Foreign Policy Institute

Dı ş Politika – Foreign Policy Institute

DIŞ POLİTİKA - FOREIGN POLICY A Quarterly of the Foreign Policy Institute

Vol. XXXIV 2008 Nos. 3-4

Year-End Notes For 2008 3 Towards a new conjuncture in the international scene 3 2008:Turkey and EU: Towards a "Make or Break" Year 7 EU General Affairs Council Act in Support of Unjust Greek Demands 13 Turkey's Southern and Eastern Neighborhood 17 The International System at crossroads? 23 Turkey-European Union Relations in the Context of Identity Debate 33 NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ONGOING DEBATE 64 The Turkish Policy of Opening up to Africa 100 Address by Ambassador Nedzad Hadzimusic, Director of RACVIAC 115 Turkish-Russian Roundtable 130 Middle East 130 Turkey’s Policy towards Iraq in the post-Saddam era 130 Russia and Iranian Nuclear program 144 Palestine - Israel 159 Turkish-Russian cooperation in Eurasia 162 Energy Politics 165 Energy Issues 165 Turkish-Russian energy cooperation: are there many prospects? 176 Turkey and Russia: Global Security Issues 185 Points of Convergence and Divergence in Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies 185 Global Political Challenges: Concurrence and Divergences in Russian and Turkish Foreign Policy Strategies 192 Diverging point in foreign policies of Turkey and Russia: Cyprus 215

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Year-End Notes For 2008

While international conjuncture has changed (Re şat Arım), Turkey's EU relations have soured (Seyfi Ta şhan), Turkey's relations with her neighbors are on a promising rise (Oktay Aksoy)

Towards a new conjuncture in the international scene

Re şat Arım

In 2008 we have witnessed major happening in the World. First came the events in Georgia, then the financial crisis enveloping every region of the globe.

When in August Georgia tried to establish control over parts of South Ossetia, which has been under separatist rule since early 1990's, Russian troops entered the disputed region. A Georgia- Russian War followed. Russian troops occupied many parts of Georgia. UN Security Council debated but could not adopt any resolution to stop the fighting. It was up to the EU Presidency held by France to act to secure a cease-fire. Washington has denounced the Russian "aggression" against a sovereign nation. NATO Foreign Ministers called on Russia to immediately take its troops out of Georgia. EU was divided between those countries who want a strong response and those who support a moderate position. Russia

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finally recognized the independence of Abhazia and South Ossetia.

This conflict represents a new phase in the post-Soviet era. The Russians aim to stop the NATO expansion to the East. They were also against the independence of Kosovo and already had said that it would have consequences notably in the Caucasus. They objected forcefully to the installation of US missiles and radars in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The financial and economic crisis that started in the US has taken global dimensions. To curb the negative effects, the first major imitative was taken during the G-7 meeting in October 2008. It was followed by the Eurogroup meeting and then by the European Council meeting. Finally, the G-20 met on the invitation of the US president and set in motion a process to be reviewed in March 2009.We can deduce from that decision that the international economic system may undergo changes that will also be reflected in changes in the geopolitical situation.

China is emerging as a World Power with its economic growth and big foreign currency earnings. The global economic crisis made the west turn to China. But, also China needs the Western powers, first among them the US. It needs them as a market for its product, but also for their technology, let alone their investments. China's economy reached the present level thanks to investments coming from all over the world since 1980 to The Special Economic Zones where fantastic incentives were provided to foreign firms. China

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would most probably follow the trade policy which made it possible to become a rich country.

Russia because of the rising oil prices in the last few years obtained big revenues and this made Russia more assertive. President Putin last year denounced the unipoliar system where the US was the dominant power. This year President Medvedev proposed a Euro- Atlantic security system. It can be said that Europe's dependence on Russian gas has made many European countries more vulnerable in the face of Russian openings. We will see what will be the reaction of the new American administration to such Russian moves.

The year 2008 has seen Iraq in a rather different picture compared with previous years since 2003. The "surge" has had positive results. This enabled the US to negotiate two agreements with Iraq that would have important consequences for that country and for the region. US official stated that neither agreement will tie the hands of the next administration. We already know that the President Obama had promised to withdraw the US military. To understand how this withdrawal will be made, it will be useful to look at the basic elements of the two agreements. One of them is SOFA (Agreement between the US and the Republic of Iraq on the withdrawal of US Force from Iraq and the organization of their activities during their Temporary Presence in Iraq). Article 4 says that the government of Iraq requests the temporary assistance of US Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its efforts to maintain security and

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stability in the country including cooperation in the conduct of operations against Al-Quaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups and remnants of the former regime. Article 24 says US Forces will withdraw no later than Dec 31, 2011 from Iraq and no later than June 30, 2009 from Iraqi cities. The other one is the Strategic Framework and security Agreement signed in Baghdad on 14 December, 2008 by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki. It is reported that this Second Agreement talks about the US role in defending Iraq from internal and external threats; US support for political reconciliation; US efforts to confront terrorist groups. It has also been declared that the agreements will not establish permanent bases in Iraq. We can conclude that the US � Iraq agreements make it possible for the US to withdraw with honor.

All the above point to the beginning of a new conjuncture in the international scene. The previous conjuncture started with the terror attacks of September 11,2001 on the United States. Iraq was the main focus of attention. We will see how the new conjuncture develops. For the time being, we can only analyze its effects on the major players in the World.

(17 December,2008 - Re şat Arım)

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2008:Turkey and EU: Towards a "Make or Break" Year

Seyfi Ta şhan

In reviewing Turkey's foreign policy decisions and implementations it is not difficult to observe that the prominent position that Western Europe and the United States occupied in these relations have entered into a period of stagnation and some retardation. It would not be to appropriate to apportion responsibility for this retardation to either Western Europe, the United states or Turkey as all of them have not spent any special effort to enliven and upgrade their cooperation. At a time when the international scene is taking a new shape with a change of government and policies in the United States, as Russia is reassuming an assertiveness not only in its over circumference but also globally and as developing new power centers are emerging in Asia, we hope that this retardation may not be the harbinger for Turkey of a new search of international identity. In order to understand fully the current picture one must first of all assess the impact of national interests on the character of these relations. I would like to begin with relations EU and some of its major member states:

When the Ankara Agreement of Association was signed in 1963 the then EEC countries that were Turkey's allies in the Cold War considered Turkey as an indispensable security partner and were

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willing to join their destiny with her. Hence the Agreement contained all the elements of an auspicious process that was supplemented with benchmarks of integration incorporated in the Additional Protocol of 1973. But immediately after this Protocol came into force, changes in the international conditions led Turkey and EEC countries to look at each other in different perspectives: The beginnings of the détente led strategists of several member states to debate the value of alliance with Turkey from a perspective of suspicion or reduced value. Oil crisis of 1973 and ensuing economic stagnation and unemployment in Europe caused unease about the large numbers of Turkish families who by then had become settled communities in West European countries. Souring of Turkey's relations with the West became tangible with the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Until then most EEC countries and US were either neutral or stayed aloof to the Turkish Greek disputes and on the problem of Cyprus. With the demise of the Greek Junta, the European powers embraced Greece and within a period seven years of substantial assistance and guidance, Greece became a member of the European Community in 1981. Western neutrality in Turkish Greek relations had now terminated and limits of Turkey' relations with EU would from then on be subject to Greek supervision and would develop only in the measure to be approved by Greece. At that time Turkey had become a socially divided country between extreme left and extreme right and those who wanted to renounce Turkey's European identity. While some wanted Turkey to become a Third World while others were talking

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about hard and dry ethnic nationalism. Turkey in the international scene maintained its faithful membership of NATO but in practice had become a country in the margins of Western Europe, Soviet bloc, and Middle East. In 1980's the liberal economic model also found its reflection in Turkey's international relations leading to an increase in Turkey's contacts with its wide neighborhood. By 1992 Turkey had moved from a status of marginality to one of centrality in its region. This development also impacted Turkey's relations with the European Union and the improvement of its neighborhood policies.

Reviewing the relations between Turkey and Western Europe at the end of 2008 my desire was to be able to comment on solid positive developments in Turkey and in Western European countries that would facilitate Turkey's integratio n in the European Union systems. Unfortunately, I am not in a position to do so as the progress that marked early years of the century seem to have grinded to a halt, even though, on the surface as new chapters are being opened for negotiations; we have a working customs union; Turkey and EU countries are cooperating to keep peace in many countries where their help are needed, there are talk about energy cooperation and pipelines, some EU economic assistance to projects in Turkey; Turkey has joined in the measure of 95% in foreign policy declarations issued by EU and EU Commission publishes progress reports that Turkish authorities find “balanced'. On their part in this picture of contacts between Turkish and EU authorities are

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continuing to give the impression that the situation is normal. What is then the true picture that has been worrying those who believe in a common future for a genuine partnership and integration between EU countries of Europe and Turkey?

As far as the EU is concerned since 1999 the name of the game is "playing for time" or "wait and see" without causing a serious break down with limited progress; and as far as Turkey is concerned it is "let us try, may be we can get in if we implement all European norms." Let me expand:

When EU decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey the accession partnership document brought into being several catch conditions such as "negotiations will be open ended"; "free circulation of man power may be "suspended permanently"; by the end of the ye ar 10 chapters would have been opened but there seems to be no chance for their closure, 8 chapters cannot be opened because Turkey refuses to recognize the Greek administration in Cyprus as the Government of Cyprus and EU cannot fulfill its promises to the people of Northern Cyprus, four chapters cannot be opened because the France objects to their opening arguing that these chapters relate to full membership. Yet, the Accession strategy paper reiterates that Turkey should be firmly "anchored in Europe".

The prospects of membership that enchanted the people of Turkey and the beginning of negotiations became a fundamental incentive for the Turkish authorities, politicians, and the public for carrying

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out significant reforms not only in the domain of human rights but also in government structures. However, if there was an initial euphoria it disappeared swiftly after Mrs. Merkel who is firmly opposed to Turkey's membership and Mr. Sarkozy who considered Turkey an Asiatic country came to power. Despite the fact that many EU member states discreetly supported Turkey's membership public polls showed that support for in the EU had fallen substantially. The reforms needed for membership in EU were also reforms needed to turn Turkey into a modern democratic society; yet, the public perception of EU membership as a will o' the wisp also reduced the zeal for carrying out reforms. This reduced perception led to a paling in Turkey's European identity. Although the Turkish state is a secular one, the visibility of Islam has become so wide spread that both inside and outside Turkey, this country is no longer considered as secular in its broader sense. This trend has even led the leftist opposition to accept in its ranks women members dressed in Islamic fashion. In foreign policy Turkey has become more active in the affairs of Middle East and the Caucasus regions; European affairs are in the backburner, with little public interest.

From these state of affairs an unfortunate conclusion emerges: Progress in Turkish democratic institutions can be achieved in the measure Turkey integrates itself in the European systems; reluctance of European states and public to have Turkey as a genuine partner creates a back-lash in the form reduced reform and leads to a search for a different identity in Turkey, so much so that one European

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journal calls the present situation and policies in Turkey as "new Ottomanism".

This is not a situation that would be acceptable for those who would like to see Turkey firmly anchored in Europe. But, regrettably neither Turkish nor European interlocutors are aware of the consequences of this growing estrangement. If this trend does not change, I am afraid; we may witness a worsening in relation patterns between Turkey and EU countries. Furthermore, because of membership solidarity EU continues to support Cypriote and Greek demands and policies against Turkey. Along with genuine reform demands EU's progress reports include political demands on highly sensitive issues on which Turkey for historic and security reasons cannot act. These become points of irritation because Turkey's unchanging attitude is clear to all. For example, present governments in Turkey cannot act unilaterally concerning the recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration as the Government of Cyprus. There are several other similar demands. Although negotiations are continuing in Cyprus between the leaders of the two communities, the behavior of the Greek leader both during the negotiations and also outside trying to brig Turkey into the picture; his signing of memoranda of understanding with countries like UK and Russia without consulting his Turkish partner in the bland and starting unilaterally oil explorations give little hope for a fair solution in 2009.

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Whatever happens, it may not be possible to maintain the waiting game much further and 2009 may be a decisive year. Either both EU and Turkey will increase their integration efforts in a more constructive pattern or estrangement may become a permanent feature of relations.

(17 December, 2008- Seyfi Ta şhan)

EU General Affairs Council Act in Support of Unjust Greek Demands

Seyfi Ta şhan

General Affairs Council of the European Union has adopted a number of decisions concerning negotiations with Turkey in its meeting on December 8th. These decisions reflect a definite attitude clearly subjecting Turkish-EU relations to Turkey's catering for

Greek pleasure on all points of disputes between Turkey and Greece and Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Let us see some these points and assess their applicability:

1. "...Council repeats that Turkey needs to commit

unequivocally to good neighborly relation and the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, having recourse, if necessary to International Court

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of Justice. In this context, the Union urges the avoidance of any kind of threat, source of friction or action which could damage good neighborly relation and peaceful settlement of disputes."

This item obviously refers to Turkish Greek disputes in the Aegean and reflects what Greece has been asserting since many years. The Greek assertion is that “there is only one dispute in the Aegean and that is the delimitation of the Continental Shelf. For the solution of this problem we may go the ICJ...” Greece refuses to go to arbitration on all other points of dispute in the Aegean which are interlocked with the question of delimitation of the continental shelf. For example, Greece claims that it has the right to extend its territorial waters from current six mile limit to twelve miles. When this expansion is applied to the islands and islets in the Aegean there will be no continental shelf left for Turkey to be decided by ICJ. The Decree for this extension is awaiting the signature of the Greek President. Only Turkey's warnings about the consequences of such an extension has persuaded Greece to withhold the Presidential signature for a while. There are also other issues for which Greece refuses to go to ICJ: Although the Lausanne Peace Treaty signed in 1923 and Paris Treaty signed in 1945 f oresees that the Greek islands very closely situated to Turkish shores must remain demilitarized, Greece has militarized these islands creating a hostile atmosphere in this sea of peace. There are other problems such as ten mile unilateral air space, etc. for which Greece refuses to go to

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arbitration. In 1995 the then Turkish Prime Minister proposed to Greece to go to international arbitration for the solution of all these problems in a peaceful way and this was refused by Greece. Therefore, this paragraph included in the conclusions of the General Affairs Council may at best be interpreted as an attempt by EU to pressure Turkey for conceding to Greek demands.

In another paragraph General Affairs Council concludes:

"�..the Council notes with regret that Turkey has not yet fulfilled its obligation of full non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and has not made progress towards normalization of its relations with the Re public of

Cyprus �"

As far as EU is concerned Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol have become a la carte menus. Notably EU refuses to implement Articles 36 (free circulation of labor), Article 41 free circulation of services and the Financial Protocol. Until the Turkey's membership status is clarified our relations are based on the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol. Turkey has shown great understanding to the economic problems faced by the EEC in connection with unemployment and has not made an issue of their reluctance to implement the above mentioned articles nor Turkey has thought of bringing up these issues for Arbitration under

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Article 25 of the Ankara Agreement.

Everyone knows that there have been armed clashes between Turkish and Greek Cypriots during Turkey's military intervention in the Island and a settlement has been refused by Greek Cypriots as late as 2004. Greeks have usurped the Republic of Cyprus in violation of the constitution of the Island and the Treaties that established the Republic. Until there is a solution in the Island and a Republic is founded on basis of political equality of the two communities it would not be fare to expect Turkey to recognize the current administration in Southern Cyprus as the legitimate Republic of Cyprus.

Being aware of the above mentioned disparities one cannot understand why EU General Affairs Council should insist on demanding a political price from Turkey in favor of Greece and Greek Cypriots. The reason may be membership solidarity at best or forcing Turkey to distance itself from European Union at worst-both are unfair.

(17 December,2008-Seyfi Ta şhan)

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Turkey's Southern and Eastern Neighborhood

Oktay Aksoy

Turkey has pursued its foreign policy since the establishment of the

Republic in line with Atatürk's dictum “Peace at Home, Peace in the

World.” 2008 has also witnessed advancement of the principle of

“no problems with neighbors for Turkey.” Within the proximity of its historic geography it has increased contacts, increased its trade and has developed relations to the benefit of the region which still suffers from instability and insecurity.

With Syria development of relations have become an exemplary as dialogue to overcome bilateral problems have been successfully pursued and mutual steps have been taken for the realization of the projects envisaged in the Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between the two countries signed the year before by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as well as those encouraged with the coming into force of the Free Trade Agreement.

In this context, continued collaboration in the fight against terrorism, increased investments, acceleration of the work on the Arab Natural Gas Pipeline, deepening of cooperation between the Turkish Petroleum Corporation and the Syrian Oil Company, enhanced dialogue on the cross border water issues and other

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problems of mutual interest need to be mentioned.

Moreover, cooperation between the two countries have also contributed in the establishment of regional peace and stability. Consultations on developments in Iraq and Lebanon, and on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have no doubt been to the benefit of the international community.

The facilitator role played by Turkey has brought delegations from Syria and Israel to start proximity talks on the future of the Golan Heights. Initially many observers were skeptical about the results this might produce. However, despite the difficulties remaining before a final solution, this has been the only means to handle a most delicate problem. The success of the process seems to have been envied by many and seems to hav e even instigated the EU term President France to try to takeover the role of the mediator without much success. The important factor here was that the parties to the conflict had confided in Turkey which had good relations with both and had remained equidistant.

The same is true with Turkey's efforts for the realization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which lies beneath the many problems in the Middle East, as Turkey believes that dialogue and cooperation must be the major tools to bring about the desired peace, security and stability in the region. Turkey not only supported the Annapolis process, which has so far been stalled, but has also tried to establish an industrial zone first at the Erez check point with Gaza Strip and

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than in Tarqumia, West Bank in order to assist in the creation of jobs for Palestinians, drawing investments to the region and hence for the amelioration of economic and social situation of the Palestinians, as well as in the development of the regional economy in the medium and long term. This was hoped to contribute to the confidence building measures to facilitate the restoration of confidence between Israel and Palestine.

Turkey's energy needs and its objective to become the energy hub in the region compels it to further develop its relations with its neighbors to the East. With Azerbaijan its relations have always been very close and Turkey's new initiative to establish a Platform for Peace and Stability in the Southern Caucasus may even serve as a necessary instrument for furt hering their cooperation in the region. Further to the East, beyond the Caspian, relations with Turkmenistan have been revitalized with its new President Berdimuhammedov. However, as Turkmenistan has tied most of its gas reserves with Russia and the continental shelf dispute in the Caspian remains unresolved, not much progress could be achieved in the field of energy until new fields are explored.

Iran remains to be a country of concern for the international community because of its nuclear ambitions. In that respect Turkey advocates a diplomatic solution to this problem, suspension of uranium enrichment activities and full compliance with the strict IAEA inspection rules. Despite its military power and capabilities,

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as well as it NATO membership, Turkey may be compelled to consider also to strengthen its defense capabilities. However, with a new President in the US and a Presidential election in Iran in mid 2009, some policy changes may be expected to reduce the existing tension to the relief of many in the region. On the other hand, bilateral relations with Iran are expanding. Visit of the President of Iran to Turkey was an important indication. Many agreements have been signed for cooperation in the field of energy and even joint ventures for the exploration of new gas fields are envisaged. However, all these intended cooperation remain to be a hostage to the US Congress imposed regulations on economic relations with Iran.

The energy routes and major developments in the region make the Black Sea most important for Turkey. In this region where Turkey has initiated the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization including states around and within the proximity of the Black Sea and later the formation of BLACKSEAFOR which includes only the littoral states, it has always encouraged regional cooperation in all fields which would produce peace and stability. However, at times of tension in the region, even when it is not directly involved, it feels the pulse even more than most of the other states in the region which makes it difficult for it to play the balancing role it wishes to do.

Therefore, in order to resist pressures of any kind, it has become

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vital for Turkey that the rules of the Montreaux Convention are strictly observed.

As for relations with Armenia, there still remain difficulties. While Turkey has recognized the independence of Armenia as early as 16 December 1991 and in view of difficult economic conditions it encountered after independence Turkey had not only sent humanitarian aid but had also signed an agreement with Armenia to facilitate the transit of EU assistance through its territory.

Turkey had also invited Armenia to join the BSEC. However, aggression and ill-disposed policies pursued by Armenia towards its neighbors, continuing occupation of substantial parts of Azerbaijan, disregard of UN Security Council resolutions have prevented Turkey to establish diplomatic relations. So far Turkey has made many attempts. Turkey believes in the necessity to continue the process of dialogue by engaging Armenia and is willing to normalize its relations.

The many rounds of talks have not produced satisfactory results. Meanwhile the Armenian diaspora has not played any positive role. However, following the election of Serge Sarkisian to the Presidency this year a new initiative was taken and benefiting from an invitation by the Armenian President to attend the national football match in Yerevan, the Turkish President visited Armenia and on the side of this visit talks were held. Also the Foreign Ministers of the two countries held lengthy discussions during that

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visit and later during the UN General Assembly and the OSCE Ministerial meetings to normalize relations and have started a process with inclusion of the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan to help the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict existing between Armenia and Azerbaijan which has been poisoning relations among the three countries.

(24 December,2008 - Oktay Aksoy)

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The International System at crossroads?

Re şat Arım

At the beginning of 2009 we are faced with so many important developments that we ask ourselves whether the International System is really at crossroads. In this article we will look at these developments and try to find the answer to the question that is in the minds of analysts all over the world.

1. The Economic Crisis: The financial crisis originating in the United States enveloped the entire globe.

The crisis that erupted in the financial markets had two faces. As far as the economics was concerned measures were taken to curb the negative effects. The major initiative was taken during the G-7 meeting held on 11 October when the IMF and World Bank Ministers and Central Bank Presidents were having their annual meeting in Washington. The G-7 officials discussed the global economic crisis and issued one of the shortest communiqués in the history of the group. It pledged to take “all necessary steps to unfreeze credit and money markets” to end the crisis. They presented a five-point "Plan of Action" to arrest the turmoil, including, most significantly a promise to "ensure that our banks…can raise capital from public as well as

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private sources, in sufficient amounts to re-establish confidence and permit them to continue lending to households and businesses." 1

In Europe the Euro area countries met on October 12 and adopted a concerted Action Plan. The plan was to ensure appropriate liquidity conditions for financial institutions; to facilitate the funding of banks which is currently too constrained to provide financial institutions with additional capital resources so as to continue to ensure the proper functioning of the economy; to allow for an efficient recapitalization of distressed banks; to ensure sufficient flexibility in the implementation of accounting rules given current exceptional market circumstances; to enhance cooperation among European countries.

That was followed by the European Council Meeting on 15 and 16 October. It decided that in a context dominated by the international economic and financial crisis, it marked its unity by expressing its resolution to act in a concerted and global way to stabilize the European financial system and protect depositors, thus confirming the principles adopted at the Eurogroup summit a few days earlier. The council also approved the initiative of its president to work with the international partners towards a reform of the international financial system and a new world governance. In this context, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission would meet with the President of the US.

1 Telegraph.co.uk,11 October 2008

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The results of these measures were going to be obtained in the medium and longer term. In fact as we will see in the following paragraphs, as the crisis continued and deepened many more meetings would be held on the same subject. But its implications on the international political system started to be felt immediately. Observers in the major centers evaluated the consequences. First, in the US. A Professor of International Political Economy, Francis Fukuyama, is referring to the conjuncture when he says that “Big ideas are born in the context of a particular historical era few survive when the context changes dramatically”. He says that there are two fundamentally American ideas that dominated global thinking since the early 1980’s when Reagan was elected President: capitalism and liberal democracy. Asian financial crisis came about when the capital markets were liberalized in some countries over there.The Bush administration used democracy to justify the war in Iraq and suggested to many that “democracy” was a code word for military intervention and regime change.” “Globally the US will not enjoy the hegemonic position it has occupied until now.” 2

The financial crisis made more apparent the deficiencies in the European politics. The Economist article talks about the moral authority which is absent in the West, but in essence it is an accusation of Europe. It says the West has no money to play geopolitic with, as Iceland’s meltdown and panicky approach to Russia shows. 3 The

2 Prof. Francis Fukuyama, The Fall of America, Inc., The Newsweek, Oct.13,2008 3 Moral Authority, Needed and Absent, the Economist, 9 Oct.2008

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turbulence in EU capitals came following a desperate attempt by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his guests at an emergency mini-summit to boost confidence in the European financial markets. An EU-wide response to the crisis however was rejected - apart from "co-ordination" between countries, with moves to be left to member states themselves. "We have taken a solemn vow as chiefs of state and government to support banks and financial entities to face the crisis. Every government will use its own system for that, but in co- ordination with other member states," Sarkozy told journalists after a three-hour debate. "The main message of today is that liquidity will be assured with a view to restoring confidence," said Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg's premier and finance minister, also invited to the meeting as the chair of the Eurogroup, a gathering of Eurozone finance ministers. The mini-summit agreed on a list of initiatives that the four countries will present to other EU member states at a meeting of the bloc's finance ministers on Tuesday (7 October), and to their partners in the G8 club of world's leading industrial nations meeting in Washington on Friday (10 October).The list confirms their support for a change in accounting standards and rules governing rating agencies, sanctions for executives of failing banks as well as more flexibility for member states in meeting the budgetary criteria included in the EU's stability and growth pact.

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However, the Paris meeting made no hint of a possible Europe's version of a bail-out plan for the financial sector similar to the $700 billion package adopted by the US House of Representatives. 4 EU Council could only take a decision on 7 October when it said that a coordinated response at the European level was necessary. 5

Where do we stand as far as the economic crisis is concerned? We can say that the overall picture is bleak. The subprime mortgage crisis in the US gave way first to the economic crisis in that country; that resulted in recession in both the developed and emerging markets; liquidity crisis everywhere, unemployment all around, bail-outs, etc. Finally, it became apparent that G-7 and G-8 meetings would not be able to solve this global phenomenon. Therefore, the world needed a Summit of the G-20 to stabilize the financial system. On 15 November the leaders of 20 countries adopted the Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy In the Declaration they said they discussed the following: the Root Causes of the Current Crisis, the Actions Taken and to be Taken :Common Principles for Reform of Financial Markets. They also asked the Finance Ministers to complete the high priority actions prior to March 31. They decided to meet again by April 30, 2009 to review the situation.

4 EU Observer.com, Lucia Kubosova, Oct 6 2008 5 Council Conclusions on the financial stability and financial supervision.

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2. The Obama factor The presidential elections in the United States always impact the International System. This time, the financial crisis had its immediate result in the internal American politics and like a wave carried Obama to the White House. Already the Democrats advanced and captured the majority in the House. There are many signals that the Obama Administration will focus on a multifaceted foreign policy. One such signal was given by an Obama supporter like Zbıgniew Brzezinski. 6 He says that “in the foreseeable future no state or combination as states can replace the linchpin role America plays in the international system”. Therefore, he suggests the following concepts to be used with the wider World: to enlarge, to engage, to pacify. Indeed, the European countries are looking forward to the first steps that Obama will take. 7 Given the fact that there has been such a divergence in transatlantic relations, it will be interesting to see on how many issues they are going to agree with the new American Administration. Mrs. Clinton, the designated Secretary of State also gave some indications as how the Obama Administration will handle foreign affairs. During the hearing at the Senate she said would put diplomacy front and center in the Obama administration. 8

3.Iraq

6 Zbigniew, Brzezinski, The Global Political Awakening, International Herald Tribune,16 December, 2008 7 Europe is ready to work with Obama, by Thom Shanker and Helene Cooper, International Herald Tribune, January 4, 2009 8 Clinton pledges tough diplomacy and a fast start, International Herald Tribune, 14 January, 2009

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Already there are many signals pointing to the beginning of the end in Iraq. Democrats gaining the majority in the House and the Senate last year was a major turning point. President Bush’s decision for a “surge” by sending additional troops had an impact on improving the situation. There was a general consensus that General Petreus did a good job. This allowed the US Government to negotiate agreements with the Iraqi Government with an end to the occupation. One of the agreements was SOFA talking about the withdrawal of US Forces in 2011.Thne other one was a Security Agreement finalized and signed during President Bush’s visit to Baghdad in December 2008. So the stage was set. The Iraqi government and Parliament were happy to declare that the sovereignty now belonged to the Iraqis. But the question remains

But the question remains: what the elections in Iraq in 2009 will bring? Iraq may hold as many as 10 elections in 2009. t hey will provide an answer to the future of Iraq. Some people believe that the questions can be summed up in the following way. Can Iraq break free of paralyzing sectarianism? Will local authorities secure more independence from Baghdad? Can Iraq avoid a Sarajevo-like clash over Kirkuk? 9

Here, we can have a look at the studies made concerning the future of Iraq. At the outset, we should point out that Turkey since the beginning has been advocating and working for the unity of Iraq.

