IN STALIN'S SHADOVV The New Russian History

SeriesEditor: Donald]. Raleigh, University of North Carolina,Chapel Hill

This new seriesmakes examples of the finest work of the most eminent historiansin Russia today available to English-languagereaders. Each volume has beenspecially prepared by the authorwith an international audiencein mind, and each will be translatedand introducedby an outstandingWestern scholar in the samefield.

THE REFORMS OF PETER THE GREAT ProgressThrough Coercion in Russia Evgenii V Anisimov Translatedwith an introduction byJohnT. Alexander

IN STAliN'S SHADOW The Careerof "Sergo" Ordzhonikidze Oleg V Khlevniuk Translatedby David Nordlander Edited with an introduction by DonaldJ Raleigh, with the assistanceof Kathy S. Transchel IN STALIN'S SHADOVV

THE CAREER OF "SERGO" ORDZHONIKIDZE

Oleg V. Khlevniuk Edited with an Introduction by Donald J. Raleigh with the assistanceof Kathy S. Transchel

Translatedby David J. Nordlander

~l RoutledgeRoutledge ~ ~ Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK First published1995 by M.E. Sharpe

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First publishedin Russianin 1993 by "Rossiiamolodaia" under the title Stalin i Ordzhonikidze:Konflikty v Politbiuro v 30-egody. © 1993 by O. V. Khlevniuk.

Library of CongressCataloging-in-Publication Data

Khlevniuk. O. V. (Oleg Vital' evich) [Stalin i Ordzhonikidze.English] In Stalin's shadow:the careerof "Sergo" OrdzhonikidzeI by Oleg V. Khlevniuk: editedby Donald J. Raleigh: with the assistanceof Kathy S. Transchel: translatedby David J. Nordlander. p. cm. - (The new Russianhistory) Includesbibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-56324-562-0. - ISBN 1-56324-563-9(pbk.) I. Union-History-1925-1953. 2. Stalin, Joseph,1879-1953. 3. Ordzhonikidze,Sergo, 1886-1937. I. Raleigh, Donald J. II. Transchel.Kathy S. Ill. Title. IV. Series. DK267.K437813 1995 947.084---<1c20 95-5694 CIP

ISBN 13: 9781563245633(pbk) ISBN 13: 9781563245626(hbk) Contents

Editor'sIntroduction vii

RussianTerms and Abbreviations xi

Introduction 3

1. The Making of a "Party Professional" 9

2. At the Headof the CentralControl Commission 21

3. The LominadzeMfair 30

4. The HeadManager 40

5. Ordzhonikidzeand Kirov 62

6. Lominadze'sSuicide 69

7. Stakhanovitesand "Saboteurs" 78

8. Piatakov'sArrest 92

9. An UnhappyBirthday (Ordzhonikidzeand Beria) 103 10. Rout of the EconomicCadres 111

11. Preparingfor the Plenum 126

12. The Last Days 143

13. Murder or Suicide? 150

14. After the Funeral(Ordzhonikidze and Molotov) 163

Conclusion 175

Notes 179

Index

About the Author Editor's Introduction

Until recently, historical studies on the dark years of Iosif Vissari- onovich Stalin were hinderedby the Kremlin's cloak of secretiveness. The inaccessibilityof essentialdocuments compelled investigatorsto snatchat whateverbits of .information becameavailable, including ru- mors andvarious other suspect sources, in constructingtheir narratives. The lack of hard data, however, did not preventsome historians from pleading their caseswith passionand conviction. Not surprisingly, the intrusion of the authors' personal biases into their works has been characteristicof muchof the writing on the Stalin period. The opening in the post-Soviet era of some-butnot all-of the archivesneeded for a full-scale reassessmentof the Stalin years has led to a historiographicalrevolution of sorts, as has the fact that Russian historianshave been freed from the constraintsof Soviet dogma and rhetoric. Excited by the prospectof reinterpretinga pivotal era in their country's history, they have begun to contribute fresh analysesof the 1930s and 1940s. But despiteserendipitous discoveries, it appearsthat the archivesmight not hold answersto all the burning questions.The imperfectrecord on somecritical issuescan nonethelessbe put to good use by careful historiansextending the parametersof debate,raising new questions,and throwing light on the most obscurechapters of Soviet history. A case in point is 's absorbingstudy of Grigorii K. (Sergo) Ordzhonikidze,In Stalin's S/w,dow. Ordzhonikidze?Although not well known in this country outside academiccircles, the name Ordzhonikidze is more than familiar to

