The evolution of a militant group
How ISIS structured its organization to facilitate rapid growth from 2012 to the establishment of the Caliphate in June 2014
Sophia Joanne Evertse 3502783 Utrecht University 31 May 2016
A thesis submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Supervisor: Dr. Chris van der Borgh Date of submission: 31 May 2016 Program trajectory followed: Internship (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Department of North Africa & The Middle East (DAM) 6 months, 40 hrs. pw. (15 ECTS) & research writing (15 ECTS) Word count: 16.435
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Abstract
This thesis addresses how the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) structured its organization to facilitate its relatively rapid growth from early 2012, to when the organization gained huge international prominence with the establishment of the Caliphate on June 29th, 2014. Over recent years, ISIS became well known of the possible danger and power of the organization to, not only Iraq and Syria, but also to the rest of the world. This thesis provides insights in ISIS's organization, and its strategies which help explain their successes. Based mainly on the theoretical models of collective action theories, this thesis aims to develop further understanding of the rapid rise of ISIS in focusing on collective contentious action literature and makes use of the theoretical lenses of opportunities, organization and frames. ISIS's recent history has been researched for key elements that ensured massive contribution to its rapid rise and puts a strong focus on the organizational structures. Multiple elements, including military, control of areas, generation of income and online propaganda combined, give explanations which ascribe the found elements within the organization, and are seen as a complex combination of power dynamics focused on intertwined and thoughtful organizational strategies.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Acknowledgements
Since this thesis marks the end of my time as a master student of Conflict Studies and Human Rights I would like to sincerely thank several people who, due to their support, motivation and advice have made this time fun and possible. To start with, special thanks go to my supervisor Chris van der Borgh for his inspiration, patience, reassurance and enthusiasm in guiding me through this research process while being at the other side of the world. Thank you so much for your quick responses and focus. I am grateful to Roel van Itallie, for sharing this research writing experience together, both in Utrecht and whilst traveling the world. Thanks for both being a major support and distraction. Furthermore, I would also like to thank Minke de Haan, who's annoying and endless positivity motivated me throughout the process, my fellow graduate students and especially Johannes Düker, for his brain and encouragement, Justin Hoek for taking the time to eventually check and correct this thesis and Nanda and Jean-Klaas Gunnink for offering their home to two thesis-writing-backpackers. Finally, a very big thanks goes out to my parents Marc Evertse and Suzan Begeer, who have always supported me and for either being proud, confident or worried.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse
ISIS is the child of war. Its members seek to reshape the world around them by acts of violence. Cockburn, 2015
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Table of Contents
Abstract ...... 3
Acknowledgements ...... 4
Table of Contents...... 6
Introduction...... 8
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 11
A. Collective contentious action ...... 11
Power, organization and violence ...... 12
Method ...... 12
B. Opportunities ...... 14
Political opportunity structures ...... 14
Connecting the concepts of power and opportunities to the case of ISIS ...... 15
C. Organization ...... 16
Organizational structures ...... 16
Support, context and structure ...... 16
Connecting the concept of organization to the case of ISIS ...... 17
D. Framing ...... 18
Collective action frames ...... 18
Connecting the concept of framing to the case of ISIS ...... 19
II. CONTEXT: THE RISE OF ISIS ...... 20
A. ISIS’ history ...... 20
Outset ...... 20
Decline ...... 21
Expansion ...... 22
B. Discussion of opportunities, organization and frames ...... 25
Opportunities ...... 25
Organization ...... 27
Frames...... 29
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse III. ISIS' ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGY ...... 31
A. Military tactics ...... 32
Mass-casualty urban attacks ...... 32
Coordinated campaign ...... 33
B. Governance and control ...... 35
Internal policy ...... 35
Controlling areas ...... 36
C. Finances ...... 38
Oil ...... 39
Extortion ...... 39
D. Online Propaganda ...... 40
Social media use ...... 41
Multimedia campaigns...... 41
Conclusion ...... 43
Bibliography ...... 46
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Introduction
A news headline in April 2016 claimed “ISIS’s losing territory, ‘The Caliphate’ will no longer exist within two years” (Heijink 2016), which seems a positive way of thinking about the organization that quickly made name for itself as one of the most ruthless militias in the Middle East. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has gained huge international prominence since it declared the so called ‘Islamic State’ Caliphate on June 29th, 2014 in an area straddling Iraq and Syria. Today most of the world seems awake and aware of the possible danger and power of the organization. A little too late, some might say, because by that time ISIS had developed itself into a fully grown militant organization and achieved its military and territorial successes within Iraq and Syria. In other words, the damage was already done. But whoever had paid attention could have seen the creation of ISIS earlier. Nowadays, there has been an increasing interest in violent social organizations and investigating ISIS is therefore of continuing importance for the international community, governments and international organizations. With the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, the wave of violent uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, and the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq, the route was paved for ISIS's ideology. After June 2014, ISIS became known on social media, as it recognizes the terror and recruitment value of multichannel, multi-language social and other media messaging. A major problem created by ISIS’ rise is the large number of refugees fleeing the Assad regime and foreign fighters, currently fighting with or against organizations like ISIS in Iraq and Syria, which has given new dimensions to older threats. On top of this, the dramatic increase in terrorist attacks on western soil has created fear and uncertainty. Because of these matters, there is an urgent need to address the origins of the safety problems caused by ISIS. The sudden appearance of ISIS was a big surprise and left many unanswered questions. Where did it come from? How was it able to grow so quickly? If we look at other unstable areas in the world, can the same thing happen again? Can lessons be drawn from a reconstruction of ISIS’ rapid rise? Recent studies have described several aspects of ISIS and tried to give answers to central themes including cross-border problems like foreign fighter issues (Byman & Shapiro 2014) and refugee problems (UNHCR 2016). This thesis aims to contribute to this area of research by focusing on the rapid rise of ISIS. When looking at ISIS’ history, in the years before the establishment of the Caliphate it showed tremendous changes it terms of the number of followers, the number of enemies it made, its territorial expansion and increased international attention. This thesis will therefore review the period before the establishment of the Caliphate to explain the rapid development the organization went through from 2012 to the establishment of the Caliphate in June 2014. The declaration of the Caliphate is also chosen as end date because more recent history does not show the formation and creation of the organization but shows a continuous flow of operations and various (mostly communication) tactics. 8
The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse The increased attention to a phenomenon like ISIS has led to the development of a more nuanced understanding of the role of power in its many forms in the initiation, prosecution and termination of large- scale organized violence (King 2007 in Crocker, Hamson & Aall 2007:115). At every state of a conflict, “power” means many things; it features the ways in which the nature, dynamics, functions and goals of violence shift with time. Therefore, to grasp these meanings of power, the lenses of opportunities, organization and frames are used to highlight the multiple uses and forms of power in violent contexts. These three elements have become central to scholarly discussions about the dynamics of contentious politics in all its forms. Therefore, mobilization and collective action theories, and in particular King's model, will be used to explain the rapid rise of ISIS in those years. Power dynamics are not something you can hold on to, or something that is simply there, but rather can be seen as the complex process in how the three lenses interact (King 2007:116). These three lenses cannot be seen as external elements that led to the rapid rise of ISIS in those years, but are the ways in which the found factors interrelate with each other. Although the three lenses are useful tools to explain ISIS’ rise, it seems relevant to highlight one element out of three in order to explain the rapid rise of ISIS. By focusing on the organization itself, questions can be answered on how it was able to grow so rapidly in those years. This research will therefore consist of a context chapter in which all three lenses are discussed. Together they will be used to obtain a general understanding of the rise of ISIS and of which factors were essential building blocks for the establishment of the Caliphate in June 2014. To explain the rapid rise of ISIS, however, the core of this research lies with the organization and its strategies. Not focusing on this would mean assuming that any organization at that time would have been able to achieve what ISIS did. This position is in line with the collective action theory, in which context and agency interact. As mentioned above, the declaration of the Caliphate in 2014 came as a surprise to many. The puzzle here is that a potentially dangerous organization like ISIS should have rung alarm bells in neighboring countries and the international community. ISIS was able to avoid notice because it was relatively small and operated under the radar. So the question that follows is: How could a group, initially small, jump into the gap and develop in such alarming and threatening ways? This research will attempt to answer that question by looking at ISIS’ politics, strategies, opportunities and frames. The theoretical lens of collective contentious action was chosen because of the aspect of rapid mobilization and the fluid factors that interrelate in contentious action. This thesis will analyze how ISIS structured itself and exploited the external power dynamics in the most useful way to ensure its success in establishing the Caliphate. The main research question thus asks: How did ISIS structure its organization to facilitate rapid growth from 2012 to the establishment of the Caliphate in June 2014? The overall structure of this thesis takes the form of an introduction, three main chapters and a conclusion. The introduction introduces the main puzzle, research questions and sub-questions. The first
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse chapter is concerned with the theoretical framework used for this research. First, collective action theories relevant to the three sensitizing concepts of opportunities, organization and framing will be discussed. At the end of this chapter, it will be clear how the theoretical lens will be used to collect and analyze the data. Since it is dangerous for researchers to conduct fieldwork in ISIS-controlled areas, this research will be based on open source data. It will limit itself to the use of internet resources, works of scholars, videos and social media. To answer the central question it is necessary to give a brief history of the rise of ISIS under the rule of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, which dates further back than the recent period this research focuses on. Chapter 2 provides the context in which ISIS was able to rise by discussing and analyzing the three lenses of opportunities, organization and frames. To briefly discuss the three lenses of the collective action model, answers will be provided to the following sub-questions: political opportunities: In what ways did ISIS make use of political opportunities to facilitate a quick rise?, organization: In what ways did ISIS's ideology justify violence? and framing: What image did ISIS portray of itself towards friends and enemies? Chapter 3 contains the analysis, and focuses on several organizational strategies: military, the governance or control of areas, ways of generating income and the use of social media. The topics and research sub-questions will be discussed and addressed per section and answers will be provided to the sub-questions. The sub-questions are divided according to the organizational strategies and are as follows. 1) Military strategies: Which military strategies were used by ISIS? and How did these military strategies contribute to its rapid rise between 2012 and June 2014? 2) Ways of governance or control: What governing or controlling strategies were used by ISIS? and How did these ways of governing contribute to its rapid rise between 2012 and June 2014? 3) Generating income: What financial strategies were used by ISIS? and How did these ways of generating income contribute to its rapid rise between 2012 and June 2014? 4) Online propaganda: In what ways did ISIS use social media propaganda? and How did its social media use contribute to its rapid rise between 2012 and June 2014? These sub-questions will help answer the main question on how the organization’s rapid growth could be explained. In doing so, the importance of the combination and interrelation of the three lenses will be taken into account. The conclusion will bring everything together and provide suggestions for future research. Finally, it will summarize the most important findings on the explanation of the rapid rise of ISIS and on how the organization structured itself to ensure its rapid growth from 2012 to June 2014.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Collective contentious action