9 Iraq’s Year of Choices, J.Scott Carpenter, The Washington Post, December 23, 2009

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On the general picture, we should see what the Americans think. In the United States a bi-partisan group led by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, after having intensive consultations during a whole year, published the Iraq Study Group Report in November 2006: ”The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.” Then, it made two basic recommendations: 1) new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region” 2) “a change in the primary mission of the US Forces in Iraq that will enable the US to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.”

When we come to specific problems, Kirkuk question is a burning issue. The International Crisis Group has published a Report on the subject on 19 April, 2007.It made several recommendations to the interested parties. To the U.S. Government the Group recommended to f ormulate and implement with full diplomatic and financial support a proactive strategy on Kirkuk that will enable a peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue and consensus building; to promise to protect the Kurdish region in exchange for the Kurdistan Regional Government’s agreement to abandon, or at least postpone, its referendum bid; to continue to push the Baghdad government, the Kurdistan Regional Government and the various political parties toward a compromise oil-revenue-sharing law

4. War in South Caucasus: Georgia

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The “frozen conflicts” in Georgia have been defrosted with a war in the summer of 2008. South Ossetia and Abhazia which have been at war with Georgia after the break-up of the Soviet Union and which have declared their independence in 1992, were considered breakaway provinces in Georgia. Georgia has the support of the West, whereas the breakaway provinces have the backing of Russia. The Baku- Tbilissi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is circumventing Russia. The railway between Turkey-Azerbaijan and Georgia also comes to add to the linkage of Georgia with the Western countries. Russian influence with the two provinces had many ramifications. It should also be noted that when the Western countries recognized Kosovo’s independence, Russia had declared that its reaction would come in the Caucasus. One would expect a small crisis in South Caucasus, but not an all-out war. So, when Russia intervened militarily in Georgia as a reaction to President Saakashvili’s action in South Ossetia, in many circles the question was asked whether we were confronted with a new Cold War. Of course the United States strongly reacted to the Russia move. But it was President Sarkozy who in his capacity of the rotating President of the European Union, brokered the cease-fire between Russia and Georgia. He traveled to the region and submitted a 6 point plan to the two sides. That was something to be expected, since Georgia was included in the neighborhood Policy of the European Union. But EU was showing to the World that it could use its soft- power in defusing an important, albeit a military conflict. Although belatedly, at the end Russian forces were withdrawn from the territory of Georgia. Russia had made her point that she objected to the

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inclusion of Georgia into NATO. But she did not go as far as justifying the talk of a new Cold War. The European Union countries were divided between those who advocated a strong response to Russia and those who wanted to manage her. Therefore after some delay, the EU-Russian strategic talks also too place. We should not forget that the European countries are almost all dependent on Russian natural gas. Also, they are curious to see which way the new International System will go.

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Turkey-European Union Relations in the Context of Identity Debate

Gökhan Ak şemsettino ğlu 1

Introduction

The enlargement of the European Union (EU) to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), in 2004, marked the importance of both multiculturalism and identity in the European integration process. In other words, the EU has accepted European countries of different cultures, which however adopted the European values and norms entirely. In this sense, the EU has decided to accept European countries as full members, which meet the minimum accession criteria without considering their different cultural orientations. This approach is the reflection of the “unity in diversity” idea.

In this context, it is obvious that Turkey, with different cultural traits, is an important test area for the EU to realize its new approach, the so- called “multiculturalism”. European identity, however, has always been a controversial issue not only for Turkey, but also for the member countries of the EU. Throughout history, the Turks have contacted with the Europeans for different purposes. Sometimes they

1 Assist. Prof. Dr., Cankaya University, Department of Political Science and International Relations.

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have come face to face with Europeans for bloody wars and sometimes for crucial alliances. This paper, therefore, examines the encounters between the Turks and the Europeans on historical basis and tries to elucidate characteristics of relations between them within the framework of identity argument. The aim of this paper is to bring the European identity of Turkey out and thus consolidate Turkey’s accession process in the eye of the member countries of the EU. In this way, it can be seen how Turkey is a junction point in the new approach of the EU.

Earlier Historic Moments As far as relations between the Turks and the Europeans are concerned, maybe, the first prominent historic moment between them was the conquest of Constantinople (present-day Istanbul) by the Ottoman Empire in 1453. Capturing the capital city of the East Roman Empire had provided the Turks with a great advantage to dominate a part of the European continent for a long time. This historic event, however, became a traumatic experience for the Europeans so that they started to exhibit negative feelings about the Turks. Virtually, whether articulated or not, the Europeans have never forgotten that staggering event. This reality has embodied itself not only in the European history books, which created a ‘terrible Turk’ image, but also in the pupils’ books that continually sowed enmity to European children against the Turks. This was one of the primary reasons behind the negative image of the Turks in Europe, today, and,

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therefore should keep in mind in assessing the current relations between Turkey and the EU.

The other important historic moment was the Treaty of Karlowitz, signed between the Ottoman Empire and a coalition of various European powers 2 in 1699. This treaty marked the beginning of the Ottoman decline in Europe because she began to cede large amounts of lands to the Europeans 3. The treaty was also significant because the Ottoman Empire had conceded the equal sovereignty of the European states for the first time 4. Hereby, the Treaty of Karlowitz, can be utilized as the doorway of the Turkish partake in the European state system legally 5 and the European integration process ipso facto.

Unification Idea in Europe and the Turks After the 15 th century, the European philosophers began to think about the idea of uniting the peoples of Europe as a reflection of the idea of ‘Eurocentrisme’ 6. In the 17 th century, particularly, philosophers such as William Penn, Abbe de Saint-Pierre, Duc de Sully, and Emeric Cruce were arguing the idea of integration for the European states.

2 The ‘Holy League’ of 1684 was consisted of the Habsburgs, Poland, Venice, and Russia. 3 From the 17 th century onwards, the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire had based on the preservation of the earlier military and diplomatic status quo. See: Mustafa Aydın, “The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey’s European Vocation”, The Review of International Affairs , Volume 3, Issue 2, (December, 2003), pp.308-310. 4 Thus, the Ottoman Empire became a part of the European legal system. At the same time, this was the recognition of the Westphalian state system by the Ottoman Empire. 5 Ilber Ortaylı, Avrupa ve Biz , (Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi), p.203. 6 The idea of ‘Eurocentrisme’, a worldview from a European perspective became an important asset for the philosophers of Europe like Voltaire and Hegel, who differentiated other civilizations from the European one. For instance, they assessed the Asian peoples as inactive societies. See: Ibid., p.7.

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The important thing, in the arguments, was that, while some philosophers set the Ottoman Empire apart, as an old enemy, from the European unification projects, some of them included it. For instance, when Emeric Cruce, French writer who emphasized international arbitration, put forward the idea of forming a kind of European Council for the European states, he had incorporated the representative of the Ottoman Empire in the project7. In 1623, furthermore, the Ottoman Empire, in a kind of European Union project, was in the protocol, side by side with the Papacy 8. In that project, the interesting thing was that, the Papacy, as the representative of the Christian world, and the Ottoman Empire, as the representative of the Muslim world, deemed as two powers to create a union in Europe 9. These attempts meant that the Turks were a compatible part of unification projects of the European states, though they had a very different culture and religion compare with the Europeans. In addition, the idea of Turkish inclusion to the Europeans’ integration plans had aimed at creating peace and cooperation in the world, or in Europe, at least.

Westernization Ideal of the Turks and Reformations An important dynamic about the relations between the Turks and the Europeans has been the westernization (or modernization) ideal of the

7 Ibid., p.10. 8 Ibid., p.224. 9 Ibid.

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Turks, which originated in the pre-Republican era 10 . The Ottoman rulers had felt the necessity of modernization when the military failures began in the 17 th century, although some writers indicated the capture of the Roman capital, in 1453, as the inauguration of the Turkish westernization 11 . For instance, the failure in the second siege of Vienna, in 1683, speeded up the struggles for modernization. In fact, this failure had set forth a necessity of grave changes in the Ottoman army. This necessity brought not only restoration of the army but also transformation attempts in legal and administrative areas 12 . Needless to say that, all these military-political developments consolidated connections between the Turks and the Europeans.

From the beginning of the 19 th century, the Ottoman Empire has forced the pace of adopting new codes for the reformation of law and education, in particular. After the proclamation of Republic, Turkey adapted the Swiss Civil Law, the Italian Criminal Law, and the German Trade Law with some changes. There is no doubt that all these radical reforms have not only contributed to the decrease of historical frictions between the Turks and the Europeans 13 , in theory at least 14 , but also prepared a solid base for Turkey to gain a western

10 Ziya Öni ş, “An Awkward Partnership: Turkey’s Relations with the European Union in Comparative-Historical Perspective”, http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~zonis/partnership.PDF , (August, 2000), p.6. 11 Veysel Bozkurt, “Türkiye ve Avrupa Toplulu ğu”, Alternatif Üniversite , Number 20, (İstanbul, A ğaç Yayıncılık Ltd. Şt., 1992), p.23. 12 Ortaylı, Avrupa ve Biz , p.18. 13 It is a fact that the Republic has been the heir to the Ottoman cultural, strategic, historical, and religious legacies, with pros and cons. See: Kemal Karpat, “Turkish Foreign Policy: Some Introductory Remarks”, Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments (Madison, Wisconsin, 1996), p.1 14 Bozkurt, “Türkiye ve Avrupa Toplulu ğu”, p.24.

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identity 15 . In fact, the ideal of ‘reaching the level of contemporary civilization’ has become one of the most important political targets of the Turkish governments since the 1920s.

Up-and-down Relations between Turkey and the European Union In the Republican era, the legal framework of relations between Turkey and the European Community (EC)/EU had drawn by the Treaty of Rome 16 (signed on March 25, 1957) 17 . Functionally, however, Turkey had applied for associate membership with the EC on July 31, 1959 following the Greek application. The basic Turkish motivation of application to the EC was political, mostly. Actually, it was a ‘historical routine’: to be a part of the Western world 18 . After the Ministerial Council approved the application, negotiations began immediately and concluded in June 1962. Afterwards, the Ankara Agreement, establishing an association between the EC and Turkey, signed on September 12, 1963 (ratified on December 1964) envisaged a stage-by-stage integration process towards full membership. This

15 H. Tarık Oğuzlu and U ğur Güngör, “Peace Operations and the Transformation of Turkey’s Security Policy”, Contemporary Security Policy , Volume 27, Number 3, (December, 2006), p.472. 16 Şaban Çalı ş, Türkiye-Avrupa Birli ği İli şkileri, Kimlik Arayı şı, Politik Aktörler ve De ğişim , 3. Baskı, (Ankara, Nobel Yayın Da ğıtım, 2006), p.39. 17 The Treaty of Rome has completed the structure of the EC because it added both the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was created in the Treaty of Paris signed on April 18, 1951. These treaties were signed by the ‘six original’ states of the European integration project: Germany (West), France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. It is important to note that the Treaty of Rome was a step towards a political integration of the European states. Some notable federalists like P. Henry Spaak, then, Belgian foreign ministers have always articulated this idea. He emphasized the spill over effect of economic integration to reach a political unification, at the end. See: Ibid., p.45. 18 Ibid., p.70.

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framework agreement targeted a customs union, following the completion of the preparatory and transitional stages. The transitional stages arranged by ‘Additional Protocol’, which was signed between Turkey and the EC on November 23, 1970 and became operative on January 1973.

The Cyprus intervention of Turkey on July 1974 and the military coup d’etat of September 12, 1980 interrupted the relations between Turkey and the EC 19 until the Association Council revived the process on September 1986. After these sleepy years, Turkey applied for full membership to the EC on April 14, 1987 but the Commission postponed to assess the application although it endorsed the eligible status of Turkey for full membership.

The 1990s have witnessed some significant, yet bumpy, developments about relations between Turkey and the EC/EU. For example, the customs union agreement between Turkey and the EU became operative on January 1, 1996. The following year, however, Turkey was kept out from the candidate status in the Luxembourg Summit of 1997. That disappointing decision had made so negative effects both on the government itself and on the public that Turkey announced to suspend its political relations with the EU. In the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, this time, Turkey became a candidate country for full

19 In this period Turkey was not given any financial aid contrary to Greece who had benefited the financial support of the EC when her relations were frozen with the EC due to military coup of 1967. See: İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Türkiye ve Avrupa Toplulu ğu II, Ulus Devletini A şma Çabasındaki Avrupa’ya Türkiye’nin Yakla şımı (Ankara, Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), pp.33-34

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membership. What changed between the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 and the Helsinki Summit of 1999 was the understanding and reassessment of Turkey’s influential geo-strategic position in its region 20 . In fact, Turkey has already become a multiregional power, after the triangular cooperation, concerning the regional balances, established among the United States of America (USA), Turkey, and Israel in 1996 21 . The Helsinki Summit 22 , therefore, can be qualified as another historic moment for the relations between the Turks and the Europeans because it has both contributed to the political and economic reforms of Turkey and levelled off the mood of the Turkish public 23 . It has also helped to decrease ‘the power of Euro-sceptic elements in Turkish society’ 24 .

Amendments to the Turkish Constitution The early years of the 21 st century have witnessed radical reforms about Turkey’s westernization ideal, again, as well as its European integration target. In October 2001, the Turkish Parliament agreed,

20 At that moment, the Cyprus problem was no longer the largest obstacle to Turkey’s accession to the EU. Turkey had made great efforts to resolve the problem by supporting the, then, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s plan to reunite the divided island. In the April 2004 twin referendum, the Turkish side voted in favour, while the Greeks voted “no”. See: Zeki Kütük, “Turkey and the European Union: The Simple Complexity”, Turkish Studies , Volume 7, Number 2, (June, 2006), p.290 21 Aslı Ege Dziedzic, “The US Factor in Turkey’s European Orientation”, Insight Turkey , Volume 8, Number 4, (October-December, 2006), p.50. 22 The Helsinki Summit was a significant pace for the Turkish integration to the EU since Turkey had created its own National Program for the adoption of the EU acquis on March 19, 2001 following the establishment of an Association Partnership for Turkey by the Commission after the summit. 23 Murat Metin Hakkı, “Turkey and the EU: Past Challenges and Important Issues Lying Ahead”, Turkish Studies , Volume 7, Number 3, (Fall, 2006), p.456 24 Ziya Öni ş, “Turkey’s Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformation, Inherent Dilemmas and the Challenges Ahead”, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans , Volume 8, Number 3, (December, 2006), p.284.

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with an absolute majority, to amend some articles of the Constitution. This radical decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) has signified the Turkish determination to complete the integration process with the EU and take steps for the realization of the motto: ‘reaching the level of contemporary civilization’. In the 2002-2004 periods, Turkey amended various articles mostly about human rights issues and judicial system 25 . Further, Turkey abolished the death penalty except for crimes committed in times of war or the imminent threat of war, and lifted legal restrictions on broadcasting in different languages and dialects used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives.

Therefore, the relations of the Turks with the Europeans have gained a ‘civilization dimension’ 26 . Although majority of the EU population discredited Turkey to fit well into the EU because of its different culture 27 , the Copenhagen European Council decided that ‘if ...Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria 28 ; the EU will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay’ 29 . Thus, because of all

25 Ibid. p.283. 26 Philip Gordon and Omer Ta şpınar, “Turkey on the Brink”, The Washington Quarterly , Volume 29, Number 3, (Summer, 2006), p.66. 27 Rainer Hülsse, “Cool Turkey: Solving the Image Problem to Secure EU Membership”, Mediterranean Politics , Volume 11, Number 3, (November, 2006), p.313. 28 The Copenhagen political criteria, set by the European Council in Copenhagen, Denmark on June 1993, are the eligibility rules of the EU to become a full member to the union. These rules require that a candidate country should have stable institutions to preserve democracy, the rule of law and human rights; a functioning market economy; and should accept the obligations of the EU. See: Desmond Dinan, Origins and Evolution of the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), p.275. 29 Kütük, “Turkey and the European Union: The Simple Complexity”, p.279.

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changes, the EU decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005.

Arguments about Turkey’s European Identity

Identity Formation of the Turks and Europeans

Throughout history, military conflicts between the Turks and the Europeans have given rise to the formation of identities of the both sides’ societies. Some of the military campaigns were so effective that their results had even caused long lasting hatreds between the societies. For instance, when the Ottomans captured Hungary in the wake of the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, some major powers of Europe, especially Austria, began to develop animosity against the Turks 30 . In fact, the Battle of Mohacs was a historical cornerstone for the relations between the Turks and the Europeans, because before that war, “the strong Hungarian Kingdom was believed to be the shield of Europe” 31 and it was believed to be a real threat for the Ottoman Empire. However, when the Turks conquered Hungary, the European countries became very fragile in the face of the Turks 32 . Thus, this became the principal source of Turkish detestation for some European societies and then contributed to the formation of their identities.

30 Ortaylı, Avrupa ve Biz , pp.216, 217. 31 Halil İnalcık, Turkey and Europe in History , (Istanbul, Eren Yayıncılık, 2006), p. 183. 32 Ibid.

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This historical anecdote evokes that defining the identity of a country conjures up the “other” at the same time, because the concept of identity is created in dynamic exchange of settings33 . The European identity, for instance, has been evolved by different types of relationships with “other” societies. This means that, different value judgements of different societies have adjusted the contours of the European identity. In other words, it is not easy to refer a pure, isolated, and everlasting type of identity. The “other”, always, affects the identity formation of “another”. For this reason, there is no specific cultural belonging identical to “Europe” and it is not possible to speak of a constant “place of civilization” 34 . On the contrary, the European identity comes out of different geopolitical and cultural values, evolved in time, in parallel to cultural developments 35 . In the Cold War period, for instance, the border of Europe with “others” had begun in Poland. After the communist threat disappeared, however, the EC took in almost all former communist countries, and allowed them to adopt the European identity. This shows how perceptions of the Europeans differ in time, and according to the composition of a new international system. It should, also, be remembered that Napoleon had restricted Europe with the Pyrenees by saying that “Europe begins at the Pyrenees”. In addition, Metternich had drawn the borders of Asia, starting from the Landstrasse (near Vienna) 36 .

33 İbrahim Canbolat, Avrupa Birli ği, Uluslarüstü bir Sistemin Tarihsel, Teorik, Kurumsal, Jeopolitik Analizi ve Geni şleme Sürecinde Türkiye ile İli şkiler , 3rd. Edition, (Istanbul, Alfa Yayınları, 2002), p. 1 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid., p.3 (for further information about Europe’s changing identity, see: Ibid., pp. 3-21).

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These approaches put forth the ambiguous nature of European borders as well as its indecisive identity. Within this fogginess, it would be not so realistic to discuss Turkey’s membership as a source of trouble for European identity, as it has frequently been put forward by conservative circles of Europe. The opposite is also true. Some Turkish conservatives think that the membership of the EU would destroy the Turkish identity. This belief is not correct as well, since the Turks have been living together with non-Muslims for a long time. In fact, both Turkey and the Europeans have impinged upon the identities one another.

Therefore, it is not easy to define a very strict European identity in such interdependent international system, where different ethnic and linguistic societies coexist. Nevertheless, the Europeans have succeeded to create a common denominator under the name of identity. Apart from Christianity, it is mostly based on democratic principles, such as human rights and rule of law 37 . Turkey, on the other hand, has adopted western principles, though most of its people are Muslim, and shared common values and democratic principles with the Europeans. In this context, pursuing policies isolating Turkey from Europe are not rationalistic 38 . On top of that, it would be very thorny for the Europeans to exclude Turkey, which is an effective regional power, for getting their growing global problems over in international arena. In this sense, the Turkish culture, compatible with

37 Faruk Şen, Euro-Türkler: Sayılar, İstemler, Analizler ve Yorumlar , (Istanbul, Günizi Yayıncılık, 2007), p. 128. 38 Ibid., p. 129.

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the European identity, should be introduced as a plus value for European culture. The striking indication of this coherence is the peaceful coexistence of over 4 million Turks with the Europeans within the borders of Europe 39 .

Turkey’s Membership Issue within the Scope of Identity

There have always been different voices among Europeans for and against Turkey’s accession to the EU. For instance, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, a German historian, has put forward that Turkey does not belong to Europe because of its geographical position, historical past and religious identity. He has contended that frequent historical clashes between the Turks and the Europeans have inscribed negative thoughts inside the minds of the both sides’ societies, and, therefore, Turkey’s accession to the EU would be a mistake for the integration process of the EU. Shortly, Wehler has propounded that political union cannot be developed beyond cultural borders. On the other hand, Günter Seufert, another German from the Orient Institute, has set forth that it is possible to unite around common values and principles, even in the case that the sides have different cultural origins. To him, exclusion of anyone on the grounds of language, culture, religion, and history is meaningless 40 . Seufert has also affirmed that the EU would not be able to apply its defence and security policies without Turkey. He has asserted that, Turkey, being a

39 Ibid., p. 131. 40 Canbolat, Avrupa Birli ği, Uluslarüstü bit Sistemin Tarihsel, Teorik, Kurumsal, Jeopolitik Analizi ve Geni şeme Sürecinde Türkiye ile İli şkiler , pp. 316, 317.

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strong member of NATO, would not allow the EU to act alone in the South Eastern of Europe and the Middle East, in particular 41 .

Actually, ideas and actions against Turkey’s accession outweigh among the European countries. For instance, it is impressive to note that, in the later years of the 1980s there were over 400 active associations in Europe functioning against Turkey 42 . Ideas against Turkey’s accession have mostly focused on cultural argument, which states that Turkey is not a part of the European civilization and culture; therefore she is not a European country and has not a place among the other European countries whatsoever 43 .

However, disagreements, among the major European powers, have created two Europe, where, England plans a Europe that cooperate with global capital, on the one side, while France and Germany think about a more independent Europe on the other side. This is why France and Germany antagonize Turkey’s membership, while England and its supporters such as Spain, Italy and Poland are in favour of Turkey’s accession. In fact, France and Germany, as two architects of the European integration project, are anxious about a dominant British

41 Ibid, p. 318. 42 Kamran İnan, “Avrupa ve Türkiye: Bazı Gözlemler”, Avrupa Toplulu ğu ve Türkiye , Number 2220, (Ankara, Türkiye ve Orta Do ğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü Yayınları, Nisan, 1987), p.36. 43 Although the size of Turkey (with the claim of upsetting the internal cohesion of the Union provided the acceptance of Turkey as a full member) and the level of development (with the claim of having difficulty to absorb it economically) have become the other subjects of argument, it seems that the cultural one prevails in most of the discussion. See: Öni ş, “Turkey’s Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformation, Inherent Dilemmas and the Challenges Ahead”, p.292.

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bloc, including Turkey 44 . Therefore, the United Kingdom (UK) is fully in favour of Turkey’s membership, mainly for political and strategic reasons 45 . The UK considers Turkey as an ally inside the union in order to provide balance among the major powers, like Germany and France. In addition, Spain, Portugal, and Italy support Turkey as a Mediterranean country to strengthen the Central-Eastern part of the EU 46 . Moreover, Ireland, Finland, and Sweden support Turkey chiefly because of strategic-political reasons 47 . They, also, consider maintaining international credibility of the EU by means of executing its committed promise to Turkey about its full membership to the EU 48 . Greece seems support Turkey’s membership, most probably because it would be much easier for her to solve its problems with Turkey under the aegis of the European Union 49 . These supporting countries believe that an affiliated Turkey with the EU would not only lead to a politically stable and economically strong Turkey in its region, but could also serve as “demonstration effect” 50 for the countries in the Middle Eastern region, and would encourage them to develop their structural, political, and economic reforms 51 .

Turkey’s European Identity

44 Mahir Kaynak, Dünyada Yeni Dönem , (Istanbul, Ekim yayınları, 2007), pp. 58,59. 45 Heinz Kramer, “Turkey and the EU: EU’s Perspective”, Insight Turkey , Volume 8, Number 4 (October-December, 2006) p.25. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., p.26. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., p.26 50 Alfred Tavias, “The Integration of Turkey in the European Community as a Stabilizing Factor for the Middle East”, Marmara Journal of European Studies , Volume 3, Number 1-2, 1993-1994, p.63. 51 Kramer, “Turkey and the EU: EU’s Perspective”, p.28

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In fact, questioning the idea whether Turkey is a European country or not is pointless. There is no doubt that Turkey is a European country and the Turks are the part of the European society. In the 19 th century, after the Treaty of Paris (1856), which ended the Crimean War, the Ottoman government was admitted into the European club of states. This war had aimed at protecting the Ottoman Empire against Russia, and guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of it. While before the Turks had been assessed as so ‘other’ or different from Europe, because she was Islamic 52 , with the Treaty of Paris, the ‘logic of raison d’etat outweighed the logic of culture’ 53 . Apart from this historical reality, Turkey’s European identity became very solid with the signing of the association agreement in 1963. In the ceremony following the signature, the, then, president of the Commission had stated that the agreement was the formal confirmation of the reality that Turkey was a part of Europe 54 . Similarly, when the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe signed on October 29, 2004 the heads of state and government of the European countries had not referred to ‘Christianity’. This meant that Turkey would not be able to exclude from the membership of the EU on religious or cultural grounds 55 . After all, if one adheres to General de Gaulle’s definition of Europe ‘from Atlantic to the Urals’, then Turkey entirely belongs to

52 Udo Steinbach, “Turkey-EEC Relations: The Cultural Dimensions”, Turkey’s Place in Europe: Economic, Political, and Cultural Dimensions, Erol Manisalı (ed.), ( İstanbul, Logos Yayıncılık, 1988), p.13. 53 Kütük, “Turkey and the European Union: The Simple Complexity”, p.281. 54 Steinbach, “Turkey-EEC Relations: The Cultural Dimensions”, p.20. 55 Kütük, “Turkey and the European Union: The Simple Complexity”, p.282

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Europe 56 . Thus, we can easily conclude that there is no doubt about Turkey’s European identity, and Turkey’s cultural and religious values are not barriers against its accession target to the EU.

In addition, both Turkey and the EU have attempted to consolidate Turkey’s European identity. For instance, the EU has taken a solid step with the adoption of ‘rapprochement strategy’ for increased societal dialogue between the peoples of Turkey and the EU 57 . This strategy suggests a strengthened political and cultural dialogue between the peoples of Turkey and the EU, which could ‘enable the EU citizens to develop a new understanding of Turkey’ 58 . Moreover, the ‘civil society dialogue’ 59 of the EU can be a good opportunity for Turkey to show its ‘European identity’ 60 . Further, Turkey has become an active supporter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, started at Barcelona in November 1995 that aims at enhancing relations between the EU and its Southern counterparts in political, economic, and cultural issues 61 . Beyond any doubt, all these developments will help Turkey to replace old images with new ones 62 . It would, then, reduce

56 Ibid. 57 Hülsse, “Cool Turkey: Solving the Image Problem to Secure EU Membership”, p.321. 58 Ibid. 59 In 2005 the European Commission adopted a communiqué about the ‘Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and the Candidate Countries’, which aimed at informing the public opinion in the member states about the impact of accessions, and in the candidate countries about the history, functioning and values of the Union. See: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50022.htm 60 Hülsse, “Cool Turkey: Solving the Image Problem to Secure EU Membership”, p.321 61 Stephen C. Calleya, “EU-Turkish Relations: Prospects and Problems”, Mediterranean Quarterly, A Journal of Global Issues , Volume 17, Number 2, (Spring, 2006), p.42. 62 Therefore, it is not fair to say that Turkey will be confronted with its negative image throughout the negotiation process. See: Hülsse, “Cool Turkey: Solving the Image Problem to Secure EU Membership”, p.314. It is not possible to ignore Turkey’s development and modernity. It should always be remembered that cooperation is founded on mutual

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the perceived cultural differences and increase the chances that the citizens of the European countries will vote in favour of Turkish membership at the end 63 .

Furthermore, Turkey, in the new international conjuncture, after 9/11 events, has recuperated its importance in its region and manifested its indispensability as a member of Council of Europe for 50 years as well as a contributor for the establishment of a new world order 64 . As a matter of fact, Turkey’s current situation, as a candidate country, is very meaningful for the EU because, for the first time in their history, the European countries have taken steps to embrace a different culture with a different religion, more importantly. In fact, these steps are the good news of a new development in the side of the European integration process: multiculturalism 65 . This religion-oriented multiculturalism will be a very important asset in European history, which will be gained by Turkey. Turkey’s accession to the EU, in this context, will not only bring about this new development but also justify what British PM Tony Blair stated during a visit to Lisbon in the aftermath of the terrorist arrack in Madrid in March 2004: “Let us show by our willingness to bring Turkey, a proud Muslim nation, into the EU on the same and equal terms as all others, to show that Europe is committed not just in word but in deed to a Europe of diverse races, understanding of the parties so; judgements about culture and image should not be used as a pretext by the EU countries and not be considered as a prerequisite for achieving membership by the EU countries. See:Ibid., p.317. 63 Ibid., p.325. 64 Armand Clesse and Seyfi Ta şhan (eds.), Turkey and the European Union: 2004 and Beyond , (Amsterdam, Dutch University Press, 2004), pp. 199,200. 65 Ibid., pp. 267,268.

