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GOVERNORS Gubernatorial Incapacity and Succession Provisions By Brian J. Gaines and Brian D. Roberts

Very rarely are living governors replaced because of incapacity. The infrequency of such events is no excuse for ambiguous resolution mechanisms; yet, several states have gaps in their legal provisions. Clarity in the grounds and procedures for replacing a governor who can no longer perform the duties of office is difficult to achieve, but the alternative is to flirt with avertable crises. Below we highlight which states seem remiss, and we catalogue some pertinent issues, without endorsing any one model as the optimal approach to this knotty question.

In September 2003, Frank O’Bannon, the Demo- event be a death, resignation under happy circum- cratic governor of Indiana, suffered a massive stroke. stance (e.g., following election or appointment to Early news stories reported that state officials had another office), forced resignation (e.g., following decided not to invoke the process for transferring conviction of a crime or revelation of a scandal), or authority to Lt. Gov. Joe Kernan (also a Democrat) even impeachment, removal or recall. It is quite rare until it became clear if there was any hope of for a living governor to be too severely incapacitated O’Bannon recovering. The relevant language from to govern, but Indiana’s experience is a reminder that Indiana’s constitution is found in Article 5, sections rare events sometimes happen. Surprisingly, a num- 10(a) and (d): ber of states have lacunae in their legal frameworks (a) …In case the Governor is unable to discharge the for dealing with such gubernatorial incapacity, not- powers and duties of his office, the Lieutenant withstanding the fact that controversy and near- Governor shall discharge the powers and duties misses with constitutional crisis have arisen at the of the office as Acting Governor. federal level and in several states. Here, we briefly review provisions for gubernatorial succession due (d)Whenever the President pro tempore of the Senate to incapacity across all 50 states, in an effort to de- and the Speaker of the House of Representatives termine which are well-equipped to deal with such file with the Supreme Court a written statement events, and which are vulnerable to crisis. suggesting that the Governor is unable to discharge Recognition of the frailty of officials is longstand- the powers and duties of his office, the Supreme ing: the federal constitution juxtaposes “inability to Court shall meet within forty-eight hours to de- discharge the Powers and Duties of [the presidency]” cide the question and such decision shall be final. with death, resignation and removal when broach- A day later, having consulted with the doctors treat- ing the line of succession in Article II, Section 1. th ing O’Bannon, the Republican senate president pro However, nearly two centuries passed before the 25 tempore and Democratic house speaker wrote to the Amendment filled out procedures for establishing chief justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, and the “inability,” the only inherently subjective condition court quickly ruled that Kernan should serve as act- of these four. The solution—also popular with ing governor, although O’Bannon would remain in states—was procedural rather than substantive. In office, entitled to salary and benefits. Five days later, lieu of any enumeration of conditions that constitute O’Bannon passed away, and Kernan automatically disability, most states (and the United States) specify succeeded him. procedures for replacement in the event of disabil- These unusual events, though traumatic for ity, thereby delegating discretion to individual deci- O’Bannon’s family, did not constitute a political cri- sion-makers on a case-by-case basis. There are po- sis. The transfer of authority was dignified, without tential hazards in such discretion, particularly where any aura of legal ambiguity or partisan controversy. natural partisan conflict can find its way into a de- Gubernatorial successions arise in many ways, and termination of disability. Far more hazardous, though, Indiana’s crisis was soon over-shadowed by the scan- is an absence of legal procedures for determining dal-induced resignations of the governors of Con- disability. necticut and New Jersey. Every state except Hawaii Table A lays out some key aspects of how the 50 has dealt with midterm gubernatorial vacancy, and states deal with incapacity in the governor. The first succession at the apex of the executive branch is typi- column lists constitutional provisions pertaining spe- cally a smooth process, whether the precipitating cifically to disability, and reveals that literally every