Since the main focus of this research is to explain the rapid rise of ISIS in the chosen time frame, the literature on mobilization and collective action is useful to discuss the factors in general and to zoom in on the relevant factors in the case study. In the first section of this chapter it will become clear why and how to use collective action theory in the case of ISIS. In the next sections, the sensitizing concepts of opportunities, organization and frames will be discussed separately to set the ground for recognizing the essential building blocks in the rise of ISIS from 2012 to 2014, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Since this research is about the “how” of mobilization, and collective action research is interested in explaining the “how” of joint actions, these go hand in hand. Collective action research is interested in examining the mechanisms and processes that lead to collective action and how individuals are mobilized for collective purposes (Demmers 2012:85). The existing social and political structures and practices are thus challenged by contentious collective action. Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, leading scholars on contentious politics, explain the term contention as: “Collective action becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, act in the name of new or unaccepted claims and behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others” (Tarrow 1998:3). In later work, Tilly and Tarrow argue that contentious performances are all related phenomena subject to a common set of explanatory mechanisms and processes (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:138). Contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. It brings together contention, collective action and politics (Tilly & Tarrow 2007:4). Very often, event specific processes turn out to be essential to the course of a conflict, also known as the ‘power of contingency’. This puts forward the importance of the dynamics of contention (King 2007:28). When focusing on ISIS, it is of great importance to study these (power) dynamics of contention to understand the mechanisms and processes that drive contention. To do this, this research will focus on the three lenses of opportunities, organization and frames to study these dynamics of contention. These three lenses are used by Charles King to explain violent conflict, which is why this research uses King's model to further explain and understand the case of ISIS.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Power, organization and violence
King’s basic argument is that to gain insight into the power dynamics of civil war, one needs to examine the precise opportunities (material and ideological) that potential entrepreneurs of violence can seize to begin mobilization, the formal and informal organizations that help to sustain conflicts (from short-term riots to protracted insurgencies or civil wars), and the frames through which violent entrepreneurs interpret, present and market a brewing conflict (Demmers 2012:87). As explained in the introduction, power dynamics are not something to hold on to or something that is simply there. The three lenses are not considered to be external elements but rather the ways the actors, factors and strategies interrelate. However, being able to explain the rise of ISIS when looking at these three lenses is not the main aim of this research. The emphasis here lies within those years from 2012 to 2014 and is looking for answers that can explain the organization's rapid growth. Since the chosen literature on collective action does not precisely focus on the rapid growth of organizations, it is not possible to provide answers to the research question like this. The question here is how ISIS managed to expand its power, to build militias and control areas so rapidly in those years. The three lenses given by King prove useful when focusing on long-term studies, but because this research focuses on a relatively short period (two years) and aims at explaining ISIS' rapid rise, the core of this research lies with organization and strategy. This research will put the center of attention at organization to focus on the strategies ISIS used to achieve this rapid growth. Collective action theory, among others, claims that an organization has to respond to the context it is in, if it is to seize opportunities and avoid threats, and by doing so, succeed. An organization is said to be able to benefit from outside factors, but the 'given' circumstances always have to be recognized and organized to achieve the organization’s desired outcomes. Therefore, the core question of this research is how ISIS’ strategies ensured its rapid growth from 2012 to 2014. While discussing the three pillars in the next three sections, it will become clear why this research must focus on the organization’s strategies to explain its rapid growth.
Method
This research will conduct an analysis of a qualitative case study and use open source data. This is because in the case of ISIS, it is important to provide analytical concepts rather than make empirical generalizations. By interpreting cultural and historical phenomena, this research will partly use the collective action research model, which claims opportunities, organization and frames are to be considered the factors to explain ISIS’s rapid growth. The core focus on this research will, however, lie with the organization itself and the structures in which it operates. The methods employed in this research draw on elements of content research and unobtrusive research, as explained by Curtis and Curtis. Both methods are non-interactive methods for data collection 12
The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse and are chosen due to the difficulties of conducting research in ISIS territory. Content research is a technique that examines various forms of communication. This technique has been described as a technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use (Krippendorff, 2004:18, Curtis & Curtis 2011). It investigates what authors communicate to their audiences by highlighting patterns and interpreting their meaning. This approach mainly concerns itself with printed media, such as newspapers, together with digital forms of communication, which are lately gaining more attention (Curtis & Curtis 2011:195). Content research primarily concentrates on the encoding of messages or patterns across a great number of messages, which seem applicable to this analysis. Besides content research, elements of unobtrusive research will be used to address this case study. This non-interactive approach draws its data from actual behavior rather than self-reported behavior. Thus data is collected from existing records, non-participant observation or material traces (Curtis & Curtis 2011:171), which is shared by content research as well. Moreover, this method is often used in combination with and as a supplement to existing research. This method faces ethical criticisms with regard to informed consent. However, this research makes use of open source data (mainly journalistic articles, news articles, interviews, original ISIS documents and secondary sources), and according to Curtis and Curtis, material that is publicly available can generally be considered appropriate for research use (Curtis and Curtis 2011: 189).
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse B. Opportunities
Political opportunity structures
The first one of the three lenses is 'opportunities', which are seen as the ways in which less powerful groups can use whatever they have at their disposal to overcome their opponent. Therefore, they may overinvest in ends, highlight their own moral superiority, encourage in the commitment of firepower to the cause or all the above. King argues there is a set of opportunities that potential entrepreneurs of violence can seize to begin mobilization (King 2007:117). To discuss the rapid rise of ISIS, it seems relevant to briefly discuss political opportunity structures in Iraq and Syria in the years before the declaration of the Caliphate. . Political opportunities can be defined broadly as “consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements” (Tarrow 1996:54). They thus refer to those aspects of the political system that affect the possibilities challenging groups have to mobilize effectively (Giungi 2009:361). They are options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them, which depend on factors outside the mobilizing group (Koopmans 2004:65). Within the debate regarding political opportunities, it is clearly stated that political opportunities are only one aspect among many that effect movements and thus do not constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions of contention (Tilly 2004:34). While political opportunities do not provide all the answers to the main question of this research, they do contribute to the overall idea on how ISIS was able to be so successful from 2012 to 2014. Political opportunity structures shape the forms and degrees of contention. Peaceful forms of contention are more likely to occur in democratic regimes, where they often take the form of representative institutions and social movement campaigns, while civil wars, revolutions and violent ethnic or religious conflicts more often develop in autocratic regimes (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:161). Giugni’s model, in line with Goldstone’s analysis (1998:125), stresses the importance of external political factors and a larger environment that influences the outcomes of movements or opposition groups (political opportunity structures) (Giugni, McAdam & Tilly 1998:381). It seems that the chance for protracted conflict to break out is largest in societies monopolized by a dominant identity group, which uses the state as an instrument to maximize its own interests, and by doing so, excludes others. Such societies have “incompetent, parochial, fragile and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy the human needs” (Azar 1990:10). Tilly and Tarrow as well as King focus on the mechanisms and institutions while Azar focuses on identity groups and needs theory in the form of maximizing self- interests. States or governments ruled by dominant (elite) groups are likely to lose legitimacy among the population when the ruling group’s own interests are maximized and others are excluded. This may create
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse grievances and result in violence against the government. If we look at the Iraqi government and the uprisings in the country by several opposition groups, similarities can be seen. The longer a conflict continues, the more opportunities are created for groups to mobilize because the origins of violence and mobilization are not the result of a fateful interaction but of grievances that are amassed on both sides of the social dividing line. In the case of ISIS, it can be seen that when conflicts between parties and governments go on for such long time, the emphasis of those grievances changes. The longer a conflict (such as the Syrian Civil War with all its side conflicts and dynamics) continues, the less its basic dynamics are reducible to a set of root causes, something which is important in negotiations. When incidents escalate in number and intensity over the years, every event feeds the fury of the next, which results in escalation (King 2007:116) Groups who have the resources to pay people to join their movement are predictably more successful at mobilizing support than those who can offer little to potential adherents (King 2007:117). Additionally, in many cases revenge overshadows the originally causes of the conflict. Therefore, revenge can be considered as an attempt at recouping past losses (King 2007:117). All the events or reasons described above provide or justify the opportunities to engage in large-scale violence, as ISIS did.