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cultures and religions all bound together by common rules and a sense of human solidarity” 66 .

Turkey’s Contribution to Political and Military Assets of Europe

In fact, throughout history, Turkey has been part of the European system. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey has become members of the major western organizations such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and the Council of Europe in order to consolidate its ties with Europe economically and politically 67 . Importantly, Turkey has always been an effective participant to the security issues of the Western world and Europe 68 . In the Cold War period, in particular, Turkey, being a major power of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has contributed to Western security interests as a means of a link tying itself to the West 69 . In other words, Turkey has not only taken the responsibilities of the western world in terms of security, mostly, but also it “anchored its destiny in the West” 70 when she decided to join NATO 71 .

66 Ibid., p. 269. 67 Çalı ş, Türkiye-Avrupa Birli ği İli şkileri, Kimlik Arayı şı, Politik Aktörler ve De ğişim , p.49. 68 For further information about Turkey’s Western orientation after 1945, see: İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin , Türkiye ve Avrupa Toplulu ğu I, Ulus Devletini A şma Çabasındaki Avrupa’nın Türkiye’ye Yakla şımı (Ankara, Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), pp.119-121. 69 For more information about Turkey’s importance in security issues, in the Cold War period, see: George S. Harris (ed.), The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations (A Report of a Heritage Foundation Conference, October 3-4, 1984), pp.9-16 70 Süleyman Demirel, “Turkey and NATO at the Treshold of a New Century”, Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs , Volume IV, Number 1, March-May 1999, p.6. 71 Ibid.

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This tendency of Turkey has continued in the post-Cold War period with a changing perspective that required taking part in peacekeeping operations of the EU 72 . Thus, Turkey has not only participated in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) but also requested to join the EU-led peacekeeping force in Congo. There is no doubt that these strategic actions of Turkey have supported it for the decisions of the EU to start the accession talks on October 3, 2005, and helped to bolster Turkey’s European identity 73 :

Participation in peace operations has had significant impacts on Turkey. First, this has promoted Turkey’s reputation as a concerned, responsible regional power. Turkey’s image as a security producer country has been enhanced, and it has alleviated foreign fears of Turkish interest in regional hegemony. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic see Turkey as a regional power contributing to peace and stability. Turkey has become an island of stability in the midst of regional instabilities. In this sense Turkey’s concern with being recognized as western and as a security producer country has been enhanced by participation in peace operations. Participation in peace operations has also contributed to

72 It is important to note that ‘Turkey’s leading role in ISAF implies Western acknowledgement that it can deal with the security challenges of the post-9/11 era only in close collaboration with the Muslims world. Turkey, as a secular and Western-oriented state with a Muslim population, contributes to the legitimacy of the Western-led international peace operations in the eyes of the Muslim communities all around the globe’ See: O ğuzlu, ‘Peace Operations and the Transformation of Turkey’s Security Policy’, p.482 73 Ibid., p.480

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modernization of the Turkish military in line with changing security understandings during the post-Cold War era 74 .

Since Turkey’s membership to the EU will depend on the political decisions 75 of the member countries, some unresolved political issues, such as Cyprus problem, will be the subjects of negotiations 76 . Beyond any doubt, this will bring extra burden to Turkey. However, the unresolved political problems could bring some benefits to Turkey as well. For instance, it would not be so easy for the EU to decide most political issues without considering the ideas of the USA, who has been one of the biggest supporters of Turkey for full membership 77 . As a matter o fact, Turkey, as full members of NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has strong intergovernmental ties not only with Europe but also with the USA 78 . In addition, it would not be so easy for the leaders of the EU to forget Turkey’s active role in both the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 79 . In fact, since the EU has begun to focus its attention to the institutionalization of CFSP and ESDP, Turkey has become an important asset with its powerful military domain. For example, Turkey

74 Ibid., p.484. 75 Kramer, “Turkey and the EU: EU’s Perspective”, p.31. 76 Gülnur Aybet. “Turkey and the EU After the First Year of Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges”, Security Dialogue , Volume 37, Number 4, (December, 2006), p.532. 77 Lauren Brodsky, “The Role of the International Media and Public Opinion in the Debate over Turkey’s EU Membership”, Insight Turkey , Volume 8, Number 3, (July-September, 2006), p.17. 78 Calleya, “EU-Turkish Relations: Prospects and Problems”, p.41. 79 Ibid.

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has contributed to all EU operations, including EUFOR Althea 80 , where she has been the largest participant 81 .

Cultural Values and Public Opinion

After the tragic events of 9/11, the outlook on Muslim culture has worsen so that the prediction of ‘cultural conflicts’, articulated by Samuel Huntington in his famous ‘Clash of Civilizations’ has almost proved itself right. This so-called inter-cultural conflict has increased the significance of Turkey as a buffer zone against fundamentalist groups in Northern Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia 82 . In this context, the former German Foreign Minister had said; ‘a “No” to Turkey would antagonize other Muslim countries, especially the Arab world’ 83 . Turkish membership, therefore, could be a good example for the Islamic world that the EU is not a ‘Christian club but is open to all cultural and religious values in the world’ 84 . This could bring not only flexible relations between different cultures but also create an atmosphere for cooperation and collaboration between different societies. For the same reason, Turkey’s western orientation and secularization, with its dynamic private sector, strong market economy, and powerful military, is a very important model for the

80 EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 81 The EU’s Headline Goal for 2010 will benefit from a brigade size Turkish unit, reinforced by nine vessels and two squadrons of F-16 fighter aircraft. Turkey has also contributed to the civilian crisis management capabilities of the EU. See: Nabi Şensoy, “The Importance of Transatlantic Unity for Turkish Foreign Policy”, Turkish Policy Quarterly , Volume 5, Number 3, (Fall, 2006), p.22. 82 Dziedzic, “The US Factor in Turkey’s European Orientation”, p.53. 83 Hakkı, “Turkey and the EU: Past Challenges and Important Issues Lying Ahead”, p.460. 84 Kramer, “Turkey and the EU: EU’s Perspective”, p.28

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other countries, such as Turkic countries in the Caucasus, in their transition to western type democracy and economy 85 .

Additionally, it seems obvious that Turkish membership will not occur without public consent 86 of the European peoples since it is, now, very difficult for the European politicians to ignore public opinion , especially for critical decisions, in the aftermath of the French and Dutch rejections of the EU Constitution 87 . It makes people think that the European public will not make its choice according to rational calculation of interest alone, but reflections of identity 88 . Thus, it would be very logical for Turkey to prepare the European public for its identity 89 by creating some specific policies such as a communications strategy, which aims to affect both public opinion and the press of the member states 90 .

Finally yet importantly, Turkey’s geographic location between Europe and the Middle East has ensured it a significant advantage as a mediator about relations among the USA, Europe, and the Middle East 91 . In this context, Turkey’s membership to the EU would ease the strife among the major players and therefore, soothe the ideas of

85 Dziedzic, “The US Factor in Turkey’s European Orientation”, p.53. 86 Kramer, “Turkey and the EU: EU’s Perspective”, p.31. 87 Gordon, “Turkey on the Brink”, p.58. 88 Hülsse, “Cool Turkey: Solving the Image Problem to Secure EU Membership”, p.315. 89 Ibid. 90 Brodsky, “The Role of the International Media and Public Opinion in the Debate over Turkey’s EU Membership”, p.16. 91 Calleya, “EU-Turkish Relations: Prospects and Problems”, p.43.

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sceptics 92 . It is also easy to think that Turkey’s strategic position as a ‘pivotal energy transit point between the EU and the Middle East, on the one hand, and the EU and Caspian, on the other’93 , would contribute much to the gains of the EU. In fact, Turkey’s accession to the EU could increase ‘the energy security of the EU by developing itself ... to a regional energy hub’ 94 . This would serve the EU as a stabilizing factor in the sector of energy security95 . Completing the accession process with the EU, Turkey argues that the economic and security interests of Europe would be enhanced and its role in the way of searching for peace about the Middle East problem would be increased 96 . Turkey’s accession to the EU, therefore, will make the EU a more political actor. This is what the EU really aims, and thus, Turkey’s accession process will be a test for the competence of the EU to map out its geo-strategic future in international politics of the 21 st century 97 .

Conclusion The 9/11 events of 2001 have changed the characteristics of international system, dramatically. Although terrorism has become a major threat for most of the nations, different cultures and identities have also entered into the agendas of the countries in the world. In this

92 Borut Grgic, “A New Strategic Outlook for Turkey”, Turkish Policy Quarterly , Volume 5, Number 2, (Summer, 2006), p.96. 93 Ibid., p.98. 94 Kramer, “Turkey and the EU: EU’s Perspective”, p.28. 95 Calleya, “EU-Turkish Relations: Prospects and Problems”, p.41. 96 Brodsky, “The Role of the International Media and Public Opinion in the Debate over Turkey’s EU Membership”, p.18 97 Calleya, “EU-Turkish Relations: Prospects and Problems”, p.40.

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sense, multiculturalism has become one of the new assets of world politics.

The EU has been affected by these developments. In no time, the officials of the EU have articulated the importance of different cultures and decided to revise their policies accordingly. In this sense, new enlargement rounds of the EU have begun to reflect the idea of “unity in diversity” and brought “flexibility” in accordance with the systemic structure of world politics. This new approach has aimed at not only accepting European countries with relatively different cultures, but also allowing these states to adapt themselves for the decision-making process of the EU, slowly. Especially, the 2004 enlargement of the EU to the CEECs, has put forward the changing policy of the EU.

Cultural differences have brought out the importance of identity, in general, and the European identity, in particular. The EU has attached importance to both different cultures and the changing European identity as new assets of the integration process. In this context, Turkey has become a significant case for the EU. On the one hand, she became the strongest example of multiculturalism, with quite different cultural traits, and it demonstrated its European identity, on the other hand.

Actually, historical facts and extensive relations between the Turks and the Europeans manifest Turkey’s European identity. Also,

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Turkey’s both political and military contributions to the Europeans and struggles to comply with the rules of the EU cement this identity. Maybe, the important thing is to provide the European public opinion with the understanding of Turkey’s European identity. Although there are continuing problems, this can be managed with great efforts, in time. Turkey is the key country for the EU to adapt itself to the new international system, where different cultures cannot be ignored anymore. Also, Turkey can be a catalyst for the EU to become a real international actor in the prospective multi-polar international system, together with the USA, China, Russia, and India, at least.

Bibliography

1. Aydın, Mustafa. “The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey’s European Vocation”, The Review of International Affairs , Volume 3, Issue 2, (December, 2003)

2. Aybet, Gülnur. “Turkey and the EU After the First Year of Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges”, Security Dialogue , Volume 37, Number 4, (December, 2006)

3. Bozkurt, Veysel. “Türkiye ve Avrupa Toplulu ğu”, Alternatif Üniversite , Number 20, ( İstanbul, A ğaç Yayıncılık Ltd. Şt., 1992)

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4. Brodsky, Lauren. “The Role of the International Media and Public Opinion in the Debate over Turkey’s EU Membership”, Insight Turkey , Volume 8, Number 3, (July-September, 2006)

5. Calleya, C. Stephen. “EU-Turkish Relations: Prospects and Problems”, Mediterranean Quarterly, A Journal of Global Issues, Volume 17, Number 2, (Spring, 2006)

6. Canbolat, İbrahim. Avrupa Birli ği, Uluslarüstü bir Sistemin Tarihsel, Teorik, Kurumsal, Jeopolitik Analizi ve Geni şleme Sürecinde Türkiye ile İli şkiler , 3rd. Edition, (Istanbul, Alfa Yayınları, 2002)

7. Clesse, Armand and Seyfi Ta şhan (eds.), Turkey and the European Union: 2004 and Beyond , (Amsterdam, Dutch University Press, 2004)

8. Çalı ş, Şaban. Türkiye-Avrupa Birli ği İli şkileri, Kimlik Arayı şı, Politik Aktörler ve De ğişim , 3. Baskı, (Ankara, Nobel Yayın Da ğıtım, 2006)

9. Demirel, Süleyman. “Turkey and NATO at the Treshold of a New Century”, Perceptions , Journal of International Affairs, Volume IV, Number 1, March-May 1999

10. Dinan, Desmond. Origins and Evolution of the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006)

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11. Dziedzic, Ege Aslı. “The US Factor in Turkey’s European Orientation”, Insight Turkey , Volume 8, Number 4, (October- December, 2006)

12. Gordon, Philip and Omer Ta şpınar, “Turkey on the Brink”, The Washington Quarterly , Volume 29, Number 3, (Summer, 2006)

13. Grgic, Borut. “A New Strategic Outlook for Turkey”, Turkish Policy Quarterly , Volume 5, Number 2, (Summer, 2006)

14. Hakkı, Metin Murat. “Turkey and the EU: Past Challenges and Important Issues Lying Ahead”, Turkish Studies , Volume 7, Number 3, (Fall, 2006)

15. Harris, S. George (ed.), The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations (A Report of a Heritage Foundation Conference, October 3- 4, 1984)

16. Hülsse, Rainer. “Cool Turkey: Solving the Image Problem to Secure EU Membership”, Mediterranean Politics , Volume 11, Number 3, (November, 2006)

17. İnan, Kamran. “Avrupa ve Türkiye: Bazı Gözlemler”, Avrupa Toplulu ğu ve Türkiye , Number 2220, (Ankara, Türkiye ve Orta Do ğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü Yayınları, Nisan, 1987)

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18. İnalcık, Halil. Turkey and Europe in History , (Istanul, Eren Yayıncılık, 2006)

19. Karpat, Kemal. “Turkish Foreign Policy: Some Introductory Remarks”, Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments (Madison, Wisconsin, 1996)

20. Kaynak, Mahir. Dünyada Yeni Dönem , (Istanbul, Ekim yayınları, 2007)

21. Kramer, Heinz. “Turkey and the EU: EU’s Perspective”, Insight Turkey , Volume 8, Number 4 (October-December, 2006)

22. Kütük, Zeki. “Turkey and the European Union: The Simple Complexity”, Turkish Studies , Volume 7, Number 2, (June, 2006)

23.O ğuzlu, H. Tarık and U ğur Güngör, “Peace Operations and the Transformation of Turkey’s Security Policy”, Contemporary Security Policy , Volume 27, Number 3, (December, 2006)

24. Ortaylı, İlber. Avrupa ve Biz (Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi), 2007

25. Öni ş, Ziya. “An Awkward Partnership: Turkey’s Relations with the European Union in Comparative, Historical Perspective”, http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~zonis/partnership.PDF , (August, 2000)

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26. Öni ş, Ziya. “Turkey’s Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformation, Inherent Dilemmas and the Challenges Ahead”, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans , Volume 8, Number 3, (December, 2006)

27. Steinbach, Udo. “Turkey-EEC Relations: The Cultural Dimensions”, Turkey’s Place in Europe: Economic, Political, and Cultural Dimensions , Erol Manisalı (ed.), ( İstanbul, Logos Yayıncılık, 1988)

28. Şen, Faruk. Euro-Türkler: Sayılar, İstemler, Analizler ve Yorumlar , (Istanbul, Günizi Yayıncılık, 2007)

29. Şensoy, Nabi. “The Importance of Transatlantic Unity for Turkish Foreign Policy”, Turkish Policy Quarterly , Volume 5, Number 3, (Fall, 2006)

30. Tavias, Alfred. “The Integration of Turkey in the european Community as a Stabilizing Factor for the Middle East”, Marmara Journal of European Studies , Volume 3, Number 1-2, 1993-1994

31. Tekeli, İlhan and Selim İlkin, Türkiye ve Avrupa Toplulu ğu II, Ulus Devletini A şma Çabasındaki Avrupa’ya Türkiye’nin Yakla şımı (Ankara, Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993)

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32. Tekeli, İlhan and Selim İlkin , Türkiye ve Avrupa Toplulu ğu I, Ulus Devletini A şma Çabasındaki Avrupa’nın Türkiye’ye Yakla şımı (Ankara, Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993)

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NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ONGOING DEBATE

Nezir Akyesilmen 1

Two explosions have taken place on the oil pipelines recently in Turkey: one in Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in August 2 and the other one in Kirkuk-Yumrtalık oil pipeline in November 2008. 3 The effects of such explosions on the local environment will be dramatic in the long run. These effects include operational oil spills, gas flaring, acid rain, inappropriate land use and poor waste management practices. 4 Nwete counts also other specific issues include pollution of air, land and water, bio-diversity, destruction of wetlands, rainforest, generally the ecosystem, forestry, and other foreseeable environmental hazards arising from oil spills; and from the generation, transportation and disposal of wastes, from project site. The social issues bothers on the manner of land acquisition and resettlement, the influx of work force and their needs, the use of child and forced labor, and destruction of archaeological, religious and

1 PhD. 2 EH, “BTC Boru Hattında Patlama Meydana Geldi” on http://www.erzincanhaber.com/habergoster.asp?id=2259 (Last visit: 06.11.2008). 3 SH, “Yumurtalık Boru Hattında Patlama” on http://www.sonhaberler.com/haber.php?haber_id=7172 (Last visit: 06.11.2008). 4 Wheeler, D., Fabig H. And Boele, R.,” Paradoxes and Dilemmas for Stakeholder Responsive Firms in the Extractive Sector: Lessons from the Case of Shell and the Ogoni” in Journal of Business Ethics, Vol.39,2002, pp.297-318.

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cultural sites. 5 Predominantly farmers and fisher folk, their livelihood and welfare is intricately bound to the health of surrounding rivers, streams and soil.

The basic question here is about the responsibility of actors: who is responsible for such human rights violations? Do pipeline operating companies, namely BTC Co. and BOTA Ş - non-state actors- need to be held responsible or Turkey, as the sovereign power is the sole responsible actor? The issue of the responsibility of non-state actors for human rights violations has been one the prominent debate in the human rights literature in recent years.

There are two conflicting views on the subject of non-state actors’ responsibility for human rights. The state-centric approach of human rights claims the state responsibility for the activities of NSAs concerning human rights violations, while newly emerging approach, on the other hand, claims for the existence of multiple violators of human rights. This paradigm shifts away from what has usually been an exclusively state-centric approach and calls for the accountability of both states and non-state actors for human rights obligations.

5 Nwete, B.O.N., “Human Rights and the International Natural Resources Industry: Multinational Corporations and the BTC Pipelinme Projrect: Any Hope for Human Rights and Sustainable Development?” in OGEL, Vol. 2, No.4, 2004, p.20.

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I. DEFINING NON-STATE ACTORS: NOT-A STATE SYNDROME?

The issue of non-state actors and human rights is a challenging topic. One of the main reasons for this difficulty is the lack of an authoritative definition of non-state actors. Since the term non-state actors may mean different things to different people, it is important to set up a working definition or a conceptual definition on its meaning. Without such a definition we would be unable to discuss properly the accountability of non-state actors in the human rights context.

Philip Alston says that when one of his daughters was eighteen months old she was describing a rabbit, a mouse or a kangaroo as a “not-a-cat”. Alston calls the situation as “not a-cat syndrome”. Similarly, in human rights literature, the idea of the state and the rest - non-state actors - is dominant. Whether the rest is a corporation, an intergovernmental organization, a supranational organization or a paramilitary group the language does not change. Indeed, Alston claims that this negative conception, do not stem from language inadequacies but instead have been intentionally adopted in order to reinforce the assumption that the state is not only the central actor but also the indispensable and pivotal one around which all other actors revolve. Thus, for the language of human rights and the international relations discourse other actors can only be identified in terms of their

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relationship to the state. 6 Just like Alston’s daughter’s cat, anything that is not a state, whether it is Amnesty International, Al-Qaeda, UN, Greenpeace or BP is conceptualized as “not-a-state”. With such a simplistic approach, it’s difficult to reach a widely accepted definition. As a result, the accountability problem arises because there is an uncertainty and ambiguity. There are plenty of actors; there are some international as well as national, there are mega powerful as well as powerless and there are profit driven as well as non-profit actors.

The broadest possible definition of non-state actors encompasses all private actors distinct from the state, including private individuals, civil society organizations, private companies, armed groups, de facto regimes. 7 According to Arts, non-state actors are all those actors that are not representatives or agents of states, yet that operate at the international level and that are potentially relevant to international relations. In Arts’s classification, five groups of NSAs are distinguished in the literature: 1. Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), 2. International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), 3. Corporate Interest Groups (CIGs) and Transnational Corporations (TNCs), 4. Epistemic Communities (ECs) and

6 Alston, P., “The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?” in Alston, P.(ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, Oxford, Oxford university Pres, 2005, pp.3-4. 7 Redress, Not Only the State: Torture by Non-State Actors , London, The Redress Trust, 2006, p.14.

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5. A remainder category including terrorist networks, professional organizations, scouts, churches, etc. 8

The expression “non-state actors” generally apart from the ones mentioned above, includes NGOs, armed groups, educational institutions, religious organizations, private individuals, civil society, media and multi-lateral financial organizations like World Bank and IMF. They have distinct “unofficial” nature as compared to state actors and they enjoy autonomy within the sphere of state.

Today almost all the non-state actors identified above have the capacity to violate human rights. Most of these entities have been actors in world politics for a long time. But in last decades, profound changes, including globalization, have taken place in the world. Consequently these actors’ power increased vis-à-vis the state.

II. DEFINING GLOBALIZATION: THE MAJOR FORCE TRANSFORMING THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND POWER

Especially beginning from the 1980s, globalization has been one of the most widely used concepts for portraying the contemporary condition of societies both in popular writings and in the social sciences. Yet, there are numerous different ways in which the concept is used and it lacks a precise definition. 9 Albrow defines globalization

8 Arts, B., “Non-State Actors in Global Environmental Governance: New Arrangements Beyond the State”, on http://www.unpop.nl/inhoud/artikelen/non- state%20actors%20in%20GG.pdf (last visit: 12.02.2007). 9 McCorquodale & FairBrother, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.21, 1999, pp. 735-736.

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as all those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society, a society in which humanity began to emerge for the first time a collective actor. This approach highlights the common concerns of humanity like environment, global pollution, natural resources and human rights. 10

In terms of political economy, globalization is defined as a process whereby power is located in global social formations and expressed through global networks rather than through territorially based nation states. 11 Indeed, globalization refers to a new, distinct phase in world politics. 12 Globalization has generated a proliferation of non-state agents, including business firms, business associations, labor unions, and NGOs, all clamoring to make their voices heard and broadening the agenda of WTO from trade policy . In the last decade of the 20th century, the number of international NGOs grew from 6,000 to 26,000, ranging in size from the Worldwide Fund for Nature with 5 million members to tiny network organizations. 13 All these actors signal the development of a new world of transnational contention. 14

10 Albrow, M. and King, E., (ed.), “Introduction” in Globalization, Knowledge and Society, Sage , London, Sage, 1990, p.8. 11 Schwartz, H.M., States versus Markets: History, Geography and the Development of the International Political Economy ,New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p.4. 12 Bretherton, C. and Geoffrey P.(ed.), in Global Politics: An Introduction , Oxford, Blackwell, 1996,p.3. 13 Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S., “Democracy, Accountability And Global Governance”, Harvard Politics Research Group, 2001, pp.21-22. 14 Tarrow, S., “The New Transnational Contention: Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms,” Prepared For Presentation at The Panel On –Social Movements And Transnational Social Movements- APSA Annual Meeting August 31, Chicago Sept. 1,2002, p.2, available at Http://Sociology.Berkeley.Edu/Faculty/Evans/Evans_Pdf/Tarrow-Transnational-Contention7- 2002.Pdf (Last visit: 07.11.2006).

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The central idea behind globalization is that many contemporary problems cannot be solved at the level of nation states; that is in terms of separate countries and their international relations. It is supported that we live in a period in which social life is mostly determined by global processes. According to the strong version of this view, national cultures, economies and borders are dissolving. Economic globalization is said to be emerging, and policies of national economic management are increasingly regarded as outdated.

It is argued that the world economy is shaped by market forces that are uncontrollable and the ‘truly’ transnational corporations which have no attachment to a particular nation state are the major economic actors. 15 With the development of global market and global circuits of production, we also see a new form of sovereignty. Together with the processes of globalization, sovereignty of nation states has weakened. Therefore, as “a unit of analysis of history and International Relations (IR), states are becoming unable to manage national economies.” 16

The impact of globalization on the traditional notion of state sovereignty has been recognized by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESR Committee) in the following terms:

[Globalization] has also come to be closely associated with a variety of specific trends and policies including an increasing

15 Held, D. et.al., “Introduction” in Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture , Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999, pp.3-5. 16 Amin, S., Capitalism in the Age of Globalization , London, Zed Books, 1997, pp.65-70.

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reliance upon the free market, a significant growth in the influence of international markets and institutions in determining the viability of national policy priorities, a diminution in the role of the state and the size of its budget, the privatization of various functions previously considered to be the exclusive domain of the state, the deregulation of a range of activities with a view to facilitating investment and rewarding individual initiative, and corresponding increase in the role and even responsibilities attributed to private actors , both in the corporate sector, in particular to the transnational

corporations and in civil society. 17

A host of outside actors such as transnational corporations (TNCs) over whom states are increasingly losing control therefore besiege today’s governments. 18 In this sense, globalization can restrict the choices open to governments and people, particularly in the human rights area, and thus make it more difficult to attribute responsibility for violations of human rights. 19

The arguments in the context of globalization in general have been developed on the premise that globalization has weakened the state sovereignty. Thus the non-state actors have got chance to get much more control on the market and force the states to serve their interests.

17 Statement of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 18 th session, adopted 27 April-15 May, 1998, Geneva, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/statements/Globalisation-1998.doc (last visit: 17.01.2008). 18 Jochnick, C., “Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the Promotion of Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly , Vol.21, 1999,p.63 19 McCorquodale, R. and FairBrother, R.,1999, p.736.

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Yet Cerny thinks in a different way when he developed the idea of competition state.

II.1 Competition State: Reorganizing State Apparatus

The changes in the international market structure that led the growing competition in international markets have given rise to a new type of state behavior, best characterized as the competition state. 20 According to Philip Cerny, “the competition state has pursued increased mercerization in order to make economic activities located within the national territory, or which otherwise contribute to national wealth, more competitive in international and transnational terms” 21 i.e. Cerny states that “The competition state involves both a transformation of the policy roles of the state and a multiplication of specific responses to change.” 22 Under new circumstances the state’s role is restructured. In other words, state is reorganizing itself so that it can compete with other states and survive. Soederberg claims that “Within the context of globalization the policy limitations and pressure have acted as the driving force of the shift from the Keynesian welfare state towards neoliberal market-oriented form of state intervention or a competition state.” 23 State tries to maintain its control and independence in the

20 Levi-Faur, D., “The Competition State as a Neomercantilist State: Understanding the Restructuring of National and Global Telecommunications” in Journal of Socio-Economics , Vol.27, No.6, 1998. 21 Cerny, P. G., “Paradoxes of the Competiton State: Dynamics of Political Globalization” in Government and Opposition, Vol.32, No.2, 1997, p.259. 22 Ibid., p.263. 23 Soederberg, S., “From a Developmental State to a Competition State? Conceprualizing the Mexican Political Economy within Global financial Orthodoxy” in Competition & hange, Vol.5, 2001, p. 135.

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changing environment. 24 Because “globalization increasingly constrains policymakers and circumscribes the policy capacity of the state.” 25 Indeed, the conditions under which government could take effective regulation in previous eras no longer exist.” 26

Cerny claims that it’s impossible for a country to maintain a welfare state, because the competition is too hard for welfare policies. Therefore, the marketization process of the state or for the state to be a market actor is not only necessary but also inescapable. Since;

The crisis of the welfare states lay in their decreasing capacity to insulate national economies from the global economy, and the combination of stagnation and inflation which resulted when they tried. The world since then has seen the emergence of a quite different beast, the competition state. Rather than attempt to take certain economic activities out of the market, to ‘decommodify’ them as the welfare state was organized to do, the competition state has pursued increased marketization in order to make economic activities located within the national territory, or which otherwise contribute to national wealth, more competitive in international and transnational terms. The main features of this process have included attempts to reduce

24 Lavenex, S. “The Competition State and Multilateral Liberalization of Highly Skilled Migration” in Smith, Michael, P and Fawell, A., (eds) Human Face of Global Mobility- Comparative Urban and Community Resarch, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2006), p.50. 25 Cerny, P. G. “The Dynamics of Financial Globalization : Technology Market Structure and Policy Response” in Policy Science, Vol. 27, 1994, pp.319-342. 26 Ibid.