208 The Book of the States 2005 GOVERNORS state has at least some such language in its constitu- Edgar’s proxy in budget negotiations, though, hap- tion. The word counts give a fairly crude indication pily, the governor recovered quickly enough to sign of the level of detail in each state’s provisions: some- the final spending bill from his hospital bed. Had times a large number of words is deceptive insofar Kustra resigned before chest pains seized Edgar, ac- as the provisions are wordy, but not very detailed, or cording to Article V, Section 6(a), that vacancy in the section in question actually includes discussion the lieutenant governorship would have placed of some aspect of succession other than disability Democratic Attorney General Roland Burris first in (where possible, we provide a second disability-spe- the line of succession. In that event, a less speedy cific count in such cases). By contrast, low word recovery by the governor might have precipitated a counts reliably signal lack of specificity. For in- messy tussle for control. stance, the 53 words in Article III, Section 12 of the A catalogue of all crises and near misses for all Alaska Constitution read simply: states would be very long indeed. At the dramatic Whenever for a period of six months, a governor end of the spectrum, in 1900, Kentucky saw William has been continuously absent from office or has Goebel, the Democratic candidate for governor in a been unable to discharge the duties of his office disputed election, shot, declared elected by the leg- by reason of mental or physical disability, the of- islature, and then sworn in while hospitalized, only fice shall be deemed vacant. The procedure for to pass away days later. In a more recent and more determining absence and disability shall be pre- mundane case, Massachusetts Gov. Jane Swift—who scribed by law. had succeeded to the governorship when Paul Cellucci resigned to become ambassador to Canada— The second column of the table lists statutory pro- came under scrutiny while bedridden, awaiting the visions that elaborate on the constitutional language arrival of twins. Swift, a Republican, had to fend off about gubernatorial disability, and Alaska’s cell is allegations from Democrats serving on the empty. The state Legislative Affairs Agency explains: Governor’s Council that her physical absence from To avoid a tedious recitation of procedures simi- council meetings rendered her incapable of perform- lar to those found in the 25th Amendment to the ing her constitutional duties.4 U.S. Constitution, the drafters of the constitution Given the many borderline or contested disability assigned to the legislature responsibility for speci- cases that did not result in succession, and many more fying how the office of governor could be declared near misses, determination of whether a chief execu- vacant. The legislature has not yet done so, which tive is genuinely unable to perform duties is the crux may be unfortunate if the task became compli- of the matter, and the key column in Table A is the cated by the circumstances of a particular situa- middle one, which identifies what actors take part in tion warranting the use of this section.1 such determination. At a glance, one notes much “Unfortunate” seems an understatement, and variety. Indeed, this brief schematic cannot do jus- Alaska is not alone; as Table A shows, by our count, tice to the diversity of procedures found across the about a third of the states similarly suffer from hav- nation. A few aspects seem particularly important. ing “unclear” legal provisions on determination of How Many Actors (and Which ones) gubernatorial disability.2 Illinois is a surprising member of this club, since it has already weathered one are Involved? political crisis stemming from the prolonged ill- In most states, governors may designate them- health of a governor, and has dodged a bullet in re- selves unfit to govern (presumably in anticipation of cent memory. Gov. Henry Horner suffered a heart an expected medical crisis, or in the midst of a rap- attack in November 1938, but clung to office through idly worsening condition). When others must make an extended convalescence rather than allow Lt. Gov. the declaration, one of the main protections against John Stelle, a fellow Democrat but also a hated ri- controversy is involvement of many actors, often val, to take power. Unable to work for more than a representing all three branches of state government. few hours per day, Horner relied on a regency of Supreme courts are frequently included, more often unelected advisors, even as his foes launched an ar- as arbiters (as in Indiana) than as precipitators. South ray of challenges.3 In 1994, the possibility of a sud- Dakota’s constitution, though, provides its supreme den gubernatorial transition again loomed. Just days court with “original and exclusive jurisdiction” to after Lt. Gov. Bob Kustra had announced plans to determine the question of disability. In justifying resign, Gov. Jim Edgar underwent unscheduled, the designation of the supreme court as the body to emergency heart surgery. Kustra then acted as “ascertain the truth” about any allegation of inabil-

