A Shift Towards China? - How Philippine Foreign Policy Detached from Systemic and Domestic Pressures

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Master Thesis 2018 By: Amanda Brinkløv Jensen, 52603 and Rêbin Ahmad, 52078 Supervisor: Gorm Rye Olsen Character Count: 216,869

Special thanks to:

Ambassador Jan Top Christensen, of the Royal Danish Embassy to the Philippines, for his support and guidance in Manila.

Jose Antonio Custodio, for his help with networking and translation of the executive summary into Tagalog.

Contents Executive Summary ...... 5 Buod Ehekutibo ...... 7 List of Abbreviations ...... 10 1) Literature Review ...... 11 1.1) Defining a Small State ...... 12 1.2) Lesser Powers’ Strategies ...... 13 1.2.1) Bandwagoning ...... 14 1.2.2) Balancing and Non-balancing ...... 14 1.2.3) Hedging ...... 16 1.3) Future Research and Theoretical Outlooks ...... 17 2) Problem Area ...... 18 3) Methods ...... 22 3.1) Choice of empirical data ...... 22 3.2) Selection of Sources and its Consequences ...... 23 3.3) Reflexivity ...... 24 3.4) Philosophy of Social Sciences ...... 32 4) Theory, Systemic and Domestic ...... 33 4.1) Variables and Scope in International Studies ...... 33 4.2) Structural Realism and its Relation to Neoclassical Realism ...... 33 4.3) Foreign Policy Analysis Approaches ...... 34 4.4) Pre-Theory, in Between Chairs ...... 35 4.5) Theoretical Framework ...... 35 4.5.1) Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell’s Intervening Variables...... 36 5) Analysis ...... 42 5.1) Systemic Pressures and the Philippines’ Power Capabilities...... 42 5.1.1) China and the U.S. – Great Power Rivalry and a Changing Security Environment in Southeast Asia ...... 42 5.1.2) Strategic Rivalry in the SCS ...... 45 5.1.3) Trump and the Asia-Pacific – What Now? ...... 47 5.1.4) The U.S., the Philippines, and China - A Strategic Triangle ...... 50 5.2) The Statesmen's Perception...... 53 5.2.1) The Duterte Administration ...... 54 5.2.2) Elite Opposition ...... 64

5.3) Strategic Culture ...... 73 5.3.1) The Philippines and the US’s Special Relationship – the Strategic proximity to the Americans ...... 74 5.3.2)The Aftermath of the Cold War ...... 76 5.3.3) Benigno Aquino III’s Resurrection of American-Filipino Security Alliance ...... 78 5.4) State-Society Relations ...... 82 5.4.1) Class and Political Power ...... 82 5.4.2) Public Opinion ...... 84 5.5) Domestic Institutions ...... 86 5.5.1) The Armed Forces of the Philippines ...... 87 5.5.2) The Parties...... 92 5.5.3) Duterte and Institutional Control ...... 95 6) Endnote ...... 97 7) Conclusion ...... 98 Sources ...... 101 Interviews: ...... 113

Executive Summary After the election of Rodrigo Duterte in 2016 the Philippines have developed a markedly different foreign policy rhetoric. The United States, as former colonial power, and current ally are shunned and both China and Russia are approached. Duterte even went as far as to set aside a ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in favor of Philippine claims over those of China, in a case his predecessor had filed over the Chinese nine-dash line in the South China Sea. Furthermore, Duterte proclaimed common military exercises with the U.S. would end and the Philippines would look for new security partners. Yet the exercises continue, and martial cooperation is expanded under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. At the same time the economic benefits Duterte claimed China could bring, have failed to materialize and China continues its military build-up in in the conflict West Philippine Sea. Ultimately the Philippines are not responding as expected to current systemic pressures.

This thesis provides an analysis of the shift in the Philippines foreign policy from assertive balancing under President Benigno Aquino, to accommodation/non-balancing under President Duterte. The paradox behavior of the Philippines is discussed within a neoclassical realist framework. It analyses systemic factors found within individual perceptions, the strategic culture, state society relations, and domestic institutions. In order to achieve insight into the elite perceptions, interviews have been conducted with important member of the Filipino political elite and other relevant actors and experts on the topic.

The perceptions held by Duterte are generally shaped by his perceptions of the systemic pressures in the region and negative interactions with the U.S.. Duterte believe the potential danger of a Chinese annexation of Philippine territory, can no longer be contained with American aid, but must be reduced by developing amiable ties. Yet others within the government, e.g. defense secretary Delfin Lorenzana, belong to the opposite camp, earning the Duterte government the potluck label. In order to achieve insight into the elite perceptions, interviews have been conducted with important member of the Filipino political elite and other relevant actors and experts on the topic.

The relative novelty of Duterte’s thinking in Manila becomes even clearer upon the examination of the strategic culture. Generations of Filipino policy makers have assumed the U.S. would shield the Philippines from external threats and the proximity of China is a threat. The Filipino civil society also expresses this view in polls. Duterte’s ability to retain his popularity, despite such misgivings, is linked to the low importance foreign policy, relative to domestic politics. Furthermore, popular contention is limited by the dominant role of the upper class, that is to a large degree attached to Duterte’s coalition.

The inability of Duterte to make good on statements vis a vis the military, and secretary Lorenzana’s liberty to contradict the President, are linked to the institutional relations of the presidency, Filipino parties, and the military. The presidency’s control of government funds exercises strong influence on the parties, that maintain clientelist networks. The clientelist networks play a key role in exercising social control and elections. The military on the other hand has a historical tendency to get involved in politics, through coups, but higher ranking military personal requires political approval for promotions. Thus, all key institutions are mutually dependent. This results in coalitions, for protection and financial benefit, but does not translate into elite agreement on foreign policy.

In conclusion the thesis finds the Philippine’s change in foreign policy is linked to domestic variables. A lack of consensus on the foreign policy is found between Duterte and important actors within the Filipino political elite and Filipino civil society. This creates a foreign policy of non-balancing, which is the result of contradictory tendencies for both bandwagoning with and balancing against China within the current government, and a domestic context that permits them to coexist.

Buod Ehekutibo Matapos ang halalan ni Rodrigo Duterte sa 2016, ang Pilipinas ay nakagawa ng isang kapansin-pansin na kakaibang paglalahad ng polisiyang panlabas. Ang Estados Unidos, tulad na dating kolonyal na kapangyarihan, at kasalukuyang alyado ay iniwasan at ang parehong Tsina at Russia ay nilapitan. Inisangtabi ni Duterte ang desisyon ng Permanenteng Hukuman ng Arbitrasyon na pabor sa Pilipinas laban sa Tsina, sa isang kaso na ang kanyang hinalinhan ay isinampa sa siyam na dash line ng Tsina sa South China Sea. Bukod dito, ipinahayag ni Duterte na ang mga pagsasanay ng hukbong sandatahan sa militar ng Estados Unidos ay magwawakas at maghahanap ng mga bagong kasosyo sa seguridad. Gayunpaman ang mga pagsasanay ay nagpapatuloy, at ang kooperasyon ng militar ay pinalawak sa ilalim ng Enganced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Kasabay nito, hindi pa naisasatupad ang mga pang-ekonomiyang benepisyo mula sa Tsinan a ipinagmalaki ni Duterte, at pinagpapatuloy ng Tsina ang pagtatayo ng militar na istruktura sa West Philippine Sea. Sa huli ang Pilipinas ay hindi tumutugon tulad ng inaasahan sa mga kasalukuyang sistemang panggigipit.

Ang tesis na ito ay nagbibigay ng pagsusuri sa paglilipat sa patakarang panlabas ng Pilipinas mula sa assertive balancing sa ilalim ng Pangulong Aquino, tungo sa accommodation / non- balancing sa ilalim ni Pangulong Duterte. Ang pag-uugali ng kabalintunaan ng Pilipinas ay tinalakay sa loob ng neoclassical realist framework. Pinag-aaralan nito ang mga sistematikong kadahilanan na natagpuan sa loob ng indibidwal na pananaw, ang estratehikong kultura, relasyon sa lipunan ng estado, at mga institusyong lokal. Upang makamit ang pananaw ng mga elitista, ang mga panayam ay isinasagawa sa mahalagang miyembro ng elitistang pampulitikang Pilipino at iba pang kaugnay na mga aktor at eksperto sa paksa.

Ang mga pananaw na hawak ng Duterte ay naihubog sa pamamagitan ng kanyang mga pananaw ng mga sistemang panggigipit sa rehiyon at mga negatibong pakikipag-ugnayan sa US. Naniniwala si Duterte na ang potensyal na panganib ng isang Intsik na pagsasanib ng teritoryo ng Pilipinas, ay hindi kakayanin o magagampanan ng mga Amerikano, at ito ay mababawasan sa pamamagitan ng pagbuo ng magandang ugnayan. Ngunit ang iba sa loob ng pamahalaan, halimbawa si Lorenzana na kalihim ng Department of National Defense, ay mukhang hindio sang ayon dun at tuloy pwede ilarawan ang administrasyon Duterte bilang isang potluck na deskripsyon. Upang makamit ang pananaw sa mga piling panlipunan, ang 7 mga panayam ay isinasagawa sa mahalagang miyembro ng elitistang pampulitikang Pilipino at iba pang kaugnay na mga aktor at eksperto sa paksa.

Ang kaibahan ng pag-iisip ni Duterte sa Maynila ay nagiging mas malinaw sa pagsusuri ng estratehikong kultura. Ipinagpalagay ng mga sunod sunod na henerasyon ng mga Pilipinong tagabigay ng patakaran na ipagtatanggol ng Estados Unidos ang Pilipinas mula sa mga panlabas na banta at ang kalapitan ng Tsina ay isang banta. Ang Filipino civil society ay nagpapahayag din ng pananaw na ito sa mga botohan. Ang kakayahan ni Duterte na panatilihin ang kanyang katanyagan, sa kabila ng mga pagdadalawang isip sa kanya ng mga tao, ay nauugnay sa mababang kahalagahan sa patakarang panlabas, kumpara sa pulitika at isyu sa loob lamang ng bansa. Karagdagan pa, ang diskurso ay limitado sa pamamagitan ng dominanteng papel ng mas mataas na uri, na karamhian ay kasali sa koalisyon ni Duterte.

Ang kawalan ng kakayahan ni Duterte na tuparin ang mga pahayag niya ukol sa hukbong sandatahan, at kalayaan ng kalihim ni Lorenzana upang salungatin ang Pangulo, ay nakaugnay sa mga relasyon sa institusyon ng pagkapangulo, mga partidong Pilipino, at hukbong sandatahan. Ang kontrol ng pangulo sa mga pondo ng pamahalaan ay may malakas na impluwensya sa mga partido, at nagpapanatili ng mga network ng clientelist. Ang mga network ng mga kliyente ay may mahalagang papel sa pagsasakatuparan ng panlipunang kontrol at sa resulta ng mga halalan. Ang militar sa kabilang banda ay may makasaysayang ugali na makilahok sa pulitika, sa pamamagitan ng mga coups, ngunit ang mas mataas na ranggo ng militar na personal ay nangangailangan ng pag-apruba sa mga pulitiko para sa mga promosyon. Kaya, ang lahat ng mahahalagang institusyon ay magkaugnay. Nagreresulta ito sa mga koalisyon, para sa proteksyon at pinansiyal na benepisyo, ngunit hindi nagreresulta sa kasunduan ng elitist sa patakarang panlabas.

Sa konklusyon nakikita ng thesis na ang pagbabago ng Pilipinas sa patakarang panlabas ay nauugnay sa mga itinatawag na domestic variable. Ang kawalan ng pagkakaisa sa patakarang panlabas ay matatagpuan sa pagitan ng Duterte at mga mahahalagang aktor sa loob ng elitistang pampulitika ng Pilipino at lipunan sibil ng Pilipinas. Lumilikha ito ng mga ugnayang panlabas na patakaran ng di-pagbabalanse, na kung saan ay ang resulta ng mga

8 magkasalungat na tendensya para sa parehong pakikisama at pagbabalanse laban sa Tsina sa kasalukuyang gobyerno, at isang kontekstong panloob o domestic na nagpapahintulot sa kanila na magkakasamang mabubuhay.

List of Abbreviations AIIB - Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

AFP - Armed Forces of the Philippines

CAFTA - China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement

CMIM - Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization

CoC - Code of Conduct

EDCA - Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement

EEZ - Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone

FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FPA - foreign policy analysis

KBL - New Society Movement

LCMD - Lakas-Christian-Muslim Democrats

OBOR - ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative

PCA - Permanent Court of Arbitration

PDP - Partido Demokratiko Pilipino–Lakas ng Bayan (lit. Philippine Democratic Party–Power of the Nation)

SCS - South Chinese Sea

TPP - Trans-Pacific Partnership

U.S. - United States

UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

WPS - West Philippine Sea

WWII - World War II

1) Literature Review “Given the Great Powers’ ability to make or break a state’s risk-mitigation efforts, an age-old question for all small and militarily weak states is thus: how should it position itself vis-à-via the Great Powers, in a way, that would allow it to maximize benefits while simultaneously cushioning against any undesirable dangers from stronger powers? Should it choose to balance, bandwagon or pursue something else?” (Kuik 2008: 164)

The literature on policy responses to systemic pressures differentiates strategies according to the described states relative power. Currently the regional power balance in Southeast Asia is undergoing a reconfiguration (Flockhart 2016; Zhao 2014; Buszynski 2012; Burgess 2016; Lampton 2016; Murphy 2017; Lushenko and Hardy 2016; Friedberg 2015; Beeson and Li 2011; Ayson and Pardesi 2017; McDougall 2011; Bisley 2011; Goldstein 2007; Ross 2010). China has in the recent past experienced rapid economic development and is adjusting its martial capacity to reflect this newfound strength. A confrontation with the U.S. about geopolitical dominance in the surrounding South China Sea has already started. The resulting changes inevitably also concern smaller powers of the region (Goh 2005; 2016). The following paragraphs review the academic literature on small state foreign policy responses in general and in the region.

The review begins by discussing the definition of small powers. It continues by examining lesser powers’ strategies and responses to a rising China. And ends in an outlook on potential future research.

Small states are found to be defined through the analysis of their systemic role. They react to developments rather than shape them (Keohane 1969; Maass 2009). The subsequent discussion of said reactions, finds the literature on small state foreign policy in Southeast Asia offers a very critical view of the traditional binary conception of balancing and bandwagoning. Kuik, Fiori and Passeri, Goh, Liou and Hsu, and Oba suggest hedging may offer a more accurate understanding of foreign policy in the ASEAN states, and especially in the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore (2008 and 2016; 2015; 2005 and 2016; 2017; 2016). Yet, hedging is difficult to distinguish from nonspecific foreign policy and falls 11 within greater categories of “waiting for balancing”, accommodation, or various forms of non-balancing (Goh 2005; Koga 2017; Lake 1996). The review finds non-balancing behavior is caused by domestic factors, rather than systemic impulses (Schweller 2006; Lieber and Alexander 2005).

1.1) Defining a Small State Arguably the majority of states are small states, nonetheless a common definition of the term is missing from the literature (Keohane 1969; Maass 2009). The following section presents an overview of the various approaches. In 1969 Robert Keohane writes the multitude of approaches is the result of purpose-built definitions, tailored to the needs of specific research. Matthias Maas repeats Keohane’s observation 40 years later and points out the substantial disagreement on what criteria can be used to define small states (2009: 65).

Keohane begins his discussion by drawing the simple distinction between small powers and great powers. To Keohane the term small power cannot appropriately be defined relatively, as in “...B is stronger than A but weaker than C.” (Keohane 1969: 292). Rothstein argues: “A Small Power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments…” (1968:29). According to Keohane this approach applies to the majority of states and should be supplemented by categorization according to their systemic role (1969: 294-295). Furthermore, leaders make policy decisions based on their perception of systemic roles (Keohane 1969: 294-295). This element becomes important since the behavior of states determine the nature of the international system and vice versa (See figure 1 p. 38). Keohane proposes four categories of states: 1) ‘system-determining’ or great power, 2) ‘system-influencing’ or secondary power, 3) ‘system-affecting’ or middle power, and 4) ‘system-ineffectual’ or small power (1969: 295-296). Great powers are states shaping the international system, they can form the poles of a system. The U.S. fall within this category. Secondary powers influence the system, but without hope of being able to dominate. They are able of determining their own place and nature within the state-system by forming alliances or partnerships with other states, or by acting on a unitarily scale. Middle or ‘system-affecting’ states can only affect the state-system by a multilateral or institutional tactic. The small or ‘system-ineffectual’ state have very little chance of influencing the system affecting them.

They have the possibility of working in big groups with other small states, but there is a great chance a divergence of interest between them will lead to a lack of results. In relation to small states, it is central to acknowledge their foreign policy outcomes are merely adjustments to the reality of the state system, not a rearrangement (Keohane 1969; Brinkløv 2017).

Since states in general are found in all kinds of forms and sizes, it becomes necessary to apply distinctive conceptualizations when determining a state’s position within the international system. This leads Maas to the question: Should there be only one definition of a small state as all states are unique in their own way? (2009: 65-68). The great variety of definitions can be understood as positive, since it brings flexibility to the understanding and analytical possibilities of the small state. By some scholars this is seen as an advantage which they have used to further their own research and definition (Maass 2009: 65-68; Brinkløv: 15). Therefore, this approach and the conceptual flexibility should be considered when conducting further research on small states.

Keohane’s aforementioned definitions are likewise important in relation to further research. In the contemporary international system, U.S. dominance and unipolarity are weakening. The U.S. and China are vital actors in this development and can therefore be defined as ‘system- determining’ in the Southeast Asian region. The small states of Southeast Asia fall under Keohane’s category of ‘system-ineffectual’ (1969: 296). But to really understand their position in the international state system, it is essential to analyze them in relation to the ‘system-determining’ states. The element of relativity in size and power between small and large states must be incorporated into the analyses of state responses to systemic pressures or changes (Brinkløv 2017: 15).

1.2) Lesser Powers’ Strategies There is a considerable body of research on the rise of China and reactions of states in Southeast Asia (Kuik 2008; 2016; Rabena 2015; 2016b; 2017; Goh 2005; 2016; Fiori and Passeri 2015). The literature is mainly focused on bandwagoning and balancing.

1.2.1) Bandwagoning When a state: “...align itself strategically with the threatening power in order to limit the threat, neutralize it, or profit from the distribution of power.” (Goh 2005: 3) it is considered to bandwagon. It is a type of foreign policy behavior rooted in the accommodation of demands made by the stronger power. Yet bandwagoning with a rising state offers the opportunity to benefit from the change and the concomitant benefits or gains (Kang 2007; Waltz 1979; Walt 1987). The bandwagoning standpoint contains elements partly derived and revised from the theory of hegemonic stability (See Gilpin 1981; Keohane 1984).

Scholars using this concept to explain Southeast Asian states’ strategy towards a rising China, argue these states will bandwagon with China. They see China as taking a leading role in the region mainly due to past historical experiences and a big power asymmetry. According to Womack and Kang Southeast Asian states share a degree of culture and ideas with China. This makes them more likely to perceive China as succeeding in securing its policies and strong position in the future. Therefor bandwagoning with China creates a better scenario for these states (Womack 2003; Kang 2003a; 2003b; 2007; Schweller 1994).

1.2.2) Balancing and Non-balancing The concept of balancing is defined as “…the forging of countervailing strength against a potentially hegemonic or threatening power…” (Goh 2005: 3). Structural realists and neorealists typically expect states to respond by balancing against rising states. Balancing is an attempt to reduce the difference in power (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 140)1. This can be done by external balancing through alliances and agreements, and internal balancing, in the form of the strengthening of military forces (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 140; Goh 2005; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979). Balancing against potential threats is often viewed as compulsion and “law of nature” in structural realist accounts (Schweller 2006: 4-5; Jerdén 2016). Ralf Emmers and Aaron Friedberg argue many of the Southeast Asian perceive China

1 Martial power for structural realists and threat (martial power, offensive capabilities, intent, proximity) for neorealists.

14 as a threat and are therefore balancing through their security cooperation with the United States (2003; 2011).

However, this view of balancing as automatic adjustment is criticized because of its disregard for the various obstacles a balancing policy faces (Schweller 2006; Jerdén 2016; Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 146). Randall Schweller argues balancing occurs less frequently than non-balancing and underbalancing (Schweller 2006). Furthermore, literature on balancing states often describes why balancing occurs rather than why it does not occur (Jerdén 2016:22). Yet certain factors may increase the likelihood of balancing, these include: 1) ‘Situationally easily’ perceived threats, clear hostile behavior indicating grave danger; 2) ‘Experientially easily’ perceived threats, in societies that have often been attacked - especially weak states; And 3) ‘Strategically easily’ perceived threats, such as a powerful and rising state, even if they are not openly hostile (Klaus Knorr 1976 but taken from Schweller 2006: 40).

A failure to act when systemic pressures changes results in non- or under-balancing. Schweller takes his point of departure in neoclassical realism and argues that states are not unitary actors but divided domestically (2006). According to Schweller, states non-balancing typically occurs: When elites are in disagreement on how to perceive systemic information; When elites are in agreement there is a threat, but disagree on the appropriate measures; When the elite consensus about the course of action is an alternative to balancing, such as hedging (2006: 49). Schweller even argues non-balancing represents the status quo, and explicit balancing reactions are not the rule (2006).