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government spending in order to minimize the ‘crowding out’ of private investment by state consumption, and the deregulation of economic activities, especially financial markets. 27

In this process unlike the arguments of the globalization proponents, Cerny claims that “the nation-state, of course, is not dead, but its role has changed.” 28 Under new conditions, the society will get less public services. Instead private industry and private services are the main focus. One of the main roles of the state is to minimize inflation, in order to maintain the confidence of the international business and financial community. 29 The development of globalized financial markets raises several key issues for the analysis of politics, public policy, and the national state. 30

Cerny argues that since there is no a world government world trade can be organized in three ways “through workable international institutions; through a hegemonic state or group of states working through less formal mechanisms of power and influence; or through the reestablishment of much closer and more direct state control over the markets. Each of these mechanisms, to work effectively, must have sufficient institutional capacity and autonomy for the task.” 31 In

27 Cerny, P. G., 1997,p.259. 28 Ibid, p.270. 29 Ibid. 30 Cerny, P. G., 1994, pp.319-342. 31 Ibid..

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the globalization era four specific policy changes have taken place. These are;

1) a shift from macroeconomic to microeconomic interventionism, as reflected in both deregulation and industrial policy; 2) a shift in the focus of that interventionism from the development and maintenance of a range of ‘strategic’ or ‘basic’ economic activities in order to retain minimal economic self-sufficiency in key sectors to one of flexible response to competitive conditions in a range of diversified and rapidly evolving international marketplaces, i.e. the pursuit of ‘competitive advantage’ as distinct from ‘comparative advantage’; 3) an emphasis on the control of inflation and general neoliberal monetarism-supposedly translating into non-inflationary growth-as the touchstone of state economic management and interventionism; and 4) a shift in the focal point of party and governmental politics away from the general maximization of welfare within a nation (full employment, redistributive transfer payments and social service provision) to the promotion of enterprise, innovation and profitability in both private and public sectors. 32

Levi Faur states that in order to respond to the changes in both global and domestic economy state powers have undergone changes. 33 He

32 Cerny, P. G., 1997,p.260. 33 Soederberg, S., 2001, p. 139.

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continues claiming that “The competition state, without transforming the whole apparatus of the state and with an important but limited effect on society, is assuming a very “traditional role,” with a neomercantilist character, which it always had. It is revitalizing and reforming economic sectors in order to promote national competitiveness.” 34 The transformation of the nation-state into a ‘competition state’ lies at the heart of globalization. In seeking to adjust “to a range of complex changes in cultural, institutional and market structures, both state and market actors are attempting to reinvent the state as a quasi-‘enterprise association’ in a wider world context, a process which involves three central paradoxes. The first paradox is that this process does not lead to a simple decline of the state but may be seen to necessitate the actual expansion of de facto state intervention and regulation in the name of competitiveness and marketization.” 35

Furthermore, in a second paradox, when states try to adopt new global realities they also contribute in developing and strengthening globalization itself. And final paradox is that the development of this new political terrain in turn limits “the capacity of state institutions to embody the kind of communal solidarity which gave the modern nation-state its deeper legitimacy, institutionalized power and social embeddedness.” 36 These three paradoxes of competition state “is itself driving a process of political globalization which is increasingly

34 Levi-Faur, D.,1998. 35 Cerny, P. G., 1997, p.251. 36 Ibid.,pp.251-252.

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relativizing the sovereignty of states and, indeed, forcing the pace of globalization in economic, social and cultural spheres too.” 37

According Cerny, globalization process is also a product of both states and market forces. He explains the process as;

Globalization as a political phenomenon basically means that the shaping of the playing field of politics itself is increasingly determined not within insulated units, i.e. relatively autonomous and hierarchically organized structures called states; rather it derives from a complex congeries of multilevel games played on multilayered institutional playing fields, above and across, as well as within, state boundaries. These games are played out by state actors, as well as market actors and cultural actors. Thus globalization is a process of political structure and Political globalization involves reshaping political practices and institutional structures in order to adjust and adapt to the growing deficiencies of nation-states as perceived and experienced by such actors. 38

The globalization debate is globalization proponents on the one hand, who observe a decline of the state in the face of denationalized economies and the skeptics, on the other, who refute the unprecedented ness of current levels of interdependence and underline

37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.,p.253.

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the continuity of states’ interventionist powers. 39 In globalization, the state has been not only an agent of its own transformation but also a major source of the development of globalization itself. 40 Therefore, it’s possible to claim that state is still the main actor of the global politics as well as global market.

Although Cerny claims that in the era of globalization state power has not diminished but restructured or reorganized, from the arguments he puts forward even from the idea of competition state, it can be depict that state power has not only restructured but also weakened. In the pre-globalization era the state was the only actor and monopoly of power in international arena. Yet now it is one of the competitors. It’s competing not only with other states but also with non-state actors, especially the international market forces, TNCs.

Indeed, Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted, the capacities and functions of states have changed as non-state actors have proliferated and become increasingly powerful. 41 Among the reasons for the transformation of state sovereignty is this era of globalization in which the NSAs’ power increased. Thus the question arises: If states are losing power to NSAs, particularly in economic sphere, are states also losing some of their responsibilities

39 Lavenex, S., 2006, p.33. 40 Cerny, P. G. 1994, pp.319-342. 41 Bernstein, A.R. “Human Rights, Global Justice, and Disaggregated States: John Rawls, Onora O'Neill, and Anne-Marie Slaughter” in American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 66, No.1, pp.87–111.

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and rights, and are NSAs acquiring some or all of these, including responsibilities to respect and secure human rights?

For these reasons it must be borne in mind that the subject of potential violators of human rights has transcended the state-centric paradigm.

III. DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY OF NON-STATE ACTORS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

The increasing influence of non-state actors in the international relations has shaken the foundation of the traditional understanding of human rights. Several scholars claim that there is a need to hold NSAs, including TNCs directly accountable if they interfere with enjoyment of human rights. 42 The new way of thinking about human rights is primarily motivated by the current circumstances, which see the state’s position decline in its ability to ensure respect for human dignity. If some governmental functions are increasingly exercised by other entities, such as TNCs, NGOs, Intergovernmental organizations etc., accountability for human rights needs to be addressed directly to these entities. 43 Otherwise, a deficit may emerge in protecting human dignity.

It’s argued that as society and economy have evolved and other actors have more influence and power, states cannot be seen as the sole

42 Gutto O. and Shadrack B., Human and Peoples Rights For The Oppressed: Critical Essays On Theory and Practice From Sociology of Law Perspectives , Lund, Lund University Pres, 1993, p.106. 43 Danailov, S., The Accountability of Non-State Actors for Human Rights Violations: the Special Case of Transnational Corporations , Geneva: 1998, p.33.

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promoter and protector of human rights. 44 While not ignoring the fact that states have bear a fundamental responsibility for human rights, there is the emergence of a new paradigm that will include non-state actors in the equation of human rights promotion and protection. This evolution of the norms and policies of human rights is necessary in the era of globalization, particularly, in the case of weak states. 45

Bernstein argues that, it will not be up to the state to uphold human rights in the future. Instead, it will be up to transgovernmental networks consisting of officials of particular branches of different state governments, as well as broader policy networks, including international organizations, NGOs, corporations, and other interested actors. The members of these networks would be the bearers of the obligations created by treaties and other international agreements. 46

One of the prominent authorities in this field, Andrew Clapham, also, suggests going beyond the state-centered approach and argues that some of the obligations found in public international law, and traditionally only applied to states, also apply to non-state actors and claims that “There exist some actors besides states that are capable of bearing rights and obligations under general international law. Intergovernmental organizations such as UN, NATO and IMF etc. have the requisite international personality to claim rights and fulfill

44 ICHRDD, Emerging Human Rights Issues, Montreal, ICHRDD, 2006, 2006, p.10. 45 Ibid., p.11. 46 Bernstein, A.R. “Human Rights, Global Justice, and Disaggregated States: John Rawls, Onora O'Neill, and Anne-Marie Slaughter” in American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Nol. 66, No.1,2007,pp.87–111.

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their duties at the international level.” 47 Bernstein also argues that corporations and other nongovernmental organizations can help secure human rights and should be encouraged, expected, and better enabled to do so when and where states are unable. 48

III.1 The Responsibility of Non-State Actors in Human Rights Instruments: A Matter of Interpretation

A number of human rights instruments, arguably seek to apply to individuals, groups and corporations thus placing direct obligations on non-state actors.

The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the two International Covenants, in their preambular paragraphs recognizes duties on individuals to promote respect for human rights. “Declaration on the Responsibility of Individuals and Other Organs of the Society” and “the Declaration on the Right to Development” are recognizing the direct applicability of international human rights norms on non-state actors. These evidences certainly represent a sign towards a change at the conception of international human rights obligations applying to non-state actors. 49 Among these instruments Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is accepted as a part of customary international law and the two covenants are legally binding treaties.

47 Clapham, A., Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors , New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.30. 48 Bernstein, A.R. 2007,pp.87–111. 49 Danailov, S., 1998, p.48.

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It is now acknowledged that although general international law is understood to be based on a mix of customary practice and consent to treaties as binding on the state, human rights law has in large measure defied these narrow categories by suggesting an additional foundation premised on human dignity. 50 Human dignity makes certain claims on all actors, state and non-state, regardless of the individual State’s consent to custom or treaty. 51

This coming section focuses on the emerging trends towards asserting direct obligations of non-state actors in the light of a number of human rights instruments.

III.1.1 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)

The new trends have led the removal of the filter that only allows international lawyers and scholars to see the world through the rules of state responsibility. It can be suggested that we allow ourselves a wider field of vision that permits us to look at a larger range of actors and a multiplicity of jurisdictions and accountability mechanisms. We should rethink that international law can bind any entity that has the capacity to bear the relevant obligations. Starting with the United Nations and the European Community, it is fairly easy to show that the customary international law of human rights is considered binding

50 Jochnick, C., 1999, p.61. 51 Van Hoof, F., “International Human Rights Obligations for Companies and Domestic Courts: An Unlikely Combination?” in Castermans, M. et al (eds) The Role of the Nation- st State in the 21 Century, The Hague, Kluwer Law International,1998, p.55.

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on such non-state actors. For instance, it binds other non-state actors in fields such as the prohibition on slavery or genocide.

It has already been pointed out by a number of scholars and international lawyers that there were several explicit indications on obligations of individuals and other private actors under UDHR. The

UDHR proclaims in its preamble the pledge by states to achieve, in co-operation with the UN, the promotion of universal respect for human and observance of human rights and freedoms. At the same time, the Declaration imposes explicit direct obligations on non-state actors. It provides thus:

every individual and every organ of society [emphasis added by the author ), keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. 52

The Declaration recognizes non-state actor duties by affirming that

“everyone has duties to the community”. 53 It further expresses that nothing in it may be interpreted as implying for any state, group or

52 UDHR, Preamble available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (Last visit: 4 March 2007). 53 Ibid., Art 29.

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person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth in it. 54 Louis Henkin also claims that: “Every individual includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace.” 55

With regard to its legal effect, although it has provided neither legally binding force nor enforcement mechanism, it’s accepted that UDHR has embodied a part of customary international law. For instance, Daes explains why the legal effect of UDHR in customary and conventional international law has already been recognized. 56 According to her, the reality that most of the international agreements have referred to the UDHR proves the assumptions that “UDHR is of a quasi-legal significance as distinct from being the source and origin of legal rights and duties.” 57 Therefore, there is likelihood that the UDHR provisions including its Preamble could be legally enforceable.

On the basis of the eight paragraph of the Preamble, a number of scholars interpret it as providing substantive obligations for NSAs. On the other hand, some scholars object the content of the assumption on the grounds that the nature of the obligation derived from the

54 Ibid., Art 30.Art 5(1) of the ICCPR and Art 17 of the (European) Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 55 HRC, Implementation of General Resembly Resolution 60/251 0f 15 March 2006 Entitelled “Human rights Council”, A/HRC/4/035, February, 2007. p.12. available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/4session/A-HRC-4-35.doc (Last visit: 28.03.2007). 56 Daes, E.A., Freedom of the Individual under Law: Analysis of Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights , New York, UN, 1990, p.48. 57 Ibid. p.51.

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paragraph does not have a clear vision. For instance, Rodley argues that it only requires individuals to participate in teaching and civic education to promote respect for human rights as well as to secure their observance.” 58 Then he concludes that the obligations pointed out in the Preamble cannot be interpreted as being imposed either on individuals or on organs of the society directly to respect or observe human rights. 59

Article 29, paragraph one also refers to the individual duties and obligations. It states as “everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.” 60 Article 30 th of the UDHR also says that “Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person (emphasis added) any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.” 61 However, Rodley again claims that the rights mentioned here are not absolute, but only a language of faith. 62

III.1.2 The International Covenants on Human Rights

The second group of human rights instrument to be analyzed include International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 63 and The

58 Rodley, N., “Can Armed Opposition Group Violate Human Rights?” in Mahoney, K.E. and Mahoney, P., (ed.), Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century, Luwer Publishers, 1993,p.13. 59 Ibid.. 60 UDHR, Article, 29. 61 UDHR, Article 30. 62 Rodley, N., 1993, p.15. 63 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted in 1966.

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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 64 Because the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contained both civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights, it could not get the international consensus necessary to become a binding treaty. Particularly, the ideological confrontation in the Cold War years between capitalist nations which favored civil and political rights, and socialist nations which favored economic, social and cultural rights was preventing the consensus. In order to solve the problem, the two binding International Covenants were created instead of one. 65

The fifth paragraph of the common Preamble to the International Covenants on Human Rights states: “individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights.” 66 Since the covenants are legally binding treaties there is no doubt about their legal effects. Concerning to the preambular paragraph it seems to create duties for individuals to spend effort for promotion of human rights.

It’s claimed that the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights entails duties also on private actors. This view is supported firstly on the premise that many of the rights provided for in

64 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted in 1966. 65 The International Covenants can be accessed on http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm and http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm (Last visit: 4 March 2007). 66 Two Covenants, preamble, para.5.

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the Covenant reflect the provisions in the UDHR which in turn does impose obligations on both state and non-state actors alike. Secondly, the Covenant’s monitoring organ, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESR), whose general comments are considered to be authoritative under the Covenant, with regard to the right to health states that:

While only state parties are parties to the Covenant and thus ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all members of the society - individuals, including health professionals, local communities, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, as well as the private business sector-have responsibilities regarding the realization of the right to health… 67

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as mentioned above, also provides the obligations for non-state entities. 68 In this regard, Nowak has referred to the “horizontal effects” that human rights produce between private parties as opposed to the vertical relationship, which exists between the individual and the state. 69 He asserts therefore that it is possible to infer from the Covenant that rights are protected not only from violations by the state

67 General Comment No. 14,2000. ‘The Right to the highest attainable standard of health’ 11/09/2000, UN. Doc E/C.12/2000/4 para 42. available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4.En (last visit: 11.08.2008). 68 ICCPR, preamble and Art 5. 69 Nowak, M., UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, Strasbourg, N.P. Engel,1993,p. 38.

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but also by other actors. To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 70 Clapham therefore put forward that “Although a suggestion was made that the freedom of assembly should be protected only against ‘governmental interference’, it was generally understood that the individual should be protected against all kinds of interference in the exercise of this right.” 71 However, Rodley here again, has doubt on the text imposing direct obligations on individuals. 72

III.1.3 UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of the Society

Apart from the theoretical exploration of the responsibility of individual and other private actors, a practical commitment of the UN to the accountability of non-state actors is a remarkable improvement. Through the open-ended Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights a Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was adopted by the UN. 73 The open-end Working Group was

70 ICCPR, art.2. 71 Clapham, A., 1993,p.97. 72 Rodley, N., 1993, p.13. 73 Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was adopted in

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established in accordance with the decision of the Commission of 1985/112. The effort to draft a declaration has been fully supported by the Commission in its resolution of 1991/63 and ECOSOC resolution 1991/31.

The Working Group held meeting in 1992 and the first reading text was circulated to the states parties. The declaration was adopted by General Assembly resolution 53/144 of 9 December 1998.

The structure of the declaration is composed of six parts: a Preamble and 20 articles. Its Preamble reaffirms that the valuable work of individuals, groups and associations in contributing to, the effective elimination of all violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of peoples and individuals, including in relation to mass, flagrant or systematic violations such as those resulting from apartheid, all forms of racial discrimination, colonialism, foreign domination or occupation, aggression or threats to national sovereignty, national unity or territorial integrity and from the refusal to recognize the right of peoples to self-determination and the right of every people to exercise full sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources. 74

The most relevant provision to our discussion is the article 18 which states:

1998, available http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/freedom.htm (Last visit: 4 March, 2007). 74 UNDRIOOS, Pramble, para.4.

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1. Everyone has duties towards and within the community, in which alone the free and full development of his or her personality is possible. 2. Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations have an important role to play and a responsibility in safeguarding democracy, promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and contributing to the promotion and advancement of democratic societies, institutions and processes. 3. Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations also have an important role and a responsibility in contributing, as appropriate, to the promotion of the right of everyone to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can be fully realized. 75

It’s explicitly stressed in the quotation that not only the individuals but also groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations have responsibility in promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, they have responsibility in contributing to the promotion of the right of everyone to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the UDHR and other human rights instruments can be fully realized.

75 Ibid., Article.18.

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III.1.4 UN Declaration on the Right to Development

One of the newly emerged human right instruments is the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRD) which was adopted by the UN General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986. Although UNDRD recognizes the primary responsibility of the state76 it explicitly declares the responsibilities of individual. Its preamble confirms that the right to development is an inalienable human right and that equality of opportunity for development is a prerogative both of nations and of individuals (emphasis added) who make up nations.

Some scholars and lawyers claim that certain obligations and responsibilities of individuals and other organs of the society exist at a minimum standard level, “in the sense that a failure to comply with would make the individual a human rights violator.”77

So far, a number of evidence which prove to impose legal obligations on non-state actors for their interference with human rights has been mentioned. The provisions of UDHR and the two Covenants as well as the two declarations provide a fundamental ground for accountability of NSAs. However, there are claims that applying human rights obligations to non-state actors trivializes 78 human rights. i.e. this view challenges with the essence of the idea of human rights.

76 UNDRD, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986, preamble. 77 Rodley, N, 1993, p.15. 78 It’s claimed that human rights violations are different from ordinary crimes. They are not crimes that can be dealth with under the criminal law. Therefore, if they are evaluated as such, then applying human rights obligations to non-state actors trivializes human rights.

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Because human rights are related only to the serious abuses of state power and this is what distinguishes human rights from ordinary crime. 79

Apart from human rights instruments, international law has provided for certain instances where it is directly concerned with acts or commission of individuals. Individuals are held responsible for some acts, such as war crime, crime against peace, crime against humanity genocide etc. expressed in international instruments. 80

Article IV reminds us that persons committing acts of genocide shall be punished “whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.” 81 If, however, individuals and minority groups possess international rights independently of the state, enforcement of their rights will no longer depend on the interests of the state. It is contended that in the context of human rights the recognition of rights held by the individual independently of the state that are enforceable by either the aggrieved individual or other states is crucial.

Individual criminal responsibility therefore serves as a necessary addition to the state-centric human rights paradigm with the purpose of ensuring that individual perpetrators of international crimes do not

79 Clapham, A., 2006, p.33. 80 Rodley, N.,1993, p.303. 81 Clapham, A., 2006, p.29.

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escape personal responsibility under the notion of the state responsibility. 82

The Nuremberg process directly and indirectly affected upon the position of non-state actors in international law. From the standpoint of world order and international relations, Nuremberg does very important things in terms of theory and practice. For example, the Nuremberg process penetrates the veil of the state, and in doing so, radically modifies the traditional understanding of the concept of sovereignty. However the breach in absolute conception of sovereignty, in large measure, is due to the Nuremberg experience; and in this sense, that experience is a very revolutionary one. To extend this analysis further, Nuremberg makes individuals subject to international law. It also gives those individuals rights to adequate representation and fair judicial proceedings, which are rights guaranteed by the international character of the process. That is to say, Nuremberg changes the subject/object dimension of international legal order. The same is true with people's rights, with individual rights, and with the application of humanitarian precepts. 83 This rejection of the state-centric theory has marked an important breakthrough for human rights and has been subsequently followed in a series of cases. 84

82 Paraphrasing the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, reprinted in American Journal of International Law , Vol. 41,1947,pp.172-333. 83 Nagan, P.W., “Human Rights and Non-State Actors” in Peace International Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 209, Spring 1999,p.6. 84 Cassidy, J., Emergence of the Individual as an International Juristic Entity: Enforcement of International Human Rights, available at http://search.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/DeakinLRev/2004/25.html#fn1#f(Last visit: 03.03.2007).

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The examples of human rights instruments and international law referred are accepted by some scholars as the proof of the existence of direct obligations of private actors. It must be pointed out however that although the above human rights instruments seek to establish direct non-state actor responsibility, implementation mechanisms to enforce these obligations remain non-existent because the treaty monitoring procedures put central focus on the state.

IV. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTIVITIES OF NON- STATE ACTORS

Development of a common standard for holding states responsible for human rights has been one of the major achievements of international community in the last decades. All human rights instruments contain explicit obligations for states to take effective measures to prevent violations of human rights. 85 For instance, the sixth preamble paragraph of UDHR states that “Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 86 The preamble of the two international Covenants on the other hand, starts by saying that “the states parties to the present covenant…agree upon the following articles” 87 Being international agreements, most of the articles of the Covenants start

85 For example, ICCPR, Art 2 (3)(a); CEDAW, Art 2(e); CERD, Art 2 (e); ECHR, Art 1; American Convention on Human Rights. 86 UDHR, preamle, par.5. 87 Preambles of ICCPR and ICESCR.

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with the phrases such as “states parties to the present covenant…” 88 In addition to these, the article number one of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRD) states that “States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions favorable to the realization of the right to development.” 89 There is no doubt that the primary responsible actor for human rights is the state.

The Draft Articles on State Responsibility 90 can be used in this respect as an indication of established and developing customary law. 91 The draft regulates the principles governing when and how a state is held responsible for a breach of an international obligation. Breach of an international obligation is defined as “an act ... not in conformity with what is required ... by that obligation.” 92 The obligation may derive from a treaty, from custom, or from a general principle of law. Furthermore, the state cannot avoid responsibility by declaring something legal under its own domestic law. 93 Therefore in relation to human rights issues, state responsibility applies when a state is in breach of the obligation to respect internationally recognized human

88 Most of the articles of ICCPR and ICESCR start with similar phrases. 89 UNDRD, art.1. 90 Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session. The report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10). Text reproduced as it appears in the annex to General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, and corrected by document A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4. 91 Lawson, R., “Out of Control: State Responsibility and Human Rights: Will the ILC’s st Definition of the “Act of State” Meet the Challenges of the 21 Century?” in Castermans, M. st et al (eds) (1998) The Role of the Nation-State in the 21 Century, The Hague, Kluwer Law International,1998,p.91. 92 Draft Articles, art12. 93 Ibid., art.3.

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rights norms that arise from treaties, custom or jus cogens 94 . An act of a State that constitutes a breach of an international obligation is an internationally wrongful act, regardless of the subject matter of the obligation breached. 95

The Draft Articles also cover acts of state organs or entities exercising elements of governmental authority, acts carried out under the direction or control of the state, and acts acknowledged by a state as its own. 96 If a non-state actor is in such proximity with the state then the activities of the corporation invites state responsibility. The usage of the general state responsibility doctrine in this sense faces the major constraint that this mechanism cannot be used in situations where there is no connection between the private violation and the state.

At another level, state responsibility also implies an obligation on the state to ensure private actors’ compliance with international obligations and an obligation to prevent violations by them. 97 A number of human rights instruments specifically express the state’s responsibility for human rights violations of private actors and this has been principally recognized by voluntary initiatives as well. The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for instance, states that “states are responsible for violations of

94 Leckie, S., “Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 20, 1998, p.109. 95 Draft Articles, art 19. 96 Ibid., art 11. 97 Leckie, S.,1998,p.109.

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economic, social and cultural rights that result from the failure to exercise in controlling the behavior of non-state actors”. 98

Yet, there are counter arguments claiming that state is responsible only for its own wrong doing. Sacharoff, for instance, claims that international law holds a state responsible only for acts of state agents and state officials. Furthermore, if only the state is held responsible for the acts for private actors, this may weaken struggle for human rights. 99 Also as it was discussed in section on globalization, the state sometimes may not be able to protect human rights. Two particular arguments that are explained below support this view.

IV.1 Government and TNCs: Comrades

It’s possible and sometimes happen that NSAs particularly, TNCs and states in developing countries, are comrades in violating basic human rights. Even though, their objectives for doing so are different. It’s therefore, meaningless to expect most of the developing states to adequately monitor the behavior of NSAs, particularly TNCs. For instance, who is responsible for human rights violations in the case of failed state? Who is going to be responsible for the activities of TNCs in weak and failed states?

98 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in Human Rights Quarterly , Vol.20,1998,pp.691-705. also available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html (la visit: 10.01.2008).par.18. 99 Sacharoff, A.K., “Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?” in Brukley Journey of International Law, Vol.23, No.3,1998.

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In many cases, developing countries are not keen on applying domestic mechanisms to protect and promote human rights. Developing country in which the TNC operate (the host state) may not enforce human rights norms because they are seen as conflicting with a regulatory regime which will attract foreign direct investment. Even a host state which has the desire to implement human rights standards may not have the power and resources necessary to enforce them. 100 Furthermore, TNCs, in many cases, are much more powerful in terms of economy than the countries in which they operate 101 and therefore, it’s easy for them to impose their requests violating individual’s rights on the states. In most cases the ruling elite in the developing countries collaborate with NSAs in the human rights violation activities either directly or indirectly. For example, reports of TNCs forming alliances with the elite in developing countries and getting directly involved even repressive activities of the said governments are not uncommon. 102

IV.2 Inadequacy of Domestic Remedies

100 Mcleay, F., “Corporate Codes Of Conduct And The Human Rights Acountability of Transnational Corporations- A Small Piece Of A Large Puzzle”, Global Law Working Paper 01/05 Symposium- Transnational Corporations And Human Rights, p.5. Availale At Http://Www.Nyulawglobal.Org/Workingpapers/Documents/GLWP0105McLeay.Pdf (Last Visit: 10112006). 101 Anderson, S. And Cavanagh, J., “Top 200: The Rise Of Global Corporate Power By Sarah Anderson And John Cavanagh” Http://Globalpolicy.Igc.Org/Socecon/Tncs/Top200.Htm. (21.11.2005). 102 Mokhiber, R. And Weissman, R., “Beat the Devil” in Multinational Monitor, Vol.18, No.12, 1997.

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The use of domestic law to tackle the problem of all NSAs has inherent limitations due to the nature of NSA activities. Focusing on TNCs activities and their operations abroad with subcontractors is an illustrative case. The process of subcontracting, allows TNCs to limit their liability for worker rights violations. This has consequently resulted into the flourishing of the informal labor markets where workers virtually have no rights, particularly in countries where economy depends heavily on foreign direct investment or export commodity. Similarly, the activities of militia or terrorist organization are uncontrollable by states. Also, states cannot control many international organizations as well as supranational organizations.

However, the reality is that despite the spread of the notion based on the responsibility of private actors, international community is yet to develop mechanisms for enforcing these direct obligations. On the other hand, any discussion on the question of private actor responsibility for human rights eventually fall for consideration within the framework of state responsibility for human rights violations

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The Turkish Policy of Opening up to Africa

Kenan Tepedelen 1

Turkey’s constantly increasing contacts with Africa-the latest most striking example of which was the Summit between Turkish and African Heads of State and Government which took place in İstanbul during August 18-21 2008 - is being regarded with increasing interest by the Turkish public and media. The following is an attempt to outline the developments that needed to take place to arrive at this point.

When looked at from a historical perspective, the first fact that must be taken into account is that the Ottoman Empire was also an African State.

In fact, the Turks first established a state in Egypt during 868-905 as the Toluno ğulları 2. Later the Mameluke (Kölemen/Slave) Turkish Sultanate was established in 1250 by Aybek and continued to exist until 1517 3.

1 Ambassador. 2 Assct. Prof. Ahmet Kavas : Osmanlı-Afrika İli şkileri (Ottoman-African Relations) TASAM Publications; İstanbul 2006, pp 29-30 3 Kâmuran Gürün: Türkler ve Türk Devletler i Tarihi (The Turks and a History of Turkish States) Bilgi Publications; Ankara 1984, p 393

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The lasting presence of the Turks in Egypt in fact dates from 1517 with the conquest of this country by the Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Sultan Selim.

During this period, two Turkish Admirals Oruç Reis and Hızır Reis, heeding the plea of the Muslims of Northern Africa for help against the Spanish who wished to colonise the region, proceeded to fight for the Muslims, in the process conquering Algeria in 1516.

Two years later, Hızır Reis who had become the Emir (Prince) of Algeria proceeded to seek Ottoman protection and taking the name Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha (Barbarossa) took command of the Ottoman Fleet in the Mediterranean as Kaptan-ı Derya (First admiral of the Navy).

