area, but as part of a more holistic cooperation package with partner countries. The GAMM should still remain the overarching framework for cooperation with third countries in this regard.

4 In terms of the measures included in the Action Plan, there are some areas that could be prioritized: - The collection of information in third countries that is already happening could be strengthened through the roles of Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) and coordination between the ILOs, MS, EU Delegations and more regular information exchange between MS; - Inter-agency coordination should be fostered between Europol, Frontex and Eurojust, but guarantees will be needed that such coordination is not at the expense of fundamental rights protection. In this regard, the hotspots approach proposed in the Action Plan remains unclear;44 - There is a lack of criminal statistics, data and regular reporting mechanisms on smuggling;

43 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to- migration/index_en.htm 44See ECRE statement on the European Council conclusions of 25th June http://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1125-ecre-raises-serious-concerns- over-council-conclusions-and-mistrust-between-member-states.html

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- Data on the role of smuggling in secondary movements within the EU also needs to be collected in a uniform manner, including through the development of indicators; - Humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants should be decriminalized; - Smuggling should not be looked at in isolation, but instead as part of a holistic approach and cooperation package with partner countries that corresponds to their needs and capacities; - Legislative frameworks in partner countries that will protect the fundamental rights of migrants, including those smuggled, and whereby investigation will not put them in additional and unnecessary risks, should be supported; - There is currently little evidence that return measures can prevent smuggling/ irregular travel: there has been no evidence to substantiate a cause -effect relationship between the two so it is unclear if the current focus on return measures without any change in the situations of conflict that people are fleeing, will have any impact on the use of smuggling to get to Europe.

Are Member States currently meeting their obligations under the existing EU framework against migrant smuggling? What are the deficiencies of the current framework, and do the actions foreseen in the Action Plan address these?

1 The existing EU framework against migrant smuggling includes the “Facilitators Package” adopted in 2002 which consists of Council Directive 2002/90/EC defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence and Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA to strengthen the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence. The Directive criminalises the facilitation of irregular migration and residence, whilst the Decision establishes minimum rules for penalties, liability of legal persons and jurisdiction. Article 26 of the Schengen Agreement and Directive 2001/51 concerning the carrier’s liability are also important in the EU legal framework as they are regarded as tools for combating irregular migration, including smuggling of people. Finally, as the Action Plan covers return as an area of importance, return and readmission polices are also relevant.

2 Cooperation at MS level between departments, between MS, and the EU and MS has been difficult and could be improved. MS can tend to prefer to liaise bilaterally with countries of origin and transit.

3 A recent report by the Fundamental Rights Agency shows that in almost all EU Member States, irregular entry and stay are offences, often punishable with custodial sentences. The use of criminal sanctions and imprisonment to fight irregular migration harms not only the persons concerned, but also casts a negative light on how society as a whole perceives them.45

4 EU legislation means that EU Member States must punish persons who help irregular migrants to enter and stay in the EU. According to the Fundamental Rights Agency it is important that MS national legislation on smuggling of people “should always include financial and material benefit as a requirement for punishment” or explicitly exclude punishment for facilitation of unauthorized entry or stay based on humanitarian assistance grounds to avoid risks of NGOs or others being punished for rendering

45 FRA: ‘The Criminalisation of migrants in an irregular situation and of persons engaging with them’ http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-criminalisation-of-migrants_en.pdf

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humanitarian assistance.46 The Social Platform has also raised concerns that the Facilitation Directive does not rule out imposing sanctions on individuals or organisations that offer assistance to undocumented migrants and pointed out that more and more responsibility is being put on service providers such as health and welfare, to provide information on undocumented migrants. This puts them in difficult situations morally and they can face financial and other penalties.47

5 The Action Plan has provisions that could enable Member States to have more operational capacity and cooperation with EU institutions such as Europol, and each other, on cases of smuggling which should aid the detection and apprehension of smuggling networks. It does not address concerns on the Facilitators Package and the rendering of humanitarian assistance. As the Commission is currently evaluating the Facilitators’ Package, ECRE hopes that this will be addressed as part of that process and will ensure that humanitarian assistance to refugees and migrants arriving in Europe is no longer a potential crime.

EU Agencies are expected to play a significant role in carrying out the objectives of the Action Plan. Do they have the mandate, budget and other capacities to fulfil this role?

1 The main challenge at the moment is coordination between different EU agencies: Frontex and Europol, Eurojust and EASO. The Action Plan includes activities to enhance cooperation. The Commission will set up a Contact Group of EU Agencies on migrant smuggling, to strengthen operational cooperation and information exchange between the relevant EU Agencies. In parallel, the capacities of EU Agencies to address migrant smuggling will be enhanced. Eurojust should set up a thematic group on migrant smuggling to strengthen and formalise cooperation between national prosecutors and enhance mutual legal assistance.

2 Support for capacity building to help Member States' law enforcement authorities to reduce migrant smuggling is crucial, as is the use of Joint Investigation Teams and the provision of mutual assistance in cases of migrant smuggling. Eurojust can make a strong contribution through the financing of Joint Investigation Teams and support for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.

3 The Commission, with relevant EU Agencies, in particular CEPOL and Europol, as well as the European Judicial Training Network, will map training needs at EU and national level to enable a better targeting of capacity building. This should include tailor-made training for judiciary, law enforcement, border guards and consulate authorities on cross-border cooperation to counter migrant smuggling. The capacities of EU Agencies to collect, exchange and analyse information on migrant smuggling will be reinforced. It is crucial that the Fundamental Rights Agency develops the fundamental rights dimension, in particular as regards the protection of smuggled migrants.

46 Fundamental Rights Conference 2014: Fundamental Rights and Migration to the EU: Conference Conclusions, FRA, November 2014, p.2. 47 See more at: http://www.socialplatform.org/what-we-do/over-arching-campaigns/criminalising- solidarity/#sthash.av1lCg4G.dpuf

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Does the Action Plan sufficiently differentiate between migrant smuggling and human trafficking? What is your opinion of the proposal to extend the 2004 Directive on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings to smuggled migrants?

1 The Action Plan clearly distinguishes that it focuses on migrant smuggling and not on human trafficking, and that although the two are interlinked trafficking is dealt with in a different policy, the EU Strategy Towards the Eradication of Human Beings . There is acknowledgement of the risk that people using smugglers to travel to Europe can become victims of trafficking for different reasons during the journey. However, unlike the GAMM, the person making the journey is largely absent from the Action Plan. The lack of acknowledgement of why people need to migrate, means that there is a gap in the policy, including any real analysis of the links between smuggling and trafficking and vulnerability at different stages of the journey, and consequently, how policies will need to be tailored to reflect this.

Does current EU action against migrant smuggling, including the actions suggested in the Action Plan, strike the correct balance between law enforcement and the human rights of migrants, including particularly vulnerable migrants such as minors and pregnant women?

1 At EU level, the EU Action Plan and other actions against migrant smuggling focus mainly on law enforcement and not enough on the human rights of migrants and refugees, including minors, pregnant women and other vulnerable groups.

2 The Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU has reported that the ‘criminalisation’ of undocumented and irregular migrants means that many people are afraid to use medical services, send their children to school or register births. Criminalisation also hurts people who help refugees and migrants. For example, it was shown after the Lampedusa tragedy that fishermen were scared of punishment for rescuing people who were drowning at sea.48 The report states that humanitarian assistance should be decriminalised; search and rescue and obligations under non-refoulement should not be jeopardised; people should be subject to detention for irregular entry or stay whilst the Returns Directive applies to them; people who are victims of exploitation and abuse should have a residence permit that is not dependent on the perpetrator of abuse. This is important in the case of victims of gender- based violence.

3 The EU Action Plan stresses the need for the EU to provide assistance and protection to vulnerable smuggled migrants, however it does not specify any concrete actions.

Do the Action Plan and other, related EU strategies (such as the European Maritime Security Strategy, Cyber Security Strategy and the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings) form a coherent whole?

1 The majority of the policies above concern the security side of tackling smuggling and related issues. ECRE believes that if the EU only addresses the security and supply side of the issue of people smuggling to Europe, and fails to open legal channels to Europe for significant numbers of people who need to seek international protection, the Action Plan

48 http://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2014/fra-paper-criminalisation-irregular-migrants

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will fail to eradicate smuggling. It will merely change the routes and modus operandi. There needs to be more emphasis on the financial side of the business of people smuggling, as included in the Action Plan.

Are the actions proposed in the Action Plan compatible with the international framework on preventing human smuggling, including the UN Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air? Do they add to this framework in a coherent and meaningful manner?

1. The EU is a party of the UN Protocol against Smuggling and all MS but Ireland have ratified it. There are some differences in the UN Protocol and the EU Facilitators’ Package. ‘Facilitation' in the EU Facilitators Package includes the assistance of irregular migration (facilitation) by “any person”, including criminal organisations49, whereas the Protocol defines the terms smuggling as clearly limited to organised criminal groups. Secondly, the definition of the UN Protocol includes the criterion of financial gain (“in order to obtain […] a financial or other material benefit”), while the EU Facilitators Package only requires an element of “financial gain” for infringements under Article 1 (b), but not Article 1 (a) of the Directive. With regards to the savings clause, Article 19 of the UN Protocol is much more comprehensive (applicable to all persons), than that in Article 6 of the Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA (applicable to refugees and asylum seekers).While the UN Protocol clearly states that smuggled migrants themselves should not be criminalized (Article 5), the EU package does not include such explicit provision. In the Directive of the Facilitator’s Package there is an optional provision to not impose sanctions in those cases where the aim of the facilitation is to provide humanitarian assistance. As noted above FRA and NGOs have called for a revision of this Article 1(2) making the optional provision obligatory.

2. Whilst the Action Plan is compatible overall, some concerns on fundamental rights as well as the Facilitators’ Package are still unclear. The focus is very much on tackling smugglers and much less is said on fundamental rights, the rights of those helping refugees and migrants, and ensuring that people have access to asylum.

21 August 2015

49 See also 2002/946/JHA, Article 1 (3).

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Europol—Oral Evidence (QQ 13-22)

Evidence Session No. 2 Heard in Public Questions 13 - 22

Members present

Baroness Prashar (Chairman) Lord Condon Lord Cormack Lord Faulkner of Worcester Baroness Janke Baroness Massey of Darwen Lord Morris of Handsworth Baroness Pinnock Lord Soley Lord Wasserman ______

Examination of Witness

Rob Wainwright, Director, Europol

Q13 The Chairman: Good morning, Mr Wainwright. You are very familiar with the Committee—you have been with us before—but as you know, this is being recorded. A transcript of the evidence will be sent to you. If you want to alter it, change it or correct it, feel free to do so. On behalf of the Committee, I welcome you very warmly. Is there anything that you want to say by way of introduction before we get into our questions? Rob Wainwright: No thank you, Lord Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here again. There are some new members of the Committee, of course, but it is always an honour for me to provide evidence and I hope to help the Committee in any way that I can.

The Chairman: Let me start by asking this. As you know, the European Commission intends to transform migrant-smuggling networks into “high risk, low return” operations. Are the four objectives in the action plan—enhanced police and judicial response, improved gathering and sharing of information, enhanced prevention of smuggling and assistance to vulnerable migrants, and stronger co-operation with third countries—the right ones to achieve those goals? Rob Wainwright: I think so, yes. They offer a good balance in tackling the problem on a number of levels. Operational experience from Europol’s work in this area suggests that they are aimed in the right direction. They are ambitious in their scope, certainly in trying to transform it into something that would be high risk, low return. I say that because this problem has not always been at the top of the policing or EU priority list in recent years. We have some work to do collectively as a community to address that. For its part, Europol has been pursuing migrant smuggling for more than 10 years. We have a dedicated operational project in this area called Focal Point Checkpoint. Many operational successes

68 of 175 Europol—Oral Evidence (QQ 13-22) have been recorded, but it has shown variable levels of support and activity from member states. For the EU institutions themselves, as the Committee knows, migration and asylum have generally been top priorities for some time, but until now the policies lacked a certain balance. Whereas a lot of the focus has been on reinforcing the external border and dealing with irregular migrants upon arrival, until now they have lacked focus in what should be the critical third area of any strategy: to identify and target the criminal networks behind the smuggling trade. That is the point that Europol has been making for some time and which has been illustrated most vividly by the crisis in the Mediterranean this year. The arrival of the new European Commission has played a role in seeing this area as something that should command greater political attention. We very much welcome that. As for the four priorities that you mentioned, Europol is particularly pleased that there are two areas in particular that we can provide a direct contribution to: police co-operation and improving cross-border information exchange. I am glad to see those included. Europol will of course provide its full range of services to help execute the action plan in that way.

Q14 Lord Soley: Does the information that you collect and analyse give you any clear idea of the root causes of irregular migration? Rob Wainwright: It is not part of our primary mandate to study that. As the Committee knows and as we see from our work more generally, a number of pull and push factors are involved. Some are geopolitical in nature in terms of the mass displacement from the conflict in Syria. A lot of it is more personal, in the sense of people trying to reach family members who are already in European countries, or, indeed, to reach part of the same ethnic community. From our work in monitoring the criminal networks, it is clear that the networks are content to exploit anyone and everyone regardless of their situation, and even to treat them as goods for bartering or sale. It is also clear that these networks are highly sensitive to relative changes in risk and opportunity of operating at different points along the external border of the European Union. Interestingly, in the last two years we have seen relatively significant periodic swings in criminal activity between southern border points around, for example, the Italian coastline, the eastern Mediterranean—Greece and Turkey— and the central European Balkans area around the border with Hungary and Austria. As law enforcement attention increases in effectiveness in one area, criminal activity shifts to the other areas and back again. That argues for the importance of pursuing a balanced and uniform approach across the EU. Lord Soley: I understand why you identify enforcement. It is an important question because we need to work out whether the action plan will actually address irregular migration or whether we are dealing just with some of the symptoms. How effective will the action plan be in dealing with irregular migration? If that question was asked in any of the parliamentary assemblies, you might say that it is a good question. What is the answer? Rob Wainwright: Yes, and I recognise that for the plan to be effective it involves doing more than just effective police work. It just so happens that effective police work is the principal domain of the area that I and my agency can contribute to. Of course you are right in the sense that the plan also, quite correctly, targets the need for more effective co- operation in third countries and more effective counternarratives and education programmes to try to reduce demand in the first place. That is why I said at the start that this is a balanced plan. It is certainly the most striking and ambitious that we have seen for some years at European Union level. Whether it is successful remains to be seen and depends on the actors involved.

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Lord Soley: I think this is my final question. One of the things the Minister told us is that he saw the action plan as a way to break the link between irregular migration and smugglers. A bit of me says that he is being a bit optimistic. Do you have a view on that? Will it break the link? Rob Wainwright: If we are successful I think it will, but that is a big “if”. We have to identify the smugglers, which requires enhanced intelligence that we do not have in large quantity. We then have to be able to target them at different points of their activity and in their source countries—in north Africa, as you can imagine, our operational reach is rather limited. It is also highly important to follow the money flows. It is achievable, provided we make a concerted effort across the community to improve intelligence and manage and co- ordinate our operational activity effectively. Lord Soley: I am sorry, that was the penultimate question after all. To be clear, a key factor is identifying the smugglers? Rob Wainwright: Absolutely. The Chairman: Thank you for the brief answer. Lord Wasserman: Can I ask one supplementary? The Chairman: Very quickly. We have to finish by 12.15 pm. Lord Wasserman: I am very interested in what you said, because we had a seminar in which some advocates said that there is not much point trying to use law enforcement to stop this, because if you stop one route they will come some other way. Because of the push factors—they are in such a terrible state back in their home countries—too many people are going to smuggle. Do you find that law enforcement actually cuts down the amount of smuggling that takes place? Rob Wainwright: Yes, I do. You are right that some of the inherent push factors clearly need to be addressed as part of the wider strategy. However, it is absolutely clear that criminal networks are at least exacerbating the situation, if not directly responsible for the extent of the trade, and using the internet to encourage people to make the journey in the first place, forcing them, sometimes against their will, on to unseaworthy vessels. Indeed, in some cases they exploit them on their arrival in the European Union. That is a large criminal infrastructure that is fundamental to this trade. If we can take that away, it will make a big difference.

Q15 Lord Faulkner of Worcester: Sticking with the action plan, do you think that the Commission has set the right priorities for it? Can they be achieved in the five-year timescale? Rob Wainwright: It is ambitious. As I said, part of it—for example, aiming to increase the effectiveness of EU actions in third countries such as Libya—will be difficult to achieve. Setting an ambitious timeframe and goal is a positive move by the EU. It underlines the renewed political commitment that we have in this area and should be applauded. There are some very well-conceived ideas in the plan that are relatively new, such as bearing down on the use of the internet by criminal networks that are recruiting their victims. Also, it once again enforces the importance of following the money train. That is something that I often hear in the police world and I do not often see sustainable success in that across many areas of organised crime activity. Where we can do something about that, it will make a positive difference. We are seeing about €8,000 per migrant made in profit by the criminal networks on the journey from Libya to Italy. That is a lot of money when you aggregate the numbers.

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Europol will therefore try to provide its services. It already acts as a centre point in the EU for a lot of the anti-money laundering and asset recovery work for the European police community. Our expertise and institutional capability will be used here. Until now, there has been no systematic use of financial investigation tools in this area. That is something that we need to do a lot more on. To answer your question in simple terms, this is a mindset issue, not only as to why we have not used financial intelligence tools enough but for the whole plan. All actions are achievable; if the actors commit themselves, in the right frame of mind, with the necessary resources, the right information exchange and the right operational attention, this can be achieved. Lord Faulkner of Worcester: Fast forward to 2020: what, for you, would count as success? Rob Wainwright: First, a much better intelligence picture of the networks involved, not just those operating in the source and transit countries in north Africa, but the secondary distribution networks here in Europe, from Italy to other parts of Europe. Of course, it would also be significant operational successes that we can feel and see the impact of in terms of numbers of people arrested and networks disrupted. In the end, the success of this plan at the highest level will be the numbers of migrants. Lord Faulkner of Worcester: Getting them down. Rob Wainwright: Of course.

Q16 Lord Condon: As Europol takes on an even more significant role in this new action plan, can I explore whether you think your mandate is clear on this, your capacity in terms of quality of the staff you recruit and retain, and, perhaps most importantly, your budget? Have they clarified your mandate, and do you have the resources to deliver it? Rob Wainwright: In these tight budgetary times we are under resource strain, like other agencies. We have developed JOT Mare, which I will happily explain later, but the idea is that we should brigade our resources more effectively internally and combine them in an operational team with experts from the member states. We have done that to maximise the use of our limited resources. That is now being pulled and pushed in different directions under this action plan, quite rightly, to pursue a more effective implementation plan, for example by deploying a forward intelligence cell connected to this in Sicily. There is talk and negotiations that we might do the same in Greece, and even in Hungary, which the European Commission is keen for us to do. That will bring significant resource strain. For the moment, only an additional three posts have been allocated to Europol as part of that. That is clearly not enough. I have made that clear to the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament. My estimate is that we should have upwards of 20 or 25 new posts over the next two years. In these difficult budgetary times that will be a difficult and challenging discussion. In the mean time, we are trying to maximise as much as we can. As for your broader questions, the mandate is clear. We have been operating in this area for more than 10 years. We have a clear legal mandate. There is one particular aspect of the new task that we have been given that I would prefer to have a clarified mandate on: where we have been asked to monitor the internet for the way it is being used to recruit victims. We have established a new EU-wide internet referral unit, principally to help on counterterrorism matters, but now, under the specific guidance of the European Heads of Government, also in this field. I raise this because until now we did not have an established

71 of 175 Europol—Oral Evidence (QQ 13-22) direct operational connection with the private sector. Our new legal regime, which is currently being negotiated, should clarify that point. Lord Condon: Can I pursue the budget aspects? You mentioned that you have been allocated three posts and that you perhaps need 25 to 30. What is happening to your budget in percentage terms? Do have you have any clarity on what is happening to your budget over the next few years? Rob Wainwright: Our budget is set from one year to the next, so I do not have clarity beyond the next year. For the next year there is a modest increase in line with inflation—no more than that. This year we had an increase of some 5% to 10%, principally to deal with ICT infrastructure development. In terms of our human resources, very little has come our way, despite the fact that Europol has taken on many new important tasks in the last few years, including the establishment of the new European Cybercrime Centre, which has been a major part of our work in the meantime. We have been under significant strain. All the actors in the EU institutional machinery recognise that, but at the moment we have not properly readjusted our position to reflect that. Lord Condon: Finally, just so I can get a feel for within your organisation, how many people are more or less dedicated to dealing with people smuggling and associated issues full time? Rob Wainwright: That is always difficult to answer, because we operate a platform hub—an operational co-ordination centre—so our service is to connect a much wider operational community around the member states. The core team that is providing that is fewer than 20 at the moment. Of that, maybe only half— Lord Condon: You said fewer than 20. How many? Rob Wainwright: About 15, maybe 18 depending on how you count them, about half of whom are devoted to the particular problem in the Mediterranean. We established a specific team to tackle the problem.

Q17 Lord Morris of Handsworth: Mr Wainwright, I have a very nosy neighbour who is always seeking information. For example, tonight he might ask me, “What has the joint operation team achieved since its launch in March 2015?”. Can you help me? Rob Wainwright: I would be happy to, your Lordship. It has only been established since March, but this team is already working pretty well. I shall give you some figures to support that. It is a multinational team; it is not only Europol’s work. Five member states have already seconded their experts to join our team. It is a very dynamic operational environment. I am glad to say that the UK is one of its leading supporters, with support from the Home Office and the National Crime Agency. The combination of their expertise and what our analysts are delivering at Europol has, since March, supported 70 cross-border investigations in this area, which is already quite a sizeable amount. That reflects the size of the problem and the scale of the commitment that the operational teams show. For those 70 investigations already identified, in the Mediterranean alone, Europol processed over 8,000 unique pieces of intelligence, including on facilitators, their associates and communication methods used. To give a recent example, JOT Mare is supporting a significant ongoing investigation led by the Italian authorities of an organised crime group that was linked, we think, to many smuggling operations in the Mediterranean, including one notable incident that led to many casualties. Eighteen suspects have already been arrested. It was an interesting case in which data were collected by the Italian authorities and analysed by our team at Europol. We quickly saw intelligence connections right across the European

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Union, including to here in the United Kingdom. It shows that this concept is working. So far, I am pleased with the progress that it is making. Lord Morris of Handsworth: Do you think you will eradicate the problem 12 months on? Rob Wainwright: No, not in 12 months. I think it will take longer than that. We should be measuring it in a period of years before we talk about eradicating the problem, or at least reducing it. Lord Morris of Handsworth: How many years? Rob Wainwright: It is difficult to predict that, your Lordship. I am counting in terms of the lifespan of the EU action plan, which takes us to 2020 before we can have a really meaningful impact.

Q18 Lord Wasserman: I see that the Europeans have set up a hotspot. How will that affect you? What are they trying to do? I was not quite clear on what they have in mind and what you are going to do about it. Rob Wainwright: Yes, it is from the European Commission. The idea is that it puts into practice an interagency arrangement in the field where the pressing problem is, from which we can deploy the different complementary assets of different European agencies, including Europol, to deliver a specific, targeted impact on that problem. From my side, Europol has always been a positive proponent of it, because it allows us to get into the field, particularly by way of collecting better intelligence more quickly to feed into our system. The first established hotspot team is in Sicily, with Europol working alongside FRONTEX in particular. For us, it is an opportunity to get closer to the operational intelligence that the Italian authorities and FRONTEX have from debriefing migrants on their arrival. We hope also to involve specialist teams from member states, including the UK, so that we can get better access to intelligence in theatre, to use the military term, and turn that around more quickly to provide some kind of actionable intelligence for operational impact. Lord Wasserman: Could you not do that before this new initiative? Rob Wainwright: All that was possible, but remotely from our team in the Hague. The systems are still there to provide that, but being on the ground and dealing with the investigators on the spot gives us a greater sense of familiarity and immediacy with the problem. Lord Wasserman: So this hotspot on the ground means that you are now able to go to the affected places? Rob Wainwright: Indeed.

Q19 Baroness Massey of Darwen: We have mentioned the word “co-operation” before. The Commission regards interagency co-operation as key to the success of the agenda and the action plan. How does Europol co-operate with other agencies in the fight against migrant smuggling? How good is it? Rob Wainwright: It is good. It can always be improved, as with anything. As I implied to Lord Wasserman, our principal partner is FRONTEX, which to a certain extent is the lead European agency, certainly in terms of protecting the external border of the EU. We have a complementary role; Europol is interested in the smuggling networks that are penetrating the external border. Our principal relationship with FRONTEX is that we can take from it some information that it is gathering to help us to identify the smuggling networks. In the

73 of 175 Europol—Oral Evidence (QQ 13-22) other direction, having identified those, we can help to deploy FRONTEX’s capabilities in the field in particular to target the vulnerable points. It is a very symbiotic relationship that is working rather well, although it needs to be solidified in the form of an operational agreement, a legal agreement, that would allow FRONTEX in particular to exchange operational information—in EU language, “personal data”—with Europol. There is a mechanism in our respective legal frameworks that allows that, but so far the modalities of that agreement have not been put into practice. Whereas Europol is ready to do that, FRONTEX still has some work to do with its data protection supervisor, for example. For the moment, we are not getting direct access to the information that FRONTEX is collecting and we need to do that. Both agencies see that as a priority, as does the European Commission. That should be finalised in a matter of months. I do not think it will be a problem for much longer. As for the other agencies, we are negotiating with the European Maritime Safety Agency to get access to vessels operating in that area. Also, I recently played host to a visit by the newly appointed commander of the EU naval force for the Mediterranean that has recently been established. I talked with him about setting up important information exchange arrangements that would allow us to use our intelligence in an actionable way, maybe to help direct the way that EU NAVFOR operates its military assets in that area, particularly against suspected vessels. Baroness Massey of Darwen: Is data a general problem, apart from with FRONTEX? Rob Wainwright: No. What is always a challenge for Europol in all its fields of activity is ensuring that we have optimum engagement, in particular with member states’ authorities, which will always be our principal sources of information. Can we build the necessary trust and operational engagement with the relevant authorities so that they will share data with us effectively and systematically? The answer to that is yes a lot of the time, but not always. Trust is a precious commodity in all fields of commercial and non-commercial activity. That is particularly true in the law enforcement domain, as some of your Lordships will know.

Q20 Lord Soley: Thinking of the resources that have been allocated to you in the action plan, can you give us an idea of how you see them relating to many other areas you could cover, from cybercrime to drugs? You have this incredible multiagency approach. How will it fit together? How will the action plan fit into the other activities imposed on you? Rob Wainwright: At the highest policy level, there is some synergy between this plan, the migration strategy and the European agenda on security, developed by the European Commission and endorsed by the Council at more or less the same time. That agenda concerns organised crime, cybercrime and terrorism, which includes aspects of the problem of illegal migration. There is policy synergy at the highest level. Indeed, some architecture has been put in place over the last five years to try to ensure that that policy cohesion at the top level can be translated into operational effect. I am sorry if that sounds like the words of an EU bureaucrat. I often hear myself talking that way. I have been away from the UK for too long. We have something called the EU policy cycle for combating organised crime, which sounds rather boring and drab but is actually very important. It is the first time that we have put an architecture in place that combines the operational activities of all member states behind an identified set of strategic priorities. That ensures that there is cohesion and consistency between what we do in one area and what we do in another. A lot of the architecture operates through Europol to give it operational effect. Therefore, at Europol we will make

74 of 175 Europol—Oral Evidence (QQ 13-22) sure that the work we are doing in this area can complement the work in other areas, in particular by making use of information connections. Where we can identify connections between criminal activity in this domain and in others, that will drive more effective coordination across the different areas. Lord Soley: I find that an encouraging answer. Thank you.

Q21 Lord Cormack: Your website indicates that, “criminals involved in facilitated”— horrible word—“illegal immigration are often also involved in other crimes such as drugs and people trafficking, forgery of passports … and money laundering”. How do you ensure that the intelligence that you collect on these crimes helps you in your fight against illegal migrant smuggling? Rob Wainwright: Our operating concept at Europol, developed in the last five years, in particular reflects what we have observed in the criminal domain, which is the broadening nature of the activities of organised crime groups. They are far less specialised in particular criminal sectors today than they were a decade ago. Many criminal groups are operating in multiple criminal sectors, including illegal immigration. In particular, we have developed our information and intelligence systems to maximise our view of that and to maximise our opportunity to identify opportunities for international investigation. That means that we have developed our analytical systems and our databases in particular to immediately crosscheck data gathered in one investigation with the other areas that we have. We have millions of intelligence entries now in our databases on all fields of organised crime and terrorism. It is a very powerful data set that is unique in Europe. Every day it has identified connections between one case and another, very often across different criminal sectors. I am very confident that we are therefore able in this case to collect intelligence about criminal networks smuggling people and our ability to connect that with drug trafficking in another. Indeed, we are already seeing those links: individuals who are smuggled for labour and sexual exploitation on arrival and individuals who are smuggled with the express purpose to support the drugs distribution business in Europe, in particular cannabis. Firearms smuggling has also been connected with this. Of most concern is the possible connection with terrorism. It is important not to overestimate that, because we at Europol have not seen this potential threat manifested yet in a significant way. Indeed, there is a possibility that some of these smuggling networks might be manipulated by Daesh. We are very sensitive to any signs of that. Lord Cormack: Some years ago, throughout the 2005 Parliament, I chaired the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee in another place. We conducted an inquiry into organised crime, which revealed in great detail that paramilitaries on both sides were much involved in it. They were involved in people trafficking, illicit cigarettes and all the rest. Is there much evidence of a UK participation in organised crime, from Northern Ireland or from any other part of the UK, or is this more a problem that is occasioned by criminals in what we loosely call mainland Europe? Rob Wainwright: Do you mean terrorist groups, or criminal groups? Lord Cormack: No, these were former terrorists in Northern Ireland who were much involved in organised crime, particularly in the Province but spreading over to other parts of the UK. I just wondered whether you had any evidence of participation by those people, or their heirs and successors, in the sort of crimes that we are concerned with here, particularly people trafficking and smuggling.

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Rob Wainwright: Yes, there are signs of that. There are established criminal networks operating in the United Kingdom that are certainly well connected with this trade, especially secondary distribution. It is not so much the primary transfer of migrants from north Africa to Italy, for example, but there is certainly the secondary distribution. On trafficking human beings—what the Home Secretary calls “modern slavery”—there are certainly established connections to Britain that we are helping to tackle. Lord Cormack: Our previous witness’s primary concern was refugees as human beings. We accept and understand that, but he seemed to suggest that there is a very real difference between smuggling and people trafficking: most of the refugees might well be exploited by or taken advantage of by people smugglers, but most of them were not necessarily being trafficked. Do you have any observations on that? Rob Wainwright: I agree with that. From our observations, the majority of them are smuggled, at least at the start of the enterprise. They are smuggled in a voluntary way; they have signed up to the smuggling operation. The way they are treated and sometimes forced on to vessels along the way is a very different matter, but only a small number of them can be defined as trafficked: that is, those whose purpose is to be exploited on arrival for other criminal purposes.