Connecting the concepts of power and opportunities to the case of ISIS
In the context of ISIS’s rapid rise, it is important to focus on the political opportunity structures. As discussed above, political opportunities are seen as one of the factors by which the power dynamics of ISIS’s rise can be explained. But just because certain political opportunities contributed to its rise does not explain its rapid rise. Chapter 2 will outline the specific context and political opportunities and discuss the sensitizing concept of political opportunities in relation to the power dynamics of the rapid growth of ISIS. This theoretical lens is applicable to the sub-question relating to political opportunities
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse C. Organization
Organizational structures
To study the successful development of ISIS, the lens of organizational structures is employed. As discussed in the previous section, the focus of this research is on the organization itself and, more specifically, its strategies. The reason for this focus is because one doesn’t expect the rapid rise of ISIS to be explained by outside factors, but rather by its own actions. As mentioned earlier, King’s three lenses are useful for a long- term study of ISIS, but it is necessary to focus on the organization and its strategies to explain its rapid rise. Which strategies did ISIS use from 2012 to 2014? How did ISIS organize itself to ensure its rapid growth?
Support, context and structure
In addition to opportunities and frames, organizations, both formal and informal, play a key role in the process of mobilization (King 2007:117). King states that it is usually a small group that is responsible for organizing collective action. This group also determine whether the violence will be short-term or sustained. They have the power to convince a significant number of people that they are their legitimate representative and to convince outside supporters (such as foreign fighters) of the same thing (King 2007:117-118). In the literature about social movements and civil wars applicable to the case of ISIS, most of the time the conflict is between the government and an opposing party, where the government is seen as the party that is more likely to provide stable structures, resources and strategies. Organizations that face fragile state structures and a population that is in need of leaders and security have a higher chance of achieving their goals. Mobilizers for collective action can, for instance, appeal to the moral sensibilities of those people most susceptible to mobilization, or to simply force members of the group at gunpoint to join the organization’s cause. According to King, any relatively weak organization can turn its organizational structure into an important mobilization tool by intentionally provoking a crackdown by the state and using the resulting oppression as a catalyst for mobilizing insurgents (King 2007:118). Kalyvas argues that the fact that a weaker actor can fight in a sustained way (often for a very long time, as ISIS has done) against a stronger one is a reflection of factors that compensate for the resource deficit of the weaker actor. In a conventional war, it is largely resources and strategy that influence the balance of power and the final outcome. The factors that influence these dynamics are said to be largely organizational (Kalyvas 2015). For groups to operate, it is important to win the hearts and minds of the local population through ideology. But, as Kalyvas mentions, in practice ideology is necessary but never sufficient. When a group cannot initially win the support of the local population, there are several ways it can eventually do so. It can police a territory to identify and punish “defectors” and reward supporters. It can effectively govern a territory and supply the local population with public goods and governance (Kalyvas 16
The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse 2015). In such cases, popular consent and collaboration (commonly known as “support”) is the outcome of the organizations ability to perform. Thus the success of a group depends on its organizational structures and the cooperation of others to achieve its goals. As mentioned above, organizations can be studied in multiple ways, based on how they gain support, on context or on how they organize themselves. It is this last aspect that is the main focus of this research. After all, the rapid rise of ISIS cannot be explained by outside elements because that would imply any actor at that certain time and place was able to do what ISIS did. Since ISIS was able to transform to a successful organization with territorial victories, lots of followers and power in those years, ISIS’s rise appears to be the result of a successful way of organizing. Therefore, the main focus of this research will consist of a careful study of ISIS’s organizational strategies, namely: military strategies, financial strategies, governing strategies and propaganda strategies. The combination of these strategies are in a certain way able to explain how the organization was successful from 2012 to 2014.
Connecting the concept of organization to the case of ISIS
Organizations that involve discrete incentive structures and that can facilitate group action are the most successful. It is the set of organizational structures around which violent mobilization revolves; it is the presence of organization that helps distinguish short-term episodes of targeted violence (riots, lynchings) from sustained violent conflict (insurgencies, civil wars) (King 2007:117). When focusing on the way ISIS organized itself, it is possible to find the organizational strategies that contributed to its rapid growth. Therefore, this research focuses on ISIS itself and will not involve other organizations or actors. This theoretical lens is applicable to this research's sub-questions on organization.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse D. Framing
Frames are the third critical aspect needed to help categorize violence and the mobilization processes according to King. Frames are described as “interpretive schemata that simplify and condense the world out there” (Snow and Benford 1992:137). Frames determine how the outside world sees the violence and they can also be mistaken for causes (King 2007:118). Framing takes place on many sides of the conflict and key leaders play a big role in it. They frame their organization, actions and goals and because of this framing, it is difficult for external interveners to have a clear view of the conflict or know who to support. Frame analysis sees a conflict as socially and discursively constructed. Although the organizational aspect and political opportunities play larger roles in this research, frames in the form of images and performances are found in ISIS' online propaganda. Since the focus of this research will mainly lie with the organizational strategies, certain aspects of framing like the several messages they send towards different audiences, via online propaganda will be discussed in the context chapter together with the other two lenses, and Chapter 3 will further highlight the propaganda strategies in which frames play a role. This research therefore focuses on the use of frames in ISIS’s online propaganda.
Collective action frames
Tarrow came up with the term ‘collective action frames’, which describes the ‘redefining of social conditions as unjust and intolerable’. These frames are intended to mobilize potential participants, which is achieved by making appeals to emotions and perceptions of justice (1998:111). Collective action frames legitimize the constructed reality presented by the frames. The sets of beliefs and meanings collective action frames offer are intended to legitimize the activities of a movement and aim to inspire and mobilize individuals (Benford and Snow 1988:201). According to Snow et al., “Frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective” (1986:464). Movements that “name” grievances and connect them to other grievances are constructing larger frames of meaning that will resonate with the cultural predispositions of a population (Snow and Benford 1992:136). Framing is considered to be a special category of cognitive understanding that relates to how movements create meaning (Wiktorowicz 2003:16). Furthermore, movements address their message simultaneously to distinct targets: power holders, the general public and their own members. In this way they try to press the political authorities for recognition to get what they want and at the same time they try to seek the public support and sensitize the population, which in turn has effect on local or national governments who pay attention to public opinion (Giungi 1998:379). The fundamental role of the media in mobilization is recognized. The media can cover, frame and interpret social groups, which is an important factor in social movement research (Gamson and 18
The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Wolfsfeld 1993) (Giugni 1998:380). The role of the Internet and in particular social media as a “framing place” are included in this research. Framing can never be divorced from the context in which it occurs and the audiences it is aiming at.
Connecting the concept of framing to the case of ISIS
Framing is used in several ways: to mobilize people, as an important factor in sense-making, or to reframe events. In particular, ISIS used framing to communicate its grievances to the public in ways that were beneficial to it. For a movement like ISIS to be successful, it has to have a frame that resonates with potential participants. The process of framing then facilitates the creation of an image of the collective identity of the movement’s participants. This creates an “us” vs. “them” distinction and a notion of “the other”. A threat towards the group can then be seen as a threat towards the self. The theoretical lens of framing is applicable to this research sub-question.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse II. CONTEXT: THE RISE OF ISIS
A. ISIS’ history The central aim of this chapter is to describe the broader context in which ISIS was able to grow. This chapter will discuss several periods: the outset (2001–2006), the decline of the organization (2006–2010) and its expansion (2011–2014). Because this research is mainly interested in certain years of this last period (2012- 2014), the first two periods will be discussed briefly. This time frame is chosen to focus on the rapid rise of the organization and to understand its rapid expansion in those years. To focus on the initial rise of ISIS, this thesis will further discuss the three lenses: opportunities, organization and frames. When doing so, it will become clearer why specific events and elements contributed to its rise. Attention will be paid to the politics in Iraq and Syria by pointing out several highlights in the rise of ISIS from 2001 to now. This chapter thus provides the context in which opportunities, organization and frames will be discussed. To address the rapid growth of ISIS between 2012 and 2014, it is necessary to take a closer look at ISIS’s organizational strategies in particular. The next chapter therefore addresses the core of this research, where ISIS’s rapid rise together with its organizational strategies will be discussed. Before elaborating about the different periods, it is important to avoid any confusion about the many titles (IS, ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) of the organization. The organization’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, proclaimed the establishment of the Caliphate on June 29th 2014, naming as the Islamic State (IS) an territory straddling parts of Iraq and Syria. At the same time, he also proclaimed himself caliph of this caliphate. The establishment of the Caliphate was, and still is, mostly seen as a political choice and marks the end date of this research’s chosen timeframe. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU, UN and many Muslim leaders reject the use of this “IS” formulation. Another name used for the organization in mostly Arab speaking countries is “Daesh” (alternative spellings: Da’esh or Daiish), which ISIS’s enemies prefer and has come to more or less mean: “Bigots who impose their views on others” (Black 2014). This research will refer to the organization as ISIS except when explicitly discussing a period when the organization had a different name.
Outset
ISIS’s origins go back to 2001, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi began training extremist militants in the Iraqi insurgency during the U.S. occupation of Iraq. This training camp in Herat was at the time funded by Osama Bin Laden and around 2000 to 3000 Salafi fighters are thought to have been trained here before the 9/11 attacks (Kirdar 2011). At the time they were known as Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (JTJ). These fighters consisted of smaller groups that also included foreign fighters, but the U.S. State Department classified them
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse together as JTJ. After U.S. troops toppled Saddam Hussein's government, JTJ became active in Iraq and was considered to be the most important group fighting against the U.S. invasion. The main differences between JTJ and Al Qaeda consisted in their preferred targets. In Bin Laden's opinion it was the “far enemy”, the West, in the form of the United States, that was to be attacked, whereas Zarqawi preferred the “near enemy”, being Israel, the Jordanian government and the Iraqi Army (Kirdar 2011). The U.S. Army’s image took a serious blow when hundreds were reported killed in Fallujah and Iraqi prisoners were abused by U.S. troops in the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad (Smeulers 2015). Meanwhile, JTJ’s first videotaped beheadings began, with the first one personally executed by Zarqawi. Many similarities are shown with more recent execution videos such as the orange Guantanamo Bay overalls. JTJ quickly became known for its ruthless tactics and experienced some backlash and lack of support from the local population. In 2004, JTJ formally joined together with Al Qaeda, and from then onwards was known as which means ,(يم نظ ت اعدة ق جهاد ال ي ف الد ب الدافدال :Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Arabic “Based in Mesopotamia” but was mostly known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (Cordesman and Roshan 2005; Stanford University 2016; Cook 2015:165). The situation in Iraq has been very unstable, especially in the years around 2005. For instance, in the early 2000’s, after the U.S. invasion, the country was disrupted and had no strong political system or leader. This provided opportunities for individuals to organize. In an uncertain situation with no strong power at the top it was easier for organizations to gain followers. During this period several aspects are seen that are important to AQI’s rise. It was able to create grievances among the local Iraqi population and its beheading videos showed several elements of power and fear, later to be used as military strategies. It shows a group with well thought out strategic choices, which at the time ensured the growth of the group but did not specifically lead to support from the local population.