At the extreme end of the non-balancing scale, is accommodation of threatening nations. Accommodating means at least partial agreement to the terms of the threatening nation. However, accommodation is not always a sign of weakness, as grievances may be perceived as legitimate, typically those of limited revisionist powers (Schweller 2006). Furthermore, accommodating certain demands can be a step in integrating a state into status quo and converting it into a defender of status quo. According to Schweller this is especially attractive

15 to small states confronted with rising powers. They have little relative power to lose by a shift in hegemonic dominance and can afford to avoid conflict with a superior power (2006; 2008).

1.2.3) Hedging Eva Goh argues the U.S., despite China's rise, still holds a dominant position and power in Southeast Asia (2005; 2016). Hence some small states might find themselves struggling with choosing between the two. By adopting a strategy of hedging, small states might benefit from the ‘public goods’ provided by the U.S.. This could e.g. be the freedom of navigation and overflight principle. At the same time, small states can also engage with a rising China to secure e.g. economic benefits. By not choosing between the two powers, a lesser power can expand their strategic options and maximizing benefits from both sides (Fiori and Passeri 2015; Zhao 2012; Kuik 2008; 2016).

According to the aforementioned theory discussed, if a state on the one hand views another state as an immediate threat, it is highly likely to choose balancing as their strategy. Hence, its strategic assets are mobilized for security. If a state, on the other hand, views a rising state as a non-threat and a possible source of relief or profit expansion, it is likely to bandwagon. But there are circumstances where the policymakers or leaders of a given state do not perceive any imminent and clear threat. Or they might be conflicted over the tenor of the threat (Kuik 2008: Brinkløv 2017). Kuik describes: “…[they] may view the embodiments of risk to be mere versatile, multifaceted and uncertain.” (2008: 164). Therefore, hedging was introduced as a strategic concept. Within much of the literature, hedging is argued to be the policy or strategy applied by many Southeast Asian states after the Cold War and in response to the continuous shift global power balance (Kuik 2018). Due to the uncertain regional order, and the ambiguous role of great powers, the smaller Southeast Asian states can no longer afford to develop too close or too distant a relationship with either China or the U.S. (Kuik 2018). This leads them to hedge between them.

While both balancing and accommodation require commitment to a certain strategy and partners, hedging offers less binding interactions. Hedging is a comparatively recent concept in international studies and a commonly accepted definition has yet to emerge (Kuik 2008;

Koga 2017). It was first adopted by scholars, who argue the dichotomy of bandwagoning and balancing falls short of explaining and predicting state behavior in post-cold-war Southeast Asia (Goh 2005 and 2016; 2016; Fiori and Passeri 2015; Zhao 2012; Kuik 2008; 2016; Oba 2016). Cheng-Chwee Kuik argues hedging occupies the middle ground between Balancing and bandwagoning (2016a: 502).

The term refers to the hedging of bets, as also found in the financial markets. A hedging strategy entails engaging multiple potential partners and threats in economically and martially beneficial interactions to avoid commitment to a single alignment position (Kuik 2008: 165; Fiori, Passeri 2015; Zhao 2012). Kuik elaborates hedging is dependent on policymakers viewing rising powers as non-threats (2008). Such a non-committal approach to foreign relations may be difficult for states invested in preserving the status-quo (2006; 2008: 164; 2016). Hedging is linked to a flexible threat perception, that goes beyond the ultimate stakes and commitments found in more ideologically charged perceptions of the international systems.

1.3) Future Research and Theoretical Outlooks The review has shown a developing trend to move away from the balancing-bandwagoning dichotomy in the literature on Southeast Asian foreign policy. The trend is currently expressed in the hedging literature which still remains within the systemic discussion parameters of earlier accounts. Yet elements of balancing and bandwagoning are still visible, because hedging is located in between the two (Kuik 2008). The alternative offered by the neoclassical outlook expressed in Schweller’s non-balancing concept requires integration of domestic variables. Thus, this review finds it necessary to further analyze the domestic variables affecting the response to systemic pressures. Neoclassical realism reflects the need to integrate domestic and systemic variables in a comprehensive analysis of foreign policy. It can potentially add to the arguments developing in the rapidly evolving discussion on foreign policy responses and the behavior of small states in Southeast Asia. The following section reflects some of the distinctions between neoclassical realism and other approaches to the study of international relations.

Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell argue other major theories of international relations, namely structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism fail to fully explain foreign policy, states’ strategies, or international politics (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell 2016; Brinkløv 2017). They argue the international system seldom gives a clear level of information on international opportunities and threats. Therefor structural realism lacks a coherent full explanation. The same is the case with Innenpolitik on its own. Neoliberal institutionalist theories and systemic liberal theories essentially can be perceived as Innenpolitik since “…the state and, by extension, the international institutions they construct ultimately rest upon the consent of the governed.” (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell 2016: 4). Liberalism and structural realism ignores the function held by policymakers and political leaders. It lacks explanation of their perception towards the domestic and systemic challenges or changes. Constructivism in comparison focuses on perceptions of the individual actors in combination with background and cultural upbringing. This theory is insufficient due to its downplay of the relative distribution of material power capabilities (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell 2016: 5).

Due to these elements, foreign policy or state behavior need to be analyzed by incorporating components from both the systemic and the domestic level (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell 2016: 3-4). Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell present neoclassical realism as the theory which allows the domestic and systemic variable to interplay. It incorporates elements from each of the mentioned theories and uses them to interpret the world of today – in their own words it “…identifies consequential variables at several levels of analysis and demonstrates how they can produce a range of outcomes at the levels of foreign policy, grant strategic adjustments, international outcomes, and structural change…” (2016: 5). Hence this review finds it is necessary to adopt a neoclassical realist theoretical lens when analyzing lesser’ powers policy or strategy towards raising or powerful state.

2) Problem Area The Philippines are an island nation located in a fast-developing Southeast Asia. The country has experienced rapid economic growth in the last decade and has transitioned from an agricultural economy to informal services (FAO; Philippine Statistics Authority 2017). The

Philippine territory in the South China Sea (SCS), referred to as the West Philippine Sea (WPS) by the Philippines, offers the opportunity to enhance economic development by adding revenue from oil, gas, fish, minerals and the proximity of important shipping routes (Rustandi 2016: 1: Brinkløv 2017: 8). Estimates suggest the SCS holds 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil (EIA 2013; Rustandi 2016). This economic potential of the SCS fuels territorial conflicts in the region (Del Rosario 2017; Rustandi 2016). The position as potential access point to East and South Asia and the colonial legacy, has made the Philippines an important element of the United States Asian strategy. It can be argued the Philippines are an element in the containment of China as potential rival hegemon (Mearsheimer 2018). Freedom of navigation has emerged as a core American interest in the area (Rustandi 2016). The Philippine claim to features within the WPS have been contested by China since 1947, when the People’s Republic of China published the Nine-dash Line (Annex 1).

During the Cold War U.S. troops stationed in the Philippines deterred active Chinese contestation of the territories. However, when the Cold War ended negative aspects of the terms of American presence became increasingly important. Hence, in 1991 the Philippine Senate allowed the Military Base Agreement to expire (Chambers 2012:152). Already in 1994 clashes occurred with China at Mischief Reef and the Ramos government of the Philippines (See Annex 3) adopted a balancing strategy based on cooperation with the United States. Since then Chinese-Philippine relations have been described as ebbing and flowing despite the territorial conflict (Zao 2012: 57). The Philippines have joined the Chinese led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) and the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) (Liou Hsu 2017). All primarily concerned with economic development. This gave China the possibility to react to rising tension in the WPS with economic sanctions (Brinkløv 2017: 9).

The height of Philippine balancing efforts was reached under President Aquino (2010-2016) (See Annex 3) after a standoff between Chinese and Philippine naval forces at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 (Heydarian 2017). Aquino even compared China to Nazi Germany (Heydarian 2017). The failure to negotiate a solution prompted the Philippines to intensify the security cooperation with the U.S. in an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)

(Congress of the Republic of the Philippines 2014). Furthermore, the Philippines filed a case with Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (See Annex 2). The verdict was spoken in 2016 and was favorable for the Philippines (Viray 2017b; Rappler 2016a). This result led China to reformulate its stance to the ‘four sha’ claim (Viray 2017a). China's "four sha" (Chinese for sand) claim covers sovereignty and maritime entitlements from four island groups. The Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank area, Paracel Islands, and Spratly Islands (Viray 2017a). Whether or not China has abandoned its ‘nine-dash-line’ claim is still uncertain. However, China appears determined to expand its territorial control in the SCS and the WPS and continues to construct military installations within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Taffer 2014; Fravel 2010; Cheng & Paladini 2014; Del Rosario 2017; Viray 2017b).

The long tradition for balancing ended with the election of Rodrigo Duterte in 2016. Duterte stated he would chart a new course for the Philippines, independent from the U.S. (Heydarian 2017a: 220; Galang 2017; Romero 2017; Merez 2017). He has since maintained a confrontational and distrustful rhetoric vis-à-vis the U.S. and simultaneously approached China (Viray 2017c; Heydarian 2017a: 220). The Philippines set aside the ruling of the Permanent Arbitration Court and ended the practice of joint exercises with the U.S. in the area disputed by China. Duterte openly accommodates Chinese demands in the name of pragmatism (Rabena 2016b). This behavior defied expectations, as it was commonly believed the new government would expand the balancing effort should the Philippines win the arbitration case (Burgess 2016: 126; Heydarian 2017: 220). In May 2018 Duterte even went as far as to state Xi Jinping assured him China will protect the Philippines from external threats and made it clear he believes the U.S.’s martial capabilities to be inferior to those of China or Russia (Geducos 2018). Within the same month China moved naval forces and civilian vessels claim another Philippine island (Viray 2018a; Viray 2018b). This puzzle led to the point of departure for the investigation:

What has caused the shift from the balancing foreign policy towards China under President Aquino, to a foreign policy of accommodation/non-balancing under President Duterte?

It is argued the current Philippine foreign policy, as a result of elite dissensus, contains several contradictory elements. Thus, it can sustain neither Duterte’s vision of a Chinese ally nor the traditional U.S.-supported balancing approach. Governments in the Philippines are shown to suffer from a lack of programmatic party building, instead they form clientelist coalitions around the presidential office. However, the institutional relations within the Philippines prevent the president from exercising full control over the military. The apparent shift in foreign policy is the result of President Duterte’s rhetoric and represents his take on foreign policy. While, Duterte has managed to achieve limited accommodation of Chinese expansion, it is argued the practice of the Philippine military in its relations with the U.S. remains largely unchanged. The military leadership retains the traditional strategic culture and shows a strong reliance on the U.S. for external security. It continues to promote balancing behavior. This fragmentation of Philippine foreign policy into limited accommodation and limited balancing results in general non-balancing. In the long term the Philippine non-balancing may prove to be inadequate and allow China to strengthen its position in the WPS and may deteriorate Philippine claims, upheld by the PCA in 2016.

3) Methods The research takes an abductive approach. This section critically reflects on the choice of methods and the selected data and sources. It does so to illustrate how it contributes to answering the stated research question. Moreover, the ontological and epistemological consideration taken during the research process are presented.

3.1) Choice of empirical data The selection of sources for this thesis consist of a mixture of primary and secondary sources (Bryman 2012: 13). As primary sources interviews, speeches, public statements, and lectures/presentations have been collected from state elites, policy makers, and academic specialists in order to gain a nuanced and in-depth understanding the researched area along with an insight in the perceptions or misperceptions of the policy makers.

The secondary sources consist of academic literature, assorted policy papers, and descriptive statistics. This has been supplemented with magazine and newspaper articles, mostly used to show specific events as part of broader trends or to present different views. In the absence of academic literature, newspaper articles have also been used as a supplement. The snowballing method was applied in the data gathering process and a criteria of peer reviewed articles and books have been applied (Bryman 2012: 471). Content analysis has been applied to the collected empirical sources (Bryman 2012: 289). When applying this method, it is important to be aware of possible preconceived ideas which might affect the conclusion of the research question. Consequently, if not done properly, it can affect the reliability and validity of the thesis. A previous internship project was conducted at the same time as the interviews for this thesis. This project was a previous groundwork to determine the character of how the Philippine policy makers understand their current foreign policy. It is used as a reference point.

Triangulation as a technique is applied to validate the findings made in this thesis and to rule out any biases. It has its offspring in the idea of providing different aspects or different lenses of understanding to what is researched. Triangulation can be done on three levels: data-, investigators-, or methodological research triangulation, or all three in combination. This 22 gives a coherent answer to the research question and hypotheses. When triangulating three possible outcomes can occur. The data sources can turn out to be either inconsistent, convergent, or contradictory (Mathison 1988: 13). On one hand the data and sources can vary and create a void in the understanding, on the other hand it could be complementary and be in consensus. Finally, it can also be in full contradiction and oppose each other. All of these three outcomes contribute to the research area by providing a significant answer or puzzle worth questioning.

This thesis combines the aforementioned three ways of triangulating in the process of gathering sources to secure the most valid and generalizable findings. Two researchers secured the possibility of an investigators triangulation which has enhanced and provided the work with different perspectives and feedback (Mathison 1988: 14).

3.2) Selection of Sources and its Consequences According to the theory selected for this thesis “Foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter” (Rose 1998: 147). Therefor interviews with members of the Philippine political elite is necessary to understand the foreign policy outcome. Interviews with academic scholars has also been conducted in order to obtain specialist knowledge on the researched topic. All interviewees were aware of the purpose of the interview and offered anonymity. The interviews were semi- structured allowing room for follow-up questions and creating space for further elaboration by the interviewed person (Bryman 2012: 471) (See annex 4.). To the extend it was possible, this thesis has used purposive sampling in the selection process of the interviewees (Bryman 2012: 419). It was not possible to get interviews with all important policy makers like e.g. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Alan Peter Cayetano and likewise the most significant, President Rodrigo Duterte. The lack of interviews with these two main policy makers is mitigated by supplementation with speeches and official statements they have made. However, public statements may be restrained by factors that can be eliminated in an interview context. When conducting an interview, the person being questions was given the option of speaking anonymously, which leaves room for a more open opinion. In the interview with Presidential Peace Advisor and close friend of President Duterte, Jesus Dureza, statements, speeches, and actions of the president were discussed, giving a more nuanced and truthful picture of his perceptions/misperceptions and take on foreign policy.

The selection of interviewees is based on the requirements of being close to foreign policy decision-making or having special knowledge on Philippine foreign policy making. The decision to leave out interviews with activist and civil society-leaders was done in order to answer the research question in best correspondence with the theory. This can in some circumstances leave a bias.

The interviews conducted encompass both views consistent with President Duterte’s, but also opposed views. This gives a more nuanced picture of landscape in which the Philippine foreign policy is created. Since the hypothesis is focused on the shift in foreign policy mainly towards the conflict with China in the WPS, the interviewees where selected in the light of having knowledge on this matter. By request of the participants, the transcriptions are not included in this thesis and only interviewees who consented are named, to ensure they were able to speak freely.

3.3) Reflexivity There are two investigators in this thesis. Only one of the two has conducted the interviews during an internship at the Danish Embassy in the Philippines. This has resulted in only her being able to get the firsthand experience during the interviews, with reading body language and signals. A disadvantage of this, might be differing interpretation of the interview-content by the authors. However, this could also be an advantage, since the investigator being presented with the interviews on a later stage in the research process, can approach them with new eyes. Biases can arise from spending long time in a certain setting and with locals in the Philippines who might have a different culture and understanding of the political environment and the policy outcomes. As aforementioned triangulation was applied to the interviews, but also between the investigators when working with analyzing the interviews.

All the interviews were performed in English. The interviewees had a high level of professional English which leaves out any possible misunderstandings.

The following table is a systematic overview of the conducted interviews. The table also serves as a reference point for the interviews used throughout the thesis. It is necessary to explicitly indicate the following elements in table 1 and 2, since it has played a role in retrieving data. An elaboration on data contamination is included further below in order to illustrate the level of trust between the investigator and the participants. According to Glenn Beamer it is important to ensure the validity of the date collected before starting the analysis (2002: 93). Therefor an examination of the interviews is done in accordance with Beamers categories of data contamination criteria (Beamer 2002: 93).

Table 1. Interview Reference Overview

Participant Position Investigator Reference Language

Professor Professor at University of Amanda (Interview English Aileen Baviera the Philippines Diliman, Brinkløv Baviera 2017: Jensen Brinkløv) Contemporary China studies, China-Southeast Asia relations, Asia-Pacific security, Territorial and maritime disputes, and Regional integration

Justice Justices of the Supreme Amanda (Interview English Antonio T. Court of the Philippines, Brinkløv Carpio 2017: Carpio Jensen Brinkløv) Lectures on the West Philippine Sea and the conflict. Was one of the main actors in filing the UNCLOS court case against China.

Professor Founder and Managing Amanda (Interview English Victor Andres Director of the Stratbase Brinkløv Manhit 2017: C. Manhit Group and President of its Jensen Brinkløv) policy think-tank, Albert del Rosario Institute for Strategic and International Studies or the ADRi.

Secretary Presidential Peace Advisor Amanda (Interview English Jesus G. and close friend of Brinkløv Dureza 2017: Dureza President Duterte Jensen Brinkløv)

High ranking Confidential Amanda (Interview English member of the Brinkløv High ranking Philippine Jensen member of Government government 2017: Brinkløv)

Gary Alejano Alejano is a representative Amanda (Interview English and Francisco of the Magdalo Partylist Brinkløv Alejano 2017: A. Acedillo and former Marine Officer. Jensen Brinkløv) Currently reserve Lieutenant Colonel in the (Interview Philippines Marine Corps. Acedillo 2017: Brinkløv) Acedillo is a former representative of the Interviewed Magdalo Partylist and together but former Air Force Pilot. referenced Currently law student. separately

Professor Jay Director of the UP Amanda (Interview English L. (University of the Brinkløv Batongbacal Batongbacal Philippines) Institute for Jensen 2017: Maritime Affairs and Law Brinkløv) of the Sea. He teaches courses on Property, Obligations & Contracts, and Law of the Sea and Natural Resources.

Jose A. Defense and Security Amanda (Interview English Custodio Analyst. Historian. Brinkløv Custodio Jensen 2017: Institute for Policy, Strategy Brinkløv) and Developmental Studies INC.

High ranking Confidential Amanda (Interview English U.S. Embassy Brinkløv High ranking officer Jensen U.S. Embassy officer 2017: Brinkløv)

Doctor Ralf Professor of International Amanda (Interview English Emmers Relations Brinkløv Emmers 2017: Associate Dean, RSIS; Jensen Brinkløv) Head of Centre for Multilateralism Studies

Security studies, the international institutions in the Asia Pacific, and the security and international politics of Southeast Asia.

Aaron J. Program Convenor at Asia- Amanda (Interview English Rabena Pacific Pathways to Brinkløv Rabena 2017: Progress, Associate Fellow Jensen Brinkløv) at Philippine Council for Foreign Relations (PCFR), and Resident Fellow at Ateneo Teehankee Center for the Rule of Law.

Table 2. Possible Interview Data Contamination Overview Interviewees Identifying any Identifying any Identifying any Identifying any Name concealed possible factors factors of factors that motives for censored eagerness to influenced the response please interview interviewer process

Professor Aileen Baviera The interview Aileen was herself at room was quit Baviera the moment cold. This is very doing rechearch common in on Duterte as a official buildings political leader. and offices in the Hence she Philippines. It might not want led to a couple of to give away too interruptions to much the and regulate information the AC. before it has been published.

Justice Might be Justices Carpio The interview Antonio T. holding back his offered a USB pin was conducted at Carpio opinion on with information his office. Music Duterte and the from his book on was playing in political shift, the SCS, the background due to hereunder over general consequences important maps. speakers through from upsetting the whole the President. interview making it 28

difficult sometimes to focus on what was being said.

Professor To further good Might be The interviewee Victor relations holding back offered the Andres C. between the due to possibility of Manhit Danish Embassy consequences publishing with in Manila and from upsetting the the President ADR/Stratebase ADR/Stratbase Duterte. institute due to institute. importance of rechearch. Also quit an amount of previous published material from the institute was given out.

Secretary He is close Might be Complimented the Before the Jesus G. friends with holding back on interviewer on her interview, the Dureza Duterte, and it is his opinion, due looks and interviewer was in his interests to to consequences engagement in the interview by the make the from upsetting Philippines staff working for President and President politics. Dureza. Is was the concomitant Duterte, his own about her policies look position within background, good. government, what the and his personal interviews was friendship with going to be used Duterte for, and what kind of question would be asked. Pictures was also taken of the interviewer and interviewee as a souvenir. This is custom in the Philippines.

High The interviewee The interview The interviewer The interviewee ranking was very was conducted was invited to chose the member of interested in in a hotel cafe. come and see the location at a the who else had Therefor it presidential fancy hotel cafe. Philippine been when coffee palace, Despite private Government interviewed. was served the Malacañang. placement many interview has to interruptions stop so no one

else would happened by the listen on what staff. the meeting was about. The interviewee was accompanied by a secretary which might also influence the answers.

Gary Part of the Might be The interview Alejano political holding back was conducted opposition due to over lunch towards Duterte consequences making it more with in the from upsetting of an government. President conversation. Duterte The interview was conducted at the same time as that of Francisco A. Acedillo. Jose Custodio was also present, since he was the one introducing the interviewer and interviewee.

Francisco A. Might be The interview Acedillo holding back was conducted due to over lunch consequences making it more from upsetting of a President conversation. Duterte The interview was conducted at the same time as that of Gary Alejano. Jose Custodio was also present, since he was the one introducing the interviewer and interviewee.