The capture of Tripoli (in modern Libya) and that of Tunis in 1551 and 1574, respectively, put an end to Spanish claims in North Africa, making Algeria, Western Trablus (Libya) and Tunisia a part of the Ottoman Empire.

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire had established cordial relations with Morocco and was able thus to commence relations with African tribes living in the Sahara Region. The renowned Turkish Admiral Turgut

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Reis who was also the Governor of Tripoli had established friendly relations with the Kanem-Bornu Muslim Sultanate 4.

The relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Kanem -Bornu Sultanate were further strengthened during the reign of the Ottoman Sultan Murad III. 5

As for Eastern Africa; during the reign of Yavuz Sultan Selim, the Turks had not only conquered Egypt but had also seized the Hejaz region on the Red Sea across from the shores of Eastern Africa. Thus ensued great rivalry and a fierce struggle between the Ottomans and the Portuguese for control of the Red Sea, since this was strategically essential for egress into the Indian Ocean and therefore Indian trade.

The conquest of the Yemen in 1538 followed by Sewwakin in the Sudan and the capture of the port of Massawa in present day Eritrea turned the Red Sea into a de facto Ottoman Lake.

These developments caused the Ottomans to show an especial interest in Ethiopia. Not only was Ethiopia on the strategic route to the Indian Ocean, but was also a country rich in gold. Thus, during the period of greatest Ottoman strength, the reign of Kanunî Sultan Süleyman (Suleiman the Magnificent), Ottoman Turkish forces under the

4 The Kanem Bornu Sultanate was a large Black African State holding sway over Northern Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Northern Cameroun. 5 Numan Hazar ‘Küreselle şme Sürecinde Afrika ve Türkiye- Afrika İli şkileri.’(Africa within the Globalisation Process and Turco-African Relations); Yeni Türkiye Publications; 2003, pp 80-92

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command of first Özdemir Pasha and later that of Özdemiro ğlu Osman Pasha, took to the Horn of Africa capturing in turn the Sudanese coast, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and parts of non-coastal Ethiopia also. In this manner, the Habesh Province (the Abyssinian Province) was established. It was to be administered from Massawa under the direction of a “beylerbeyi” (supreme governor) 6.

The loss of power suffered by the Ottoman Empire reached its nadir in the 19 th century. This, coupled by the race for colonisation that European states were involved in, resulted with a form of division of the continent among themselves leading to the weakening of Ottoman ties with Africa. With the loss of Libya following the Turco-Italian war of 1911-1912, Turkey lost all real presence in Africa.

Soon after the creation and establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkey established in 1926 diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, at that time one of the very few independent states in Africa together with Egypt and Liberia. In fact, Atatürk sent the Turkish Minister to Cairo Muhittin Pasha to Addis Ababa in order to represent him at the coronation ceremony of Emperor Haile Selassie I which took place in 1930.

The ties established with Ethiopia at this point in history are rather meaningful in terms of the vision enjoyed by the young Turkish

6 Cengiz Orhonlu Habe ş Eyaleti (The Abyssinian Province) Türk Tarih Kurumu Publications;1996

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Republic. Together with the advent of decolonisation, diplomatic relations were established with a number of African countries from 1956 onwards as they, in turn, gained their independence. From the very beginning Turkey has supported the struggle for independence in Africa as well as the struggle to end the racist system of “apartheid” that prevailed in South Africa up to the 1990’s.

Following the so-called January 24 th Resolutions (January 24 th 1980), Turkey entered a phase of structural adjustment oriented toward a free-market economy. The economic growth that was aimed at this period was based on increased foreign trade, particularly increased exports. The fact that Africa with its rich natural resources and population of 850 million inhabitants could be an excellent market for Turkey was noted by the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal and in accordance to his wishes a delegation composed of members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and those from the Under-Secretariat for Foreign Trade went to Africa on a fact finding mission from March 18 th to April 5 th 1989. The Delegation’s positive findings were later related to Turkish businessmen. 7

It had been observed that a country of Turkey’s stature did not have sufficiently developed relations with the fifty three African countries as represented in the UN and in particular with the sub-Saharan countries (SAGA) and from this it followed as a natural progression

7 Tan şuğ Bleda Meslekî Anılar (Professional Memoirs); Do ğan Publications, İstanbul, pp 184- 191

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that under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs work was begun to formulate a policy for opening-up to Africa. In fact, during the tenure of the 55 th Government of the Republic, an “Action Plan for Opening-up to Africa” was formulated and put into action after October 1998.

In brief, the plan envisages the increase of high-level contacts between Turkey and African countries, thus creating the necessary environment for the further development of political relations, the establishment of the necessary legal infrastructure for the improvement of economic and commercial relations, the development of relations in education and culture, furthermore the establishment of military relations that would allow inter alia to provide Turkish forces for UN peace-keeping missions in Africa and finally improving the level of representation of Turkey (i.e. increasing the number of diplomatic missions) in Africa.

In parallel to the “Action Plan”, the Under-Secretariat for Foreign Trade (attached to the Prime-Minister’s Office) put into place a “Strategy for Improving Economic Relations with Africa” in 2003. The main aims of this may be summarized as follows: - The gradual increase of Turkey’s part in African Commerce (including all African countries); - Creating the means for small and medium sized Turkish businesses to open-up

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to Africa; - Enabling Turkey to enter into joint ventures in Africa; - Realizing the transfer of technology from Turkey to Africa; - The increase of market share for Turkish contractors, consultants and engineering firms in Africa.

The fruits both of the “Action Plan for Opening-up to Africa” and of “The Strategy for Improving Economic Relations with Africa” are now becoming tangible.

In fact, while the value of trade between Turkey and Africa was 5,5 billion USD in 2003, this rose to almost 13 billion dollars in 2007. Turkey’s aim is to increase this sum to 30 billion dollars by 2010. 8

Meanwhile, the value of investment by Turkish Companies in Africa has reached 404 million USD and shows a tendency to increase. 9

The total value of projects involving Turkish contractors in Africa reached a value of 22,4 billion USD at the end of 2007. 469 of these projects are taking place in Northern Africa at a total value of 21,6 billion USD, while 25 projects with a value of 800 million USD are being undertaken in Sub-Saharan Africa. 10

8 Figures of the Under-Secretariat for Foreign Trade, the Prime-Minister’s Office. 9 Figures of the Under-Secretariat for Treasury, the Prime-Minister’s Office. 10 Figures of the Union of Turkish Contractors.

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Within this framework, it must be pointed out that Turkey has been accepted as the 25 th non-regional member of the African Development Bank on May 2008. Once the necessary legal formalities shall be taken care of, this membership will ensure that Turkey will be able to partake in tenders for infrastructure projects financed by the African Development Bank.

In parallel with these developments, Turkey is trying to improve its communications network with African countries. At present, Turkish Airlines has scheduled flights to most all destinations in North Africa and also to Khartoum, Addis Ababa, Johannesburg and Lagos. Work is underway to establish scheduled flights to Dakar and Nairobi in the near future.

Relations between Turkey and Africa have become very dynamic over the past three years. The fact that the Turkish economy has been growing in average at a rate of approximately % 6 over the last years has no doubt had a positive effect on this outcome.

In fact, the Turkish GNI at the end of 2007 was approximately 660 billion USD whilst the value of gross Turkish trade abroad was about 300 billion USD at the same date thus making the Turkish economy the 17 th largest in the world. Turkey has also been attracting approximately 20 billion USD per annum of foreign capital, until the recent global economic crisis broke out.

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These factors have enabled Turkey to extend a helping hand to Africa and become an emerging donor country throughout the continent. In this sense, 2005 is a watershed year in Turkish-African relations.

In this context, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo ğan visited during March 1 st - 5th 2005 Ethiopia and South Africa formally. These constituted the first formal visit paid by any Turkish Prime Minister to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Similarly, it was in 2005 that Turkey achieved observer status to the African Union. Thus, the Turkish Ambassador to Addis Ababa also became the permanent Turkish representative to the African Union.

Turkey also declared 2005 ‘Africa Year’ and it was during this year that the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (T İKA) opened its first office in Africa on March 2 nd 2005 at Addis Ababa. Thus, T İKA, which since its inception had concentrated its work in the Central Asian region and the Balkans, began work in Africa. Regional offices were opened in Khartoum and Dakar in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Therefore, at present with its three regional co-ordination offices, TİKA serves a total of 37 African countries particularly in the areas of health, agriculture and education.

Africa which has only a 2 % share of world trade, does not manage to take any advantages from the process of globalisation. In fact, half the

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population of sub-Saharan Africa subsists on less than 1 USD a day. The continent is ravaged by hunger, poverty, drought and highly infectious illnesses (for example, HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, polio etc.). Many of these problems have become chronic.

Turkey, who considers aiding the least developed countries and in this framework Africa as a humane and moral endeavour, believes that unless sustainable development is not achieved in Africa, world peace and stability would also become endangered.

During 2005-2008, Turkey has either directly or via the relevant offices of the UN, given 23 million USD to African countries in need and has allocated a further 50 million USD for use in a variety of developmental projects throughout Africa over the next five years.

The above attempted to analyse the framework of the rapprochement between Turkey and Africa as well as its rationale.

As for the reasons for African interest in this cooperation and rapprochement, these may be summarized as follows:

- Above all else, African countries have confidence in Turkey. Since Turkey does not have a history of colonisation and since it is not perceived to possess any hidden agenda towards Africa, she inspires confidence.

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- Much of the aid at present emanating from the U.S and Western European countries to Africa is most often linked to “conditions” such as better governance by the country concerned or attention to human rights or democratisation and similar reforms. Meanwhile, the modus operandi of TİKA, the major contributor of Turkey’s donor programme, are considerably different. The projects supported by T İKA are essentially those formulated by African countries themselves for which TİKA provides technological support. In other words, the projects undertaken and supported by T İKA in Africa involve professional training. On the other hand, projects such as opening up water wells in arid regions of Africa or providing schools with computers are relatively low cost and yet are publicly acclaimed. - Turkey also attracts African countries because of its geopolitical and geostrategic position as well as the steps it has taken toward the creation of inter-cultural dialogue, its laic (secular) institutions and its candidature for membership of the European Union. - 27 African countries are members of the Organisation of Islamic Conference as is Turkey. - African countries perceive Turkey as an emerging donor country which, in its position as the world’s 17 th largest economy, would be able to offer its contribution to the economic and social development of Africa.

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As a result, the Executive Council Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of African Union Member Countries held in Addis Ababa, during January 25 th – 29 th 2008, in the 12 th Ordinary Session, Turkey was accepted as a “strategic partner”; this constituted a watershed in Turkish-African relations.

When considered that such a relationship was enjoyed up to the present only by the People’s Republic of China, Japan, South Korea, India, South America as a continent, and the European Union as a regional organisation, the value and meaning of such a tie being conferred to Turkey becomes more apparent.

The natural conclusion of this rising dynamic in Turkish-African relations was the convention of a Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in Istanbul during August 18 th -21 st 2008.

The aim of the Conference which was realized with the participation of Heads of State and Government, Cabinet Ministers and Ambassadors from 49 African countries was twofold; on the one hand to assess the level Turkish-African relations had already attained and on the other to ascertain future areas of cooperation.

At the end of the Conference, The Istanbul Declaration on Africa- Turkey Partnership which provided for the establishment of “Solidarity and Partnership for a Common Future” was adopted as

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well as a document establishing guidelines for the implementation of the plan “The Framework of Cooperation for Africa-Turkey Partnership”.

In the Istanbul Declaration, after a preamble consisting of the general principles of Turkish-African Cooperation, the areas of cooperation were defined as:

-Inter-governmental cooperation; -Trade and Investment; -Agriculture, Agribusiness, Rural Development, Water Resources Management and Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs); -Health; -Peace and Security; -Infrastructure, Energy and Transport; -Culture, Tourism and Education; -Media and Information and Communication Technology; -Environment;

In order to ensure the implementation of the provisions and policies of the Istanbul Declaration, the establishment of a follow-up mechanism was also decided. Accordingly, it was convened that a Turkey-Africa Summit of Heads of State and Government would take place every five years in Turkey and in Africa respectively (the Second Turkey- Africa Summit is to take place in Africa in 2013). Similarly, it was

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agreed that in the intervening period between Summits a ministerial level review conference would take place on the third year proceeding the Summit.

It was also agreed that a meeting of senior officials would take place twice during the period between summits in order to prepare the agenda for the ministerial meeting and to report to the Ministerial Review Conference.

The month of August was in many senses a true meeting between Turkey and Africa; 18 th -21 st August , when the Turkey-Africa Summit took place, before the Summit during August 14 th -16 th 2008 the Turkish Asian Strategic Research Centre, TASAM organized a Forum of Turkish-African Civilian Organisations, moreover in parallel to the Summit a Turkish-African Business Forum also took place.

As a result of the Turkish-African NGOs Forum, it was decided that an International Civilian Organisations and Cooperation Platform be established (the acronym being USTK İP in Turkish) and that a web site which would use the Turkish and African formal languages would be created to provide information from the address www.ustkip.org .

As a result of the Turkey-Africa Business Forum Meeting in name of the various Chambers of commerce of Turkey and of Africa, The Turkish Union of Chambers and Stock Markets (TOBB) and the African Commercial. Industrial, Agricultural and Professional

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Chambers Union (UACCIAP) agreed to form a Turkish –African Chamber.

When examining the Declarations agreed upon as a result of the Turkey- Africa Summit and the NGOs Forum that took place in tandem, as well as the Business Forum, we find that the aim of establishing knowledge and resource sharing emerged as a highly significant and important goal. This also indicates the unique nature of the Turkish –African strategic partnership.

As a matter of fact , this partnership which resides purely on equality and mutual gain, is a relationship in which both sides gain; in other words a true “win-win” situation.

Doubtless, the follow-up proceedings in the near future following the Declaration adopted as a result of the Istanbul Summit and of the “Framework of Cooperation for Africa-Turkey Partnership” document will be of great importance. Similarly, there can be no doubt that the Turkish-African relationship which has evolved into a strategic partnership, if pursued with perseverance, shall provide both Turkey and Africa with great benefits.

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Address by Ambassador Nedzad Hadzimusic, Director of RACVIAC

– Centre for Security Cooperation in Southeast Europe

The Foreign Policy Institute and Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey 12th January 2009

REGIONAL COOPERATION – INDISPENSABLE TOOL FOR EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION OF SOUTHEAST EUROPE:

RACVIAC, Centre for Security Cooperation in SEE and its Contribution to regional Security and Stability

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1. Security and Stability

1.1 Security

There is an immense literature on the analysis and categorization of security. Part of the reason for this is that, in most security systems, the "weakest link in the chain" is the most important. The situation is asymmetric since the defender must cover all points of attack while the attacker need only identify a single weak point upon which to concentrate.

With no preaching to distinguished audience and converted people in the most reputed Foreign Policy Institute and Bilkent University here in Ankara, allow me to briefly focus on International and - as a result - Regional Security as one of the many realms of Political Security, such as Homeland Security; Human Security; National Security; Public Security.

International and consequently Regional Security consists of the measures taken by nations and international organizations, such as the United Nations, to ensure mutual survival and safety. These measures include military action and diplomatic agreements such as treaties and conventions. International and national security is invariably linked. Peoples only gain political security from co-operating with their neighbors. RACVIAC - Centre for Security Cooperation is fostering this co-operation by definition.

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1.2 Stability

Stability could be defined as the tendency of the variables or components of a system to remain within defined and recognizable limits despite the impact of disturbances. Thus, stability is the ability of a system to persist and to remain qualitatively unchanged in response either to a disturbance or to fluctuations of the system caused by a disturbance. Furthermore, stability is the capacity of an object or system to return to equilibrium after having been displaced. Note with two possible kinds of equilibrium one may have a static (linear) stability of rest or a dynamic (non-linear) stability of an endlessly repeated motion. A system is stable if, when perturbed, it returns to its original state. The more quickly it returns, the more stable it is.

Southeast Europe has not yet reached the level of regional stability necessary to fully integrate to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures as a region! This is not the least justification for the existance of the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC). And RACVIAC - Centre for Security Cooperation could become the strongest working muscle for the RCC.

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2. A brief retrospective on co-operation: From South East European Co-operation Process (SEECP) to Stability Pact (SPSEE) to Regional Cooperation Council (RCC).

• International Community (IC) was ill prepared for the collapse of ex-Yugoslavia.

• Result: region was tragically denied of peaceful integration into Euro-Atlantic Structures, the way obtained by a great majority of the countries use to belong to Soviet lager.

• Consequences of the so called containment approach: spill over and escalation of conflicts; massive destruction of infrastructure, historical and cultural monuments; gratuitous escalation of violence and number of victims;

• Lessons learned brought about more responsible and carefully elaborate approach by the IC to the region in the aftermath of the conflicts. Principle goal: sustainable, lasting stability trough down to earth style regional cooperation and integration of the whole region of SEE/Western Balkans to EU and NATO.

• Dr Erhard Busek, Coordinator for SECI Initiative (Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative) – launched 1996, and Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for SEE (SP) - launched

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1999: “Regional cooperation is an imperative – the best training camp for gradual integration of all the Western Balkans countries into European mainstream”

• SEECP launched 1996 – as a “genuine voice of the region” with heterogeneous membership: countries of ex-Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia, and Croatia) – plus Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania,, joined later by Croatia (2005) Moldova (2006) and Montenegro (2007).

• “Ownership process”- end of Stability Pact for SEE with Secretariat out of the theatre (Brussels) and creation of the Regional Cooperative Council (2008, Sarajevo).

• Other regional initiatives & Centres disseminated by SP throughout of the region: CEI- Central European Initiative (Trieste); AII - Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (Ancona); Danube Cooperation Process (DCP); RACVIAC-Centre for Security Cooperation (Zagreb); MARRI (SKOPJE); SESAC (Beograd); DPPI (Sarajevo) . . .

2.1 South East European Co-operation Process (SEECP)

The SEECP was launched on Bulgaria's initiative in 1996. At the Bulgaria-chaired meeting in Sofia, the SEE countries laid the

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foundations for regional co-operation for the purposes of creating an atmosphere of trust, good neighbourly relations and stability. A special characteristic of SEECP is that it is an original form of co- operation among the countries in the region launched on their own initiative, and not on the initiative of some other international organisations or countries. In that regard, the SEECP seeks to define itself as an authentic voice of SEE, complementary to the Stability Pact or the Stabilisation and Association Process.

The basic goals of regional co-operation within SEECP include the strengthening of security and political situation, intensification of economic relations and co-operation in human resources, democracy, justice, and battle against illegal activities. It is the intention of the SEECP to enable its members to approach the European and Euro- Atlantic structures through the strengthening of good neighbourly relations and transformation of the region into an area of peace and stability.

JOINT STATEMENT (Article 12) Meeting of the Ministers of Defense of South East European Countries, Sofia, March 11th 2008

Quote - Implementing the decisions taken at the 2005 Bucharest Meeting of the Ministers of Defense, we took into account the results achieved by the work of Center for Security Cooperation – RACVIAC. We are satisfied with the successful work of the Center in

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the area of extra military properties conversion and social adaptation of released servicemen as a result of the reforms. We welcome the decisions of the Multinational Advisory Group regarding the new objectives, tasks and funding mechanisms for the Center based on the Regional Ownership concept. We declare our readiness to participate in the formation of RACVIAC’s joint budget. We expect the Center’s leadership to actively work for the timely formulation of a new, adequate structure and optimized activities and expenditures plan. – Unquote

2.2 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE)

The SPSEE was an institution aimed at strengthening peace, democracy, human rights and economy in the countries of Southeast Europe from 1999-2008. It was replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in February 2008. The RCC replaced the Stability Pact because it is more "regionally owned" than the SP, which was driven more by outside partners such as the EU.

The pact was created at the initiative of the European Union on June 10, 1999 in Cologne. All of the countries of the region, except for Serbia and Montenegro (then FR Yugoslavia) and Moldova, were present at the founding conference. Representatives of Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Turkey, USA, all members of the EU at the time, OSCE, Council of Europe and European Commission were also considered active participants. Representatives of Canada, Japan,

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UN, UNHCR, NATO, OECD, WEU, IMF, World Bank, European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development were present as facilitators.

The pact was created subsequent to the escalation of Kosovo War and stability of Kosovo was among the primary objectives.

In 2006 it was announced that in early 2008 the Stability Pact should be succeeded by a more regionally owned co-operation framework, the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC) formed by the countries of the region themselves, but with continued support and advice from the international community. The Southeast European Cooperation Process should be playing an important role in this process.

The last meeting of the SPSEE took place on 28 February 2008, when it was succeeded by the Regional Cooperation Council.

2.3 Regional Co-operation Council (RCC)

The RCC is a regional cooperative network for countries in Southeastern Europe, with the stated goal of "promoting mutual cooperation and European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Southeast Europe in order to reinvigorate economic and social development in the region to the benefit of its people." It succeeded the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe on 27 February, 2008. The RCC receives political guidance from the Southeast European Cooperation Process.

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The RCC headquarters is located in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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3. RACVIAC and its Contribution to Security and Stability in Southeast Europe

3.1 RACVIAC Mission

The mission of RACVIAC is to foster dialogue and cooperation on security matters in South Eastern Europe through a partnership between the countries of the region and their international partners. RACVIAC accomplishes this mission by:

• Transforming thinking on national, regional and international security cooperation issues,

• Exposing participants to the benefit of cooperative approaches to security issues, primarily through conferences, courses, seminars and meetings at RACVIAC, as well as through language training and other applicable supportive programmes,

• Reaching key members of national, regional, and international security cooperation communities.

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RACVIAC carries out an ongoing needs assessment of the situation in Southeast Europe through enhanced international co-operation, especially with institutions located in or close to the region.

Consequently, RACVIAC contributes significantly to institutional/administrative capacity building on an academic level supplementary to and stimulating the practical work done in the region.

Subsequently, RACVIAC is giving support to the improvement of networks in the field of security policy and helping to create a peaceful, strategic and stable community in Southeast Europe compatible to other organizations/institutions.

3.2 RACVIAC Overarching Themes

RACVIAC focuses on three overarching themes:

• International Relations and Cooperation, with a special focus on Euro-Atlantic integration

• Security Sector Reform

• Cooperative Security Environment, with the focus on Arms Control

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3.3 RACVIAC Strategic Objectives

• To strengthen the SEE region’s overall stability and security • To improve the momentum achieved thru all arms control mechanisms and confidence and security building measures

• To promote Security Sector Reform and encourage regional cooperation in the area of Defense Conversion

• To encourage regional cooperation to effectively counter terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, and all kinds of illicit trafficking

• To support European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes

• To be at the ready to assist the Regional Cooperation Council’s (RCC) activities

• To seek for synergy with organizations and institutions having similar objectives, such as EU, NATO, OSCE

• To communicate and to support European Security and Defense Policy

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3.4 RACVIAC Vision

RACVIAC shall become the premier platform for dialogue on security cooperation in the region.

3.5 What participants ought to remember

Mission: The mission of RACVIAC is to foster dialogue and cooperation on security matters in South Eastern Europe through a partnership between the countries of the region and their international partners.

Strategic objectives: 1. To strengthen the SEE region’s overall stability and security 2. To improve the momentum achieved through all arms control mechanisms and confidence as well as security building measures 3. To promote Security Sector Reform and encourage regional cooperation in the area of Defense Conversion 4. To encourage regional cooperation as to effectively counter terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, and all kinds of illicit trafficking 5. To support European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes 6. To be at the ready to assist the Regional Cooperation Council’s (RCC) activities

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7. To seek for synergy with organizations and institutions having similar objectives, such as the EU, NATO, OSCE 8. To communicate and to support European Security and Defence Policy

Budget 2009: Core part of the budget: 411,000 EUR (overheads considered) Activity part of the budget: 489,000 EUR (cost estimation)

Programme 2009: Out of 27 planned activities, 4 are training courses, 3 are conferences and 20 are seminars/workshops. Additional activities are in the process of development.

Ownership: RACVIAC - Centre for Security Cooperation is materializing the principle of regional ownership! In the region (SEE) - for the region (SEECP) Chairman of the MAG from the region Led by a Director - for the first time a civilian diplomat - from the region Chief of Staff always from the host nation Core portion of the budget raised by the region Staff predominantly from the region

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Cooperation: RACVIAC co-operates with all relevant organizations and institutions in the region and beyond!

RACVIAC New Organization: • A more academic orientation of the Centre

• The abolition of a simple military structure/hierarchy by introducing a more collegial working relationship amongst the faculty members

• A program development cycle with internal review mechanism

• A leaner and more output oriented - both quality and quantity - structure

A working Group, currently elaborating RACVIAC New Organization, is close to finishing its work.

RACVIAC Legal Status: A working group is currently elaborating a new legally binding document on “RACVIAC Legal Status”.

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RACVIAC Manpower: Out of 36 staff members 9 are seconded from HR, 4 from BA, 3 from DE, 2 from GR, and 1 each from AL, AT, HU, IT, MD, MK, SI, RS, TR. Furthermore, there are 9 staff members employed locally.

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Turkish-Russian Roundtable On a Global Framework October 10th and 11th, 2008

Middle East

Turkey’s Policy towards Iraq in the post-Saddam era

Tarık O ğuzlu 1

US Policy in Iraq during 2003-2006 US Policy during 2003-2006 period can be described a pro-Kurdish, as Kurdish groups received strong US support. This period provided 3 important gains for Kurdish groups. The first one is the article 140 of the new Iraqi constitution which states that Kirkuk’s final status is to be decided through a referendum. Secondly, Kurdish Region became a federal area and the Iraqi Constitution defines Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) region as a federal unit in Iraq. And lastly, Kurds gained influential positions in state administration such as the presidency of Mr. Talabani.

1 Assoc. Prof. Bilkent University

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Another aspect of US policy in this period was about the containment of both Shiite and Sunni forces. After US take over, Sunnis were excluded from the Iraqi body politics. The goal was to consolidate de- Baathification. At the same time US aimed at eradicating the roots of the Al Qaeda in Iraq through the cooperation of Shiite militias as there was no possibility of an alliance with Sunni groups against Al-Qaeda or resistance groups. In 2003-2006, US tried to exclude Iran from the game as a legitimate player. After the end of military campaign against Saddam Hussein, Iraqi army was disbanded and new Iraqi forces were to be established. The US military plan was just to do the clearing the ground from any unwanted group and activity. Holding the ground and rebuilding it, would be undertaken by Iraqi forces. This strategy, however, proved to be wrong.

US policy in Iraq since early 2007 When we came to 2007, US understood that Peace with the Sunni Arabs was necessary to fight the Al-Qaeda and Baathist resistance. Therefore US increased its support to Sunni groups such as the Sunni Awakening group and the Sons of Iraq. Understandably the US support increased the strength of the Sunnis and The Awakening has now at least 100000 men under arm, for instance. Through its support to Sunnis, US goal was to see that the Sunni forces are reintegrated into the Iraqi army and the new political elections, local and general, ease the way for Sunni representation in state administration. Since the early 2007, the beginning of the surge strategy, more troops are needed to provide stability and security in Iraq. Now Sunni Arabs are

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in the payrolls of US administration, too. De-Baathification strategy which was aimed at during 2003-2006 period needed to be reversed. In addition to that previous US strategy to clear and leave to Iraqi forces was redefined as clear-hold-build. This time the US soldiers do the fighting and stay in the war zone to consolidate the gains. They do not turn over the field over to the local Iraqi forces after the war came to an end. The US goal was redefined as to win hearths and minds of the Sunni Iraqis.

Another change was seen in the attitude towards Iran as well as Syria. It is now the case that the Washington administration has now been in the process of altering its exclusionary approach towards Iran and Syria, as the voices of traditional realists are now being heard more often than the neo-con demagogues. The need to talk to Tehran and Damascus in order to contribute to the emergence of long-term stability in Iraq and the region has now become more pronounced in Washington than ever. Reconciliation with Iran was seen necessary to have lasting stability in Iraq. Therefore Iran’s support is needed to have control over Iraq’s anti-American Shia groups. This resulted in such a deal like; the US would not support the Iranian regime’s opponents in Iraq. In return Iran would help the US secure Sadr’s agreement to a ceasefire. Sadr group declared ceasefire in the summer of 2007 and cease fire was extended in April 2008. This fact constitutes a main factor for the positive results yielded by the surge strategy. As the surge strategy proved functioning and level of violence decreased in Iraq, the issue of pulling back American soldiers

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from Iraq has been debated more vociferously then ever. The best way to succeed in Iraq before withdrawing is to tie the decision of withdrawal to clear benchmarks, success of the Iraqis to settle their problems at home. It is important to keep in mind that the satisfaction of Arabs, both Shia and Sunni, is more important than the satisfaction of Kurds for long-term stability in Iraq. A strategy that primarily relies on Kurdish support, at the expense of Arabs, particularly Sunnis, would never work. The Kurds do now have to fight at two fronts, Baghdad front and Ankara front. Kurds are in fight with Arabs over Kirkuk, the share of the oil resource, the limits of regional government, the budget, and Turkey over Kirkuk and PKK. The Americans would likely side with the Arabs over Kirkuk, for they have increasingly become dependent on their cooperation.