Decline
From 2006 to 2011, the organization faced a decline due to backlash from the community and increased pressure from U.S. and Iraqi troops. It changed its name to “Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in an attempt to rebrand and consolidate support, but was mostly still known as AQI. When Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. military airstrike in 2006, Abu Umar al Baghdadi (not to be confused with Abu Bakr al Baghdadi) took over the organization (Lister 2015:11). At first, the Egyptian Abu Ayub al-Masri was considered to be the new leader, but this created critiques about the foreign presence in the organization’s leadership. Together with the leadership of Umar, the name change to ISI was intended to demonstrate that the different fighting parties had to unite against the U.S. coalition. Despite the leadership change, more local Iraqis resisted ISI's leadership, which is how the Anbar Awakening started, wherein Sunnis cooperated and trained with the U.S. to fight ISI (Al-Jabouri et al. 2010), with significant success. This made it possible for U.S. and Iraqi 21
The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse operations to reduce ISI's power and prevent its expansion. In 2008 and 2009, some 9000 ISI members were imprisoned and 2400 were killed (Standard University 2016). The U.S. continued funding local Sunnis to fight ISI and launching campaigns to destroy the organization. In 2011, most of ISI's leadership was either captured or killed and it had lost its territory and communication with the central AQ leadership (Lewis 2013). All this raises the question on how this shattered organization managed to achieve its current powerful state. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was released from the U.S. prison Camp Bucca in the fall of 2009 and was named the leader of ISI in May 2010 when both Masri and Umar were killed in a U.S./Iraqi raid on the 18th of April 2010 (Lister 2015:15; Stern & Berger 2015:15). One could say this was a very fortunate circumstance for the organization to have its future leader returned by the Americans. Thus, during the decline of ISI, both U.S. and Iraqi operations were very active and successful in reducing ISI's presence. Together with the Anbar Awakening, the organization almost disappeared. This period provided fewer political opportunities in the form of an unstable regime. It was a less favorable climate for ISI to develop and the organization did not have a message that resonated with the local population.
Expansion
From 2010, under the rule of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the organization experienced better times. Having briefly discussed ISI’s developments in 2000–2009, the focus can now turn to main period of interest—2012 to the establishment of the Caliphate in June 2014. In this period, ISI also began operating in Syria, which makes it necessary to split this section into two development lines: Iraq and Syria.
Iraq To continue with Iraq, the number of ISI attacks increased significantly the moment the coalition forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011 (Lewis 20113). The U.S. handed sovereignty to Iraq's interim government, and when Nouri al Maliki was asked to form a new government, it left the country in a state of deadlock for months. During this period ISI released its first part of a popular video series and started a campaign to regain lost territory and free members from Iraqi prisons (Hashim 2014). Meanwhile, mass rallies took place in Iraq against the Shia government (Laub & Masters 2014). From 2013 onwards, the Sunni outrage in Iraq intensified against the Maliki regime and ISI launched a new campaign called “A Soldier’s Harvest”, which was meant to intimidate and assassinate Iraqi security forces. Shortly afterwards, at least five hundred imprisoned (Originally) al Qaeda members were freed from Iraqi prisons. Meanwhile ISI changed its name to ISIS which will be explained below.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse ISIS gained more and more worldwide attention because of its attacks on Western soil, a Twitter app that could send thousands of tweets a day and the release of part four of “Clanging of the Swords”, which is considered to be the most popular jihadist propaganda video ever made (Zelin 2014b). In June 2014, ISIS took control of Mosul and spread beheading images on Twitter (Stanford University 2016). On June 29th, ISIS announced the reestablishment of the Caliphate and named itself “the Islamic State”, with its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the Caliph. In this statement, all Muslims were called upon to declare allegiance to the Caliphate (Pizzi 2014). To review the situation: the coalition left and Iraq was divided. The international community shifted its attention from Iraq to focus on the waves of violence during the Arab Spring. The Iraqi participators in the Sunni Awakening, who were trained by the U.S. to tackle ISI, were found lost in the years after the operations and did not agree with the Maliki’s Shia government (Hassan 2014). The government was quickly losing legitimacy in the eyes of the Sunni population and former military leaders.
Syria Protests against the Assad regime started in Syria in in 2011, and by 2012 thousands of soldiers together with their commanders defected from the Syrian military and all Muslims were called upon to help overthrow Assad (Lewis 2013). The Syrian rebels were promised “nonlethal assistance” by the United States, while at the same time, Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) became the dominant in rebel areas in Syria. Additionally, ISI was exploiting the Syrian Civil War as a training tool and way to expand. When the Islamic State announced JAN to be its official Syrian offshoot in 2013 and changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (or Sham) (ISIS), JAN rejected this statement and called on al Qaeda Central for judgement (Stern & Berger 2015:10). It is in this period that the European Union ended its arms embargo on Syrian rebels. This made it easier for all parties, including ISIS, to access weapons to fight the Assad regime, or anyone else for that matter. The U.S. then decided “To train and equip ‘appropriately vetted’ members of the Syrian opposition” (Obama: Cockburn 2015:3). Unfortunately, the Syrian military opposition was by that time dominated by JAN and ISIS and U.S. officials later admitted that the U.S. and its allies (referring to Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) fueled the civil war in Syria (Martin 2014). ISIS then changed the situation by attacking Syrian rebel groups and at the same time created its first official Twitter account (Stern & Berger 2015:11). In 2014, ISIS took control of the city of Raqqa and proclaimed it to be the capital of the Caliphate, which is still seen as a significant and symbolic move. When Al Qaeda Central publicly distinguished itself from ISIS (Thomas 2014), ISIS’s immediate response was that it, not AQ (then led by Bin Laden’s successor Zawahiri) represented the spirit of Osama Bin Laden. In the early years of the organization, not all information about ISIS was clear, but the international community had its warnings and decision-making points. Important events were the start of the war in Iraq,
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse the withdrawal of the Western forces from Iraq and the start of the civil war in Syria. Many countries’ leaders have urged President al-Assad to step down. But with more political issues in the game, Assad did not act as much against ISIS as desired. However, having only briefly discussed the rise of ISIS, this organization cannot be underestimated by thinking that is was lucky, or got the right chances or situations that made it easier for it to get to where it is now. The question is how it made use of the given situations to achieve its rapid growth. The conflict in Syria provided many uncertainties, displaced people and grievances towards the Assad regime. As explained in Chapter One, the weaker the legitimacy of the state, the bigger the political opportunity structures. The longer a conflict continues, the more opportunities are created for potential parties to seize power (King 2007:120). As explained in this case of ISIS, the situations in Iraq and Syria were insecure, and there were many opportunities for actors to strive for power as ISIS did. What is important to know here is how did ISIS exploit these situations to ensure its rapid growth? After the reestablishment of the Caliphate, ISIS was known all over the world because of its ‘sudden’ appearance and threat (towards the West). The declaration marked the start of ISIS’s global strategy, which involved organizing several attacks across the world. Its strategy was two-fold: to strengthen the organization by gaining territory in the region and by creating chaos in the rest of the world (Pichon 2015). Despite U.S. airstrikes, ISIS continued spreading its message through online propaganda and ISIS’s ideology and power were spreading to countries like Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Even when ISIS lost territories in ongoing fighting with the Kurds in 2015, the organization could continue to steadily recruiting foreign fighters (Bora 2015).