Q22 Lord Condon: In trying to grasp how we address this problem with the law enforcement response to the action plan, in percentage terms, how much of that law enforcement focus is on organised crime and how much arises from opportunist local fisherman, boat owners and people who are prepared to make money out of exploiting this huge mass of people who are trying to move? I do not yet have a feel for whether organised crime is at the core of this change or whether they are just tapping into it in an opportunist way, as lots of small fishermen and others have done. Rob Wainwright: That is a good question. Part of this is opportunistic in nature. Of course, it very much depends on how you define organised crime. Certainly there are established criminal syndicates that are organising the smuggling operation from start point to end point, also with a very deliberate exploitation of the internet as a recruitment mechanism. Lord Condon: Is it possible to put any sort of percentage on the total? Rob Wainwright: It is not, I am afraid. It is very difficult to do that. Lord Condon: Is it likely to be half, or more? Rob Wainwright: We have a much better view on the secondary distribution trade in Europe, in which most of the problem is certainly controlled by or in the hands of established organised crime syndicates. As for the situation in Libya and other areas, it is such a difficult situation to read that I am afraid I cannot answer with much confidence. Baroness Massey of Darwen: I am trying to count all the strategies. Rob Wainwright: Me too. Baroness Massey of Darwen: Good. Who is co-ordinating them? Is it you or is it out there somewhere? Rob Wainwright: The European Commission is principally a co-ordinating actor. It shares that responsibility with the Governments and with the European Council. There are review and co-ordination mechanisms, which I can testify work in practice. At the operational level, on specific targeted European work against the smuggling networks themselves, yes, Europol

76 of 175 Europol—Oral Evidence (QQ 13-22) is responsible for co-ordinating their implementation, very much in co-operation with the national authorities. The Chairman: That is all from us. Thank you very much indeed for your time. If there is anything that on reflection you think would be helpful to our inquiry, please send us some supplementary information. Rob Wainwright: I shall send you a written submission as well. The Chairman: That would be very helpful. Thank you very much indeed for your time. Rob Wainwright: My pleasure, thank you.

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Europol—Written Evidence

4. The Action Plan 4.1. The European Commission intends to transform migrant smuggling networks into “high risk, low return” operations. Europol fully supports this approach and is of the opinion that the four objectives of the Action Plan against migrant smuggling are the right ones to achieve this goal.

4.2. The Action plan is balanced and comprehensive. It pays due attention to law enforcement aspects. This problem has not always been at the top of the EU or policing agenda as the response was focused on reinforcing external borders and dealing with the migrants upon arrival. The Action Plan rightly introduces a stronger focus on the criminal networks behind the facilitation activities. In particular, it includes a focus on two important areas to which Europol could contribute, namely enhancing police cooperation and improving the cross-border exchange of information.

4.3. The Action Plan is coherent with other EU strategic documents and actions. At policy level, there is synergy between the Action Plan under the Migration Strategy with others developed for other security threats under the European Agenda for Security. At operational level, synergy is ensured by the EU Policy Cycle on combating Serious and Organise Crime. Illegal migration is one of the Policy Cycle priorities. The Policy Cycle, in which Europol plays a vital role, ensures that actions in related priority fields are mutually supportive, avoid duplication and identify information connections.

4.4. There are new tasks allocated to Europol by the European Council, such as the establishment of the Internet Referral Unit (IRU). The development of the IRU, the role of which is primarily in the field of counter terrorism, is also connected to the fight against facilitated illegal migration and the unit identifies relevant Internet content (in particular, the use of social media by facilitators to ‘recruit’ irregular migrants).

4.5. Europol fully supports the ambitious goal to transform migrant smuggling into a ‘high risk – low return’ enterprise for criminal networks. Europol’s role in this regard may be instrumental, in providing Member States’ competent authorities with a variety of tools and products needed to fight organised criminal groups, as described below.

5. Europol’s response to facilitated illegal migration 5.1. Europol has a clear mandate to deal with migrant smuggling and to support the implementation of the Plan. The Agency has been pursuing migrant smuggling networks for over 10 years through a dedicated intelligence project called Focal Point (FP) Checkpoint.

5.2. Europol offers Member States a number of tools and services – dedicated teams of experts, now also including a specific team targeting the Mediterranean area (described in detail below); unique databases covering all forms of organised crime; a special database on suspected vessels; secure communication systems linking over 500 law enforcement

78 of 175 Europol—Written Evidence authorities in Europe and beyond; and forensic expertise, such as the ability to retrieve data from mobile phones.

5.3. Joint Operational Team (JOT) MARE, which was launched in March 2015, is the key element of Europol’s response to the increasing challenge in the Mediterranean. The JOT is a unique concept that creates synergy between Europol capabilities, in particular FP Checkpoint, with additional reinforcements from the most affected Member States.

5.4. Currently JOT MARE is supported by 6 Seconded National Experts50. Although established only in March 2015, JOT MARE is already handling 130 unique cases and has over 20,000 entities in its database, including approximately 3,000 suspects, their communication and working methods.

5.5. Europol is fully aware that facilitated illegal migration might be linked to a spectrum of other criminal activities. There are individuals who are smuggled for labour and sexual exploitation on arrival and individuals who are smuggled with the purpose to support the drugs distribution business in Europe, in particular cannabis. Firearms smuggling has also been connected with this. Of most concern is the possible connection with terrorism. Europol have not seen this potential threat manifested yet in a significant way, but remains vigilant to any signs of it.

5.6. JOT MARE has all Europol tools at its disposal, so it may address various aspects of the criminal activities in question. Europol ensures that investigations and intelligence leads from other crime fields are checked against data on facilitated illegal migration, so the investigations may be linked and the intelligence picture is more complete. This is done not only by virtue of regular cooperation between experts in various crime fields, but also facilitated by automatic systems that compare data available in Europol databases.

5.7. The use of the Internet, especially social media, by criminal networks to recruit their victims is of particular relevance. Europol’s newly established Internet Referral Unit (IRU) supports the JOT in identifying illicit content facilitating smuggling.

5.8. Europol recognises the importance of identifying criminal assets. Criminal groups may receive as much as 8,000 EUR per migrant for a journey from Libya to Italy. Payments are often made through methods difficult to trace and proceeds are invested in real estate or other high value goods. Unfortunately, there has not yet been systematic use of financial investigation tools by national authorities to help combat illegal migration. This field requires more attention and efforts from national authorities, if the fight against criminal groups involved is to be comprehensive and efficient.

5.9. Operational support on the spot is a tangible and effective means of direct support for affected Member States. This takes place within the framework of the “Hotspot” concept developed by the European Commission. The concept facilitates the use of EU resources to form an EU Regional Task Force (EU RTF), including agencies such as Europol, Frontex or EASO, in a coherent and coordinated way, in line with their mandates and natural areas of expertise.

50 The experts were seconded by the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Germany and Greece and France. Another British expert will be seconded to the team as of September 2015.

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5.10. Europol has deployed its staff to the first “Hotspot” (EU Regional Task Force) in Catania, Sicily. The deployment serves three purposes, namely to:

 Enhance intelligence collection via direct provision of intelligence from agencies active in the field to JOT MARE, to maximise opportunities to identify organised crime groups active in facilitated illegal migration in the Mediterranean, as well as secondary movements;

 Establish direct access to Europol’s information and analysis capabilities for the agencies present in the field.

 Increase opportunities for coordinated operations, using improved intelligence flows and on-the-spot access to initiate and support investigations against organised criminal groups.

 Provide forensic support on the spot to the investigators (such as extraction of data from data carriers, document checking equipment).

5.11. Within the framework of the “Hotspot” and otherwise, Europol is strengthening its partnerships and cooperation with other authorities responsible in the fight against facilitated illegal migration. An operational agreement with Frontex is ready to be signed, pending final technical preparations by Frontex. Contacts with EUNAVFOR Med, an EU naval operation against smugglers in the Mediterranean, have been established in order to exchange information and ensure proper coordination of law enforcement and military activities.

6. Challenges 6.1. Europol recognises the significance of facilitated illegal migration and prioritises the fight against the criminal groups responsible. The JOT MARE concept was specifically developed to support Europol’s limited resources. It is a unique framework that seeks synergies between Europol capabilities and additional resources from EU Member States in order to address the situation in the Mediterranean. The concept was developed before any deployment on the spot was requested.

6.2. Criminal networks are highly sensitive to any changes to the relative risks and opportunities of operating at different points at the external border of the EU. The last two years have shown significant periodic swings in criminal activity between southern Mediterranean points, those in the East (Turkey, Greece) and central Europe (Balkans, Hungary). The situation is dynamic and Europol is confronted with an ever-increasing demand for its services and expertise.

6.3. The establishment of the “Hotspot” in Sicily proved to be a challenge, especially in the light of Europol’s limited human resources. The establishment of a “Hotspot” in Greece is now being considered, depending on the wishes of the Greek authorities; this will require even more resources, as the sea border is very different and more difficult to manage by virtue of the great number of disembarkation points and unregistered arrivals. As there is no central region for disembarkation (unlike in Sicily, where almost all search and rescue actors bring migrants to a limited number of dedicated ports), mobility and flexibility are needed.

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The European Commission has also offered support to Hungary, including possible Europol deployment. Spain may require support too, should smuggling routes change. The situation in Calais is also being carefully monitored by Europol, which is already providing intelligence analysis in support of the British and French authorities. All these activities will require additional resources, both for deployment on the spot and analysis/support from Europol headquarters.

6.4. Considering the scale of the challenge, in particular potential new “Hotspots”, and other new tasks assigned to Europol (e.g. Internet monitoring), Europol has informed the Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament that about 25 new posts would be needed over next 2 years. So far, only 3 additional posts have been offered by the European Commission.

6.5. Internal reallocation of resources may also be a challenge; although Europol recognises the importance of the threat, it is dealing with many other crime areas that require constant attention, in particular cybercrime and terrorism.

21 August 2015

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Frontex—Written Evidence

ANNEX

This Annex contains the contribution of Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States (MS) of the European Union (EU), to the inquiry sent by the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords. As agreed the focus will lie on four issues:

 The tasks allocated to Frontex by the Action Plan and EU action against migrant smuggling more generally;

 Frontex's mandate and whether this will have to be broadened in order to fulfil the above tasks;

 The anticipated functioning of the new "Hotspot" approach;

 Inter-agency cooperation and the interaction between Frontex and other EU Agencies in the context of migrant smuggling.

Numerous tasks are assigned to Frontex in the EU Action Plan, some of them suggest an extended interpretation of the Agencies mandate (or even explicitly suggests this direction). We have addressed the four abovementioned suggested topics by commenting on the main chapters of the EU Action Plan and referring to Frontex most relevant activities.

Enhanced Police and Judicial Response

 There is a general statement about the need to “enhance the ability of EU Agencies to provide support to MS” capacities to investigate and prosecute migrant smuggling networks. There is a potential of Frontex to contribute directly to the investigations of MS, as Frontex is a direct source of information by its capability in intelligence collection. MS rely more and more on Frontex capacity and ability to obtain and make available actionable intelligence to Frontex Agency. This occurs mostly at times of pressure at the borders, when MS resources are stretched to its limits. Then Frontex provides these extra resource, expertise and value (in debriefing, in scrutiny of evidence from sites or boats, etc.) on activities that otherwise would not take place or would be postponed, risking the loss of its value as evidence and intelligence. Also in regular border management activities, the best practices and expertise of Frontex coordinated pools on intelligence experts, also in the use of more sophisticated means of collection of information (when not available at MS level), brings added value to MS capacities to investigate.

 In many MS, the relevant Border Police and Border Guard authorities are also entrusted/mandated to carry our investigations on human smuggling (in some cases, exclusively as part of the Police). These authorities are also Frontex counterpart in many of its operational activities. At times, it becomes desirable for those authorities that Frontex could provide more direct operational/analytical support to their investigations. Frontex has grown in ability and maturity to provide this kind of support and is able to

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support MS investigations in the field of smuggling of migrants should the mandate of the agency take this direction. (Which emerges as the most relevant cross border crime for Frontex). At the moment Europol receives this kind of intelligence through the Europol National Units in the MS.

 Frontex can effectively contribute to the success of financial investigations, both by providing strategic intelligence but also by direct contribution to ongoing or future investigations. Frontex has the ability to collect and record important amounts of information in relation to payment procedures and means, directly from interviews performed on migrants.

 Frontex actively participates, since the outset in June 2015, in the meetings of the Contact Group of EU Agencies. Frontex has been proactive in bringing information and proposals to the common table in relation to migrant smuggling, enabling more efficacy in the exchange of information and operational interaction. The most visible initiative within this group has been the availability of Frontex to offer its operational platforms (Joint Operations (JO), Intelligence Networks, Fusion Services, etc.) for the integration and participation of the operational response of all other EU Agencies.

 Frontex utilises the Eurosur framework to its full potential, including the efforts to identify and track vessels intended to be used by smuggling networks. The agency makes available to MS real time and near to real time information on the situation of suspicious vessels and other related relevant services, which provide for effective operational response. Likewise, Frontex has set up risk indicators to be able to establish when a certain vessel merits specific monitoring attention, be it at the request of the MS or upon the agency’s own operational judgment.

 During Frontex Operational Activities, when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a stateless vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, the interception is performed either in territorial waters, contiguous zone or international waters. The intervening maritime units must assure to the extent of possible that no migrants’ boat is left adrift. In case of need, other MS could instruct the participating maritime units, through the Frontex International Coordination Centre, to support the towing of the migrants’ boat left adrift to a define port or position.

 Frontex actively participates in multiple actions under the EMPACT (European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats) Priority Illegal Migration, and in the implementation of the relevant activities of the Operational Action Plan of this priority in the EU Policy Cycle.

Improved Gathering and Sharing of Information

 The EU Action Plan states “The capacities of the EU Agencies to collect, exchange and analyse information on migrant smuggling should be reinforced. Full use should be made

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of the risk analyses on migrant smuggling routes produced by Frontex”. Frontex would require that strategic intelligence and analysis stemming out of investigations at national and EU level (Europol) could be made available for the purpose of more targeted actions at the EU external borders. Furthermore, the possibilities for Frontex to provide analytical advice to relevant stakeholders should be enlarged. This is especially relevant considering visa issuing authorities working in third countries and their need to be informed about the developments at the EU external borders, likewise Schengen local cooperation authorities in third countries. In a similar manner, Frontex would largely profit in its risk analysis activities from effective constant exchange with EU Delegations and European/MS liaison officers posted in third countries.

 Frontex has set up an effective cooperation structure and information flow with EUNAVFOR MED, as part of the operational coordination scheme arranged that aims at guaranteeing that the EU CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) mission and Frontex coordinated operation in the Central Med, JO Triton, deliver the expected EU value and are fully coordinated. In this regard, many operational measures have been taken, ranging from shared operational plans, jointly designed information flows, sharing of guidelines and operational models, to concrete tactical decisions enabling coordination, including the sending of liaison officers to each other’s coordination structures.

 The EU is deploying European migration liaison officers to EU Delegations in third countries of relevance. It is paramount that the information which is generated by these experts reaches the analytical capacities of Frontex, in order to integrate the strategic information collected upstream into a global operational risk analysis. In this sense, the EU Action Plan on smuggling announces a revision of the EU Regulation on the Immigration Liaison Officers (ILO) Networks. Frontex has been through the last decade developing and expanding its information sharing and analytical activities gaining the engagement and participation of different ILO networks. The most relevant example is the EU ILO network in Turkey, which has been developing with the support of Frontex, who has been attending all its meetings. Another valuable example is the African EU ILO meetings organised by Frontex, in the framework of the Africa Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC) activity. The objective of Frontex is to make these cooperation platforms available for additional purposes other than risk analysis (e.g. exchange of operational information). Finally, Frontex is ambitious with regard to its role in the management of ILO networks, as an entity with enormous potential to provide strategic intelligence from third countries, relevant to the pre-frontier intelligence picture; Frontex could play a stronger role in coordinating the activities of the networks, enabling it to become also a platform for tactical and operational information exchange. This also applies to the management of the reporting obligations of the EU ILOs and EU Presidencies, where Frontex could play a fundamental role.

 The exploitation of the service-level agreement (SLA) between Frontex and the EU Satellite Centre (EU SatCen) is pivotal to the generation of the pre-frontier intelligence picture, as highlighted in the EU Action Plan. Frontex has categorised a number of Earth Observation services that will be requested from the EU SatCen and delivered to MS. Frontex and MS authorities need to develop their capacity and knowledge of use in order

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to render satellite imagery analysis instrumental for the purpose of detection of departure points, movements of suspicious means and persons, validation of intelligence, change analysis and others.

 The African Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC):

During 2014 and 2015 AFIC has become more and more visible to outside stakeholders such as the European Commission (both Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, DG HOME and Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, DG NEAR/ Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, DG DEVCO), European External Action Service (EEAS), ECOWAS and regional initiatives of the Rabat and Khartoum processes as well as the G5 Sahel. This increasing visibility and the success of the approach adopted by Frontex when working in the field of analysis and intelligence sharing with African countries was echoed also by the ‘EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling’ that recommended the AFIC to be “further developed as a platform for information-sharing and joint analysis with third countries in Africa.” Furthermore, the European Commission noted that, given the success of the AFIC “launch of similar platforms in other key regions should be considered.” AFIC African members have reiterated their commitment to the joint work with Frontex within the AFIC on multiple occasions, but also their expectations regarding AFIC activities in Africa and further capacity building activities in the field of risk analysis have been clearly expressed.

The Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community was set up in 2010 to provide a framework for regular knowledge and intelligence sharing in the field of border security between Frontex and African countries. The concept of this collaboration was broadly based on the model of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and the two already-established regional risk analysis networks (Western Balkan-RAN and Eastern Borders-RAN). Since 2011 North African countries, international organisations active in the African continent, like the African Union and the Arab Maghreb Union, ECOWAS, EEAS, EUCAP Sahel and EUBAM Libya, have participated in the AFIC activities. The AFIC countries want the network to evolve further (and not just through expanding it geographically). As of March 2015, the AFIC has exchanged information continuously on a dedicated secure platform. Frontex also finally took the AFIC to Africa: one regional workshop was organised in Casablanca and another one in Dakar. The feedback from the AFIC participants to these changes have been positive. Going local also enabled Frontex staff to establish links to relevant local/regional actors to get their insights regarding the situation on the ground. In addition, in 2015, AFIC has been on the agenda of Euro- African Police Conference on Irregular Immigration (Canary Islands), the G5 Sahel (Niger), the IOM regional conference (Niger), and in the inaugural meeting of the Border Security Initiative of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum-UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (GCTF- UNCCT) (Morocco).

The AFIC has matured and in many ways exceeded the initial expectations. However, AFIC African members and key external stakeholders, namely DG HOME and EEAS demand more including the capacity building pillar of this analytical activity.

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 The European Agenda on Migration has developed the new approach “Hotspot” which should enable the coordinated support of EU Agencies to those MS facing high migratory pressures on their external borders, including the support in targeting smuggling networks. Frontex, together with Europol, EASO and Eurojust have jointly developed a cooperation model and materialised this model in so called EU Regional Task Forces (EURTF). The first EURTF to be set up was in Catania, Sicily, where all the agencies and the host MS national authorities are present and working jointly. In addition to this, EU NAVFORMED has allocated its liaison officer within this coordination team. The EURTF is capable of facilitating the cooperation between agencies, including the coordination of operational means made available as part of the operational response. The EURTF model will now be expanded and applied in Greece, where talks between EU Agencies and local authorities are already taking place.

 The propose Hotspot approach is integral part of Frontex coordinated JOs and hence of its Operational Plan. It is part of the Integrated Border Management concept implemented by Frontex in its operation activities boosting the inter-agency cooperation dimension at EU and National level

 Frontex has supported a recent pilot activity of the European Asylum Office aiming at gathering information and intelligence on smuggling activities in the course of an asylum determination process (interview). A success in this activity will bring more knowledge on offenders and smugglers, especially when the collection of information takes place in areas and locations where debriefing interviews are not possible or not foreseen.

 The EU Action Plan calls for more research and risk analyses on the possible links between cross border crime, irregular migration and smuggling. Indeed, the risk analysis model used at EU level (the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model) categorises the analysis of cross-border crime as a fundamental element intrinsically embedded in the analysis of border security risks. However, the mandate of Frontex is not sufficiently straightforward in this regard and in occasions it raises questions if not resistance from parties who do not understand the complex nature of border management nor are aware of the EU concept of Integrated Border Management and its close connections to Internal and External Security. At EU level, it should be able to produce an EU Integrated Risk and Threat Assessment Report, where the knowledge and analysis of risks at the highest strategic level is introduced to the EU leadership in order to inform high level/strategic policy development in the area of Home Affairs, including migration management.

Assistance to Vulnerable Migrants (People in Need of International Protection and Victims of Trafficking)

 The EU Action Plan makes a clear statement on the need to amend the mandate of Frontex in relation to its role vis-à-vis the management of return of persons who do not have the

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right to stay in the territory of the MS. There is not yet a formal Commission proposal to amend Frontex mandate.

 Frontex is in the process of establishing an effective monitoring system to ensure compliance with fundamental rights in all its activities. The system is currently supported by an internal reporting system from participants to operations, that are briefed and obliged to report any incident that could be consider an allegation of a violation of fundamental rights during Frontex coordinated activities. In order to support this mechanism, the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer also has the capacity to operational plans, follow up on incidents and make observations on evaluations of those plans.

 Furthermore, the Agency counts on the support from the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights that has the mandate to provide strategic advice on these matters to the Executive Director and the Management Board of the Agency. The Forum is composed of 15 external partners, including EU Agencies, International Organizations and NGOs working in the field of migration and human rights within the EU and beyond.

 The Agency is in the process of revising the 2011 Fundamental Rights Strategy and Action Plan. Among other key actions, the Agency has devised a specific Fundamental Rights Training for Border Guards Trainers, it has also provided basic fundamental rights training to its staff, and includes an overview of the basic concepts and available mechanisms to tackle them in the pre deployment briefings before any operation starts. The main aspects highlighted are the obligation to refer persons that are in need of international protection without delay to the respective authorities in charge of dealing with their asylum claim at national level, the provision of basic needs and the prohibition of non refoulement.

 In the field of trafficking in human beings Frontex works closely together with the other JHA Agencies under the guidance of the EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator. Frontex is mainly active in Capacity Building activities and supports the MS in the identification process of victims and their perpetrators at the EU external border, with a Handbook on indicators on trafficking in human beings and a handbook dealing with children at risk at airports.

Stronger Cooperation with Third Countries

 The main areas of activities of Frontex are highlighted in the Action Plan as areas to which the European Commission and the European External Action Service should be looking to when funding and supporting the development of EU and national actions in third countries. This brings a massive opportunity in broad areas of engagement core for Frontex, which is if the strategic direction of the Agency would be to engage further in the implementation of institutional building and capacity building actions in third countries. Specifically, the Action Plan mentions that the “Commission will provide financial and technical support for starting or improving the collection, sharing and analysis of data on migrant smuggling between countries of origin, transit and destination”.

 Frontex is implementing technical assistance projects in third countries:

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- Frontex has been directly awarded a EUR 4.5 million grant by the European Commission’s DG NEAR for implementing the Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management Capacity Building Project. The main aim of this project is to ensure border security and to facilitate legitimate movements of persons and goods in the region, while ensuring that the fight against corruption and respect for human rights will be given necessary attention throughout the project. The project partners and co-beneficiaries are the World Customs Organization and the International Organization for Migration, as well as the International Centre for Migration Policy Development. The project also foresees the involvement of other actors, including European and United Nations agencies, in implementing specific actions.

- Frontex is engaged with EASO in a technical assistance project aimed at, among others, familiarizing Tunisia and Morocco with the work of the agencies. The 18 month project is funded by the European Commission’s DG DEVCO. Frontex focuses on implementing awareness raising activities in Morocco and Tunisia laying the foundation for intensified structured future cooperation.

- Furthermore Frontex is engaged in the IPA II (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance) Regional Programme – regional support to protection sensitive migration management in the Western Balkans and Turkey. The foreseen signature date of the contract is September 2015, while implementation will begin in end 2015. The regional programme will run for 36 months. Frontex, together with EASO, IOM and UNHCR, will implement the project. The actions delivered in the region will be aimed at:

1. strengthening identification mechanisms;

2. improving and strengthening systematic information exchange and;

3. preparing the candidate and potential candidate countries to offer sustainable return solutions.

 Based on article 14 of Frontex Regulation, the Agency concluded working arrangements with the competent authorities of 17 countries outside the EU, as well as with the Coordination Service of the CIS Border Troop Commanders and the MARRI Regional Centre in the Western Balkans.

 Additionally, Frontex is mandated by its Management Board to start negotiations with other seven third countries, mostly in North of Africa. Partnerships and cooperation with competent authorities of third countries were further developed throughout 2014/2015. Frontex progressively succeeded to develop mutually beneficial and sustainable partnerships across the EU External Borders. Tangible results have been achieved particularly in the field of information sharing, training, joint operational activities and in the area of research and development.

21 August 2015

88 of 175 Frontex and European Commission—Oral Evidence (QQ 64-72)

Frontex and European Commission—Oral Evidence (QQ 64-72) Transcript to be found under European Commission.

89 of 175 Home Office—Oral Evidence (QQ 52-63)

Home Office—Oral Evidence (QQ 52-63)

Evidence Session No. 6 Heard in Public Questions 52 - 63

Members present

Examination of Witnesses

James Brokenshire MP, Immigration Minister, Home Office, David Smith, Deputy Director, Border Force South East and Europe Region, and Richard Quinn, Director of Criminal and Financial Investigations, Immigration Control.

Q52 The Chairman: Good morning, Mr Brokenshire, Mr Quinn and Mr Smith. As ever, we are grateful for your time. You are pretty familiar with the format of our proceedings. This session is being televised—not live but it will be webcast live. You will be sent a transcript, and if there is anything you wish to correct, let us know. If there is anything you want to amplify after you have read it, please feel free to do so. I know how busy you are and we are grateful for your time. I will start by asking you about the scale of migrant- smuggling in the UK and how this has changed over time. James Brokenshire MP: Thank you, Baroness Prashar. We appreciate the opportunity to debate what is clearly a highly topical, relevant and important issue not just for the UK but for other European partners, and the need to have the overview from the EU and the UK but also beyond the shores of Europe of how we are responding to the challenges of the smuggling of people, how a lot of the criminals involved view people as simply goods or commodities, and how we are seeing a change—with organised crime groups moving into people-smuggling from the smuggling of drugs, tobacco and various other commodities. From the outset, there is that change of seeing organised crime groups seeking to diversity into this appalling new line of illicit business, and how that manifests itself. If you look at the near position on our juxtaposed controls in northern France, last year we foiled nearly 40,000 attempts to cross the Channel illegally. Between April and July alone, more than 30,000 attempts have been detected. That breaks down into two key components: people who have travelled to northern France opportunistically to try to make the journey across, trying to stow away in lorries; and a separate cohort that will be supported in some way,

90 of 175 Home Office—Oral Evidence (QQ 52-63) where people will be seeking to put them into vehicles, into lorries, in a more organised fashion. Some of these may be more sophisticated than others and some of the concealments that Border Force have been discovering have been quite shocking in terms of the potential risk to the people being stowed away in refrigerated lorries and other containers. It underlines the extent to which some of the criminals out there are prepared to put people’s lives at risk simply to make money, which is why the approach that we are taking in the UK, as well as the EU initiatives, is so important. The Chairman: The numbers you gave are in relation to France and the situation in Calais, specifically. James Brokenshire MP: Yes The Chairman: What about other smuggling, people coming on to the boats and so on— the wider smuggling situation? James Brokenshire MP: The main challenge remains from the juxtaposed controls, on the basis of the volumes of people trying to gain entry into the UK. We are vigilant about issues of displacement and whether there is a movement to other ports across Europe; I am in discussions with the Belgians and the Dutch, for example. Some isolated detections have taken place at different ports, but we have not seen displacement in a significant way. But it is absolutely something that we are very vigilant about, recognising that with the security measures that we have put in place around northern France, and how those continue to evolve, we could see a movement to other adjacent ports, in France or in other neighbouring countries. We have not seen that to any material extent to date, so I would not want to give the Committee the impression that this has suddenly become an expansive position in that way, but we are alive to that risk, which is why we are setting up our discussions and our relationships—very good relationships, actually—with the Dutch and the Belgians in particular, and the agreement that the Home Secretary signed on 20 August really cements some of that very good practical co-operation with the French authorities. The Chairman: What has been the scale and success of the prosecutions? James Brokenshire MP: On prosecutions, you can certainly look at this in a number of different ways. For example, we have figures for prosecutions for offences under the Immigration Act, which can be linked to migrant-smuggling, so that can cover a range of different issues such as sham marriage and illegal working, so that once someone has been facilitated in, offences may have occurred in that way. The numbers that we have on prosecutions for those offences increased from 303 to 405 between 2013 and 2014, and so far this year there have been 215 prosecutions. You can also look at this in other ways: for example, in respect of disruptions of organised crime groups that are linked to organised immigration crime—some of that facilitation activity. Last year, UK law enforcement disrupted more than 170 organised crime groups involved in that form of criminality, and that is work between Immigration Enforcement, the National Crime Agency and other agencies. Again, to give another complexion to this, we have something called Operation Groundbreaker, which is an intelligence cell based at what is known as the Joint Border Intelligence Unit, which brings together Border Force, Immigration Enforcement, UK Visas and Immigration, and the National Crime Agency. It also receives inputs from some of our colleagues in Europe, and has a link into Europol and some of the intelligence fusion that is taking place there. Between January and August this year, 48 convictions resulted from Operation Groundbreaker. As I say, it is about how you want to look at the challenges that we face and the action that we are taking, both in-country and looking at some of the cross-border elements, and obviously then how the work of the

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National Crime Agency and the work of the task force further evolves in taking disruptions away from the UK, as well as the focus that we continue to have on prosecutions and action being taken within our border. The Chairman: Do your colleagues want to add anything about prosecutions? No?