Indications of new strategy to tilt towards Arabs For the United States to leave Iraq as soon as possible as claimed by the majority of Iraqis and foreseen by the presidential candidates, Iraq should turn to a stable and secure place. For this to happen, the satisfaction of Arab demands, particularly the Sunnis, is important. The change in the US policy from relying on Kurdish support to provision of Shia and Sunni satisfaction for long-term stability in Iraq inevitably have had positive implications for Arabian side of Iraqi. First of all, the referendum on Kirkuk is postponed for six months till June 2008. Sunnis and Shias form a common block in Iraqi parliament to resist the Kurdish claims on Kirkuk. They have even made it clear that they could resort to force to overcome any Kurdish

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fait-accompli on the status of the city. Even though the local elections in Iraq will be held in 2009, the Kurdish region will be excluded from this process. Elections in Kirkuk will not be held unless the parties to the conflict came to an agreement as to how to share power in Kirkuk. The Kurds agreed to this term. This is a sign of victory on the part of Arabs and Turks. In addition to that the Americans are now supporting the Arabs’ policy on the sharing of Iraq’s oil resources. The final decision on the production, use and distribution of oil rests with the Central authority in Baghdad, not regional governments. Last but not least the Kurds could get only 17% of Iraqi budget. They asked more than this but Sunni and Shia Arabs resisted. The proportion of Kurdish share will be discussed every consecutive year. On the Turkish side, The US administration does now offer Turkey military help against PKK. PKK is declared as the common enemy of Turkey and the US. Collective action of the US and Turkey against PKK increases the pressure on the Kurds to cooperative with Ankara. Improvement of bilateral relations is a must for stability in the Middle East and Iraq. The US does now need Turkey to contain Iran. Such developments led the Kurds to feel that the United States might once again leave them out in the cold, as it did during first Gulf War in 1991.

Prospects for Future On the on hand, Shiites are not happy to see that the Sunnis are reintegrated to the Iraqi body politics and army. They are still afraid of the possibility of Sunni domination of Iraqi politics. They are reluctant to incorporate the Sunni soldiers into the Iraqi army. At the same time

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Iran is against the possibility of Iraq transforming into a centralized state with Sunnis playing the role of power brokering. In this regard, Turkish and Iranian policies are in conflict. The more centralized Iraq become, the happier Turkey becomes. For Iran, a more decentralized Iraq is much welcome. On the other hand, US lenience on Sunni Arabs is also motivated by the US concern to counterbalance the rising Iranian influence inside Iraq and the whole Middle East. The Sunni regimes of the region support this American policy within the framework of their goal to limit Iran’s influence. On the Kurdish side, there is a dissatisfaction to see that the Arab influence in Iraqi politics is increasing and supported by the United States.

The most important concern for the future is what might happen after the US leaves without the roots of any everlasting peace were built in Iraq. The strengthening of Sunni tribes might be perceived by the Shiites and Kurds as the most important challenge against their communal gains in the post war era. The US strategy resting on Sunni tribes might in the end result in the deepening of communal conflicts. The United States is now advised to ask the Iraqi groups to settle their differences before the withdrawal of American troops. Withdrawal should be tied to meeting of certain preconditions on the part of the Iraqi groups. Each actor appears to have been trying to gain time and consolidate their own gains before the US leaves. None of the conflicting parties in Iraq seems to be working hard for the unification of the country and establishment of a truly democratic state. In one way or the other the forecasting of Joseph Biden and Peter Galbraith

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are coming true, the soft portioning of Iraq along sectarian lines. For US to be able to start a healthy withdrawal and leave a stable Iraq behind in which no one power is dominating the main body politics or threatening the security of the country, the Status for Forces Agreement needs to be signed as soon as possible.

Why Iraq is Important for Turkey? Turkey has historical responsibility for the maintenance of Iraq’s borders and any change of this structure will undoubtedly influence Turkey’s interests. However, the significance of Iraq does not only stem from the historical aspects, its relevance to Turkey does also emanate from Iraq’s geopolitical location. Whether Iraq is going to remain as a unitary state or morph into three new states, whether Iraq is going to operate as a strong centralized state or transform into a weak federal structure, whether Iraq is going to become a pro-Western secular country or turns into a theocratic state in the image of Iran are of significant questions with respect to Turkey’s regional interests in the Middle East.

In addition to historical and geopolitical factors, demographic issues make Iraq a crucial region for Turkey. Iraq’s population includes substantial number of Kurds and Turkmen, who have kinship relationship with Turkey’s own people. Such kinship relationship between the two populations denies Turkey the luxury of keeping itself immune from Iraq’s internal developments. Iraq is also a factor in Turkish bid for EU membership. Iraq’s future and Turkey’s

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responses to that will undoubtedly impact Turkey’s relations with the European Union and the US. And finally, the future of northern Iraq and the power vacuum there impacts Turkey’s fight against PKK.

Turkey’s Iraq policy during the 1990s Iraq’s territorial integrity was considered as vitally important for the preservation of Turkey’s own security. Despite the repressive and authoritarian character of Saddam’s regime, the writ of Baghdad’s rule over the whole country was seen as the most important break on the separatist and secessionist claims of Kurds and Shiite groups. In the post-Saddam era Turkey became tremendously concerned with the political status of the Iraqi Kurdish groups. Turkey was also concerned with the possibility of the PKK benefiting from the lack of authority in northern Iraq in its efforts to organize terrorist attacks inside Turkey. While Kurdish groups increased their power and influence thanks to US support, Turkey gradually saw Iraq’s Turkmen community as a possible source that might potentially counterbalance the rising Kurdish influence. The existence of the Turkmen community in Iraq was also a concern in Turkey’s relations with Iraq. However, Turkey’s approach towards this particular issue was that Iraqi Turkmen were Iraq’s citizens and the improvement of their well- being depended on the nature of the relationship between Baghdad and this community.

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Turkey’s Iraq Policy after the regime change First of all, Iraq increasingly transformed into a weak/failed state during the 1990s. Iraq has now transformed into a place where different kinds of wars are waged simultaneously. On the one hand, Sunni insurgents fight the American occupiers; on the other Al-Qaeda terrorists fight both the US-led international coalition and Iraq’s mainly Shiite groups. Another struggle has been between the Shiite and Sunni groups. Another one is between the Kurds and Shiite on the one hand and Sunni groups on the other. Another war is currently waged between the US and pro-American Sunni regimes on the one hand and Iran on the other. While the main concern during the 1990s was Iraq’s explosion, it is now Iraq’s further implosion.

Secondly, the political future of Iraqi Kurds has increasingly become one of the key factors in Turkey’s own Kurdish problem than ever. The fear on the part of Ankara has been that if Iraq’s future were to reflect ethnic differences, the ethnicization of Kurdish question in Turkey might gain ground. Whether Turkey’s Kurds would be growingly attracted to the emerging political authority in northern Iraq has become a question that Turkey’s security policy makers do now take into account while defining Turkey’s national security interests. Political developments in northern Iraq have led the international community to pay more attention to the situation of Kurds of Turkey more than ever. At the same time the success of Turkey’s efforts to eliminate the PKK terrorism at home has been negatively impacted by the PKK’s increasing ability to use northern Iraq as a logistic area.

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Thirdly, given that Turkey’s transformation in line with the premises of liberal-democracy is now considered to be the number one factor affecting Turkey’s chance of being admitted to the European Union, the more negatively Turkey’s security were impacted by the developments in northern Iraq, the less able Turkey has become to complete its democratization/Europeanization process. The continuation of the PKK terrorism appears to have slowed down Turkey’s democratization process, for in a securitized domestic environment the steps that need to be taken in the name of liberal democracy have increasingly been seen as threatening. Besides, Turkey’s exposition to growing security threats emanating from northern Iraq seems to have contributed to the EU’s reluctance to admit Turkey as a member. The EU public opinion does not want to see that the EU borders Iran, Syria and Iraq.

On the US- Turkish front, inevitably, the US occupation of Iraq has negatively affected Turkey’s relations with the United States. Despite all American attempts otherwise, Ankara has gradually come to the point that the current US government, under the influence of the neo- conservative ideology, has been punishing Turkey for its non- cooperation on the eve of the war in March 2003. The United States has been seen by increasing number of Turkey as a potential threat to Turkey’s security. Furthermore, the occupation of Iraq has also impacted the dynamics of balance of power politics in the Middle East mainly by contributing to the rise of Iran’s relative influence at the

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expense of Turkey. Even though Turkey would not like to see that she needs to increase her defense expenditure in order to counterbalance the rising Iranian power, Iran’s growing nuclear aspirations on the one hand and the declining of NATO’s security commitment on the other might lead eventually Turkey to reconsider its decades-long non- nuclearization policies.

As for the final status of the City of Kirkuk, Ankara has long argued that the referendum in Kirkuk needs to be postponed sometime in future . From Ankara’s perspective Kirkuk is a miniature of Iraq where people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds have been living for centuries and its final status should be decided by all Iraqis. Otherwise, the incorporation of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city, into the Iraqi Kurdistan region would likely increase the prospects of a civil war, for the majority of Iraqis strongly oppose any Kurdish control of the city. As for the shape of Iraq’s administrative structure, Ankara supports the idea of a federal Iraq that is based on geographical criteria, rather than ethnic and religious differences.

Alternative Turkish discourses towards he Kurds of northern Iraq When we look at the attitudes towards Kurds of Northern Iraq we witness two alternative competing discourses; realist-exclusionist vs liberal integrationist

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To the adherents of the first position, realist-exclusionist and Kemalists , which mainly consists of the members of establishment in politics and bureaucracy, Turkey’s number one priority, should be to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdistan. In this regard, Turkey should never accord legitimacy to Iraqi Kurds by talking directly to them. Gradual integration with northern Iraq is dangerous, for this might accelerate the process of reawakening of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, particularly in Kurdish populated areas. To this view the United States and Israel actively support the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in the hope that such a state would not only provide Israel and the US with the capability to install anti- ballistic missiles against Iran, but also act a US protégée in the region.

To the other position, liberal-integrationists and neo-Ottomanists , whose adherents consist of liberal intellectuals and pro-European circles, there is now a new status quo in Iraq and the only thing Turkey can do is to adjust its position to these new realities and to adopt a liberal integrationist approach towards the Iraqi Kurds. The Kurds of Iraq are Turkey’s true allies, particularly right after the influence of Shia Iran has increased in the region. The Kurds and Turks do share many common points, of which their western orientation and secular characteristics come first. While the Iraqi Constitution itself recognizes the political legitimacy of the Kurds, they ask what Turkey would gain from turning a blind eye to the Kurds of Iraq? The more Turkey eradicates the structural causes of the Kurdish problem at home through liberal-democratic reforms, the

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healthier relations with Iraqi Kurds would turn out to be. Turkey should not overstate the potential danger of rising Kurdish influence in Iraq, for the Kurds need Turkey more than Turkey needs the Kurds. Turkey is the only outlet for the transmission of Kirkuk oil to western markets. Turkey does now own 80 percent of the construction sector in the region. Without trade with Turkey, the life in northern Iraq would be extremely costly. Trying to make northern Iraq economically dependent on Turkey would not only benefit Turkey’s economy but also provide her with better capabilities to affect Kurdish political decisions. Just as the EU influenced the nature of economics and politics in Central and Eastern European countries through the enlargement strategy, Turkey might play a similar role vis-à-vis northern Iraq. The region provides Turkey with the chance to prove its growing European identity in the realm of foreign and security policy. It remains to be seen which position holds sway over Turkey’s approach towards Iraq and Iraqi Kurds.

The liberal integrationists are gaining the upper hand in this debate. The ongoing Turkish military involvement attests to this: Goal is limited to the eradication of PKK, great effort has been spent to convince the international community to the legitimacy of a military action against the PKK, the EU and US do now lend legitimacy to Turkey’s actions, political relations with Iraqi Kurdish leadership is improving, Talabani visit to Turkey, the volume of bilateral trade is increasing.

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Latest Developments on the ground in Turkey-US-Kurds-Iraq Relations Several positive and promising developments have been noted in Turkish-US relations as well as the relations between Turkey and Iraq. The American and Turkish governments mended their relations and began to cooperate. The US does now provide Turkey with intelligence with respect to PKK presence in northern Iraq. The new Turkish Chief of Staff underlined that Turkish-American intelligence cooperation is now perfect. On the Turkey- Iraq front, we have seen the official visits of the statesmen on both sides such as visit of The Iraqi President Talabani in Turkey in spring 2008 and visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan in Iraq in July 2008. Also, Turkish President will soon visit Baghdad in official capacity. This diplomatic traffic yielded positive results. The parties signed a document whereby they agreed to establish the Higher Strategic Council. Both parties underlined the need for close cooperation against PKK. On the other hand, the local election in Turkey in 2009 and the increasing PKK-led terror violence in this context might negatively impact the improving security environment between Ankara and Baghdad-Erbil.

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Russia and Iranian Nuclear program

Vladimir Sotnikov 1

From the time of the former USSR’s dissipation and creation of the Russian Federation (RF) Russia has its natural national interests in the relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) These national interests have historical roots which were formed even in the times of former USSR and the Shakh of Iran. Then, after the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) and Gorbachev perestroika and glasnost in the USSR, these national interests gradually formed into that kind of cooperation between Iran and Russia which we can observe now-days. Accordingly both neighboring states which are big regarding their military and political capabilities at the same time are the natural partners. Notably their mutual interests include foreign economic and foreign trade relations, political interaction on many international matters of modern global as well as regional international relations. And besides that they include the area of military and technical cooperation, the partnership for realizing in Iran of large-scale commercial projects in oil and gas industries (e.g. possible participation of Russian companies in construction of trans-regional gas pipeline Iran-Pakistan- India), as well as the cooperation in the area of peaceful utilization of atomic energy (the construction of nuclear power station in Bushehr, with direct participation of Russian

1 Ph.D. senior research fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS

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state companies). Russia has also important foreign policy interests in Iran: IRI is the large regional power in the area of the Near East which makes considerable influence on the political trends not only in its region but in the adjacent regions of the Middle East, area of the Persian Gulf states and the countries of the Central Asia as well as Trans – Caucasian region – newly independent countries – Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia and the Caspian sea basin. This underscores the significance of Iran as the foreign policy partner for Russia not only in regional relations but in the global context, too.

There are no big contradictions in Russian-Iranian relations if it is not to mention the remaining differences in the both countries’ approaches to the question of developing the Caspian hydrocarbon reserves (the IRI claims the bigger sector of the Caspian Sea with the development of its hydrocarbon deposits). Also it is related to the position of Russia regarding Teheran nuclear activities, which was subject to undergo some changes after 2004 when the IRI fully launched the uranium enrichment program using it as a pretext for the country’s pressing nuclear energy development needs. Notably Russia continue cooperating with Iran in the construction of Bushehr atomic power plant but raise its voice for the purely peaceful use of the atomic energy by Iran – as after the year of 2004 the international community and, first of all the United Nations and the IAEA has some doubts in the nature and the aims of the IRI nuclear activities. As for the Islamic Republic of Iran it can not certify with complete clarity the fact that its nuclear program serves purely peaceful objectives. And here at this

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point it is relevant in the very beginning of this presentation to repeat the question which is put in its title but just having changed it to some extent: to which degree the Russian national interests are consistent with Iranian nuclear program? To our mind the answer is in the following: the possible making of NW by the IRI which the international community is suspicious of, and which Russia is not sure to the end – single-handedly contradicts the national interests of Russia. Why? Because in this case a large regional nuclear power having armed with ballistic medium and shorter range missiles which cover the southern flank of the Russian territory will turn up in the direct vicinity of the borders of RF. And this creates the grave security situation for Russia but not for the U.S. which are placing the so- called antimissile defense shield in the Eastern Europe and Israel as the Iranian nuclear-capable missiles cannot reach the U.S. territory but they can reach the territory of the RF. With nuclear Iran another danger for the Russian security environment in the Southern comes to the regional (Greater Middle East) equation, notably that the southern flank of Russian borders will be encircled with so-called “Islamic nuclear belt” including nuclear Pakistan, Iran and possibly nuclear Saudi Arabia and Turkey – the possibility feared by many international nuclear policy analysts. Further projecting the “Islamic nuclear belt» it might be a part of “nuclear Arc of instability” stretching from Israel – the de-facto nuclear power through nuclear Iran and nuclear Pakistan to nuclear India and ending with recognized nuclear power – China and the new nuclear informal nation – North Korea. And this entire “Arc” will be going along Russian southern,

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south-eastern and eastern borders, thus creating completely new situation in security environment for RF. Such scenario of the new nuclear dangers for Russian security might not be existing at all but anyway the Russian leadership should take this plausible scenario into consideration fully calculating the risks of further proliferation of which Iran is going to be the “bad example”.

As regards to the IRI nuclear program directly – the stubborn unwillingness of Teheran to stop uranium enrichment and even the beginning of its industrial scale enrichment turned the nuclear program of this country into the nuclear problem for the whole nuclear community. The situation with Iranian nuclear program is getting more ominous with the revelations of the facts of shipments of sensitive nuclear technology and equipment from the A.Q.Khan illicit nuclear chain which became evident just recently. In fact nuclear cooperation between Iran and Pakistan is believed to be dating back to the year of 1987 when the first secret agreement on the nuclear cooperation was concluded between the two states. For the time being the IAEA cannot verify that Iran is wholly cooperative in explaining some facts of its nuclear program which might be bearing non- peaceful nature. In fact, starting from the spring 2006, the so-called “nuclear dossier” of Iran is under close scrutiny of the IAEA. And moreover lately the Iranian “nuclear dossier” has been put for the consideration of the UN Security Council which took three resolutions demanding form Iran to stop all works on uranium enrichment and return to legal field of the NPT of which Iran is a member as a non-

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nuclear state. The last resolution of the UN Security Council adopted just two weeks ago on the basis of draft resolution put forward by RF reiterated all former “soft” sanctions undertaken against Iran and gave the Iranians another tome-frame for stopping its works on uranium enrichment and answer all questions from the IAEA on the nature of its nuclear program. Needles to say that formally Iran does not breech any of the basic principles of the NPT but at the same time as the IAEA witnesses in its regular reports on Iran’s observation of the IAEA safeguards, the nuclear activities of the IRI cannot provide the IAEA with the possibility to assure the international community and the UN that Iranian nuclear program is entirely peaceful. Contrary to this, according to the latest reports from the IAEA experts, the IRI has recently increased the number of centrifuges cascades which give the level of enrichment as of 3% (Let’s remind you, that starting from the level of enrichment as of 20% uranium becomes weapons-grade material). The IRI also commissioned heavy water production plant in Arak, which is one of the key facilities for nuclear fuel reprocessing and plutonium extraction – another material for making NW.

For the six states (Russia, U.S., China, UK, France and Germany) which actively discuss the Iranian nuclear problem at all levels (Foreign ministers conferences, at U.N. Security council and at the expert level) as well as for the majority of international community there is a question to be answered about expediency of creating by Iran of full nuclear fuel cycle having in mind that the Iranian own uranium ores’ reserves would be hardly enough for the ensuring of

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the functioning of the Bushehr Atomic Power Plant. However, Teheran declared its ambitious plans for construction 20 NPP for the “development of its nuclear power industry” (these plans had been declared even during the Shakh rule in Iran). All this was declared at the time when Iran has the second place as regards to its explored natural gas reserves and is one of the key oil exporting countries in the world market Both natural gas and oil are the cheap alternative energy sources for Iran. But the present leadership of the IRI –in the personality of Iranian President Ahmadinejad stubbornly states about the necessity of the creation of the full nuclear fuel cycle and declared in the spring of 2006 that Iran had joined the “ selected club of nuclear powers” having mastered the uranium enrichment technology. All this is allegedly motivated by the needs of the development of the Iranian nuclear power industry. Having said that the question of the end use of the sensitive nuclear technologies and equipment, which as it was already mentioned above, were supplied to Iran, according to the IAEA experts by the clandestine nuclear network of Pakistani nuclear scientist and “nuclear businessman” Dr. A.Q. Khan in 2003-2004.

Meanwhile as of today the consideration of the Iranian nuclear problem at the international level, and in the U.N. Security Council at first hand, has come to a sort of deadlock. After several UN security council resolutions containing demands mixed with mild sanctions against Iran (the last resolution, based on the Russian draft resolution, passed unanimously on September 27, 2008 pressing Iran to comply with international efforts to monitor its nuclear development program

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and reaffirming both earlier sanctions and the offer to end the confrontation through negotiations), Iran refused to address these demands and rejected the sanctions and refused from the package of incentive proposals of the six nations. Teheran continues from time to time conducting negotiations with Eurotroyka represented by J. Solana but to no avail. At the same time, Iranian authorities are said to give the IAEA inspectors access to nuclear facilities of the country to verify the absence of fissile materials at these installations. In 2006 President Makhmood Ahmadinejad renounced conducting nuclear test by North Korea in October 2006 and appealed to North Korea leadership to reject nuclear weapons. Last but not the least, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not left the IAEA Additional Protocol of 1997 yet although it is still refusing from ratifying it. So what is it? The attempts by Iran to prove to the world that its nuclear development program is peaceful and not wholly aimed at making NW or is it a subtle move of the Persian diplomacy? In any case, the Iranians can have some grounds to accuse the international community that it is making pressure on Iran who is the full-fledged participant to the NPT and a member of the IAEA. Nevertheless it seems to be all but usual maneuvers of Iranian diplomacy aimed at preventing unfavorable development of the situation around Iranian nuclear problem which presumes passing of the UN Security Council unanimous resolution containing concrete sanctions against defiant Iran. Unlike U.S., Britain and France Russia and China considered adoption of sanctions against IRI to be premature and raised their voices in favor of further diplomatic negotiations within the framework of the IAEA with the

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active participation of the above-mentioned six nations. But at least two UN Security Council resolutions (including the recent one) contained specific sanctions against Iran, although Iranian authorities on their part considered them illegal and dishonoring for the Islamic republic. So the question is as to which extent the sanctions against Iran are complying with the Russia’s national interests? We believe that any resolution of the UN Security Council requiring full cancellation of the nuclear cooperation with Iran is not acceptable for Russia (and for China, too, as it seems), who strictly abides to all its international obligations regarding the construction of Bushehr Atomic Power Plant (in February 2005 there was specially concluded an agreement between the IRI and RF on the return of the spent nuclear fuel from Bushehr APP to RF). So far the sanctions which actively promoted by the Western powers, the U.S. first of all, did not include Russia’s cooperation on Bushehr although the U.S. are trying to actively push such a resolution mentioning stoppage of any nuclear cooperation with Iran from any country, Bushehr included. This looks like the attempt to squeeze the natural commercial interests of Russia in Iran and in the prospective period of time to deprive Russia of any access to Iranian nuclear market. We repeat ourselves by saying that this is well understood by “Eurotroyka”: it is not by chance that it submitted its own “softened” draft resolution containing sanctions against Iran which was passed by UN Security Council twice, last time just two weeks ago. The last resolution as it was mentioned above was drafted by Russia and took into consideration the special interests of Russia in Bushehr. But it should be noted that such moves

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on behalf of Britain, France and Germany are not related to their willingness to give away Iranian nuclear market to Russia but to their desire to find the consensus on Iran in the UN Security Council.

We believe that any UN Security Council Resolution containing reference to the use of military force against Iran as the actual use of force against Iran to coerce Iran to stop its nuclear activities on uranium enrichment single-handedly contradicts Russian national interests. That is because any military option in solving Iranian nuclear problem whether it is undertaken by U.S. or Israel or by both of them together regardless under the auspices of the UN or without this organization is war-jittery and rapid growing into the large-scale regional conflict, first of all between Iran and Israel, de-facto nuclear power against which (just like against U.S. military threat) the future Iranian Bomb is aimed at. The speculation here that possible nuclearization of Iran and its NW are against nuclear Pakistan because of very complicated nature of their bilateral relations and problems in these relations between them does not make sense at all due to, at our opinion, the Islamic nature of both countries. And in the meanwhile Iran is the powerful regional state who has after Israel second military forces as to their war capabilities in the region of the Greater Middle East. And such large conflict between Iran and Israel (as the plausible air strike of Israeli forces against Iranian nuclear facilities would inevitably lead to Iranian missiles’ strike against Israel) or the war between Iran and the U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf would mean that there is a possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons

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against Iran from Israel or the U.S. which in it turn would mean the dangerous developments for the security of the Russian Federation on its southern flank. Russia then may have to reconsider its policy of ensuring security in its South and even in the Caucasus and the Russian doctrine of using nuclear weapons for the protection of vital interests of Moscow may come true in case there is an act of military aggression against Russian Federation. To add to that one should say that such a conflict in the Middle East is threatening by involving as many states of the region as it may be involved, including Syria and even Saudi Arabia or Turkey who as was mentioned above may go nuclear as well.

So what can be expected in the present situation around Iranian nuclear problem and what will be the Russian attitude to the possible developments of this situation? As it seems the possible further developments options related to Iranian nuclear program and Russia’s reaction can be conditionally broken up into three main scenarios.

First scenario (in fact already partly implemented). UN Security Council passes the agreed resolution on “soft” sanctions against IRI. The talk here is about the stage-by-stage escalation of sanctions against Iran from the international community starting from freezing Iranian accounts in the Western financial organizations and ending supplies of high-tech to Teheran, including in the nuclear field and finalizing with the embargo on supplies of some kinds of industrial products to Iran. Here it is important to note that there is no talk about

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oil embargo against IRI as the West (the European countries and China surely would not accept it). It seems that having such a defiant position of Iran regarding its uranium enrichment Program Russia could join into these “soft sanctions” subject to reservations but of course not damaging the Russian-Iranian all-round cooperation. It would give the signal to Teheran that there is existing a certain “red line” which it has crossed and that it cannot further play on the differences between Russia and Western states. Such position of RF would not contradict Russian national interests as Russia would be trying from it side to prevent the making of NW by its great neighbor. WE can assume that such Russian position (with high possibility of support from China) would not be indifferent to Iran. As we mentioned above this scenario is being partly realized now already.

Second scenario (plausible but partly taking place) Despite passing of the resolutions containing “soft sanctions” against Iran the Iranian nuclear problem is time and again getting back to the consideration within the framework of the IAEA and the negotiations by the six nations as well as to the negotiations between Iran and “Eurotroyka”. This situation is to a larger extent favorable for Teheran as it enables it to postpone the treat of escalations of sanctions even further on and to continue uranium enrichment without many consequences for its nuclear program. For Russia this is not the best situation as the diplomatic negotiations with Iran being progressively insisted by Moscow are actually coming to a deadlock and Teheran continues to play “Russian card” in it big play with the West. Besides that such a

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situation can not be lasting long time. One way or another Russia has to choose between its partnership position on Iranian nuclear program in its relations with Western powers and abortive talks with Teheran to stop its uranium enrichment. This presents a real dilemma to Russia but to our opinion Moscow will find a way-out from this complicated situation which best serves its national interests in the view of diplomatic pressure on Iran in concert with co-members of U.N. Security Council. Here we should keep in mind the failure of Russian proposal to Iran to enrich uranium for the peaceful purposes on the Russian soil within the framework of proposed Russian-Iranian JV. AS it is known after several rounds of negotiations on this issue Teheran finally rejected this proposal but suggested to set up an international consortium for uranium enrichment to be functioning on the Iranian soil.

However, in this scenario, Moscow can put forward some new political and diplomatic initiatives regarding Iranian nuclear development program. For example, it is expedient the comprehensive participation of Russia in the negotiations between Iran and “Eurotroyka”. And undertaking this move it is necessary on behalf of Western powers and Russia to give Iran guarantees to promote on the territory of Iran the development of the peaceful nuclear energy facilities – commercial nuclear reactors and nuclear research installations for peaceful purposes, e.g. for nuclear medicine, with the all-round control from the IAEA. So that resembles the policy of carrot and stick towards Iran but this is the peculiarities of this

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scenario. Also it could be reasonable to offer Iran in exchange of non- enrichment of uranium in the Natanz and Isfahan facilities higher than the level of 3 to 5 % (which is usable as a fuel for Iranian nuclear commercial reactors , in fact a cap on uranium enrichment) to guarantee the delivery of new commercial nuclear reactors together with European interested countries (“Eurotroyka”) and implementation of new additional investments to the Iranian oil and gas sector including high-tech technologies. As we mentioned above this is precisely what Britain, France and Germany are trying to offer to Iran but it is not so much responding. But all this are consistent with Russian national interests.