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse B. Discussion of opportunities, organization and frames
Opportunities
This section provides the context in which ISIS was able to rise and shows the political opportunities that seemed to be essential to its rise considering its territorial victories, money flows, ideological reasons and the attention it attracted from the international media. The specific timeframe chosen, from 2012 to 2014 (the establishment of the Caliphate) shows the most significant changes and developments, marking a period that showed rapid growth in an organization once almost destroyed. Because of the scope of this research, not all political opportunities the organization made use of can be discussed here. The focus lies on the political contexts that seemed most relevant to the improvement of the organization. The question answered in this section will be: In what ways did ISIS exploit political opportunities to facilitate a quick rise? The political instability in the region created many opportunities. These opportunities can often be seen as the result of the failure of the “war on terror”, which the U.S. started after the 9/11 attacks. The weak and divided state of Iraq can be seen as a result of the inability of external and local actors to bring stability to the country. The reaction to 9/11, the Arab uprisings and the US intervention in Libya, the political instability and war in Iraq, and the Syrian Civil War all paved the way for violent opposition groups, such as ISIS, to take power. Therefore, the main result of these events are the weak states of Iraq and Syria. Considering the efforts the international community tried to make, the rise of ISIS also resulted in confused world leaders who, partly because of their own mistakes, saw ISIS grow but for a long time saw no way to intervene (Gilsinan 2015) As the literature mentions, when grievances are amassed on both sides, it still takes a leader to step up and give voice to those grievances (King 2007:116). The population will then begin to realize the power of their common cause and it will only take a key event to escalate to violence. There were several such events, from the violent crackdown of the protests in Syria by the Assad regime to the series of escalating events in Iraq (when the conflict has continued for a long time). The focus of the grievances may change, but every event feeds the fury of the next. The basic political opportunities were provided to the organization because of the political instability in the region. That ISIS was able to start operating in Syria to train its fighters, to recruit new fighters and to expand its territory, can be partly explained by the ongoing chaos in the country and the many rebel groups already operating there. Besides political opportunities, an organization has to have sufficient means to operate. These means were supplied to ISIS when the international confusion about the Syrian Civil War reached a point where the U.S. was supplying arms to Syrian rebels. Much of ISIS's equipment and munitions also came from 25
The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse stockpiles captured from the U.S. Allied Iraqi military and Syrian rebels (Amnesty 2015). It exploited the fact that it was among the “Syrian opposition” fighting Assad. ISIS also used the weaponry to attack other rebel groups, to gain more strength and to maintain and control its territory, which was rapidly expanding. Because of the fear and animosity towards Syrian president Assad, many donors chose to fund ISIS in the early years of the Syrian Civil War. Estimates say that ISIS received around forty million US dollar between 2013 and 2014 from wealthy businessmen and families from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE (Swanson 2015). Hundreds of millions of dollars were donated to various Syrian rebel groups (ISIS being among them) from Kuwait (Dickinson 2013). The funding of the external donors is discussed in this section as a part of material opportunities because it gave ISIS more space to operate in the ways it wanted to. As stated in the theoretical framework, it is important for an organization to have sufficient means to provide for its followers. Besides financial resources, it also needs to win the “hearts and minds” of potential followers (Kalyvas 2015). The political opportunity here was the grievances of the populations towards the Shia governments of Syria and Iraq. The deeply rooted grievances provided ISIS with a large number of followers. Additionally, ISIS did not seem to be a big problem for Assad at the time either, making him the lesser of two evils, being under huge international pressure (El-Shenawi 2014). ISIS therefore used the instability and weakness of Iraq and Syria to grow, which also bought the organization time to perfect its strategies. This however does not answer the question on how ISIS exploited these situations. It cannot be only the political opportunity structures that ensure a successful organization because this implies that it would be possible for any actor to achieve what ISIS did in those years. Therefore, a political opportunity cannot be parted from its context and the capability of the organization exploiting it. ISIS has had multiple opportunities, but so did other groups. Therefore, it is important to know how ISIS used or created those opportunities. Thus, opportunities cannot be seen as something external to the organization and the role of the organization and its structures and strategies is fundamental and is able to explain more about events than the opportunities that seemed to be 'given'. This 'how’ question will be answered in Chapter 3. This answer will refer to ISIS's capability to use these situations and opportunities strategically, which implies that the organization was tactically choosing moments when its strategies could succeed.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Organization
Since this research is mainly focused on ISIS’s organizational strategies and how these ensured its rapid growth, it is relevant to discuss ISIS’s (religious) background to understand which ideas and origins underlie its actions. In what ways did ISIS's ideology justify violence? This section will briefly elaborate on ISIS’ ideology and how it portrays itself and others in relation to violence. ISIS is an armed political militant group that carries out an armed struggle and occupies territory based on religious Salafi Sunni beliefs. It has expanded its control over areas of northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria since 2013 with the goal of establishing and expanding a caliphate (Stanford University 2016). ISIS has drawn the attention of the international community and is threatening the security of Syria and Iraq, as well as other countries to which it has expanded, such as Libya (Blanchard, Humud & Nikitin 2015). The organization is highly placed on the security agenda of the international community and especially in Europe. The religious ideology has been important during ISIS’s rapid rise and has served a few goals in particular. By elaborating on its origins, it is possible to focus on how ISIS exploited its ideology to ensure its rapid growth. By doing this it has to be stated clearly what ISIS considers itself to be and who it considers its enemies. Next, it is important to assess the ways in which ISIS portrays itself to its potential audiences and what kinds of effects this brings considering collective action and its rapid growth. ISIS’s ideology propagates the vision of Wahhabism, which has its origins in Saudi Arabia and promotes a fundamentalist (eighteenth-century) version of Islam, which includes imposing Sharia law and advocates persecuting non-Muslims as well as Shia and Sufi Muslims (Cockburn 2015:5). Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Saudi state held the Wahhabi faith, which at the time had great military successes and conquered most of Arabia. ISIS religious genealogy comes from jihadi Salafism, and condemns other non-like-minded Muslims. According to Haykel “ISIS claims that the Saudi state has deviated from the true beliefs of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and that they are the true representatives of the Salafi or Wahhabi faith” (Haykel: BBC:2015). The organization considers its beliefs to be the only true will of Allah, and therefore sees people with differing beliefs, also known as “infidels” (VICE documentary 2014) as a threat. Because “infidels” are considered to be a threat to the organization, to its ultimate ways of thinking and thus towards the self, acts of violence are considered to be theologically justified. By religiously justifying violence towards these infidels, the violent character of the organization can be explained. ISIS labels the enemy as an important threat to its existence. Over the years, ISIS developed the idea that ‘apostate’ Arab regimes dominated the Middle East thanks to economic support from Western countries and the American military (Byman 2015). Thus, these ‘apostate’ regimes were seen as the real enemy, but direct 27
The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse opposition against this near enemy seemed impossible because of its support from a far enemy (the U.S. / the West) (Gerges 2009:48). Many similarities can be seen between ISIS’s violent behavior towards people with differing beliefs and towards the West in general. ISIS rejects other Muslim beliefs that do not agree with its ‘true’ religion. Having discussed ISIS’s ideology and origins, it becomes clearer which ideas justify its actions and how they portray themselves and the enemy. The next section will address and further outline the organizations frames with which this chapter will end its general analysis of the three lenses.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Frames
To complete the analysis of power dynamics, this chapter ends with a discussion of the frames that were used by ISIS to the greatest effect. To cover this issue it is important to examine in what ways these frames were used. Here it will become clear in what ways ISIS portrayed itself towards the international community and the populations of Syria and Iraq. The research sub-question “What image did ISIS portray of itself towards friends and enemies?” will be answered. An organization like ISIS needs to have a frame that resonates with the potential participants and creates clear “us” vs. “them” distinctions, leading to a threat towards the group being seen as a threat towards the self. This relates to how movements create meaning. In this section, the focus is on ISIS’s ability to create meaning, which in turn influenced support and contributed to its rapid rise. Certain elements of framing are seen in the case of ISIS, but I found it hard to assess the specific frames that were used by ISIS to explain its rapid growth. After studying online propaganda material presented by ISIS in 2012–2014 (Islamic State Reports, The Clanging of the Swords, etc.), it seemed the organization more likely used images and performances in its online propaganda. On images and performances will be elaborated further in the next chapter. The element of framing is thus less applicable in comparison to the lens of organization, to the case of ISIS. Framing does, however, contribute to the explanation of the growth of the organization, on which I will elaborate below. Throughout ISIS’ online propaganda campaign, it is possible to find two distinct versions of the message it conveyed. Its videos and online newspapers highlight two opposite sides of ISIS: the violent character of the organization and the daily “good” life in the areas it controlled. In general, ISIS tries to simplify the real world by dividing the world into a battle between evil and good. ISIS does this by 1) projecting an image of strength and victory, 2) pairing extreme violence with moral justification, 3) manipulating the perceptions of citizens to demand military action, 4) placing the blame for any conflict on Western governments and the incitements of ‘Zionists’ and 5) recasting any violence against ISIS as violence towards Muslims in general (Stern & Berger 2015:250). For first side, the violent character of the organization, a violent and strong frame is used to create fear and a sense of authority. ISIS and its members are experts on fear. Fear can be used as a military tactic to weaken an opponent, but here it is considered to be a way of projecting the organization’s image to the outside world. Through its propaganda (videos, images and written texts), ISIS creates fear in its opponents. To the West ISIS portray itself as a dangerous threat and to potential foreign fighters it portrays itself as the one and only true solution and faith. In the end, these images in videos and texts sometimes created small and sometimes huge differences. One important contribution to the rise of ISIS, for instance, is the way in which videos of the group showed fighters executing Shia soldiers and truck drivers. This played an
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse important role in terrifying and demoralizing Shia soldiers leading up to the capture of Mosul (Cockburn: 2015:xiv). This propaganda influenced the behavior of the Iraqi army. The second side, of portraying the daily “good” life in ISIS territory, illustrates its way of governing and creating a sense of wanting to live and belong in ‘the promised land’. The Islamic State Reports and multiple propaganda videos give the idea that ISIS was building a peaceful “true” state and contributed to society by controlling roundabouts, developing agriculture projects and opening complaints desks and nursing homes (Al Hayat: ISR one). This was the image it created for outsiders and insiders to believe. The organization uses both types of messages (violent and peaceful character) to target potential foreign fighters to join the fight. Since 2011, up to 30.000 foreign fighters have travelled to Syria and Iraq, most of them to join ISIS (Norton-Taylor 2015). The arrival of foreign fighters has been the result of multiple reasons that, in those years, made ISIS seem very attractive for such fighters. The image of ISIS in combination with its military strategies, which will be addressed in the next chapter, contributed to the rapid rise of the organization. ISIS’s ideology justifies the acts of violence against “non-believers” and can, in combination with very carefully plotted (online) propaganda, motivate and influence individuals to mobilize. ISIS’s ability to frame itself as wealthy and successful strengthened its recruitment of both local and foreign fighters. The issue of foreign fighters is therefore the result of a very successful combination of strategies and framing, and contributed to the rapid rise of ISIS After having discussed “frames”, the next chapter will address and further outline the organization’s strategies. By doing so it will become clearer what specific elements contributed to ISIS’s rapid rise and answers will be provided to the research's main question.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse III. ISIS' ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGY
Fundamental power dynamics often favor violence over accommodation, continuation over cessation, and victory over negotiation, even if the societies in which violence emerges are ultimately worse off as a result (King 2007:128)
Discussing the political opportunity structures, a general view of the organization and the frames it uses provided important insights into the situation the organization was in. However, so far this did not provide insights to help answer the question of how ISIS was able to grow so rapidly. That is why the groundwork on the organization itself needs to be laid down in this chapter. As mentioned in the section on the collective action literature and in the context chapter, the success of the organization mostly seems to come back to ISIS itself. For an organization to be successful it has to respond and react to the context it is in in order to grasp hold of opportunities and avoid threats. This having been said, an organization can benefit from outside circumstances, but these circumstances have to be properly taken advantage of so that they lead to the desired outcomes. How was ISIS able to grow rapidly with relatively few people noticing? The question here is, how did ISIS structure itself to facilitate its rapid growth? The previous section shows that ISIS had opportunities that facilitated situations for it to take power. However, it still remains unclear how it did this. To cover this issue, this section will be divided in “military structures” “governing structures”, “financial structures”, and “propaganda structures”. These four approaches are chosen because each aspect can explain a different part of ISIS’ rapid rise. These are also chosen because, as mentioned in the theoretical chapter, it is largely a function of resources plus strategy that influences the balance of power in conflicts (Kalyvas 2015). The factors that influence these dynamics are said to be largely organizational. By implying this, the success of a group is then said to depend on its organizational structures. The organizations that can facilitate group action and use discrete incentive structures are considered to be the most successful (King 2007). The following section will first and foremost focus on ISIS itself. It is beyond the scope of this research to incorporate external organizations. The analysis will state clearly that the combination of ISIS’s capacity and strategies eventually contributed to certain victories and therefore contributed to ISIS’s rapid growth.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse A. Military tactics
To start with, the focus on military strategies was chosen because the period of 2012 to 2014 showed a high proportion of territorial conquests. Highlighting ISIS’s military strategies that might have contributed to its rapid rise will provide a clearer explanation of that rise. Here answers will be provided to this research sub- questions: Which military strategies were used by ISIS? and How did these military strategies contribute to its rapid rise between 2012 and June 2014? When the Caliphate was proclaimed in June 2014, ISIS controlled considerable territory, backed by large numbers of weapons systems and a force of around 31.000 fighters (Lister 2015:26). To get to this point, ISIS had long implemented policies that aimed for the professionalization of its militia and its members. The number of ISIS training camps has increased since 2013 to maintain the organization’s well trained, ruthless and motivated fighters. Generally speaking, the military operations carried out by ISIS can be divided into two categories: mass-casualty urban attacks and a coordinated campaign that aims to weaken its opponents’ military capabilities and morale (Lister 2015:29). Both will be explained below and will be illustrated by specific cases in 2012–2014 that were essential turning points in ISIS’s rapid growth.
