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1 C Structure of Iranian Govement 10 Structure of the Iranian Government, National and Local Executive Branch • Assembly of Experts 1: o The Assembly of Experts is a congressional body of 86 religious scholars (Mujtaheds) elected by direct public vote to eight year terms who meet in the former Senate building in Tehran. o The current assembly (4 th Assembly) took place on December 15 th 2006 concurrently with municipal elections and was convened on February 19 th 2007 with Ali Meshkini as Chairman and after he died Hashemi Rafsanjani was substituted on July 2007. o The law obligates the assembly to meet for at least two days, twice annually. Among their constitutional duties they elect the Supreme Leader and supervise his activities based on his qualifications in the field of jurisprudence and commitment to the principles of the revolution, reviewing his performance, and deposing him if deemed necessary. 2 o The guardian council determines the qualification of assembly of expert candidates who finally compete. o There is a vicious circle. Supreme leader appoint voter member of guardian council, Guardian council assign the qualification of assembly of expert members and these members appoint supreme leader and supervise his performance!!! It is a strong sign that show why the assembly of expert is not a serious parliament and does not compatible with democratic principals. • Expediency Council: o The Expediency Council is an administrative policy advisory and implementation board consistent of permanent members, who number over 40 and represent all major government factions. o The current council was appointed on February 27, 2007 and was convened with Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as Re-appointed Chairman. o The permanent members of the Council are appointed by the Supreme Leader for five-year terms; temporary members, including Cabinet members and Majles committee chairmen, are selected when issues under their jurisdiction come before the Expediency Council; the Council further includes the heads 1 Majles-e-Khobregan 2 As all of their meetings and notes are strictly confidential, the Assembly has never been publicly known to challenge any of the Supreme Leader's decisions. of the three branches of government, and the clerical members of the Council of Guardians; o Expediency Council exerts supervisory authority over the executive, judicial, and legislative branches and meditate to resolve differences or conflicts on legislative issues on which the Majles and the Council of Guardians disagree and serves as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader, making it one of the most powerful governing bodies in the country. o In October 2005, the Supreme Leader delegated some of his supervisory powers over the government to the Expediency Council. • Council of Guardians: o The Council of Guardians is a high chamber within the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, legitimated by Chapter 6 of the Constitution. o It is a12-member board made up of six clerics chosen by the Supreme Leader and six jurists selected by the Majles from a list of candidates recommended by the judiciary (which in turn is controlled by the Supreme Leader) for six- year terms on a phased basis, so that half the membership changes every three years. The current Chairman of the Council is Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati. o The Council determines whether proposed legislation in the Majles is both constitutional and faithful to Islamic law, vets candidates for suitability, and supervises national elections. Interpretative decisions on the Constitution require a three-quarters majority of the Council. If a law is deemed incompatible with the constitution or Sharia (Islamic law), it is referred back to Parliament for revision. If the Majles and the Council of Guardians cannot decide on a case, it is passed up to the Expediency Council for a decision. Further the Council is accorded "supervision of elections”. Legislative Branch • According to article 7 of the Iranian Constitution, these local councils together with the Parliament are "decision-making and administrative organs of the State". • Parliament o Articles 62 through 90 of the Constitution of 1979 invest legislative power in the unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly, the parliament called Majles- e-Shura-ye-Eslami or Majles. o The Majles is elected by popular vote to serve for four year terms. Last elections were held February 20 th 2004 with a runoff held May 7 th 2004. The next election will be in March 2008 o The Majles is comprised of 290 seats from which 190 are held by the conservatives/ Islamists, 50 by reformers, 43 by independents and 5 by religious minorities. 3 o All Majles candidates and all legislation from the assembly must be approved by the Council of Guardians. o The Constitution permits the Majles to draft legislation, ratify international treaties, approve the national budget, format committees and hold hearings. The Majles not only has the responsibility of approving the prime minister and cabinet members but also has the right to question any individual minister or anyone from the government as a whole about policies. Articles 88 and 89 require ministers to appear before the Majles within ten days to respond to a request for interpellation. If the deputies are dissatisfied with the information obtained during such questioning, they may request the Majles to schedule a confidence vote on the performance of a minister or the government. • City and Village Councils o These are local councils which are elected by public vote in all cities and villages throughout Iran. Council members in each city or village are elected by direct public vote to a 4 year term. o The councils are in charge of electing mayors, supervising the activities of municipalities; study of social, cultural, educational, health, economic, and welfare requirements of their constituencies; the planning and coordination of national participation in the implementation of social, economic, constructive, cultural, educational and other welfare affairs. Judiciary • The judicial system is regulated in Chapter XI of the Constitution and provides for an independent judiciary according to its article 156. After the 1979 revolution, it was revised to conform to an Islamic canon based on the Koran Sunna 4 and other Islamic sources. • The highest judicial office is the High Council of Justice, which consists of five members who serve five-year, renewable terms. The High Council of Justice consists of the chief justice of the Supreme Court 5 and the attorney general 6, both of whom must be Shia mujtahids 7, and three other clergy chosen by religious jurists. 3 To seats unaccounted 4 the traditions of the Prophet 5 Appointed by the fagih in consultation with the justices of the Supreme Court 6 also seen as State Prosecutor General 7 members of the clergy whose demonstrated erudition in religious law has earned them the privilege of interpreting laws • The Supreme Leader appoints the head of Iran’s Judiciary, who in turn appoints the head of the Supreme Court and the chief public prosecutor. • The responsibilities of the High Council of Justice include establishing appropriate departments within the Ministry of Justice to deal with civil and criminal offenses, preparing draft bills related to the judiciary, and supervising the appointment of judges. The minister of justice is responsible for all courts throughout the country. • The judges of all the courts must be knowledgeable in Shia jurisprudence; they must meet other qualifications determined by rules established by the High Council of Justice. Women are barred from serving as certain types of judges. There are several court systems. The two most active are the common courts and the Islamic revolutionary courts. o Common Courts Investigations of all civil, criminal, non litigious cases are within the jurisdiction of the common courts. There is no jury system in the civil and criminal courts. The establishment of such courts, in each judicial district, the extent of the area of each district and number of the court branches is subject to the approval of the Head of the Judicial Power. o Revolutionary Courts Address all of the offenses against the internal and external security of the Country (Utter slander against the Founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Honorable Leader, Conspiracy against the Islamic Republic of Iran or carrying arms, use of terrorism, destruction of building against the IRI's system, Engaging in espionage for aliens, all crimes involving smugglings and narcotic items). o Supreme Courts The State Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority in the Country, whose composition is based upon laws drafted by the High Council of Justice. It is an appellate court that supervises the proper enforcement of laws by the courts of justice, to make judiciary precedent, to revise judgments delivered by the Military Court and the significant judgments of the Common and Revolutionary Courts. Tin addition the State Supreme Court 8 is competent to investigate miscarriages committed by the President in discharging his duties. 8 pursuant to section 10 of Article 110 of the Constitution The main seat of the Supreme Court is in the city of Tehran. It is composed of various branches and has 33 at the present time. Two of the branches are in Mashad and the remaining are in Tehran. Each branch is presided over by two judges, (one as chief and the other one as advisor) and may have one deputy to discharge the duties of either of the two judges as and when necessary. The chief and the advisor have the right to issue judgments. In addition to the State Supreme Court, there is the prosecutor's office of the State Supreme Court: State Prosecutor’s office It is composed of a chief (the State prosecutor General) and the First and Second Deputies and a number of assistants to the State Prosecutor General who discharge their functions together with the State Supreme Court.
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