Third scenario (not very probable but remaining as the last resort for the U.S. and Israel). The U.N. Security Council under the U.S. pressure passes the resolution on the use of military force against Iran in accordance with the Article VII of the UN Charter. Russia (as well as China) will most probably veto this resolution as it means the beginning of war in the Near East and sharply contradicts Russian national interests. Most probably, the U.S. and/or Israel would undertake military action against Iran without U.N. sanctions. The possibility of this military option as it was mentioned above, still exists, although seems remote. Russia under these circumstances would be insisting on direct negotiations between U.S. and Iran with possible participation of Israel not to let the military action happen. And considering Russian negotiations with Iran Moscow has the full right to demand from Iran the guarantees that the Iranian uranium

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enrichment program is entirely peaceful and for this purpose fully cooperate with the IAEA. And as a gesture of good will from Iran it should completely cover by Additional Protocol of 1997 of all its nuclear installations even in the absence of its ratification by Iranian Majlis. And the six nations, on the consent of Russia, should guarantee to Iran non-offence against its nuclear facilities, in exchange of stoppage of uranium enrichment by Teheran and to allow access of the IAEA inspectors to the key Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran should abide by the IAEA recommendations and this should not be a diktat to Iran but only as recommendations. In any case military option for the solving Iranian nuclear problem should be categorically avoided.

The main conclusion which Iran can be made after the consideration of this three scenarios is the following: even in the present, almost deadlock situation around Iranian nuclear development program there is still the so-called “window of opportunity” existing for Iran provided there is a positive Iranian response to the Russian and Western initiatives in the good will spirit and that the military solution to Iranian nuclear problem can be avoided. Besides that it is important not to let the Iranian nuclear crisis to outgrow to the situation when Iran, being cornered, starts to undertake impulsive actions and behaves itself irresponsibly as an answer to the unlimited pressures from the international community. Russia, according to its national interests, should and could play a vital intermediary role in resolving differences between Iran and the West and in resolving Iranian nuclear problem, as Moscow still has some leverage in its mutual relations

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with Teheran. Only concerted and subsequent steps taken by Russia in Iranian nuclear crisis will be assisting the fact that national interests of Russia will be preserved regarding Iranian nuclear program.

Therefore the Iranian nuclear program directly influences the situation in the region of Greater Middle East causing the crisis of regional relations and having potential for a future conflict which would entail all countries of the Middle and Near East and Persian Gulf states. The way-out from Iranian “nuclear deadlock can be seen in collective participation of all parties concerned as “Eurotroyka”, U.S. and Russia as well as the states of the region of The Middle and Near East in diplomatic settlement of Iranian nuclear crisis. And once again it should be said that these steps are consistent with Russian national interest

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Palestine - Israel

Irina Zvyagelskaya 1

I agree with the previous speaker who said that actually the process itself is probably much more important than the result. But the process, I’m afraid, is the only hope we have because there is no lack of all sorts of plans for the solution of the Palestinian Problem. You can mention people’s plan. You can mention the plan which was elaborated by Barak, so on and so forth. So, actually you can pick up any of them because they do not differ so much between themselves. But the problem is that they simply cannot be implemented. And the question was “what is the problem with the Palestinian Issue”?

Why do we always have negative results despite all these efforts to mediate between the two sides? I believe, to understand this, we should say a couple of words about the nature of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Of course it is a part of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. It is a core issue. It started with the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time it differs profoundly from the so-called conflict in the Arab states.

First, it is a conflict which has a vivid, well-cut confessional dimension . So it is a conflict not about interests but rather a conflict about values. If you can more or less easily compromise on interest,

1 Prof., Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS

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you will really have problems in compromising the values; because the values have to be seen as something important for national survival itself, for national identity. So, on the surface we can see that Palestinian Arabs and Israelis are fighting always for the same territory. This is right. But at the same time, they are not only fighting for the territory. They are fighting for their history, for their myths, for their identity because all these values are linked to the territory which is the core of their dispute. So, I would say that if we take this into consideration, we can understand why it’s so difficult to reach at the solution of the issue. And what’s more, now we are not talking about the present phase in the solution, about a new step which can probably make other steps easier.

Nowadays, we are talking about the final solution, about the final status. This of course makes the situation even much more difficult. At the same time we can say that the Middle East is sick and tired with the open ended peace process. So it is high time to say that we are conducting this process for the purpose of creating the Palestinian State. And of course everybody knows that there are lots of details. Still it is obvious that the result of the process should be the creation of the Palestinian state side by side with Israel. Unfortunately the situation on the ground is not ripe, I’m afraid, for this solution. So, people treat the Palestinian-Israeli issue as a chain of lost chances. I can only agree to this conclusion. Either Israel is not ready for the solution, or Palestinians are not ready for the solution. But each time when the international community or US and the Soviet Union or the

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US alone or any other mediators, including Turkey now, each time they believe that now that we have right time, it occurs that the situation is not ripe either in the Palestinian community or in Israel. So, as far as the Palestinian community is concerned we can see that right now it is really divided and very fragmented. So, on the one side Abu Mazen represents the Palestinian people as a whole. On the other side no body knows what he really represents. He probably represents only part of the Palestinians who live in the West Bank. And he represents Fatah which is not in the government in Gaza. So, in Gaza we have absolutely a separate entity where Hamas has its own government and is more or less isolated from the general process. On the contrary it is not isolated because according to many estimations there is popularity of Hamas in the West Bank. Because there is no move in the peace process, nothing happens. And for the Palestinians it means that there is a continuation of the settlements policy. There are checkpoints which actually no one wants to remove. Some of them were removed but it doesn’t change completely the situation. So, there is a large gap between declarations of the American Administration, that they believe the agreement will be signed by the end of the year, and the situation on the ground. Then let’s take Israel. In Israel the situation is also not probably the best right now. But of course you cannot expect which would be any better. So, right now Israeli society is also fragmented, it is also divided over the issue of territory, over the issue of West Bank and Gaza.

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Turkish-Russian cooperation in Eurasia

Oktay Aksoy 1

Over the last few years some significant shifts have taken place in Eurasia’s geopolitical landscape, with Turkey and Russia moving away from the Cold War era animosity, toward what seems to be closer cooperation. However, this should not be interpreted as a cooperation emerging as a result of both countries’ frustrations with their relations with the EU or US.

There is no doubt that Turkey and Russia are now enjoying closer ties than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, reminiscent of the 1920’s.

On the other hand, NATO enlargement to the East has been a big concern for Russia despite developing NATO-Russia relations. It seems that as long as Turkey is a member of NATO, customary Cold War evaluations would unavoidably emerge among the Russian policymakers. But improving mutual understanding and frankness in their improving relations would eliminate these concerns as well.

One should remember that change of threat perceptions on both sides preceded any significant increase in the bilateral economic relations.

1 Ambassador (Rtd.)

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Immediate interest in Turkey and increasing relations with the newly independent states in Central Asia and South Caucasus, where there exist ethnical and traditional ties, need not be interpreted negatively as it has occasionally been done in some quarters in Russia. Since these states emerged in the international scene without much preparation for independence, Turkey felt the necessity to be of help to them. The objectives of the Turkish policymakers were more to strengthen their independence and democratic process, as well as to enhance their social and economic development within the means available in order to maintain stability and peace in the region. Imposition of a so-called “Turkish model” was not the intention. On the contrary, the newly independent states who had a secular social and political basis and fears of expanding religious fervor instigated by their southern neighbors, Iran and Afghanistan, must have found relief in utilizing the Turkish experience in their efforts of establishing independent state structures.

Parameters of cooperation between Turkey and Russia in this Eurasian geography is set in the “Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia” signed by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries on November 16, 2001 in New York when they both were attending the UN General Assembly.

It is emphasized in the Joint Action Plan that fundamental changes in the world of historic magnitude has opened a new stage in interaction

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between the two countries characterized by opportunities of developing fruitful bilateral and regional cooperation in every field in the spirit of friendship and mutual trust and thus the two countries are determined to carry their relations to the level of enhanced constructive partnership defining it as ‘from bilateral cooperation towards multidimensional partnership’.

It is underlined that the two parties have decided to extend their existing good relations, political consultations and their experiences in the field of economic cooperation to the Eurasian dimension. They shared the belief that dialogue and cooperation in Eurasia will positively contribute to bring about peaceful, just and lasting political solutions to disputes in the region. It also reflected the willingness of Turkey and Russia to develop bilateral and multilateral economic relations there also. In the framework of the Action Plan, they agreed to establish a high level Joint Working Group. This cooperation was perceived not only to diversify and deepen the cooperation between the two countries but also to contribute to the security, peace, stability and welfare in the region, as well as in the international scene in general.

However, there has not been sufficient progress in concretizing this positive intention of the two sides. Needless to say, Turkish and Russian interests in this region need not be competitive but complementary. More efforts should be made to find projects in which they can jointly work on and benefit from.

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Some politicians may forget that Central Asia was not within the Ottoman ruled territories and consequently cannot be considered of interest for Turkey in that respect. Moreover, Russia may undoubtedly see this region within its zone of influence. Therefore, friction in that respect should actually be unlikely and joint efforts may bring concerns and interests closer and eliminate possibilities of suspicion. Energy is one area where the two sides can work closer. As this will be discussed in detail tomorrow, I will leave it here for the moment.

Energy Politics

Energy Issues Necdet Pamir 2

It is no secret that EU’s dependency to energy imports and gas is rapidly increasing. Energy security is a growing concern and the EU member countries do not want to irrationally rely on a single country for their gas imports. Even if they do not mention a specific country in this context, they want to limit their dependence on Russia for the gas imports which is roughly 28 % of the gas consumed. To that end EU is supporting several projects to supply the continent from alternative sources other than Russia. One of these projects is the so-called NABUCCO which is proposed to supply Europe from different

2 Lecturer at Bilkent University

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sources via a gas pipeline to cross Turkish territory. The project is recently so much discussed, so I have chosen that project as a case study to better understand the technical, economical but mostly the geopolitical debate on such projects since energy security concerns are related with all those concepts.

When the idea first came up, five companies from five relevant countries came along to form a Joint Venture for the construction of an ambitious gas pipeline called NABUCCO: Turkey’s BOTA Ş, Bulgaria’s BulgarGas, Romania’s Transgas, Hungary’s MOL and finally OMV of Austria. They had 20 % stake each. From the feasibility studies they have done, in the first report that they released (October 2005) they published maps showing all the alternative source countries they thought of, namely, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Egypt. That report was released in October 2005. And let’s have a look at the developments of today. RWE of Germany also joined this project and the NABUCCO Company released a new report. In that new report of February 2008 and on the same map they published in their original reports of 2005, you now can see that Russia is additionally shown as a source to feed the Nabucco Pipeline. But the initial idea was not to include Russia and on the contrary, to limit those countries’ dependency to Russia. I am addressing this issue, since we are trying to inform the interested parties about the facts and not about the dreams. In open discussions, those who think that NABUCCO Project has no obstacle at all are tending to not taking those developments and

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problems into account. Let’s analyze the alternative sources proposed, in a more detailed manner:

First of all let us take Azerbaijan. Yes, Azerbaijan is getting more and more important in the energy scene as a gas exporter. Every year, they are producing more oil and more gas. Several years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, they already started to export some gas to Georgia, to Turkey and some of this gas is even going further to Greece via Turkey since July 2007. The Azerbaijani gas is transited through a pipeline (South Caucasus Gas Pipeline), which was constructed parallel to the BTC Oil pipeline. It crosses Georgia and Turkish territories and then it joins to Greece and now that is expected to extend to Italy. This project is developing in a positive manner. But when it comes to talk about whether we have additional Azerbaijani gas available for Nabucco pipeline, that is, to feed a different pipeline supplying Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria and further to Germany, and even to some other small European countries, there you have several problems. To supply NABUCCO stakeholder countries, we need to develop the second phase of the gas producing field; that is Shah Deniz in Azerbaijan. Is there enough gas to feed 2 pipelines and so many countries? This is a serious question without a satisfactory answer yet given. Another debate is on the pricing issue. Azerbaijan wants to increase the price while Turkey insists on lower prices as she received for the Shah Deniz Phase-1. Furthermore, for its energy security concerns, Turkey insists on receiving additional volumes from Azerbaijan in addition to the already contracted 6.6

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billion cubic meters (bcm) a year, while Azerbaijan wants to transit the gas through Turkey but to sell more volumes directly to Europe. These are real issues of concern. But, officials from related countries and project stakeholders do not like to comment on these serious and basic matters and rather prefer to announce optimistic views on the Project. There is also the Russian component of the Azerbaijani gas exports. Although Azerbaijan is an exporting country, they were also importing Russian gas until 2 years ago. They were importing 4.5 million cubic meters of gas from Russia until January 2007, the import price from RF being around 110 dollars per thousand cubic meters. Then Russia said, “OK, let’s play the game accordingly. If you are a ‘westerner’, you should pay like westerners.” (This is my interpretation but it explains the case). Russians declared that, they increased the price to 230 dollars per thousand cubic meters starting with January 2007. At that point, Azerbaijan started to decrease its imports from Russia while keeping more volumes for its own consumption and therefore, its capacity for exports was limited. And also Georgia faced and is facing similar and serious problems. They are consuming 2 billion cubic meters all of which comes from Russia. They were importing with the price of 110 Dollars before 2007. And when Russia increased it to 230 Dollars, then they were unable to pay and they turned to Azerbaijan and requested additional volumes than the already contracted amounts. So this also decreased the amount that was available for Turkey and further to Greece and Italy. Need less to say, this is further a concern for the Nabucco pipeline. And when it comes to develop the Shah Deniz second phase, there Russia came

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into the scene in Azerbaijan and said “I want to buy your gas and pay you at international prices. So, forget about exporting it to other countries, give it to us”. Then Azerbaijan started to reflect a different position in its negotiations with Turkey since every country tries to maximize its own benefit.

As the recent crisis in Georgia showed, Russia will not hesitate to defend its benefits even if it has to use military power. Russia also plays the “energy game” in a tough way but looking at the U.S. and many other western States, it is hard to criticize the Russian politicians since energy is one of the most important parameters of maintaining a country’s economic and national security. To a certain extent, we feel respect to the leaders who are defending their country’s benefits. Of course we have to look at the limits to that and worldwide balances and to what extent energy is used as a “tool”.

Turkey is importing from Russia (64 %), Iran (17 %), Azerbaijan, Nigeria and Algeria. 98 % of the gas we consume is supplied through imports. The import price for Russian and Iranian gas both are around 420 dollars per 1000 cubic meters. The price is calculated by a formula which is indexed to several oil products and therefore rises with the increasing oil prices.

Depending on the policies of Russia and other big actors like the U.S., regional policies are also being affected. You frequently hear that “Turkey is a natural bridge/hub between rich energy sources and

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highly demanding countries. But writing such sentences on the paper and/or looking at the map you may easily and naturally make such a comment. But when it comes to real politics, then we see that to be a bridge or a hub requires much more conditions to be fulfilled. If you do not develop correct policies at the correct time you may have problems, as we are already living with. Turkey’s dependency on Russia makes us vulnerable to this country at the very outset. The overall dependency to gas and the very limited gas storage capacity are other critical disadvantages we are living with.

Let’s look at Iran. Iran is the second in the world after Russia, as far as its gas reserves are concerned. 15.7 % of the world’s gas reserves are in Iran. But today Iran is producing 112 million cubic meters and they are consuming the same amounts. Since the consumers in Iran do not pay international but “symbolic” prices, the consumption is in extremely high volumes and in addition, they are injecting the gas produced into the oil fields to maintain the reservoir pressure and therefore the production. As a result, they don’t have a single billion cubic meters to export. They are exporting to us by swabbing from Turkmenistan. Last year their exports to Turkey was 6.7 billion cubic meters a year. They made it possible by importing the similar amount from Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan exported them 6.7 billion cubic meters and they used it for their own needs and released the same amount for exports to us. They were able to export 6.7 billion cubic meters accordingly. If they are unable to develop their big potential, starting with the South Pars field, it is almost impossible to feed even

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Turkey and no need to say, further the European Union. But EU and everybody need diversification not being dependent on a single country. This is understandable. But I should say that to develop those fields you need investment. To that end comes American policies. The Iran- Libyan Sanctions Act and several other regulations stop third countries from investing in Iran’s oil and gas sectors above 20 million dollars. It is not an important amount for the gas sector. The memorandum of understanding that Turkey signed with Iran has not turned into an agreement. I was until yesterday, in a meeting in Antalya. Iranian Oil Minister was there, Iranian Deputy Oil Minister was there. They are trying to turn this MOU into an agreement and to use it in the international arena. But the plain fact is; still there is not an agreement but only a MOU on the table while we have many of those waiting on dusty shelves. Furthermore, if you ask my view, I do not believe that there will be any agreement as far as the current Turkish Government is so parallelly aligned with the current US administration. But what I am trying to say is this: US comes to Turkey and asks us “why are you this much depending on a certain country (Russia) for gas imports?” The question is fair. But the wrong party is asking the fair question. I am also against this. Whether it is Turkmenistan or Azerbaijan, I don’t care. One should not be dependent on such a level of over-dependency. Personally, I stood against it at the proper time. 65 % dependency on Russia or on any other country is irrational and unacceptable. There is no doubt about it. But when the US officials come and ask you such a question, then we have the right to ask them in return: “OK, we are trying to

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diversify. But we cannot invest in Iran since you are applying sanctions to any third party trying to develop the Iranian oil and gas fields.” To that end, not only Turkey but Repsoil, Statoil, Japanese companies, and all foreign companies recently declined from investing in Iran under the increasing pressure from the US Administration at least for a certain period. EU is, starting with Merkel and Sarkozy, increasingly acting in parallel with the Bush Administration in the recent years. Nevertheless, we are also hearing that, several European countries together with Chinese and Russian companies trying to invest in Iran despite the American pressure with a low profile approach. But the plain fact is; recently, even Statoil, the Norwegian company, also declined from investing. For diversification, Iraq is another alternative. But, how can any company invest in Iraq under the existing conditions of instability? Whether the US stays there or pulls out, we should not expect a suitable climate for investment. The risks are sky high. Even if the US pulls out as Obama promised, the chance of a civil war and sabotages targeting the oil and gas investments and infrastructures is high. But the US and Turkish government officials are making lip service on the contrary as if the weather is Spring in Iraq and want us to believe in their rhetoric: “In Iraq new fields are open, everything is under control. Turkey and United States together are going to invest in Iraq and open a new page”. This is again not a serious and responsible policy. In addition, there is nothing to be “new”. Because since 1994, Turkish companies including State Oil Company Turkish Petroleum, BOTAŞ (Turkish Pipeline Company) are trying to develop oil and gas fields in Iraq

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since 14 years. There is no agreement and activity during those 14 years. Recently 35 companies were awarded and again we saw that there are no Turkish companies announced to be qualified. Then after some talks and low tune protests from the Turkish side, very recently TPAO’s name was also announced together with some major companies as a small partner by the Iraqi officials. This is the “new page” and the chance and reliability of the Iraqi alternative. Yes, we have significant oil and gas fields in Iraq but it needs a long time to achieve stability, a properly selected and representative government, the acceptation of rule of law in the country, the approval of a new Petroleum Law and so forth before a suitable investment climate is achieved.

And coming to Egypt, maybe they are more in the position of importing instead of exporting in the coming years. Because they don’t have adequate sources and therefore, they prefer to keep it for their children; that is what officials tell us when we talk to them.

To that end, of course we have certain problems on the demanding countries as well; they are getting more and more close to Russia despite the claims on the contrary. For example OMV of Austria signed an agreement with Gazprom, transferring 50 percent of their gas storage capacity to Gazprom. There is a saying in Turkish “Havada uçan ku şa de ğil, ete ğimdeki ta şa bakarım”. When translated it may well be like this: “A bird in the bag is better than two in the bush”. Anyway, gas storage capacity is as important as the

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construction of the pipeline. Turkey is an example to the significance of storage capacity since the country has a very limited storage capacity of 1.6 million cubic meters, compared to its yearly gas consumption of 38 billion cubic meters. When you look also at Bulgaria and Hungary, other two stakeholders of the NABUCCO Pipeline Company, they are also getting more and more close to Russian policies. There are some competing projects as you know, South Stream and others like White Stream, proposed by the Russian Federation. But nevertheless, these are important tools of the Russian energy and foreign policy and used with a certain success until today. The NABUCCO partners and the European consumers are looking at the map and looking for diversification opportunities. But when they see that those alternatives are limited due to several geopolitical and economic hurdles, and then they are re-thinking the Russian “alternative”. So, at the end of the day, the Russian influence is increasing despite the positive rhetoric for its alternatives.

But when you look at the decreasing oil prices and the global economical crises, Russia also has a two edged dilemma. On the one side, it is loosing its sky high revenues and on the other hand, demand is decreasing, which in turn decreases the consumers’ vulnerability to imports. These developments are not favoring Russian policies in the mid and long term. In the coming years we may expect lower oil and lower gas prices. It can go further down. Of course, it is not easy to make precise estimates. Because even the Department of Energy of US renews their estimates every month and even every month for the

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next year’s prices they have 7-8 dollars differences per barrel. It is not only demand and supply dynamics that dictate the prices. We have geopolitics, speculations and many other factors. So, if the oil and gas prices go down, this will of course affect Russian policies and their ability to move accordingly. So, anyway, this is more or less the scene. To that end, I am not trying to comment on whether Nabucco is going to be played down or not. Of course in the coming decades, many projects will be realized. Because the demand is increasing (even if it is not at the recent rates) so you need many projects. They may even be complimentary. But I have tried to give an understanding of the American and Russian policies affecting our region at least through energy security concerns. It is not that easy to align our policies exclusively according to our benefits.

Coming to Russian and Turkish relations in the energy context, of course such a dependency is not rational. Some say this is interdependency but if you ask me Russia with their exports they are 9% dependent on us. We are 63.5% dependent on Russia. When you look at the trade volumes, they are as high as 25-26 billion US dollars by the year end. But it is not that much balanced because we are importing also significant amounts of oil. So that makes the greater portion of the trade. So, we are trying to diversify but our diversification opportunities are limited. There are many areas to cooperate but we should have more contacts to draw the best picture and then find the areas of mutual cooperation together.

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Turkish-Russian energy cooperation: are there many prospects?

Natalia Ulchenco 1

2007 became the year when both Russia and Turkey had defined their positions on prospects of cooperation in such important sphere as energy sources trade. In May 2007 presidents of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have agreed to create a consortium for Caspian pipeline project.

The consortium is going to ensure the expansion of capacity of the existing gas pipeline Central Asia-Center-4 from 1-2 billion cubic meters per year up to 10 billion. For this purpose an additional pipeline along the Caspian coastline will be constructed. Besides the capacity of another existing pipeline Central Asia- Center-3, connecting Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia, is going to be increased up to 20 billion cubic meters per a year. So Russia is expecting to get about 90 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Central Asia by the year 2014 instead of 60 billion she is getting today.

As Russian side believes, the two above mentioned projects being the components of the Near-Caspian gas pipeline leaves practically no space for the alternative Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. But this alternative project is a key part of large-scaled international project

1 Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS

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NABUCCO which is expected to deliver Central Asian gas to the world market bypassing Russian territory but via Caucasus and further through territory of Turkey - to Western and Southern Europe. Russia’s strong conviction is that stocks of gas in the Caspian and Central Asian region are not enough to fill any other gas pipeline but the this one along the coast of Caspian Sea, even though the presidents of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan do not deny the opportunity that Trans-Caspian project can be realized as well.

Russia has tried to confirm her exclusive rights for importing gas from Turkmenistan when the new president G.Berdymuhammedov had just come to power. It seemed the new leadership in Turkmenistan looked at Russia’s plans favorable as the meeting of three presidents in Turkmenbashi city resulted in their mutual intention to realize the gas pipeline along the Caspian seacoast. The Russian side believes that this intention means that the Trans-Caspian project has been given up without any hopes. Simultaneously due to the increase in the supply of Central Asian gas, including gas from Turkmenistan, Russia may expect that gas purchases from Turkmenistan will increase in 2028 up to 70-80 billion cube meters per a year as now Russia is getting no more then 42-44 billion cube meters per a year.

The great importance Russia gives to the realization of the prospective gas agreements with Central Asian Republics is confirmed by the fact that just after Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit held this year in September in Tashkent special

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talks between Russian Federation prime minister Putin, head of Russian "Gazprom" company Miller from one side and the leaders of the Central Asian Republics from the other side took place. As a result new important details were agreed by the sides. For example, the construction of the new pipeline in Uzbekistan that is going to duplicate the existing one will be realized by joint Russian-Uzbek joint company created by Russian Gazprom and Uzbek “Uzbekneftegas”.

Just at the beginning of October 2008 a Summit of Caspian states was held in Astrakhan (Russia) where the intention to create a new regional organization- Organization for Caspian Economic Development was proclaimed. It seems Russia is going to use it as another instrument to fulfill the Near-Caspian gas project as the information on the new Organization was breaking together with the news that the construction works on the gas pipeline will start at the second half of 2009.

It seems Russian- Turkish gas cooperation could had become even closer as the increase of gas purchases from Central Asia creates new opportunities for Russia’s gas export to Europe, including new opportunities for gas export via Turkey’s territory. So the situation seems to be much like as it had already been more then ten years ago when at the end of 1997 an agreement was signed between Russian Federation and Turkey on the construction of «the Blue stream» gas pipeline. From the year 2003 the pipeline crossing Black sea delivers

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Russian gas to Turkish port Samsun. But in 1999 rather soon after the signing of the Russian-Turkish gas agreement the agreement between Turkey and Turkmenistan was signed. According to the agreement the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline was going to be constructed with the capacity equal to «the Blue stream»’s one - 16 billion cubic meters per a year. The Turkish side did not hide the aspiration to diversify geographically the sources of gas supplying. So Russia bearing in mind some doubts about the capacity of the Turkish gas market and geostrategic importance of Turkey’s territory realized that drastic measures had to be taken: it was necessary to reserve a prevailing share in the Turkish gas market, to leave no space for the competing gas from Turkmenistan and to get advantage in using Turkish territory for energy sources transit in the future. So in 2003 the Blue Stream was opened. The same year another important tactical step which had provided Russia with father success was taken: a 25- year agreement was signed with Turkmenistan. Under the agreement Russia got the right to purchase all Turkmenistan gas which was not the subject of any other export contracts . So the Turkish side had to reject any other new gas suppliers except Iran who is providing gas through a pipeline of 10 billion cubic meters capacity per a year. Forecast on purchases of Turkmen gas by Turkish state company BOTASH remains extremely uncertain, their beginning may occur not earlier then 2020 and even 2020 is a big question 2.

 См . www.botas.gov.tr

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A beat less then ten years later in 2006 new project “Blue stream-2’ had just stared to be discussed between Turkey and Russia. This gas pipeline was going to duplicate “the Blue Stream 1” up to the Turkish port Samsun, but after that it was going to be continued to the South and to the West of Turkey and from there both to Israel to Southern Europe. The construction of this gas pipeline was discussed in particular during in summer 2006 when President of Turkey Necdet Sezer had visited Russia. He stressed out that Turkish side expected Russian participation in construction of a gas pipeline from Samsun to Turkish Mediterranean port Ceyhan.

The favorable prospects for new project had been prepared earlier when in December 2004 Russian gas company Gazprom and her Turkish partner Botas signed the Memorandum for the development of gas cooperation. According to it Russian side got the right to deliver gas to Turkish end users directly from Russia or from companies affiliated with “Gazprom”. In response to this new opportunities at the Turkish market Russian side had agreed to provide “the Blue stream” with international project status, and Turkey – with the transit country status delivering gas to the Southern Europe and Israel. The prolongation of the gas pipeline to the Mediterranean coast of Turkey was going to become the first step to the realization of the project. In the end of 2005 Turkey had changed the national legislation to create space for strengthening "Gazprom"’s position at Turkish gas market – the Russian gas company got the right to control the list of companies delivering gas to end users. So Turkey

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was expecting the Russian side to start using Turkish territory for gas transit. As Putin stressed out during Sezer’s visit “large investment projects are on the agenda”. The words were considered to be a positive answer to the expectations of the Turkish side.

In the Summer 2006 Russian Minister of Finance A.Kudrin had informed, that "Gazprom" and Italian firm Eni, Russia’s partner in “the Blue stream “ construction, were going to sign an agreement on joint construction of a gas pipeline Samsun-Ceyhan.

But the international status of Turkey has changed significantly during last period. One of the most remarkable changes is the new much deeper level of cooperation with EU: now Turkey is the official candidate for membership in the European Union who much cares about his energy security. Meanwhile the realization of « the Blue stream-2 » project could result in a contradiction between Turkey’s interests and interests of her European partners as the Blue Stream 2 realization would had meant no possibility to diversify the geography of gas suppliers for EU countries. Therefore official representative of Turkey had recognized, that being adhered to the realization of « the Blue stream-2 » gas pipeline, they could not avoid serious problems in relations with the European Union as Turkey would have got the status of the unreliable partner in the European integration. Actually the system of foreign policy priorities of Turkey is precisely designated in the program of the government: « Developing relations with such large world actors in Eurasia as Russia, China, and Japan

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are not alternative to the traditionally stable relations with EU and the USA » 3. It is also emphasized in the program that the «efforts of the government will be enclosed to realization of NABUCCO project assuming transportation of Caspian gas and gas from Central Asia via Turkey to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria» 4.