Mass-casualty urban attacks
These attacks are military operations carried out by small, covert, urban cells that are linked to a larger military structure that can provide weaponry and manpower. These operations are in line with the larger strategy of the organization and are important to sustaining offensive momentum against its opponents. These mass-casualty urban attacks often target civilian areas with Shia (including Alawites) or other minority groups. This kind of military operation aims to provoke the Shia to radicalize, join Iranian sponsored militias and commit similar atrocities on the Sunni population (Zelin 2014a). ISIS could then represent itself as the true leader and protector of Sunni ideals, knowing that the Shia led governments of Iraq and Syria are often repressive towards the Sunni populations in these countries. These attacks repeatedly took place in Iraq from 2010 to 2014. In fact, with ISIS knowingly operating these kind of strategies to create anger among the populations towards the Shia government, it is appropriate to question the origins of the political opportunities discussed in the previous section, as these may have resulted from ISIS’s earlier actions. The case of Syria seems to be a little more complicated, since ISIS also started attacking Sunni rebel groups at some point. However, these were seen as acts of revenge and intimidation.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Coordinated campaign
ISIS’s coordinated campaign is a way to demoralize its military opponents by launching a campaign of attrition. These operations mainly focused on Sunni urban centers and transport routes in Sunni regions. Within Syria, these campaigns mainly targeted resource-rich regions in the east or northeast of the country. These operations are mostly carried out to create the conditions necessary to acquire and consolidate territory (Lister 2015:29). These new territories potentially provide supportive populations and access to resources. This strategy is considered to be the most influential factor facilitating ISIS’s successes in 2012– 2014 and can be illustrated with the case of Mosul. The fall of Mosul is considered to be a turning point in the history of Iraq, Syria and the Middle East in general. Years before the actual attack on Mosul, however, ISIS started extensive intelligence-led operations that make it impossible for the Iraqi security forces to maintain full control over the city. These operations primarily involved attacking checkpoints and patrols. By starting campaigns to intimidate the military and government by assassinating senior officials, ISIS weakened the government’s ability to control Mosul. This in return led to the establishment of a shadow authority through which ISIS was able to exert influence within the city (Lister 2015:30). ISIS made a series of complex alliances with Sunni Arabs who held strong grievances towards the Maliki government (which as mentioned before, could be the result of Shia retaliations for previous ISIS mass-casualty urban attacks). Additionally, the Maliki regime’s reliance on Shia militia groups that were Iranian proxies caused anger among the almost eighty Sunni tribes that fought alongside ISIS (Hassan 2014). During this time, the regime turned down offers from Massoud Barzani, the Kurdish leader, to send the Peshmerga (the Kurdish militia) into Mosul to fight ISIS. When on June 9th 2014 the three top generals fled the area in a helicopter, many soldiers followed their example. Despite U.S. aid and twenty five billion dollars’ worth of training, U.S. trained Iraqi soldiers and police officers left their posts, fleeing and leaving their uniforms to escape ISIS’s advance (Sly & Ramadan 2014). “We felt like cowards, but our commanders were afraid of Daesh. They were too afraid to lead us” Said Shebab, using the Arabic acronym for Islamic State” (Zucchino 2014). Some soldiers were told by their commanders to leave their uniforms and flee and local Iraqis were encouraging them and offering alternative clothing (Parker, Coles & Salman, 2014). By the time the final offensive on Mosul began, the population had lost its trust in the government and the military’s capabilities and confidence had been weakened, which made it possible for ISIS to seize Mosul within 24 hours. Some say the problem with the Iraqi army was not a lack of command or insufficient counterinsurgency training but rather a lack of governance of willingness to fight for Maliki’s version of Iraq (Ricks 2014). But in terms of ISIS’s military strategy, this specific case was the result of a very successful series of operations. The case of Mosul not only shows ISIS' military strategies, but also shows the 33
The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse importance of political alliances, psychological warfare and the way ISIS established some sort of local preponderance. It cannot be proven, but it is likely that the grievances of the eighty Sunni tribes towards the Maliki regime were the result of the regime’s responses to numerous ISIS attacks. The three lenses, discussed in the context chapter, here all come together in this specific case. It shows a set of carefully thought out operations that took place over the years and led to the capture of Mosul. By providing the conditions that led to the desired outcome, ISIS was able to manipulate its opponents and “allies” to shape its desired future. The ability to do this contributed to ISIS’s rapid rise.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse B. Governance and control
In a relatively short period, ISIS was able to conquer significant territories, which it then tried to control. This is one of the fundamental differences between ISIS and its predecessors, which operated with guerilla style operations. As stated in the theoretical framework chapter, it takes a strong leadership that can provide structures and that provides for the needs of the population to make an organization successful. There seem to be multiple ways of winning the support of the population. Even if ideology does not win hearts and minds there are ways to police territory effectively and identify and punish the “defectors” and reward the supporters. This section will discuss the internal policy of the organization together with its governing strategies in ISIS-controlled areas in 2012 to 2014. This section will provide answers to the research sub- questions: What governing or controlling strategies were used by ISIS? and How did these ways of governing contribute to its rapid rise between 2012 and June 2014?
Internal policy
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, also known as Caliph Ibrahim, was and still is the top leader and projection of the image of ISIS. He oversees both religious and political life in the areas ISIS controls. Al-Baghdadi’s religious background combined with the military and intelligence experts (ISIS’s senior leaders) he gathered around him created a successful combination. Leaked documents provided a glimpse of the organization’s structure (El-Shenawi 2014). Baghdadi is both the religious and state leader. Next to him, he preferred a personal advisor or assistant and next in line are two deputies (one for Syria and one for Iraq). Below these positions, the leadership consists of a cabinet with eight ‘ministers’ and a military council consisting of thirteen men (Lister 2014:21; Sherlock 2014). The organization rules certain provinces (Waliyat) and has appointed in each a governor and local governments beneath them with administrative units. In this way it became a typical government bureaucracy with mostly foreigners in civil institution positions and Iraqis in its army (Lister 2014:88). While ISIS is providing support to regions it controls in those years, there is no hard evidence that it can direct the activities of a regional Waliyat as part of a cohesive campaign (Barrett 2014). The idea of a ‘caliphate’ is not empty rhetoric. ISIS’s caliphate rests within a controlled territory and is a core part of ISIS’s political vision. ISIS “holds territory, provides limited services, dispenses a form of justice (loosely defined), most definitely has an army and flies its own flag” (Ollivant and Fishman 2014). It has built a holistic system of governance that includes religious, educational (school systems, providing materials like backpacks and writing material) and judicial services as well as security, humanitarian aid (providing services during Ramadan) and infrastructure projects (Water and electricity lines) (Caris & Reynolds 2014:4). The announcement of the Caliphate seemed to realize ISIS’s grand strategy of first establishing
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse control of territory through military conquest and then reinforcing this control through governance (Caris & Reynolds 2014:9).