The Council of State Governments 209 GOVERNORS ity “unsound(ness of) mind,” the drafters of a line of succession for an interim governor while Alabama’s 1901 constitution explained, “The Com- the legislature makes this choice—that permit a very mittee can conceive of no safer body, no more au- temporary change of gubernatorial party stemming gust body, no body less liable to temptation to use from disability. the power for political gain or any other improper In Pennsylvania, where the lieutenant governor motive, than the Supreme Court of Alabama.”5 also serves as president pro tempore of the senate, the potential for change in partisan control of the gov- Must the Designation be Bi-partisan? ernorship has become more salient as two of the last In addition to being multi-member, supreme courts three governors have either resigned (Tom Ridge) or often (but not always) enjoy the appearance of non- temporarily relinquished their power (Bob Casey). partisanship. An alternative to ceding determination The question of separation of powers is also raised, power to non-partisan actors is to ensure that the pro- since the constitution requires the lieutenant gover- cedure used to determine disability involves a bipar- nor to vote in the event of a tie vote in the Senate.6 tisan group of actors. Requiring the involvement of Concern over potential partisan shifts even further a large array of actors has the effect of making it down the line of succession has recently prompted more likely that both major parties will take part, the Massachusetts legislature to consider a proposed though numbers alone provide no guarantee of bi- constitutional amendment that would allow a gover- partisanship. In Pennsylvania, state statute stipulates nor who succeeded to the post from the office of lieu- that the lieutenant governor and a majority of the tenant governor the capacity to appoint a new lieu- governor’s 26-member (as of 2004) cabinet make a tenant governor subject to the confirmation of both determination of disability, but the cabinet is com- legislative chambers.7 In short, the shadow of parti- prised of individuals appointed by the governor and san switches complicates every aspects of succes- confirmed by the state senate. The legislature enters sion, including what mechanism for assessing gu- the picture only in the event of a dispute about the bernatorial incapacity is optimal. governor’s capacity to resume the power and duties of the office. Does the Successor Play a Role? Section four of the 25th Amendment to the U.S. Can Succession Following from Disability Constitution provides a role for the president’s im- Result in Partisan Changeover? mediate successor, the vice president, in the deter- Almost all state lines of succession allow for party mination of disability. Several states follow a simi- changeover at some depth. Although this is not a lar practice. In Delaware, the immediate successor, point inherently about disability, the prospect of a while not in a position to make the determination partisan turnover surely complicates consideration unilaterally, could be a member of the opposite po- of an incumbent governor’s fitness to stay on, given litical party. There would appear to be some merit in a dispute over disability. Accordingly, Table A in- excluding immediate successors from this process, cludes a column showing the line of succession (and so as to decrease the possibility of cabal. Alabama, whether it is constitutionally or statutorily deter- for one, deliberately excludes the individual next in mined). The final column indicates how far down line to become governor from playing any part in the line of succession party changeover can occur, rendering judgment on the fitness of the incumbent, and also provides examples in those states that have a decision that the constitutional convention viewed seen such party-switching successions. (To be clear, as a “safeguard.” these cases did not necessarily involve disability, and all Civil War/Reconstruction switches were ignored). Is There Medical Involvement? Indiana is unusual in the degree to which its laws Another notable distinction among those states mitigate against a change in gubernatorial party. having clear provisions for the determination of dis- First, the governor and lieutenant governor are ability is whether they require the involvement of elected on a common ticket. That is an increasingly individuals with medical expertise. States in this cat- common arrangement, and a clear insulation against egory include Georgia, Iowa, Nebraska and Oregon. partisan changeover, except in unusual circumstance. As an example, Nebraska statutes designate the dean Furthermore, in the event of dual vacancies, Indiana of the College of Medicine of the University of Ne- requires the legislature to elect a replacement of the braska and the chairperson of the Department of Psy- same party as the incumbent. It is only brand new chiatry at the University of Nebraska Medical center changes in the constitution as of 2004—which broach as members of a three-person team who examine the