Professor Jay L. Batongbacal

Jose A. The interviewee Might be Mentioned other The interview Custodio was very holding back relevant people to was combined interested in due to interview, who with a tour of the who else had consequences shared the same museum where been from upsetting opinions has he the interviewee interviewed. or getting on the did. works. wrong side of President Duterte

High Interested in When asked The interview ranking U.S. what the more was conducted in Embassy interviewer had specifically a restaurant with officer found in her about the U.S. a lot of things research so fare strategy towards going on in the in relation to the the Philippine background. U.S. and the the question was Philippines avoided and relations. (Who waugely of the answered. interviewed from government had said what).

Doctor Ralf The interview Emmers was conducted over the phone. There for body language and expressions could not be taken into account.

Aaron J. The interviewee Might be Seemed reluctant The interview Rabena was very holding back to answer the was conducted in interested in due to question correct a cafe. There who else had consequences or so they could was a lot of been from upsetting be useful for the noise in the interviewed. President research. background. And if his Duterte opinions was in line with the others.

There were no noteworthy observations in the blank fields. Most of the interviews went along without hurdles or remarkable considerations. Some interviewees wanted to be completely anonymous and where quite worried about their job and safety, if they were to speak truthfully and in their own opinion. Due to this, is was necessary to create a setting where the person being interview would feel safe and comfortable. They were reassured through the investigator’s connection with the Danish Embassy, that everything would be confidential and used with respect for their position. Most of the interviews where only a possibility because of the investigator working at the Embassy. The interviews were reached through the help of the Danish Ambassador’s connections or through networking at top multilateral meetings on the South China Sea conflict and maritime disputes. Some of the connection were also made through the 31th ASEAN summit in Manila. Bryman’s snowballing method was used in relations to finding interesting relevant people to interview (2012: 471). All interviews conducted would end with a question on anybody else, who could be interesting to talk with. This created a fast overview of the most important players and experts in relations to the foreign policy making in the Philippines.

An interview guide, consisting of 18 questions (See Annex 4) was provided upon request before the interview. In most cases, there was no demand for previo viewing the questions. Not all of the interview questions were asked every time. Sometimes due to the interviewee answering the question before it was asked. Other times the flow of the interview made certain questions irrelevant to ask. This has been found satisfactory since the questionnaire was intended as guiding framework. It should be mentioned, that even though not all questions were, the interviews conducted all touched upon the same topics.

3.4) Philosophy of Social Sciences The ontological and epistemological stance of this thesis derives from a structuralist account due to the selection of theory. Interests and security are the prevailing subject of state encounters, interactions, and creations of a state’s foreign policy. The neoclassical realist position, due to its focus on state interests, entails elements of soft constructivism. When analyzing a states’ perception of its relative material power capabilities and systemic pressures, perceptions or misperceptions of other international states and state leaders are vital. Emphasis is placed on the statesmen’s self-constructed truth.

4) Theory, Systemic and Domestic

4.1) Variables and Scope in International Studies The following section presents and reflect upon theory used, and how it is applied to the analysis. The choice of theory is also reflected in the analysis, which looks into the external and internal variables affecting the Philippine foreign policy in general and how it further has implications on the issue in the WPS. The findings are discussed and concluded upon.

Theories of foreign policy are meant to open avenues of understanding for foreign policy decisions and their causal background (Rose 1998: 145). However, as other tools they are limited to certain functions and therefore illuminate and uncover certain aspects of international processes, rather than a comprehensive picture of the truth (Rosenau 1984: 247; Rose 1998: 145, Stavridis, Hill 1996: 21). Thus, the topic of inquiry must be deliberately limited to an extent, which allows a consistent narrative to unfold, although the ideal degree of parsimonious simplification is subject to debate.

The following chapter introduces the predecessors2 of neoclassical realism and argues it should be understood as an attempt to reconcile the demands of systemic and domestic approaches to international studies theory. Subsequently a neoclassical realist theoretical framework is introduced.

4.2) Structural Realism and its Relation to Neoclassical Realism Early neoclassical realism was as much the ad-hoc attempt to counter the dead corners of structural realism, as it may have been an independent school of thought (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 25, 33). The systemic determinism of structural realism long dominated the field of international relations (Rose 1998: 144). Neorealists propagate a notably restrained understanding of policy processes, based on the broad strokes of global

2 This should not be understood to mean theories are obsolete or abandoned, merely indicate their partial adoption by neoclassical realists.

33 power politics, to promote a parsimonious outlook (Rose 1998: 145). The essential driving force of international politics in a structural realist understanding is the struggle between established/satisfied- and rising/dissatisfied powers (Schweller 2006: 27). In this effort to maintain or upset current power dynamics, states are guided by systemic pressures and relative power, focused on martial capabilities (Mearsheimer 2018).

Akin to other forms of realist theory, structural realism assumes the international system is anarchic, and state activity guided by the struggle to survive3 (Dunne and Schmidt 2008: 92). John Mearsheimer, whose work on structural realism has achieved seminal status, emphasizes the importance of the stringent adherence to limited variables and parsimony, if theory is to fulfil its purpose and is strongly opposed to the ideas of neoclassical realists (2018). Neorealist theorists tend to focus on the discussion of global power distributions and their consequences on a systemic level, rather than the foreign policy challenges of individual states (Rose 1998). This thinking leads to a preference for the discussion of polarity and stability, resulting in inadequate consideration of the actual foreign policy processes (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 18). It is precisely this gap in structural realist thinking neoclassical realist theory seeks to remove.

4.3) Foreign Policy Analysis Approaches On the opposite end of the spectrum from structural realist theory, systemic determinism is the domestic determinism of theories of Innenpolitik (Rose 1998: 146; Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016). Innenpolitik theories are based on the idea that domestic actors, mediated by domestic logics, are responsible for foreign policy. It is prominently featured in foreign policy analysis (FPA). FPA variables have strongly influenced the intervening variables discussed by neoclassical realists. Christopher Hill lists six variables constituting the ‘building blocks’ of FPA: 1) domestic constitutional frameworks of the decision-making system, 2) the political culture pervasive in society, 3) the beliefs of decision makers and their relevance for decision

3 To avoid harm may be a more appropriate formulation, considering there have been few incidents of the dismantling of states in the post-World War II system, with the notable exception of the consequences of the dissolution of the USSR.

34 making, 4) the psychology of individual decision maker, 5) group dynamics of policy making, and 6) information processing characteristics of a system (1996: 22-29).

4.4) Pre-Theory, in Between Chairs There is a long tradition of attempts to integrate domestic and systemic explanations for foreign policy at the expense of parsimony. Both Rosenau and Rose argue parsimony may distance theory from the empirical realities (1984: 250; 1998). Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell illustrate how potential misperceptions of systemic stimuli by involved actors can easily lead to failure of structural realist analysis (2016: 20-21). One early proponent of more general and empirically oriented international studies can be found in James Rosenau’s work. His pre- theory and theories was first published in 1964. It laid out five categories of causal explanations of foreign policy, including systemic, governmental and societal, and organizes them by importance (Haas 1964). 20 years later he criticizes the methods common in his contemporary study of foreign policy for imitation of the natural sciences and cautions against the overemphasis of parsimony in theory (Rosenau 1984: 251-253).

4.5) Theoretical Framework The criticism levied at realist scholarship for the distance between theory and empirically observable foreign policy processes did not remain unheard. Structural realists generally acknowledge there are cases where systemic determinism finds no purchase in establishing causality and scholars must refer to Innenpolitik (Mearsheimer 2018). According to John Mearsheimer the foreign policy of the Duterte regime shows such properties (2018). However, Innenpolitik offers unit level explanations, yet may not offer satisfactory causality for policy differences between internally similar states, which can be observed (Rose 1998: 146). Neoclassical realists take the next step by adding theories of Innenpolitik as intervening variables to their fundament of realism. Initially variables were added to a realist point of departure in an ad-hoc manner (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016). However, the great variety of possibly relevant Innenpolitik theories, which adds the domestic dimensions of foreign policy, comes at the price of theoretical coherence. Even without the question of coherence, certain variables must be selected. Two methods can be applied to solve this problem. 1) As with more traditional neoclassical realist scholarship, the selection of intervening variables can be undertaken based on case-specific factors, or 2) by developing a theoretical framework 35 limited to selected variables beforehand. Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell refer to approach 1) as types I and II of neoclassical realism and approach 2) as type III neoclassical realism (2016). This thesis follows an iterative path in the formation of the intervening variables. The analysis has its point of departure in Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell’s sketch proposal for a type III neoclassical realist model and specifying it to suit the institutional structures of the Philippines.

Figure 1. Brinkløv 2017

4.5.1) Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell’s Intervening Variables The following section presents Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell’s foreign policy formulation system (see Figure 1.) (2016). It starts out with an overview of the process and then launches into a discussion of the concrete objects of empirical analysis and variables discussed under each ordering category.

Systemic stimuli caused by change in the international surroundings of a state, is used as independent variable. It kicks off the policy making process. Within the policy making process Ripsman et al identify three junctures at which intervening variables become relevant: 1) perception, 2) decision making, and 3) policy implementation.

1) Perception refers to the foreign policy actors’ understanding of the systemic situation. Neoclassical realists recognized this concern of classical realists (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 20). As a result, arguments about beliefs and expectations, which form leadership images and strategic culture become relevant here. 2) Decision making is the process of formulating a response to perceived systemic stimuli. It is here Ripsman et al place variables constraining or encouraging certain policy options (2016: 20). This includes the strategic culture, state-society relations and domestic institutions all as domestic restraints on policy options. 3) Policy implementation can be distorting the intended policy, because of the limitations found in state-society relations and domestic institution. According to Christopher Hill an understanding of the implementation is central to the analysis of foreign policy as outcomes may markedly differ from intentions (2003: 51).

The following paragraphs discuss the four intervening variable clusters, which are analyzed during the three stages of the foreign policy process.

Leadership Images The idea that individuals matter to foreign policy outcomes is perhaps as old as political thinking itself. Steles, temples, prophets, and historians committed, rulers and their deeds, famous and infamous, to memory. The general debate on the role of individuals is one of agency versus structure. Neoclassical realists view agency as meaningful to the policy process within the constraints of systemic and domestic structures (Rose 1998: 157-158; Tang 2009)4. Neoclassical realist considers individuals in their role as cogs, which may upset the transmission of systemic impulses to policy outcomes. As Friedberg points out, there is a relation of perceptions with reality one way and policy the other way, but in neither case, it is determinative (1988). The following paragraphs give an overview of empirical factors and their theoretical underpinnings, that form what Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell call images or perceptions guiding individual actors (2016: 62). The advantage of the term ‘leadership images’ lies chiefly in its overarching nature. There are a great number of concepts in the study of psychological factors in foreign policy making and they have overlapping and

4 Both articles are reviews of neoclassical realist literature.

37 varying contents. Thus, referring to leadership images allows the later analysis to benefit from the greater variety of questions posed by looking at multiple definitions and concepts.

Many of the constituent components of leadership images in neoclassical realism have long been part of FPA approaches. In their treatment, Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell begin by making references to psychological factors such as personality and personal beliefs, core values, operational codes, and group thinking (2016: 62)5. in Christopher Hills FPA system.). Personal beliefs may form the cognitive framework within which decision makers view and interpret the world. Christopher Hill poses two questions related to belief systems, that allow useful conclusions about leadership images: 1) What view of international politics does a belief system propagate? Fascism is a case where the implications become easily visible. 2) To what degree is the belief-system relevant or accorded relevance by the individual in the daily decision-making process? (1996: 23). In Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell’s account core values act as cognitive filters reflecting the actor’s experiences, and influence how they process information (2016: 62).

Operational codes are defined relatively similar to leadership images and comprise philosophical and instrumental beliefs on politics, and images of oneself and others and are rarely changed (2016: 64). According to Hill, this is because of the need for cognitive consistency and may lead to cognitive dissonance, that is the bending of perceived realities to one’s imaginations (1996: 25). Schweller connects these cognitive distortions to motivated bias, that can gravely distort the perception of systemic stimuli (2008: 39). Motivated bias can cause great danger if threat perception is distorted, especially in volatile situations. Group thinking on the other hand inches in on strategic culture. Therefore, it is difficult for individuals to argue in opposition to the majority in a group they belong to (Stavridis and Hill 1996: 26-27).

5 Corresponding to variables 2), 3), 4) and 5).

Strategic Culture Neoclassical realist theory perceives the role of strategic culture in a manner similar to operational codes described above, albeit on a collective level. Strategic culture can be organizational, in other words it is part of the collective thinking expected within a bureaucracy, or ideas accepted within general society (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 65- 67). According to Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell it is constituted by beliefs, norms and assumptions adapted through socialization and institutionalized norms, creating a socially acceptable horizon of possible policies (2016: 67). Stelios Stavridis and Christopher Hill adopt the concept of political culture as equivalent FPA variable. They point to the importance of history and its societal reception to the development of strategic culture and elite socialization (Stavridis and Hill 1996: 22).

State-Society Relations State-society relations are necessarily a defining element in many grand theories across the social sciences from political economy to development studies. In Marx’s “Das Kapital” the state is treated as institutionalized class- and thereby societal relations (Marx 2009). The good governance school on the other hand suggests the state as vehicle of societal goals. It has long been recognized as both goal and means for development in international institutions, such as the World Bank. Early concerns about state- society relations among neoclassical realists have been linked to the resource mobilization capacity as component in attempts to gauge relative strength among states (Rose 1998).

Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell define four major areas of state-society relations acting as composite intervening variables in the foreign policy process (2016: 70-75):

1) The ability of foreign policy actors to insulate the foreign policy process from society at large and domestic concerns in general. In Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell’s account this is largely dependent on domestic institutional structures discussed as next intervening variable (2016: 71). 2) The inability to insulate the foreign policy process may result in considerable social pressure due to the second component variable, state-society discord or distrust. A state distrusted by key societal groups may be unable to extract necessary resources for certain policies, possibly even encounter widespread resistance if social groups

perceive state demand as overreach (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 71-72). However, it may also be argued leadership images are a relevant factor when actors actively ignore popular or institutional pressure due to personal preferences or are able to relieve pressure through populist rhetoric and other tools. 3) Because societies are fragmented factors, such as class, ethnic identity, belief groups and economic sectors, cross-sectionality is a prevalent phenomenon and allows for a wide variety of shifts in social coalitions opposing or supporting policies and their implementation. Thus, the dynamics of coalition politics are key to understanding foreign policy preferences (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 72-73). 4) It is clear, that state-society relations are complex and difficult to causally map. Yet the armed forces can potentially change any such arrangement by virtue of their potential power projection capability in favor of social coalitions over others. The government and state apparatus over society at large or even its own parochial interests (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 73). The understood willingness of military actors to comply with foreign policy actors’ demands also influences the range of actions these will consider (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 74).

The importance of these intervening variables is to a large degree dependent on the degree of fragmentation in society and the state and the salience of the fragmentation as crystallization lines for potential conflicts of interest. Randall Schweller argues a high degree of fragmentation is associated with a slow foreign policy process, which tends towards the lowest common denominator (2006). However, Schweller’s argument is difficult to extend to situations where fragmentation leads to the pursuit of opposing foreign policy strategies by different sections of society. This may even result in foreign intervention on behalf of one party (2006). Particularly in polarized political environments, e.g. when confident communist factions exist in a hostile environment, confrontation may entirely replace compromise. In view of these composite variables domestic institutions appear as important actors in foreign policy processes. The following section discusses their role as intervening variable in neoclassical realist theory.

Domestic Institutions The term institution covers a wide range of distinct groups of actors and phenomena. In this case the focus is solely on institutions relevant to foreign policy outcomes, disregarding differences in the form of institution. 40

According to Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell institutional arrangements hem in the range of domestic policy competition and limit the legitimate participation in and outcomes of the process (2016). The primary actor in this approach to the analysis of domestic institutions as intervening variable, is the executive branch of government. Therefore, it is important to consider the party landscape and constitutional frameworks surrounding executive action (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 76).

Bureaucratic institutions can develop agendas of their own. Administrative process models attempt to capture processes, that limit the variety of options presented to the decision makers by lower level functionaries and bureaucrats. Stavridis and Hill describe the ideational momentum once an initial analysis is conducted within administrations as potential blinders in relation to alternative policy options (1996: 31). A similar process, termed incrementalism, may occur when a chain of lower level agents processes matters exclusively within the narrow parameters of their purview and thereby inadvertently limit the actual discretion of their superiors step by step (Stavridis and Hill 1996: 32). However, the bureaucratic influence on the policy outcome can also be understood within the framework of bureaucratic politics. In this case bureaucracies attempt to leverage policy influence in order to expand over rival sections of the bureaucracy (Stavridis and Hill 1996: 32).

5) Analysis The theory chapter shows complex intervening variables may result in foreign policy outcomes beyond a unidimensional systemic analysis. The thesis posits the counter-intuitive contradictions in foreign policy rhetoric displayed by the current Philippine government, are the result of the intervening variables and remain within the expected responses to the systemic insecurities the Philippine state faces. To form the argument, the intervening variables are analyzed in separate sections. The following paragraphs discuss the systemic stimuli and geopolitical context, that constitutes the point of departure for the remainder of the analysis.

5.1) Systemic Pressures and the Philippines’ Power Capabilities According to Schweller systemic stimuli typically originate when the balance of power changes and threatens the status quo (2006). Many countries in East and Southeast Asia have experienced rapid expansionary transformation of their productive capabilities in the recent past. Yet it is the economic expansion of China and the concurrent need to redefine the country’s role, which provides the defining systemic stimuli in the region’s security politics. Chinese foreign policy has been defined by attempts to create buffers against unrestrained U.S. access and resulted in assertive territorial claims in the SCS and WPS (Zhao 2015; Yu 2017; M2 Press Wire 2000). This section starts out with a discussion of great power rivalry between China and the U.S., and how it is affecting the Southeast Asia security environment (see Annex 7 for an overview). Specifically, it looks into the developing bipolarity and strategic rivalry in the SCS, and the shift in presidency from Barack Obama to Donald Trump. Furthermore, it examines the Philippines power capabilities and its relationship with the two great powers. There is a great uncertainty on how the rivalry between China and the U.S. will play out. This uncertainty leaves room for Philippine policymakers to interpret the signals and actions from the two powers according to their perceptions. Furthermore, it is found the Philippines are caught in a strategic triangle with the U.S. and China.

5.1.1) China and the U.S. – Great Power Rivalry and a Changing Security Environment in Southeast Asia Within much of the academic literature on international relations there seems to be an agreement, that the international system is in a state of flux, and the post-World War II liberal international order in peril (Flockhart 2016; Zhao 2015; Buszynski 2012; Burgess 2016; 42

Lampton 2016; Murphy 2017; Lushenko and Hardy 2016; Friedberg 2015; Beeson and Li 2012; Ayson and Pardesi 2017; McDougall 2012; Bisley 2011; Goldstein 2007; Ross 2006). Global power is shifting as new powers rise and the formerly dominant decline or re-assert themselves. Changes within demographics, technologies, political structures, resources, economics, and the environment increase the urgency of the question about stability of the existing order. This change is placing the existing international order and its institutions under pressure (Flockhart 2016: 3-4). The strategic triangle between China, the Philippines, and the U.S. shows the Philippines have been struggling to find their position in the post-Cold War systemic environment. The Philippines have been going ‘hot and cold’ on respectively the U.S. and China.

The U.S., as present hegemon, are the main sponsor of the current order and China is positioned/ predisposed to be the main challenger (Flockhart 2016). This builds upon the argument, when a rising power increases their material capabilities, hereunder economically, it is natural to also increase military power capabilities6. This has been the case for China. China has risen to be the world’s second largest economy, with $11 trillion, or 14.8% of the world economy compared to the U.S. with $18 trillion, representing a quarter share of the global economy (24.3%) (World Economic Forum 2017). In addition, in 2015 China became the world’s largest goods trader illustrating a major economic power (Lampton 2016: 112). In step with its economic growth China has expanded, professionalized, and modernized its military capabilities. It has increased its defense spending by double-digit percentages since 1989, building up its naval power by deploying its first aircraft carrier and developing new classes of ships, submarines, frigates, and destroyers (GFP 2018; Buszynski 2012; Lushenko and Hardy 2016).

With its newfound economic and military power capabilities, China has also become more politically active in its neighborhood engaging in the Six Party Talks, taking a leading role in the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, attending the ASEAN regional forum, developing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in contrast to the American-led World Bank,

6 Military power rests on economic strength, hence economic strength must come first (Flockhart 2016: 6).

43 and the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative (Lushenko and Hardy 2016: 7; Yu 2017: 353).

Under President Xi Jinping, China’s foreign policy has changed from the previous ‘Keeping a low profile’ to the ‘Striving for achievement’ policy (Chang-Liao 2016; Lampton 2016: 114). Hong Yu argues the OBOR initiative is the centerpiece of this new more assertive foreign policy and is to be perceived as a reflection of China’s ascendance in the global arena, politically, economically, and strategically (2017: 353). The same is true about the AIIB which has given China the opportunity to be in the center of geo-economics and geopolitics in Southeast Asia. The AIIB and OBOR is a possible game changer of the economic and political landscape and a challenge to U.S. primacy in the region (Yu 2017; Lushenko and Hardy 2016). Paul Lushenko and John Hardy furthers this argument by stating: “China’s incremental revisionism and expanding policy interest, particularly in the South China Sea, have fueled concerns that the PRC is or will soon be in a position to begin circumscribing America’s regional role and changing the existing power structure in East Asia and perhaps beyond.“ (2016: 7). Their perception presented here, regarding power transition, is important since it links general assumptions concerning security implications of rising powers to specific circumstances and policy responses.

