Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Comments

United Nations Peacekeeping and the Use of Force WP S The Intervention Brigade in Congo Is No Model for Success Denis M. Tull

The number of uniformed personnel serving in UN peace missions reached a new record in 2016, at almost 123,000. Following grave failings of UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, there is growing awareness with- in the UN of a widening disjoint between the expectations placed upon peacekeeping forces and what they can actually achieve. One aspect of the debate relates to the ques- tion of how robustly UN missions should operate in enforcing their mandate. In some quarters the resolute use of force is seen as the key to greater success. Almost three years ago the UN sent a Force Intervention Brigade to Congo with an explicit mandate to neutralise armed groups. An assessment of its record reveals that the brigade cannot be regarded as an organisational model worth replicating, and that peace-enforcing mandates do not necessarily lead to greater success in peacekeeping.

Three years ago, on 28 March 2013, the UN ongoing UN mission, namely, MONUSCO Security Council decided to send a 3,096- (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations member Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) Unies pour la Stabilisation en République to eastern DR Congo (Resolution 2098). The Démocratique du Congo). Despite claims move came in response to persistent dif- to the contrary, this represented the aban- ficulties in establishing peace in the region donment of the principle of mission impar- after the (M23) was tiality. The FIB was to conduct “targeted able to capture ’s provincial offensive operations” jointly with the Con- capital in November 2012, unhin- golese army (Forces Armées de la Répu- dered by UN forces. blique Démocratique du Congo, FARDC) to Resolution 2098 broke new ground in disarm militias and rebel forces and thus several respects. Firstly, “on an exceptional lessen the threat such groups posed to the basis and without creating a precedent or civilian population and “state authority”. any prejudice to the agreed principles of Despite its separate mandate, the FIB is part peacekeeping”, an intervention force with of MONUSCO and answerable to its force its own separate remit was created within an commander. On 30 March 2016 the Secu-

Dr. Denis M. Tull is Deputy Head of SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 20 April 2016

1 rity Council extended the FIB’s mandate for remaining militia in eastern Congo with the third time. 1,000 to 2,500 fighters. Assessing the impact of the FIB means The reasons for the FIB’s meek record are answering two questions. Firstly, can the political rather than military in nature. Its coexistence of the FIB and the conventional origins play a role. The idea to establish an UN mission serve as a model for future mis- intervention force came not from the UN, sions? And secondly, does greater robust- but from and South Africa as rep- ness – critics speak of militarisation – prom- resentatives of the Southern African Devel- ise greater success in peacekeeping? opment Community (SADC). Their inten- tion was to rid their ally Kabila of his worst tormentor, the M23. To that extent the ini- FIB’s Balance Sheet tiative was also directed indirectly against The brigade passed its only real test to date the M23’s regional protector , whose in October 2013, just three months after relations with South Africa and Tanzania arriving in Congo, when it defeated the are strained. The UN was greatly concerned M23 in a military offensive conducted jointly about the idea of a regional intervention in with the FARDC. Hopes that this would its own area of operations, and the compro- lead to the neutralisation of other militias mise of integrating the FIB in MONUSCO and a general stabilisation of the region originated in efforts to rein in that initia- were not to be fulfilled. The situation in tive. However, this arrangement neither pre- eastern Congo remains characterised by vented regional rivalries from overshadow- violence and persistent armed attacks on ing the FIB, nor could it alter the fact that the civilian population. the countries behind the FIB never intended Why did the FIB intervention fail to to do more than suppress the M23. In other mark a turning point? Its success against words, the limited results of three years of the M23 was not a good yardstick of its the FIB merely reflect the limited goals of influence on the overall security situation. its initiators. After the neutralisation of the Firstly, the defeat of the M23 was only par- M23, the Kabila government also lost its tially attributable to military force. Massive briefly heightened interest in closer co- international pressure on neighbouring operation with the UN. MONUSCO found Rwanda to abandon its support for the itself – as it has consistently since 2006 – rebels played an equally important role. in the role of the unpopular and politically Secondly, while the M23 may have been marginalised bystander. eastern DRC’s strongest group in military Even if the FIB had functioned as terms – and the greatest threat to the gov- MONUSCO’s enforcement tool, its impact ernment of President – the would have remained modest on account Congo Research Group listed eighty-one of its lack of integration in a viable political armed organisations in the two Kivu prov- strategy. In fact, the FIB mandate was cer- inces at the end of 2015. If the FIB had been tainly compatible with MONUSCO’s. In able to repeat its initial success against pursuit of its objective of “stabilising” Con- other militias (including the Forces Démo- go, MONUSCO has for years prioritised cratiques de Libération du Rwanda [FDLR] supporting the FARDC against the militias, and the Allied Democratic Forces [ADF]), alongside its work of strengthening state it would have been able to improve the institutions. The solution to the problem of situation in eastern Congo at least in the violent conflict is seen to lie in establishing short term. But the momentum of the the state’s monopoly on the use of force. offensive against M23 quickly dissipated. This approach, however, has brought at Operations against other groups either best limited success, including in relation fizzled out (ADF) or never occurred at all, to the top priority of the MONUSCO man- as in the case of the FDLR, the largest date, the protection of civilians (PoC).