210 The Book of the States 2005 GOVERNORS governor and determine the issue of disability—a de- the president of the Senate without requiring this in- cision that requires unanimity among the examin- dividual to relinquish his legislative post. 12 This sce- ers.8 Iowa similarly lodges power to evaluate a seem- nario played out in 2001, as Senate President Donald ingly disabled governor in a three-member body in- DiFrancesco became acting governor following Gov. cluding “the person who is chief justice, the person Christine Todd Whitman’s departure to the Bush ad- who is director of mental health, and the person who ministration. The transition from DiFrancesco’s act- is the dean of medicine at the state university of Iowa” ing governorship to the swearing-in of governor-elect and even elaborates, “Provided, if either the director Jim McGreevey in 2002 saw a week with an unprec- or dean is not a physician…the director or dean may edented four acting governors, including a farcical assign a member of the director’s or dean’s staff so six-day stretch with both Republican and Democrat licensed to assist and advise on the conference.”9 acting governors.13 In the summer of 2004, McGreevey, in the midst of a scandal, precipitated Acting or Actual? another chaotic transition by announcing his resig- In Table A, for brevity, we finesse the discrepancy nation, but delaying it to prevent a special election between an “acting” (where powers and duties, but for his successor. We would quickly concur that New not the office devolve) and “actual” governor (where Jersey’s laws can use an overhaul; but, to give credit both the powers and the office devolve). In many cases where due, it is not especially remiss in detailing how the distinction is far from trivial; and it can be an es- a stricken governor be evaluated. By contrast, many pecially important consideration in the event of dis- states simply have not dealt seriously with the issue. ability insofar as a living, but incapacitated governor Finally, we note that a special case of gubernato- might require health benefits. In Utah, a state that has rial disability might occur in the course of a large- a rather detailed process for determining disability, but scale emergency wherein many other state officials very limited experience with midterm succession, con- are also afflicted. Since September 11, 2001, there siderable ambiguity on the acting-versus-actual point has been renewed discussion of how American gov- surrounded the transition from Gov. Mike Leavitt to ernments (federal and state) would cope with an at- Lt. Gov. Olene Walker upon Leavitt’s acceptance of tack or other disaster that disabled numerous offi- the office of administrator of the federal EPA in 2003. cials simultaneously. Many states already have fairly As of late 2004, the state’s Constitutional Revision specific provisions to allow continuity in the opera- Commission was considering recommendations to tions of state government in the event of some cata- clarify succession procedures.10 strophic event (terrorist attack, natural disaster, etc.). Most statutes of this nature have their origins in the Conclusion cold war era, but a few states have enacted new stat- As we write, late in 2004, New Jersey’s unusual utes since the 9/11 attacks. Nevada offers one ex- gubernatorial succession law is making news. By ample,14 and post-9/11 concern played a direct role most accounts the governor of New Jersey is among when Virginia voters recently overwhelmingly sup- the strongest of the nation’s chief executives. Exclud- ported a constitutional amendment adding an addi- ing U.S. senators, the governor is the only statewide tional 14 potential successors to a line previously elected official. Vast appointment power allows the containing only three.15 As officials and scholars re- governor to select heads of executive departments, visit the question of how to handle the unthinkable members of state and certain county commissions, in many states, they would do well also to re-exam- judges and prosecutors. The reaches of power ex- ine their rules for handling an isolated emergency. tend even into the legislative arena, where the gov- Inability, whether strictly medical or understood ernor is endowed not only with veto authority that more broadly, is ambiguous and subjective in a way requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers to that death, resignation and removal are not, so clear counteract, but the capacity to request legislation for provisions controlling how to determine when a gov- executive action in a manner that is favorable to ernor should not retain office are critical. Those states pocket vetoes.11 The extensive powers of the New that do have rules have, in many cases, passed a few Jersey governor are compounded by the state’s suc- trials. But the number of empirical data points is cession laws. One of eight states without a separate small, and it is not difficult to identify bothersome lieutenant governor, New Jersey flouts traditional or problematic scenarios even in the states with de- separation of powers principles by allowing (in the tailed, modern constitutional and statutory provi- event of the absence, death or disability of the gov- sions. Though rare, gubernatorial inability merits ernor) the power of the governor to devolve upon close attention.

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11 “Perspective: The Evolution of New Jersey’s Guberna- Notes torial Power,” 25 Seton Hall Legis. J. 1 (2001): 5-6. 1 Gordon Harrison. Alaska’s Constitution: A Citizen’s 12 Julia Nienaber Hurst, “Lieutenant Governors: Power- Guide. 4tth ed.(Juneau, AK: Alaska Legislative Affairs ful in Two Branches,” The Book of the States 2004 (Lexing- Agency, 2002), 80. ton, Ky: The Council of State Governments, 2004): 189. 2 We assembled Table A using LexisNexis and hardcopies 13 Mike Kelly, “Just Make us Proud; We’re Longing for of state codes and constitutions as well as interviews with Return to Normalcy,” The Record (Bergen County, NJ), 14 officials in a number of states. Since constitutions and codes November 2004. are constantly changing, we may have missed some provi- 14 Neb. Rev. St. § 239C.260. sions even with this multi-stage screening. 15 Michael Hardy, “Changes Secure Approval; Virginia 3 Thomas B. Littlewood, Horner of Illinois (Evanston, Voters Back Two Amendments to State’s Constitution,” Rich- IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969). mond Times-Dispatch, 3 November 2004, A25. The previ- 4 Boston Herald, “Pregnant Pause Needed – Dems Re- ous list included only the lieutenant governor, attorney gen- miss in Handling of Gov. Mom,” 13 May 2001, Op.Ed., 23. eral and the speaker of the House. The amendment added 5 Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention the chairmen of the 14 standing committees in the Virginia of the State of Alabama, May 21st, 1901 to September 3rd, House of Delegates. 1901. Volume I (Wetumpka, AL: Wetumpka Printing Co., 1940), 482. 6 George Strawley, “Senate’s Top Republican Proposes About the Authors New Rules for Lt. Governor,” Associated Press State and Brian J. Gaines is an associate professor in the Depart- Local Wire, 24 December 2002. ment of Political Science and the Institute of Government 7 Boston Globe, “Constitutional Questions,” 11 Febru- and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois, Urbana- ary 2004, A22. Champaign. He has served as a consultant for two Canadian 8 R.R.S. Neb. § 84-127. Royal Commissions and for Polimetrix, Inc. 9 Iowa Code 7.14. 10 Nicole Warburton, “Guv’s Succession May be Clari- Brian D. Roberts is an assistant professor of Political fied,” Salt Lake Tribune, 9 July 2004, B5. A determina- Science and the director of the Cox School of Government tion was made that Walker assumed the full control of the at Principia College. From 1991 to 1994, he served as the power and responsibilities of the office. director of research for the Texas Public Policy Foundation.

