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November 26, 2012 Distressed Investing 201219TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE Maximizing Profits in the Distressed Debt Market November 26, 2012 Helmsley Park Lane Hotel New York City HIGHLIGHTS Year in Review & New Business Opportunities Municipal Debt Restructuring Energy Industry Opportunities & Pitfalls Wildcard Claim Valuation Family Office Distressed Investing Multinational Companies in Chapter 11 Credit Bidding Labor Relations Successes & Disasters CLE Ethics Hour: Corporate Governance Investors’ Roundtable PLUS Wine Tasting and Honors Banquet for 2012 Outstanding Young Restructuring Attorneys PRESENTED BY 10.10.12 Dear Colleague: We are genuinely pleased and gratified that you have joined us for this conference. For you veteran attendees, you know that this is our 19th consecutive year hosting Distressed Investing. And for first-time attendees, we hope you make this an annual event. Our sponsors, as ever, are the lifeblood of this gathering. They represent the best, the brightest, and the most knowledgeable professionals in the world of restructuring. We say it every year, and we mean it: We are extremely grateful for their willingness to collaborate with us and to share their insights, their talents, and their time. As in previous years, this conference will be punctuated by three memorable highlights. First, during today’s luncheon, we will honor this year’s recipient of the Harvey Miller Award. The next notable event is the first-class wine tasting that is so generously hosted each year by Andy Rahl at Reed Smith and John Brincko of Sitrick Brincko Group. They open a treasure trove of world class wines, and we all are fortunate enough to both savor their selections as well as learn a bit about oenology. And finally, the day will be capped off by a tradition that we have truly come to enjoy and respect, a banquet at the offices of Skadden Arps to recognize the Outstanding Young Restructuring Lawyers of 2012. These are the remarkable standouts of today and the future of tomorrow’s endeavors in the restructuring arena. Congratulations to each of them. To our sponsors, to Harvey Miller, to John Brincko and Andy Rahl, and to the generous restructuring practice at Skadden Arps, we say a big, big Thank You. We couldn’t have done it without you. We hope everyone participating will find this day to be both illuminating and enjoyable. Thank you so much for being here. Cordially, Peter A. Chapman Nina Novak, Esq. CEO Managing Editor Beard Group | P.O. Box 40915 | Washington, DC 20016 Telephone (240) 629-3300 [email protected] | [email protected] 10.10.12 11:05am Family Office Distressed Investing Conference Agenda • A.M. Adam C. Harris, Panel Moderator, Partner SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, LLP 7:30am Registration and Continental Paul A. Rubin, Partner Breakfast HERRICK FEINSTEIN, LLP Ira Perimuter, Managing Partner Sponsored by T5 EQUITY CAPITAL 8:00am Chairman’s Opening Remarks Benjamin F. duPont, Managing Director & Co-Founder Hugh M. Ray, Partner FAIRBRIDGE VENTURE PARTNERS and Founder MCKOOL SMITH and President, yet2.com. Samuel Brill, Chief Investment Officer, Portfolio 8:10am Year in Review & New Business Manager and Director Opportunities WEISMANN CAPITAL, LLC Steven L. Gidumal, Managing Partner VIRTUS CAPITAL, LP Steve Gidumal will join us for the 17th year to share his Conference Agenda • P.M. insights and unique perspectives about the prior year’s 12:05pm The Harvey R. Miller Awards Luncheon winning and losing distressed investments and share his thoughts about what’s ahead given the outcome of the Sponsored by presidential election, continued high unemployment, and record-low interest rates. Presentation of the Harvey R. Miller Outstanding Achievement Award for Service to the Restructuring 8:40am Municipal Debt Restructing Industry to this year’s winner and that individual’s William A. Brandt, Jr., President keynote address, “My Advice to Distressed Investors”. DEVELOPMENT SPECIALISTS, INC. and Chairman of the Illinois Finance Authority 1:15pm Multinational Companies in John J. Rapisardi, Partner Chapter 11 CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT J. Andrew Rahl, Partner REED SMITH 9:30am Energy Industry Opportunities and Pitfalls 2:00pm Credit Bidding Paul N. Silverstein, Partner Robb L. Tretter, Partner Robin Russell, Partner BRACEWELL & GIULIANI ANDREWS KURTH, LLP Tim O’Conner, Managing Director Tero O. Jänne, Managing Director SANDLER O’NEILL JEFFERIES & COMPANY, INC. Mark Palmer, Director MATLINPATTERSON GLOBAL ADVISERS, LLC 10:10am Networking Break Larren M. Nashelsky, Partner MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP (who represented the Sponsored by bank in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Pick up a free copy or two of titles authored by some Bank in the Bankruptcy Court, Circuit Court and U.S. Distressed Investing 2012 faculty members and Supreme