Lushenko and Hardy’s argument is important in order to understand the ground premise of the strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China. For seven decades, the U.S. had undisputed supremacy in the SCS. They have promoted the principle of freedom of navigation, secured free seas and open skies. From the 1970s the U.S. also led the promotion of globalization, free market economies, and its accompanied benefits to many states in the region (Burgess 2016: 111; Ayson and Pardesi 2017). However, some question U.S. leadership or argue the US’s period of dominance and leadership is coming to an end (Interview Baviera 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv; Burgess 2016). China aims to challenge the status quo and form a bipolar balance of power in the region (Burgess 2016: 111-112). The U.S. response towards China has not always been clearly formulated. There has been a great uncertainty in how to handle China which resulted in the U.S. important economic links to China after having moved much low productivity manufacturing there (Roach 2015). In the process the U.S. understanding of China has gone from a developing economy to a rising power. (Lampton 2016: 116).

The newfound understanding of China resulted in President Barack Obama's ‘Pivot to Asia’ or ‘Rebalancing to Asia’, which was an attempt to secure continued hegemony in the region through a mixture of restraint and cooperative engagement (Löfflmann 2016: 92). The key goals were to secure “...a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolutions of dispute, and respect for universal rights and freedoms.” (Donilon 2013). However, Obama’s rebalance showed a fundamental dilemma. Should the U.S. increase its engagement with its allies and partners in the region at the risk of fueling political, economic and military completion with China (Löfflmann 2016: 92). Georg Löfflmann argues the U.S. strategy of cooperative engagement with allies and partners in the Asia-pacific region has indeed fueled Chinese fear of American containment and a prevention of their rise. This resulted in China pursuing geopolitical and geo-economic counter-measures against U.S. hegemony in the region risking a growing security dilemma (Löfflmann 2016: 105). China and the U.S. is clashing on two conflicting visions of hegemony and regional preeminence creating a growing mistrust between the two powers. This clash becomes especially visible in the territorial disputes in the SCS. The next section elaborates on the strategic rivalry in the context of the SCS.

5.1.2) Strategic Rivalry in the SCS The SCS has become a focal point for U.S. and China rivalry. Around 2010, the SCS started to become associated with broader strategic problems related to China’s naval build-up and American forward presence in the region (Buszynski 2012). China’s territorial claims goes well beyond its EEZ or continental shelf and overlaps with legal claims of other regional states (See Annex 1 and 6). Many of China’s opponents in the territorial conflicts are considered to be allies of the U.S., e.g. the Philippines. China’s assertive behavior, wanting to control the water, resources, and land features within its ‘nine dash line’, has led scholars to question if China is really a status quo power, as China’s leaders have claimed to be over time (Friedberg 2015: 91; Burgess 2016: 112). The display of force, and threats to use force in advancing its territorial claims together with the rejection of any multilateral and legal solution to the dispute, has shattered the illusion, that China is becoming “...a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the existing international order.” (Friedberg 2015: 91; Burgess 2016: 112). A invitation by the U.S. to organize a combined exercise of the U.S. and PRC navies in 2018 was retracted after China stationed bombers in the SCS in May 2018 (Katigbak 2018). 45

Stephen F. Burgess argues President Xi Jinping appears to be seeking regional dominance, as part of his legacy, which leads to an enhanced risk of unintended escalation of the conflict in the SCS (2016: 111). Burgess understand China’s buildup of military outposts in areas claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines as an example of how China is becoming a revisionist power seeking to dominate the SCS and limit the U.S. access to the region (2016: 112). Leszek Buszynski argues, China believes they need increased naval strength to rise to the status of great power (2012: 145). These elements create a rising bipolarity in the region. As China experience a rise in economic power, its maritime interest and ambitions similarly expand. This leads China into a conflict with U.S., who is the current dominant naval power in the Western Pacific (Buszynski 2012: 145). Furthermore, China has demonstrated its ability to abandon agreements and declarations. In 2002 China signed the ASEAN ‘Declaration on a Code of Conduct’ (CoC) for the SCS, which entailed a moratorium on new constructions. China did not follow through on its commitment and continued to develop and construct in the SCS (Rappler 2016a).

However, the very assertiveness and expansionist drive China shows in the SCS also hems in its development as regional hegemon. China has surrounded itself with territorial disputes and created suspicion in the region, which may strengthen the American position. All the way from Japan over Korea, the Philippines to Vietnam, China is viewed as a potential security threat, while the United States do not have any territorial ambitions.

In order to understand the power rivalry and potential outcomes in the SCS, Sarah Raine and Christian Le Mière uses the terminology: ‘Nobody’s sea’, ‘Somebody’s sea’ and ‘Everybody’s sea’ in their book, Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Dispute (2017). The three concepts offer a good description of the process in the SCS. Under U.S. hegemony it was somebody’s sea. Now due to the rivalry and growing bipolarity between China and the U.S. it has become nobody’s sea. China’s actions, assertiveness, and nine-dash-line illustrate China want it to be somebody’s sea in contrast to the other claimant states, and ASEAN who wants it to be everybody’s sea. These contradictions and different understandings of what the SCS is supposed to be, heightens the risk of it becoming a ‘Sea of conflict’ leaving the security environment in the region unpredictable and un-transparent (Raine and Le Mière 46

2017). The risk of conflict also leaves the U.S. and other claimant states in the region more hesitant in its actions towards China. Small mistakes or miscalculations could easily escalate the situation.

Burgess argues the SCS is of greater importance to China than it is to the U.S. due to proximity. Therefore, it is rational for China to be more assertive and employ active defense, making it difficult for the U.S. to convince China of its resolve (2016: 115). The SCS is said to be an acting ground for a power transition between the U.S. and China. The more powerful China becomes the more difficult it is for the U.S. to balance against its rise without provoking conflict. This leaves open the question if U.S. allies and partners will turn towards bandwagoning with China (Burgess: 114).

China is posing a challenge to the international order underpinned by U.S. power. Within the academic literature on China’s rise there are many contradicting discussions and answers found on what may happen over the next decade (Goldstein 2007). If China continues to grow, the U.S. will face a choice between accommodation and confrontation (Friedberg 2015: 94). Under President Obama the strategy in how to deal with China was clear. But with the election of Donald Trump as president in November 2016 the U.S. strategy becomes unclear or unexciting (Choong 2017; Chacko and Jayasuriya 2017; Huxley and Schreer 2017). The next section discusses the implication of a new U.S. President on the security environment in the Southeast Asia region.

5.1.3) Trump and the Asia-Pacific – What Now? The Obama administration’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ encompassed important diplomatic, military, and economic dimensions. It was seen to be a shift away from the Middle East and Afghanistan towards Asia (Chacko and Jayasuriya 2017: 122). It promoted forward-based U.S. military presence in the region with its deployment of 60% of the naval forces, a strong U.S. support for multilateral institutions, and finally a strong economic engagement with the key element of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP aimed to secure the possibility for Southeast Asian states not to become overly dependent on China (Huxley and Schreer 2017). In strong contrast, President Trump has ripped up the TPP – killing a main pillar of the pivot to Asia,

47 enacted punitive tariffs on China, and threatened to pull American troops out of Japan and South Korea (Choong 2017; Huxley and Schreer 2017; Associated Press 2018).

Recent events suggest Trump may create progress with the U.S. position in North Korea, but results remain to be seen. Most of Trump’s threats remains rhetoric, and there is still no clear Asia strategy. Trump’s main policy, ‘America First’, falls under three broad themes: bring back jobs from overseas, U.S. military allies must pay more for their defense, and a preference for bilateral over multilateral trade agreements (Choong 2017: 182). However, it can be argued the negotiating strength of the U.S. is increased in a bilateral setting. This leaves uncertainty for U.S. allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific on how Trump will handle a rising China. Trump appointments of China critical and trade focused Wilbur Ross, Robert Lighthizer, and Peter Navarro indicated Trump’s policy towards China is likely to be focused on trade. Trump has introduced steel tariffs and negotiations are ongoing (Associate Press 2018). He has also indicated he would challenge China on the military front if necessary. Presidential advisors Alexander Gray and Navarro had claimed the previous administration’s strategy towards the Asia-Pacific has led to Chinese aggression and left American allies and partners discouraged. Trump, and his administration, have been provoking China with many statements. Especially when Trump answered a phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in December 2016, breaking the ‘one China’ principle. But China has not taken the provocation easily (Choong 2017: 184). Choong describes it as an action-reaction cycle taking place within U.S.-China relations. Despite U.S. threats and provocation, China has continued construction on its established outposts in the Spratlys and seized a U.S. underwater surveillance drone in the EEZ of the Philippines (2017). These actions illustrate the strength of China’s resolve and indicate China will continue to assert its claims in the region and counter any U.S. challenge to such assertions.

In order for the Trump administration to roll back Chinese expansion in the SCS, it needs to deal with the contradictions within its policies. “…how would ‘America First’ square with a bid to re-assert American dominance in the Asia-Pacific? How would dropping the TPP gel with what Trump sees to be the importance of the U.S. presence in the region? And how could a potential clash with China help to sustain the U.S.-led liberal order?” (Choong 2017: 186). These questions posed by Choong highlight the uncertainty on how the U.S. will position

48 themselves within the Asia-Pacific region. Tim Huxley and Benjamin Schreer argues the U.S. allies and partners needs a clear Asia strategy from the Trump administration to reassure them about America’s competence, capacity and resolve to preserve its position of dominance and leadership in the region (2017: 81). Trump’s rhetoric under his campaign triggered unease in many Asia-Pacific states, due to his questioning of US’s commitment to its allies and partners combined with his economic nationalism. His views of America's role and position within the international system is in clear contrast with America’s post-Second World War role illustrating a possible power transition.

The ambiguity generated under Trump arrives at a moment in history where China’s coming as a major strategic and powerful actor has caused many Southeast Asian-states to hope for U.S. reinforcement, rather than U.S. reduce in strategic presence. “…many regional countries were in a ‘strategic holding pattern’, waiting to see ‘whether the United States and its security allies and partners can continue to play the robust and constructive role that they have for many decades in delivering peace…if ‘stability and prosperity are to continue, the United States must play an even greater role as the indispensable strategic power in the Indo- Pacific’.” (Huxley and Schreer 2017: 83). Strategic holding patterns are a reaction to the potential power transition in the region. It has been argued China will step in to fill the power vacuum created by the Trump administration's missing Asia strategy, pushing different states towards China (Huxley and Schreer 2017). The election of President Trump reveals the fracturing of the social foundation, that underpinned the U.S.-led liberal world order, which Obama's ‘Pivot to Asia’ was envisioned to consolidate (Chacko and Jayasuriya 2017).

John Mearsheimer argues the power balance is still in favor of the U.S. and long term economic and technological change are the determining factors for future developments (2018). This means the Trump administration can afford to consider various strategic avenues in the Asia-Pacific region (Huxley and Schreer 2017: 84). This includes measures of economic cooperation and sanction, in order to encourage or discourage economic and technological development in the region. The remarkable development of Japan and the Republic of Korea can be viewed as historical precedents and were in part, due to U.S. support, creating strong allies and stakeholders in U.S. hegemony (Iokibe and Minohara 2017, Kim and Vogel 2011). However, Donald Trump’s preference lies with economic sanction,

49 expanded military balancing and retrenchment (Associate Press 2018; Choong 2017). However, even though it seems unlikely, it may be argued the current developments in Korea could offset Trump’s apparent weakness. If the U.S. succeed in integrating the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea into their security and economic orbit a direct land-border between U.S. troops in the Republic of Korea and China could be established. Such a border would reduce the strategical usefulness of the islands in the SCS in China’s defensive strategy (Pollack 2015; Huang 2017).

5.1.4) The U.S., the Philippines, and China - A Strategic Triangle The Philippines has, and still is, operating within a strategic orbit of the U.S. (Heydarian 2016a: 337). They are formally allies and series of agreements and treaties exist between them. Examples are the U.S.-Philippines Military Assistance Pact (1947), the Military Bases Agreement (1947), and the mutual defense treaty (1951) meant to ensure the U.S. would stand as de facto guarantor for the Philippines, in the event of an aggressive war against the Philippines (Heydarian 2016b: 149).

The long history between the Philippines and the U.S. is still playing an important role and is affecting the relationship and collaboration between the two countries today. The memories of American colonization and oppression have left the Philippines with an ambiguous relationship to the U.S.. The Philippines hold a strong nationalistic feeling and are on a quest for self-determination pushing them away from the U.S.. But the Philippines still needs the U.S. to provide security and military support. It is essential for them to keep up good relations in order to maintain the much-needed military support. The U.S. are in a sense the ideal patron, because they have no direct territorial interests in the Philippines anymore, but still has a strong incentive to maintain Philippine territorial integrity in the face of Chinese claims.

Even before WWII the U.S. had a strong presence in Asia. It’s now defunct military bases in Subic and Clark functioned as a deterrent towards China on Filipino soil (Heydarian 2016a: 337). Today the U.S. still has the upper hand and the capacity to balance China with its defense budget of 587,8 billion USD compared to China’s 161,7 billion USD. Today China has 2,955 aircrafts, 4,788 armored fighting vehicles, and 1 aircraft carrier. Compared to the

U.S., China is still falling behind. The U.S. controls 13,762 military aircrafts, 41,062 armored fighting vehicles, and 19 aircraft carriers. Despite the fact, that the Philippines intend to increase their military budget from 1 percent of their GDP to around 2.4-2.5 percent, Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana acknowledges the Philippines still have one of Asia’s weakest militaries (Parameswaran 2017). If one compares the Philippines military capacity to its rising neighbor China, it becomes clear why they are dependent on the U.S. for security and military support. The Philippines defense budget is 3 billion USD, their total number of aircraft is 149, they have 778 armored fighting vehicles, and no aircraft carrier (GFP 2017; Brinkløv 2017). In terms of martial might the Philippines can be labeled a small power relative to China and the U.S..

Despite the Philippines strategic proximity and dependence upon the U.S., they began to reach out to China in the 1970s, when China began to normalize its relations with the U.S. (Heydarian 2016a: 338). Tourists coming from China brought economic growth, and China committed itself to big investments in the Philippines and promised infrastructure improvements (Baviera 2013: 3-4). In 2016 China became the Philippines largest trading partner worth 21.937 billion USD or 15.5 percent of the country’s total trade. The export receipts from China was 6.373 billion USD while payment for import commodities was valued at 15.565 billion USD, resulting in a 9.192 billion USD trade deficit. The U.S., compared to China, is the Philippines third largest trading partner. They Account for 11.6 percent or 16.427 billion USD in trade (Brinkløv 2017; Philippine Statistics Authority 2017; Cahiles-Magkilat 2018). At the same time the country enjoys the influx of a large influx of remittances from overseas Filipino workers, primarily in the U.S. (Rowley 2018). Comparing the Philippines trade relations with respectively China and the U.S., clarifies they are dependent upon both countries in securing economic growth and development. But only the economic relation with China is problematic, because of the territorial conflict WPS, which invites sanction politics. This is according to Aileen San Pablo-Baviera why the bilateral relationship between China and the Philippines is more important than their asymmetry and differences might otherwise suggest (2013).

It can be argued that: “To fully understand the strategic triangle between the U.S., the Philippines, and China it is important to understand the shift in the systemic environment after

51 the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era there was no longer an ‘existential external threat’ from the Soviet [Union]. Due to this, and along with a wave of nationalist and pacifist sentiments washing over the Philippines, there was no longer the need for a strong U.S. military presence in the country.” (Brinkløv 2017: 17). Baviera and Javad Heydarian both argue the disappearance of the obvious threat to their own social position led the political elite in the Philippines to decide to rely on their own capabilities against external threats. In 1992 the U.S. bases in Subic and Clark were closed down (2013; 2016a). The closing of the two military bases could be seen as the beginning of the contestation of U.S. hegemony by China (Baviera 2013; Heydarian 2016a).

The US’s turn away from the region resulted in strategic window of opportunity for China to extend its control of the WPS. The Chinese navy soon took control of Mischief Reef in the WPS and harassed of Filipino fishermen. “To the Philippines’ horror, China soon began to build a military compound on the atoll, effectively consolidating its expansive territorial claims well into the Philippine claimed waters.”(Heydarian 2016a: 341). This was a wakeup call for the Philippines and soon after they wanted to revitalize their ties with the Americans. This lead to the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, which allowed U.S. military presence on Filipino soil (Heydarian 2016a; Baviera 2013; Governments of the USA and PH 1987). Again, nationalist sentiment led to discussions on whether strong security ties with the U.S. were serving the country's best long-term interests. According to Heydarian, the result of nationalist sentiment and insecurity on how to best position itself between the two great powers in the region, led to a turn towards China and the economic benefits provided when being friendly engaged (2016a: 342-343).

The following sections of the analysis explore the intervening variables, that translate the oscillating opportunity structure and risks created by the beginning Chinese challenge of U.S. hegemony in its immediate surroundings. The first intervening variable explores the connection of the ‘back and forth’ between great powers and the perceptions or misperception of the Filipino policymakers. The Philippines finds themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand they are dependent on the U.S. for security, and on the other hand they are pushed towards China due to nationalistic sentiment and potential economic benefits.

5.2) The Statesmen's Perception In the previous section it is argued that the long term prospect for the power balance in the Philippine’s surroundings appear uncertain, because the systemic signals are unclear. Thus analysing intervening variables becomes more important. The Philippines are struggling to find their place in the post-Cold War world. This struggle becomes visible within the perceptions of the political elite. Schweller argues there are certain conditions when threats are more easily recognised. Among these are rising powers with territorial claims and security concerns, that conflict with those of other states (2006). As discussed in the first part of the analysis, this is the case in the WPS. Furthermore, states with historical experiences of subjugation tend to be more sensitive to potential threats (Schweller 2006). Arguably this is the case with the Philippines. Yet current Philippine policy under Duterte is non-action towards China and attempts to rest the issue despite constant Chinese encroachment.

The following chapter finds Duterte’s perceptions differ markedly from previous incumbents. Duterte believes China is needed to secure economic and infrastructure development. At the same time Duterte perceives the U.S. as declining and being unwilling to aid the Philippines in the WPS, should conflict with China erupt, which Duterte believes to be likely (Mendez 2018). Therefore, Duterte argues further conflict with China would foreclose a potential partnership in domestic development and leave the Philippines exposed to retaliation without U.S. support. Yet the resolution of the Marawi crisis put a hold to Duterte’s separation plans with the U.S., due to the extensive support and help with fighting the insurgency. However, Duterte’s views were not swayed in the long term, in May 2018, after the fact, he insisted the U.S. would not aid the Philippines in combating insurgents (Mendez 2018).

Furthermore, it is shown, that within the political elite in the Philippines there are many who do not agree with Duterte’s perceptions and his concomitant foreign policy. It has been argued that the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ does not reflect the Filipino view in general (Interview Manhit 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Carpio 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Acedillo 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv). “Duterte does not represents the Philippines. He represents whatever political interests he has.” (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv). 53

5.2.1) The Duterte Administration The Chief Foreign Policy Executive, President Duterte The Philippines presidency is the oldest in Asia and has an extraordinary powerful chief executive. Constitutionally the Philippines’ chief diplomatic architect is the President (Heydarian 2017: 220). “Article VII Executive Department Section 1. - The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” (The Philippines’ Constitution 1987). Mark R. Thompson argues that the Philippines are an example of hyperpresidentialism (2014: 434). This is due to weak constraints on the appointment powers of the Philippine presidency, its ability to circumvent legislative and judicial constraints, and its domination of what should be independent regulatory and oversight agencies (Thompson 2014: 434). Formally the president is the main foreign policy executive, and has the final say. Foreign policy practice in the Philippines is consistent with the president’s strong formal position and must be understood in the context of the presidential agenda (Interview Baviere 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv; Interview High ranking member of government 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Rabena 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Dureza 2017: Brinkløv).

President Duterte is the first president to hail from Mindanao, the most distant part of the country from the capital, and the first president to take office directly after holding a local government position, as mayor of Davao City (Cook 2018: 268). Duterte has been categorized as an outsider to ‘imperial manila’. Yet Duterte was not uninvited, as he had powerful backers in Manila, including former President Ramos, who later came to regret his decision, citing the violence committed by Duterte backed groups (Reuters 2016; Ilagan and Mangahas 2016). During the presidential election campaign, Duterte repeatedly underlined that he would continue as the mayor of the Philippines, and he did not want to be addressed as President. “He will govern the country the same way he governed Davao City” (Inquirer 2017). It has been argued that Duterte has kept true to his word and embraced a very mayoral approach to being president. Custodio argues his mayoral approach extends to foreign policy – “…it reflects a very local - a mayor’s perception of politics and his [Duterte] worldview.” (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv). This has earned him criticism for his limited international and national experience (Strategic Comments 2016). Justice Antonio T. Carpio argues that Duterte’s lack local outlook results in a foreign policy of which he does not understand the long-term consequences (Interview Carpio 2017: Brinkløv). Baviera describes 54

Duterte’s self-conception as: “.... a strong local leader, where it is very much about having control and all that – so yes, it is very personal for him” (Interview Baviera 2017: Brinkløv).