Controlling areas
Control over populations in the immediate period after seizing control over an area is crucial for ISIS’s authority. It seeks to establish law and order right after capturing a territory, which means police forces, male and female, were rapidly formed to patrol the streets and enforce traditional civil and Sharia laws (Lister 2014:27). The systems were applied immediately and Sharia courts were rapidly established. ISIS used terror as a form of power over the populations in the areas it controlled and punishments for wrongdoings varied between fines, beatings, crucifixions or beheadings (Remnick 2015). However, the level enforcement differed in different areas controlled by ISIS, which shows that ISIS adapted to the unique dynamics faced in different locations. The longer an area was under ISIS rule, the stricter and more confident the local rulers. The implementation of a strict form of Sharia law, which clearly was central to its governance, included enforcement of the five daily prayers and outlawing of drugs, alcohol, tobacco and gambling. It also controlled clothing, gender mixing and non-Islamic music among other things (Lister 2015:45). Ultimately, ISIS’s political project was based upon establishing a Sunni Islamic state. ISIS was and is, however, not only about disciplinary justice, but it is said to spend large amounts of money on social services, such as civilian bus services, roads repair, food for the poor, healthcare for children and religious education (Lister 2014:28). The situation stated above is the ISIS’s ideal. In the many areas where ISIS operated, different forms of control are applied depending on the local dynamics. Some would describe ISIS’s governing as “fast and efficient and coordinated” (Goha's Nail 2014). The organization faced resistance from its populations and services seemed not as great as described by their online propaganda. The schools in many areas closed down in a failed attempt to rebuild the school system. Young children became restless and went looking for adventure in ISIS or were involuntarily sent off to ISIS religious institutions and later military camps (Remnick 2015). Besides all this, the basic services ISIS was willing to provide, for instance water and electricity, were often limited (Sly 2014). To conclude, as is clear from the aforementioned research, relatively little is known about the ways ISIS governs areas it controls. Several sources point out ISIS’s aim to govern these territories and that it proved effective in maintaining justice or control by force from the moment it entered the territory. The question here is, how was ISIS able to function for such a long time? It was able to police its territories by force and identify and punish defectors and reward supporters. It aims to effectively govern territory, which often comes down to controlling the areas according to tight rules. It seemed able to do so because of its relatively stable source of income, which will be elaborated in the next section (Lister 2015:29). From within 36
The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse the context of disrupted regimes and the Syrian Civil War, it was mostly the Sunni population that was more likely to accept ISIS control over an area and the imposition of harsh norms. As explained in the literature above, “support”, in its many ways, is the outcome of the organisation’s ability to perform public services. Thus ISIS was seen as a viable alternative to the repressive, foreign-influenced governments or moderate oppositions. Harsh measures were therefore accepted because of the social services that were offered by the organization. This “stick” versus “carrot” method as explained here can be seen as a key factor to ISIS’s survival during those years. Were ISIS's governing strategies an important factor in its rise during those years? Although ISIS’s governance or ways of controlling areas shows a very different image in comparison to other organizations, it did in some ways contribute to ISIS’ positive image successes, too little is known about ISIS governing structures to provide a clear answer. However, since relatively little resistance was seen by the outside world from the local populations in Syria and Iraq, ISIS’s seemed to be successfully controlling its territory, which made it possible for ISIS to continue growing.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse C. Finances
One important aspect of ISIS’s internal structure that has proven to enable expansion is how it generates its income. Funding is a key factor for the start of any organization. ISIS needed funding to organize its structure and plan operations. Large scale violence involves large scale finances. Groups that can pay salaries and provide weaponry, nice food and homes will be more successful than those that cannot. This section will therefore elaborate on the ways ISIS maintained its income that seemed of greater importance to this research. This will provide answers to the sub-questions: Which financial strategies were used by ISIS? and How did these ways of generating income contribute to its rapid rise between 2012 and June 2014? ISIS appeared to be an extremely wealthy organization. The wealth of the organization strengthened its recruitment of local and foreign fighters, simply because it was able to pay salaries and thus attract poor people by providing for their basic needs (Lister 2015:40; The Economist 2015). It is essential to know how ISIS was able to get a hold of its financial resources. Before 2012, the organization had already been self- financed through smuggling oil and selling it on the black market (Bahney et al. 2010). Additionally, foreign fighters provided funding for ISIS on arrival and foreign donors from the Gulf States provided money via interest (Sunni) organizations in Arab (Gulf) countries. However, this funding was only a small percentage of the organization's income. When ISIS began operating in Syria it still relied on donors in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan (BBC 2014). In 2013 and 2014 it was estimated that ISIS received around forty million US dollar from donors like Kuwaiti businessmen (Dickinson 2013) before it split from AQ Central and continued to finance its operations with illegal activities, such as kidnapping, extortion and smuggling, to name a few (Swanson 2015; Brisard & Martinez 2014:3). ISIS effectively made use of the region’s riches by aiming for oil and banks during its territorial victories. Between 2012 and 2014, the organization was able to finance itself through oil refineries that it had taken over in its territorial expansion. By the time ISIS proclaimed the Caliphate in June 2014, experts estimated that its oil revenues alone brought in between one and two million US dollar per day and ISIS was worth up to two billion US dollars (BBC 2 August 2014; Johnston 2014). One of the reasons ISIS appeared to be so successful in funding its organization was because it used multiple ways to get this funding. It did not matter whether the income and the activities it did to maintain this fluctuate over time because if one funding source was shut down, it turned to another (Swanson 2015). While in previous years the contribution from external donors seemed higher and more necessary, between 2012 and 2014 the organization seemed mostly self-sufficient. The most important funding sources were estimated to be natural resources, such as oil, and extortion (Brisard & Martinez 2014:5).
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Oil
During its territorial victories, ISIS used the captured oil fields in Syria and Iraq as a major source of funding. Iraq is the world’s fourth largest exporter of oil and has forty per cent of the world’s reserves. ISIS’s control of the oil fields resulted in a very large black market oil trade, which provided around thirtyeight per cent of ISIS’s income in the last years before the establishment of the Caliphate (Stanford University 2016). By the time the organization proclaimed the Caliphate, more than sixty per cent of Syria’s oil production and about ten per cent of Iraq’s oil production were controlled by ISIS (Brisard & Martinez 2014:6). This black market trade has resulted in confusion as to who was buying oil from whom. U.S. officials have stated that the Assad government as well as Turkey and Iraqi Kurds bought oil from ISIS (Laub & Masters 2016). Moreover, because the oil was smuggled into Turkey, European countries that buy oil from Turkey were considered to contribute to the finances of ISIS (Hubbard, Krauss & Schmitt 2014; Global research 2015).
Extortion
Terror and fear also seemed to be effective methods of financing the organization during 2012 to 2014. ISIS has heavily relied on ransoms, and has kidnapped businessmen, local politicians, clerics and foreign nationals. In the years before the establishment of the Caliphate, these ransom payments were together estimated at around ten million US dollar per month (Duhaime 2015:4). Besides kidnapping, when ISIS established civil control over the areas it conquered, it implemented taxes on commercial activities, such as telecommunication companies, taxes on goods, road taxes and protection taxes for non-Muslims. The living costs started to rise in ISIS-controlled areas in 2014 due to increased taxes, and they increased as the organization was more frequently under attack later in 2014. This resulted in residents paying a fixed tax per person living under ISIS rule and paying for water and electricity, although paying these taxes did not guarantee those basic needs (Swanson 2015; Lister 2015:38). In total, these kinds of taxes and tactics provided the organization with around thirty million US dollar per month (Brisard & Martinez 2014:5). ISIS is the world’s richest militant organization because it was able to combine the benefits of plundering natural resources and more traditional financing methods, such as kidnapping and extortion. Additionally, when it was conquering territory it was able to take over banks, such as the central bank of Iraq in Mosul. It is estimated ISIS ‘earned’ around 425 million US dollar in cash from that location (Brisard & Martinez 2014:6). ISIS recognized the importance of funding for its actions and goals. It made use of the oil-rich environment it was in and was able to get started with the help of wealthy donors. However, generating income does not directly lead to rapid growth. But carefully thought out organizational structures and military strategies do need funding and this strong combination made it very easy for ISIS to grow rapidly. The “wealth” of the organization therefore contributed to its rapid rise from 2012 to 2014 because it could finance its living, 'governing' and military expenses. 39
The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse
D. Online Propaganda
Besides the organization’s military, governance and financial strategies, propaganda strategies have to be discussed to create a more complete image of ISIS and in the ways it operates. The organization seemed to have found a very effective way of using social media in its operations, as a tool to communicate with its members, spread its message, recruit potential fighters and exploit international media attention. In this section the focus will lie with ISIS' clever use of social media in its online propaganda and how it generated strategies of fear in this propaganda. This section will therefore provide answers to the research sub- questions: In what ways did ISIS use social media propaganda? and How did its social media use contribute to its rapid rise between 2012 and June 2014? ISIS is considered to be by far the most media-savvy militant group to emerge in the Middle East. According to Neumann, “ISIS understands very well that in order for an act of terrorism to be effective, it needs to actually terrorize people. The act of communication that follows the act of violence is almost as important as the act of violence itself.” (McPhee & Ross 2014). ISIS violent propaganda is designed to shock and terrorize populations in Iraq and Syria as well as those in the Western world, and achieves this by using extremely violent methods and images. This projection of terror is considered to be a military tactic used to intimidate ISIS opponents. While it is not used in and around the battlefields, it does leave a big impact in the world-wide creation of fear. ISIS’s former social-media director was believed to be an American named Ahmad Abousamra, who had been active in the organization since 2009. He grew up in France and Boston and spoke Arabic and English fluently (McPhee & Ross 2014). He studied computer science in the U.S. He used his skills in the service of ISIS and encouraged others to actively use social media to promote jihad. It is said that Abousamra, together with other social media experts, were killed in an airstrike by the Iraqi Army in May 2015 (Al Arabiya 2015). These social media experts joined the organization to contribute in their own way to try to mobilize and spread the message of ISIS to others. ISIS had and still has a strong group of media experts from the West who know exactly how to create fear and to aggravate this emotion with a steady flow of videos, images and written propaganda. Although the precise composition of the ISIS’ media team in the period of 2012 to 2014 is unclear, it is known that there were many regional media hubs out of which ISIS operated. These included Raqqa and Deir Ez-zoor in Syria and Saladin, Mosul and Kirkuk in Iraq. Multiple Twitter accounts routinely published updates (video, image or text) about ISIS from these locations (Stern & Berger 2015: 113).