Q53 Lord Soley: I want to ask about strategy. I have listened to your answers and you have given considerable detail about small parts of it here and there. You are faced with the biggest crisis in migration and refugees in Europe since the Second World War, and I am struggling to see what the Government’s overall strategy is. You must be involved in discussions about that strategy. I do not expect dots and commas in every place at the moment, but what is your overall strategy in the face of this crisis? James Brokenshire MP: This evidence session has been largely looking at the smuggling aspects of this. In that context, we want to see action taken at every level, hence the creation and establishment of the new task force led by the National Crime Agency to look at ways in which we can interdict and disrupt all steps of the equation, from source countries through transit to our border, across Europe and into the UK. That is the end-to- end approach that we judge to be necessary, working with our European partners and bilaterally with individual countries, and in support of that the National Crime Agency is deploying officers to countries along those routes. The question that you are highlighting goes beyond that very high-level approach on the criminal aspects and the smuggling aspects to the flow of people, which is where our aid efforts and regional development assistance to a number of key countries are highly relevant. Europol, the National Crime Agency and others are doing work on, for example, the use of new technology—the internet—to give false hope and false messages to a lot of the migrants who are seeking to come to Europe, and disrupting that. It is also about having a strong returns and processing mechanism for when people arrive on the shores of Europe, so that humanitarian protection can be offered to those who, absolutely, are in need of it, who are fleeing persecution and war. At the same time, there is a cohort that is coming here for a better way of life, and we need to ensure that that is disaggregated and that those who want to come for those reasons are returned. That is what underpins our hotspot support—the mechanism in some of the key receiving countries to ensure that that processing is there. Equally, that is allied to the very firm action that we want to take and are taking against the smuggling networks. It is multifaceted. Seeing the solutions beyond the shores of Europe, we have our diplomatic efforts to work towards a more stable Libya, on the southern Mediterranean route. Obviously we need to find ways—diplomatic and others—to bring about an end to the ongoing conflict in Syria so that people have a strong Syria that they can return to, and ultimately to deal with the flows that we are seeing from that area of conflict at the moment. Lord Soley: I understand that, and that is helpful. Is there a document somewhere that pulls the strategy together? You are absolutely right, we are investigating smuggling, but as you will know, and as you have indicated, it is all mixed up together. One boat might contain refugees and it might contain smuggled people or trafficked people; there are a number of differences. I am still not convinced that the Government have an overall strategy about which you can say, “This is the overall strategy into which this bit—smuggling—fits”. James Brokenshire MP: We have before the Committee today the EU document dealing with smuggling. That links up with the CSDP—the Common Security and Defence Policy— leading to interdiction in the Mediterranean using naval assets. That has complementarity

92 of 175 Home Office—Oral Evidence (QQ 52-63) around it. Obviously, we are working with European and other partners. The Prime Minister has made statements, for example, on how we want to use the Valletta conference to bridge the European Union with African Union countries in order to deal effectively with migratory flows and criminality issues. If you look, as a document of record, to the bilateral agreement that we reached with the French Government over the pressures in northern France, you will see the different mechanisms that we have identified on security for the external border, good co-operation between law enforcement and border agencies— Lord Soley: Are these all together in one paper anywhere? I have listened to the Prime Minister’s statements. It is evolving, I understand that; I am not asking for anything cut and dried. A lot of people would look at British policy and says that it is basically, “Pull up the drawbridge and get under the bedclothes”. I know it is not, but there is no document that says, “This is our strategy. This is where we are working. This is where these things fit in it”. I am puzzled by that, because you get the feeling that the Government are still just reacting all the time. I agree that you have to just react to a crisis such as this when it happens, but you also have to evolve a strategy. It is that which I am looking for and not finding. James Brokenshire MP: I think the strategy is there to reassure you, absolutely, and informs the approach that we are taking within the EU; it informs the statements of the Prime Minister, and how to deal with the upstream issues overseas on how we create stability. Indeed, it includes: the work that we want to see on establishing reception centres in certain parts of Africa, again to stop the flow; seeking to provide stability in the border areas leading into the Mediterranean, which is why the work in Libya matters; the external Schengen border; the hotspots proposal, which we support, to see that you get effective and speedy processing; clearly, the work that we are doing in the Syria region through our £1 billion of aid investment, and some of the resettlement work that we are supporting there; as well as good intelligence co-operation and collaboration. All those building blocks are absolutely there in framing a strategy. Whether or not we have put that down in a document of record is one thing, but absolutely we view this in a strategic sense rather than some sort of piecemeal tactical sense. I understand why you make the point, but that is absolutely not the approach that we are taking. Lord Soley: I do not think I am the only person in the country who would like to see a strategy somewhere.

Q54 Lord Jay of Ewelme: Perhaps I can bring us back to smuggling. You talked about the importance of bilateral contacts with the French, the Belgians and the Dutch. I would be interested to know, in additional to the bilateral contacts—which are clearly crucial, particularly around Calais—what value the Government see in EU activity more broadly in dealing with smuggling issues. It is that link between the bilateral and the EU that we are looking for. James Brokenshire MP: I do see real value in EU co-operation. I went out to Europol a few weeks ago to have a meeting with Rob Wainwright, who I believe gave some evidence to you just before the summer, to work through how Europol has been developing its intelligence fusion work, this joint operational team—JOT Mare—that has been put together to put the whole intelligence picture together. So there is an important role for the EU on co-ordinating a response. That may, for example, lead to the establishment of joint investigation teams. If you have a piece of intelligence that may touch on certain European partners, using the existing Europol mechanisms you can set up a JIT to be able to investigate that. That is absolutely what we are doing. You have a co-ordination function that may then

93 of 175 Home Office—Oral Evidence (QQ 52-63) lead to action being taken or work that may be bilateral or trilateral between individual member states. I suppose I see it in that context. There is also the work on the external Schengen border, the work that FRONTEX is doing to assist and co-ordinate that, and how we then use the debriefing material to enrich and feed into the work that Europol is undertaking to fuse that intelligence to give us the strongest picture possible in order to take action. I reassure you that our Joint Border Intelligence Unit based down in Kent is linked into the intelligence work that Europol undertakes, so there is a good exchange of intelligence between the two. We are one of the most significant contributors of intelligence into JOT Mare. We are doing our utmost to encourage other EU member states to do all they can because it is through that enriched picture that we have the strongest means to be able to take action and to disrupt. Lord Jay of Ewelme: So you see a sort of organic link between the bilateral contacts which you have and the broader EU activity? James Brokenshire MP: It is complementary but is part of a strategy that is looking pan-EU down to more individual crime groups that may get identified or intelligence that points to links between, say, two countries. Therefore, it is how you can move up and down through that process of intelligence-sharing, and indeed the outcomes or outputs that that intelligence may generate for you. I see it in that way, and that is why I think Europol does have an important role in this. Clearly, the discussions I had with Mr Wainwright were about how we move forward from intelligence fusion to further outcomes and further action being taken from some of the really interesting and important intelligence that is now being generated as a consequence of that work.

Q51 Lord Morris of Handsworth: Minister, have the Government assessed how this area of co-operation will be affected if the UK was to leave the European Union? James Brokenshire MP: I do not necessarily want to get involved in a wide EU debate. In the past, we have had discussions in this Committee and others about, for example, the JHA measures, the opt-out and the activity that the scrutiny of this Committee provided on the value that certain mechanisms within the EU can provide. I have spoken here today and previously about the role of Europol and how we use things such as the European arrest warrant very positively and helpfully. But that is not to say that such work could not be undertaken from outside the EU. There are different ways in which you could do that, using some of the mechanisms and structures. That is probably one for another day and possibly a separate evidence session on the pros and cons and the ways in which you could either piggyback on or use certain European mechanisms outside as contrasted with the benefits of being inside. As I say, I could probably give quite an extended answer on that, but I am sure there is a broader debate to be had on justice and home affairs, on the benefits that we obtain from some of the structures and mechanisms that we are party to. I know that law enforcement and other colleagues will have their own views about some of the legal issues that can arise and what could be achieved through engagement and discussions with the European Union outside of it. But, in the nicest way, that is probably one for another day. The Chairman: Thank you. Baroness Massey. You can ask your supplementary and your own question. Baroness Massey of Darwen: The supplementary question that I want to ask on the first question concerns your use of the word “stability”, when you talked about aiming for stability in places such as Syria, which of course we all wish for, together with international co-operation. We know that stability could take years and year and years. In the meantime,

94 of 175 Home Office—Oral Evidence (QQ 52-63) there is a real crisis here, which is this push-pull factor that we have talked about so much in relation to trying to get people to back to state countries. Are we in danger of being overtaken by events here, thinking about the long-term impact but not dealing effectively with the short-term impact? James Brokenshire MP: I think that is why the paper that you are considering as part of the Committee’s scrutiny matters, because it is about the short term, or one aspect of it— disrupting the people smuggling. Indeed, some of the announcements that colleagues in defence are making and the meeting today with European Defence Ministers in Brussels over the deployment of further naval assets support that very direct action against people smuggling. We need to focus on how we stop the flows from places around Syria and in the Syrian region. That is why the Prime Minister has spoken very clearly of the need for further aid investment by other countries around the world. We have obviously made significant efforts to support the camps in the region around Syria because of the conditions that people are living in. Our aim is to give hope and provide education. The additional £100 million that has recently been announced as a further commitment takes us up to a total of £1 billion, the largest amount that we have contributed to any crisis. Yes, it is about providing drinking water and food—those very basic things—but it is also about supporting education. Funding of about £20 million is for education in Lebanon and to make sure that 120,000 children inside Syria receive education. That provides some of that stability and is a building block. The Chairman: I think we need to move on to another question, otherwise this could go on and on.

Q52 Baroness Massey of Darwen: Let me ask you a different question. We know that the Government are not engaging in some of the elements of the agenda on migration—for example, proposals on reunification and resettlement. Will this affect/prevent a comprehensive EU approach to migrant smuggling? James Brokenshire MP: We do not think that it will. We have not supported the relocation mechanism because our judgment is that it does not provide protection to those who need it or return for those who do not. In some ways, it takes attention away from that. We agree with a lot of elements of the EU action plan. There are certain elements that we do not agree with, but I do not think that that detracts from the general practical measures that are taking place in respect of people smuggling. There is work around JOT Mare and Europol, action has been taken in the Mediterranean, and some practical steps are being examined around, for example, the use of social media and the internet. Some very good, practical steps are now being taken, and I certainly do not see that the approach that we are taking to some of the other issues that are being debated at the Justice and Home Affairs Council detract from work that is not just being talked about but is actually happening. Much of this is about the practical and about taking those very important steps not simply on intelligence but on action against the smugglers. The Chairman: Do you think that could also have a negative impact on co-operation from the other member states? There is a kind of overall EU programme. Do you think that the fact that we do not co-operate fully in other areas would have a negative impact on the other member states? James Brokenshire MP: You could probably make that broad point in respect of a lot of justice and home affairs matters. We are not party to a number of things that we have decided to opt out of. However, I do not think that that detracts from the emphasis that we

95 of 175 Home Office—Oral Evidence (QQ 52-63) give to practical support, co-ordination and co-operation, which, having the European brief within the Home Office, I have advocated since virtually the first European Council meeting that I attended back in 2010. There is a strong sense of what the UK can offer. We want to collaborate effectively with our partners. As I have already indicated, we see benefit in working through the EU structures. We are contributing, and will contribute, a great deal to some of the practical work that absolutely supports combating the smuggling that is taking advantage of vulnerable people.

Q53 Lord Wasserman: That just leads me to ask how much we are actually spending on EU co-operation against people smuggling: that is, spending in terms of finance and how many human resources you need—how many people, if you like—in that EU part of the programme. James Brokenshire MP: I am sure that my colleagues from the Border Force and the immigration force will be able to talk in practical terms about some of the contributions that they are making. A monetary number is quite difficult to give, not that I wish to obfuscate or not respond to the question directly—I would not treat the Committee in that way. For example, some of the work of the National Crime Agency across the board has benefits and clear merits in confronting and combating smuggling. It is not necessarily ring-fenced as support that we are providing to the EU. We have obviously put personnel into Europol. The scaling up of the 90-strong task force is intended to support that end-to-end approach, and therefore you could say that it is supporting some of the European actions that are taking place on the border. It is quite hard to monetise it and say what proportion of the NCA’s budget is ascribed to that. I think that Rob Wainwright said—I saw it reported somewhere—that around a third of the groups involved in organised immigration crime are involved in other forms of activity as well. You are looking at drugs and other forms of organised criminality, so it is quite difficult to disaggregate it. If I may, I will ask my colleagues from the immigration force and the Border Force to talk about some of those direct contributions, which may be helpful. Richard Quinn: In Immigration Enforcement I have responsibility for the crime team. There are in the region of 500 staff, with a mixture of police officers and immigration officers with police powers. Our budget is £28 million. I will react to the intelligence that comes from the Joint Border Intelligence Unit. As that intelligence increases, clearly I will assign additional resources to it. I have a dedicated team in Dover that deals with border referrals, where, through its detections, we have seen an increase in the numbers. That clearly increases the resources that I put into tackling what was referred to as the border, and then it is a case of identifying the OCGs—the organised crime groups—that operate throughout the United Kingdom and which use Dover or any other port as a gateway into the UK. As I said, my budget is £28 million. Like the Minister, I cannot say what percentage of that budget I assign to people smuggling, but the resources that I put in are significant. David Smith: From a Border Force perspective when referring to the wider EU work, the UK Border Force supports the work in the Mediterranean. We have placed officers in the intelligence fusion cell in Italy. We ae also supporting the wider debriefing of migrants across Europe through FRONTEX. In addition, we have placed officers in the National Maritime Information Centre, which deals with the maritime threat to the UK. More specifically I can cover what we are doing in Calais with the investment programme there and the plan of works, if that would be helpful. Lord Wasserman: How many do you have in Italy? David Smith: I do not have the exact numbers with me.

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Lord Wasserman: Are there five or 20? Is it a small group or quite a large group? Three people can make up a team. Twenty-five is a more impressive number but may not be necessary. James Brokenshire MP: We have two cutters in the Mediterranean, which are the Border Force’s contribution to the search and rescue operation but also to some of the intelligence work. There are debriefers linked to that as well. The numbers for the intelligence cells are likely to be small, because that is effectively about intelligence co-ordination and linking things up. It perhaps gives a sense of some of the deployments that the Border Force is supporting in the Mediterranean, as well as of the debriefing and intelligence work that is taking place. We can certainly provide the Committee with some further granularity, if that would be helpful. Lord Wasserman: It would be very useful for our report if we could say that there is a major effort here and that it is costing this much, or if could say that we were disappointed with the size of the effort because it was costing so much less. James Brokenshire MP: Of course.

Q54 Lord Cormack: Minister, when you came before us last time, we talked about the fact that HMS “Enterprise” will replace HMS “Bulwark”, and you tried to reassure us on that. I gather that this morning there will be an announcement in the House of Commons— it has already been on the radio—on deploying HMS “Richmond”. I wonder whether you can put us in the picture and bring us up to date on precisely what this contribution is going to amount to and what you are hoping to achieve from it. James Brokenshire MP: Lord Cormack, I well remember your questioning and our discussion about HMS “Enterprise”. I tried to explain the different role that HMS “Enterprise” was playing as part of what is known as EUNAVFOR Med—the EU naval force in the Mediterranean, in the parlance that the EU tends to use for some of these activities— to give us a better operational picture and intelligence on the smuggling networks and activities that were taking place. You questioned me at the time on the need for continued support to rescue those at sea. I can certainly identify an example where HMS “Enterprise” intercepted four small vessels and safely brought 453 people aboard. It also supported an Italian-led EU mission—“Enterprise” was supporting it rather than actually doing the rescuing—that rescued around 4,400 people in a single day. It is being tasked for some of those activities in rescue and support of the broader mission on that front, as well as the intelligence work that I spoke to previously. The Common Security and Defence Policy approach has four phases. Phase 1 is the “understand” phase, the initial phase that we are engaged in. Phase 2 consists of operations to seize smugglers’ vessels on the high seas or, if Libyan consent and a UN Security Council resolution can be obtained, within Libyan territorial waters. That is obviously the phase that we are starting to move towards as part of the Defence Ministers’ discussions that are taking place today. Phase 3 would extend to more coastal interdictions and activity in Libyan territorial waters but, again, only with Libyan consent and a UN Security Council resolution. Ultimately, phase 4 is withdrawal, because the mission has been completed. That is the journey that we are on, and the offer of further military and naval support is part of that activity, with the offer of HMS “Enterprise” to join the EU mission off Libya part of that further stepping up. Obviously, this is being led by MoD colleagues and is subject to further discussion between European Defence Ministers today. Lord Cormack: Can you say a little more about HMS “Richmond”?

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James Brokenshire MP: Of course. HMS “Richmond” will be offered to provide further support to the mission that I have described. It has some additional surveillance and reconnaissance capability, including the ScanEagle unmanned aerial system, which can cover vast areas. It is that type of support and activity that “Richmond” is able to offer. Ultimately, we cannot tolerate having criminality on the shores of the EU and we judge it is appropriate to use military assets to support the European mission that I have described and which “Richmond” is intended to further enhance—alongside “Enterprise”, which will remain in the Mediterranean—as we start to move through the different phases. Lord Cormack: Will “Richmond” deploy drones? James Brokenshire MP: It has the ScanEagle aerial system that I spoke about. Therefore, it is intended that that could be utilised as part of its mission. Lord Cormack: What is the timescale? Is it going to be put there indefinitely or is it there for a defined period? James Brokenshire MP: It is intended to move to the Mediterranean. It is currently down in Suez, I understand. It is intended to join the mission for an initial period of two months. It is then a question, obviously, of how things are developing. In the same way, we had tasked “Enterprise” to remain in the Mediterranean until September and that is now being extended as well. Obviously, we keep under close review the activity and the development of the overall programme.

Q55 Lord Soley: On the law enforcement side, if the captain picks up a boat that has someone on it who is believed to involved in smuggling, he destroys the boat, but then— leaving aside the refugees or migrants he has rescued—does he take the suspect to Italy or another EU country or will they be brought back here to be charged? James Brokenshire MP: Should the mission apprehend suspected migrant-smugglers and traffickers, whether that is in the scenario you describe or there is a direct interdiction of a vessel that is suspected to be about to facilitate—which may be another scenario, and certainly some of the intelligence that we are drawing together is seeking to identify those vessels in that way—they would be taken to the nearest safe port in Europe as directed by the operational commander, in the same way that the vessels that are being deployed for rescue are under the operational commander’s direction as to where they come back through. Therefore, the expectation would be that prosecutorial action would take place in that country. Lord Soley: Your expectation is they would be charged in that country and the court case would take place there? Are you aware of any such cases taking place anywhere in Europe? I understand that you would not collect the figures on that; I am asking simply if you are aware of it. James Brokenshire MP: I am not aware of that action at the moment in Europe, but that is because we are now entering the next phase of this programme—more interdiction and executive action—building on the intelligence picture. This will lead to prosecutions and legal cases being advanced. So the main reason I am not aware of that is because we are now moving to a further phase of this programme.

Q56 The Chairman: Minister, have you made any assessment of the shift in the policy from rescue and search to a more intelligence-led approach? Has it made any difference? Have you been successful?

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James Brokenshire MP: From the discussions I have had with Europol, for example, some very useful and actionable intelligence is being generated through JOT Mare and the fusion that is taking place. Indeed, some of that is coming back into the Joint Border Intelligence Unit for action that may be taken through that mechanism, but it is also leading to the establishment of joint investigation teams between different countries. There are currently five formal joint investigation teams under the umbrella of Eurojust to tackle organised immigration crime, and a further two joint investigation teams are due to commence in October between the UK, France and Belgium. It is leading to practical action, and it is also identifying the use of social media and the internet, in a very fast way, to sell—and I use that term advisedly—false hope and false messages, but also the ability for people to try to make links into the people-smuggling networks and some of the absurd and disturbing packages that people-smugglers are trying to put out there to entice vulnerable people to make the journey, sometimes trying to use statements of European and other leaders in a skewed way to try to present a particular case, which is giving us a much clearer picture of some of the challenges and some of the networks. We will need to put more capability in place, for example for financial investigation. It is certainly part of the task force’s work to have financial investigation capability there, to track and trace the money linked to this, albeit recognising that working in some of the jurisdictions beyond the shores of Europe is challenging and not straightforward.

Q57 Baroness Pinnock: So far, Minister, we have been talking mainly about enforcement. Some of our witnesses have pointed to the fact that the creation of safe and legal routes may divert opportunities for migrant-smugglers. What is the Government’s view on that? James Brokenshire MP: We would say that there is little evidence that providing opportunities for what would be relatively small numbers of people to travel legally from source countries would have a significant impact on the very large numbers of people who are prepared to travel illegally to the EU. Rather, we see this in terms of issues of resettlement and vulnerability, hence the Prime Minister’s recent announcement. We think it is better to prioritise those interventions upstream in countries of origin and transit to reduce the need for migrants to leave their countries of origin or move through a safe country. The Khartoum process, which was launched at the end of last year, bringing together EU and African Union states, is intended to advance that, as well as some of the regional development and protection programmes. We see that as a much more fruitful and positive way of dealing with it, and we are not persuaded by the benefits of what we think would impact only on a relatively small number of people. Baroness Pinnock: What you are saying does not reflect the current situation. The Khartoum agreement does not actually deal with the current huge movement of people, from the Middle East in particular, towards Europe. If we are to concentrate on tackling the vicious and dangerous business—which is what it is—of smuggling people, would it not be more humanitarian to create safe, legal routes for people fleeing war, particularly in Syria and Iraq? James Brokenshire MP: My view is that we have to be very careful not to take decisions that might make matters worse. Sometimes you can be led down an approach that may see you taking the wrong decision for the right reason, if you see what I mean. If you are talking about vulnerability, that is where the resettlement programmes make sense. That is where aid absolutely makes sense. I am not convinced that some new legal routes would provide the answer or prevent the smuggling; they may actually facilitate greater smuggling to some of those areas or camps; it may be twisted by social media as presenting new ways that you can come to Europe. It is quite a dynamic situation that we find ourselves in. Therefore,

99 of 175 Home Office—Oral Evidence (QQ 52-63) when it comes to the actual impact of what is proposed by this concept of new legal routes—when there are existing routes into the EU, there is resettlement from camps in other areas—is this providing an answer? I am just not convinced that it is. Equally, that could be misinterpreted and used by others to facilitate more smuggling and, sadly, put more lives at risk. It is that value judgment that we assess, and we judge that there are better, more effective ways to deal with those issues. The Chairman: In your view, what are the most effective safe and legal routes? James Brokenshire MP: I think it is the work that we are doing on the resettlement programmes. We need, by putting aid and investment into the area around Syria, to try to stop more people putting their lives at risk. As the Prime Minister says, our work trying to provide that stability in the region has stopped several thousand people who would otherwise have left the region. That is the first thing I would say. For those who may be vulnerable, we should look at resettlement as the mechanism to achieve the support that they need. The Chairman: But who has the responsibility for these resettlement camps? The conditions in these camps are not so good. Say you are resettling people in Lebanon: who is looking after them in Lebanon in terms of education, support, water and all that? James Brokenshire MP: The UNHCR is taking the lead role as the agency on the ground. Obviously, UK aid is being provided very directly to the UNHCR to support that activity in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. That is the mechanism that we use and the counterparty that we work very closely with, as well as some other NGOs. The work that we are now doing to scale up our vulnerable persons relocation scheme involves working with the UNHCR to identify those who are the most vulnerable and in need and cannot receive that support in the region. We see those mechanisms as being the way forward. Lord Jay of Ewelme: You said that you thought that creating safe and legal routes could in some sense encourage smuggling. I do not quite understand that. Surely if genuine refugees are better able to go through a safe and legal route into the EU, that will reduce the scope for those people getting on to smuggled boats and dying en route. I do not see the logic of how it would encourage smuggling. James Brokenshire MP: When I see some of the social media commentary on this in some of the chat forums that are being used by the smugglers to entice and encourage people to put their lives at risk, things are being presented in ways that are not intended, such as statements—by whoever—which the smugglers will repackage and rebatch. If you were to say, “There are now safe and legal routes”, I am pretty sure the smugglers would seek to present that externally to those en route as, “Europe is now welcoming more people and there are new routes for you to come—this is the means by which to do that”. So it provides a further angle for that exploitation of vulnerable people. That is against, as I see it, the evidence not being there for what that would do for the large movements that we are seeing. Any mechanisms that you might seek to adopt would affect only a relatively small number of people. I am trying to see how that solution answers the question that is being proffered. My concern is how it can get misinterpreted and manipulated by the traffickers and therefore lead to greater exploitation. Lord Jay of Ewelme: But would it not help to separate the genuine refugees coming from a war zone from those who knew that they would not get in through that legal route, so then you have the economic migrants who are going through the smuggler? It helps in that differentiation, which is such an important part of this.

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James Brokenshire MP: That is why there needs to be much greater focus on reception at the EU border, on making that separation, on seeing investment in countries such as Greece, Italy or Hungary, going into get that processing right, and to telegraph a message to those who are not entitled to humanitarian protection that they will be returned. That is why we have put such a heavy emphasis on returns as part of the reception arrangements that take place. That is the most effective way to do it and where the focus should lie, rather than looking at a number of other solutions that may be proffered for very laudable reasons but are detracting from the here and now of getting that processing done and ensuring that those who need protection are getting it quickly and that those who are not are being returned.

Q58 Baroness Janke: In some of your evidence, Minister, you have put forward a number of practical suggestions about safe routes. We might expect an overall strategy to incorporate a number of different measures—for example, expedited family reunion, separating, as Lord Jay said, the humanitarian cases through, for example, humanitarian visas and other ways, as well as the use of third countries in processing legal routes. Have you considered any of these, and might this be part of some emerging overall strategy? James Brokenshire MP: We are certainly considering the flow and some of the movements that we are seeing across, for example, the continent of Africa. We are considering what steps could be taken, for example, to establish centres in certain parts of Africa, although we would probably take a slightly different view on the purpose of those centres as being to combine the provision of information, local protection and resettlement opportunities for those in need through resettlement arrangements. However, we see the potential benefit of dealing with some of those flows by providing alternative opportunities for migrants currently seeking to make the journey to Europe, with potential third-country safe returns for those who are not entitled to humanitarian protection. That, I think, needs to be considered very carefully, but there is a role for establishing centres. Niger has been advanced by the EU as a centre that could be used initially to combine this information and provide support in that way. I suppose that I have reservations, which I have outlined, about further legal routes. Smuggling is facilitated not simply across the Mediterranean; it starts a long way back down the chain, and therefore we need to be aware of the potential risks that may be involved. However, I think you are right to identify the benefit that could be attached to providing centres in north-mid Africa to stem some of the flow and to ensure that people have some support and the information that they need. The Chairman: Baroness Janke, would you like to ask your own question now, as we need to move on?

Q59 Baroness Janke: My question goes on to ask how the human rights migrants are being protected. I would like to introduce into that the fact that we are constantly hearing that other countries which are accepting refugees and migrants are very aware of the contribution that they make, in terms of skills and talents, to aspects of life in those countries. In addition to human rights, what sort of work is going on across the board to look at these movements and at how people might positively contribute to European countries and particularly the UK? James Brokenshire MP: There are a couple of points there. To my mind, the best way to ensure that those in need of protection receive that support is to identify them quickly at the EU external border and to quickly give them access to an asylum process. That is

101 of 175 Home Office—Oral Evidence (QQ 52-63) absolutely why we fully support the EU’s proposals on hotspots, and indeed it is why we have provided practical support through the European Asylum Support Office with the deployment of personnel. We stand ready to do more in support of the hotspots initiative to make sure that humanitarian protection is offered at the earliest possible time. Equally, I would slightly flip on its head your question about the effect that people travelling to Europe may have on Europe. One thing that I worry about is the movement of people from some African countries northwards to Europe, when they may be really important in providing support, knowledge and intellectual capital for the further development of their countries. As part of the regional development programmes, we need to consider—and we do—how we ensure that the incentives are there. Here, I am talking about people who are making the journey not to flee war but to get a better way of life. We need to consider how we stem that flow through our continued focus on regional development so as to provide stability in those countries, rather than have people make the journeys at the outset. Baroness Janke: But are not many of those people—potentially people who may contribute by bringing skills and capabilities—fleeing war? A lot of our evidence seems to suggest that there is an inability to distinguish between, for example, people in need of humanitarian relief and asylum and people who are termed economic migrants. That is one of the major difficulties that we face with the growing numbers of people who are coming. James Brokenshire MP: This comes back to my desire to see speedy processing and to ask what we can do to support other member states. Indeed, some member states are adhering to their basic responsibilities in relation to humanitarian protection. You can look to other countries beyond the UK in that way. As we touched on in a previous evidence session, the flows of people that we are seeing from various routes differ in their make-up between those who are fleeing war or are in absolutely genuine need of humanitarian protection and those who try to make the journey for a better way of life. If you look at the eastern route through Greece, the majority are Syrians fleeing the conflict. If you look at Libya and the southern Mediterranean route, the balance is very different, with people coming from across the continent of Africa to make the journey northwards. However, it still comes down to the need to ensure that people are processed quickly and that we look beyond the shores of Europe at camps in Africa to stem the flow. We also need to look at regional development aid so that we can identify where support may be needed. Equally, when people come to the EU border, we need to ensure that we have the practical facilities in place to process them quickly and to provide help and assistance where it is needed quickly. Q60 Lord Condon: Minister, we would like to develop a better understanding of the role of the organised immigration crime task force. We have been told that, when fully operational, it will have about 90 people. How many will be immigration staff and how many will be border staff? What are you hoping they will achieve, and how will you be able to make a judgment about how effective they have been? What sort of performance criteria do you hope will be in place?

James Brokenshire MP: I saw the transcript of your session last week, to which the National Crime Agency gave evidence, and I know, Lord Condon, that you asked those questions on that occasion. The vast majority of the contribution will come from the National Crime Agency. I will obviously let colleagues from the Border Force and Immigration Enforcement talk about the specific contribution that they are already making and what they intend to contribute, in large measure because I see this as being about

102 of 175 Home Office—Oral Evidence (QQ 52-63) confronting and combating organised immigration crime, where the National Crime Agency has the national lead. From the reports that I am starting to receive and will continue to receive, I will expect to have a clear picture of the intelligence, which is certainly growing rapidly, so as to identify not simply, for example, the routes that are being taken but the methodologies, the type of criminality involved and the sorts of flows of money and other supportive items that facilitate these movements. This, again, leads into things such as vessels and so on. Therefore, I will want to see the disruption of more organised crime groups linked to organised immigration crime. Obviously the National Crime Agency can flex resources up and down in relation to the issues that it is dealing with. The 90-strong task force should not be seen in isolation, because it can draw on broader NCA resource and the specialist resource that resides around it. The Prime Minister’s emphasis, and mine, is on tackling organised immigration crime from its source through to transit to the UK and, as with other forms of cross-border criminality, on interdicting, taking action and disrupting it wherever the opportunities present themselves. Lord Condon: Are any immigration or Border Force staff being permanently deployed to the task force? Richard Quinn: Yes, in the region of 20 staff in Immigration Enforcement, including intelligence and investigators, so there is the small asset of an investigation team in that task force of 90. Lord Condon: Are they being relocated in any way, or will they remain in their home bases? Richard Quinn: They are being relocated, so I have relocated resources to the investigation team. But, as the Minister says, this is on top of what already exists: the sizable asset that I have in Immigration Enforcement. This also goes to the fact that the revision of the tasking process is about making sure that we are working jointly together, that we are prioritising, but more importantly that we are reacting to the intelligence that we hope to gather—that there is an operational outcome rather than just gathering the intelligence—and that we then evaluate the impact that we have had as a result of some of that disruption or arrests. It is about how quickly we do that rather than lending investigations to where there are quick opportunities. Sitting beyond that is also how we work with other government agencies, so this is not just the task force but policing, HMRC and DWP internally. Lord Condon: Mr Smith, are any Border Force staff permanently deployed to the task force? David Smith: Yes, there will be. From an intelligence support perspective, we will be putting officers into the task force as well. In addition to that— Lord Condon: Sorry, you say that there will be. So they are not there yet? There will be some Border Force— David Smith: No, they are already working to support the task force. Lord Condon: Sorry, to support the task force, or to be part of it? David Smith: They are part of the task force. In addition to that, it is important to recognise that we support, and have been supporting, the work of the task force. An initial task force was set up in 2014 under Operation Groundbreaker, which has already been discussed, initially to focus on the criminality in northern France and human smuggling there. The Border Force has been supporting that agenda over the last year and several months, which

103 of 175 Home Office—Oral Evidence (QQ 52-63) will be enhanced as part of the task force work, and we will continue to support it. Therefore we will interdict targets that are provided by the task force in northern France following that enhanced intelligence product. The Chairman: How do your agencies co-operate with other member-state authorities bilaterally and at EU level? David Smith: I will start with northern France. We have a very well-established relationship with the French, obviously at the political level but also at the official level and locally at operational level. We meet regularly as part of our bilateral co-operation. We share strategic and tactical intelligence via those high-level meetings. We also have structures in place already through the joint border intelligence unit, which has been mentioned previously, and through the joint operation and control centre in Calais, which has been in place for several years. Under the most recent ministerial joint declaration, there is an agreement and a commitment to enhance that joint co-operation with a new joint operation control centre, probably to be situated in Coquelles. It is likely that there will be two elements to that. One will be tactical operational co-ordination; the other will be intelligence and criminality-based co-ordination to tackle organised crime. That work is ongoing. It is not fully formed yet, but it will be very shortly, and it will be implemented as soon as possible. The Chairman: And at the EU level? David Smith: At the EU level is the current co-ordination through JOT Mare, through FRONTEX, through the new intelligence fusion cell in Italy. That co-ordination is very good and effective and is in place, predominately with my investigation colleagues, but intelligence sharing is a fundamental part of that. Richard Quinn: There is an appetite, following the Minister’s visit to Belgium, Holland and France, where we are working with our counterparts in law enforcement, not just at strategic level but at tactical level. We mentioned the seven joint investigation teams, which we are running on. That manifests in good operational working and the sharing of intelligence, and there is flexibility in where we may lead some of that investigation. Actually, the better judicial outcome is for the Belgians and the French to lead it, so there is real flexibility and joint working rather than being protective or working in silos, as well as the faster sharing of intelligence. For example, we recently supported the French in an operation where our officers worked with the French in France, and vice versa where we conducted arrests in this country, with the French or the Belgians alongside us.