Justice Carpio argues Duterte’s personal commitment to the ‘War on Drugs’ means U.S. and EU criticism causes him to respond emotionally and turn towards China (Interview Carpio 2017: Brinkløv). Manhit likewise argues that the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ and here by the turn towards China, is rhetoric and driven by personal anger over interference in his domestic politics. “This is how Duterte reacts [towards the U.S. and the EU], anyone who questions his war on drugs - he tends to get very defensive publicly. Privately when he meets with them he doesn’t really become defensive. But publicly, it is the populist nature of the president” (Interview Manhit 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Emmers 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Baviera 2017: Brinkløv).

Duterte has been described as a ‘tough-talking’ or ‘foul-mouthed’ leader due to his many harsh remarks against political leaders or institutions criticizing him. This has been especially visible in relation to Duterte’s mains political goals, like the ‘War on Drugs’. When the U.S., UN, and the EU began to openly criticize his human rights record, he lashed back with hard words for previous President Barack Obama, the American ambassador to the Philippines, and openly questioned the wisdom of the UN system as a whole (Heydarian 2017a: 220). Some have argued that Duterte’s use of “gutter” language injects authority to his urgency of saving the country (Curato 2017: 149). A Philippine policy maker described Duterte’s political thinking“We have all experienced a friend or classmate who is a bully maybe. Normally they are afraid of one thing – a bigger bully. That is how I see our President. He is tough internally, but when there is somebody bigger than him, he is afraid. (Informal conversation with Philippine policy maker 2017: Brinkløv). This is also exemplified in his fury against any constraints, even legal or constitutional, to his personal political agenda and politics (Cook 2018: 268; 2017: 5).

Despite Duterte’s harsh rhetoric he remains extremely popular. In December 2017, 71 % of adults polled were satisfied with the president, and only 13 % were not. His approval ratings are strongly positive across all sub-sections of the population. Duterte is the first president to

55 enter in to office with a high level of trust and keep it steady over the first quarter of his term (Cook 2018: 268-269). This strong consistent popularity, in a mix with the fluid and momentary ways of Philippine party politics, secured Duterte and his administration a historic super-majority in the House of Representatives (90%) and a majority in the Senate (Strategic Comments 2016a: v; Cook 2018: 269). This leaves him in a position as a political leader, to push through his political agenda without any, or very few, obstacles. Nicole Curato argues that Duterte’s popularity is strongly connected to his populist leader style (2017: 145). Duterte’s brand of populism is described as ‘repertoire of performance’ which is meant to build the bridge or relation between the leader (the performer) and the population (audience), comparable to President Trump’s rhetoric (Morffit 2016).

Duterte’s populist, heavy-handed leadership style is also reflected in what he has determined as the Philippines’ national interest: 1) Ensuring economic growth and development; 2) Tackling domestic security issues; 3) Solving drug related problems (Brinkløv 2017; Duterte 2016). The following provides a more detailed overview:

1) The 10-point economic agenda entails a poverty reduction from 21.6% in 2015 to 13- 15% by 2022. It also aims to accelerate the infrastructure project and buildup of industries that will create growth across the country and create new jobs. The ‘Build Build Build’ portal lists down high impact project that are envisioned to create jobs and better income for the Filipino population (Philippine Government 2017). 2) The main domestic security issue are the Islamist and Communist insurgencies; that reached their peak with the Marawi city siege. It was a main priority for the President (Heydarian 2017b). On the 17th of October 2017, President Duterte declared Marawi City liberated (McKirdy and Berlinger 2017). But even if the crisis is ended, the impact on political decisions then, are still crucial to Duterte’s actions and politics. 3) The signature issue, setting him apart from previous administrations, is the ‘War on Drugs’(Go 2017: 59; Cook 2018: 271). Duterte consistently presents illegal drugs and related crime as an existential threat, and himself as the last possible option to save the country (Strategic Comments 2016a: v). Despite the scathing criticism from human rights groups, the international community, and the opposition, Duterte continues his hard stand on prioritizing this issue.

The Duterte administration has expressed its conviction, that the Philippines require foreign martial and economic support to tackle all these issues. The following section discusses the so called ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ as the administration's strategy to mobilize international support to achieve domestic goals.

Duterte’s ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ In September 2016, Duterte announced the Philippines would pursue an ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ (Galang 2017; Romero 2017; Merez 2017). This implicated his government would be the first to break with course plotted by the U.S. colonial administration (Interview Baviera 2017: Brinkløv). However, the Philippine constitution of 1987 makes explicit mention of independent foreign policy in: “Article II, Section 7: ‘The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.” (Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs 2017). This definition leaves room for interpretation, of how it will be translated into a concrete policy. Therefore, the president can use the independent foreign policy as a tool to construct his or her own version of the foreign policy, and secure the prioritisation of his or her perception of the national interest. This creates a certain amount of flexibility (Brinkløv 2017: 20). Hence, based upon the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’, the actual policy or strategy towards the WPS can be shifted based on national or political interests (Interview High ranking member of government 2017: Brinkløv).

Duterte bold claim to the label of ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ originates in his break with the traditional U.S. alliance: “I will be chartering [sic] a [new] course [for the Philippines] on its own and will not be dependent on the United States.” (Heydarian 2017a: 220). Duterte also made it clear, that the Philippines would seek a new alliance with China and foster closer economic and diplomatic relations. He is determined to take advantages of China’s emergence as a major economic power, and in the process replace the U.S. security arrangement with China as the new main foreign bilateral relation (de Castro 2017: 4-5). This indicated Duterte would change the foreign policy in respect to the U.S., its main security ally, and China its main extremal security threat.

Presidential Peace Adviser Jesus Dureza recounted a conversation with the President about the meaning of the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’; Dureza asked: “what do you mean by an independent foreign policy, because that is already in our constitution… what is the difference between what is there and what have been done by previous foreign policy makers? What will you be doing?” Duterte replied: “...you know we have friends, but we would like to make more friends who are not yet friendly, or who is still far from our friendly perimeter.”, Duterte was referring to the U.S. and China. Dureza again asked: “Will it mean that you will abandon all ties with tested allies, or will you shift interest away from those we are close with to those who are not in your alliance, especially militarily?” Duterte: “You know, the purpose is only to win new friends but also keep the old friends.” (Interview Dureza 2017: Brinkløv; Brinkløv 2017: 21). This is the basic explanation from President Duterte to a friend and member of his administration on what the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ encompass. However, Duterte’s reasoning about systemic circumstances necessitating such steps remains unclear. The following paragraphs analyse Duterte’s perception of systemic pressures, discussed in the previous chapter.

Duterte’s Perceptions of the Systemic Pressures President Duterte has raised legitimate concerns over the U.S.’s reliability as an ally. For a long period, the Philippines was the biggest recipient of American Foreign Military Financing in Southeast Asia. But in the period between 2010-2015 monetary military assistance declined (Heydarian 2017a: 231). This happened despite Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’. Baviera argues that the Obama administration was increasingly concerned with China’s actions in the SCS, hence the U.S. began to take a stronger interest in the region. This happened just after the financial crisis and ironically: “When the U.S. did have the capacities they did not have the political will. And when they had the political will they did not have the capacities.” (Interview Baviera 2017: Brinkløv). Baviera stresses that she believes the U.S. could have done something if they really wanted to (Interview Baviera 2017: Brinkløv).

Furthermore, Philippine policy makers perceive the U.S. as questioning the area the Mutual Defense Treaty covers. The U.S. do not consider the Spratly island and the Scarborough shoal as part of the Philippines territory due to the way the treaties were written. As stated by a High Ranking U.S. Embassy officer: “Technically, in legal terms we do not consider it to be

58 something we have to defend. The Philippines very much seems to think that we should do that for them. So, there is a divergence of interests. We are not a claimant state to the South China Sea. For U.S. it is only the freedom of navigation…” (Interview High ranking U.S. Embassy officer 2017: Brinkløv). Carpio argues the new American position contradicts colonial era U.S. maps, that clearly illustrated that the Scarborough Shoal as being part of the Philippine territory (See Annex 5.). Hence, they were indirectly saying that they no longer believe it part of the Philippine territory (Interview Carpio 2017: Brinkløv: Brinkløv 2017: 21). Carpio amongst other explicitly expresses, that the U.S. is reneging on its obligation towards the Philippines, leaving the vivid impression of being in decline in the region.

Heydarian argues U.S. government officials, including Obama, on many different occasions, have neglected to reaffirm their willingness to aid the Philippines should tensions with China in the WPS escalate into armed conflict (2017a: 231). In relation to this, Secretary Dureza argues that Duterte believes the U.S. has its own interest to protect. “Don’t even think that one country will go to war for another. The U.S. will do with is good for them. China will do what is good for them. And the Philippines will do what is good for us.” (Interview Dureza 2017: Brinkløv). This shows that Duterte’s perception of the U.S. is that they will not come to the help of the Philippines in the WPS, not as long as it is not in their interest. Rebena stresses the uncertainties about U.S. support due to their own economic stakes with China (Interview Rebena 2017: Brinkløv).

The pessimism Philippine policy makers show about U.S. commitments today, can also be traced back to the ‘Scarborough Shoal Standoff’ in 2012. Chinese government vessels prevented a ship of the Philippine navy from arresting Chinese fishermen, illegally exploiting the resources around the shoal (Zhao 2012: 60). In the situation the Philippines turned towards the U.S. for arbitration. Subsequently the U.S. negotiated the withdrawal of both parties. However, China simply neglected to comply with the negotiated solution and took full control over Scarborough Shoal (Interview Manhit 2017; Interview Carpio 2017; Interview Hing ranking member of government 2017: Brinkløv). Despite the fact that the decision was made by China, Philippine policy makers, hereunder Duterte, blame the U.S.. In the Philippines, the Philippine failure to resist the Chinese incursion is interpreted as the U.S. failure to uphold the commitment to the Philippines national defense (Heydarian 2017a: 231). President Duterte

59 views the incident as confirmation of his perception of U.S. decline in the region (Heydarian 2017a: 231). Duterte believed that the interest of the U.S. and of the Philippines are not converged. In fact, there is a strong perception amongst most of the Filipino policy makers that the U.S. have let the Philippines down (Interview Carpio 2017; Interview Dureza 2017: Interview Baviera 2017; Interview Manhit 2017; Interview Batongbacal 2017; Interview Custodio 2017; Interview Rabena 2017: Brinkløv). According to Secretary Dureza’s, this is Duterte’s argument why it is vital to make new friends closer to home, despite the obvious disregard of China’s open hostility. Therefor the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ was proclaimed by Duterte (Interview Dureza 2017: Brinkløv).

Another explanation Duterte offers is his claim China will start a war, should the Philippines continue the Aquino administration's balancing policies, including the insistence on international legal norms (Interview Manhit 2017: Brinkløv). Duterte believes the power capabilities of the Philippines to be nowhere near sufficient to challenge China and as established above, does not trust treaties with the U.S.. Aaron J. Rebena emphasizes the question: Do the Philippines really want to confront China if they do not have someone stronger to back them? (Interview Rebena 2017: Brinkløv). Rebena explains a Filipino joke which has apparently reached China. “When I was in China they knew a joke about our air force – It’s all air, no force” (Interview Rebena 2017: Brinkløv). This clearly exemplifies both how China sees the strength of the Philippines, but most importantly how the Philippines perceive their own power capabilities.

Yet the ruling of the PCA provided Duterte with a non-military possibility to gather international support and strengthen the Philippine position. Again Duterte claims this would provoke China to declare war, despite no evidence of any such development during the arbitration process (Heydarian 2017a: 231). Again, the perception of some Philippine policy makers is the fault lies not with the Philippines, but the U.S., that let the Philippines down, by: “calling for ... “calm and patience”, while immediately deploying National Security Advisor Susan Rice to Beijing to communicate the Obama administration’s interest in preserving “the most important bilateral relationship” of the 21th century.” (2017a: 231).

Duterte’s Conceptualization of National Interest and ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ In order to fully understand what is driving Duterte’s ‘Independent Foreign Policy’, his perception of the national interests is important. In the above section on ‘Duterte’s Perception of the National Interests’ these priorities were presented. This section analyzes how Duterte’s prioritizing of the national interest affect the foreign policy.

The 10 Point Economic Agenda and the ‘Build Build Build’ initiative - Economic Concessions from China As mentioned before the perceived national interest of President Duterte is strongly driven by domestic policy aspirations. Duterte sees China and their growing economy as something that should be benefited from. “Right now, the foreign policy is in the name of trade and investment and friendship…” (Interview Manhit 2017: Brinkløv). But he seems to forget Chinese interests. On the one hand, China has indeed promised President Duterte support, particularly in terms of infrastructure investments and development aid, if he changes the previous confrontational strategy of the Aquino administration. On the other hand, China has threatened Duterte with stark responses if he continues to facilitate the American military pivot to the region, and actively use the arbitrational ruling against China’s interest (Heydarian 2017a: 232). As aforementioned Duterte is worried about the prospect of a military confrontation with China. Heydarian quotes Duterte: “I will not go to war because we will not win it. It will be a massacre. I will not waste the lives of Filipino soldiers and policemen.” (2017a: 232).

Batongbacal argues that the Duterte administration is convinced China is the answer to all their needs for financial development assistance and better access to the Chinese market. They believe that this is the only way to go since the U.S. and EU are in decline and China is the rising economic power. “Because of that Duterte believes that he is being opportunistic - China is the opportunity, so let’s go there. Never mind the U.S. and the EU, they are in decline anyway” (Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv). Gary Alejano and Francisco Acedillo agrees with this “Duterte has shifted towards China because he believes that China has excess capacity and that we [the Philippines] could avail from the resources of China. They [Duterte and his administration] are seeing the U.S. as declining.” (Interview Alejano 2017: Interview Acedillo 2017: Brinkløv). Rabena argues that one of the main reasons for perceiving the U.S. as declining, is the for seeing the U.S. as being in decline is the 61 breakdown of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The Philippines were looking forward to the economic gains from the TPP corporation. Now that it does not exist anymore it becomes easier to turn towards China and their economic promises (Interview Rebena 2017: Brinkløv). Batongbacal further explains that how one of the government’s economic managers said at a forum, that from their perspective there is no longer any money in the West (Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv). This is one of the government’s main assumptions. He further stated that they now have to turn towards China and the region for further economic development. This is also argued by Emmers: “Duterte might be thinking we need Chinese foreign direct investment to upgrade the Philippines infrastructure and to continue to grow. And we can’t do that without China.” (Interview Emmers 2017: Brinkløv).

Duterte believes that in moving away from the U.S. he can please China and secure concessions. Especially economic concessions. It is important for him to get goodwill from China to further his domestic projects, the ‘10 Point Economic Agenda’ and the ‘Build, Build, Build initiative’, in order to address the poverty problem in the country. Hence, the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ is being used as a tool by Duterte to further what he sees as being in the best interest for the Philippines (Interview High ranking member of government 2017: Brinkløv).

If Duterte was to raise the tribunal ruling on the WPS that would upset China. It is a general understanding within Duterte’s administration, that China will provide foreign direct investment to the Philippines if they keep quiet about the ruling and the WPS in general (All interviewed 2017). An example are the 34 billion dollars that are expected from China to help build a new railroad (Interview Carpio 2017: Brinkløv). Justices Carpio emphasizes: “… China says, we will give you the money just keep quiet about the South China Sea… what is in it for the President?... he wants to build a railroad and his Build Build Build projects. He wants to achieve what he thinks is the national interest” (Interview Carpio 2017: Brinkløv). In relation to this, Gary Alejano explains that Duterte presented to the Special Committee on the WPS and to the Foreign Affairs Committee of Congress, that the reason why the Philippines is backing down in the WPS and benching the ruling, as part of the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’, is to secure welfare, infrastructure, and jobs to the Philippine people (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv). Alejano and Acedillo emphasizes that security matters in the WPS

62 are being neglected in favor of hope for economic gains (Interview Alejano 2017; Interview Acedillo 2017: Brinkløv). This illustrates that Duterte connects his withdrawal from the assertive stand towards China in the WPS with securing what he finds in the national interest of the Philippines.

The Marawi crisis and Recent Events “We have domestic security issues that affects our resources. Because of the internal security problems, the Philippines cannot fully address the WPS issue.” (Interview High ranking member of government 2017: Brinkløv).

This section examines perceptions of recent international martial support for the Philippines. It finds Duterte prioritises domestic development and security issues over the conflict with China in the WPS. This is due to Duterte’s perception of China as being the new regional hegemon, willing to aid the Philippines economically if they set aside the artribitional ruling and the conflict in the WPS. But Duterte is also determined to reshape public opinion of the U.S. in a negative fashion, despite their support in solving domestic security issues.

In recent time Duterte has been friendlier in the rhetoric toward President Trump and the U.S. in general (Esmaquel 2017). The reason for this is connected to the Marawi crisis. Duterte needed the U.S.’s help in fighting the terrorist siege. A high-ranking officer from the U.S. embassy to the Philippines argues that the friendship between the U.S. and the Philippines is still strong, especially militarily. Duterte might not acknowledge it in public, but he does so in a private bilateral setting, that he is grateful to the U.S. for the help and support they have given to the Philippines in Mindanao and Marawi (Interview High ranking U.S. Embassy officer 2017: Brinkløv). This argument is supported by Dureza. He agrees that the Philippines needs the U.S. to solve the Marawi crisis (Interview Dureza 2017: Brinkløv). Baviera also argues that the Philippines needed the U.S. for the Marawi crisis, since China did not have the right military equipment or will to take on the task. Only the U.S. was able to deliver the support the Philippines needed (Baviera Interview 2017: Brinkløv). Batongbacal stresses this argument: “In terms of security relations, Duterte made such a big show about turning towards China and Russia for security alliances. But it turns out that China and Russia is not interested in that. So, when the Philippines needed assistance with Marawi, who was there? U.S. and Australia, the traditional allies.” (Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv). 63

Despite Duterte’s initially friendlier approach towards the U.S. after the Marawi issue, he has returned to his post-electoral flat rejection of any U.S. contribution to Philippine security recently. In May 2018 Duterte cast doubt on the willingness of the USA to aid the AFP in Marawi, even though the U.S. have already made crucial contributions and continue to be present (Mendez 2018). Even while China introduced bombers capable of carrying nuclear payloads and proceeds to exploit expanding areas of the WPS, Duterte suggested the Philippines should seek Chinese military aid in Marawi (Mendez 2018; Reuters 2018b). Duterte did not change his stand on China and questioned the point of protesting China’s actions, arguing he did not want to start a war (Placido 2018). In the beginning May 2018 Duterte claimed China will protect the Philippines from external threats and accused U.S. forces of war-shyness while praising Chinese and Russian contributions in Marawi (Geducos 2018). Only weeks later Duterte drew a red line and threatened war, should China build military installations on Scarborough Shoal and begin unilateral resource exploitation (Viray 2018c). Within the same month China occupied the Philippine Island of Sandy Cay with naval forces and civilian vessels began exclusive Chinese resource extraction (Viray 2018a; Viray 2018b). In reaction, former Chief Justice of the Philippines, Davide Jr, critically reminding the Philippine public of Duterte jokingly calling the Philippines a Chinese province in front of a Chinese audience in February 2018 (BusinessWorld 2018). U.S.-officials have commented “... there’s only one country that seems to take active steps to rebuff ...” Chinese activities after a U.S. Navy freedom of navigation exercise in the area (Agence France-Presse 2018). On May 31st the Philippines filed diplomatic protest against recent Chinese activities (Corrales 2018c).

In the next section the political elite’s understanding of Duterte’s actions and perceptions is discussed.

5.2.2) Elite Opposition This section analyses perceptions within the Filipino political elite towards the current administration. It begins by discussing understandings of Duterte’s ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ and continues with a discussion of the views held on the premises that drive Duterte’s foreign policy agenda. It finds the there is little agreement with Duterte’s understanding, even though trust in the U.S. has suffered.

Reception Duterte’s ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ The name ‘independent’ is a very convenient label to use for political purposes and whether or not the foreign policy is independent is subjective to people (Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv). Despite the provision in the constitution from 1987 on the independent foreign policy, there is still a perception that the Philippines is, and have been, historically, politically, and ideologically aligned with the U.S. in a manner that makes them unable to make decisions based on the Philippines interest and perspectives. According to Batongbacal, the Philippines has actually been relative independent in its foreign policy for years – “...even though the Philippine’s population does not realize it...” (Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv).

Professor Victor Manhit argues, that Duterte decided to use the phrase ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ to define his pivot towards a stronger relationship with China. He does not want to be constrained by the U.S.. But Duterte’s turn toward China, and letting them influence him, leads to new constraints. According to Manhit, an independent foreign policy should entail maintaining strong relations with traditional allies and trading partners and at the same time improving relations with China. One should not be exclusive of the other (Interview Manhit 2017: Brinkløv).

This take on the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ is also reflected in the Filipino Defense and Security Strategist and Historian Jose Custodio take on the issue. He argues that Duterte’s take on the foreign policy is “good in name only” (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv). He suggests the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ is linked to Duterte’s search for alternative partners, that are less critical of his ‘War on Drugs’. Custodio further argues, that the shift towards China within Duterte’s ‘Independent Foreign Policy’, is to secure international support if his traditional partners should choose to take their criticisms to actions such as economic sanctions. Duterte may have found a willing guarantor in the PRC. “This is something that in a way underpins the lofty assumption of and independent foreign policy” (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv). In May 2018 Duterte stated Xi Jinping had told him: 'We will not allow you to be taken out from your office…’, effectively implying his immunity from domestic threats and international accountability (Viray 2018d).