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Table A PROVISIONS FOR DISABILITY-BASED GUBERNATORIAL SUCCESSION IN THE 50 STATES

Constitutional Statutory Actors involved Depth in line of article, section elaboration on in disability Line of succession for State (total words)(a) disability designation succession possible party switch

Alabama ...... V, 128 (297) . . . Any 2 in line of succession LG, 6 more (C) 1 (1993) except successor, SC Alaska ...... III, 12 (53) . . . Unclear LG, apt. (C, S) 2 (unlikely) (none) Arizona ...... V, 6 (206*) . . . Unclear SS, 3 more (C) 1 (1988) Arkansas ...... CA 6, 4 (96*) 21-1-304 (159) Unclear LG, 5(b) (C, S) 1 (1996) California ...... V, 10 (105,* 62) 12070-12076 (259) 5-member commission, SC LG, 6 more (C, S) 1 (1917) Colorado ...... IV, 13[6] (137) . . . G; legislature, SC LG, 4 more (C) 2 (unlikely) (none) Connecticut ...... CA XXII, IV, 18c-h (869) Vol. 1, 3, 31, 3-1a (370) G; LG, 9-member council, LG, PPT (C, S) 2 (1946) SC, legislature Delaware ...... III, 20b (368) . . . G; 3-member board (incl LG), legislature LG, 4 more (C) 1 (1895)(c) Florida ...... IV, 3b (129) . . . G; 4 cabinet members, LG, 6 more (C, S) 2 (none) G, legislature, SC Georgia ...... V, IV (265) . . . Any 4 elected exec., SC, LG, SH(b) (C) 1 (none) at least 3 physicians Hawaii ...... V, 4 (147,* 43) . . . Unclear LG, 7 more (C, S) 2 (none) Idaho ...... IV, 12 (75,* 37) 67-805A[2] (43) Unclear LG, PPT, SH (C) 1 (none) Illinois ...... V, 6c-d (136) 15 ILCS 5/0.01 (224*) G; otherwise unclear LG, 6 more (C, S) 2 (none) Indiana ...... 5, 10c-d (216) . . . G; PPT, SH, SC LG, 6(b), leg-el (C) 2(b), no (none) Iowa ...... IV, 17, 19 (248) 7.14 (362) CJ, next in line of succession, LG, PPT, SH leg-el (C) 2 (none) 3-member board, G Kansas ...... I, 11 (167) 75-126 (147) Unclear LG, PPT, SH (C, S) 2 (none) Kentucky ...... 84 (286) . . . G; AG, SC LG, PS (C) 2 (1834)(c) Louisiana ...... IV, 17-18 (447) . . . G; 5/9 stwd elec. exec., LG, 5 more (C) 1 (none) G, legislature, SC Maine ...... V, 1, 14-15 (839,* 445) . . . G; legislature, SC; SS, SC PPT, SH 1 (1959) Maryland ...... II, 6 (851) . . . G; legislature, SC LG, PS, leg. picks (C) 2 (1969)(c) Massachusetts ...... XCI (459) . . . G; SC (or other body) LG, 4 more (C) 2 (none) Michigan ...... V, 26 (211,* 116) . . . G; PPT, SH, SC LG, 2 more (C) 2 (none) Minnesota ...... V, 5 (157) 4.06, c-e (383) G, 3/4-member board, LG, 5 more (C, S) 2 (1915)(c) G, legislature Mississippi ...... V, 131 (319) . . . SS, SC LG, PPT, SH (C) 1 (1876) Missouri ...... IV, 11a-b (574) . . . G; 9-member board (LG), SC LG, 6 more (C) 1 (none) Montana ...... VI, 14[2-5] (235) . . . G; LG & AG, legislature LG, PS, SH (C) 2 (none) Nebraska ...... IV, 16 (197*) 84-127, 128 (353) LG & 3-member board LG, SH (C) 2 (1960) of medical and psych. experts Nevada ...... V, 17-18 (230*) 223.080 (184*) Unclear LG, 3 more (C, S) 1 (none) New Hampshire ...... II, 49-a (504) . . . G; AG & 5-member PS, 3 more(b) (C) 1 (none) elected council, SC New Jersey ...... V, 1[7-8] (284*) . . . G; legislature, SC PS, 3 more (C, S) 1 (2001) New Mexico ...... V, 7 (305*) . . . Unclear LG, 7 more (C, S) 2 (1917)(c) New York ...... V, 5-6 (455*) . . . Unclear LG, 2 more (C) 2 (1829)(c) North Carolina ...... III, 3 (329*, 197) . . . G; AG, legislature LG, 10 more (C, S) 1 (none) North Dakota ...... V, 11 (65*) . . . Unclear LG, 4 more (C, S) 2 (1935)(c) Ohio ...... III, 15, 22 (449*, 212) . . . G; legislature, SC LG 6 more (C, S) 2 (1957) See Footnotes at end of table