Q61 Lord Ribeiro: Minister, how is the UK response to migrant smuggling co-ordinated? I ask that because we have heard varying accounts from our witnesses, some of whom felt that there was a plurality of actors across national and international areas dealing with operations and intelligence gathering, and others who felt that the whole thing was a bit of a mess. We heard evidence last week from the NCA, which felt that in the UK at least it seemed to be well co-ordinated. Would you comment on that? James Brokenshire MP: Obviously you took evidence from the National Crime Agency last week, and I think Tom Dowdall is very well placed to give you that sense of how the NCA is linking up all our response to organised immigration crime. Obviously the NCA has the power to task and co-ordinate. That is one of its functions around serious organised crime. As we have also heard, the Border Force and Immigration Enforcement have embedded resources into the NCA’s National Intelligence Hub and threat desks to ensure that we have an effective join-up, because obviously some of the things that the Border Force might be seeing at the border may involve practical intelligence and operational issues of the kind that

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David has alluded to. We have, for example, an embedded person in the Police Aux Frontières joint control centre at Coquelles, so that we see some very real on the ground- type activity. It is important that that is fed into and co-ordinated so that we have that enrichment and fusion of intelligence, which can then be tasked out if it points to operational intelligence packages that require further investigation and can then be taken forward either by the NCA or by Immigration Enforcement, for example. Mr Quinn’s team will be absolutely engaged on some of the intelligence product that is being generated, as he has alluded to, with the criminal investigation teams. The work of the task force is intended to strengthen that further to give us the more end- to-end intelligence picture that we do not completely see at the moment, which is why the task force is being established, is under way and is already starting with its secondments into Europol, Sicily and elsewhere: to give us that picture. So I do see that fusion of work between our agencies to support action against organised immigration crime. From a European law-enforcement standpoint, Europol has the lead co-ordination role, as it has had in other spheres as well. Indeed, FRONTEX, at the external borders, through some of its debriefing and the actions that the Border Force is supporting, again links into this. I am sure that more can be done, and we would encourage other European partners to step up resources and arrangements in a similar way to the way we are doing that. I think there would be real benefit from that. Europol and FRONTEX would gain from that as well. The architecture is there, but we are all stepping up and seeking to more on this not just to create better intelligence but to take action off it. Lord Ribeiro: What criteria are you going to use to assess success? James Brokenshire MP: As I think I said in response to Lord Condon, I want to see more organised crime groups being identified and more work being tasked out so that they are disrupted. I alluded to the statistics from last year for the period 2014-15, which showed 170 organised crime groups involved in organised immigration crime being disrupted. It is a question of seeing more of that work. I could easily say, “Let’s look at the numbers here. Do we see an increase in numbers?”. Actually, I think it is more nuanced than that. Some groups will be more harmful than others. You can look at this in simple number terms, but as we get better intelligence, targeting the groups that are doing the most facilitation or creating the most risk to those who are being transported will give us a much more nuanced picture and enable us to go after the groups that are causing the most risk to the UK and indeed to the people whose lives they are putting at risk. It is that sort of approach that I am expecting the task force and this work to be able to take. Lord Ribeiro: On the one hand you are working very collaboratively with the French, the Belgians and so forth, but are you inviting any of them to come here? James Brokenshire MP: Yes, into the joint border intelligence units. There have been—a phrase that is used in intelligence—“injects” into that intelligence from those countries’ law enforcement operations, and I absolutely welcome that. The work that will flow through from the agreement that we signed with the French Government in August absolutely envisages us having that pooling of resource, because it matters and makes sense. Indeed, we are also looking at what further work we can do with the Belgian and Dutch authorities, and the Director-General of the Border Force, Sir Charles Montgomery, has visited both Belgium and Holland to further enhance our already very good practical arrangements. But certainly seeing how those things can add value and how we can deepen those relationships further is something that we keep under very close review.

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Q62 The Chairman: This is the final question from me. The action plan states that the Commission intends to review the facilitators’ package in 2016. What changes would you like to see, if any, in that review? James Brokenshire MP: It is interesting, because this builds on, I think, the original 2002 framework that was established, which aimed to strengthen the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence. Obviously we wait to see what the Commission might say when this is put forward in proposals next year. I think we would encourage the EU to consider further disruption options concerning money flows, for example. This is an issue that I want to be seen as a greater priority, because I find it absolutely immoral and unconscionable that we have groups out there that are making significant sums of money by putting people’s lives at risk without caring what might happen to them. So going after the facilitation and the money flows is something that we would like to see: how we can go after the assets of smugglers. The other element that I would point to is the use of social media. It is starting to become a lot clearer how that is being harnessed and used to sell false hope and put people’s lives at risk. We need to look in a practical and collaborative way at what structures might aid that. So I suppose at this early stage those would be two of the thought processes that I would put into the mix, but obviously we stand ready to consider the proposals when they are released next year. The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. We have run over time, but as ever we are grateful to you and your colleagues for accompanying you. As I said at the outset, if there is anything that you want to amplify or any further information that you want to give us, we will be very grateful. The information about resources that Lord Wasserman asked for would be very helpful. James Brokenshire MP: Definitely. Thank you very much.

106 of 175 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International UK—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31)

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International UK—Oral Evidence (QQ 23-31) Transcript to be found under Amnesty International UK.

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Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association—Written Evidence

Summary i. We answer questions 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8. ii. In answer to question 1 we emphasise, as did UNHCR, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in their evidence to the Committee, that the evidence indicates that those crossing the Mediterranean are for the most part, refugees and that the world is in the middle of the biggest refugee crisis since the second world war. The European Action Plan is more focused on pull than push factors and as such does not present a comprehensive response. Safe, legal ways into the EU should be the priority and in this context we draw attention to the conclusions of the recent study for the LIBE on the Dublin III regulation which identified the main tools needed to stop dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean. We warn of the risks of resources being diverted and doubt the efficacy of some of the proposed measures.

iii. We answer “no” to question 2, because the Action Plan starts from the wrong place in failing to acknowledge the extent to which it is dealing with a problem of forced migration. We touch on the minimum standards with which the plan must comply to be compatible with international refugee law.

iv. In answer to question 4 we suggest that the question of political will is central to the question of whether the mandate of the EU Agencies will suffice and express concern that funds will be directed at more general immigration enforcement work and as a consequence the sums allocated to address the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean will be lower that the headline figure.

v. We answer “no” to the first part of question 5: the Action Plan does not sufficiently differentiate between smuggling and trafficking. As to the extension of Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 from the trafficked to the smuggled, we are in favour of this provided that the safeguards in its preambles (4) to (7), as to the primacy of refugee protection and respect for human rights, remain in place.

vi. We answer “no” to question 6; the Action Plan does not strike the correct balance between law enforcement and the human rights of migrants, most fundamentally in that it fails to give effect to the rights of refugees as set out in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to Refugees and its 1967 protocol.

vii. We answer no to question 8: the actions proposed in the Action Plan are not compatible with the UN Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air because that protocol requires compliance with the international law of the sea and explain why we do not consider that the Action Plan complies with this.

ILPA Response to the House of Lords Committee on the European Union call for evidence on the Action Plan on migrant Smuggling

1. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA) is a registered charity and a professional membership association. The majority of members are barristers,

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solicitors and advocates practising in all areas of immigration, asylum and nationality law. Academics, non-governmental organisations and individuals with an interest in the law are also members. Founded in 1984, ILPA exists to promote and improve advice and representation in immigration, asylum and nationality law through an extensive programme of training and disseminating information and by providing evidence-based research and opinion. ILPA is represented on advisory and consultative groups convened by Government departments, public bodies and non- governmental organisations.

1. One of the priorities of the European Agenda on Migration is the prevention of migrant smuggling, with the goal of transforming migrant smuggling networks into “high risk, low return” operations. Are the four objectives of the Action Plan the right ones to achieve this goal? Which, if any, of the proposals in the Action Plan should be prioritised in this context?

2. ILPA concurs with the evidence given by Andrej Mahecic of UNHCR51 and by Steve Symonds of Amnesty International and David Mepham of Human Rights Watch52 that the evidence indicates that those crossing the Mediterranean are for the most part, refugees. They come predominantly from Syria, from Eritrea, from Afghanistan and consideration of figures on rates of recognition as a refugee in the European Union attest to their protection needs.

3. In 2014 there were a total of 624,000 (first) applications for asylum made in the 28 EU Member States. For the 1st quarter of 2015, 185,000 (first) asylum applications were made in the EU. Of them:  4% were made in the UK  8% were made in France  39.6% were made in Germany  1.4% were made in Greece (Sweden with a similar size had 6.3% of the total)  8.2% were made in Italy.

4. Over half of the total number of persons seeking asylum in the EU came from one of three countries: Syria, Kosovo or Afghanistan.

5. Some 94% of Syrian asylum applications made in the EU were granted in 2014. In the same year 90% of Eritrean applications were successful and 88% of Iraqi applications. In the same period, 66% of Afghan applications succeeded.53 Statements such as the Action Plan’s “…migrants are likely to pay a high price to smugglers to bring them to the EU if they know that they will be returned home quickly after reaching their destination” fail to acknowledge that many of those on boats have no choice but to flee for their lives

51 Evidence session No. 1 15 July 2015 10.30am. 52 Evidence session No.3 Wednesday 22 July 2014 10.30am. 53 Asylum: 1st Quarter 2015: Eurostat news release 112/2015 18 June 2015; 2014 statistics: EUROSTAT news release 53/2015 20 March 2015.

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and fail to acknowledge that many will be recognised as refugees or persons in need of humanitarian protection.

6. As the witnesses mentioned explained and other commentators have addressed,54 the world is in the middle of the biggest refugee crisis since the second world war, with countries through which persons are travelling hosting enormous numbers of refugees, for example some two million are in Turkey. Mr Mahecic reminded the Committee in his evidence that every second Syrian is now forcibly displaced. Professor Guy Goodwin addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s Ad Hoc Committee on Large Scale Arrivals of Refugees to Turkey said in June:

The movement of people leaves few States untouched, and much of that movement is driven by desperation – unremitting conflict and persecution, failed and exhausted economies. Nor is that movement a problem waiting for a solution; on the contrary, it is a phenomenon in a modern, globalized world presently no more able to resolve major economic challenges than to broker peace in conflict. It is a phenomenon we must learn to live with, and to manage as best we can in the interests of all. Among other matters, this will require States dealing with each other on a basis of equity and equality, not outmoded and unrealistic expectations of sovereign entitlement. In addition, better ‘management’ will require investing in long-term responses, not short-term, ad hoc measures focused simply on symptoms, not causes. Only an approach combining protection, humanitarian assistance and opportunity with political and financial investment in mitigating and removing the underlying push factors can have any impact.

7. The European Action Plan is more focused on pull than push factors and as such does not present a comprehensive response. With its focus on measures such as taking stronger action against the employment of irregular migrants, it is written for those who have a choice to stay put, ignoring that so many of those crossing the Mediterranean have no choice but to move if their human rights are to be secured. The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees contains some 34 substantive articles,55 of which the majority are about the rights and entitlements of refugees. These rights and entitlements are not respected and protected in overburdened or unsafe56 States.

54 See Professor Guy Goodwin Gill’s Refugees – Challenges for Protection and Assistance in the 21st Century’: Notes for a Presentation Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Ad Hoc Committee on Large Scale Arrivals of Refugees to Turkey, 15 June 2015 available at http://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/news/professor-guy-goodwin-gill-speaks-challenges-refugee- protection-and-assistance-21st-century (accessed 19 August 2015); 'Refugees and Migrants at Sea: Duties of Care and Protection in the Mediterranean and the Need for International Action’ Notes for a Presentation Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence on Migrants’ Rights in the Mediterranean University of Naples ‘L’Orientale’ Palazzo du Mesnil, May 2015 available at http://www.jmcemigrants.eu/guy-s-goodwin-gill-refugees-and-migrants-at- sea-duties-of-care-and-protection-in-the-mediterranean-and-the-need-for-international-action/ (accessed 19 August 2015); ‘Regulating “Irregular” Migration: International Obligations and International Responsibilities’ An International Workshop” National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Faculty of Law Friday, 20 March 2015 available at http://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/news/professor-goodwin-gills-address-regulating- %E2%80%9Cirregular%E2%80%9D-migration-international-obligations-and (accessed 19 August 2015). 55 Articles 1 to 34. 56 See the comments of Mr Symonds and Mr Medham on Libya.

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8. The current system of distribution of persons seeking asylum around the EU is the Dublin III Regulation which is predicated on returns to the first EU country in which the person could have sought safety: thus in theory funnelling persons toward Greece, Italy, etc. until such time as because of problems of capacity or competence those states are 57 deemed unsafe. It is estimated that only about 3% of asylum seekers are ever actually subject to a successful Dublin transfer58 yet most have their claims determined in a country other than that in which they entered the EU. The recent study for the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament Enhancing the Common European Asylum System: Alternatives to Dublin, paper for the LIBE committee of the European parliament,59 concluded that the Dublin system

… does not work effectively from the viewpoint of Member States or asylum- seekers. … as long as it is based on the use of coercion against asylum seekers, it cannot serve as an effective tool to address existing imbalances in the allocation of responsibilities among Member States. The EU is faced with two substantial challenges: first, how to prevent unsafe journeys and risks to the lives of people seeking international protection in the EU; and secondly, how to organise the distribution of related responsibilities and costs among the Member States.

9. As Mr Symonds of Amnesty International pointed out in his oral evidence, while the preamble to the Action Plan refers to the importance of opening “more safe, legal”60 ways into the EU, this is not addressed in the body of the document. It should be the priority.

10. The study for the LIBE committee concluded that

Those seeking refuge undertake dangerous journeys as they have few other options - mandatory visa requirements coupled with carrier sanctions on transport companies preclude regular means of travel. Without these two EU measures, unsafe access and the demand for the services of smugglers would greatly diminish.”

11. It identified the main tools as (1) humanitarian evacuation and transport; (2) humanitarian visas, (3) resettlement; and (4) immigration visas.

12. The study for the LIBE Committee also argues for mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions so that those recognised as refugees are free to move and is critical of the wrongful characterisation of the onward movement of persons seeking asylum as ‘irregular secondary movement’, asylum seekers and refugees are seeking a place of refuge and access to reception standards and fair procedures in line with their entitlements under international and EU law.

57 See M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (Application no. 30696/09), European Court of Human Rights and NS v UK (C-411/10), Court of Justice of the European Union. 58 European Asylum Support Office, Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2013, July 2014, section 2.6, p 30, https://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/EASO-AR-final1.pdf, accessed 4 July 2015. 59 PE 519.234. Authors Professor Elspeth Guild; Dr. Cathryn Costello; Ms. Madeline Garlick, and Dr. Violeta Moreno-Lax. Professor Elspeth Guild is co-convenor of ILPA’s European subcommittee. 60 See further the response to question 3 below: in the circumstances described in Article 31 of the Refugee Convention there is nothing illegal in a person’s crossing the Mediterranean in a boat to seek asylum, although those who convey them may be committing one or more crimes.

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13. It suggests that distribution keys which identify the reception capacity of states based on indicators, such as population, GDP, economic success and current hosting of asylum- seekers and refugees could be used and that this could compel closer attention to the extent to which Member States are meeting their responsibilities and provide benchmarks for developing institutional capacity. However it cautions against distribution keys that lead to coercive transfers or allowing Member States to buy their way out of their protection responsibilities. On the other hand, additional financial support for those who provide protection over and above their allocation should be made available. 14. We recognise a response couched in terms of enforcement is designed to appeal to those States whose political stance on immigration is based on an enforcement approach. But insofar as this approach was designed to sugar the pill of responsibility-sharing and make it politically acceptable to States to agree to take refugees from Italy, Malta, Greece and parts of Europe under most pressure, it has failed. States rejected calls for compulsory quotas in May and June 2015. It carries with it risks, including risks of diverting resources to information-sharing, prevention of illegal working, etc. While States may choose to fund these from other budget lines, they should not be counted as part of the funding used to deal with the movement of refugees across the Mediterranean and for their reception in Europe, where funds are already limited and evidence of responsibility sharing scarce. Mr Mahecic reminded the Committee in his oral evidence that UNHCR’s appeal for Syria is “severely underfunded” and described the current responsibility sharing in Europe as “untenable.” He reminded the Committee that the UK has resettled a mere 187 Syrians, compared with Germany’s 30,000. 15. Demand for a passage across the Mediterranean looks set to remain high and with it the profits of smugglers. We are doubtful whether increased criminal penalties will affect the behaviour of smugglers in those circumstances.

16. Financial investigations are long term measures and new EU bodies are only as effective as their mandate and resources. The need to respond to the current movements and deaths at sea is the higher priority in the short to medium term.

17. Many of the vessels used to transport persons across the Mediterranean are unseaworthy. They are used once and abandoned to the persons being carried to bring to shore, so that the smugglers escape prosecution. In these circumstances we question the extent to which measures to establish lists of vessels and to destroy vessels will have much effect on patterns of movement and suggest that priority should not be accorded to them.

18. Work with third countries to tackle border management, youth and employment and mobility are unlikely to affect patterns of movement where the causes of that movement are war, famine, pestilence and death.

2. According to the European Commission, the Action Plan “should be seen in the broader context of EU efforts to address the root causes of irregular migration”. Does it suggest the correct set of measures to bring this about?

19. No.

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20. As set out in response to question 1 above, the Action Plan starts from the wrong place because it fails to acknowledge the extent to which it is dealing with a problem of forced migration. The failure to treat the movement as a humanitarian crisis and a crisis of protection has led to a rich wealth of material, analysis and recommendations such as that described in response to question 1, being overlooked. 21. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention provides 1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.

2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.

22. See further s 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.

23. These set out minimum standards with which the Action Plan must comply to be compatible with international and UK domestic law.

24. The Action Plan appears to place undue faith in the efficacy of gathering and sharing information without identifying clearly the use to which the information will be put. There is considerable joint working between states in the areas of transnational organized crime, of which smuggling is one example, and the notion that increased regional information gathering and sharing could make the step change in tackling smuggling is nowhere justified in the Action Plan. Our experience over the years suggests that smugglers are very quick to adapt to interference with their activities. Information gathered is almost always yesterday’s news.

3. Are Member States currently meeting their obligations under the existing EU framework against migrant smuggling? What are the deficiencies of the current framework, and do the actions foreseen in the Action Plan address these?

25. Not answered.

4. EU Agencies are expected to play a significant role in carrying out the objectives of the Action Plan. Do they have the mandate, budget and other capacities to fulfil this role?

26. We suggest that as with the question of compulsory quotas, the question of political will is central to the question of whether the mandate of the EU Agencies will suffice.

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27. As to budgets, the sums allocated to States are also relevant. The European Commission approved financial allocations for asylum, migration and integration for some of the front line states for the period 2014 – 2020 as follows:  Cyprus: 32 million euro  Greece: 259 million euro  Italy: 310 million euro  Spain: 257 million euro  Sweden 118.5 million euro.

28. The funding is being released urgently to the front line states in light of the reception crisis. As explained in response to question 1 above, we are concerned that funds will be directed at more general immigration enforcement work and as a consequence the sums allocated to address the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean will be lower that the headline figures.

5. Does the Action Plan sufficiently differentiate between migrant smuggling and human trafficking? What is your opinion of the proposal to extend the 2004 Directive on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings to smuggled migrants?

29. No.

30. Smuggling is the clandestine movement of people across borders. It is a crime against the State. People hide in vehicles, or use false documents, to cross borders. Many are brought by an agent, or smuggler and disrupting smuggling routes is a key concern of those involved in migration control. In the UK media attention has focused on disrupting routes used to bring people to claim asylum in the UK. Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention says that countries should not impose penalties on people fleeing persecution who have had to use clandestine methods of entry to flee. This does not prevent States from taking action against the person who did the smuggling.

31. Trafficking is the movement of people in order to exploit them. It is a crime against the individuals concerned and a violation of their human rights. It need not involve clandestine measures: some people move on their own passports.

32. The distinction between trafficking and smuggling does not present a conceptual difficulty: see above, the differences are clear. However, when looking at factual situations, it is can be complex to sort out what is going on. Imagine two persons wish to flee. The smuggler’s charge is £10,000. The man can pay, and does. Once he reaches his destination, he never sees or hears of the smuggler again. The woman cannot pay. The smuggler says that he will still carry her, but she will have to pay back the £10,000 once she gets to her destination. So far so good, neither she nor than man have been trafficked. But if she works for the smuggler once she gets to her destination, if the smuggler can control her actions because of her debt and uses that control to exploit her, then the situation starts to look like trafficking. By contrast, if the smuggler simply wants his money and she engages in forced and

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exploitative labour for someone else to repay her debt, she may be a victim of slavery, but she is not trafficked.

33. We recall preambles four to seven to Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities: (4) This Directive is without prejudice to the protection granted to refugees, to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and persons seeking international protection under international refugee law and without prejudice to other human rights instruments. (5) This Directive is without prejudice to other provisions on the protection of victims, witnesses or persons who are particularly vulnerable. Nor does it detract from the prerogatives of the Member States as regards the right of residence granted on humanitarian or other grounds. (6) This Directive respects fundamental rights and complies with the principles recognized for example by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. (7) Member States should give effect to the provision of this Directive without discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic characteristics, language, religion or belief, political or other opinions, membership of a national minority, fortune, birth, disabilities, age or sexual orientation. 34. Provided those safeguards remain in place, then we consider that the extension of the Directive to persons who have been smuggled could offer valuable additional protection for such persons.

6. Does current EU action against migrant smuggling, including the actions suggested in the Action Plan, strike the correct balance between law enforcement and the human rights of migrants, including particularly vulnerable migrants such as minors and pregnant women?

35. No.

36. See above, most fundamentally it fails to give effect to the rights of refugees as set out in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to Refugees and its 1967 protocol. These obligations apply to all: minors, pregnant women and single adult men.

37. It fails to recognise that the risks of staying put may be as great as the risks of undertaking a hazardous journey. The suggestion that a person would not flee Syria or embark from Libya if warned of the hazards of the journey is, for the reasons given in the oral evidence of Mr Symonds and Mr Medham, dubitable. It wholly underestimates the desperate need of those trying to flee. Alternatives, rather than deterrents, are required to change behaviour.

38. The Action Plan suggests “…monitoring of the pre-frontier area for early identification of smuggler and prevention of irregular departures of migrants”. This carries a clear risk of breaches of human rights if persons are left in places where their life and freedom is threatened and in circumstances where they face

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persecution on the territory or return from the territory to a place where they face persecution and refoulement contrary to Article 33 of the UN Refugee Convention, which provides

1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.

39. Similarly if Immigration Liaison Officers act to prevent persons from embarking from places where their life is in danger.

40. It also appears to envisage extra-territorial operations, for example on Libyan territory. Such operations, unless the free consent of the Libyan authorities to them were secured, which appears unlikely, would be acts of aggression and unlawful under the Charter of the United Nations unless a specific UN mandate were obtained, which also appears unlikely.

7. Do the Action Plan and other, related EU strategies (such as the European Maritime Security Strategy, Cyber Security Strategy and the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings) form a coherent whole?

41. Not answered.

8. Are the actions proposed in the Action Plan compatible with the international framework on preventing human smuggling, including the UN Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air? Do they add to this framework in a coherent and meaningful manner?

42. No.

43. That protocol requires compliance with the international law of the sea.

44. The primary obligations of Shipmasters and member States of the International Maritime Organisation when faced with persons in distress at sea are set out under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Conventions on Search and Rescue and Salvage.

45. Regulation V 33.1 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea obliges the Master of a ship to proceed with all speed to assist persons in distress at sea. See also Article 98(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 98(2) of that Convention obliges coastal States to promote search and rescue services in cooperation with other States. See also Regulation V/7 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. The International Convention

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on Search and Rescue at chapter 2.1.10 obliges State Parties to provide assistance to persons in distress at sea, Chapter 1.3.2 requires States to provide for initial medical or other needs and deliver persons to a place of safety.

46. Thus rescue is situated with a framework of obligations to commit resources to search and rescue and these must be the primary focus of all actions. Within that framework it is vital that the judgement of Masters of their ships on the safety of rescue obligations be accepted. In particular, it should be for Masters to assess the time for which a ship should stand by before attempting rescue and rendering assistance. It is vital that the action plan recognise that a place of safety means dry land, and specifically a place where obligations under the Refugee Convention can be met or from when there is a plan to be able to render the person safely, without delay and with respect for their dignity to a place where those obligations can be met.

21 August 2015

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International Organization for Migration—Written Evidence

Introduction 1. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is pleased to submit its views to the House of Lords EU sub-committee on Home Affairs on the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling.

2. IOM is an intergovernmental organisation established in 1951, committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. The Organization acts to help meet the operational challenges of migration, advance understanding of migration issues, encourage social and economic development through migration and work towards effective respect for the human rights and well-being of migrants. IOM’s mandate allows it to work with migrants, refugees, displaced persons and others in need of migration services or assistance. With over 480 offices worldwide61 and numerous ongoing projects and programmes, IOM is in a strong position to offer advice to governments and bring best practices from experience in other countries.

IOM’s Involvement with the Issue of Migrant Smuggling 3. According to Article 1 (c) of the IOM Constitution, one of the purposes and functions of the Organization is “to provide […] advisory services on migration questions and other assistance as is in accord with the aims of the Organization”. The IOM Strategy, adopted by the IOM Council in 2007, further provides that the Organization will focus on inter alia “assisting States in the development and delivery of programmes, studies and technical expertise on combating migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, in particular women and children, in a manner consistent with international law” (Point 11 of the Strategy).

4. IOM seeks to address migrant smuggling in a comprehensive way, saving migrants’ lives, prosecuting migrant smugglers and promoting more regular migration channels, as well as advancing the socio-economic well-being of migrants. The desired future outcome is that states, international organisations and other actors work towards a situation where migration management approaches, at a minimum, do not exacerbate vulnerabilities; such approaches must instead guarantee protection of the human rights of migrants irrespective of status, while migration takes place within the rule of law, and is aligned with development, social, humanitarian and security interests of states.

5. IOM works towards two key objectives in response to the issue of migrant smuggling: the first is to enable states to more effectively interdict migrant smuggling and save migrants’ lives; the second is to foster regional and international cooperation to fight migrant smuggling. IOM’s response to migrant smuggling addresses the multiple dimensions of

61 See IOM Snapshot 2015 for more details. Available here: http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/about- iom/docs/iom_snap_en.pdf

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the phenomenon and consists of four key components: legal migration options; practical protection for migrants; interdiction and prosecution of smugglers and development and durable solutions.

Inquiry into the EU’s Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling 6. IOM welcomes this inquiry by the House of Lords EU sub-committee on Home Affairs which provides an opportunity to feed into the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling 2015-2020. In submitting views to the inquiry IOM’s comments will focus on the questions that address the scope of the action plan, the balance between law enforcement and the human rights of migrants, and coherence with the international framework (addressed in questions 1, 2, 5, 6 and 8 respectively).

Question 1: One of the priorities of the European Agenda on Migration is the prevention of migrant smuggling, with the goal of transforming migrant smuggling networks into “high risk, low return” operations. Are the four objectives of the Action Plan the right ones to achieve this goal? Which, if any, of the proposals in the Action Plan should be prioritised in this context?

7. IOM welcomes the European Agenda on Migration as a good initial step towards a comprehensive European approach and, in particular, the renewed focus on saving lives. IOM also welcomes the Action Plan on Migrant Smuggling which sets out what specific actions are necessary to implement the counter smuggling part of the European Agenda on Migration.

8. The Action Plan covers most of the critical components of a comprehensive response to migrant smuggling; however IOM would welcome greater balance between the four different objectives. This would involve further expanding the objective that seeks to address the assistance needs of vulnerable smuggled migrants, which is not currently elaborated in detail (see responses to question 6). IOM would also welcome the inclusion of procedures that should be in place to assess whether smuggled migrants are in need of international protection. Furthermore, IOM would encourage the inclusion of further details on the importance of opening more safe, legal ways into the EU, in addition to what is noted in the introductory paragraphs. Expanding this part of the Action Plan represents a significant opportunity to introduce measures that can adequately disrupt the business model of migrant smugglers.

9. IOM welcomes the second objective on improving the gathering and sharing of information, which will allow for a more effective response to smuggling in order to ensure that smuggling operations are disrupted at the earliest opportunity. In addition to data on volumes and routes, and complementary to EU intelligence gathering efforts, IOM recommends that more detailed analysis of human mobility and vulnerabilities

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could help improve understanding of the motivations for certain routes, such as, for example, the importance of diaspora networks and family reunification along specific corridors.

10. IOM notes, as a positive development, the strengthening of the joint maritime information operation (JOT-MARE) to become a single inter-agency information hub for cases of smuggling by sea; however IOM also recognises an absence in details for a mechanism of information sharing for other forms of migrant smuggling, such as by land or air.

11. IOM notes that assistance to vulnerable migrants is included as a component of objective three; however IOM would strongly welcome greater detail on the specific measures or mechanisms of assistance to smuggled migrants. This is not elaborated upon in the current wording of the Action Plan. Indeed the one proposal under the sub- heading ‘Assistance to Migrants’ within this objective refers to a consultation on an EU Directive on residence permits which is very narrow in outlook compared to much broader assistance measures for vulnerable migrants which could be outlined here. Further comments on this point are provided in the response to questions 5 and 6.

12. Objective three entitled, ‘Enhance prevention of smuggling and assistance to vulnerable migrants’ targets two broad issues in one. IOM would recommend that this objective is separated into two since prevention of smuggling and assistance measures are very distinct issues which require a distinct set of responses62. IOM would encourage the two topics being addressed separately and in parallel rather than as two sub-components of one overall objective.

13. As part of the third objective, the Action Plan recognises the need for an effective EU system to return irregular migrants whose asylum applications are rejected. IOM acknowledges the importance of return migration as a necessary element of a well- managed and coherent migration policy; however IOM also notes with concern that the focus is very much on forced return without reaffirming the preference for voluntary return and reintegration as traditionally included in EU policy initiatives, such as the EU Return Directive. IOM considers that further efforts to emphasise the role of reintegration assistance and opportunities to link this to local development initiatives, as a means of promoting community stabilisation, is required.