vii viii DONALD J. RALEIGH

Russianreaders, thanks to a minor personalitycult Soviet officialdom constructedaround him. Schoolsand institutes, streetsand highways, towns and farms carried and still carry his name. His ashesremain buried in the Kremlin walls, amongthe pantheonof fallen revolution- ary heroes.Despite the efforts of Soviet historiographyto presentan "official" interpretationof his career,however, Ordzhonikidze has been the subjectof sustainedspeculation and hearsayever since his deathin rathermysterious circumstances in 1937, a year in which so many other Old Bolsheviksperished at the handsof the secretpolice. As oneof Stalin'sclosest associates and most powerful andinfluential economicmanagers, Ordzhonikidze, a fellow Georgian,played no small role in Kremlin politics during the yearsleading up to his death.While keepingOrdzhonikidze as his focal point, Khlevniuk examinesthe ca- reer of Sergo to probe larger questionsof Soviet political history. Was Stalin powerful enoughto have the do his bidding, or did top party leadersplaya significant role in decision making? Was there op- position to the "party line" within the organization'sgeneral member- ship or the inner sanctumsof the Kremlin and, if so, did it ever emerge as a viable alternativeto Stalinism?Were there conflicts betweenStalin and his closestcomrades? If so, how far did they go to opposehim? Drawing on newly openedfiles in both the former CommunistParty and Soviet governmentarchives, the author builds on the two extant points of view found in the scholarly literature about Ordzhonikidze's role in Kremlin intrigues. Some authors, basing their argumentson memoirsand personalaccounts, argue that Ordzhonikidzeprepared to challengeStalin openly and consequentlypaid with his life. A counter viewpoint is that no one among his contemporariesconsidered Ord- zhonikidze a serious opponentof Stalin's policies, especially that of state terror, and that Sergo took his own life. Weighing both perspec- tives, Khlevniuk offers an alternative explanationthat is more subtle andnuanced. And more convincing. Khlevniuk's Ordzhonikidzeis a tragic figure. A "soft Stalinist" deeply troubled by unfounded accusationsof industrial sabotageand no longer able to comprehendand accommodatethat which was going on aroundhim, Sergobecame defensive and confused.The ensuingcrisis consumedhim-and resulted in his murder. Or was it suiCide? Khlevniuk interrogatesthe availablesources and offers an answerto this EDITOR'S INTRODUCfION ix recurrentquestion. What is so attractiveabout his compellingargument is that it helpsexplain how the Stalinistsystem worked. Khlevniuk's study can be recommendedto readersfor severalother reasons.His is not only the first publishedstudy of the Politburo in the 1930s basedon recently declassifiedmaterials, but it is also one of the few works available that delves into the vital interlude between 's murderin 1934, often viewed as the openingsalvo of the Stalinist terror, and Ordzhonikidze'sdemise in 1937. Deftly weaving a tale of suspenseand intrigue, Khlevniuk frequently lets the documentsspeak for themselves.Whenever the sourcesare silent or difficult to decode,he offers plausible versions of what might have been. Unlike many of his contemporarieswho in the currentscholarly atmosphere in Russiahigh- light the moral turpitude and historical guilt of Sovietleaders, Khlevniuk adoptsa detachedtone in passingjudgment on his protagonists. It is my pleasureto invite readersto enjoy this, the secondvolume in a seriesof historicalworks in translation,The New RussianHistory, whose purposeis to make available to English readersthe finest works of the most eminenthistorians of Russiatoday. Born in 1959, Oleg Khlevniuk defendedhis candidatedegree in history at the Institute of History of the then-SovietAcademy of Sciencesin 1987. His dissertationand early publicationstreat of Soviet urbanizationand the formation of a work- ing class in the 1930s.During the Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev years, Khlevniuk joined the editorial collective of the journal Kommunist (Communist),an official organof the CommunistParty. He also gained accessto the CommunistParty archivein . Using materialsfrom it and related repositories,he publisheda secondbook in Moscow in 1992 entitled 1937-i: Stalin, NKVD i Sovetskoeobshchestvo (The Year 1937: Stalin, the NKVD, and Soviet Society). Khlevniuk is presentlyrewriting the book for publication in this series,incorporating newly declassified documentsmade available since its first publication. He also works as an editor of Svobodnaiamysl' (Free Thought), a Moscow public affairs journal that supersededKommunist. The English-languageedition of Khlevniuk's studyof Ordzhonikidze and Kremlin politics representsa team effort. David Nordlandergood- naturedly took up the task of translating the work, finishing a draft translationand revisions I suggestedon the early chaptersbefore he left the country to carry out dissertationresearch in Moscow andMagadan. x DONALD J. RALEIGH