Professor Jay Batongbacal, like Custodio, describes the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ as “just another political label” (Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv). It has the purpose of selling and justifying Duterte’s decisions vis-à-vis China and the Philippine people. Batongbacal argues that Duterte is aware of his actions towards China. In relations to the territorial dispute in the WPS, his actions are not consistent with the broader expectations of what the foreign policy towards China should intaile (Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv). When it comes to the WPS and Duterte’s ‘Independent Foreign policy’, there is a gap between Duterte’s approach and what the public thinks should be done. This becomes clear in the high public distrust towards China and the strong support for the arbitrational ruling on the territorial dispute with China in the WPS (Pulse Asia 2017). This stands in stark opposition to the President’s high trust towards China and setting aside of the favorable ruling. The question of public opinion is elaborated in the chapter on state-society relations.

A high ranking member of the Philippine government argues, that Duterte actively uses the fact that the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ is up to interpretation. “The President says that the foreign policy is leaning away from the U.S. and towards China. But at the same time leaning away from China and towards the West, is also part of it.” (Interview High ranking member of government 2017: Brinkløv). This adds to the uncertainty about what is the actual foreign policy.

This doubled take on the foreign policy can be explained by three different arguments. The first two arguments adopt a negative perspective on Duterte, whereas the last is positive:

1) The foreign policy is a ‘knees jerking’ reaction to actions undertaken by Chinas and the U.S. instead of a proactive policy. This means Duterte is just reacting to what China is doing one day, trying to accommodate them, and the next day he is reacting towards the U.S. trying to accommodate them (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv).

2) “The thing with the Duterte administration, is that you should not confuse it with Duterte” (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv). It is a potluck administration - meaning that everybody ‘brings their own food’. Factions within the administration brings their own agenda and hence neglects uniting in a cohesive manner to add the agendas together as part of a coherent strategy. The department of foreign affairs has its own agenda. The department of foreign affairs is led by Peter Cayetano, who has his own agenda. The Philippines ambassador to China has his own agenda, and his vision of good relations with China might not be the same as Cayetano’s vision. Custodio argues that this potluck administration takes advantage of Duterte’s ‘Independent Foreign Policy’, and the freedom of interpretation it entails, leaving the inconsistent picture of the foreign policy. Due to this, Custodio categorizes the foreign policy, not as independent, but as “...a collection of interest and people who have their own separate agendas.” (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv). 3) In contrast to the argument, that the foreign policy is a ‘knee jerking’ reaction to pressures from China and the U.S., Secretary Jesus Dureza and a High ranking member of government argue, that: ‘moving back and forth’ between the U.S. and China is a proactive hedging strategy (Interview High ranking member of government 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Dureza 2017: Brinkløv). The different signals being sent are a deliberate action of the President to get the best from both countries and to secure that the Philippines does not “...come on the side of one alliance” (Interview Dureza 2017: Brinkløv). The foreign policy is aimed at maximization of diplomatic economic relationships with non-traditional partners and reduced dependence on the U.S. (Interview Rabena 2017: Brinkløv). Secretary Dureza emphasizes that in order to understand the current ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ one must “…listen to what he [President Duterte] says and enjoy it, but watch what he actually does.” (Interview Dureza 2017: Brinkløv). There seems to be a common understanding by Duterte, and his administration, that the independent foreign policy is a hedging strategy (Brinkløv 2017).

These three different arguments and understandings illustrate a disagreement on what the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ entails and how President Duterte is perceived. Yet in the light of the systemic circumstances, Duterte’s proposed foreign policy can be interpreted as a form of bandwagoning. China has not given indications, that it may change its stance on the WPS,

67 and Duterte has not acted in the defense of these territories. Quite on the contrary, he proposes to increase economic exchange and a form of infrastructure development, that would depend on China (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv).

The above section clarifies that the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ is part of the 1987 constitution and that it is not something new. The change lies in the perceptions of the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ and how it is used by different presidents and policymakers. The section shows a disagreement within the Philippine political elite on what the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ entails. To some it is a fragmented policy and a ‘knees jerking’ reaction to China and the U.S.. And to others, hereunder the Duterte administration, it is a clear hedging strategy to maximize diplomatic and economic benefits from old and new partners. From a realist standpoint his policies may be interpreted as initial stage of bandwagoning with China.

Critique of Duterte’s Premises Custodio stresses that the feeling amongst the senior members of government and other important political players, is that the Philippines should not overrely on the U.S. or China (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv). On the one hand the U.S. has its own interest to protect in its relations with China, like the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand China’s construction of military installations within the Philippine EEZ beckons caution. A High Ranking Member of Government argues that “The number one issue that prevents U.S. from engaging China before, is the issue of trust. Can we really China, given the recent history and their actions – what they did at Mischief Reef and at the Scarborough Shoal when both of U.S. agreed to withdraw and they did not. So how can we trust China because of this?” (Interview High Ranking Member if Government 2017: Brinkløv). He further argues that it is paradox, that Duterte and Cayetano has full trust towards China, when most of the policy makers and Filipino population do not (Interview High Ranking Member if Government 2017: Brinkløv). In relation to this argument, Manhit affirms that the arbitration ruling is permanent, but the government is not. This fact is also acknowledged by China who knows that Duterte might be the only one who is really in favor of setting aside the ruling in order to have more friendly relations (Interview Manhit 2017: Brinkløv).

When confronted about his failure to utilise the arbitration to keep Chinese claims at bay, without having to go to war, President Duterte has repeatedly falsely claimed the ruling was handed down early enough for the Aquino administration to make good use of it, when in fact the ruling was awarded in the beginning of his own term (Corrales 2018b). Carpio upholds the view: “We have to restate our approach [to the WPS conflict] when Duterte is gone.” (Interview Carpio 2017: Brinkløv). The Americans have the same approach to Duterte’s Presidency: “The larger strategy with the Duterte administration is to wait him out.” (Interview High Ranking U.S. Embassy Officer 2017: Brinkløv).

Manhit agues the terminology used, by Duterte and the media, on the WPS issue with China is perceived as misleading. They entrench the understanding, that the territories in the WPS are disputed and China will go to war or impose economic sanctions if the Philippines where to insist on the ruling. “I hate it when they use the phrase: ‘this is disputed territories’ – it’s not anymore.” (Interview Manhit 2017: Brinkløv). The public slips into this narrative even after the ruling in favor of the Philippines. And this is the narrative Duterte bases his foreign policy on.

The previous government under President Aquino experienced economic sanctions on the banana trade due to their hard line against China in the WPS (Heggins 2012). This is one of Duterte’s reasons for why the Philippines should have a friendly relationship with them. But Manhit argues the case is not strong. “There is really no money coming from China. Historically, that is why the old government had the hard line – China has really not invested that much.” (Interview Manhit 2017: Brinkløv). He points to the argument that there is no history of China investing in a lot in the Philippines (Interview Manhit 2017: Brinkløv). At the time where the Philippines was experiencing a drop in banana export to China, they also saw a 6,8% economic growth rate. Chinese promises of greater economic investment in the Philippine’s have shown themselves to be unreliable (Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv), but China has had great success with investments in Philippine politics. Duterte himself has confirmed his presidential campaign was partially financed by Chinese donors (Macas 2016).

Batongbacal elaborates that the promises of China for economic help and trade is not coming through and argues that the current administration has taken their beliefs in China to the extreme. “They are not realizing that even if the Americans are in decline, even if the EU is weakening as a market, it is still a substantial portion of the Philippines market.” (Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv). Justice Carpio also argues the Philippines negative trade balance with China reduces the impact of economic sanctions. Thus, China would experience greater loss in an economic war. Justice Carpio and Albert Del Rosario studied the potential economic impact of sanctions before they filed the arbitration case against China, and found it would not significantly reduce growth (Interview Carpio 2017: Brinkløv). This undermines Duterte’s premise of economic risks attached to insisting on the favorable ruling.

A High Ranking Member of Government argues the Philippines stands at the risk of falling into economic dependency, which will lead to political capture. He questions what the consequence of accepting China’s economic enticements will be. The promises from China are potentially dangerous, especially in relation to the WPS (Interview High Ranking Member of Government 2017: Brinkløv). The Americans are also concerned the Chinese are trying to get economic leverage over the Philippines so that they can put the screws on the Philippines in WPS (Interview High Ranking U.S. Embassy Officer 2017: Brinkløv). There is a general fear within the Filipino political elite, that Duterte might have accommodated China too much, too early and for too little, and thereby have diminished the prospects of a favourable solution. Batongbacal says the government allowed China free range in the WPS, in the hope that in exchange China would return the favor. But China has not reciprocated, they have stayed where they are and intensified their activities (Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv). Some would even argue that Duterte is selling of what should be the Philippines most vital security interest, namely its territorial integrity. “…the national interest of territorial integrity should never be compromised… despite whatever foreign policy or strategy we have.” (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Acedillo 2017: Brinkløv).

Despite the difficulty for the U.S. to support the Philippines in the WPS and Duterte’s eagerness to break ties with them, relations are still perceived as intact by members of the political elite. Batongbacal argues that despite Duterte’s efforts to elevate China’s role, it has not yet made a significant impact on relations with the U.S.. He underlines that ties with the

West are too institutionalised to just break from one day to another (Interview Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv).

In 2016 the U.S. helped push back the Chinese from Scarborough Shoal despite the lack of action in 2012. He further argues that U.S. has no other choice than to honor the Mutual Defence Pact, because of the consequences it will have on the US’s relations with its other allies around the world (Interview High Ranking Member of Government 2017: Brinkløv). The argument is also carried by Alejano and Acedillo. They raise the question “If we cannot depend on our treaty ally, how will other countries rely on the US?” (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Acedillo 2017: Brinkløv). Rabena explains that the Americans lack of clearly about their stand towards the WPS is to maintain strategic ambiguity. He believes that they might be trying to test the Chinese resolve (Interview Rabena 2017: Brinkløv). From an outside perspective, Emmers maintains that relations between the U.S. and the Philippines are still good: “A U.S. official said to me: ‘despite the crazy rhetoric, our day to day relations are still very good’, no cancellations of exercises and such.” (Interview Emmers 2017: Brinkløv). This fits well with the statement from a High Ranking U.S. Embassy Officer: “Duterte gets it privately that the U.S. is important to the Philippines and how big of a help we have been. But publicly not.” (Interview High Ranking U.S. Embassy Officer 2017: Brinkløv).

At the American Embassy in Manila discarding the TPP is viewed as detrimental to U.S. interests in the region (Interview High Ranking U.S. Embassy Officer 2017: Brinkløv). Custodio argues that the U.S. are still able to show to the world, especially China, that relations between them and the Philippines are still intact. This happened during the Marawi crisis where the U.S. showed its importance and influence when one of its B3 Orion aircrafts flu in very low over Marawi. Custodio explains: “That aircraft can stay higher in altitude. But this one went down to show itself. That was a clear signal to everybody, even China, that the President of the Philippines might be saying that you are best buddies, but we [the US] are calling the shots here. We are the ones with the Philippines military, not you guys [China].” (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv).

Another important premise for Duterte’s arguments for his prefered foreign policy is that China will go to war against the Philippines if he uses the arbitrational ruling and resists them in the WPS. An important perception, that is not shared by the political elite. As aforementioned Duterte has publicly stated many times that he does not what to go to war. Manhit argues that there can be no talk of war after the ruling. China would not go against an international ruling. Manhit questions why China did not start a war when Aquino was president and the Philippines were very assertive towards China? “Why was there no attack when the arbitrational case was filed? Why was there no attack at the height of the conflict?” (Interview Manthi 2017: Brinkløv).

Alejano and Acedillo argue: “China is using the phrase ‘that the U.S. let the Philippines down in the WPS, leaving the question hanging, if we attack you, will the U.S. come and help you? No, they will not.” (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv; Acedillo 2017: Brinkløv). Alejano underlines that talk of war, is Duterte intimidating the Philippine people. It is a way for Duterte to defend his actions of lack thereof (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv). Justices Caprio stresses that war is out of the picture and a clear misperception by Duterte since offensive war is against the UN Charter. He agrees that it is an attempt by Duterte to legitimize his own approach to the conflict. “Legally the dispute is settled and the U.S. is the only real ally of the Philippines and China knows this, therefore they will not go to war.” (Interview Carpio 2017: Brinkløv). Carpio explains, that China intends to secure the SCS without firing a single shot and without going to war. They will conduct public relations warfare, legal warfare, and psychological warfare. (Interview Carpio 2017: Brinkløv). Manhit further argues that Duterte’s perception is a irrational misperception. A rational reaction to a threat like this, would be building alliances. He should have used the ASEAN chairmanship to gather international support and introduce a common code of conduct on the SCS issue. Likewise, he should have moved closer to traditional allies like the U.S. and Australia, to strengthen balancing capabilities (Manhit 2017: Brinkløv).

Duterte, in his role as chairman, defined the outcome of the ASEAN 2017 summit. Comparing the main statements from the Joint Communiqué of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, 2016 to 2017, the rhetoric on China and the SCS is changed. In 2016 there was an emphasis on the member states remaining “…seriously concerned over recent

72 and ongoing developments and took note of the concerns expressed by some Ministers on the land reclamations and activities in the area…” (ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting 2016). In 2017, under the chairmanship of Duterte, it has changes to a much lesser serious tone: “We discussed extensively the matters relating to the South China Sea and took note of the concerns expressed by some Ministers…” (ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting 2017). The Philippines have clearly taken a step backwards in relation to the ASEAN cooperation on the SCS issue with China (Interview Manhit 2017: Brinkløv). Manhit highlights a contradiction with the way Duterte words the WPS issue: “On the way to ASEAN last week, Duterte was already talking about that he will raise these issues [West Philippine Sea]. So, he used the media as a puppet to say that he will do something. But behind the scenes he didn’t do anything.” (Interview Manhit 2017: Brinkløv).

Baviera argues China has the capacity for self-correction, but at its own pace. China has suffered a legal defeat, which is as source of learning for them. But China is not going to change their behavior overnight. Baviera argues the Philippines need to patiently insist on the ruling until China adjusts its behaviour. However, Duterte’s non-action allows China to consolidate its gains and irreversibly alter the status quo. It is unknown how buildup of structures in the WPS will it take before Chinese claims can no longer be reversed. Baviera argues: “By setting aside the ruling, we don’t know if we are waiting for a better opportunity or actually missing an opportunity that could have resin stronger support from the international community and thereby strengthen the Philippines position.” (Interview Baviera 2017: Brinkløv).

The following section on strategic culture is intimately connected with the sentiments of potential government internal opposition to Duterte’s anti-American agenda, especially within elements of Duterte’s supermajority that are less beholden to short term political agendas or have Manila’s, rather than Mindanao’s perspective.

5.3) Strategic Culture This section analyses the strategic culture of the Philippines. It looks into beliefs, norms, and assumptions adapted through socialization and institutionalized norms, which create a socially acceptable horizon of possible policies. The analysis focuses on history and the societal reception to the development of a strategic culture. 73

It is argued that there is nothing controversial about President Duterte’s call for an ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ since the Philippines constitution from 1987 preserves the principle of independence. What is new about Duterte’s foreign policy is the emphasis on separation from the U.S. and a non-dependence on the U.S.. It is a norm for the Philippines to turn towards the U.S. for security. The main assumption has always been that the Philippines could count on the U.S. and the conditions within the various treaties between the two countries. These elements have led to an institutionalization of a strategic culture connected to cooperation with the U.S., which is analyzed and discussed in the next chapter on domestic institutions. The strategic culture of the Philippines has existed since the colonization of the U.S. and is closely linked to a dependence on the U.S. for security in relations to external threats. Despite national sentiment and an urge for more independence from the U.S. after the end of the Cold War, the Philippines strategic culture was still found to be linked to the history with the U.S. under President Aquino (2010-2016). Duterte is trying to break with the strategic culture of the Philippines by limiting ties with the U.S. and turning towards China. Whether or not a change in the strategic culture will take place, depend upon the success of President Duterte, the administration that takes over the presidency, and the influence of domestic institutions on the actual relations with respectively the U.S. and China.

5.3.1) The Philippines and the US’s Special Relationship – the Strategic proximity to the Americans Since the end of World War II, the Philippines has been part of the liberal international order. It has participated in the advance of the global human rights regime and the development of the United Nations system (Heydarian 2017a: 220). The Philippines, as found in the independent variable, has since its independence remained within the strategic orbit of the U.S.. After a short-lived war against Spain in 1889, the U.S. became the new colonial power in the Philippines. The Philippine-American War of 1899-1902 remains a symbol of the Filipino people’s pursuit for self-determination and the fight against imperialism. When the U.S. colonized the Philippines, it transformed it into a showcase colony modelled on their political system. In order for the U.S. to maintain the peace, and win over the elites of the Filipino society, the Americans allowed them to maintain the same privileges as they had under the Spanish colonization. In addition, they also provided access to new technology, capital, and new foreign markets. The result was an American-style political system, where

74 the survival of the Filipino elite dependent on the survival and success of the colonial power (Heydarian 2017a: 222-223). This formed the foundation of the Philippines strategic culture.

The Philippines and the U.S. fought in the two world wars together, and during the Korean War from 1950-1053 and the Vietnam War from 1955-1975 the Philippines deployed thousands of troops. This was despite the end of American colonization in 1946. It has been argued by many that the American influence over the Philippines extended far beyond the colonization and still is prominent today (Heydarian 2017a: 223; de Castro 2017; Timberman 1991). When the Philippines became independent U.S. troops remained in the country and were hosted at two of their largest overseas bases in Clark and Subic. Clark and Subic served as a platform from where the U.S. could project power and dominance into the region. This was at the time aimed at containing the spread of communism and the bases were maintained throughout the Cold War. The Philippines served as a key element in the U.S.-led ‘hub-and- spokes’ military alliance architecture in the Asia-Pacific. The ‘hub-and-spokes’ system consisted of a network of bilateral alliances to secure U.S. strategic leadership in East Asia (Misalucha & Amador III 2016: 52; Heydarian 2017a: 223; De Castro 2017: 3). This shows the pivotal role of the U.S. in Philippine security politics has become an entrenched norm. Heydarian argues that this strategic centrality came at the cost of the Philippines policy autonomy and that a strategic culture was founded on the outsourcing of external security to the U.S. (2017a: 223).

The long-term reliance on the U.S. for external security still has implications today. The Philippine strategic culture prioritizes internal security threats over external security threats. The security establishment within the Philippines gradually established a profound and damaging sense of strategic dependence upon the U.S., which was illustrated in the aforementioned ‘Scarborough Shoal incident’. This sense of strategic dependency upon the U.S. was entrenched by the various security arrangements and treaties between the U.S. and the Philippines. The most prominent of these are the U.S.-Philippines Military Assistance Pact from 1947, the Military Bases Agreement from 1947, and the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951 (Heydarian 2017a: 223). These three agreements between the U.S. and the Philippines entailed granting the U.S. the right to establish bases at different locations within the Philippines territory. It also established that the U.S. would provide training and

75 development of the Armed Forces’ of the Philippines. And finally, the MDT supplemented the bases agreement with an emphasizes on a mutual commitment to peacefully resolve international disputes, jointly or separately developing the capacity to resist attacks, and the need for consultation when the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of either the U.S. or the Philippines were under threat of attack (Heydarian 2017a; Albert 2016). This resulted in a stunted development of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) compared to other former colonies in Southeast Asia. Heydarian argues “America became the de facto guarantor of the Philippines’ survival against external threats. As a result, the Philippines became more of a de facto protectorate than a sovereign ally of America.” (2017a: 223).

5.3.2)The Aftermath of the Cold War After the end of the Cold War the relations between the Philippines and the U.S. changed. The alliance between the two became challenged by domestic politics within the Philippines along with a change in the systemic environment. Due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and China’s integration into the global economy driven by the western lead liberal world order, the U.S. no longer felt the need to maintain a large-scale military presence in the Philippines. There was no longer an ‘existential external threat’ from the Soviet bloc (Heydarian 2016a: 340; Baviera 2013: 20) This happened at a time where the Philippines witnessed a rise in nationalism, that drove the call from civil society to remove the American presence in the county (Heydarian 2017a: 224; Brinkløv 2017). The rise in nationalism was linked to abuse of Filipinos by the American troops, who enjoyed immunity against prosecution in the Philippines. Heydarian argues, that since there was no longer an existential threat to the Philippines, a questioning of the rationale behind extending the treaties allowing U.S. bases and American soldiers began (2017a: 224). There was no justification left to keep the American presence and the associated harassment and problems. This resulted in the Philippines relying on their own capabilities in defining themselves against any external threats. The U.S. would remain their most important ally, but the Philippines would no longer “act as a de facto satellite state” (Heydarian 2017a: 224).

In 1992 the American military bases in Subic and Clark were terminated. Not only because the Philippines wanted it that way, but also because the U.S. in generally moved out of the

76 region and did not want to pay the high expenditure associated. Some would argue that this marked the regional beginning of a U.S. decline and a rising China (Heydarian 2017a: 224; Heydarian 2016a: 340; Baviera 2013: 20). But soon after the U.S. retreated from the Philippines territory, the Chinese Naval forces wrestled control over the Mischief Reef in the WPS from the Philippines and began harassing Filipino fishermen. This created a diplomatic crisis with China that the Philippines had not experienced before. As Heydarian describes: “To the Philippines’ horror, China soon began to build a military compound on the atoll, effectively consolidating its expansive territorial claims well into the Philippine claimed waters.” (2016a: 341). At the time of events, the Ramos administration (1992-1998) considered a military response but did not have the power capabilities vis-à-vis China. The U.S. made it clear the they would not intervene on the behalf of the Philippines. The reason behind this was their neutrality on territorial disputes in the Southeast Asian region. The Americans also argued that the Mischief Reef fell outside what was covered by the MDT and the American national interest in general (Interview Carpio 2017: Brinkløv; Heydarian 2017a: 224).