14. In objective four recognition of the need for stronger cooperation with third countries (as both countries of origin and transit), in order to allow for effective investigation and prosecution of migrant smuggling, is welcomed by IOM. The provision of financial and technical assistance for the development of counter-smuggling strategies, border

62 To read more about the distinction between prevention of migrant smuggling and protection and assistance measures, please refer to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Toolkit to Combat Smuggling of Migrants, 2010: Tool 8 Protection and assistance measures and Tool 9 Prevention of the smuggling of migrants.

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management systems, police and criminal justice responses to smuggling and improved collection, sharing and analysis of data are particularly positive capacity building developments that IOM supports. However, IOM would also welcome greater partnership language here, in line with the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, which also considers the needs and interests of third countries in relation to migrant smuggling.

15. With regards to priorities in the Action Plan, IOM considers the provision of assistance to vulnerable migrants as the critical priority; however, as noted above, this is the part of the Action Plan where IOM would also welcome further elaboration and detail to ensure specific and substantive measures are included within the document. Reducing deaths and human suffering as a result of smuggling and protecting the human rights of migrants are almost entirely absent from the Action Plan. Assistance measures for smuggled migrants such as urgent health care, food, non-food items such as hygiene kits, psychological support, temporary shelter, counselling, facilitation of contact with families, and consular and referral services should also form part of the Action Plan in order to ensure it is fully comprehensive and adequately addresses the needs of smuggled migrants, in particular vulnerable groups such as children and women63.

Question 2: According to the European Commission, the Action Plan “should be seen in the broader context of EU efforts to address the root causes of irregular migration”. Does it suggest the correct set of measures to bring this about?

16. The Action Plan on Migrant Smuggling makes two brief references to the root causes of irregular migration, once in the opening remarks of the second section of the document, and once under the fourth objective ‘Stronger Cooperation with Third Countries’ (on pages 2 and 8 respectively). Neither reference provides significant detail on the specific measures that are recommended to address the root causes of migration; rather, they note that the Action Plan should be seen in the context of, or in connection with, wider EU efforts in this area.

17. IOM would welcome further details on this particular topic, including potential response measures to address key “drivers of irregular migration”. In this regard IOM advocates for the use of “drivers” of migration as the preferred terminology that more adequately reflects the reality that migration is a desirable, necessary and inevitable process to be managed rather than a problem to be solved.

18. IOM’s view is that without investing in large-scale stability and development programmes in communities of origin of smuggled migrants, as well as individual and

63 See also United Nations Human Rights Commissioner Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/OHCHR_Recommended_Principles_Guidelines.pdf

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community level assistance for returning migrants, smuggling will continue to thrive and thousands of lives will continue to be lost. In addition, initiatives aimed at improving economic opportunities, social (including health) services, and community infrastructure are needed in areas prone to economically-induced irregular migration. Similarly, efforts aimed at disaster risk reduction and building community resilience are required to reduce other negative migration drivers, such as conflict, environmental degradation, violence and other man-made and natural disasters64.

19. IOM also notes that further research and data initiatives are required to gather quantitative and qualitative data on the profiles, needs, expectations, vulnerabilities and intentions of migrants, in order to improve the evidence base for policies that are designed to address the drivers of irregular migration.

20. IOM also recognises that one of the important drivers of irregular migration is the lack of regular migration and mobility options. IOM advocates for greater access to safe options that include humanitarian avenues as an alternative to reliance on dangerous smuggling movements by land and sea. In addition to the plans to increase resettlement and other forms of admission, regular economic migration channels at all skill levels should be developed in order to respond to labour market realities and provide alternatives to the use of smuggling routes65. This should be seen as a critical element in any effort to reduce the number of people who feel they have no viable option but to turn to smugglers.

21. While the European Agenda on Migration and the Europe 2020 strategy highlight the importance of legal migration and mobility, no new concrete proposals are put forward in the Action Plan on migrant smuggling. Indeed, only very brief mention is made on the importance of opening safer, legal ways into the EU. This point in the Action Plan represents an essential opportunity to introduce measures that can adequately disrupt the business model of migrant smugglers.

5. Does the Action Plan sufficiently differentiate between migrant smuggling and human trafficking? What is your opinion of the proposal to extend the 2004 Directive on the residence permit issues to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings to smuggled migrants?

22. IOM would recommend the inclusion of a definition of migrant smuggling in the Action Plan, or a reference to other documents from which it may take its definition, in order to provide background to the content of the document. This would further complement the reference that is made later in the document to the focus on migrant smuggling and

64 Addressing Complex Migration Flows in the Mediterranean: IOM Response Plan, June 2015, p.4, available upon request. 65 Ibid.

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not trafficking in human beings, which is a “different yet interlinked crime” (page 2), in addition to the footnote which provides information relating to the differences between the two topics, as well as the reference to the two topics being addressed under separate strategies at an EU level.

23. IOM would also recommend the inclusion of a definition of migrant smuggling given the different and concurrent definitions provided for by the EU and by the UN. One point of divergence, for example, is on the profit element of smuggling which is an integral part of the UN Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, but is absent from the EU definition as given in the Directive 2002/90/EC and the Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA (the so-called Facilitators Package). Another point of divergence is on the issue of prosecution of smuggling for humanitarian purposes (such as fishermen who are saving lives of smuggled migrants), something that is explicitly excluded from the UN Protocol but not in the case of the EU definition.

24. Under objective three of the Action Plan, ‘Enhanced Prevention of Smuggling and Assistance to Vulnerable Migrants’ and the sub-heading, ‘Assistance to Vulnerable Migrants’, the document refers to a consultation and impact assessment to be launched in 2016 by the European Commission on the possible revision of Directive 2004/81/EC on residence permits issues to victims of trafficking in human beings and to smuggled migrants cooperating with authorities. Further details on this point, such as the specific purpose of the consultation or areas of focus, could better facilitate the provision of informed comment on this topic.

25. Indeed, the Directive 2004/81/EC already covers both victims of trafficking and those who have been the subject of an action to facilitate irregular immigration who cooperate with the competent authorities; however the key distinction in this Directive is that it provides a mandatory obligation on states to introduce a residence permit for victims of trafficking, whereas states can exercise discretion in deciding to apply the Directive to third country nationals who have been smuggled.

26. As this topic will be addressed in a separate consultation, IOM will make only a summary comment as it relates to the Action Plan. IOM recognises that to effectively investigate migrant smuggling there may be circumstances in which migrants who have been smuggled can provide important witness testimonies to support criminal proceedings (to the police, prosecution and/or judicial authorities); therefore the provision of residence permits can better facilitate this process and this should be supported by assistance measures, such as those provided for in the Directive 2004/81/EC. However, the provision of a residence permit for smuggled migrants cooperating with authorities should not be considered, in and of itself, to be a measure of assistance to smuggled migrants, if the motivation is solely about tackling smugglers as opposed to providing protection or other assistance measures to smuggled migrants who are vulnerable. IOM

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would therefore recommend a reconsideration of where reference to this issue is made within the Action Plan.

Question 6: Does current EU action against migrant smuggling, including the actions suggested in the Action Plan, strike the correct balance between law enforcement and the human rights of migrants, including particularly vulnerable migrants such as minors and pregnant women?

27. IOM’s view is that the Action Plan focuses on immediate law enforcement actions, such as destroying vessels, building capacity and information sharing between law enforcement agencies and strengthening third country criminal justice responses to smuggling. IOM considers that the protection and vulnerability concerns of smuggled persons could be better addressed in the Action Plan. By further elaborating on these points the Action Plan could more evenly distribute the focus between law enforcement and the human rights of migrants, particularly vulnerable migrants.

28. As noted in point 15 IOM recommends that more emphasis should be given in the Action Plan to reducing deaths and human suffering during, and as a result of, smuggling in order to protect the human rights of migrants. To ensure the Action Plan is fully comprehensive and adequately addresses the human rights of smuggled migrants, IOM advocates for the inclusion of greater detail on the ways in which states can protect and assist vulnerable smuggled migrants, through the provision of access to information and legal representation, the provision of assistance measures, such as hygiene kits, psychological support, temporary shelter, counselling, facilitation of contact with families, as well as and consular and referral services and so forth.

29. The provision of direct assistance and legal counselling to smuggled migrants arriving by land, sea and air should also include the early identification and referral of vulnerable migrants to local authorities and relevant civil society actors and institutions. IOM suggests that this could be included in the Action Plan with specific reference to the key entry routes and the varying needs that vulnerable migrants may have in each route.

30. Additionally specialist support measures could be tailored to address particular vulnerabilities, such as those of unaccompanied migrant children, migrants vulnerable to trafficking and abuse, migrants with health and psychosocial-related needs, as well as persons in need of international protection, in partnership with national authorities and UNHCR.

31. IOM would also advocate for greater clarity within the Action Plan on the nature of migration flows to the EU through smuggling routes in order to draw attention to the

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mixed nature of the flows, including those who are in need of international protection, economic migrants and vulnerable migrants.

32. Finally, it is worth noting that the Action Plan stipulates on page 2 that it “should be seen in connection with the on-going work to establish a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations to systematically identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers”, something that constitutes a new and not yet tested approach to combating migrant smuggling. IOM is extremely concerned about any steps towards the militarisation of migration governance and urges that impacts are carefully analysed to ensure that the protection of smuggled migrants, refugees and asylum seekers is not compromised66.

Question 8: Are the actions proposed in the Action Plan compatible with the international framework on preventing human smuggling, including the UN Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air? Do they add to this framework in a coherent and meaningful manner?

33. The Action Plan only makes reference to the UN Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air under the fourth objective which relates to stronger cooperation with third countries, whereby partner countries are encouraged to become Parties to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Protocol.

34. IOM recommends that an Action Plan addressing an issue such as migrant smuggling could begin by contextualising the international framework and make reference to international provisions throughout the document. This would ensure coherence and consistency between the framework and the Action Plan and allow for a more coordinated EU response that is also embedded in the global response to a phenomenon that affects all countries throughout the world.

35. In this regard IOM would reiterate its recommendation to include a clear definition of smuggling within the Action Plan, in order to allow for compatibility with the UN Protocol to be assessed. As noted above in points 22 and 23 there is currently a lack of full coherence between the definition provided for by the UN and by the EU in the ‘Facilitators Package’; the latter omits the profit element and explicitly excludes mention of assistance to those crossing borders for humanitarian purposes, both of which are integral parts of the UN definition of migrant smuggling.

36. IOM would welcome greater clarity in the definitions used and further consistency with the international framework on combating migrant smuggling, particularly as the Action Plan calls on member states to encourage partner countries to become Parties to the UN Protocol.

66 Ibid, Page 8.

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3 September 2015

126 of 175 Migrants’ Rights Network—Written Evidence

Migrants’ Rights Network—Written Evidence

1. The Migrants' Rights Network (MRN) is a registered charity set up in 2006 to strengthen civil society campaigns and advocacy work in support of a progressive, rights-based approach to immigration. MRN is now a leading UK network on migrants' rights issues, regularly contributing our perspective to public debate through the media and other policy fora. MRN works for an evidence-based conversation on immigration issues, extending across the whole of the public and bringing in Parliamentarians committed to open-minded discussion.

2. MRN has worked on issues related to irregular migration and refugee movement since its inception. Our range of interests and concerns extend to the situation in the European region and we are actively involved in the work of the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, based in Brussels.

3. We have had the advantage of seeing evidence presented to the Committee by Mr Steve Symonds of Amnesty International and to Mr David Mepham of Human Rights Watch. We hope it will assist the brevity of this submission to say that we are in agreement with them.

4. The EU Plan against Migrant Smuggling (“The Plan”) appears overly focussed on policing operations, rather than in addressing the causes of migration movements. The crises in refugee and migration movements that we are seeing in Europe are caused by huge humanitarian crises around the world, particularly those mentioned in Oral Evidence Session No. 3 such as Syria, Somalia, Eritrea, Afghanistan and Libya, but also others. There are no safe, legal routes for refugees to claim asylum within the EU. Within that context a major contribution to the task of reducing smuggling would come from the creation of safe, legal routes into the EU for refugees; making a greater commitment to resettlement across the EU region; and more investment in durable solutions in sending countries, and also in transit countries. However, these solutions will have to approached in a holistic manner, and with serious long-term investment and commitment. The overemphasis on policing in the Plan is at best a distraction from the root causes of the problem, and at worst will increase violations of the rights of those fleeing persecution and seeking sanctuary in the EU.

5. We are particularly concerned that the attitude of the UK government continues to be hostile to those fleeing persecution. We add our voice to those requesting that this Committee question the Prime Minister, and the Immigration Minister on their comments suggesting that the majority of those fleeing across the Mediterranean are ‘economic migrants’, as the evidence clearly shows otherwise.

6. Priority should be given to assisting vulnerable migrants, and ensuring that there are safe legal routes for refugees into the EU.

7. We agree with the points raised in the third oral evidence session around the apparent overemphasis in the policy of an enhanced police or judicial response. Routes into Europe are many and varied, and given the corruption absence of rule of law protections in some relevant countries, forging effective partnerships to police Europe’s borders will

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be extremely difficult if not impossible. The Plan is overconfident in its assumptions around the possibility of more effective enforcement.

8. Smuggling networks are poorly understood, but what we do know, is that they are highly resilient, widely distributed, and the vast majority of actors and facilitators are very easily replaceable. These are not centralised operations capable of being hampered by the arrest of a few key players. Each stage of the journey may involve a person with local knowledge, capable of guiding migrants across a border. They will have contacts at the next stage to recommend, but they will not be dependent upon them. If any link is broken, new ones will be found. If a part of the border is made impassable, a new route will be found, with new guides.

9. Smugglers are not a uniform group, and we are concerned by the blanket characterisation all those who facilitate migrant movements in the Plan, the Agenda, and amongst EU officials and governments as being criminals. For example, the recent Anglo- French ministerial statement calls for action ‘stopping the evil criminal gangs who prey on migrants at every stage of the journey’.67 While there is no question that criminal gangs or individuals, employing brutal measures, do prey on vulnerable migrants, and play a role in smuggling, it is overly simplistic to view all those who facilitate migrant movement over borders as violent or ‘evil’ criminals. Some are motivated by purely humanitarian concerns, such as the old woman who provides food for refugees passing through her village, or the unknown well wishers who put up signs pointing the way to water fountains in hot, dry country.68 Others, while taking money, have a greater concern for the well-being of their passengers, and do not simply treat them as any other cargo . There are undoubtedly arrivals in far better appointed boats - rich Syrians have hired yachts to cross the sea in safety with their children.69 We would be wary of extrapolating the experience of the most vulnerable border-crossers, who are naturally more likely to need rescue and come to the attention of the authorities, to all those who use the services of smugglers.

10. We would recommend that where criminal measures are taken against people smugglers there should be exemptions for all those acting with predominantly humanitarian motives, even if they accept some compensation. For those who are undoubtedly engaged in criminal smuggling activity, account should be taken of any measures smugglers take to improve the safety and well-being of their passengers when considering charging and sentencing. This would incentivise more to avoid the sort of ‘evil’ behaviour decried by the UK and French governments.

11. A very recent study conducted by interviewing new arrivals in Sicily provides good insight into this issue:70

67 Managing Migratory Flows in Calais: Joint Ministerial Declaration on UK/French Co-operation, Calais August 20 2015, http://statewatch.org/news/2015/aug/uk-fr-calais-agreement.pdf 68 http://newirin.irinnews.org/on-the-migration-road-in-macedonia/ 69http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/11554510/The-first-class-refugees-paying- thousands-to-reach-Italy-by-yacht.html 70 Move or Die: Migratory Routes form Sub-Saharan Countries to Europe, MEDU (Medici Per I Diritti Umani), August 2015 (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/aug/eu-medici-per-dirriti-humani-move-or-die-08- 2015.pdf) (emphasis as in original text)

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“The journey to Italy is facilitated by migrant smugglers and criminal groups who can offer various services, from transportation to corruption of border officials. The testimonies collected inside the reception centres in Sicily confirm that the business of migration across the Sahara Desert, Libya and the Mediterranean Sea is comprised of a combination of highly organized smugglers and non professional individuals acting alone, or providing a specific service on a contract basis. Different actors are responsible for organizing different sections of the journey: from the migrants’ home country to Niger or Sudan; from there to Libyan border; from the border to a collection point on the coast; and finally from Libya to Italy across the Mediterranean. The smuggling network has become a loose chain in which even a single individual can enter and exploit the vulnerable migrants, through kidnapping, forced labour or extortion of money. This makes the dismantling of the trafficking network even more challenging for authorities.”

An interview with a smuggler elaborates on the fundamental problem facing policing operations:

“”Who? Where?” asks a friend of Hajj’s when contemplating the potential targets of EU anti-smuggling operations. “No one has the name ‘smuggler’ written on their chest. Anyone here who has no money can sell their apartment, buy a boat, and organise a smuggling trip. By the time of the next trip you’d already have regained half the cost of the apartment. It’s a very easy formula.

12. The extent to which enhanced police operations can have any effect on overall numbers of people crossing into the EU is limited. There is a massive humanitarian crisis taking place near to the EU’s borders, and so far the great majority of refugee movement has been to countries outside the EU. This is likely to continue to be the case. However, many of those countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are at capacity. Libya, which was for a while a refuge, is now far from safe. There will continue to be a great demand for routes into the EU. Given the horrors that people face if they remain where they are, no amount of policing or punishment is going to have a significant impact on their desire and determination to reach safety. We recommend that the Committee considers the full text of the Move or Die report referred to above in its reflections on this point.

13. A great deal of this ground has been covered in the oral evidence sessions by Ms Collett, and by the representatives from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Without rehearsing their evidence, we would like to raise a point that does not seem to be addressed in the Plan, around the EU’s land borders.There is a failure to address the degree of endemic corruption, and an absence of practical rule of law protections in a number of states on the Eastern borders of the EU. Enhanced police response and judicial activity can only have an effect if the police and the judiciary are truly independent, and have the freedom and power to pursue smuggling operations. Unfortunately the EU plan will need to address more clearly what is to be done with regard to states where the police, government officials, and even the judiciary might profit from smuggling operations.

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14. We agree completely with the principle that assistance should be given to vulnerable migrants. However, it is important to recognise that in the absence of safe legal routes into the EU, prevention of smuggling may have the opposite effect. Any prevention measures must be accompanied by strong measures to ensure the safety of those attempting to leave a country. We are concerned that Plan does not put forward concrete proposals as to developing safe, legal routes for asylum seekers. From this, and from the political response that the recent crisis has received, it seems to us likely that politicians will focus on policing measures, and will place insufficient resources into assisting vulnerable migrants. The UK’s position refusing to take part in even the modest plans for relocation set out in the Agenda, is one example of a widespread refusal across countries in Europe to take necessary humanitarian measures. 15. We would welcome any improvement to the gathering and sharing of information about smuggling, providing is done in a manner that respects vulnerable individuals’ rights to privacy. 16. We welcome an increase in cooperation with third countries, providing it is focussed on measures that preserve the rights and improve the conditions of people in those countries. It is not enough to simply pay or otherwise encourage countries to push back potential migrants from EU borders. The EU should be very careful to avoid situations where third countries end up committing human rights abuses against those seeking to enter the EU, pursuant to EU policy. 17. We are concerned by the proposal to give Frontex the power to play a role in returns. We would advocate strongly for placing the onus squarely on European governments to assess asylum or other claims made by individuals. It is essential that tribunals hearing asylum and protection claims are, and are seen to be, completely impartial and diligent in their assessments. Outsourcing this to an inter-governmental border control agency creates an unacceptable conflict of interest, and would cast doubts on the credibility of the EU system. 18. The Plan is not set out in sufficient detail for us to be able to give a proper assessment of its impact on human rights, and particularly the human rights of vulnerable migrants or refugees. However, where policing operations close down relatively safer routes for travel without a corresponding effort to provide safe legal routes and to increase safety and stability in sending countries, the risks will only increase for migrants forced to take more dangerous routes. In these situations it is the most vulnerable who will be most at risk. We have seen this already happen over the past few decades as Europe has developed stronger border controls, and migrants have progressively been driven to use more dangerous routes. A good analysis of this trend can be found in the International Organisation for Migration’s publication Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration, Chapter 3 Tracking Deaths in the Mediterranean.71 19. Finally we acknowledge that many of those involved in people smuggling are violent and abusive. Policing efforts that target and stop these criminals are to be welcomed. However, to the extent that the Plan envisages a reduction in migrants seeking or gaining entry into the EU as a result of these efforts, we believe it is overly optimistic. The only way to reduce smuggling is to ameliorate the push factors that drive people to move, and to provide safety and stability to those who have been displaced.

21 August 2015

71 http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/FatalJourneys_CountingtheUncounted.pdf

130 of 175 Migration Policy Institute Europe and Dr Franck Düvell—Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39)

Migration Policy Institute Europe and Dr Franck Düvell—Oral Evidence (QQ 32-39) Transcript to be found under Dr Franck Düvell

131 of 175 National Crime Agency—Oral Evidence (QQ 40-51)

National Crime Agency—Oral Evidence (QQ 40-51)

Evidence Session No. 5 Heard in Public Questions 40 – 51

Members present

Baroness Prashar (Chairman) Lord Condon Lord Cormack Lord Faulkner of Worcester Baroness Janke Lord Jay of Ewelme Lord Morris of Handsworth Baroness Pinnock Lord Ribeiro Lord Soley Lord Wasserman ______

Examination of Witness

Tom Dowdall, Deputy Director, Border Policing Command, National Crime Agency

Q40 The Chairman: Good morning. Thank you for your time this morning appearing before us. As you know, this session is a public session and it will be broadcast on a webcast. We will send you the transcript in a few days’ time and you can correct it. If there is any additional information you wish to send us, please feel free to do so. Could you please begin by introducing yourself and telling us a little about your job, and if there are any introductory comments that you wish to make?

Tom Dowdall: Thank you very much, Chairman, and thank you to the Committee for inviting me to come along to give evidence today. I would like to help you in every way that I can. I am Tom Dowdall; I am the Deputy Director of the Border Policing Command within the National Crime Agency. That means that I have responsibility essentially for the border-facing operational resources that we have within the agency, so those are the investigators who take forward the investigations and seizures that have been made by Border Force. Where they have seized drugs or other commodities, they are referred to the National Crime Agency for us to proceed and to take further action on. Also, as part of the Border Policing Command, we have a responsibility for co-ordinating the activities of all of the principal border actors involved in law enforcement and control at the border. That is about 20 or so different organisations that have that level of interest. The principal actors of course are the NCA, the police, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and HM Revenue and Customs, but there are a number of other organisations that have an interest as well. The Border Policing Command is one of the operational commands within the National Crime Agency so we have, in addition to that, Child Exploitation and Online Protection

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(CEOP); we have an Economic Crime Command, a Cyber Crime Unit and a central intelligence hub. The Border Policing Command fits in as part of that operational network and, of course, we will support other parts of the agency when the requirement is there to do so, in line with the priorities that have been set strategically by the Home Secretary and operationally by our Director General. Q41 The Chairman: Thank you for that. As you know, we are looking into smuggling. The European Commission intends to transform migrant smuggling networks into high-risk and low-return operations. In your opinion, are the four objectives of the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling the right ones to achieve the goal?

Tom Dowdall: There is certainly synergy in terms of what the objectives of the EU plan are, in comparison to what we are doing within the UK to address the issue of migrant smuggling. The Prime Minister has spoken about breaking the business model, which is very much in line with what the EU is seeking to do as well, and so the synergies for us are the extent to which we are able to build on partner co-operation, both in the UK and overseas. We have quite an extensive international network, which is part of the National Crime Agency, but also networks that are run by the Home Office as well, which work together on this issue. We also have created our task force, which again is a combination of the NCA, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and the CPS. That is really to build a more complete and more dynamic intelligence picture of the problem. It is also to look at the extent to which we can use a range of criminal justice as well as non-criminal justice solutions to address the problem, so looking at things such as vessels of interest as well as subjects of interest, and looking at the extent to which we can focus greater attention on the economic dimensions and the criminal flows of money. We can see quite a synergy between the plan that we have set out here in the UK and the fit with the European plan. What I would add as well, which is quite central to all of this, is the relationship that we have with Europol and our ability to be able to exchange and share intelligence with Europol, and the ability for what we are trying to do here in the UK, which is not separate from what has been set out within the EU plan, but actually the intention is that we are seeking to build upon those existing structures, so things such as Joint Operation Team (JOT) Mare, which Europol has embarked on. Our task force is very much part of being linked to that, contributing directly to it in terms of personnel, but also in terms of intelligence sharing. The Chairman: I hear that there is a synergy between what you are trying to do and what the European agencies are doing, but do you think the objectives are the right ones to achieve the goal? Tom Dowdall: Yes, I think so. They are ambitious objectives. The issue is complex and will not be solved very quickly, but certainly the reason why we have the synergies is that, actually, we think those objectives are right. Lord Wasserman: I have one question. I was going to ask you about the problem. You keep referring, Mr Dowdall, to “the problem”. You are dealing with the problem, but what is the problem that you are dealing with, in simple words of one syllable? What is the problem? Tom Dowdall: The problem we are dealing with is really around understanding and disrupting the crime groups that are involved in the smuggling trade or involved in smuggling migrants. Lord Wasserman: Migrants are a subset of this more general problem?

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Tom Dowdall: No, the focus is on migrants. Having said that, organised crime groups will often look at these issues as commodities. They will look at people, they will look at drugs, they will look at firearms as commodities. Quite often, these crime groups will be involved in a range of activities—not just migration, but also drugs and firearms. What we are looking at here is absolutely around immigration, but it is also understanding some of the operations and the way that the crime groups may seek to operate. Lord Wasserman: More narrowly, if you look at the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling, what is the NCA role in this? How are you working with all these agencies? You mentioned 20 different agencies, and then there are the European agencies. What is your role as the NCA Command? Tom Dowdall: In terms of the EU plan, it is very much around how the NCA, with our UK partners—and I will talk about those relationships in a moment—make sure that we have a coherent UK response that also fits alongside the European plan. For example, what we think is important is that the efforts that we are making fit directly into the work that Europol is undertaking. Our ability to directly share intelligence with Europol in both directions and our ability to help them grow some of the capabilities that they are seeking to put into the Mediterranean now to increase that flow of intelligence coming out of the Mediterranean are important. We have put resources directly into Europol. We have seconded national experts from the UK who are part of that. In addition to that, we are also using our international network—so the NCA international liaison officer network. We are expanding that now, as part of the UK task force, into source and transit countries, so into East Africa, West Africa and North Africa, as well as the transit points coming through Europe, to work with host authorities. Sometimes that relationship is best done in a bilateral way. Sometimes we need to get host nation authority to allow us to be able to operate, but that again allows us to put the information, experience and intelligence we get from our international network into the Europol domain. That is how we are seeking to lead that relationship. In terms of who the UK players are around this, in terms of the task force, the NCA has been charged to create and to lead the task force, but that includes resources from Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and from the Crown Prosecution Service, and equally there is a relationship with police here in the UK as well. Actually, this is about how we bring to bear our collective knowledge, resources and capability. The NCA has a niche capability in terms of some of our specialist resources and intelligence-gathering opportunities. Border Force, for their part, clearly have responsibility as the guardians of the border, but also an ability to collect intelligence. They are deploying debriefing officers as well as the cutters that they have deployed into the Mediterranean, so there is an ability for them to provide intelligence into our intelligence hub, which then we share with Europol. Similarly in terms of Immigration Enforcement and their investigative capability here in the UK, as well as their international network, it is important that they are part of that group. What we have seen is the task force from the UK end needs to be multi-agency. It needs to use the skills and the capability that exist in those organisations, bringing that together, for us then to be able to share directly with Europe, and with Europol principally. Q42 Lord Cormack: Mr Dowdall, since the National Crime Agency was established a couple of years or so ago, what changes have you and your colleagues noticed to the scale and the nature of the package of migrants?

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Tom Dowdall: There have been some changes. One of the quite important features of what we are now doing and what Europe is seeking to do is to build a more complete intelligence picture, so understanding better the flows coming from source countries and how they are flowing into the Mediterranean and beyond. Some of this is not just about changes, but it actually is about filling in some of the gaps that have existed previously. In terms of serious and organised crime, our knowledge—and this is not just the UK, but this is much wider—around things such as drug smuggling is far more mature than some of the knowledge around organised immigration crime. What we are aiming for is an ability to fill that gap. Some of that is catching up over a number of years. Specifically, therefore, in terms of some of the changes that we are seeing, certainly there are some changes around the nationalities. Clearly Syria has featured far more than previously. We are seeing the extent to which migrants are relying upon organised crime groups, who are seeing the opportunity being created by that mass migration and the ability for them to generate money and profit to be able to operate. We have also seen, over the last year, just the volume of numbers coming through both the central Mediterranean, as well as the eastern Mediterranean. Closer to home, in recent years we have seen a growth in some of the migrant numbers that we now see in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Lord Cormack: We have heard these words “organised crime” a number of times during our evidence sessions. I appreciate you cannot give an absolute answer here, but how much UK national involvement is there in this? Tom Dowdall: There is some UK involvement, or there is some nexus that involves the UK, but, actually, it is a much broader issue. The nature of the organised criminality, when I go back to my drugs analogy again, in terms of organised crime gangs involved in drugs, is that you will have individuals who make a long-term investment in the movement of that commodity. They will look to control it almost from A to Z. The nature of the organised criminality in terms of illegal migration is far more compartmentalised. Of course, there is a degree of organisation, but quite often, the decisions around how the organised crime groups operate are taken by the migrants themselves, who will embark on their journey. Sometimes, they will embark on their journey quite legally; sometimes it may well be a bus ride across a border. It may well be some time, some hundred miles, before they first come into contact with a facilitator or someone who will arrange travel movements or safe houses, or things like movement through a desert, which happens when individuals on the west side get into Mali and Niger, and then on the east side into the Sudan. Sometimes the organised criminality starts to operate from them onwards. The individuals may then work their way into the Mediterranean and then into Europe. The nature of that criminality is cellular so, while there are connections between criminals on the supply chain, quite often these groups may well be relatively self-contained. Lord Cormack: There was a lot of evidence a few years ago, when I was conducting an inquiry into organised crime in the UK and Northern Ireland in particular, of the activities of former paramilitaries. Do you believe that there is much involvement of those who used to be deploying their nefarious talents in terrorism within the UK? Do you think there is any evidence of their involvement in this? Tom Dowdall: There is a wide group of individuals who will take the opportunity to be involved in this criminality. I would not say there is strong evidence to show how people may have moved into terrorism. The possibility exists, given the growth of this crime area and given the opportunities that may well present themselves to individuals.

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Q43 Lord Soley: I would like to get a better grasp of the business model bit. You referred to a “business model”. With the sudden dramatic increase of people moving to Europe, clearly, if you are doing it as a business model, demand goes up, so you increase your supply. Presumably that is your main focus, but also, all around the edges of that, there will be ordinary people who have boats who are being offered money, or indeed a group of people who club together and buy an inflatable in order to get from Turkey to Lesbos, for example. I am not quite sure how you distinguish all of this. Within them of course, there are migrants, but there are also refugees. I am not quite sure how you tease this out. Are you focusing mainly on the large organised smuggling groups, who will increase their activities because demand has increased, or are you also focusing on this incredible explosion of people coming by every means they can manage, some of which might be organised, some of which might be extremely disorganised?