I assumedfull responsibilityfor the project at that time, checkingthe entire translation against the original and editing it. I was very ably assistedby Kathy S. Transchel,who helped nurture the manuscript throughseveral additional drafts. It is a pleasurefor me as well to thank David R. Shearerfor introduc- ing me to Oleg Khlevniuk's work, and andJ. Arch Getty, who called this particularvolume to my attention.I also wish to acknowledgethe assistanceof SusanBeam Eggers,who preparedthe index. Finally, I wish to expressmy thanks to PatriciaA. Kolb and her staff at M. E. SharpeInc., Publisher,for their unflaggingsupport of this monographseries and for their soundprofessional advice, which made this a betterbook.

DonaldJ.Raleigh ChapelHill, NC Russian Terms and Abbreviations

CC Central Committeeof the CommunistParty of the SovietUnion CCCRKI CentralControl Commissionof the Workers' andPeasants' Inspectorate gorlwm city party committee StatePlanning Commission GPU (or OGPU) the StatePolitical Administration ITR Engineer-TechnicalWorker Komsomol All-Union Leninist CommunistYouth League kraikom regionalparty committee NEP New EconomicPolicy NKTP People'sCommissariat of HeavyIndustry raikom district party committee RSFSR RussianSocialist Federated Soviet Republic RSDRP RussianSocial DemocraticWorkers' Party Sovnarkom Council of People'sCommissars STO Council of Labor andDefense VSNKh SupremeCouncil of the National Economy VTsIK All-Russian CentralExecutive Committee

xi This page intentionally left blank: IN STALIN'S SHADOVV This page intentionally left blank: Introduction

Someof the most controversialquestions in Soviet history concernthe activities of the higher echelonsof the party-stateleadership, especially the Politburo. The Politburo stood at the apex of power in the USSR. This body brought togetherthe networks of administrationand made major decisionsthat determinedthe country'sfate. How did this come about?Were Politburo resolutionsmerely the secretpersonal orders of the leader, the result of so-called collectiveleadership, or the by-prod- uct of more complexinterests and conflicts amonggroups or individu- als? The answerto suchquestions depends, of course,on formulating a more general understandingof the political system and how it func- tioned,as well as of its stagesof developmentand logical evolution. During the entire reign of the CommunistParty, factionsand groups opposedto the "generalline" appearedwithin the party and suggested ways to reform the regime. These currents acquired real political strength,however, only if they had supportin the Politburo. From this supremebody emanatedall efforts at reform, from the deepeningof the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920s and de-Stalinizationin the 1950s and 1960s, to the policy of perestroika.How and when did thesereformist groupstake shape,and which other currentsof reform or counterreformappeared in the Politburo?These questions gain spe- cial significancein light of the fact that mostof Soviethistory represents the gradualand inconsistent reformation of Stalinismfrom above. Many issues merit our utmost attention regarding the 19305, the

3 4 INTRODUCfION period of the so-calledStalin Revolution.* Debaterevolves around sev- eral questions:When did Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin (1879-1953) as- sumeabsolute rule-at the end of the 1920sfollowing victory over the Bukharin group, or later, as a result of the masspurges of 1937?What real power did Stalin's associatesin the Politburo have? Finally, did forces exist in the Stalinist Politburo of the 1930sthat had the potential to revise the general line, even if they did not institute any principal changes? In answeringthis last question,many historianshave focusedmainly on two membersof Stalin's Politburo-SergeiM. Kirov (1886-1934) and Grigorii K. (Sergo) Ordzhonikidze (1886-1937).Several versions regardingthe circumstancesof their deathshave long circulated.The main questionthat still has not beenanswered centers around whether therewas a link betweenthe tragic deathsof Kirov and Ordzhonikidze and their opposition to Stalin. Would it be fair to say that they repre- sented a relatively moderatestrand of party leadership,a center of oppositionto Stalinistextremism and a distinctive brandof "soft" Stalin- ism? If this in fact was the case,then anotherquestion arises: To what extent were these associatesof Stalin preparedto take decisive and independentactions in opposingthe leader? Such questionsobviously require concreteanswers. In this context, generalarguments are inappropriateand hypotheticalreflections and suppositionsare of little interest. If Stalin and his associatesactually clashedover differencesof opinion, then it is necessaryfor the histo- rian to presentfacts and evidenceto documentthis. Moreover, as in historical researchgenerally, it is obviously not enoughto rely on mem- oirs and rumors. If conflicts actually existed, one can find traces of them in the archiveseven if the materialsare not always informative