What is important to understand from this, is when the U.S. left the AFP where unable to fill the space and China moved into the vacuum. The Philippines soon after sought to revitalize the security ties with the U.S. leading to the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, which allowed U.S. military presence in the country (Heydarian 2016a; Baviera 2013). It made it possible to expand the joint military exercises, increase the military aid, and enhance the intelligence- sharing (Heydarian 2017a: 225). But this was again questioned by the nationalist sentiment and the political opposition. It led to a growing concern over whether the security ties with the U.S. were serving the country’s best interests (Heydarian 2016a: 342-343; Brinkløv 2017: 18).

At the same time, the Chinese seizure of the Mischief Reef led the current President Ramos to call for a modernization of the AFP and a strengthening of the defense sector. Ramos realized that the Philippines had neglected to develop the Philippines external defense capabilities. On one hand, the reason for this was the long history of focusing on domestic security issues, e.g. the Islamic and Communist insurgencies. On the other hand, was the Philippine over-

77 dependency on the U.S. presence in the region and strategic protection (Heydarian 2017a: 225).

5.3.3) Benigno Aquino III’s Resurrection of American-Filipino Security Alliance Under the presidency of Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016) the alliance with the U.S. was revitalized. The security alliance and MDT between the Philippines and the U.S. became increasingly entrenched in the consciousness of the Filipino policy makers due to the rising tensions with China in the WPS (Misalucha & Amador III 2016: 55). In 2011, on the occasion of the 16th anniversary of the MDT, Albert Del Rosario, current Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Philippines, together with Hillary Clinton signed the Manila Declaration. This was done in order to reaffirm the MDT as the footing for the bilateral relationship between the two countries (US Department of State 2011). Charmaine Misalucha and Julio Amador III argues that there are two important mechanisms which are of importance in the revitalization of the alliance between the Philippines and the US: “…the Bilateral Strategic Dialogue and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).” (2016: 55). The two arrangements illustrate the enduring Philippine commitment to the alliance with the U.S. and that the Philippines up until 2016 worked within the strategic culture of security dependency on the U.S..

The Bilateral Strategic Dialogue entailed senior officials from both countries meeting once a year to share and discuss their respective views on various national, regional, and global changes and challenges. It is a key mechanism for debating political, security, and economic cooperation (Misalucha & Amador III 2016: 55; U.S. Department of State 2017a). The EDCA is in general terms oriented towards a fortification of the bilateral security partnership regarding the development of the Philippines’ minimum credible defense position. This was thought necessary due to the changing geostrategic environment in the Asia-Pacific. The EDCA aims to maintain and further develop both the Philippines and the U.S.’s collective and individual defense capabilities to better achieve the goals of the MDT (Misalucha & Amador III 2016: 56). This entailed a modernization and allocation of more resources to the AFP in an effort to change the AFP’s focus from domestic security issues to external security issues. Diversifying the Philippines security relation to other U.S. allies like Japan and Australia was also an important element of the agreement. These elements of the agreement were based on

78 the U.S. security umbrella in the region along with the ‘hub-and-spokes’ architecture. It was important for the Philippines to reverse the historical underinvestment in external defense which before had been thought covered by the U.S.’s security role in the region (Misalucha & Amador III 2016: 57). Misalucha and Amador argue the EDCA comprehends the sensitive political environment that surrounds the U.S.-Philippines history and relations. They stress the element within the Philippines constitution which states that “Any permanent basing by U.S forces is prohibited…” (Misalucha & Amador III 2016: 57). In the light of the aforementioned dissatisfaction with the U.S. former abuse during their permanent basing in the Philippines, the EDCA received vast critique. The Supreme Court of the Philippines has adjudicated a case that was filed which challenged the EDCA’s passage on shared facilities build by the U.S. in the Philippines but owned by the Philippines. On the 12th of January 2016 the court found the EDCA conformed with the constitution (Rappler 2016c).

The interaction with the U.S. took a new turn under Aquino. The vitalization of security relations with the U.S. bought the Philippines time to modernize the AFP and prioritize external security. This could have aided the transition from a strategic culture anchored in dependency on the U.S. to an AFP based culture. But this development was cut short by the election of President Duterte. He began his term by breaking with the Americans and turning towards China in his ‘Independent Foreign Policy’. This became especially visible in the changing rhetoric shown during the Bilateral Strategic Dialogue in March 2016 and the next in December 2017.

In the joint U.S.-Philippines press statements from the Bilateral Strategic Dialogue in March 2016 and December 2017 a clear difference in the rhetoric on collaboration between the two countries and the SCS issue is visible (US Department of State 2016; US Department of State 2017a). In March 2016, Aquino was still president and the joint statement emphasizes the good strategic relationship between the Philippines and the U.S.. The joint statement summarizes: “…The annual dialogue supported and reinforced the Alliance across a broad range of shared values, interests, and priorities… Discussions reaffirmed shared commitment to strengthening the Alliance, in terms of ensuring both countries’ mutual defense and security, as well as jointly contributing to regional peace, stability, and economic prosperity.” And importance was given to the history of strategic cooperation and cultural bonds between

79 the two countries: “…the delegations from the United States and the Philippines underscored the strong personal and societal bonds, including a commitment to shared values and norms, which form the core of the relationship, and reaffirmed their commitment to continue to support and deepen people-to-people ties…” (US Department of State 2016). This highlights vital elements from the Philippines strategic culture, hereunder the close connection to the U.S.. Furthermore, great importance was given to closer security cooperation and on the reinforcement of the MDT and the EDCA agreement. In relation to China’s assertiveness in the SCS, the Philippines and the U.S. reiterated their commitment to peace, security, and stability in the region, unhindered lawful commerce, and freedoms of navigation and overflight and other uses of the SCS sea as assured by international law. More specifically on the Philippines turn toward international law and the arbitration case against China over the disputed territories in the WPS the following was stated:

“Both sides expressed their firm opposition to the ongoing militarization of outposts in the South China Sea and discussed their common view that the installation of new military assets on the outposts escalates tensions. They discussed options to address further militarization and unilateral actions in the South China Sea. … Both sides restated their views that the ruling in the South China Sea case before the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention arbitral tribunal would be legally binding on both China and the Philippines.” (US Department of State 2016).

This clearly illustrates that the Philippines under the Aquino administration still worked within the strategic orbit of the U.S.. They followed the strategic culture of the Philippines in depending on the U.S. as the guarantor of the liberal international order, here under the freedom of navigation and overflight and the rule of law.

After Duterte took office his ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ soon affected the rhetoric in joint statement. The statement from December 2017 merely explained the general purpose of the Bilateral Strategic Dialogues along with a list of topics, mainly focused on what the Philippines would see as domestic issues: “…senior officials discussed a wide variety of issues of mutual interest and reaffirmed their commitment to deepening collaboration in areas including maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, cybersecurity,

80 countering transnational drug trafficking, countering terrorism, and improving drug prevention and treatment services, as well as combating wildlife trafficking and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.” (US Department of State 2017a). No attention was given to the Philippines favorable ruling in the arbitration case against China in the WPS. The only mention given to the security issue, was a broader statement on the SCS: “Both sides reiterated their commitment to uphold freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea in the South China Sea, and stressed the importance of peacefully resolving disputes in accordance with international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.” (US Department of State 2017a). The only security issues that was stressed was the two sides concern over North Korea’s unlawful ballistic missile and nuclear programs. Besides the clear difference in relation to the WPS under Aquino to Duterte, is the lack of friendly rhetoric on strong personal and societal bonds was taking out. The Philippines and the U.S. only reaffirmed the importance of holding regular high-level consultations (US Department of State 2017a). This demonstrates Duterte’s effort to break away from the historical strategic culture of the Philippines by downplaying the cooperation with the U.S..

As argued in the independent variable and the first intervening variable, the Philippines still depend on the U.S. for security. This was especially clear in relation to the Marawi conflict. The historically over-dependence on the U.S. for security is still visible in the Philippines’ policies today. The AFP still lacks modernization in order to deal with external threats and are still mainly focused on fighting domestic security issues. Whilst it was found that the Philippines strategic culture is historically linked to dependency on American security, an awakening occurred with the division of interest between the U.S. and the Philippines after the Cold War. This was reversed by the Chinese seizure of the Mischief Reef and later the Scarborough Shoal incident with China. With President Duterte an open questioning of the strategic culture and dependency upon the U.S. for security has begun. It was shown in the chapter on perceptions Duterte believes the U.S. have let the Philippine’s down in relation to the WPS and the country needs China for economic development and prosperity. Therefor he pushes for a break with the current strategic culture.

The next section proceeds with the analysis of state-society relations. While the importance of ideational traditions creates some overlaps with strategic-culture the discussion here focuses

81 on the way in which the state can insulate policy makers from societal demands and discontent and furthermore what segments of society have control of the state.

5.4) State-Society Relations The following section of the analysis discusses the relations of state and society. The People Power Revolutions (EDSA) in 1986, 2001, and a failed one in 2001 again, seem to suggest a strong society, that acts in place of failing checks and balances on presidential power. However, the analysis suggests People Power was successful only in conjunction with support of traditional elites and the military. Yet electoral preferences cannot be disregarded. Polls continue to suggest a clear distrust of China and support for U.S.-military aid and disagreement with the decision not to use the favorable arbitration ruling in the conflict with China.

5.4.1) Class and Political Power The Philippines are an ethnically diverse former colony. As such, local identity building based on pre-colonial polities might be expected. However, identity building outside the former Sultanates remains difficult after centuries of colonization and Filipino nationalists are mired by contradictory narratives (Timberman 1991: 12-13). In the late colonial phase and post WWII decades, many Filipinos thus looked to the U.S. for cultural and consumer preferences as they had earlier to Spain (Timberman 1991: 13). The continued importance of American culture also becomes clear by the pervasive use of the English words in the press and politics. According to Mark Thompson, Philippine society and politics are defined by the cleavage of class, rather than the less viable ethnic or religious divisions (2010: 28). The decade long conflict in the Muslim dominated southern region of Mindanao and surrounding isles has been a fixture in Philippine politics. It that has defined elements of development- and defense- politics and can be linked to approval ratings. But it can be argued the conflict is for the most part external to Philippine society at large.

Historically Philippine economy has been largely based on agriculture. Large landholdings and the resulting tenant economy evolved into systems of political patronage, once elections were introduced (Timberman 1991: 17,23). As Timberman argues, poverty and vulnerability of tenants opens the door for vote buying (1991: 21). Landowners use their inherent power 82 over tenants, money and violence to affect tenant compliance and bundle their political strength in parties that in turn extract state resources. The result has been a chain of patronage, ultimately connecting tenants to the president and the nexus of power, or “patron-in-chief” (Thompson 2014: 433). Custodio argues: "The Philippine politics are very feudal. This is a place where dynasties rule. The governor of a province belongs to a family, the town major belongs to the same family, and the counselors belong to the same family." (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv).

Yet, the relative stability of this “changeless” system has been upset by various attempts at agricultural reform (Timberman 1991: 111), and more importantly a shift towards the informal and the service sectors of the economy (Thompson 2010). In 2003 40% of the Philippine labor force was employed in the agricultural sector (FAO) by 2016 the number had fallen to 27%, a little more than 10% of the total population (Philippine Statistics Authority 2017). As a consequence, traditional networks of patronage have become less effective at eliciting electoral support and populist platforms have greater potential as the election of Vice-president and former actor Estrada demonstrated already in 1992 (Thompson 2010:21). Yet Arroyo’s traditionalist campaign won the 2004 election against Fernando Poe, also a former actor, who surpassed Estrada in popular appeal (Thompson 2010:31). Later revelations raised questions about the results, but Estrada managed to retain control of congress and avoid impeachment (Thompson 2010).

It is in the retention and stability of control, that the advantage of the traditional networks over populist mass appeal lies. The congress, courts, media, parties and business, all permanent fixtures of the political landscape in the Philippines, are dominated by the upper and middle class. Thompson argues these strata of society are instrumental to presidencies survival when faced with allegations of corruption (2014: 443). The People Power Revolution II against Estrada in 2001 has been linked with the countries elites, the return of the traditional parties (Thompson 2010: 23). The mass mobilization of poorer segments of Metro Manila against Arroyo, People Power III, was met with skepticism and resistance by the upper class, and ended in violence and failure (Thompson 2010).

5.4.2) Public Opinion Duterte has been known to make use of both populist and traditional strategies. Therefore, it is important that he remain popular. The relation between the Duterte administration and the civil society there are important elements, which contradict each other. It is well known that Duterte and his administration have very high popularity ratings. In the First Quarter 2018 Social Weather Survey, from March 23-27, 69% Filipinos were satisfied with the current administration. This is a drop of 10% from the 79% in December 2017 (Social Weather Station 2017a). In another survey from Social Weather Station it was found that 80% of the population trusts their President Duterte (Social Weather Station 2017b).

Yet Duterte’s high trust ratings on their own may offer a misleading perception of the public's perception of his policies. In a Pulse Asia survey from December 2016 it is found that 84% of Filipinos agrees with: “The Philippines government should assert its right on the West Philippine Sea as stipulated in the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration” (Pulse Asia 2016). This is in stark contrast to Duterte’s decision to set aside the ruling in order to obtain better relations with China. In the same survey, it is found that 76% of Filipinos trusted the U.S.. Only 38% trusted China. As Manhit argues: “The Philippines don’t trust China. The Philippine public never really trusted China. So here the President makes a big stand, but it contradicts what the public wants.” (Interview Manhit 2017: Brinkløv). Both Filipinos trusting China and trusting the U.S., believed that the Philippines should assert its rights in the West Philippine Sea. The affection for the U.S. and distrust towards China is in line with previous surveys and stand in contrast to Duterte’s repeated denunciation of the U.S. and his effort to embrace China. Duterte is trying to shape public opinion by praising China and demonizing the U.S. in the public (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv). “As much as Duterte does not want it to be an issue, there is also a certain red line he cannot cross. And Duterte knows this. The Philippine public will not tolerate him giving in to China. He is in a difficult situation with the resources in the WPS, the public done not want him to trade that away.” (Interview High ranking U.S. Embassy officer 2017: Brinkløv).

When putting the aforementioned numbers and facts in relation with each other it is found that the population is satisfied with Duterte and his administration. They are also satisfied with him approaching China to better the relation. But it is very clear, better relations with China

84 should not be at the expense of sovereignty in the WPS. There is a gulf between the president's foreign policy and the sentiment of the public toward the move away from the U.S. and closer ties with China, when looking at the different surveys. In relation to this Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Institute, diagnoses a schizophrenic reaction: “Most citizens like the idea of an iconoclastic outsider driven to reform Philippine politics and combat crime... but they consistently break with him on actual policy, including foreign policy and the war on drugs.” (Woody 2017). It has been suggested temporary drops in Duterte’s approval ratings in late 2017 were related to the recording of murder of minors by the police (Ramos 2017). Police brutality in the ‘War on Drugs’ has affected poorer segments of society disproportionately and the incident was followed by temporary suspension of certain anti-drug operations by the police (Lamb 2017; Talabong 2017). The war on drugs has also spawned a series of large protests supported by the Catholic church (Reuters 2018). The ‘War on Drugs’ as become a policy to exercise control over society. Alejano argues: "Duterte is using the war on drugs to control the people. We (the Filipinos) are used to freedom and protest and the freedom of speech. With the war on drugs, his objective is to sow fear to the people and opposition." (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv). Due to frictions between the state and society, the government’s strategy is to try and limit information coming to the public. This is done in order to establish a different status quo or norm, where the public is forced to accept the perspective of the government (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv).

Both Duterte’s foreign policy and the ‘War on Drugs’ are issues Filipinos disagree with Duterte on, but they show a clear preference of the government tending to domestic issues. In a survey from Pulse Asia, 2017, on Most Urgent National Concerns and Performance Ratings of the Duterte Administration only 6% of respondents indicated ‘defending the integrity of the Philippines’ territory against foreign threats’ is the most important issue. Amongst high ranking preference are improving wages, creating jobs, fighting criminality, and fighting corruption (Pulse Asia 2017). This reinforces the account given in the analysis of the Philippine’s strategic culture, there is a high preference for prioritizing domestic issues. This suggests the Filipino public is less likely to protest over foreign policy matters. Leaving the President free to disregard public opinion on foreign policy.

5.5) Domestic Institutions This chapter of the analysis discusses the influence of institutions on the foreign policy process in the Philippines. The institutional center of gravity in the Philippines is found in the presidency (Panao 2014). However, the presidency more than any other institution changes with the office holders, therefore it is discussed in terms of Duterte’s ability to manage institutions. Historically the presidency has depended on the military and the party system in a complex triangular relationship (Quimpo 2009; Chambers 2012). Institutions in the Philippines have been described as particularistic and can be beholden to certain factions.

The chapter begins by showing the military takes a keen interest in defense related foreign policy, e.g. the Philippine’s territorial disputes, and in some instances even has made foreign policy decisions (Chambers 2012:151). According to several authors the AFP has developed a culture of political involvement (Quilop 2010; Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Acedillo 2017: Brinkløv; Quimpo 2005; Chambers 2012). Yet it is bound to the administration in patronage networks. Certain actors within the officer class form coalitions with specific politicians, which prevent the majority of the regular coup attempts, but increase the military's ability to participate in politics (Abinales 2005; Quimpo 2005). It is argued that the symbiotic pairings of politicians and military officers not only limit the chances of a coup, but also restrict foreign policy options of incumbent politicians. Furthermore, the politicised military has also produced political incumbents. The military’s role as provider of government services in conflict fraught areas has allowed the military to compete with the party-based patronage systems, that dominate the countries politics (Chambers 2012). In conclusion it is argued that the military has a robust historical preference for the United States as security partner. Furthermore, it pursues a more aggressive posture towards Chinese activity in Philippine territories and will pressure the incumbent administration towards practicing such positions. Thus, the AFP limits the freedom of the executive to form foreign policy.

The second part of the chapter discusses the party system as institutionalized forum for elite competition. It is suggested that the Philippine party system and electoral process encourage clientelist and arguably predatory politics and minimize ideological and foreign policy concerns. As a result, much of the Philippine political elite does not develop high stakes in

86 foreign policy decisions. In the third part it is suggested Duterte has managed to limit the institutional checks and balances, through the pursuit of authoritarian politics of intimidation.

Figure 2.

5.5.1) The Armed Forces of the Philippines This section begins with a short outline of the historical development, function, and the foreign ties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Relevant interviews are used to establish the foreign policy preferences of the military. It then continues to explore the role of the military in Philippine government. However, due to the difficulty in showing direct influence on foreign policy, the relations with governments are used to show patterns of foreign policy influence of the armed forces. Finally, Duterte’s foreign policy goals and in areas within military interests are compared with the current state of events and contextualized with interviews in order to indicate the influence of the armed forces as intervening variable in the foreign policy process.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the United States Filipino auxiliaries had been used in Spanish and American campaigns, in particularly in the southern Philippines to conquer and repress Muslim majority territories. But the AFP were created by the American colonial administration in 1935 (Timberman 1991: 44). The AFP were modelled after and initially trained by the U.S. Army and thus subject to civilian oversight (Timberman 1991: 44). Soon the Philippines became involved in WWII and after independence as U.S. allies in Korea and Vietnam. However, most action the AFP have seen, has been due to insurgency and rebellion by the radical left in northern Luzon and Muslim separatists in southern Mindanao (Timberman 1991: 45,60,88-90). The traditional connection with the U.S. in the AFP was emphasized by Alejano who said: “In the armed forces we are oriented to the western doctrine. Most of our offices were trained in the U.S.. “… Aside from the organizational we have personal relations with the people from the U.S….”(Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv).

Despite the initially strong civilian oversight and little military tradition and prestige the AFP gradually managed to leverage two factors to insert itself into the political process. Among the checking mechanisms were the congressional confirmation process for certain ranks in the AFP (Timberman 1991; Chambers 2012; Quimpo 2009). Furthermore, the fact that politicians were mostly from the ranks of prominent, often landed, families, while the military promoted social mobility created inherent mutual suspicions between the two institutions inherited from class-based recruitment (Timberman 1991: 44). This also resulted in a tendency of the military to align with the president (Timberman 1991: 44). However, the military was increasingly made responsible for public services and infrastructure in where there were insurgents and remote and inaccessible areas. Custodio argues the role of the military in counterinsurgency has prevented modernization of the military hardware, appropriate to territorial defense scenario: “You don’t need jet-fighters to attack rebels, this is the prevailing perception…” (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv). According to David Timberman the frequent domestic activity normalized the presence of military personnel in civil matters to the population. But the military was also influenced, as Raymund Quilop writes, by change of military culture to one actively seeking involvement in government (1991:45,46; 2010:264). A tendency, which weakened the military’s martial capacity by integration into political cliques. Furthermore, Heydarian points to corruption as a problem that consumes means needed for reformation (Heydarian 2017a:225).