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PROVISIONS FOR DISABILITY-BASED GUBERNATORIAL SUCCESSION IN THE 50 STATES—Continued

Oklahoma ...... VI, 15-16 (235*) 74, 8 (593) G; PPT, SH, 6-member LG, PPT, SH (C, S) 1 (none) committee, legislature, SC Oregon ...... V, 8a (264*) 176.040, 176.050 (318) G; SS,CJof SC, 2 medical SS, 3 more (C) 1 (1909) experts Pennsyvlania ...... IV, 13 (65*) 71, 784.1-784.3 (333) G; LG, Gov.’s Cabinet, LG, PPT, SH (C, S) 2 (1848)(c) legislature Rhode Island ...... IX, 9-10 (107*) . . . SC LG, 4 more (C, S) 1 (none) South Carolina ...... IV, 11-12 (431*, 334) . . . G; PPT & SH, AG, SS, LG, 5 more (C, S) 1 (none) Compt. Gen., legislature South Dakota ...... IV, 6 (188*) . . . SC LG, 10 more (C, S) 2 (none) Tennessee ...... III, 12 (70*) 8-1-109[b,1-2] (101) G (to authorize power of atty,), LG, 4 more (C, S) 1 (none) otherwise unclear

Texas ...... IV, 3a (249*) . . . Unclear LG, 3 more (+ order 1 (none) of 14 ct. of appearls CJs) (C, S) Utah ...... VII, 11 (538*, 167) . . . G; PS, SH, SC LG, 5 more (C, S) 2 (none) Vermont ...... II, 24 (161*) . . . Unclear LG, 4 more (C, S) 1 (1991) Virginia ...... V, 16 (559*, 341) 24.2-211 (341) G; PPT, SH, AG, legislature LG, 6 more (C, S) 1 (none) Washington ...... III, 10 (378*) . . . Unclear LG, 6 more (C) 1 (1919) West Virginia ...... VII, 16 (133*) . . . Unclear PS, 3 more 1 (none) Wisconsin ...... V, 7-8 (222*) 17.025 (751) 7 member diasbility board LG, 5 more (C, S) 2 (none) that includes G (see 14.015 of statutes) Wyoming ...... IV, 6 (51*) . . . Unclear SS, 7 more 1 (1949)

Source: Compiled by the authors from relevant constitutions, statutes and SC—Supreme Court reference sources, 2004. SH—Speaker of the House Key: SS—Secretary of State C—Constitutional provisions apt.—individual appointed into line of sucession by the governor, subject to CJ—Chief Justice legislative confirmation . G—Governor leg-el— individual elected by the legislature LG—Lieutenant Governor (a) For those numbers followed by an asterick, the word count covers sec- PPT—President (Pro Tempore) of the Senate tion with other details (e.g. succession in case of death). PS—President of the Senate (b) Successor takes power only on an interim or acting basis, pending spe- S—Statute cial election. (c) Occurred under a previous constitutional or statutory regime.

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