Court) published by Beard Books. Mark F. Hebbeln, Partner FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP 10:25am Wildcard Claim Valuation John Brincko, President 2:45pm Networking Break SITRICK BRINCKO Sponsored by Peter S. Kaufman, President GORDIAN GROUP, LLC 3:00pm Labor Relations Successes & Disasters This panel will outline practical ways for investors to Steven C. Bennett, Partner place values on the complex wildcard claims and causes JONES DAY of action like fraudulent conveyance claims, preference Robert D. Katz, Managing Director recoveries, and other claims and causes of action that EXECUTIVE SOUNDING BOARD ASSOCIATES, INC. may not be liquidated for years but may substantially Lorenzo Mendizabal, Managing Director impact creditor (and shareholder) recoveries in EPIQ SYSTEMS distressed situations. There are limits to what can and can’t be done to 10.10.12 pare labor costs in a chapter 11 setting. Learn what’s This veteran panel of distressed investors will tell you worked in the past, what hasn’t, and what ideas might how they’ve invested their money and how they intend be out there that haven’t been tested. We’ll also touch to invest their money in the current environment of on communicating with employees, their confusion, low interest rates, high unemployment, and runaway and debtors’ best practices beyond the typical first-day government spending. motion for permission (but not direction) to continue employment programs. 5:30pm Wine Tasting for All Delegates, Speakers and Honorees and Honors Banquet 3:45pm Ethics Hour for the 2012 Turnarounds & Workouts Outstanding John Wm. (Jack) Butler, Partner Young Restructuring Lawyers. SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & Hosted by FLOM, LLP Prof. Harlan D. Platt, Professor of Finance NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY D’AMORE-McKIM SCHOOL OF BUSINESS 4:45pm Investors’ Roundtable Steven L. Gidumal, Panel Moderator, Managing Partner VIRTUS CAPITAL, LP Leon Frenkel, General Partner TRIAGE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT Ken Grossman, Managing Partner JURIS ADVISORS, LLC Gary E. Hindes, Managing Director THE DELAWARE BAY COMPANY, LLC Dave Miller, Portfolio Manager ELLIOTT MANAGEMENT CORP. PLEASE JOIN US Wine Tasting for Honors Banquet All Delegates, for Turnarounds Speakers, and & Workouts Honorees Outstanding SPONSORED BY Young Restructuring Lawyers 2012 Wine Tasting & Honors Banquet will be hosted in their Conference Center by SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 4 Times Square (Broadway between 42nd & 43rd) 37th Floor 10.10.12 Outstanding Young Restructuring Lawyers • 2012 Ryan Blaine Bennett Todd M. Goren Currently represents Global Aviation Holdings, parent Represented unsecured creditors’ committee in LA company of World Airways, North American Airlines, Dodgers’s proceedings, helping secure a par plus interest and other subsidiaries. Principal attorney representing recovery. Successfully negotiated a $24 million insurance DBSD in negotiating and obtaining court approval of $1.49 buy back from Caribbean Petroleum’s liability insurance billion cash investment from DISH Network. Recently carrier for general unsecured creditors. Represented Euro- represented Japan Airlines as international restructuring hypo Bank AG’s NY branch and lenders having more than counsel advising JAL on all aspects of global restructuring. $2.6 billion exposure to General Growth Properties. Ronit Jeanine Berkovich Tyson M. Lomazow Represented Dallas Stars in sale of all hockey-related as- Counsel to unsecured creditors committee in Eastman sets. Represented Apple as bidder in historic Section 363 Kodak case. Played leading role in Capmark Financial sale of portfolio of 6,000 patents and patent applications Group case, representing ad hoc group of unsecured lend- of Nortel Networks. Apple partnered with consortium ers holding over $2 billion of debt. Representing Wilm- including EMC Corp., LM Ericsson, Microsoft, Research ington Trust Company as collateral trustee for 7.5% senior In Motion, and Sony in winning $4.5 billion bid, topping secured notes issued by American Airlines. Counsel to stalking horse Google. unsecured creditors’ committee of Sea Launch Company. Mark W. Deveno Douglas Mannal Represented first-ever officially recognized secured credi- One of the lead attorneys representing General Maritime. tors’ committee in reorganization of Spansion Japan. Represented Plainfield Asset Management in restructuring Representation, in case of Takefuji Corporation, of one of $300 million of Wolverine Tube debt. Represented Ameri- first-ever ad hoc bondholder groups to form and enforce can Capital in its significant investment in Appleseed’s. On its rights in a corporate reorganization. Most recently behalf of Smurfit-Stone creditor’s committee, negotiated has begun representing ad hoc group of bondholders in DIP financing, responsible for strategy
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