Tom Dowdall: You have described the complexity very well there. What we cannot do is just focus on one aspect of it and completely ignore another. Whilst we clearly have an interest in those who may well be at the higher end of sophistication and our ability to disrupt them, to penetrate and to collect intelligence on them, clearly our law enforcement means of operating and dealing with those groups is quite different to how we would deal with others. Some of this is around making sure that, first of all, the basic building blocks of intelligence-gathering are there and in place. What I mean by that is straightforward intelligence-gathering, such as debriefing and debriefing close to where the action is taking place, so debriefing within the Mediterranean and as far upstream as we possibly can. That will help us to understand the nature of how much of this is opportunistic and how much of this is a more gold-standard service that might be offered in certain instances. As well, the disruptions that we can put in place will differ from group to group. Understanding the nature is important, as is understanding how we can disrupt, so what we can do against organised crime groups. Similarly, in terms of those who are more opportunistic, one issue that we are focusing our attention on is both vessels as well as subjects of interest. We want to be able to monitor vessels. We want to be able to take action, and we are taking action, with our partners in the Mediterranean, to prevent some of these ships and boats from actually being used. We are also looking at the extent to which we can start to build other disruptive elements around what it is that either the opportunistic criminal or the more organised criminal may well have access to, in terms of assets like boats of all sorts of descriptions. How can we start preventing and denying access to some of those? We have activity that is taking place around that. We are also looking at the social media aspects, the extent to which we can, again, disrupt crime groups—I say crime groups, and I mean everything from those who are at the very lower end up to the higher end—and the extent to which we can understand how they are using social media and how we can use that for both intelligence-gathering purposes, but also how we use it in terms of disruption elements as well. It is criminal justice as well as non-criminal justice sanctions that we are seeking to deploy.

Lord Soley: With the organised crime individual or gang doing it, if they bring a boat-load across of migrants from safe countries who are looking for work, but their next boat brings a group of refugees from the war zone in Syria, how do you make a judgment on that? Tom Dowdall: That judgment will obviously be made by the host country, however that vessel is being encountered.

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Lord Soley: You do not distinguish between the refugee and migrant. You are not expected to. This is not a criticism; I am asking to understand better. A smuggler might actually switch from one to the other quite readily. Tom Dowdall: They might do. We would look for the criminality and we would look to identify how these individuals are exploiting whomever it is that they are coming into contact with. Q44 Lord Jay of Ewelme: I just want to come in briefly, following on the question from Lord Cormack. It is related to Calais. There has been quite a lot in the press recently about criminal gangs, facilitators in the jungle in Calais, with cars with British number plates. Is this true? Are these people opportunists, who suddenly see an opportunity to be exploited, or are these, as it were, a collection of criminal gangs operating elsewhere that see that this is the place to get money over the next few months? Do you have any sense of who they are?

Tom Dowdall: Some of the specific issues that you raise are issues that are under investigation, so I can speak in broader terms. With Calais, as with anywhere else, the nature of the criminality will vary. It will vary from those who are organised and may well seek to find ways into the UK using more sophisticated means. There is a range of things that they could do. They will charge a price for that. That comes at a particular premium. Much of what you see within Calais is individuals who may well not have access to those kinds of funds. Actually, getting to the UK is quite difficult and quite expensive. In many cases, with these individuals who get to Calais, as you can see from the large numbers of people or groups who have been trying to penetrate fences, railway lines, et cetera, that this is disorganised activity. This is around trying to storm fences and that kind of thing. What you see in Calais, at least at the stage from Calais on to the UK, is lower-level activity, and lower-level criminality and support. Anything more sophisticated, by its nature, will be less evident. Baroness Janke: You referred earlier to having a coherent response that fits alongside the European plan. I just wondered how you feel the European actions on this are helping broader international co-operation on this issue. What is your assessment of that? Tom Dowdall: Is this specifically around the intelligence? Baroness Janke: It is along the whole issue of migrant smuggling. Tom Dowdall: The important features that I would emphasise are that all the principal actors, and by that I mean the states in Europe that are part of that migration trail, are readily sharing intelligence with Europol and that, in turn, Europol is therefore able to produce a more comprehensive and complete picture to understand not only how the flows are working but who the criminal groups are involved around that. That is important in terms of getting that cohesion among member states. There are some important elements of that that we need to make sure are resolved—the ability of Frontex, for example, to share debriefing material and personal data that they collect with Europol, which in turn can share that with law enforcement across the member states so that we can take action on that. I know there is work in hand to put that in place. That ability to share that is important, as is using the bilateral arrangements that we have, where we can. We have strong bilateral arrangements and relationships with countries outside of Europe, where we have had the ability to deploy our international assets and other countries are doing similarly. Again, bringing that intelligence and information back into Europol, for me, is key for us to be able to successfully undermine the organised crime groups.

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Baroness Janke: Do you feel there are more things that could be done to improve that position? Are the differences of view coming out from some of the European members having practical implications for your operation? Do you feel there are recommendations that one could make or suggestions as to how this could be improved? Tom Dowdall: I will speak to this as a law enforcement professional. As I say, the important element is this ability for states that are all on that route to be able to collect as clear and coherent a picture as possible and to share that. Sometimes that may well be a mixed picture. Some states are better than others at being able to do that. That sharing of information and intelligence is key. What I mean by that is that this is simple, relatively low-level intelligence. This is not of a highly sophisticated nature. The starting point has to be our ability to effectively debrief those who have encountered either the migrants themselves or the criminals that are arrested, so that we are able to understand if there is a UK dimension, for example, or a French dimension, which we would work through with our colleagues in France. Those are the areas. That ability to share is hugely important. Baroness Janke: You have told us that there is quite a lot more to be done in that area. Tom Dowdall: I think good progress has been made, and more can be done as we go forward. Baroness Pinnock: Can I expand on that? The Chairman: You can, yes. Baroness Pinnock: I wonder if you could make a judgment as to whether, given the increasing scale of the challenge, there are sufficient resources being allocated to both Europol and to the NCA to meet the escalating scale of the task that you have been given. Tom Dowdall: In terms of Europol, it is probably a question to give to Rob Wainwright, in terms of what he thinks he has at his disposal to be able to undertake that. From a UK perspective, we can see the benefit now from the investment into the UK task force, the 90-strong task force for which we had funding committed from the end of July. We are in the process of assembling and putting in place that team now. It is operational now and more of that team are coming on board, even over the next few weeks. Within the NCA, we have the ability to flex to meet the priorities that essentially are determined across law enforcement. We do not have static resources in the NCA. If we see organised immigration crime, and specifically people-smuggling, as being an area of risk, we can flex that resource to be able to focus attention on all of that. It is difficult to anticipate as we go forward. This is not an issue that is going to be resolved in months. What we have to build and plan for now is an enduring law enforcement response that is able, over time, to make sure that we a) understand the picture better, and b) are developing, as we go forward, through that knowledge, more creative criminal justice disruptions, economic disruptions in terms of flows of money and denial of resources. That will be quite important for us as we go forward. For us, it is about the durability of what it is that we are putting in place now. Q45 Lord Faulkner of Worcester: You are talking quite rightly about illegal activity by people organising smuggling and trafficking. Do you recognise any activity, by organisations or individuals, to assist people to move from one country to another to be legitimate and legal?

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Tom Dowdall: We are focusing on the organised criminality end of this. If we are to understand what that means, it is about the exploitation of individuals. Separately there may well be people who are legitimately travelling from place to place, from country to country. Lord Faulkner of Worcester: And being helped? Tom Dowdall: Where people are legitimately travelling and using the transport networks at their disposal, that is one element of it. From a law enforcement perspective, our focus of attention has to be on those who are seeking to exploit individuals. These are groups that are charging significant amounts of money to these individuals and to their families, indebting them for some period of time. We can make a very clear distinction. A lot of the organised immigration criminality involves transportation and the movement of people, be it in taxis, be it in lorries or whatever that happens to be. There are a number of issues with that. First of all, there are significant threat-to-life issues, depending upon the mode of transport that people have taken on, and actually there is a charge that is levied by these individuals that is completely disproportionate to any kind of service that would be provided. For us, that is very clear. I do not think that that in any way could be described as legitimate assistance. The Chairman: May I probe something a little further on the question of co-operation and co-ordination? In your written evidence, you say that this might extend to operational matters and joint investigations. Can you say a little more about that, please? Tom Dowdall: The 90-strong operational team that we are putting in place is a combination of overseas assets, who will work with host authorities, as I described earlier on. It is also around building more resource and capability into our intelligence network here in the UK, but part of it as well is creating an investigative capability. The investigative capability has several functions. Clearly, where there is a UK nexus to the criminality, this will be the resource that will undertake the investigations into that criminality. They may well be working with partners, so it may well be something that is done in conjunction with the police, with Immigration Enforcement or any other UK authority. They will also assist in terms of some of the other disruptive activity that we think we can put in place. If we are identifying vessels of interest, we can identify where those vessels are, what flag those vessels bear, and we can work with hosts and others to start to seek to deny access to those vessels, take action to test their seaworthiness, for example, and seek to be able to prevent their use. We would also use that investigative capability, where we are able, to support other member states in terms of their investigations. The central nerve of an organised crime group may well be in another state. We would undertake work here in the UK, as evidenced by recent press reports of individuals, who we had identified in work that we had done with Belgian and French colleagues, who had been returned to Belgium under a European Arrest Warrant. They had been involved in, we assess, moving anything like up to 200 migrants into the UK, so it can work with overseas assets as well. The last point I would make is that the relationship we have with France in particular, but also with Belgium and the Netherlands, is quite important and fundamental to us as well. As part of our task force, we have an officer embedded with our French colleagues, OCRIEST, who are their equivalent in France for organised immigration crime investigations. That has allowed us to be able to share intelligence between the UK and France, for us to be able to undertake activity on individuals the French have identified who are here in the UK, and vice versa. Similarly, we are taking forward, with Border Force colleagues and Immigration Enforcement in particular, work with Dutch and Belgian colleagues.

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What is quite important in what we do here is that the task force is looking at the whole end to end. We are trying to see what happens at source and at transit into the Mediterranean, but similarly we are also looking to see the impact and the connections with Calais and the near continent. What we do not want to do is to compartmentalise the issues, so that we do not come up with an answer that addresses the Calais problem, only to find that the organised crime groups can operate flexibly and start moving further down the coast or further up into Belgium and the Netherlands. From my experience, something like 3,000-plus HGVs going through Calais every day and services that are operating at 30 to 40-minute intervals is attractive for the larger numbers, but we have seen evidence and we have intercepted groups who have tried to penetrate from the Hook of Holland up the east coast and some evidence of where individuals have come through on the south coast as well, in much smaller numbers than those we see in Calais but, actually, they tend to be the more organised end of it as well, because it takes quite a bit of organisation to come through some of those areas and you will pay more money in order to do that. That investigative capability is really pulling together with our colleagues that activity. Q46 Lord Jay of Ewelme: You have already talked quite a bit about intelligence sharing and the importance of intelligence sharing. You have talked about the need for a complete dynamic picture of migrant smuggling, the need for an intelligence hub and the importance of co-operation, in particular with Europol. We have also had evidence from Mr Düvell, an Oxford academic, who talked about intelligence or information exchange. “What we have is a mess. I have an A4 list of agencies, institutions, programmes and intelligence-gathering mechanisms, at EU level and UN level”, and so on. My question is: from your point of view, do you feel you are looking through a kind of fog, or with clarity at what is going on? What are the key intelligence relationships, as far as you are concerned, and how effective are they?

Tom Dowdall: I have some sympathy with the contention that there are lots of people out there who have badged in some way a kind of intelligence interest. What has been quite important in creating the task force, for example, is that we have gone to great pains to say that we want to build on what already exists. We want to build on the work that Europol is doing, principally through JOT Mare and Focal Point Checkpoint. We do not want to create a new intelligence hopper that we start to put intelligence in, which avoids in some way what we are trying to put into Europol. There are some really important blocks here, which I think we have made real progress in putting in place. Part of that is getting a focal point in the Mediterranean, so the creation of the capability that we are working with Europol and the Italians to put in place in Sicily, and I know that Europol has plans for other hot spots as well. Having intelligence-gathering close to the action is really important. Having a single point of contact here in the UK, which has that relationship with Europol, is similarly of importance. What we have done within the National Crime Agency intelligence hub is to now have NCA, Border Force and Immigration Enforcement intelligence officers working together. They still wear the cap badge of their organisations and bring the experience and knowledge of their organisations in there, but it is really important that we are able to make sure that, when we get that intelligence, we interpret it in the right way and come up with the right set of disruptions, be they protective security work, which Border Force may take forward, or more investigative work. We are then using the bilateral relationships that we are putting in place in the source countries, bringing that intelligence back into that single multi-agency intelligence hub in the

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UK, which we can then act upon where there is a UK end to it, but sharing that with Europol in all instances, and, importantly, having strong bilateral arrangements, particularly with the French but with some other member states as well. I think we are on the way to simplifying that system and process, but still think it is going to take a little bit of time, particularly the further we get away from the UK, seeing the appetite that exists for lots of host nations to be looking to collect intelligence to understand what it means for them, given the extent of the problem at the moment. For me, it is about multi-agency hubs nationally, as well as internationally, and the ability then to effectively share that intelligence and to be able to connect our investigative teams in order to take forward, where necessary, joint investigations, but certainly the sharing of investigative evidence and intelligence, where we are able to do so. Lord Jay of Ewelme: The impression you give is that you think things are quite a bit better than they were, but have some way to go until they provide you with the hubs of intelligence you really need. Tom Dowdall: I think that there is a greater intent by international partners, as well as the work we are doing here in the UK, to simplify what has existed previously. The intent is there and it is important. There are discussions, at both the political and the operational level, with some of our key partners along that migration route. Through that, there is a shared view and intent in terms of how we would go about collecting some of that intelligence. Everybody grasps the importance of people-smuggling and organised immigration crime. There are not that many people whom you need to convince any longer that, actually, it is quite important for law enforcement to step up to do what it needs to do. A while back, you may well have had a more difficult conversation to try to persuade others; I do not think that exists any longer. That intent is there. That plan in place, both nationally and with European colleagues, is there. We are now starting to see some operational results coming out of that. The task force received funding before the end of July, so we very quickly looked to build that team. We have already posted a number of our international officers as part of that task force. My point at the very outset is that this is an enduring issue and we need to make sure that what we are putting in place actually has the ability to address the right set of problems and ensure that we have effective building blocks. Intelligence sharing is the really important effective building block that we need to have in place. Q47 Lord Ribeiro: Do you agree with the Director of Europol that, to date, the European response to migrant smuggling has been more on enforcing border controls than actually on enforcing the law enforcement element? I have in mind that there has been a great change, where the focus has been on Greece and Italy at the bottom end, and now suddenly we are seeing this huge movement coming through the Balkans, providing opportunities for Albanian gangs and others who are obviously exploiting the new route.

Tom Dowdall: The Director of Intelligence for Europol probably has that broader view across member states, in terms of that balance between border control and criminality. From our perspective, what we have welcomed has been the growth and focus on the serious and organised crime element of illegal migration. The two issues clearly go hand in hand, in terms of effective border controls, as part of the disruptive elements that need to be put in place.

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It is important that we understand how the risk is changing dynamically, as you quite rightly say. Whilst the media coverage has shown the movement from Libya to Italy, actually, when it comes to the UK, the biggest risk for us has been from Turkey through to Greece. That is where we see the evidence of the number of migrants coming to the UK, who have often taken that route. The route through the Balkans is not new either. It is something that has been used in time. As well, we have seen evidence that this is not just about people who are moving across the Mediterranean. We have seen evidence where groups of individuals have been flown as far away as Moscow, then flown into the near continent and then put on trucks to come to the UK. There will be a whole host of different methodologies that are put in place to do that. Back to my previous answer, what we have seen is this greater intent from law enforcement across Europe, through Europol as well as bilaterally, in terms of what the focused effort needs now to be around organised immigration crime, the complexity of dealing with opportunistic criminality, as well as also getting under the skin of those who are operating at the more sophisticated end. Lord Ribeiro: The Action Plan makes a point about prevention of smuggling. One of the things that you cover very well in your partnership work in your paper, internationally, is the collaboration you have developed overseas. I am thinking particularly in the sub-Saharan context, with the transit camps in Chad, Kenya, Ethiopia and so forth. Where is the penetration of Europol working with the organisation of the African Union to try to get intelligence in those camps to try to prevent the smugglers? The camps are a very good source of business for the smugglers in identifying people to move on. Tom Dowdall: You are quite right. The intelligence collection plan has to be what we can get from source countries, as well as through transit, as well as what we get at this end. What we have learned from our experience with our international network has been building those co-operative relationships with host authorities, being able to put in place with them some very clear asks and requirements, so that they can support our activities, no matter what the criminality or the crime types involved. Certainly, we are keen to share our experience with Europol and with other countries as well, in terms of being able to cement those intelligence plans. I would say that some of the experience of debriefing—I was at Europol just over a week ago, so from some of my conversations with Europol there—is that getting some of the intelligence from the migrants would clearly differ from place to place. Clearly, where migrants feel that they are under some duress or coercion from smugglers, the quality of that intelligence that we get may not be so great. Similarly where migrants may well feel that they still have further to go, they still need to access smugglers, so, again, the quality of any debriefing and intelligence we might get may not be quite as effective. Some of the most effective intelligence we get is often from those who have completed the journey, because they will feel less at risk from the smugglers. They may well have a view about the experience that they have had during that period of time. It is quite important that our collection plan needs to ensure we are getting intelligence from the source countries. That may well be from the camps, but, equally, it may well be, and it needs to be, from the host law enforcement that we are dealing with. In some instances, we have to build capacity to provide us with the means by which we can access or create that intelligence in the first place, as well as what we need to put in place in transit countries. Again, the debriefing effort that we are encouraging Europol to take forward, and which we are putting in place in the Mediterranean area, is important and clearly has a dividend closer

142 of 175 National Crime Agency—Oral Evidence (QQ 40-51) to home, either on the near continent or here in the UK. The collection plan needs to embrace that whole end-to-end part of the journey, so that we can just assess the veracity of the intelligence we are getting. Lord Ribeiro: Finally, if Europe decides to open its doors much more, in the way Germany has suggested, do you think there is a danger that one might take one’s eye off the intelligence side of it, because a door has been opened? Tom Dowdall: It is important that we do not take our eye off that, quite frankly. Do I think that will happen? I do not know really, at this stage, to be perfectly frank. I do not think that whatever decisions may well have been taken in Europe in recent days detract from what law enforcement is doing, in all of these countries, against the smugglers and against those who are seeking to exploit. I would make a distinction between decisions that might be taken that may allow movement of people within the Schengen area, for example, and the intent of law enforcement in those countries to continue to pursue the criminal gangs and criminal networks. We only have to look at what happened on the Austria/Hungary border with the vehicle two weeks ago. That really serves as a reminder that, actually, I do not really see that my law enforcement colleagues, either in Europol or in other parts of Europe, will take their foot off the gas. Q48 Lord Soley: Law enforcement requires, at the end of the day, legal cases and prosecutions. Do you have any information available about successful or unsuccessful cases that have come as a result of your activities, or is this just left to the individual countries? Do you have any assessment at all of the success of prosecutions?

Tom Dowdall: Where the UK has been involved, then clearly we can share some of that with you, and I am happy to do so in writing. The Chairman: It would be very helpful if you could send us that in writing, please. Tom Dowdall: As far as European partners are concerned, certainly my understanding is that Europol themselves are putting reports in place around the success of JOT Mare and the progress around JOT Mare. We would need to see how much of that is put into the public domain or not, but again we can either pose questions directly, or the Committee may want to ask that question directly of Europol as well. Lord Soley: Presumably it would help you and your colleagues in other countries to know how successful prosecutions have been. Tom Dowdall: Take the close relationship that we have with the French, for example, at the moment, where the intelligence that we are sharing in both directions will help to underpin prosecutions that have been taking place in both cases, or in the case I mentioned earlier of the individuals who were moved under European Arrest Warrant to Belgium and then subsequently prosecuted. There are certainly good examples that we have and which I would be happy to share. Q49 Lord Morris of Handsworth: Mr Dowdall, do forgive me if I am wrong in my assumptions here, but I get the impression that the agency is running very hard, with a lot of effort, but is still behind the curve, in terms of moving not just the debate but the activities that follow. I am reinforced in this because the Action Plan reinforces the importance of financial intelligence-gathering and co-operation. It is at something of a late stage that it is introducing new measures now to deal with smugglers’ online activities. One would have thought that this would have been built in at the start of the problem. My question is:

143 of 175 National Crime Agency—Oral Evidence (QQ 40-51) should more resources be invested in either or both of these aspects of tackling migrant smuggling, at national and EU level? Do you have a resource problem?

Tom Dowdall: At EU level within the work that Europol is undertaking through the Joint Operation Team Mare, they have a dedicated team that they have now built, which we, the UK, wish to contribute to around financial investigations and understanding how the money is flowing. Similarly, for some months now, they have had a social media team in place, looking to build intelligence and to undertake disruptions around social media. From the UK perspective, we have within the NCA, with partners in both the public and the private sector, a Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce. That covers the whole range of financial crime, but it is important, given that we bring together the principal financial institutions here in the UK, as well as law enforcement, so we are able to share the kinds of issues, concerns and requirements that we might want to place upon the private sector. The support that we have had so far has been important around that. We have shared with this group, the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce, information and requirements around financial flows, flows of money. Of course, it represents difficulties, because some of that financial flow does not involve the UK at all. Some of that money is not moving into the UK, so there are limited opportunities, but there are opportunities nevertheless and there are areas that we are exploring at the moment. I said earlier on that there are some intelligence gaps. One of those intelligence gaps is really understanding those financial flows well enough. Those gaps exist not just here, in terms of our knowledge here in the UK, but in the knowledge that exists in Europe and, I dare say, further afield as well. This comes back to catching up on what we have done in other crime areas, such as drugs, for example. It is filling that gap, bridging that gap. Because of the nature of the criminality and because that criminality is compartmentalised, some of those financial flows are actually quite localised and do not necessarily touch the international banking systems. It is complex and really difficult to get under the skin of that. Where we are able to, we are now progressing that. In terms of social media, I would say that, at both European as well as national level, it is quite a key component of the task force work that we are doing here in the UK and in the work that European colleagues are doing as well. We are seeing the extent to which some crime groups are using social media to communicate and engage with individuals. Sometimes that is a very simple message saying that there is a vessel leaving in two hours’ time if you make your way to a particular location. Sometimes it is something that is longer term, where crime groups are putting information out there, essentially selling their services. We are looking to use that for an intelligence-gathering purpose, but also where we can actually disrupt those social media outlets, by taking down those sites or other action that we might take. As well, the nature of the criminality over time has changed, even in such a short space of time. Actually, the exploitation of social media is not necessarily that long a phenomenon. In terms of the way the crime groups are operating quickly, our ability to respond quickly and understand how they are exploiting social media is growing as well. Lord Morris of Handsworth: Do you think you have the resources necessary to produce results in proportion to the problem that you have analysed? Tom Dowdall: The investment that has been made in the task force is going a long way to providing the core of how we respond to the overall problem. What we will need to ensure around that is that broader law enforcement, be it policing or other parts of the Home

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Office Border Force and Immigration Enforcement, has an ability to respond to the disruption opportunities that come out of the task force. The task force is there to lead the way. It is there to provide that critical mass of how we deal with the problem but, clearly, that is not the only resource that will be deployed. That is how we would deal with crime anyway. If it is a priority for UK law enforcement, then it would require the involvement of the other players to be part of that. Q50 Lord Condon: Thank you very much for your evidence so far. Could I just develop a little more the role of the task force? Against the very dramatic escalation of the size of the problem over the last couple of months—and you yourself have said it is going to be an enduring problem, so we are talking years that this is going to be a major problem for policymakers, nationally and internationally—could you give us more of a feel for how the Organised Immigration Crime Task Force is being built up? It could be argued it is a relatively modest investment. You are talking about getting up to 90 people; when will all those 90 people be fully operational?

What will be the top one, two or three tasks they should immediately be taking on, and how will you, the other agencies and outsiders get a feel for the performance criteria? What are the things we should be looking at to make a judgment around whether that task force is actually succeeding or not? When will it be operational, how will it be co-ordinated and what are the performance criteria that you think we should be looking at? Tom Dowdall: The task force is a 90-strong task force incorporating the NCA, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and the CPS. That task force involves the deployment of overseas assets into source transit countries, as well as into Europol. Lord Condon: Are those named individuals who are working with them now or are they still to be recruited? Tom Dowdall: They are there. Lord Condon: Those 90 are up and running? Tom Dowdall: No. In terms of the international assets, we have put most of those in place in those countries. That has been difficult. Well, that is always a difficult thing to address, because we are working through host nation authority and other issues. To move where we have moved from July through to now to get those individuals actually located in those countries around the world has been a success. In terms of the wider team, a number of those resources are now in place. The remainder of those resources will be in place in a matter of weeks. Lord Condon: Percentage terms to 100% completion? Tom Dowdall: In percentage terms, we pretty much have almost all of our overseas assets in place. In terms of what we are looking to put in place in the UK, in the next few weeks, I think we will be at or almost at 100%. Even in the intervening time, even in those areas where we are bringing in new resources, that work is currently being undertaken, so the task force is operational at this point in time. Lord Condon: In terms of performance criteria, how we will know they are making progress? Tom Dowdall: In terms of what it is we are seeking for the task force to undertake, it is partly intelligence-gathering, the identification of both individuals and vessels of interest and for us to be able to identify and therefore take disruptive action against either or both. It is also in terms of our ability to identify and seize the assets of the criminal groups, so that

145 of 175 National Crime Agency—Oral Evidence (QQ 40-51) would be in terms of the financial investigation work that we would seek to undertake. It is about disrupting activities, either through arrests or through other interventions that we might undertake, including the denial of assets, including the prevention of using unseaworthy vessels. It is our ability to put in place effective debriefing arrangements within the Mediterranean, and the intelligence and the information that we share with Europol. Lord Condon: In terms of comparative data, if we ask you in a year’s time to compare what you were achieving then to what you are just starting to achieve now, will there be comparative numerical data? Tom Dowdall: Part of the success would be that we understand the intelligence picture far better than we had previously, there are fewer intelligence gaps and, where we have identified those gaps, that we have sought to fill them. It would be in those areas. We will be able to compare where there have been prosecutions here in the UK, which have directly related to the work that we have done in the Mediterranean, and we can directly draw a comparison between activity that took place before the task force and activity that has taken place since then. Equally, where we have been able to put in place other disruptions, we will be able to compare actions that we have done around unseaworthy vessels, which is work that we are doing with private-sector partners and bodies such as the IOM to look at some of the maritime arrangements that exist. We will be able to show and to quantify those disruptions and therefore be able to ultimately preserve life. Lord Condon: How is the task force monitored at the most senior level within the four agencies, at DPP level or at Director General level in your own organisation? How hands-on have they been and will they be in the notion of getting the task force up and running and keeping that momentum going? Tom Dowdall: The task force and the work to create what is being delivered through the task force is being reported on and discussed at the highest levels, including the National Security Council, which is where some of the original tasking actually came from for the task force. We will be reporting performance, as well as reporting how we use the money that has been allocated for our work through the NSC, but also directly with Ministers. Underneath that, we have a gold group structure that has been created, multi-agency, to both deliver the capability as well as ensure that the performance and the objectives are being delivered. Lord Condon: Who is the gold commander? Tom Dowdall: I am the gold lead for this piece of work, but my responsibility then is to report directly to the NCA board and to the Home Office and all of the partner agencies that are involved. There is an architecture in place that involves oversight and reporting, both to Ministers, as well as at DG level. The Chairman: In your opinion, is it an effective architecture? Does it work? Tom Dowdall: We have the funding. We are well on the way to putting in place the team. So far, what has been really important is seeing the extent to which there is a clear interest and oversight from NSC level downwards. Actually, I think it has been effective and it allows us to move quickly to put in place what it is that the Prime Minister set us to deliver in the first instance. Q51 Lord Cormack: It is just a very brief question and all I am seeking is a reassurance. You have an enormous task. We have sympathy with what you are seeking to do and of course want to see that it is as effective as possible. We all have enormous sympathy for these poor refugees and an understanding of economic migrants, but can you reassure the

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Committee that sufficient priority is being attached to try to establish how many are infiltrating, because some certainly will be, into the refugee groups and the migrant groups, whose intentions might not be honourable or decent, in other words terrorists and those who would support the evil ISIS and all the rest of it? Are you devoting sufficient attention to try to identify any such elements?

Tom Dowdall: We are working closely with our counter-terrorism colleagues on this issue. While in terms of dealing with the criminality side, it is a serious and organised crime issue, we are alive to the fact of where there are other threats and are ensuring we have close co-operation and close work with our colleagues who lead on those other areas. We are not looking at this simply in a myopic way. The Chairman: On behalf of the Committee, can I thank you very much indeed for very comprehensive answers? If you can, send us the written information about the investigations that Lord Soley asked for. If on reflection there is anything further that you think would assist us with our inquiry, we would be very grateful to receive it. Thank you very much indeed. Tom Dowdall: Thank you very much. Thank you for the welcome. I hope I have been of help.

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National Crime Agency—Written Evidence This is the National Crime Agency’s (NCA) response to the call for evidence from the House of Lords Inquiry into the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling. A background note on the role of the NCA is at Annex A.

1. Migrant smuggling into and across the EU requires a comprehensive, cross-governmental response. The NCA’s role is leading the UK law enforcement element of this focusing on tackling the Organised Crime Groups involved in illegal migration. 2. The EU Action Plan on Migrant Smuggling’s goal of transforming the criminal aspects of migrant smuggling into a ‘high risk, low return’ enterprise is congruent with the objective the Prime Minister has set UK law enforcement: breaking the business model of the OCGs involved in this trade. 3. Similarly, the UK law enforcement response mirrors those EU Action Plan objectives that apply to law enforcement: enhanced police and judicial response, improved gathering and sharing of information, and stronger cooperation with third countries. Joint Ministerial Declaration on UK/French Co-operation 4. On 20 August 2015 the Home Secretary visited Calais to meet her French counterpart Bernard Cazeneuve. During the visit it was announced that there would be greater collaboration between French and British law enforcement agencies in respect of irregular migration. This includes officers from the UK being based in a new command and control centre alongside their French counterparts, and Border Force personnel. The role of the NCA 1. The NCA works in close collaboration with partners to undertake activity against Organised Immigration Crime. Recently, in response to the assessed increased threat from greater number of migrants entering the EU, and the increase in numbers of migrants in Calais, the NCA has enhanced its response. For example we have established a multi-agency intelligence cell to coordinate all intelligence relating to the current migrant pressures in France in order to establish a single threat picture. Organised Immigration Crime Threat Group 2. The NCA organises the Organised Immigration Crime Threat Group, which brings together a range of law enforcement and other partners in collaboration to work against a mutually agreed Strategic Action Plan against the threat, assessed as a national priority. Due to the size and diversity of the Organised Immigration Crime Threat, the Strategic Action Plan is divided into four streams of activity, each with their own lead and regular meetings to ensure collaborative effort and progress: • Facilitation by air, land and sea; • Clandestine entry; • Use of false documentation; and, • Abuse of legitimate entry.