Such an internal focus was to some degree allowed by the 1947 Military Base agreement and the 1951 mutual defense treaty with the U.S., in which they guaranteed participation in defensive wars and thereby provided the Philippines external security. Furthermore, the expansion of the AFP’s non-military functions where aided by the U.S. in exchange for participation in the Vietnam war (Timberman 1991: 45). Direct U.S. military assistance accounted for up to 90% of AFP spending prior to the expiry of the Military Base Agreement in 1991 (Chambers 2012: 152). Yet in 1994 clashes with China at the Mischief Reef prompted the drafting of a visiting forces agreement with the U.S. under President and former general Ramos in 1998 in a clear attempt at balancing. The agreement reaffirms the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 and allows U.S. troops to stay in the Philippines (Governments of the USA and PH 1998). After 2001 U.S. troops became a near permanent presence in Mindanao, to aid the suppression of Islamist groups (Heydarian 2017b: 12-13). In 2012 a Chinese incursion on Scarborough Shoal provoked further Philippine balancing measures most importantly an arbitration under UNCLOS and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed 2014 (Eilperin 2014; Heydarian 2017b: 21). The EDCA allows the construction of shared facilities by U.S. forces, effectively restoring much of the strategic capacity the U.S. lost with the end of the Military Base Agreement and giving the AFP access to new infrastructure (Heydarian 2017b: 21). “Even within the general headquarter of the Philippine Armed Forces, there is a physical American presence… the U.S. can circumvent the president.” (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv).

Considering both the origin of the AFP in an American military tradition, the common wars, and the importance of U.S. funds had in the AFP’s maintenance, it is perhaps no surprise that there is a deep-seated allegiance to the U.S. alliance in the AFP (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Acedillo 2017: Brinkløv). The AFP have a longstanding tradition of using U.S. aid to balance internal and external threats. Prominent members of the AFP, such as former President Fidel Ramos, have sought closer relations with the U.S., and have used political clout to achieve them. The institutional avenues and connections, that enable the military to do so are discussed next.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines as Political Entity Another important development in Philippine politics that increased the institutional power and presence of the military, was the development of the traditional clientelist relations the parties maintained in to a predatory system centered in the presidency (Quimpo 2009). Philippine elections had long known and still know violence, including killings and paramilitary party organizations, and bribes as pressure strategies and even military involvement (Quimpo 2009; Timberman 1991: 45; Igarashi 2008: 98), yet the Marcos years presented some essential changes. Ferdinand Marcos, who had been president since 1965 announced martial law in 1972 and changed the constitution in 1973 in a bid to hold on to power.

After declaring martial law Marcos ordered the purge of party-militias and replaced great number of officials with active or retired military personnel (Chambers 2012: 145). In the period from 1972 to 1986 the manpower of the military more than doubled and the police, fire departments and other organizations came under military purview (Timberman 1991: 97). Marcos did this to ensure the military would have a stake in his administration, as Alejano puts it: “When you have the support of the armed forces, the opinion of the people doesn’t matter. Because then you can control the people.” (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv). The AFP’s capacity for military action on the other hand suffered great damage as a function of falling wages and deteriorating equipment, to a degree were insurgents both communist and Muslim, put severe strain on it (Timberman 1991; Chambers 2012). The military turned from an institution for organized large-scale conflict to one for social control. According to Paul Chambers the experience of the Ferdinand Marcos government under martial law from 1972 to 1981 created an attitude in the Philippine armed forces that holds it is the rightful place of the military to intervene in politics (2012). However, while higher ranking officers in Manila profited and increased their power, the local, younger officer confronted with the insurgencies grew increasingly discontent with their military impotence. Furthermore, Marcos had empowered family within the military and created resistance among the higher ranks as well.

When the results of the snap elections held by Marcos in 1986 triggered the People Power Revolution, the armed forces sided with Corazon Aquino and Marcos fled to the United States. It is important to note that within the AFP the People Power Revolution was held to be

90 public support for a military coup, rather than the other way around. In the process of reforms that followed the military was in a strengthened position, due to its support for the uprising. Many military officers, who had served under Marcos, continued their careers in professional politics, locally and nationally (Quilop 2010: 264,265; Chambers 2012; Abinales 2005: 36- 48; Timberman 1991: 152). The Philippine constitution re-written in 1987 attempted to wrest control of the military from the presidency, by making the armed forces “protector of the people” has ironically strengthened this tendency and may even have encouraged human rights abuses, such as the continued extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances (Quilop 2010: 272-273). Under the new constitution the AFP’s preference for the president over the congress has continued, Alejano argues the status of commander in chief results in a degree of deference within the military, as long as the president is perceived to act within the constitutional limitations (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv).

This elevated prestige of the AFP was converted into political leverage, opening a Pandora’s box of political “adventurism” (Quilop 2010: 268). AFP officers regularly withdrew support of the president in attempted coups only to be subsequently pardoned and continue their political careers. Colonel Gregorio Honasan for example failed in a 1987 coup attempt against Corazon Aquino (Timberman 1991: 153). He was later pardoned by President and former general Fidel Ramos, who had been Aquino’s secretary of national defense. After his pardon Honasan went on to become senator and then challenged Ramos’ endorsed candidate Rodrigo Duterte in the 2016 elections, only to chair several senate committees under Duterte, including National Defense and Security.

The consequence of the of the strength and impunity with which AFP officers can act in Philippine politics has been the formation of coalitions between military and party factions (Chambers 2012: 156). The military faction provides security from coups, while the political partners ensure congressional approval of promotions (Quilop 2010). Such a precarious situation can force a government to make concessions on foreign policy as well. Alejano even argues “Duterte needs the support of the armed forces because then he can disregard the opinion of the people.” (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv). Chambers claims that AFP deployment in Iraq 1991 and Cambodia 1992 as U.S. allies, was approved by chief of staff general Ramos, rather than president Corazon Aquino, who merely concurred (2012: 15).

Alejano, Acedillo and Custodio all argue the military has strong personal and institutional ties to the U.S. (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Acedillo 2017: Brinkløv; Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv). However, factions within the AFP share Duterte’s skepticism of the U.S., the current spokesperson for the AFP for example reported the U.S. had blamed the AFP for tensions in the WPS in the year of the Scarborough Shoal incident (Interview Alejano 2017: Brinkløv).

It can be said the AFP have developed effective tools to pressure the government within certain policy areas and has secured a large degree of autonomy from civilian oversight (Quilop 2010; Abinales 2005). Patricio Abinales contends it difficult for a Philippine government to escape such pressure, unless it has its own military tie, as was the case with Ramos (2012). Custodio argues the Philippine defense sector ignores Duterte’s statements as long no explicit orders are sent from the Malacañang Palace (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv). He continues: “Duterte is feeling his way with the military. … the military played along with Duterte, but they impose themselves when they see that it affects their interests.” (Interview Custodio 2017: Brinkløv). In conjunction with the AFP’s preferences on foreign policy, balancing and the U.S.-partnership, the military as intervening variable increases the expectation of balancing behavior by the Philippines.

5.5.2) The Parties This section argues that elite power and control of the state in the Philippines is channeled through the party system. Thus, strong party backing increases the policy freedom of the administration. However, dominance in the Philippine party system is not linked to the congressional elections, but rather the presidential elections, as the presidency controls the spoils of the state. Parties, except for the leftist Huk and Moro organizations, are found to be based on personalistic ties and facilitate the commitment of pooled monetary and martial resources in the electoral process and their extraction during government. While this mechanism is an iteration of the traditional clientelist structure, reciprocity implied in clientelism may no longer be given, even though it is rhetorically present (Quimpo 2009; Kawanaka 2001; Thompson 2010). It is then suggested that the control of state resources and electoral spoils combined with extractive priorities in elite politics result in severely weakened congressional opposition. Thus, parties have been liked too criminal organizations,

92 and function as tools of repression for the presidency and extraction for participating elites (Kawanaka 2001; Quimpo 2009). Core opposition may be found in strong personalities.

It is argued the Duterte administration has managed to capture the majority of congress due to the weakness of party cohesion in the absence of access to electoral spoils and has made efficient use of the parties and other means in repressing the strongest potential opposition candidates.

The Traditional Party The observation that the personalistic character of Philippine parties has been a defining feature since the Spanish colonial period, has led to the popularity of the derogatory term traditional political party or trapo (Quimpo 2009; Quimpo 2005; Thompson 2008). According to Gene Pilapil political institutions influence actor behavior through rules incentives and constraints (2006:94). Ultimately these sets of rules form both the strategic and time horizon within which actors consider their positions and make decisions and thus change the probability of certain outcomes. However, actors may also attempt to subvert institutional rules (Pilapil 2006: 94). Pilapil argues that valuable insights into the behavior of the Philippines in external arenas may be garnered from an analysis of political institutions (2006: 110). Yet, he criticizes the popular analysis of Philippine politics as neopatrimonial party system and thereby the trapo concept (2006: 110). Further criticism of the debate on “traditional politics” in the Philippines is offered by Reynaldo Ileto’s concern with orientalism, that originated in the study of political parties during the U.S. colonial era (2001). However, Philippine scholars have made recent use of the conceptualization of traditional political parties as institutionalized forms of clientelist, patrimonial or corrupt networks of power, in often critical studies (Quimpo 2005; Quimpo 2009; Quilop 2010; Panao 2014, Raquiza 2014; Arugay 2005). This account of parties is consistent with the post-election party switching behavior of incumbents and the corruption scandals that have surrounded the Estrada administration (1998-2001) and the Arroyo administration (2001-2010) (Quimpo 2009: 342-343).

Trapos are characterized by the absence of strong political programs apart from permanent conflicts that demand government responses, including the longstanding communist and Islamist insurgencies and the territorial conflict with the People’s Republic of China. Political parties have historically attempted to control all sectors of society, by integrating economic elites and the military, and suppressing media and even the judiciary. This includes former putschists, electoral competition, disgraced politicians and opposition leaders. In 2017 former President Gloria Arroyo joined Duterte’s PDP-Laban leaving her Lakas-Christian-Muslim Democrats (LCMD) without leadership (Yap 2017). Both allegations of avoiding the fallout of her corruption scandals and possible conflict with Duterte over her opposition to the PDP’s Death-Penalty Bill have been named as possible reasons (Cupin 2017). While parties in the Philippines do have institutional histories and memories, such as the suppression of the left- wing with U.S. support, the frequent party switching make party identity more dependent on the leadership.

While the extent of the New Society Movement (KBL) during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos can be regarded as most extreme iteration in the history of the Philippines, the modern-day system became visible after the presidency of Gloria Arroyo (2001-2010). While Arroyo’s party was engaged in an economic reform program, that yielded stable and high GDP growth it simultaneously gained control over state finances, that were used in widespread corruption (Chambers 2012). In order to suppress opposition party militias and government agencies were active under the veil of Human Security Act and the need to counteract several coup attempts. After the end of her term Arroyo was accused of plundering the state, involvement in illegal gambling, election rigging for the 2004 elections and 900 cases of extra-juridical killings and 180 disappearances among journalists and left-wing activists were documented (Quimpo 2009: 346). These accusations resemble the charges Estrada faced after his ouster in 2001. The functions of political parties in the Philippines can thus be summarized as the concentration of power around the central institution of the presidency, through legislation, party organization, co-optation of other movements, party militias and a function as financial hub.

5.5.3) Duterte and Institutional Control This section offers an overview of the new means, by which Duterte consolidates his political hold. It finds Duterte has made effective use of violence and intimidation in addition to the traditional means. This secures his foreign policy against international sanctions by stabilizing his domestic position.

In 2016 Rodrigo Duterte won a landslide victory 39% and a distance of 6.5 million votes to Leni Robredo of the liberal party (Inquirer 2016). Duterte’s Party the PDP-Laban on the other hand won only 3 out of 293 seats in the house of representatives and none of the 24 seats in the senate (Inquirer 2016; Rappler 2016b). The election was held on the ninth of May 2017 and already on the 18th of May 80 congressmen and women joined the PDP-Laban in an ultimately successful bid to replace preferred speaker of the house (Cayabyab 2018). As of May 2018, a total of 112 congressmen and women joined the PDP and 258 belong to the coalition around the PDP. Furthermore 3 senators joined the PDP-Laban and 17 of the 24 Senators joined the coalition. While this may seem unusual in the context of the PDP-Laban’s rhetorical emphasis on a distinct arty agenda, its right-wing position and the liberal majority, that joined, it follows the historical practice in the Philippine party landscape (Timberman 1991).

However, Duterte’s expanding control in other institutions is not confined by the example of previous administrations. Duterte has launched efforts to change the constitution (Corrales 2018a). The faction in the supreme court, favored by Duterte, succeeded in removing the critical chief justice Maria Sereno and commentators are worried about the disintegration of the division of power in the Philippines (Chikiamco 2018). Duterte had also ordered the fast- tracking of Sereno’s impeachment in congress, after calling her his enemy, strengthening the impression he requires personal loyalty, even where there should be none (Roxas 2018). Furthermore, he has suspended an ombudsman in an anti-corruption investigation into himself, despite a supreme court ruling, which denies the President the power to do so (Esmaquel II 2018).

The police force has since Duterte’s inauguration been carrying out a brutal ‘War on Drugs’ and increased the state's’ capacity for repression. Duterte has publicly demanded the death of addicts and dealers and admitted to having participated in death squad activities and promised to protect and reward police officers who killed ‘drug personalities’ (Singh 2017). The police own statistic, of December 2017 puts the number of killed at 3,967 and related homicides under investigation at 16,355(Romero 2017b). Human Rights Watch puts the number of killed at above 12,000 (HRW 2018). The distinction made by the police is disputed, because many cases are pinned on unidentified gunmen or after the police had the victim in custody (Kine 2017; HRW 2017). The recording of the execution of a 17 year old by the police sparked large protests in late 2017 and yet protests can be argued to have been muted, as fear spreads (Villamor 2018). Duterte’s offensive also extends to opposition politicians he names in speeches, including several majors, who were killed, one after he had surrendered himself (Hincks 2017). The police’ accounts of operations resulting in deaths have been challenged by senators Pangilinan, Trillanes, who has been charged with secession, and de Lima, who was arrested on drug charges (Hincks 2017; Torres-Tupas 2017; Lema 2017).

6) Endnote In the analysis it is shown, that Philippine foreign politics in the Duterte era have been marked by rapidly switching rhetoric towards both the PRC and the U.S.. Within the year 2018 Duterte has reversed his suspension of the ‘War on Drugs’, fired officials for corruption and protected others from the same allegation. One day he proclaims China the nations protector against external threats and the next he threatens war. Political elites and institutions show highly complex interests and a willingness to cooperate with and oppose his foreign policy at various junctions. The potluck character of the administration, makes it difficult to identify stable political blocks. The historical novelty of Duterte’s willingness to offend the U.S. increases the difficulty in determining the gravity of change, which has occurred. Considering these obstacles any estimate of the consequences must be qualified. Duterte’s political habitus disguises his motives for his ‘Independent Foreign Policy’. His behavior invokes the rhetoric of Donald Trump and an increase in politics rooted in personalized narratives of reality, that can be abused to shield authoritarian tendencies from public scrutiny, that can be seen in other countries as well. Other approaches to International Studies may offer different understandings of the phenomenon Duterte. Systemic realism, may offer an opportunity to dodge the question of perception, but lack the insight the domestic side of politics provides. A constructivist approach on the other hand may be able to untie the logic knots Duterte binds, but miss the greater picture. The conclusion reached within the neoclassical realist framework used here, may be limited by the number of variables considered necessary and the caveats of the case. These reflections should guide further research on the topic.

7) Conclusion The following section sums up the conclusions of the thesis and answers the question that is its point of departure. It begins by presenting the conclusions from the different sections of the analysis and then goes on to compress the findings into a main conclusion.

The thesis has considered both systemic and domestic factors in the analysis. In the initial phase of the analysis it is shown that the foreign policy of the Duterte administration is not the direct effect of systemic pressures coming from the regional changes and the balance of power between China and the U.S.. From a discussion of the systemic factors alone, a balancing policy may be expected of the Philippine government in order to shield the country from the territorial demands of the rising power with regional hegemonic ambitions, China.

In the first section it is concluded the Duterte administration can be described by the term “potluck” government. Especially, the defense secretary and the military are shown to prefer and promote a different foreign policy reliant on the traditional ties with the U.S.. Yet Duterte’s personal control of the government, strong believes, and rhetoric in favor of closer ties to China dominates the country’s political discourse. It is concluded these features of the personal images of leading Filipino foreign policy makers are symptomatic of elite dissension and cause Philippine foreign policy to be divided into incongruent rhetoric and practice.

In the second section on the strategic culture, it is concluded the Philippine elite traditionally relied on the U.S. for security from external threats, and thus was free to focus their attention on domestic politics. Consequently, it can be said the rhetorical foreign policy Manila currently promotes goes against the grain of the established strategic culture. Following the Cold War, the Philippines gained some distance to the U.S.. This trend was soon reversed by renewed cooperation, because of the challenge posed to Philippine security by new Chinese expansionism. While the reliance on the U.S. in the strategic thinking remains, Duterte has invest much political capital into changing this culture and aligning segments of the elite with his views. However, it remains to be seen if he can permanently change the strategic culture and establish a new consensus, that is more trusting of China and less dependent on the U.S..

It is concluded that there is a lack of consensus on whether or not the long standing strategic culture should be continued or be replaced with a shift towards China.

In the third section, it is concluded the relations between the Philippine state and society are defined by the class structure. The upper class competes for control of the state in elections and then uses the state as means for profit and suppression of the lower class. Due to recent economic changes that reduce the importance of tenant farms and created massed urban poor, populist appeal has become a viable alternative to the traditional clientelist competition in the elections. Thus the upper class was divided into the traditionalist faction and the populist faction in the 1990s. Duterte has developed the traditional and populist means of previous government into a new, more authoritarian form of control, most radically expressed in his “War on Drugs”. A policy that can be argued to reduce space for compromise. This has weakened social mobilization against his unpopular foreign policy positions, as society struggles with government sanctioned violence. Yet Duterte can be said to have been pressured to seek U.S. assistance by popular sentiment during the Marawi crisis, when U.S. troops played a key role. It is concluded there is a lack of consensus between the society and the government on the foreign policy. But due to the strong preference of prioritizing domestic issues, the government can discard the public opinion and conduct at policy of their choice.

Finally, the institutional structure of the Philippines is concluded to promote the “potluck” character of Philippine foreign policy and in the case of Duterte’s pro Chinese course change a split between rhetoric and practice. It is shown, a stable government typically requires an alliance of a strong leader, a political and a military faction. Due to the mutually dependent nature of the internal relations in these coalitions, the military is in a good position to enforce its foreign policy preferences where military matters are involved. The military’s institutional preference for a U.S.-alliance, may have played a defining role in paralyzing Duterte’s efforts to distance the Philippines from the U.S.. At the same time, the party system is focused on domestic factors, and thus less influential in the realm of foreign policy and Duterte has gained increasing control over other institutions. It can be concluded the dissensus on foreign policy in the Philippines originates in the difference between Duterte’s vision and the defense sector.

Considering these intervening variables, it is concluded Duterte’s non-traditional foreign policy preferences clash with systemic necessities and established doctrine in the Philippines. Duterte’s rhetoric is heard widely but many military practices of cooperation with the U.S. continue nonetheless. Thus, a lack of consensus is found amongst actors in all four intervening variables. Within the Duterte administration perceptions on the appropriate responses to the Chinese advances diverges between Duterte’s cooperation and Lorenzana’s balancing factions. The government rhetoric presents a radical break with the strategic culture, which traditionally positions the Philippines in the strategical orbit of the U.S.. The state represented by the Duterte government promotes a foreign policy ignoring the popular distrust of China and the military makes use of its institutional role to pursue goals different from those set out by the administration. As a result, neither the traditional balancing policy in regards to China’s threatening behavior, nor the economic bandwagoning envisioned by Duterte are fully implemented. Philippine policy is bound to non-balancing. Hence the lack of consensus between Duterte and other foreign policy actors is concluded to have caused the switch from balancing to non-balancing.

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Interviews: • Acedillo 2017: Brinkløv - Francisco A. Acedillo, former representative of the Magdalo Partylist and former Air Force Pilot • Alejano 2017: Brinkløv - Gary Alejano, Representative of the Magdalo Partylist and former Marine Officer • Anonymous Philippine Advisor 2017: Brinkløv - Confidential • Batongbacal 2017: Brinkløv - Professor Jay L. Batongbacal, Director of the University of the Philippines Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea • Baviera 2017: Brinkløv - Professor Aileen Baviera, University of the Philippines Diliman • Carpio 2017: Brinkløv - Antonio Carpio, Supreme Justices of the Philippines • Custodio 2017: Brinkløv - Jose A. Custodio, Defense strategy analyst, Institute for Policy, Strategy and Developmental Studies INC. • Dureza 2017: Brinkløv - Jesus G. Dureza, Presidential Peace Advisor • Emmers 2017: Brinkløv - Doctor Ralf Emmers, Professor of International Relations and Associate Dean, RSIS; Head of Centre for Multilateralism Studies • High ranking member of government 2017: Brinkløv - Confidential • High ranking U.S. Embassy officer 2017: Brinkløv - Confidential • Manhit 2017: Brinkløv - Victor A. Manhit, President Stratbase and ADR Institute • Rabena 2017: Brinkløv - Aaron J. Rabena, Program Convenor at Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress, Associate Fellow at Philippine Council for Foreign Relations (PCFR), and Resident Fellow at Ateneo Teehankee Center for the Rule of Law.

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