*Stalin Revolution. The period of revolutionary changethat the USSR underwentat the end of the 1920s and early 1930s associatedwith the launchingof the First Five-Year Plan. The main featuresof the Stalin Revo- lution we~erapid rapid industrialization, forced collectivization of agriculture, cultural revolution, and eventually the use of terror, as a result of which Stalin consolidatedhis own personaldictatorship. During the Stalin Revolu- tion the so-called command-administrativesystem was established,which gave the its basic political, economic, social, and cultural forms until recently.-Ed. INTRODUCTION 5 andcandid. Reminiscences must be supportedby historical documents. This work representsan attemptto do just that. In researchingthis project, I have collected and analyzeddocuments on the relationship betweenStalin and Ordzhonikidzein the 1930s.These include materi- als from the Politburo Archive; the archivesof the Council of People's Commissars(Sovnarkom), the SupremeCouncil of the National Econ- omy (VSNKh), and the People'sCommissariat of Heavy Industry (NKTP-which Ordzhonikidzeled); and Ordzhonikidze'spersonal ar- chive as well as thoseof his Politburo colleagues.These documents are located in the Russian Center for the Preservationand Study of the Documentsof Modem History (RTsKhIDNI), the StateArchive of the RussianFederation (GARF), and the RussianState Archive of Econom- ics (RGAE). Papersin the so-called Kremlin Archive (Archive of the Presidentof the Russian Federation,the former archive of the Polit- buro of the Central Committeeof the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union [CC CPSU]), remain closedto researchers.Something needs to be said regardingthese depositories. Judging from available information, the Kremlin Archive contains the protocolsand records (stenogramswere not always kept) of Polit- buro meetings,including decisionsstored in a "special file," prepara- tory materials for Politburo resolutions, all Central Committee plenums, records of party congressesand conferences,and personal archivesof individual party activists.At first glance,the inaccessibilityof this set of documentswould seemto doom any attemptat studying the history of the highestechelons of power in the Soviet party-state.How- ever, extensivearchival experienceand comparisonof available docu- ments with those materials from the Kremlin Archive published periodically in the press,indicate that the classificationof Kremlin ar- chive documentsas confidentialserves more to satisfy the self-esteemof the bureaucratsthan to interferewith the historian'stask. The current availability of previously closed archival files of the Politburo, Sovnarkom,and departmentsof the People'sCommissariats, as well as the personalpapers of party leaders,and so forth, will either prove to duplicate documentsin the Kremlin Archive or provide information that shedslight on a majority of the most secretacts of the country's leadershipin the prewar period. For specialists,there was nothing sen- sational about the well-publicized excerptsfrom the Kremlin Archive 6 INTRODUCfION concerningthe shootingof Polish prisonersof war, the secretprotocols of the Soviet-GermanNon-Aggression Pact, or resolutionson conduct- ing mass arrests and executionsin 1937. Of course, new documents define things more precisely, and to a certain degreedot the i's, but they usually only supplementwhat was previouslyknown with good and colorful examples. Likewise, little new awaits us in the unpublishedmaterials from the personalfiles of the PresidentialArchive. For example,the recentpubli- cation of the correspondencebetween Stalin and his wife NadezhdaS. Allilueva (1901-1932)unquestionably contains many interesting details and is an important source.) But it does not provide answersto many critical questions-especially,what happenedin the Stalin family in 1932? Did political disagreementsbetween Stalin and Allilueva bring about her tragic death?It is clear that a completeselection of letters from 1932 doesnot exist. The reasonfor this is explainedin the preface to the publication: 'Thejournal beginspublication of documentsfrom the personalarchive of I.V. Stalin. The archive was kept by Stalin. It containsdocuments reflecting his party and stateactivities from 1916 to 1931, personal correspondence,biographical materials, and photo- graphs from 1888 to 1953." Apparently, Stalin compiled his archive from thosedocuments