3. The Organised Immigration Crime Threat Group meets regularly to: review the multi agency intelligence fed threat picture of Serious and Organised Crime (produced by the NCA); and, review activity undertaken by a number of stakeholder agencies against that threat, in respect of assessing sufficiency and impact. Organised Immigration Crime Taskforce 4. The NCA-led response has also involved the creation of an Organised Immigration Crime Taskforce, involving colleagues from Border Force, Immigration Enforcement, and the Crown Prosecution Service. The Taskforce has the dual objectives of: delivering a rapid tactical response that clearly demonstrates the UK’s intent to

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target the Organised Crime Groups involved in illegal migration; and, translating this into longer term enduring successes through sustained disruptions and local capacity building. Funding for the Taskforce, for the current financial year, was agreed in mid- July 2015. 5. Officers in the 90-strong Taskforce will be based in key source and transit countries, as well as in the UK. They will be focused on Organised Immigration Crime in the Mediterranean and will: gather intelligence; identify and pursue the criminal groups, disrupting their activities; identify and seize the assets of criminal groups; and, wherever possible, prosecute them. 6. The Taskforce will include a dedicated team of experienced NCA and Immigration Enforcement investigators, supported by financial investigation experts, based in the NCA’s National Intelligence Hub. This team will specifically develop investigative opportunities. Officers are also being embedded in the National Maritime Information Centre to develop and monitor intelligence around vessels suspected of being used by Organised Crime Groups. Partnership working – internationally 7. The transnational nature of the Organised Immigration Crime threat means that effective cooperation with a range of international partners is central to any response. In particular, the NCA is working closely with Europol to enrich the overall intelligence picture. We have deployed officers to the Europol Joint Operational Team (JOT Mare) in The Hague and the Europol Intelligence Cell in Sicily. We also have officers working alongside FRONTEX, debriefing migrants to gather all intelligence we can, feeding this back into JOT Mare and our own National Intelligence Hub. In time, this cooperation will extend into operational coordination and joint investigations. 8. The NCA has a strong working relationship with the French OCRIEST. Border Force similarly works closely with the French PAF (Police aux Frontier). 9. The NCA has an extensive Liaison Officer network; officers work closely with their host country against Serious and Organised Crime threats including Organised Immigration Crime. Recognising that Organised Crime Groups operate at all stages of the migratory routes, we are deploying NCA Liaison Officers to source and transit countries across Europe and North Africa. We are bolstering existing posts where necessary and establishing new posts in countries where we need to develop our own capacity including helping those countries to attack some of the criminal groups at source. This is already increasing our intelligence coverage and generating opportunities to disrupt Organised Crime Groups before migrants reach EU borders. In the longer term, we will develop local i.e. host nation law enforcement capacity to independently dismantle these criminal networks. 10. The fragmented and often chaotic nature of the organised criminality underpinning illegal migration gives the threat a high degree of flexibility. Smuggling routes and patterns quickly evolve in response to law enforcement activity. Our response reflects this flexibility: the breadth of our overseas deployments and our commitment to Europol’s JOT Mare will enable our intelligence collection and analysis capabilities to keep pace with criminals’ adaptability. Similarly, the mobility of our dedicated investigation team will allow us to project our investigative capacity across different routes and countries, subject to host nation consent, as Organised Crime Groups adapt to disruptions. 11. This flexibility also extends to the range of disruption tactics the Organised Immigration Crime Taskforce will be using. We will exploit every opportunity available to us, including targeting formal and informal money flows, and using social

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media as both a source of intelligence and a means of disruption. Our intelligence picture shows that money launderers are not commodity specific and will facilitate the handling of money coming from a range of organised criminal activity including Organised Immigration Crime. 12. The NCA continues to work closely with international partners to tackle international money laundering. This includes engagement with Financial Intelligence Units overseas and through the Liaison Officer network. We recognise that money laundering is a key enabler of almost all forms of Serious and Organised Crime. Therefore robust operational activity against large scale international money launderers will inevitably disrupt those Organised Crime Groups engaged in the smuggling of migrants. 13. Our overarching objective is to protect lives. As law enforcement agencies, we are delivering this by targeting the Organised Crime Groups that place migrants’ lives at risk, and acting on risk-related intelligence swiftly and decisively. Whilst it is clear that individuals being smuggled by Organised Crime Groups will include victims of human trafficking, migrants are generally viewed as commodities by the smuggling groups; they make no distinction between willing participants and victims of trafficking. As such, the opportunity for the Organised Immigration Crime Taskforce to identify trafficking victims arises during debriefing. We work with local partners to ensure that Taskforce debriefing officers have a clear process in place for referring migrants assessed to be potential victims of trafficking into local safeguarding arrangements.

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National Crime Agency

Annex A The National Crime Agency - background briefing The Crime and Courts Act (2013) provides the legislative basis for the NCA. The NCA’s remit is described in Act as securing that efficient and effective activities to combat Serious and Organised Crime (a National Security threat) are carried out whether by the NCA, other law enforcement agencies, or other persons. The NCA has two key statutory functions: a ‘crime- reduction function’ of securing that efficient and effective activities to combat organised crime and serious crime are carried out (whether by the NCA, other law enforcement agencies, or other persons); and, a ‘criminal-intelligence function’. The overall mission of the NCA is to lead the UK’s fight to cut Serious and Organised Crime. The NCA: • Has a multi-skilled workforce with the specialist capabilities to undertake operations to cut Serious and Organised Crime across the UK, and to provide specialist support to UK operational partners; • Has a wide remit to tackle Serious and Organised Crime across a range of threats including Organised Immigration Crime. The NCA provides leadership in these areas through: CEOP Command; Economic Crime Command; National Cyber Crime Unit; Organised Crime Command; and, Intelligence and Operations Directorate, including Intelligence and Tasking, Intelligence Collection, Investigations, Borders, International and Specialist Support. • Works with partners to maintain an authoritative UK intelligence picture of Serious and Organised Crime (the National Strategic Assessment72) to drive joined-up operational activity. This is undertaken by a multi-agency National Intelligence Hub within the Intelligence and Operations Directorate, incorporating the national Organised Crime Fusion Centre; • Ensures that the UK’s response to Serious and Organised Crime is joined up by coordinating and tasking the national response, enabling the NCA to prioritise its effort and effectively deploy its resources locally, regionally, and nationally, as well as at the border and overseas; • Has an international leadership role, working with partners to cut serious and organised crime through a network of International Liaison Officers; and, • Delivers operational results with partners through the use of operational capabilities, flexibly deployed across the threat areas identified in the National Strategic Assessment, delivering criminal justice outcomes, asset denial, prevention and other disruption activity.

24 August 2015

72 Organised Immigration Crime is identified as a national priority in the National Strategic Assessment 2015.

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Refugee Council—Written Evidence

Refugee Council key recommendations 1. The UK Government should commit to creating alternative legal routes for refugees to reach safety in the UK by: a. Offering thousands of additional places on the UK’s excellent resettlement schemes to refugees around the world at this time b. Proactively seeking to help families separated by forced displacement to reunite in the UK c. Exploring other legal avenues for refugees to reach the UK, such as humanitarian or asylum visas.

2. The UK government should also seek to share responsibility for a greater proportion of arrivals to the EU by ensuring that the Dublin III regulation is used to its full potential and that UK guidance reflects this.

For more detailed recommendations, please see the body of the submission.

Context

1. Smugglers exist fundamentally because of the lack safe and legal routes for refugees and irregular migrants to the EU. In their effort to tackle irregular migration, the UK and other states have placed a plethora of border controls overseas that effectively prevent refugees (sometimes intentionally, see point 5) as well as irregular migrants from reaching our shores. In the case of refugees they are driven by push factors forcing them from their home countries, and Europe offers a place of refuge where they can rebuild their lives, possibly aided by the opportunity to reunite with family members already living in safety in Europe. In our experience, some refugees may make an active decision to seek protection in Europe but others have less control over their journey or their destination.

2. Given the remit of the Refugee Council, this submission deals exclusively with the use of smugglers’ services by people in search of protection and offers some solutions in this context. While we acknowledge that there will be some without protection needs taking the sea route to Europe, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) finds that the majority are refugees, a conclusion based on the nationalities of arrivals over the first six months of 2015: Syria (34%); Afghanistan (12%); Eritrea (12%); Somalia (5%); and Nigeria (5%). In 2014, the 28 Member States of the EU gave 95% of Syrian asylum seekers, 89% of Eritrean asylum seekers and 63% of Afghan asylum seekers, protection in the first instance.73

3. When people are forcibly displaced, because of conflict or persecution, it is often many years before they are able to find a safe haven where they can begin to rebuild their lives. After fleeing their homes, they may be forced to survive in precarious and

73 UNHCR, July 2015, The sea route to Europe: The Mediterranean passage in the age of refugees. Available here: http://www.unhcr.org/5592bd059.html

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dangerous circumstances both within their country of origin and in third countries. They are often forced to make secondary movements as they may still be at risk, or because of insecure and unsustainable conditions in countries which are unable or unwilling to respond appropriately to the needs of the disproportionate number of refugees they are hosting. Travelling irregularly through transit countries such as Egypt, Libya and Morocco amongst others, they are at risk of further violence and exploitation.74 Women travelling irregularly are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence.75

4. Invariably, refugees are forced to travel in the company of smugglers because of a lack of safe and legal routes to Europe for refugees. The UK does not offer an ‘asylum visa’ and in fact, when war breaks out and people begin fleeing a country like Syria for example, other types of visas such as student or visitor visas, are routinely refused if the authorities believe there is an intention to claim asylum upon arrival. In the case of Syria, this is borne out by the Home Office quarterly immigration and asylum statistics that show a steady increase in the number of visa applications from Syrians refused during the course of the conflict; from 25% in the second quarter of 2011 to 59% in the first quarter of this year.76

5. There are other examples of efforts made to prevent refugees from accessing protection in the UK. Continuing with the example of Syria, in March of this year changes were made to the immigration rules to remove the transit without visa exemption for Syrians with a visa for entry to the USA. This was done explicitly for the purpose of preventing Syrians with a USA issued visa from claiming asylum in the UK.77 This is despite the fact that the numbers of Syrians claiming asylum in the UK is low, even compared to other EU Member States: Since 2011, approximately 6,000 Syrians have claimed asylum in the UK whereas in 2014 alone Germany received 40,000 asylum applications from Syrians.78 Such efforts to prevent refugees reaching the UK contribute to the creation of a ‘Fortress Europe’, and create and increase demand for smugglers’ services.

6. A truly effective answer to human smuggling needs to concentrate on reducing ‘demand’ rather than curbing ‘supply’.79 In the case of refugees, demand for smugglers’ services is

74 Amnesty International, May 2015, ‘Libya is full of cruelty’: Stories of abduction, sexual violence and abuse from migrants and refugees. Available here: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde19/1578/2015/en. See also blog by Acer, Human Rights First, Refugees in Egypt Urgently Need Protection, January 2015. Available here: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/refugees-egypt-urgently-need-protection 75 MSF, March 2010, Sexual Violence and Migration: The hidden reality of Sub-Saharan women trapped in Morocco en route to Europe. Available here: http://www.msf.org.uk/sites/uk/files/Sexual_violence_and_migrants_201003253808.pdf 76 See Home Office immigration statistics available here: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-january-to-march-2015-data-tables 77 16 March 2015, Statement of changes in immigration rules, available here: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/413118/48244_HC_1116.pdf ?utm_content=bufferedc21&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer We would particularly draw your attention to paragraph 3.2 of the explanatory notes. 78 Eurostat 2015, Asylum applicants and first instance decisions on asylum applications 2014. Available here: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4168041/6742650/KS-QA-15-003-EN-N.pdf/b7786ec9-1ad6-4720- 8a1d-430fcfc55018 79 Achilli, L., June 2015, The smuggler: hero of felon? Migration Policy Centre, EUI. Available here: http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/36296

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created not only by wars, conflict and persecution, i.e. the causes of refugee flight, but also by the lack of alternatives to irregular travel. Yet far more effort, attention and resource is invested in reducing supply through disrupting smuggling networks, as well as prevention, through the stricter application of law enforcement and the tightening of border control. This is disappointing given that, as Steve Symonds from Amnesty International UK highlighted in his oral evidence to the committee on 22 July, blocking one smuggling route simply leads to the creation of new irregular channels, often exposing refugees to even greater risks as well as greater cost. This is borne out by an examination of the evolution of smugglers’ routes to Europe since the early 1990s.80

7. Clearly, demand for smugglers services would be reduced by addressing the causes of refugee flight. But at a time when the international community seems incapable of both ending existing wars and preventing new ones, this remains a distant goal at best. In the meantime, demand can only be reduced by opening new legal channels for refugees to protection in Europe and reinforcing existing ones.

Reducing demand for smugglers services: Creating safe and legal routes for refugees

8. Consideration of the different responses to UNHCR’s call for the proactive admission of Syrian refugees by states provides detail on the different safe and legal routes that states can make available to refugees.81 This submission specifically highlights resettlement, family reunification and humanitarian visas as the measures that the Refugee Council considers most appropriate for the UK.

Resettlement

9. Resettlement involves the selection and transfer of refugees from a State in which they have sought protection to a third State which has agreed to admit them – as refugees – with permanent residence status.82 The number of refugees around the world in need of a resettlement place continues to increase year on year and UNHCR recently projected that 1,150,000 refugees will be in need of resettlement in 2016.83 While last year saw an increase in the numbers of refugees resettled, largely in response to an appeal by UNHCR for additional resettlement places for Syrian refugees, the number of resettlement places available globally continues to be dwarfed by need. In 2014, 105,200 refugees were resettled: If this number is maintained into 2016, it will provide solutions for only around 9% of those in need according to UNHCR’s projection. The vast majority of refugees resettled in 2014 went to USA (73,000), Canada (12,300) and Australia (11,600).84 Historically, EU Member States’ commitments to resettlement compare poorly, with

80 As above 81 The committee may want to see UNHCR guidance on the pledging process prior to the Ministerial-level pledging conference on Resettlement and other forms of admission for Syrian refugees available here: http://resettlement.eu/sites/icmc.tttp.eu/files/Resettlement%20and%20other%20forms%20of%20admission% 20for%20Syrian%20refugees%20-%20Guidance%20to%20support%20the%20pledging%20process.pdf 82 UNHCR, 2011, UNHCR Resettlement Handbook. Available here: http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf 83 UNHCR, 2015, UNHCR Project Global Resettlement Needs 2016. Available here: http://www.unhcr.org/558019729.html 84 UNHCR, 2014, World at War: UNHCR Global Trends, Forced Displacement in 2014. Available at: http://unhcr.org/556725e69.html

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Europe as a whole consistently providing a global annual quota of around 5,500 places a year. 750 of these places are in the UK via the Gateway Protection Programme (GPP).

10. In 2013, UNHCR appealed to States to admit on resettlement or other forms of admission 30,000 Syrian refugees from 2013 to 2014. In 2014 the agency called for an additional 100,000 places for Syrian refugees from 2015 to 2016. The agency called for the development of these avenues to ensure protection and solutions for the most vulnerable and to help “provide safe legal alternatives to perilous irregular secondary movements by land and sea”.85 While we understand that this target of 130,000 places for Syrian refugees over three years is likely to be met, the target does not reflect need. Amnesty International has called for 380,000 Syrian refugees from the main host countries to be relocated by the end of 2016, approximately 10% of the total refugee population in those countries at that time.86 Aid agencies including Save the Children and Oxfam working with Syrian refugees in the major host countries, called on the Government to ensure the UK takes its ‘fair share’ of resettled refugees from Syria, estimated to be 10,000 refugees, in addition to Syrians arriving through other routes.87

11. However, the Government has shown considerable reluctance to providing resettlement places to Syrian refugees, despite leading the international response to the refugee crisis in other respects. It was only after considerable pressure following a campaign led by the Refugee Council that the Government responded to UNHCR’s appeal and established the Vulnerable Persons Relocation scheme for Syrians (VPR). According to the most recent publicly available statistics 187 refugees have been resettled in the UK since the start of the conflict. This contrasts particularly poorly with countries like Germany that have made real and meaningful efforts to create alternative legal routes to safety for Syrian refugees through a commitment to offer refuge to 35,000 through humanitarian admission and private sponsorship.

12. The European Council’s commitment following the June summit to establish 20,000 resettlement places is welcome but given the extent of need, evidenced by both the projections by UNHCR and by the numbers of refugees taking dangerous irregular routes across the Mediterranean, and given that this is the only measure that begins to address the issue of safe and legal routes for refugees, it is a disappointingly small step. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the proposal is 20,000 additional resettlement places in Europe or if this figure simply represents a target for existing programmes: in which

85 UNHCR, 2014, Ministerial-level pledging conference: Resettlement and other forms of admission for Syrian refugees – guidance on the pledging process. Available here: http://resettlement.eu/sites/icmc.tttp.eu/files/Resettlement%20and%20other%20forms%20of%20admission% 20for%20Syrian%20refugees%20-%20Guidance%20to%20support%20the%20pledging%20process.pdf 86 Amnesty International, 2014, Left out in the cold: Syrian refugees abandoned by the International Community. Available here: http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Reports/Left_Out_in_the_Cold_Syrian_Refugees_Abandoned_by_the _International_Community_final_formatted_version.pdf 87 Refugee Council, November 2014, News story: Aid agencies call for UK to resettle up to 10,000 refugees from Syria. Available at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/latest/news/4200_aid_agencies_call_for_uk_to_resettle_up_to_10_000_re fugees_from_syria

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case, it may only equate to a few more thousand resettlement places a year across the whole of the EU.

13. It is in this context that the Government recently announced an expansion of the VPR to an estimated 800 resettlement places over a three year period, an additional 100 resettlement places a year. This means the UK will be receiving just over 1,000 resettled refugees every year for the next three years. Given the scale of the global refugee crisis as well as the immediate pressures on the Europe’s borders, the UK’s resettlement programmes should be offering thousands of additional places to refugees around the world at this time, and the UK Government should be proactively calling on other European states to follow suit. In order for the UK to significantly scale up its resettlement programmes, more resource must be made available to the relevant team in the Home Office.

Family reunion

14. The commitment to provide additional resettlement places was the only measure that was adopted by the European Council during the summit on 26 June that acknowledged the need for safe and legal routes for refugees to Europe. However, in addition to an increase in the provision of resettlement places, the Commission also called for Member States to utilise other legal avenues to the full including private and government sponsorship, humanitarian permits and family reunification to help refugees reach safety.88 These proposals seem not to have been considered by the European Council at all.

15. Family reunion is one of the few existing legal channels available for refugees to come to Europe. The families of recognised refugees and those granted humanitarian protection can apply to enter the UK under the family reunion rules, to be reunited in the UK. Evidence suggests that refugees seeking to bring their family members to join them in the UK as well as to other EU states face considerable barriers. Currently, very few refugees with relatives in the UK would qualify for family reunion due to the very restrictive nature of family reunion rules.

16. UNHCR has repeatedly advocated for swifter, more efficient family reunification procedures for refugees in Europe, particularly for Syrians, but there is little indication that member states are prepared to make the process any easier. In fact, the trend is towards more restrictive eligibility criteria, more onerous requirements for supporting documentation and less availability of state-funded legal aid to help refugees navigate the increasingly complex application process.89 This is true of the UK where, most notably, following the implementation of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) refugees are no longer entitled to legal aid to support their

88 European Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 13 May 2015. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background- information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf 89 Siegfried, K, July 2015, Family reunion out of reach for many refugees in Europe, article published on IRIN website available here: http://www.irinnews.org/report/101712/family-reunion-out-of-reach-for-many- refugees-in-europe

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applications. For further information on the barriers to family reunion facing refugees in the UK as well as detailed recommendations on how to facilitate family reunion, see the British Red Cross report Not so straightforward.90

17. The withdrawal of legal aid for family reunion reflects a tendency to see it as a straightforward immigration matter. The British Red Cross report not only examines the complexity of the process, it also highlights the humanitarian and protection needs of family members who wish to travel to the UK. Of the 91 cases included in the study, the majority of sponsors (in the UK) were men while 95% of applicants were women and children (seeking to join their sponsor in the UK). 51% of applicants were exposed to security risks. 96% of those exposed to security risks were women and children.91 The report makes clear that family members of refugees in the UK, entitled under current rules to join them, may be living in insecure conditions and still at risk while they seek to resolve the significant complexities arising from their family reunion application. Where this is not possible and family members are refused, it is reasonable to assume that travelling to the UK through irregular channels, possibly at great risk, becomes the family’s only option if they are to live together in safety.

Limited definition of family 18. Like other EU members states, the UK government’s definition of family for the purposes of family reunion is the Western concept of the ‘nuclear family’. However, unlike other EU member states, unaccompanied children granted asylum or humanitarian protection in the UK are denied the right to reunite even with their closest family members. This is despite the fact they have been through an asylum determination system and been found to be a refugee or in need of humanitarian protection, in the same way as an adult. The right to reunite with your family is a fundamental right of a refugee and as a matter of urgency the Home Office should amend the rules for unaccompanied children so that they are in line with adults granted refugee status or humanitarian protection.

19. For adult refugees, only partners and dependent children under the age of 18 would qualify for family reunion in the UK, under the usual rules. This, for example, means that a Syrian father granted asylum in the UK would be allowed to bring his wife and his younger children to join him. However his eldest child, an 18 year old daughter, would not ordinarily be allowed to travel with the family and they would be forced to leave her behind or pay smugglers to bring her to the UK – in either scenario, putting the young woman at considerable risk. The above does not refer to one specific case, however we are aware of a number of cases, including Syrian, where young female family members who are 18+ are refused.

20. Family reunion rules in the UK and other member states do not recognize the way that forced migration can change the makeup of a family and their dependency on extended family. In addition to ensuring that those entitled to refugee family reunion under the

90 British Red Cross, 2015, Not so straightforward: the need for qualified legal support in refugee family reunion. Available here: http://www.redcross.org.uk/~/media/BritishRedCross/Documents/About%20us/Not%20so%20straightforward %20refugee%20family%20reunion%20report%202015.pdf 91 As above

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current rules are able to access it, the Refugee Council recommends that at this time of exceptional need a more flexible approach is taken to what constitutes as ‘family’ allowing refugees with extended family members living in the UK who are willing to act as sponsors, to be allowed to join them in safety here.

21. Alternatively, the Government could follow the examples of States that have provided opportunities for the admission of relatives beyond family reunification rules including Austria, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland.92 For example, Germany has pledged 10,000 places to Syrian refugees through private sponsorship. Refugees in Germany are able to privately sponsor members of their extended family if they can guarantee accommodation and living costs.

22. The Refugee Council recommends that the Government proactively seeks to help families separated by forced displacement reunite in the UK by: a. Making legal aid available for family reunion. b. Simplifying the family reunification process and seeking ways to make it safer for applicants living in insecure conditions. c. Amending the rules so that unaccompanied children found to be in need of protection can reunite with their family in the UK. d. Taking a more flexible approach to the definition of family during this time of exceptional need. e. Ensuring that the relevant team in the Home Office is sufficiently resourced to swiftly process family reunification applications.

Humanitarian visas

23. Humanitarian visas is another tool that could be used to enable refugees to access the UK and other EU Member States and claim asylum, thereby creating a safe and legal route. Certain states already issue humanitarian visas however there is a lack of detail around such programmes, complicating understanding of the opportunities they may present for people in need of protection. However, current practice suggests the following process: a. Applicants for humanitarian visas approach the consular representation of the potential host state (possibly in a third country). b. The consular representation may pre-screen the humanitarian visa application to identify protection needs but this is only an initial assessment as the final status determination procedure is conducted after entry to the host state. c. After arrival in the host state, the applicant lodges an asylum application.

24. The humanitarian visa programmes of Brazil and France seem to operate on this basis and were established in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Since 2013, Brazilian embassies in countries neighbouring Syria have had the possibility to issue special

92 UNHCR, 2014, Ministerial-level pledging conference: Resettlement and other forms of admission for Syrian refugees – guidance on the pledging process. Available here: http://resettlement.eu/sites/icmc.tttp.eu/files/Resettlement%20and%20other%20forms%20of%20admission% 20for%20Syrian%20refugees%20-%20Guidance%20to%20support%20the%20pledging%20process.pdf

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humanitarian visas for Syrians and other nationalities affected by the Syrian conflict who want to seek refuge in Brazil. Claims for asylum are presented upon arrival in Brazil. As of February 2015, Brazil had issued 7,380 humanitarian visas to Syrian refugees.93 Since 2012 French consulates have been able to issue asylum visas where a need for protection is evidenced on a discretionary basis. There is little detail on the scheme but as of February 2015 France had issued 1,880 visas to Syrians to enable them to travel to France and claim asylum.94

25. The Refugee Council recommends that the UK government explores the use of humanitarian visas to facilitate access to protection in the UK for refugees, through discussion with other EU Member States.

Arrivals to the EU: Sharing responsibility

26. A significant commitment to the establishment of safe and legal routes to Europe by a number of Member States would lead to a reduction in the numbers attempting to arrive by sea. Admission of refugees through legal channels such as resettlement, family reunion and humanitarian visas, would also allow for better planning and management. However, given the lack of safe and legal channels and the inevitable high numbers therefore taking irregular routes and arriving in Italy and Greece, the UK government needs to recognise that a more equitable sharing of responsibility for refugees (including hosting them) is required within the EU.

27. The Refugee Council is disappointed in the government’s decision not to support an EU- wide relocation programme, particularly given the modest scale of the proposed scheme. However, the UK government should seek to share responsibility for a greater proportion of arrivals to the EU through the full implementation of the Dublin III regulation including through the generous use of its discretionary clause. This would also reduce the numbers travelling through irregular channels after arrival in the EU, seeking to reach family members in the UK. Some of those in Calais may be eligible to have their asylum claims considered by the UK under Dublin III.

28. EU regulation 604/2013, commonly referred to as the ‘Dublin III regulation’ came into force in January 2014 and the UK is fully bound by it. However, the guidance to Home Office staff published on the gov.uk website has not been amended since this change of law and still refers to Dublin II, which is no longer relevant. As a result, it is unclear what written instructions staff in the Home Office are working to, which is a concern because of the significant improvements made to policy in the latest iteration of the regulation. This needs addressing as a matter of urgency. The Dublin regulation preamble states clearly that respect for family life and the principle of family unity should govern decisions relating to the examinations of asylum applications. In addition, the criteria relating to unaccompanied children are rooted firmly in the best interests of children.

93 UNHCR, August 2015, Resettlement and Other Forms of Admission for Syrian Refugees (list of pledges). Available here: http://www.unhcr.org/52b2febafc5.pdf 94 As above

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29. We are specifically concerned about three significant elements of the Dublin III regulation that are not reflected in current guidance. Firstly the criteria relating to unaccompanied children, listed in Article 8, require Member States to reunite children with family members, siblings or relatives, yet this is not mentioned in the guidance. Similarly Member States are bound by Articles nine, ten and eleven which relate to the reunification of family members (spouse, partner and dependant children); a fact again, not reflected in the guidance.

30. It is unclear what process the Home Office undertakes to assess how it responds to requests made under the discretionary clause (Articles 16 and 17) in bringing together relatives, including those dependant upon asylum applicants in the UK, where family or cultural considerations prompt a request for the UK to take responsibility for asylum requests made in other Member States. A positive approach to the discretionary clause would be a sensible way of showing solidarity with those Member States experiencing most pressure, as well as being in the best interests of families and relatives seeking asylum.

31. The Refugee Council recommendations that the UK government: a. Seeks to share responsibility for a greater proportion of arrivals to the EU by ensuring that the Dublin III regulation is used to its full potential including through the generous use of its discretionary clause. b. Ensures that the latest iteration of the ‘Dublin Regulation’ is reflected in UK guidance as a matter of urgency.

Conclusions

32. Large parts of the world are engulfed in conflict – the largest, most intractable, is on Europe’s doorstep. Neither the UK nor Europe as a continent, can avoid the biggest global refugee crisis since World War II, nor should we attempt to. In fact, it is attempts to contain the crisis through the closing down of safe and legal routes for refugees that has in part provoked the crisis on Europe’s border. There is a risk that efforts to dismantle smuggling networks are simply an extension of this theme: seeking to close down irregular routes for refugees searching for safety. In the unlikely event that these efforts were successful, this approach risks trapping people in countries where they cannot get the protection they need, where in fact, they may be at risk of further human rights abuses. The Refugee Council believes that the single most effective way to undermine the smugglers’ networks is to reduce demand, as detailed above.

33. With 60 million displaced from their homes, the EU cannot continue to expect much poorer countries to bear the bulk of the responsibility for the world’s refugees. While some news reports may understandably alarm, it should be remembered that the numbers seeking to enter Europe are comparatively low and the UK takes much lower numbers than some other EU Members States: In 2014 Germany received six times the number of asylum applications than the UK, Sweden received three times the number

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and Italy and France received double.95 The UK government should be playing a far more constructive role in responding to the crisis, in particular, by working with our EU partners to see how the UK could provide protection to a greater proportion of the world’s refugees.

21 August 2015

95 UK received 31,000, Italy received 56,000, France received 63,000, Sweden received 81,000 and Germany received 166,000. From Eurostat 2015, Asylum applicants and first instance decisions on asylum applications 2014. Available here: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4168041/6742650/KS-QA-15-003-EN-N.pdf/b7786ec9-1ad6-4720- 8a1d-430fcfc55018

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Evidence Session No. 1 Heard in Public Questions 1 - 12

Members present

Baroness Prashar (Chairman) Lord Condon Lord Cormack Lord Faulkner of Worcester Baroness Janke Baroness Massey of Darwen Lord Morris of Handsworth Baroness Pinnock Lord Soley Lord Wasserman ______

Examination of Witness

Andrej Mahecic, Senior External Relations Officer, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Q1 The Chairman: Good morning, Mr Mahecic, and thank you most warmly for your time. This session is open to the public and a webcast goes out live by video transmission. A transcript will be taken of the evidence and put on the parliamentary website. You will be sent a transcript. If there are any corrections, please send them to us. If you would like to give us any supplementary evidence after the session, please do so. Before we get into questions, is there a general statement or any comments that you wish to make? Andrej Mahecic: First, I thank the Committee and the Chairman for the invitation. The issue that you are looking at today is of great importance to the UNHCR. It is perhaps the visible part of what is happening globally. We are living in a time when global forced displacement is the highest recorded, with nearly 60 million people forcibly displacement. What I will say today will closely relate to that and to the UNHCR’s mandate, which has been given to the organisation by the General Assembly. That mandate is to protect and assist refugees, and to work with the Governments trying to find the solutions to their plight. My answers will, if you like, come from the refugee protection and the protection- sensitive approach.