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Social media use
ISIS used Twitter to exert and increase its impact on how the world perceives the organization by disseminating images of graphic violence. This includes the beheadings of Western journalists and aid- workers and of the Jordanian air force pilot. By doing this, ISIS successfully used social media to attract new recruits and inspire lone actors to commit attacks (Berger & Morgan 2015). ISIS had easily outperformed any other revolutionary group on Twitter until mid-2014. ISIS used the site as a communication tool inside the organization as well as for outside communication. In June 2014, after years of communication, the ISIS app was terminated by Twitter in an attempt to reduce ISIS’ influence and ability to broadcast its message. Later in 2014 Twitter began to suspend large numbers of ISIS supporting accounts. The research shows that these account suspensions have had concrete effects in limiting the reach and scope of ISIS activities (Berger & Morgan 2015). In addition to Twitter, ISIS also operated several Android applications as communication tools within its organization, which were of major importance during the capture of Mosul (Berger 2014). Ever since, its influence has been tried to be limited on Android as well. The social media revolution of ISIS on Twitter in 2014 created lots of opportunities for it to expand its reach and easily speak to others around the world. However, ISIS could only do this because its use of social media was still largely unknown in the international field. From the moment ISIS started its active media campaign, which was increasingly aimed at international audiences, the international community recognized its danger and its responsibility to try to reduce ISIS's social media influence.
Multimedia campaigns
Since Westerners were involved in its social media project, ISIS’s Al Hayat Media Center could translate material into English and other languages. In May and June, multiple English magazines were produced. ISIS gained full control over Raqqa in January 2014 and with this complete control, proclaimed it the capital of the organization (Chulov 2014). In combination of the proclamation of Raqqa as its capital, the propaganda videos shot after gaining control over the city showed the attractiveness of traveling to Raqqa. The Islamic State Report series showed how ISIS separated its superior religious beliefs from others (Al Hayat: ISR one & four). A couple of these reports show everyday life in ISIS-controlled areas and how the organization wishes to help the locals, such as its development of circumstances for farming combined with border control and governing police structures (Al Hayat ISR two & three). Besides the Islamic State Reports, ISIS created a very popular jihadist propaganda series named “The Clanging of the Swords”. By the time the “Clanging of the Swords Part four” came out in May 2014, the makers developed themselves into professionals and showed a video considered to be the most popular jihadist propaganda ever made (Zelin 2014b). These videos combined creating fear and with images of the Promised Land; the message they were 41
The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse sending was clear “We are strong, and we are winning” (Stern & Berger 2015:112). These propaganda mechanisms contributed to the creation of fear all over the world and provided the organization with foreign fighters who felt drawn to ISIS because of the videos and because it had shown itself to be a governing state. The proclamation of Raqqa as ISIS’s new capital is seen as a highly significant and symbolic tactical move. This image of the capital Raqqa improved ISIS’s credibility not only as a stable organization, but also as a “governing” one. Additionally, declaring Raqqa as its capital improved the accessibility and capacity of the organization by making it easier for foreign fighters to reach the organization. It was already clear that ISIS differed from its Al Qaeda affiliates, who were mostly operating as underground guerilla movements. This move lifted ISIS towards the surface in becoming a ‘state’ of its own. Clearly, controlling one city is not a confirmation that the organization was capable of ruling and governing whole areas, but it is considered to be a step on the road towards the Caliphate. These ways of exploiting multimedia and propaganda strategies had led to a powerful image of ISIS within the international community and created opportunities for foreign fighters to join the organization (Hegghammer: Thomas 2014). The combination of a very successful multimedia campaign, together with territorial victories like Raqqa and Mosul, produced an attractive image for foreigners to join ISIS. Having Raqqa as strategic point to go to, and the propaganda videos made it easy for foreign fighters to reach ISIS. In this way the organization kept expanding, and by the time it proclaimed the so-called ‘Caliphate’ it was ready to flood social media channels with multiple messages showing its new trophies: the foreign fighters. The content of ISIS propaganda and messaging seemed to be primarily aimed towards its opponents to portray an image of terror, and towards its supporters and foreign fighters an image of the Promised Land. Its active social media use gave it a large playing field and new ways to portray itself towards friends and enemies. Its social media use then mainly contributed to the creation of fear, which is often seen as one of its military tactics as well. In addition, the access to possible supporters was increased, which led to an increasing number of foreign fighters joining the organization and contributed to the growth of the organization in those years.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse Conclusion
Having answered the sub-questions, this conclusion will combine the findings presented in this research, and provide answers to the main research question: “How did ISIS structure its own organization in order to facilitate its rapid growth from 2012 up to the establishment of the Caliphate in 2014?.” Before this is examined, the results of this research will be discussed together with the use of the theory and its limitations. Possibilities for future research will then be discussed. The analysis in this thesis shows the complexity of attempting to explain the rapid rise of ISIS using power dynamics. The military, governance, funding and propaganda strategies give important insights, which combined with the opportunities and frames, can explain the rapid rise of ISIS. The combination of political instability, military strategies, the successful ways to generate income and the ways social media was used to create fear and mobilize potential fighters led to the creation of opportunities that contributed to ISIS’s rapid rise. The elements discussed above cannot be considered as coincidental ways to ensure growth. They imply the careful considerations and organization that made ISIS’s actions succeed. The years between 2012 and 2014 were chosen because the biggest changes in organization, media attention and territory expansion were seen in this period. However, as can be seen in the context chapter, much work had been done by ISIS prior to this period, which made many things fall into place during those years and allowed the organization to reach a level of maturity. For instance, the seizure of Mosul was a result of careful preparations that had been happening for a long time. The political instability in the region created political opportunities, but ISIS also created additional opportunities and may have helped create the political instability. ISIS effectively exploited these war-torn areas by applying its military strategies and framing itself as the true protector of the Sunni populations, which created a message that in certain ways resonated within the local populations in Iraq and Syria. ISIS recognized the importance of funding for its actions and goals and made use of its oil-rich environment. Money alone does not directly lead to rapid growth, however, carefully thought out organizational structures and military strategies combined with adequate funding allowed ISIS to grow rapidly. ISIS was able to control territory effectively and punish the defectors of the regime. It aimed to effectively govern territory and, with the help of its financial resources, has largely kept cities running and the people living under ISIS rule tacitly content. The “stick” versus “carrot” method has been seen as a key factor in ISIS’s rise from 2012 to 2014. The combination of the organization’s wealth, its ways of governing and its efficient use of online propaganda attracted a large number of foreign fighters. ISIS’ ability to present an image of wealth and success strengthened its recruitment of both local and foreign fighters. The organization shaped its own future by intelligently using several strategies to exploit the weak states of Iraq and Syria.
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse All of the above, combined with the fact that ISIS’s propaganda strategies aimed at the West began relatively late, influenced its rapid growth by helping it stay ‘under the radar’ for a longer period. Even though ISIS was successfully promoting its own organization over the years, it can be said that its focus towards the West resulted in a reduction of ISIS’s influence, including territorial losses and social media losses after 2014. Before the official recognition of danger by the international community, the group could grow ‘silently’ while preparing itself and perfecting its strategies in order to establish a level of maturity. This allowed ISIS to choose the moment to reveal itself as a fully constructed group, which shocked the world and led to questions about its rapid rise. Its ability to create this kind of organizational maturity in relative anonymity is another important factor in its apparent rapid rise. After reconsidering the aspects that seemed to be especially important to their rapid rise, it can even be said that in some cases the other power dynamics were considered to be a part of the organizational structures and strategies or in the case of “opportunities” an outcome. The three lenses used here, introduced by King (2007), proved useful as a guide in the beginning of the research. While doing research it became clear a focus on the organization itself deemed necessary to explain ISIS's rapid rise. The three lenses of King's model support each other and work together but since this research was focused on a relatively short time frame one out of three became more necessary to focus on than the other two. This in turn led to a limitation of the research since only one of the three lenses was payed sufficient attention to. There are a number of reflections regarding potential future research. For instance, future research could investigate how ISIS’s military strategies could contribute to the knowledge of the origin of revolutionary or militant groups. Additional insights would be extremely relevant for policy makers and could be gained from ISIS’s capability to shape and influence surrounding actors and therefore design its battlefield. Furthermore, it would be incredibly helpful to gain more insights about life under ISIS rule. This will require multiple interviews with refugees, who, in a way will be biased and tell selective stories, but will be able to provide a better understanding of how the organization functions than can be gained from afar. More insights into the governing structures of ISIS can help the international community better find and exploit ISIS’s weaknesses. This research began by considering the unknown factors that had been critical to the explanation of the rapid rise of ISIS. Through the analysis of the three lenses, opportunities, organization and frames, ISIS’s history was researched for key elements that ensured massive contribution to its rapid rise. With a strong focus on the organizational structures, multiple elements like its military, way of controlling areas, ways of generating income and online propaganda were named that together can explain the rapid rise of ISIS. The elements found can be mainly ascribed to the organization itself and can be seen as a complex combination
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The evolution of ISIS | S.J. Evertse of dynamics, focused on intertwined and thoughtful organizational strategies. The question that remains is: will the Caliphate still exist in two years?
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