that presentedthe greatleader and his deedsin the best possible light, and conversely,those that exhibited the worst traits of his political opponents.2 It is appropriateto rememberthat a search,conducted over severalyears in the Politburo Archives for seri- ous evidenceconcerning Kirov's murder, was undertakenduring the tenures of both Nikita S. Khrushchev (1953-1964) and Mikhail S. Gorbachev(1985-1991) without success.This questonly revealedthat documentscapable of sheddingsome light on this secret had been destroyed. Of course,this doesnot meanthat historiansdo not needthe Krem- lin Archive materials,but rathershows that they can conductextensive researchwithout "presidentialdecree" to openthese party files. It is necessaryto note that previously, in spite of the completeinac- cessibility of the archives,historians produced a considerablenumber of significant works that remain important. This is true of the topic understudy. In the historical literaturethere are two opposingpoints of view regardingthe conflict betweenStalin and Ordzhonikidze.One is INTRODUcnON 7 based primarily on memoirs. Its supportersbelieve that serious dis- agreementsexisted between Stalin and Ordzhonikidzestemming from the arrestsof the latter'sfriends, colleagues,and relatives.According to this version, Ordzhonikidzewas ready to challengeStalin openly, and eventually paid with his life (either was driven to suicide or was mur- dered).Currently, this is the prevalentpoint of view found in numerous scholarly, popular,and belletristic works, and is mostfully presentedin the studiesof Roy A. Medvedev,, and Robert Tucker. 3 Another less common, skeptical viewpoint is advancedby J. Arch Getty, whoseinterpretation is supportedby severalrecently declassified documents.He maintains that Ordzhonikidzewas not considereda serious opponentof the Stalinist Terror. Under the best of circum- stances,Ordzhonikidze was preparedto defendhis colleagues,but not all of them. In particular,Getty questionswhether Ordzhonikidze tried to defendGeorgii (Iurii) L. Piatakov(1890-1937).4 Mter studyingavailable materials, I have come to the conclusionthat both viewpoints contain some truth. Archival sourcessupport memoir accountsconcerning the existenceof a seriousconflict betweenStalin and Ordzhonikidze,which beganin the late 1920sor early 1930s.This doesnot mean,however, that Ordzhonikidzewas ready to actively and openly opposeStalin or seriously struggle against the so-called Great Terror. Ordzhonikidzewas not an independentpolitical figure, and almostalways followed Stalin'slead. The documentsshow that many of the initiatives attributedto Ordzhonikidzein the literaturewere not his own, but Stalin's. As a Stalinist, Ordzhonikidzewas not able to go be- yond clearly definedlimits in his opposition-hewas able to arguewith Stalin in private or use his power to sway somedecision. In the end, he could take his own life as an act of protest,but he could go no further. Of course,this doesnot meanthat Ordzhonikidzewielded no influ- ence over defining the generalpolitical line or shapingStalin's deci- sions. Ordzhonikidzecan be examinedas a typical, in fact, most active, representativeof the moderatewing of the Stalinist Politburo whose opinion Stalin hadto considerto a certaindegree. Apart from the questionabout the nature of Stalin's conflict with Ordzhonikidze, the literature addressesseveral other questionscon- nectedto Ordzhonikidze'sactivities in the CentralControl Commission of the Workers' and Peasants'Inspectorate (CCC-RKI), VSNKh, and 8 INTRODUCTION

the People'sCommissariat of Heavy Industry, and his position regard- ing specialistsand the campaignagainst "saboteurs" of the ,and so forth. My study utilizes much of this earlier work. A critique of the ideas presentedin the literature can be found in the appropriatechapters of this book. Chronologically,my projectencompasses the periodfrom the endof the 1920sto Ordzhonikidze'sdeath in February1937. Specialattention is given, however, to the eventsof 1935-37,when the conflicts between Stalin and Ordzhonikidzepeaked. The first chapterssurvey the history of the relationship betweenStalin and Ordzhonikidzeand presenta seriesof familiar and revealingconflicts betweenthem throughoutthe periodof their work together. The natureof the documentarymaterials greatly shapedthe focus of my research,which attemptsto reconstructevents on the basisof well- known andrevealing documents.