The Chairman: Thank you. Perhaps I may start by saying that you collect a lot of data. Do the data collected by you shed any light on the root causes of irregular migration to the EU? Andrej Mahecic: We believe that they do. Before I elaborate on that, I would like to share the latest data that we have collected for the first six months of this year. So far in 2015, 166,000 refugees and migrants arrived by sea, including more than 77,000 in Italy, 87,000 in

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Greece, 94 in Malta and more than 1,600 in Spain. The very important element of this is the top five nationalities, which basically speaks of who these people are. Some 36% of all arrivals are Syrians, another 13% Eritreans, another 11% Afghans, and another 4% are equally Somalis and Nigerians. The Chairman: Would you repeat those figures more slowly? Andrej Mahecic: Yes. Some 36% are Syrian nationals, 13% Eritreans, 11% Afghans, 4% Somalis and 4% Nigerians. So there is a direct and clear link between unprecedented forced displacement globally—as I said, nearly 60 million people—and what we are witnessing in the Mediterranean. The majority of those taking the sea route to Europe are refugees. Their numbers continue to rise rapidly. Most people arriving from sea are fleeing war, conflict and persecution at home, as well as deteriorating conditions in many refugee-hosting countries. EU states have a clear responsibility to offer them protection and an obligation, with others, to rescue people at sea when they are in danger. Another finding of a recent report, which I have copies of and will leave with the Chairman, is that the number of deaths at sea rose to record levels in April 2015, then dropped significantly in May and June. While many factors contributed to the recent decline, improved European-led search and rescue operations beginning in May have had an immediate and very positive effect. Yet we should be aware that the peak months are ahead of us. The third finding is that there has been a major increase in refugees and migrants taking the eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey to Greece. More than 85% of those arriving in Greece are from countries experiencing war and conflict, principally Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. From Greece, most move onwards across the Balkans to western and northern Europe. Italy remains the primary destination for Eritreans, Somalis and other people from sub-Saharan Africa. The fourth finding relates to the fact that as arrivals increase, the reception capacity and conditions remain seriously inadequate. While conditions of reception in Italy vary a great deal, serious systemic gaps remain in Greece. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia collectively offer fewer than 3,000 places of reception—significantly below the level of arrivals. Let me just give you the data: 19,000 arrivals were recorded in the first weeks of June alone. This impacts on people with special needs, including unaccompanied and separated children, and increases their vulnerability and risk of exploitation. This is an emergency situation that requires urgent attention and far greater support for efforts to handle new arrivals. If this situation remains unaddressed, onward movement of refugees and migrants is very likely to continue on a significant scale. The fifth finding shows that the number of refugees and migrants entering the western Balkans from Greece has dramatically increased since the beginning of June, with more than 1,000 people arriving every day, as opposed to about 200 just a few weeks ago. They face serious humanitarian and protection challenges linked to the hardship of the journey, the abuses of smugglers and criminal gangs and increased tightening of the borders. The sixth finding is that countries of origin and the international community at large need to do better at preventing and resolving conflicts. Transit countries need to develop their asylum systems, including reception arrangements and identification processes. In other words, the record number of people displaced globally speaks to two harsh realities: that peace is in serious deficit today, and the general inability and capacity of the international community to end long-term conflicts and to prevent new ones.

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The Chairman: Thank you very much for that very comprehensive answer.

Q2 Lord Morris of Handsworth: Do you think that the measures suggested by the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling contribute to addressing the root causes of irregular migration? Andrej Mahecic: I underline first of all that combating smuggling is likely to be effective only if accompanied by a holistic approach and other alternatives for refugees. Only a genuinely European approach can tackle a phenomenon of such scale, complexity and transnational nature. A number of proposed measures focus on disrupting the smuggling trade and stemming movements in co-operation with third countries, but the law enforcement measures must be accompanied by efforts aimed at reducing the need for migrants and refugees to turn to smugglers in the first place. The situation today calls for measures beyond just border security. Most smuggling does not involve the crime of trafficking. That distinction is really important to maintain in statements and actions initiated in response to the current crisis. Moreover, people resorting to smugglers and those falling prey to traffickers are not criminals. Those boats are carrying human beings who are entitled to their human rights and who are in need of international aid and protection. Therefore, all actions must scrupulously respect international human rights law, international refugee law, international humanitarian law and the law of the sea, and ensure the dignified, safe and humane treatment of migrants. We look forward to working with EU member states and institutions on: elaborating concrete actions respecting the rights of all refugees and migrants, and consultations to increase resettlement places on offer; on arrangements for pre and post-arrival assistance; and on relocation to ease the burden on the states on Europe’s southern border. Efforts to deter smuggling will be in vain unless measures are adopted to address overly restrictive migration policies in Europe, as well as the push factors of conflicts, human rights violations and economic deprivation in many of the countries of origin or transit. Enforcement measures therefore need to comply with applicable standards of human rights law enforcement and the administration of justice. We, as the UN agency mandated to protect refugees, are urging states to consider the increased use of legal alternatives so that persons in need of international protection do not have to resort to the dangerous irregular movements by sea and the use of smugglers. We were pleased to see that the EU Agenda on Migration also called on member states to use other legal avenues for people in need of international protection to reach Europe. A number of models are available, such as private sponsorship schemes, humanitarian visas and the possibility of family reunification, among others. We hope that these issues will create much-needed and credible legal avenues for refugees to reach safety in Europe. Without such avenues, refugees will continue to be left with few options and will be pushed into the hands of smugglers. If this is the case, international efforts to crack down on smugglers and traffickers are unlikely to be effective on their own. Lord Cormack: You made the distinction at the beginning between traffickers and smugglers. What sort of an overlap is there? Are you saying to us that very few smugglers are traffickers? Are you saying to us that some are traffickers? How do you break this down? I know that it is impossible to give an exact statistical answer, but by and large are smugglers not traffickers and are there only very few traffickers, or do you think that there are a lot? Andrej Mahecic: This is a very complex issue and a question that can probably be debated on its own, but to put it into straightforward terms, smuggling is not a human rights violation

164 of 175 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-12) per se, although it could be, while trafficking is a human rights violation. That is the very important distinction, which we believe needs to be reflected. There is also the issue of the people who are using the services. With regard to the trafficking of human beings, there are essentially three points to why this is of particular interest to UNHCR. First, we want to prevent refugees and asylum seekers from becoming victims of the trafficking of human beings. Secondly, we want to identify actual victims of the trafficking of human beings, who are at risk and therefore may be in need of international protection and should be warranted international protection. Thirdly, the efforts to combat the trafficking of human beings should not take place in a way that prejudices the rights of a person to seek asylum. This is enshrined in the Palermo protocol, which I believe is also being referenced here. Lord Cormack: Do I infer from what you say that the majority of these refugees are desperate people who use the services of smugglers and are not people who are being exploited by traffickers? That is a very important question. Andrej Mahecic: We do not have the data that would indicate the level of those who might be trafficked and those who use smugglers to get to Europe. The vast majority of migrants are fleeing from conflict and war situations—situations of human rights violations—and they seem to resort to the use of smugglers in the absence of any credible alternative at this point.

Q3 Baroness Massey of Darwen: I have two questions. First, do you think that the action plan sufficiently differentiates between migrant smuggling and human trafficking? Secondly, are certain groups more liable to be trafficked than smuggled, with the trafficking starting off in different kinds of ways—by family, for example? Andrej Mahecic: It is possible. We have seen that in situations of war and conflict people will resort to the services of the smugglers, because if you have no legal alternatives, what other way is there? For example, if you are a Syrian family who have lost all your papers in a blast or fire, you have a hard time proving who you are, let alone being in a position where you can cross the border in a regular way. These people may already have been registered as refugees, but that does not mean that the situation in the countries that are hosting them is such that they can stay there and not be at risk. This is what we are seeing in the Mediterranean. You have to remember that the countries neighbouring Syria are currently hosting 4 million Syrian refugees. The people on the move are, by definition, vulnerable. Specific groups could be more exposed to the risk of trafficking, especially when you have a situation where refugees are resorting to negative coping mechanisms such as child labour, arranged marriages et cetera. This vulnerability provides the possibility of exploitation and the risk of trafficking. Baroness Massey of Darwen: I know that there is a separate issue with trafficking, but could I just push that a little further? It seems to me that those most likely to be trafficked are women and girls for sexual exploitation or domestic labour, but not exclusively, because there are the boys who are going to the cannabis farms, for example. Often it is a family who will sell their relative or child into trafficking, so the situation is quite different. Am I right about that? Andrej Mahecic: It is a very broad and complex issue, and it goes way beyond the refugee mandate that strictly speaking we are looking at. It certainly needs to involve discussions with Governments, local communities and those international organisations that have far more expertise in this. Obviously, there is also the law enforcement element. As I say, it certainly goes beyond the remit of our mandate.

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Baroness Massey of Darwen: Yes, but does the action plan differentiate between smuggling and trafficking, because they are quite different? Andrej Mahecic: Yes, they are. This is an element that can always be strengthened. As I said earlier, we would encourage this important distinction to be stressed in any statement or action of the EU in this regard. Lord Faulkner of Worcester: Is it not the case that the UN protocol says that smuggling of migrants is a criminal offence if the person doing it is getting a financial reward for it? That is a little at variance with your drawing the distinction between smuggling and trafficking. Andrej Mahecic: I did not say that there was no criminal element; I said that smuggling per se may not be a human rights violation but that trafficking is. I did not speak about the criminality element of it.

Q4 Lord Faulkner of Worcester: Can I ask you to compare and contrast the EU action plan with the UN protocol? Andrej Mahecic: I can answer that question only partially, because the protocol itself and the convention is, if you like, in the domain of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Our take on it, as I said, is from the refugee protection perspective. I explained the three elements of our interest in combating trafficking. When it comes to the smuggling of people, many persons fleeing conflict, persecution and violence resort to it because they have no other option, and we welcomed the adoption of the protocol at the time with the provisions that look specifically at the protection of smuggled migrants, such as the obligation on state parties to take appropriate measures to afford smuggled migrants protection against violence and to take into account the special needs of women and children. The protocol against smuggling is also clear in that it does not aim at punishing persons for the mere fact of having been trafficked or smuggled, or at penalising organisations that assist such persons for purely humanitarian reasons. Lord Wasserman: I have a very short question that relates to your first answer about the Balkans and Greece. I was very interested in what you said about how it had suddenly jumped enormously. What is the reason for that? What do you think has happened? Andrej Mahecic: First, there is, if you like, an almost perfect storm in what we are seeing in the Mediterranean. First and foremost, this is driven mainly by unabating conflict inside Syria. The situation in Syria can be described with three words: death, destruction and displacement. In addition to the 4 million Syrians who are living in neighbouring countries, there are another 7.6 million Syrians who have been displaced in that country for more than a year and more than once. If you add these two figures together, that is half the Syrian pre- war population, which means that every second Syrian is now in the situation of forced displacement. The situation in neighbouring countries, which are buckling under the pressure, is becoming untenable. Lebanon is currently hosting about 1.2 million Syrian refugees, which is 25% of the Lebanese population. Turkey, in the last few months of 2014, with the fighting around Kobane and further fighting along the northern Syrian border, has become the country with the largest refugee population in the world. Lord Cormack: And Jordan? Andrej Mahecic: Jordan is currently hosting about 620,000 refugees, which is about 10% of the Jordanian population. Just to give you an example of the pressure on the infrastructure, Jordan is the sixth country in the world when it comes to the scarcity of water. You can imagine what challenges this alone brings, not to mention the effect that this is having on local communities, which are mostly hosting the refugees. While there is a perception that

166 of 175 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-12) most of the Syrian refugees are in camps, only a fraction of them are accommodated in camps; most of them are staying with the communities that have accepted them. That is certainly true of Jordan, where more than 85% are living like that. Lord Cormack: With families. Andrej Mahecic: With families, exactly, and they face slowly and surely sinking below the poverty line, which means that they can depend on less than $3 per person per day. This is where we get to the vulnerabilities—exploitation, child labour, early marriages—which, as I said, might lead to other vulnerabilities such as falling prey to traffickers. Many of the Syrians can no longer enjoy protection, because the protection space for Syrians in the neighbouring countries is shrinking, and because of that and the risks they are facing some of them are attempting the journey from Turkey, especially towards Greece. On the situation across northern Africa, the situation for Syrians changed substantially in Egypt last year with the change of regime. We know that many of those who were there feel harassed, are frequently detained et cetera. Then you have those who are in Libya, and the collapse of law and order in Libya is, if you like, the last of the elements that create that perfect storm that we are now seeing in the Mediterranean. Lord Wasserman: I am interested in particular in what you said about the number of people from Greece to the Balkans increasing enormously. Is that because suddenly more people came? Is that because there is no more law enforcement, but the Greeks are trying to keep them out? What is the reason? Andrej Mahecic: The Greek coastguard is doing a commendable job in rescuing these boats. Lord Wasserman: I understand. Andrej Mahecic: There is a combination of factors. There has been an increase in the number of arrivals. There are also, as I mentioned, serious gaps in the reception capacity of Greece. Therefore many people simply move on, because it is very difficult for them to stay there. They are left to their own devices. That is why we say that this is an emergency. In fact, we have declared it as a level-2 emergency, as Greece certainly not only faces a volatile economic situation at the moment but is coping with this increased influx through Turkey.

Q5 Lord Condon: In response to this perfect storm, which you have very eloquently described, are the European Union institutions currently co-operating with UNHCR to address migrant smuggling—not only Brussels but your Liaison Office, your office in Warsaw, EASO and FRONTEX? Is that co-operation really effective? Andrej Mahecic: We do co-operate with EU institutions, and it is a regular and strong co- operation. However, we approach that co-operation from our refugee protection mandate rather than from the one that deals with migrant smuggling, because, as I said, this is outside our remit. We have regular co-operation with FRONTEX within the EU bilaterally and as part of the FRONTEX Consultative Forum. We also work with other international organisations such as IOM and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, but again, as I said, combating migrant smuggling is not our key objective for being involved in that. In this context, our expertise can help in understanding why people are on the move. It can help to inform people about the conditions. You perhaps know that the UNHCR operates in 125 countries in the world—hence we can certainly offer good information about the situation in the transiting countries. We have had very good co-operation with Mare Nostrum, which was the search and rescue operation launched by the Italian Government.

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We are also in contact with EU NAVFOR for the Mediterranean, and have attended a number of briefings and meetings. I would like to note here that the launch of EU NAVFOR is one component of the European Agenda on Migration, particularly in its focus on fighting human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean. But I would emphasise that we certainly do not want to see the loss of civilian life in those actions. It is also important that in no circumstances should there be disembarkation in Libya or north Africa without the consent of the Governments concerned. It is also important that international law prescribes an important distinction between smugglers and traffickers on the one hand, as I mentioned earlier, who are involved in criminal activities, and the victims of smuggling and trafficking on the other. Lastly, I would just like to highlight that any efforts to combat smuggling must fully comply with international human rights and refugee law, and in that respect I would like to end on a positive note: the EU NAVFOR Mediterranean operations plan reflects that in the language of the plan.

Q6 Lord Cormack: In your opinion, are the EU member states doing enough to meet their obligations? Andrej Mahecic: Unfortunately, I will not be able to answer questions on that, simply because they lie beyond our expertise. I do not believe that I can offer the Committee the meaningful response that it needs on this issue. It should perhaps be addressed to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, which is the UN body overseeing the framework that you are talking about.

Q7 Lord Cormack: Yes, but you are the UNHCR. I personally have great admiration for what your organisation has sought to do over the years. Clearly you are on the point of being overwhelmed. The EU as an entity has statutory obligations under international law, et cetera. Do you believe that the UNHCR is having adequate co-operation from the countries of the European Union? Andrej Mahecic: I can speak on the co-operation that we have vis-à-vis refugee protection. However, I cannot speak in a way that will help you on the issue of smuggling and human trafficking. In the light of the current situation in the Mediterranean, at the very end of the Mare Nostrum operation the UNHCR called for an adequate replacement. Unfortunately, it took the 1,800 lives that were lost in April before we saw the resurrection of the search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean. That is one of the things that we are looking at because it is needed and the priority for us should be rescuing human lives. In that sense, it is welcome to see that resources for FRONTEX and the search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean have been boosted. Beyond resources, it is also important for us that the search and rescue operations cover the same area that the Mare Nostrum operation covered, because most of the distress calls last year and many in the first half of this year came from the Libyan search and rescue operation area. Another element that we put forward to the European Commission in March related to having robust procedures in place and adequate reception facilities. These procedures are important because they need to satisfy the legitimate security concerns of the Governments because it is important to identify who the people arriving on these boats are. Equally, these procedures can identify the people who need international protection and those who do not, because you need two separate ways to deal with the solutions.

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Lord Cormack: Could you very simply and clearly define for me and for the benefit of the Committee your precise remit as the UNHCR and whether you believe that you have adequate resources to fulfil your obligations and remit? Andrej Mahecic: As I said, the mandate of the UNHCR is to assist and protect refugees and to work with the Governments to find solutions to their plight. That is the perspective that we are coming from. Most of the UNHCR operations are in Asia and in Africa. Our biggest operation at the moment is the Syrian emergency. To answer your question directly, we do not have sufficient support. Our appeal for the refugee response in the region is funded at about 22%. We are now in July, which means that we should be at well over 50% in order to meet the needs of the 4 million Syrian refugees. We have been alerting the international community about this. It means that the Syrians in the neighbouring countries will face more and more difficulties. There are risks that the food rations will go down. We currently have a lifeline for Syrian refugees in, for example, Jordan that consists of cash assistance to vulnerable families, 40% of whom are families headed by a woman because many of the men have been killed in the Syrian conflict. A family of four or five is supposed to cover the rent, education, health services et cetera with this. We certainly do not have enough resources. We are severely underfunded. The European bloc is an industrialised and developed bloc. We work mostly in developing nations where 86% of the world’s refugees are hosted. Lord Cormack: How many of you are on the ground dealing with the problems that we are engaging with today, and what is your budget? Andrej Mahecic: Globally? Lord Cormack: No, the people dealing with the subjects that we are talking about today: dealing with the refugees from the countries that you have very clearly enumerated and given us the percentage of. Andrej Mahecic: Globally there are about 8,000 UNHCR staff working in 125 countries. The largest operations by far are in Syria and its neighbouring countries. I do not have the staffing tables for the offices in Europe, but they are very small because their function is different. Their function is working with Governments on asylum and the quality of asylum procedures. It is also focused on global major emergencies and advocacy for them. The UNHCR’s offices in Europe have a different role compared with the operational presence that we have on the ground. If this is of interest to the Committee, we can certainly provide the profile of the offices in Europe and their size. The Chairman: That would be very helpful. It is of interest. Andrej Mahecic: In the light of the discussion of what is happening in the Mediterranean and because of the gaps identified in Greece and the situation in Italy, we have recently beefed up our presence there, especially vis-à-vis legal protection of refugees, the provision of aid et cetera. However, the primary response within the EU, which as I said is a developed, industrial bloc, will be the prerogative of the Governments. The Chairman: Thank you for that answer. Lord Soley: Just before I ask my question, can you clarify this? I might have misheard the early part of your answer to Lord Condon. I thought I heard you say that people-smuggling was outside your remit. Did I hear that correctly? Andrej Mahecic: I said that the UNHCR’s mandate is focused on refugee protection. We know that at times refugees may resort to smugglers and may become victims of traffickers. We are not a law enforcement agency. We approach the issue strictly from the refugee- protection aspect.

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Lord Soley: So people-smuggling is outside your remit? Is that what you are saying? It is what you seemed to be saying earlier. I am not saying that that is right or wrong, I am asking for clarification. Andrej Mahecic: It is not the primary focus of the mandate. It is something that could have, and at times has had, an impact on the refugees and the asylum seekers. In that context we are looking at this, but in a very co-ordinated way with others who have more expertise on this issue. Lord Soley: So it is in your remit? Andrej Mahecic: Partly. Lord Soley: Either it is or it is not. I understand what you said—that it is complicated and all the rest—but assuming I heard you correctly, you said that people smuggling is outside your remit. If it is, that raises certain questions; if it is not it would not. Andrej Mahecic: If we are approaching it from the law enforcement narrative, certainly we are not a law enforcement agency. Lord Soley: I understand that. Andrej Mahecic: However, we have concerns when refugees and asylum seekers are in situations where they have to resort to smugglers—they are then particularly vulnerable—as well as in situations where they could become victims of traffickers. Lord Soley: So if I write to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and say that my understanding, from your answer to Lord Condon, is that people-smuggling is outside your remit, you will confirm that? Andrej Mahecic: I can give the mandate as it has been written and given to the UNHCR.

Q8 Lord Soley: Right. Thank you very much. The question I wanted to ask you is about your experience of migrant smuggling on the ground. Is the framework against migrant smuggling effective? Does it have any drawbacks? Can you see the European Union’s action plan addressing any of the problems with it? Andrej Mahecic: Again, I fear I must repeat what I already said in answer to the previous question: I am not in a position to give you an answer on the implementation of the treaty, as that is not within the UNHCR’s remit. Lord Soley: No, but the UN says that there ought to be legal ways of doing it, and you are saying that you think that will address the people smuggling side of the problem. Is that correct? That is why you say, presumably—not you personally, but the office—that you want legal routes to deal with the people-smuggling problem. Andrej Mahecic: When we speak of the legal alternatives, these are the alternatives that would draw the refugees and asylum seekers away from the smugglers, but in the absence of credible legal alternatives people will resort to smugglers, and that is the problem. Lord Soley: I understand that. Is the framework that you have at the moment good? Is it successful, or not? Andrej Mahecic: Which specific framework? Lord Soley: The framework against migrant smuggling—I think that is the phrase you used.

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Andrej Mahecic: That particular international treaty is in the domain of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. I cannot give you an answer on the compliance and how successful the framework is, because it is not the treaty that we are supervising. Lord Soley: I understand your difficulty on this, and I am not saying that this applies to you necessarily, but it does come over that there is perhaps a wooliness about the thinking on people smuggling on the part of the wider bodies of the United Nations. It is hard to get clear answers, and I am not saying that it is necessarily your personal responsibility, but it is almost as though there is no clear strategy other than to say, “We need some legal outlets for people in order to stop the smuggling”. I rather doubt that would help, let alone stop it. Andrej Mahecic: The UN Office on Drugs and Crime could certainly provide the Committee with a more detailed and helpful response. As I said, it is very difficult for me to comment on the compliance and implementation of an international instrument that is outside our remit. The Chairman: Thank you. I think we have asked the question on human trafficking anyway, so Lord Wasserman has the next question.

Q9 Lord Wasserman: As I understand it, you are concerned with human rights and refugees, and you are not concerned with whether they get there by trafficking, smuggling or the ordinary routes. You want to protect refugees, no matter how they proceed. You find refugees and you want to protect their human rights, to look after them and to take care of them. There is another agency called the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and its business is stopping smuggling. Andrej Mahecic: Yes. Lord Wasserman: So you are really concerned with human beings and their human rights, and I think I understand that. You made it very clear, too, that you see a very big difference between smuggling and trafficking. Trafficking is actually a human rights violation. Smuggling might be illegal but it is one way of moving from one place to another, and we might not like it but it goes on all the time and it is certainly not your business professionally to stop it. I wonder what you opinion was on the proposal to extend the 2004 directive on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking—victims of a human rights violation—to migrants who are smuggled and who are therefore not subject to a human rights violation. Andrej Mahecic: Again, it is one of those complex issues where, in addition to what I can partially offer, comments can certainly be sought from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights as well as from the International Organization for Migration. From the perspective of the UNHCR and our refugee protection mandate in relation to this, we would expect smuggled migrants and the victims of trafficking to be channelled through an asylum procedure whereby it can be established whether these are people in need of international protection or not and then that protection granted if needed. Again, as you mentioned, it is really important to keep the distinction between smuggling and trafficking, because they basically entail different legal and practical responses to these situations, in addition to different levels of state obligation vis-à-vis those and to the state engagement. The 2004 residence permit directive was issued as a way of increasing the protection of victims of trafficking, although of course we recognise that there are situations where what started as smuggling turned into trafficking.

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There are also some thoughts from human rights experts from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and some concerns that they have voiced vis-à-vis the motivation behind this directive that it might be about tackling smugglers as opposed to providing proper protection to victims of smugglers. In some of the discussions that the human rights office had, the main preoccupation of states there was to use the smuggled migrants to get information about the smugglers. To do this they were even willing to forgo a few protections that are contained, for example, in the Palermo smuggling protocol. The other potential problem with this might be who is defined as a smuggled migrant. EU legislation, I understand, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, improperly defines smuggling in that it omits the profit element, which is an integral part of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Also from a human rights perspective, the human rights office has stressed that it would not want to see those who merely facilitate illegal entry to residents being harshly criminalised with the link being made between smugglers and traffickers. Going back to my earlier point, smuggling is not a human rights violation per se, but trafficking is. The Chairman: Did you want to ask a supplementary briefly, Lord Cormack? Lord Cormack: Yes, very briefly. You said earlier in answer to a question that I asked that you did not believe that you had enough resources. We are part of the UK Parliament. The UK is a permanent member of the Security Council. What should we be doing to ensure that you have better resources? What should you, not personally but within the United Nations, be doing better to co-ordinate your approaches to these really terrible human problems? Andrej Mahecic: First, the UK has been a very important contributor to the UNHCR. As you may know, the UNHCR is funded entirely by voluntary contributions. The UK has also generously contributed to the Syrian crisis. The Government frequently point out that since April 2011, when the Syrian crisis blew up, until today they have put forward some £800 million, which is a considerable contribution to the overall international effort. We also recognise the contribution that the UK Government are currently making vis-à-vis the search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean, the participation of the Royal Navy vessels in those operations and the thousands of lives that have been saved. When it comes to dealing with the specific elements of the agenda that relate to relocation and resettlement, we believe that only a genuine collective European effort will be able to succeed. We believe that the figures and the plan are important steps. The figures can be described as “modest”, but they are important because they open those very important legal alternatives. With regard to reception, the idea of relocation, burden-sharing and responsibility-sharing in the EU is important, because Greece and Italy are currently shouldering that. Equally, the largest numbers of asylum applications in Europe are launched in Germany, which received about 200,000 asylum applications last year, compared with about 30,000 received here in the UK. Many other asylum applications are also lodged in Sweden, especially by the Syrians. Those two situations are untenable. The Chairman: We are familiar with that, and in the interests of time I would like to move on. Andrej Mahecic: We believe that the UK can take part in the collective EU effort. The UK already has the vulnerable persons relocation programme in place. However, about 187

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Syrians have been resettled through that programme; by comparison, Germany has offered 30,000 places.

Q10 Lord Faulkner of Worcester: I shall start my question with a slightly naive preliminary. There is enormous confusion in this country, and I think elsewhere, between an economic migrant, an asylum seeker and a refugee. If we were to take you to, say, Calais this afternoon, where there may be 15,000 people at the border, what proportions of those people would fall into those categories? Andrej Mahecic: It is impossible to answer that question without talking to these people to find out who they are and what their needs are. My understanding from colleagues in France is that there are about 3,000 people around the port of Calais. What you can see there and in the Mediterranean is a consequence of what is happening elsewhere. This is where I come back to the issue of having robust procedures in place that can identify those in need of protection and those who are not. For the asylum system in Europe to be functional, it is important that these procedures are fair and efficient, because you need to grant protection to those who need it. We do not want to see the asylum system abused. While many migrants might be prompted by economic difficulties at home and by the ambition to better their lives, which is understandable, our primary concern lies with those fleeing for their lives and those who need to be granted protection. The function of the asylum system is of paramount importance for us. There is an issue in Europe where, if you are a Syrian refugee seeking asylum in Europe, your chances of being recognised as a refugee in Greece and in Sweden are far apart. In Greece, there are relatively low recognition rates, while in Sweden or Germany it is almost 100%. In the UK the recognition rate for Syrians is very high: it is about 85%. Lord Faulkner of Worcester: It is high? Andrej Mahecic: Very high, yes. That is the crucial part. Equally, you need to look at the solutions for those who do not need protection and whether there is any reason to grant them stay on any other grounds. In some cases the solution will be return, in dignity and safety, to the country of origin where they face no risk at all. This will be the solution for many, simply because they will have no way of regulating their stay in Europe. I believe that in Italy, for example, many of the young Tunisians who arrive on these boats are returned to Tunisia on the basis of the readmission agreement and because they do not have a founded protection claim.

Q11 The Chairman: Does the European Union action plan strike a correct balance between immigration control and refugee protection? Andrej Mahecic: The plan is an important step towards finding solutions to the current crisis. Clearly, more needs to be done, especially on addressing the root causes. We are amid the largest global displacement in modern times. We believe that it is essential that states work together to find answers and that Europe shows leadership and vision in addressing the challenges of protecting the thousands of refugees who are fleeing war. I spoke about the relocation of 40,000 people who are in clear need of international protection. The participation of all member states will be key to success in that regard. These measures will need to be expanded to address current needs and the fact that an increased proportion of the sea arrivals take place in Greece. On the proposal for the resettlement of 20,000 refugees, we are urging member states to make concrete commitments towards this goal beyond the existing resettlement quotas. We are also calling on member states to offer other legal avenues, as I mentioned. As I also just

173 of 175 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-12) mentioned, we have long recognised the importance of the return programmes for people not in need of international protection to preserve the integrity of the asylum systems. The plan, while heavy on the law enforcement element and border control, acknowledges the necessity of co-operation with countries of origin, the first asylum country and transit countries, but the root causes also need to be tackled. In that context of forced displacement, finding political solutions to conflicts and human rights violations, together with increasing development co-operation, is critically needed. Furthermore, major humanitarian operations, such as those in Syria and the Central African Republic and others, are dramatically underfunded. Although more targeted assistance is needed, including development initiatives, the resilience and self-reliance of refugees and internally displaced populations could be strengthened, allowing them to live their lives in hope and dignity. We, as the UN body mandated to work with refugees, stand ready to work and to collaborate with EU member states and EU institutions, as well as with other partners, to make these objectives a reality. We believe that now is the time for all EU member states to show strong commitment and leadership in supporting and building on these measures.

Q12 Baroness Pinnock: I have one question, but I might extend it to one and a half. During your responses to us this morning, you have said two things that are very interesting to me. Right at the beginning you talked about the fact that a lot of the migration from northern Africa, Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East was people fleeing conflict: in other words, it is not economic migration. Could you put some figures on that and give us the rough proportions? Secondly, right through your responses you have also talked about vulnerable people and people whose human rights might be violated. I am particularly concerned about girls and pregnant women. Does the action plan deal with those sufficiently? Andrej Mahecic: That has been our main focus of attention: strengthening the protection element of the EU plan. The EU plan obviously cannot deal with everything; it addresses a number of issues on the European agenda. First, on the situation across northern Africa and the Middle East, I have already spoken about the Syrian displacement, which is the main driver of what we are seeing. Of the Syrians who, for example, have initially sought immediate refuge in Egypt, we have at least 130,000 registered. The estimate is that there are many more who did not come forward to register for a number of reasons and concerns. Many of them have felt especially compelled to leave Egypt since the change of regime last year. A number of boats originated in Egypt. It is also the practice that when these boats are intercepted by the Egyptian navy, most of these people end up in detention, in addition, of course, to the harassment and the abuse that these people feel. Across northern Africa, we have another 24,000 Syrians registered, some of whom are also in Libya. As you can imagine, the current situation in Libya is dire, and volatile, and because of the collapse of law and order there, many of those who might have been there even as migrant workers ultimately decided to board these boats and make the journey to Europe in search of safety. Further into sub-Saharan Africa, there is Boko Haram in Nigeria, and our current estimate is that over a million people are displaced internally in Nigeria because of the violence. The neighbouring countries are hosting hundreds of thousands of Nigerian refugees, some of whom are likely to be also making their way northwards. There is another crisis in the

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Central African Republic, which is dire, and instability in South Sudan. To add to that, there are human rights abuses in Eritrea, which are pushing a large number of Eritrean refugees, and last year we already noticed a significant increase in the number of Eritreans, most of them tracking across Sudan and Libya, trying to make their way into Europe. Many of them are also trying to make their way through Sinai into Israel. These people are particularly vulnerable to traffickers. We often hear reports of people being abducted and families being approached for ransom. Further eastwards, there is the situation of Somalia and more than 20 years of civil war there. The camps that we are managing in northern Kenya are some of largest in the world. The Dadaab refugee complex consists of five camps and covers about 25 square kilometres, and is currently home to nearly half a million Somalis, some of whom are the third generation to grow up there. Throughout these situations, the particularly vulnerable categories are the girls and women, many of whom fall victim to torture, rape et cetera. We are particularly sensitive to that, and the resettlement programmes, especially for the resettlement of Syrians, take the vulnerability criteria into account, as outlined by UNHCR. The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed for your very comprehensive answers and your time this morning. We would be very grateful if you could send us information about your offices in Europe. That would be very helpful. As I said at the outset, if there is any other supplementary evidence that you want to send us, please feel free to do so.

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