SWP Comments 20 April 2016

2 What were the UN’s assumptions under- sive, static and at best reactive behaviour lying the stated aim of neutralising? Trans- led to a widely noted “garrison mentality” ferring “liberated areas” to Congo’s largely among the framework brigades. The de dysfunctional state authorities has not facto refusal of these contingents to imple- turned out to be a promising solution. To ment the “proactive” interpretation of the this day, the government demonstrates mandate demanded by MONUSCO’s civil- little interest in demands – repeated ad ian and military leadership (including libitum by donors and the UN – to reform frequent patrols, also at night, greater vis- the security sector. Army and police are ibility in high-risk areas, checkpoints) – up ineffectual, and often no less brutal than to and including refusal to obey orders – the armed groups. In October 2015, for generated considerable conflict between example, the FARDC was responsible for the mission leadership and the framework twice as many human rights violations as brigades and between the framework bri- the “worst” non-state militia. The state gades and the FIB. of the judiciary is little better. Both with MONUSCO leadership’s hopes that the respect to the overarching objective (sta- FIB’s aggressive mandate would reinvigor- bility) and the priority of the mandate (PoC) ate the mission as a whole proved fruitless. there is to date no convincing evidence to This is clearly revealed in the case of protec- suggest that MONUSCO and the Congolese tion of civilians. While the mission leader- government have compatible interests. ship (mirroring the FIB mandate) believed The fact that MONUSCO has suspended its that civilians had to be protected through military support for the FARDC for more an aggressive stance towards armed groups, than a year on the grounds of the latter’s MONUSCO’s North Kivu Brigade continued human rights violations, and that the to insist on a more static approach, known Kabila government continues to insist on as “protection by presence”, which relied the mission’s withdrawal, suggest the on a multitude of small bases distributed opposite. throughout the territory. This approach is widely regarded as a failure, due to the limited resources and the huge geograph- The FIB: Valium for MONUSCO ical area. This passivity exacerbated The FIB’s deployment led to a series of MONUSCO’s credibility problem. On the unexpected negative consequences. ground this generated increasing criticism The coexistence of two mandates, with and even protests against the mission. diverging interpretations and approaches, Another problem that arose with the caused frictions and rivalries and ulti- FIB was political disagreement within the mately prevented an effective cooperation mission over the question of which armed between the FIB and MONUSCO. groups to target in FIB military operations, The most important unexpected conse- following the successful neutralisation of quence of the FIB operation was that parts the M23 (FDLR, ADF etc.). of MONUSCO’s contingents (the so-called framework brigades) fell into apathy, whether because they now regarded the Conclusion FIB as the force responsible for active and In the case of the FIB in Congo, the question robust peacekeeping, or because the M23 of whether (even) more robust peacekeep- as the most important armed group had ing also means more successful peacekeep- been eliminated. To their alarm, the mission ing is likely to be answered in the negative: leadership soon realised that the already Not because the FIB energetically pursued weak willingness of the framework bri- the objective of “enforcing peace” and failed, gades to interpret their mandate actively but because political problems quickly and robustly had largely evaporated. Pas- piled up to an extent that called into ques-

SWP Comments 20 April 2016

3 tion the feasibility and wisdom of such an political context. This is reflected for approach. The most important of these was example in the almost excessive attention the diverging interests of the protagonists – given by UN missions to the question of the Congolese government, the FIB troop what they can do themselves to protect contributors and MONUSCO – which could civilians (and other priority tasks). This is be expected to recur in similar form in not to downgrade the importance of PoC. other cases. Another problem that emerged MONUSCO has generated important inno- was the interests of the traditional troop- vations in that respect, some of which will providing countries, most of which oppose be emulated elsewhere. Unfortunately, a “militarisation” of UN peacekeeping on however, they only tackle symptoms, and account of the risks associated with robust ineffectively. It would be more promising peacekeeping. In ongoing operations these to ask what MONUSCO and other missions countries and their troops decide them- can do to influence the political environ- selves how much force they are prepared ment such that civilian populations live in

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und to use, regardless of what the mandate and greater security. Then one would arrive at Politik, 2016 the UN Secretariat tell them. This issue is answers that direct attention more strongly All rights reserved unlikely to be resolved. The often-repeated towards political and institutional pro- These Comments reflect suggestion that Security Council members cesses and towards local ownership – and the author’s views. should involve troop contributors more thus also towards the government of the SWP strongly in formulating mandates, in order host state, an actor that is a partner as well Stiftung Wissenschaft und to achieve more realistic mandates and as part of the problem (see also South Sudan). Politik German Institute for more binding implementation, will not If, as in Congo, even repeated attempts International and change that. by a mission to influence political processes Security Affairs In any case, Chapter VII mandates, which fail in the face of resistance by local actors, Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 legitimise the use of military force, already including the government, focussing on 10719 Berlin grant MONUSCO and other peace missions military aspects is nothing but a diversion. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 adequate possibilities to defend their man- As such, it would appear advisable to return www.swp-berlin.org date actively and robustly, even against to the question of finding appropriate politi- [email protected] armed groups. The creation of the FIB points cal strategies that can potentially be sup- ISSN 1861-1761 instead more to the problem of inadequate ported using robust means (should). In that Translation by Meredith Dale implementation of mandates by peace op- context the relatively new UN concept of erations, rather than evidence of the con- “stabilisation” has not proven to be useful. (English version of SWP-Aktuell 22/2016) sequences of the lack of a mandate for the Neither in MONUSCO nor within the UN use of force. system as a whole would there appear to There is still need for a clarifying debate be a shared understanding of what stabili- over the appropriate measure of robustness sation means. The concept should either be in peacekeeping, and how this should be concretised or abandoned. implemented. A greater degree of robust- ness is no doubt necessary in some circum- stances. But the idea that greater use of force will automatically solve the persistent problems of peacekeeping is an illusion. The causes of the situation in Congo – per- sistent violence, the existence of numerous armed groups and an ineffectual state – are political. They need to be understood and tackled as an interconnected set of factors. Unfortunately, the present trend in peace- keeping is in the opposite direction, namely to isolate individual problems from their

SWP Comments 20 April 2016

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