Russia and the Contemporary World Gennady Zyuganov Chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation functioning have always been at the center of Russian philosophical The problems thought, political of passions, Russia's and struggles. development The need to solve theseand prob the organization of its basic lems grows especially urgent during those transistional moments in the history of our Fatherland—a cyclical history which, unlike many other nations, is marked by achievements of sovereign power and spiritual purity, alternating with periods of state catastrophe and moral degredation. What has been happening in Russia over the past eight to ten years? What are the real, underlying reasons for the recurrent Russian conflict? Who or what is responsible? What must be done to place the situation under control once and for all? Where is the way out of its political, economic, and ideological dead end? Russian society cannot move forward without articulating answers to these questions or recognizing the particular features of its historic path, and the character of those problems standing before it. In order to approach these questions, we must consider the following issues: 1) the processes going on in the world in the spheres of material produc tion, science and technology, social, political, national, and ideological relations; 2) the condition and role of power structures in the life of modern society; 3) the role of capital concentrated in the "hands" of a few national and transnational groups which act as organizers and directors of social cataclysms; 4) the ten dencies of interrelationships among states struggling to survive within the con ditions of a growing shortage in raw materials and energy; and 5) the fierce competition for the market. Translated from Russian by David L. Gehrenbeck, Brown University Summer 1995 - Volume II, Issue 2 117 This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 21:45:04 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Gennady Zyuganov 0 . This gamut of problems has been Communists must now developed in many scholarly works and WOrk with increased publications. It is only just beginning, how energy on ascertaining an e™r<10 * "?e s"b)e? of comprehensive OJ . ° philosophical-political research. The con authentic, and not sequences of the policy of the so-called "de illusory, concept of ideologization" of social thought are tell 1 • . 1.1 ing. Under appeals to root out the "phi history an theory« losophy of totalitarianism," many research programs have been curtailed. The promised exit of ideology into a qualitatively new branch of devel opment has not taken place. Common human values—torn out of the real con text of class, national, informational, and geopolitical interests—have ended up socially and politically eroded, and, in essence, lost any real definition. Like the formula "the more democracy, the more socialism," the ideas of "perestroika," "acceleration," "the human factor," and "qualitatively new conditions of soci ety" have only succeeded to create the illusion of a new theoretical situation. Therefore, communists must now work with increased energy on ascer taining an authentic, and not illusory, concept of history and theory. The ques tion about the theoretical activity of the party was one of the central issues at the recent plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CC CPRF). Although far from being fully answered, it is now possible to locate the solution to the problem within the context of Russian history and contemportary life. Basic Contradictions The necessity of revamping our society and establishing a new strategic line for its development arose long ago, as the result of both internal and external cir cumstances. In the beginning of the last decade, a number of contradictions became clear within the effort towards social development: 1) a unified form of state property, and the centralized system of governance founded on it, versus the growing need for self-governance of major industrial and agricultural en terprises, scientific centers, and other highly developed sectors; 2) the intensive development of various enterprises of a particular group, primarily the entire defense complex, versus the enterprises of all other groups; 3) the high level of industrial development versus the archaic position of agriculture; 4) the stag nant production relationships versus the growing production potential; 5) the growth in volume of the production versus the decrease in consumption by the population; and 6) the tendency towards unification of culture versus the con certed effort towards developing and maintaining national culture. The military-strategic parity between the USSR and the US abetted a turn from the Cold War to the discharging of international tension. This turn, however, being forced and limited—it touched only the level of strategic arma ments—did not remove the Soviet Union's political and economic contradic tions with the West. Known contradictions have arisen within the common 118 The Broïim Journal of World Affairs This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 21:45:04 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Russia and the Contemporary World wealth of socialist countries as well. The situation that arose in the USSR had its mirror image reflected in the socialist countries—a situation which the West lost no time in exploiting. Finally, it is necessary to note a third group of contradictions as well— those in the Western world itself. These include primarily the contradiction between highly developed and weakly developed countries, as well as the com petition among highly developed countries for markets, energy, and material resources. Today, we can correctly draw the conclusion that the contradictions between the US and the USSR were not founded on a difference in ideology, but, rather, on a rivalry for political and economic influence in the world. One cannot help but agree with those researchers who examine the con tent of these contradictions through the prism of the changes that have taken place not only in Russia but within the spectrum of relations among civiliza tions. The major tendency of these changes, which have appeared in various regions and countries of the world with different levels of intensity, is clear. The result of these changes is the adaptation of socio-economic systems to the needs of the scientific-technical revolution, along with the establishment of a unified structure of aggregate productive forces and new social structures. The Process Has Not Begun One cannot say that the leadership of the country did not see the need for re form. From year to year, at all levels, an understanding evolved regarding the notion that a mechanism was necessary to lend the requisite dynamism to the development of the USSR. As a result, the model of perestroika took shape—a model which was directed toward the control of socio-political changes, at first within the framework of the existing state-political and social structure, and then much more widely—beyond the borders of formalized relationships, tak ing into account common processes among civilizations. In general, reforms can be successfully executed in the presence of the following conditions: a carefully thought-out program, and a clear goal of the reform; an energetic and highly intellectual team of reformers; a strong and active system of directing political phenomena; the mobilization of the mass media for the explanation of the essence, the goals, and the consequences of the reforms for the state as a whole, and for the individual; and, lastly, the preser vation and development of structures, relations, functions, and methods that have met with the approval of the population. Reforms are developing in China in approximately this manner. Gorbachev and his team, however, failed to adhere to this formula. The great tragedy for the USSR was centered around the fact that the Party nomenklatura rejected the ideas of a careful but rapid reform movement, one without a break with the historical tradition of the Russian civilization. Instead, the ideology of Eurocentrism was adopted—all must follow the path of the West. Within its framework is the social philosophy of neo-liberalism. This situation cast the country off the track of a formally declared goal—a multi-tiered, socially-ori ented economy. Thus, a qualitative social break of the counterrevolutionary Summer 1995 - Volume II, Issue 2 119 This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 21:45:04 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Gennady Zyuganov variety began at a forced tempo, with all its inherent attributes: collapse, suf fering, violence, theft, and lawlessness. The most important tendency defining the mechanism of socio-political changes in the beginning of this decade was the growth of social conflict. The failure of perestroika as a mechanism for the resolution of agonizing—that is, irreconcilable—conflicts contributed to a transition escalating into antagonistic conflict. Not just separate individuals and pressure groups, but practically all social layers and political constituencies have become the subject of a struggle for power. "Managed Catastrophe" From the moment that a political group of radical "Westernizers"—with the support of the world oligarchy—managed to take political power in Russia, at the cost of the fall of the USSR, it became clear that a significant portion of Russians would not accept the path of development embarked upon by the radical democrats. It is equally clear that the number of those dissatisfied will begin to grow in accordance with the impoverishment of the masses—the un avoidable consequences of the political and economic course of the new Rus sian leadership. At a certain stage, the dissatisfaction will reach a chaotic, criti cal point, when the efforts of many years of activity by powerful international forces striving to distance Russia from the geopolitical arena by any means— and attain global sovereignity—will wind up in danger.