As the project is of strategic importance for Turkey, it is possible to suggest that one of the reasons Turkey’s activity in Northern Iraq at the end of 2007 was that in November the Hungarian side has expressed her doubts about Turkish ability to provide functioning of NABUCCO as Turkey was hardly able to protect the her territory against Kurdish terrorist attacks.

In turn Russia had defined her position on transnational gas projects. In June 2007 at the meeting of the heads of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization member states in Istanbul the president of the Russian Federation V. Putin had announced, that…« Gazprom » is concluding new agreements and, the company is interested to realize new contracts via new transport corridors» 5. That was the way the Russian leader had commented the signing of an agreements between "Gazprom" and Italian company “ENI” just before the meeting in Istanbul. The new agreement meant by Putin was an agreement on “Southern stream gas pipeline”. It is going to connect Russia,

3См . Hükümet Programı. – www.basbakanlik.gov.tr 4 Ibid. 5 Российская газета , 26.06.2007

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Bulgaria and Greece via Black sea and then to deliver gas up to the Italian cost.

So prospects on bilateral Russian-Turkish energy cooperation much more limited than one could imagine before had been determined. Some prospects in this area still exist, but they are less promising than could be. In particular they can be realized through full usage of the capacity of « the Blue stream » gas pipeline. In 2007 t it had been pumped a little more than 7 billion cubic meters while the projected volume is about 16 billion cubic meters 6.

The last events in Russian- Georgian relations made Russia’s dialogue with Europe more difficult and actualized once again the security aspect in energy sources import to Europe. As usual security means diversification of foreign gas sources. So it seems the international situation became even less favorable for development of energy cooperation between Turkey and Russia, including energy sources transit to the world market via Turkey’s territory. But may be not quite accidentally on September 2 2008 the parliament of Greece had ratified the agreement with the Russian Federation on the construction and operation of the Southern stream gas pipeline within the territory of the Greek Republic. So not being sure of the prospects of NABUCCO Greece has declared openly her intention to continue the energy cooperation with Russia. Besides, Italy, Austria, Serbia, Hungary and Bulgaria in spite of being potential participants of the

6 См . www.botas.gov.tr

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NABUCCO had declared even before Greece their wish to join the Southern stream. But, all the above mentioned countries are already EU members that allow them to be more independent in their energy policy while Turkey is constantly and tightly controlled as a candidate country. Speaking on the phenomenon of that kind of independency the head of the international energy agency Nobuo Tanaka had stressed that nowadays each country of the European Union tries to sign bilateral agreements with the energy sources suppliers ignoring an opportunity of the policy coordination in EU. Of course it is not possible to forget about the special attention paid to Turkey’s activities in internal and foreign policy by her European partners. Nevertheless the rejection of the « the Blue stream 2 » project in favor of the alternative Southern stream bypassing Turkey but supported by EU leadership is another Turkey’s victim for yet not evident prospects for full EU membership.

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Turkey and Russia: Global Security Issues

Points of Convergence and Divergence in Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies

Ali Karaosmano ğlu 1

I want to shift to a different level of analysis: the points of convergence and divergence in foreign policies of both countries. Yesterday and today we have discussed at length various aspects of the relationship. So, I don’t want to reiterate those arguments which have already been advanced. I would like to talk a little bit about more general aspects; I will also go back to history a little bit because today’s problems, especially security problems, find their roots in history.

When you look at history, there are divergences, probably more divergences than convergences. However, first I should probably make a comment reminding that there are some important convergences between the two countries. There is a tendency in Russia and Turkey, especially in decision making and business circles to aggrandize implications of convergences and to minimize divergences. I am not saying that this is bad, actually this is good. This

1 Prof., Bilkent University

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is good in the long run. However, in the meantime, probably depending on other factors, also probably in the long term, today’s divergences are also important - Cyprus, for instance. Probably, Oktay Aksoy will talk about Cyprus today later on. And today we talked about Nabucco, we talked about diversification and many other issues concerning energy and also, there are divergences in the Caucasus. Relatively less important divergence is about the shift which Prof. Belokranitsky pointed out yesterday, the shift from the Middle East to the North East section of the broader Middle East, namely Afghanistan. Even if this is an objective fact and I agree with the Professor that this is an objective fact, this does not correspond to Turkish role. Actually, if we take into consideration Turkish security policy, the classical Middle East, especially the northern part of the Middle East is still problematic and Turkey does not have sufficient means to focus attention to Pakistan and to Afghanistan. Yes, we are participating in ISAF. Our priorities, however, are in our immediate south. There are also respective interesting similarities between the two countries. Especially, the similarities are about our processes of Westernization.

Westernization in both countries created problematic identity problems. From Western point of view, this is a problem for both countries. They perceive both countries having problematic identities. Our political cultures, to some extent, are similar. For instance, there is a traditional fear of encirclement in the minds of the Russian elite. In the minds of the Turkish elite, we have exactly the same fear of

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encirclement. For instance, take the Cyprus problem. We think that if Cyprus becomes a Greek island, then Turkey will be encircled from the West and from the South. This will threaten our sea lines of communication. This is a very similar way of approaching at security problems, a geopolitical approach so to speak. And in both countries there is a feeling of exceptionalism. In both countries, there is a very strong tendency to believe that they are exceptional. They are exceptional in the sense that they are different and they must be treated differently by the Western countries and they have certain peculiarities especially as far as security is concerned, geopolitics is concerned.

When it comes to the application of Western standards, actually, we both believe that we should apply those standards according to our own interpretations. Of course, this creates problems with the West, especially today in the post Cold War era. The reluctance for domestic reforms was a major obstacle to the development of strategic cooperation with Western countries, Western democracies. Similarly, Turkish slowness in further democratization was a major obstacle to its EU membership. Recently, I read a very interesting article by Prof. Norman Stone. It was on “Turkey in the Russian mirror.” He was emphasizing historical similarities, especially those arising from the process of Westernization in both countries. The article begins with a quotation from Khrushchev. Khrushchev, in 1957, had an outburst against Stalin’s foreign policies. “He had even managed to make an enemy of Turkey”. He remarked: “ in 1930s there had been a square in

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Izmir named after Voroshilov”. This is true. I remember that when I was a primary school pupil, there was such a square in Izmir. This is an interesting statement on the part of Khrushchev. However, this doesn’t really reflect the reality. Why? Because Turkey’s alignment with NATO after the Second World War was not only a counter measure against the Soviet claims from Turkey. It was also the choice of an ideological block. So the statement probably overlooked that aspect of our alignment with the West. So as far as adoption of political values and political norms are concerned, Turkey was ready to adopt Western political norms and Western values in politics. Probably, Russia has been more reluctant and probably still is reluctant. However, as far as the adoption of Western arts are concerned, we were unsuccessful and Russia was much more successful than us. So there are such similarities and divergences.

However, Turkey has always been sensitive about Russia‘s security concerns. We were a staunch ally of the West during the Cold War, but we refrained from provoking Moscow. For instance, we did not always accept NATO’s military plans because those plans would be a threat to Russia. This was the case for the modernization of short range nuclear systems deployed in Turkey. Also, we refused to broadcast to the Caucasus and Central Asia, considering it to be provocative. We were quite responsive to Russia’s traditional fears.

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Now a few words about the impact of the end of the Cold War: how did it affect Turkey’s foreign and security policies? We can answer this question from two different but interrelated perspectives. One is relations with Russia, the other one is Turkey’s policy towards the Caucasus and the Black Sea.

Relations with Russia flourished. The major reason for this was the disappearance of the Soviet threat. New avenues opened before the two nations to develop economic relations. Both nations benefited from the new environment and the new opportunities were used by them. There are thoughts and there are plans even to develop relations further. And there are some embryonic but somewhat concrete plans. For instance, the Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia signed in 2001 is an example for mutual intention to shift the economic relationship to upper levels such as political level and strategic level.

However, Turkey’s policy in the Caucasus and the Black Sea was somewhat different. The region again opened up new opportunities for Turkey. Turkey’s main objective has been political rather than economic in the Caucasus. The energy issue in the minds of Turkish policy makers was primarily a political issue and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was important because it would consolidate the independence of two key countries, Azerbaijan and Georgia. But in the course of time, the economic importance in the minds of the Turkish policy makers increased. Initially, the whole project and the Turkish policies were not motivated by economy but motivated by politics.

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One other aspect, the political aspect was to contribute to the creation of a secure regional environment in the Caucasus and in the Black Sea. The way to a security environment, to a convenient security milieu for Turkey was to consolidate the independence of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine. So this was the motive behind Turkish policies in the Caucasus and the Black Sea basin and the second characteristic of Turkish policy which differs from Turkish policy of bilateral relationship with Russia was that in the Black Sea basin and Caucasus, Turkish policy depended on multilateralism and cooperation with the West.

Take PfP for instance. Most of the Turkish actions in the Black Sea basin and in Caucasus were taken within the framework of NATO PfP programs. Also the BlackSeaFor and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation scheme, they were all one way or another linked with Western policies. Turkey’s political role in the region, however, grew and the major reason for the success or relative success, if you wish, of Turkey in the region was that all these regional states including Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria, they eagerly wished to open up to the West. They eagerly wanted to change their economic systems, adopt capitalist system. They wanted to join Western alliances. Turkey was a catalyst in the eyes of all these countries, a means, actually, an instrument, a facilitator because Turkey was member of quite a number of Western institutions. Turkey was a candidate for the EU. Turkey was a member of NATO. So on and so forth. So what may be

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the implications of this history for the future relationships with Russia?

Now there is a trend, an unfortunate trend, that the world is probably returning to policies of spheres of influence - Russian sphere of influence and Western sphere of influence. There is a kind of a “peaceful”, so to speak, confrontation between Russia on the one hand and the United States on the other hand. However this confrontation has been softened due to the transatlantic rift because European allies and Turkey do not seem to be so ready to follow American policies. This is a moderating factor. However, the trend is there.

This is a dangerous trend in my opinion. But what happens if this trend strengthens itself and Turkey finds itself in a very difficult situation? Then Turkey will really have enormous difficulty to take decisions. All the European allies are already finding themselves in a very difficult situation. For instance the deployment of antiballistic missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic put all the alliance in a very difficult situation. Also in relations with Iran. It is also a difficult situation. We may probably say that if Russia does not reduce the authoritarian aspects of its present regime, this may create problems in the future for Turkey and for the European allies. Because if that continues then one way or another they will try hard to find the ways of acting together with the United States. So I think this is the major risk in our relationship.

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Global Political Challenges: Concurrence and Divergences in Russian and Turkish Foreign Policy Strategies

Vyacheslav I. Shlykov 2

First of all I’d like express my gratitude to Bilkent University and Institute of Foreign Policy who have organized our today’s meeting and provided us with an excellent opportunity to express and exchange openly our views on basic problems of international security, Russian and Turkish policymaking in this respect.

The enhancing of security both on the global and regional levels forms a key problem of the international relations system as a whole. The end of the “cold war”, the dissipation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization together with the further development of globalization which leads to the strengthening of interdependency between states and forces the global world to solve the arisen problems by joint efforts of the whole world community – all these facts and tendencies however does not guarantee the solution to all the security problems.

2 Assoc. Prof. Moscow State University

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The events of last ten years indicate that the today’s world hasn’t become more stable and safe. Moreover as new forms of modern weapons appear, nuclear and other types of mass destruction arms proliferate, terrorism and ecocatastrophes spread all over the world the problem of enhancing security for people on the international plan becomes more and more acute. So the question of how we have to explicate the term of “international security” arises.

“The achievement of world peace and stability” – such an answer doesn’t exhaust all the contents of this idea. Security questions can be considered on the global, regional and state levels (as well as on the national, ethnic, clan, family and individual levels). In any case the enhancing of security depends on the complex of different factors. Even when we speak about personal safety it’s quite insufficient to eliminate the danger to one’s life. It includes the necessity for provision of worthy living conditions (e.g. housing, food, health services etc.) as well.

Modern studies on the international security problems mark out their “tough” and “soft” aspects. The first ones are those which can be attained by military pressure or power game. The list of the letter ones expands constantly – among them are economic and environmental problems, problems of cultural and intellectual development and so on and so forth. On the national level the economic security of a state becomes the main characteristic of the state stability and depends on a complex of factors such as provision of food, natural resources,

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energy sources or export potential which can in several cases compensate the country for lack of food provision, natural resources, financial stability etc. In the near future the poverty of necessary water sources can become a very important security threat to a country.

The Conception of Foreign Policy in RF, approved by president Dmitry Medvedev on the 10 th of August 2008, names a broad spectrum of threats to the modern world order (among them are new challenges and dangers: first and foremost – international terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, proliferation of mass destruction weapons and means for their transportation, regional conflicts, demographic problems, global poverty (including energetic poverty) as well as illegal migration and climate change. All these threats bear a global character and need an adequate response from the world community and joint efforts to overcome them. The role of environmental factor and the prophylaxis of infectious diseases gain more and more importance. The complexity of problems which the world community faces now needs to elaborate a well-balanced strategy for their solution which has to be based on principles of interconnection of security, socio-economic development and human rights protection.

Now I’d like to outline the dimensions of Russian foreign policy and its vectors in the globalizing world. The peculiarity of Russian foreign policy is – probably – its well-balance state and multi-vector course. These features are determined by geopolitical place of Russia as the

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biggest Eurasian state, its position as one of the leading world countries – permanent member of United Nations Security Council. Nowadays the interests of the state determinate the necessity of the positive agenda for all international problems (with a stress on collective actions for their solution).

The last ten years assure us that the strategy of unilateral acts destabilizes the world order, instigates tensions and arms race, worsens intergovernmental contradictions, rouses ethnic and religious strife, escalates tensions between civilizations. The application of compulsory measures with the use of military forces bypassing the Charter of the United Nations and its Security Council fails to eliminate deep socio-economic, interethnic and many other contradictions which are the basis of almost all conflicts, tears up the foundations of international law and leads to expansion of conflict space (including those regions which are in close geopolitical vicinity to Russia and consequently to Turkey).

Russia is quite conscious about its responsibility for maintaining of security in the world on the global as well as on the regional levels and ready for joint actions with other states concerned aiming at solving common problems. If the partners are not ready for such joint actions Russia will be forced to take its own line but always on the basis of international law.

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Russia is interested in stable system of international relations based on the international law and principles of equality of rights, mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation. Such a system of international relations is designed to provide equal security for every unit of world community in political, military, economic, information and any other spheres. Its main instrument is multi-track diplomacy. UN should remain to be a regulatory centre for international relations and world politics in the 21 st century, because of unique its unique legitimacy and lack of any alternative to UN.

Russia consistently speaks in support of reduction of power and military factor in international relations together with strengthening of strategic and regional stability. For these aims Russia thinks that development trends in modern world (such as arising multipolarity), diversification of risks and threats draw us to a conclusion that problems of strategic stability can’t be the sphere of only US-RF relations. It’s time to open the dialogue on these issues with leading states, first of all nuclear states which are interested in mutual actions aimed at provision of international security. It’s the main idea of strategic openness on which Russian initiatives are based (eg. collective counteraction measures against missile threats in Europe).

Russia will contribute to stabilizing the situation in the Middle East using its status of permanent member in UN Security Council as well as member of Quartet of principals. The main aim here is mobilization of collective efforts to achieve on the internationally recognized basis

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all-embracing and long-term settlement of Arab-Israel conflict in all its’ aspects (including the making of independent Palestinian state which is peace with modern Israel). Such a settlement should be gained in participation with all states and societies which determined the stability in the region and of course taking into account their interests. Russian Federation supports collective actions aimed at political settlement of conflict in Iraq by national reconciliation and restoration of sound political and economic system in this state. Those are main features of foreign policy strategy in Russia at the present stage.

During last ten years we can see quite visible activization in relation between Russia and Turkey in political sphere. Undoubtedly, the first impetus for such a tendency gave high-level visits: the visit of Turkish Prime-minister to Moscow on November 1999, Russian Prime- minister M.M. Kasyanov to Turkey on October 2000 and the head of Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry I.S. Ivanov to Ankara on June 2001 as well as mutual visits of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish Prime-minister Tayyip Erdo ğan, Foreign Affairs Ministers Sergey Lavrov and Abdullah Gül. All these visits and contacts resulted in achieving of shared vision on necessity to raise the Russian-Turkish relation on the level of multidimensional partnership.

Russia and Turkey share the general approach to the main issues of world development in the 21 st century and support the democratization of international relations aimed at construction of fair world order

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based on observance of international law, equality, mutual respect and cooperation. Moscow and Ankara agree that UN should play the central role in this process.

On the 16 th of November 2001 in New-York Russian and Turkish Foreign Ministers Igor Ivanov and Ismail Cem signed a unique document in the history of mutual relations – Plan for the development of relations between Russian Federation and Turkey in Eurasia (from bilateral cooperation to multidimensional partnership). The document stated the fact that the relation between the two countries had entered a new phase characterized by development of not only bilateral but also regional cooperation in different spheres on the basis of friendship and mutual trust. It’s very important that the document also stated the geographical trends of this cooperation: the Balkans, South Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Cyprus, Middle East, with special stress to Iraq, Black Sea region, Mediterranean region, interactions in solution of Eurasian problems within international organizations. According to that agreement high-level workshops were created which had to coordinate the politics of the two countries in Eurasia. Despite the fact that during that period those workshops gathered only three or four times the attempt of coordination of geo-strategies between Turkey and Russia in Eurasia itself means a lot.

In recent times Russian-Turkish relations is developing in accordance with the signed mutual Political Declaration (2004) which envisages

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the raise of bilateral relation on the level of advanced multidimensional partnership. Active political high-level dialogue stimulates this process. Within the last three years there were eight high-level Russian-Turkish meetings; phone conversations on actual problems of bilateral relations as well as on actual international and regional questions between the leaders of Russia and Turkey became a regular practice. The agenda of such conversations usually includes the questions of Iraqi and Middle East peacemaking process, situation with Iran nuclear programme and Kosovo, situation in Transcaucasus and Central Asia, Cyprus question and Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSECO) and a number of other questions.

Let’s cite one instance that illustrates the new important aspect of Russian-Turkish relations. At the opening ceremony of “The Blue Stream” on the 17 th November, 2007 Russian President Vladimir Putin during the negotiations with Turkish Prime-minister Tayyip Erdo ğan said: “Some time ago we didn’t consider Turkey as a country with which we can perform a direct dialogue. Today with your foreign policy Turkey – is our partner for the dialogue without intermediary. Due to the fact that foreign policy of every country is formulated by an in gathering, the role of personal factor is very important here. It’s also right for modern Turkey: despite its membership in NATO Turkey (like Russia) feels itself more as a Eurasian than a European country. That Eurasian world-view of Turkey (they call it new- Ottomanism) gained new impetus in 2002 when Justice and Development Party (JDP) with its Muslim values came to power. I

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said Muslim instead of Islamic because JDP prefers to represent itself as moderate and conservative Muslim analogue of Christian Democratic Parties rather than Islamic party. However this moderate conservative party – thanks to geopolitical concepts of Prof. Ahmet Davuto ğlu, an advisor of Prime-Minister Tayyip Erdo ğan – performed a real revolution in Turkish foreign policy.

For Turkey a competition with Russia has always been a determinative strategic challenge and a key factor in formation of its relation with Europe. On joining NATO the policy of containment of the USSR played a key role in making of strategic priorities of Ankara. After dissipation of socialist camp and collapse of USSR the field of foreign policy manoeuvre for Turkey has broadened out considerably: the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia – all of them has become an open territory for Turkish penetration. Nevertheless nationalistic political elite of Turkey led by the army which got accustomed to severe block discipline quite “slept away” all the new opportunities opened to it in the new post-communistic world. Thus the irony of Turkish “post modernity” is the fact that Islamist politician Tayyip Erdo ğan became a progressive leader who managed to draw the country from severe economic crisis of 2000-2001 and in a radical way activate Turkish foreign policy on the basis of the concept of “strategic depth” which Prof. Davuto ğlu offered to the Turkish society in the homonymous popular book.

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In 2007 president Vladimir Putin during his visit to Astana said that Turkey – quite unexpectedly for him – shown interest to Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which embraces Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. It’s quite known that the Shanghai Six in some respect try to lay down the foundations for a new union of states which in the future – as SCO leaders see it – will play a key role in the region. It refers to Russia and China.

The fact that Turkey shown an interest in SCO is an evidence of considerable changes in Turkish foreign policy. In this context it’s useful to cite the conception stated by Prof. Ahmet Davuto ğlu in his book “Strategic depth” (2000). The term “strategic depth” itself came from military science and characterizes the interest of a state in placing its strategic objects at a depth which is inaccessible for a potential adversary. However during recent decades some states like Pakistan and Israel are developing this concept in their inner and foreign policy. In such as an aspect Prof. Davuto ğlu tried to apply this concept to Turkey perceiving not only spatial but also historical dimensions of the “strategic depth”. He speaks about Turkey as a country that has a historical depth, a state that entered the beginning of the 20 th century among other seven empires which controlled different regions of the world, and he concludes that Turkey has to play a great role in world politics and can’t be treated as a small European country. According to that concept all the territories which used to be parts of the Ottoman Empire possess a strategic importance for modern Turkey and Ankara has to play a special role on those territories.

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Davuto ğu treats the geographical dimensions of “strategic depth” not only as good neighborhood relations with countries which are close to Turkey, but also as a strive to force those countries to tie their foreign policy to Turkey – as tightly as possible (for example try to make Georgia and Bulgaria co-operate with each other only through Turkey. In this respect Davuto ğlu appeared as an advocate of neo-ottomanism. While analyzing the foreign policy of ruling Justice and Development Party in Turkey we draw to a conclusion that it tries to realize the above mentioned concept. Today Turkey makes great efforts to improve its relations with the neighbors. Let’s say, at the end of the 20 th century Turkey had bad relation with almost all neighbor countries – with the Arab world, Iran, Caucasus. Today the situation is quite different. We also shouldn’t disregard the Eurasian subject- matter. The programme of JDP mentions Eurasianism as well.

As the result, if we consider the conceptual basis of existed Turkish- Russian relations it encompasses these two concepts – “strategic depth” and Eurasianism. The ongoing tendencies can be characterised as a striving of two countries to subdue the regional rivalry (which of course is still exists), strengthen the economic cooperation and gradually come to solution of geostrategic problems.

We have to mention that Ankara also thinks highly of the partnership relations with Moscow. On the opening ceremony of a exhibition dedicated to 85-year anniversary of Russian-Turkish relations (Ankara, December 2006) Deputy Prime-Minister and head of Turkish

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Foreign Ministry Abdullah Gül said: “We managed to reach such a level in relation with Russia that a lot of our ally-countries envy us. And in the future we will pile up the potential of these relations”.

Today we can see the raising importance of Turkey in the system of modern international relations on the regional as well as on the global level. Turkey is a member of NATO and an important regional Eurasian country which politics has a great potentiality and can influence the situation in the Middle East, the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey works in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Minsk Group for settlement of Karabakh conflict. On the other hand Turkey is an active member of the very authoritative Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The politics of strengthening of ties with the Islamic world brought the JDP government a very important achievement which a lot of political analysts undeservingly set aside. On January 2005 in result of competitive struggle for the first time in the history of modern Turkey its citizen Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsano ğlu was elected a general secretary of the Organization of the Islamic Conference – the leading and largest international Muslim organization in the world. After the elections new secretary general of OIC emphasized that he did have any connections with any political party but at the same time admitted: “I have very good relations with the ruling Justice and Development Party. It supported my candidacy for the post of secretary general of OIC and I’m very grateful to our Prime-Minister and head of Foreign Ministry for their favour”.

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The Middle East is a region which is very important for the both countries. During the whole 20 th century it was full of conflicts. Boundary, ethno-territorial, natural recourses and water supply problems play a crucial role here. We can continue this list with “new threats” – the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, demographic dynamics and migration; ethnic violence; illegal drug trade; illegal arms trade. Both countries are interested in easing of tensions, stability and security in the region (of course, by reference to their own national interests – aspire for the sustainable development of the economy in each country, preservation of territorial integrity, maintaining of socio-political stability in society in respect to its religious and ethnic structure).

The complexity of the situation in the Middle East is determined by continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, highly explosive situation in Iraq, terrorist activities in the region, internal political situation in Turkey and neighbor countries forced Ankara to make some changes to national security programme. Turkey despite certain difficulties tends to keep multi-vector course of its foreign policy and at the same time develop the relations with the Arab world (first of all with Syria, as well as with Iran which are reckoned by Washington to so called “axis of evil”. Thus in 2004-2005 for the first time there was an exchange of official visits on the presidential level between Turkey and Syria. In September 2008 Iranian President Mahmud Ahmedinejad visited Turkey. Along with this Turkey is developing relations with Israel –

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an ally country for US. Notwithstanding the critics of this process from different sides (Arab countries, Iran etc.) Ankara continues to deepen bilateral cooperation with Israel in a number of spheres including secret service and military techniques. Thus it becomes quite clear that any change in national security protection doctrine of a country like Turkey located in the centre of strategic important and unstable region is question of great interest for us.

On of the results of such change of accents was an adoption of new national security concept. The National Security Council (NSC) under the chairmanship of President Ahmed Sezer formulated that concept on the 24 th of October 2005 and named it “Political Document on National Security” ( Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgesi – MGSB ). One of distinguishing features of the new concept is that the security questions should be considered not only as problems of state-to-state relations with other countries but also from the point of regional dimensions for those contacts, existence of implicitly dangerous zones, activities of different radical organizations etc. All this shows us that Turkey gradually becomes a regional state which has economic, military and political facilities for active participation in coordination of joined actions against dangerous organizations and settlement of regional conflicts and realization of large-scale projects taking into account national interests.

We also have to notice that in accordance with the current situation the “Political Document on National Security” specially stated the

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priority of new threats and challenges which are dangerous for Turkey. According to the degree of danger they are placed as follows: separative and clerical actions, international terroristic and radical organizations, drug trafficking, illegal migration and kidnapping. The document notes that “Turkey is threatened by international terrorism which can found support in some parts of Turkey”. It draws attention to Kurdistan Workers’ Party which is included together with al-Qaeda and Hizbullah (Turkish version of Hezbollah) to the list of organizations personified threats and challenges cited in the “Red Book”. The document for the first time introduces the idea of national economic security which is called one of the most important functions of the state and marks out security of energy supply. The authors of the conception see one of the solutions for those problems in transformation Turkey into a world transit station for transfer and storage of energy resources.

The analysis of recent events shows us that Turkey aiming at realization of a national security programme in a full-scale (military, economic, energetic, politic and water security) has activated offensive foreign policy. This policy together with preservation of strategic partnership with the USA, large-scale cooperation with Russia and Israel, implementation of EU full-membership plan, also envisages the development of close relations with Arab countries, neighbor states, Turkic republics of the former USSR, Muslim regions within Russian Federation.

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Current situation in the Middle East and the new conception of national security in Turkey point out to the fact that Ankara reacts flexibly and competently to the changes in the region and in the world. All this make key countries of the region think about strategic dialogue with Turkey. Russia, USA, Israel together with some European and Arab countries as well as Iran understand that in long chain of Middle East politics Turkey plays one of the most important roles. Turkish “link” can determine the main directions of the Middle East politics. The question is to what extent all those countries will be able to preserve and increase their interests.

Now we’ll shift to the problems of South Caucasus which now is one of the most problem and topical region in the world. South Caucasus is a territory of three interethnic conflicts which has transformed into open military confrontation. South Caucasus is one of the most militarized regions in the modern world. Independent states located here possess military and war potential which is comparable to the war potential of an approximate European country. Except for independent states there are also three unrecognized republics with their own military potential. And there are also such uncontrolled territories which don’t have even unrecognized governments (e.g. Kodori Gorge or “Abkhazian Svanetia”).

South Caucasus has very important geopolitical and geo-economical dimensions. It is located on the border line of common European security region. It is also a significant transportation corridor and a

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location of numerous undeveloped natural resources. Thus stability in South Caucasus and its incorporation in the world community and world economy represent an important task for all the participants of international political process. However USA, Russia, Turkey, Iran and EU have different opinion on the problem and it leads to great competition of various projects for “conciliation” of South Caucasus.

Both Moscow and Ankara have clear political and economic interest in South Caucasus and they are concerned in strategic stability of the region (first of all because of energy sources). Non-belligerent and predictable Georgia is a guarantee for petrol transportation to Ceyhan. Peaceful Azerbaijan means uninterrupted production of “black gold”. After all being a serious regional and geopolitical player Ankara tends to strengthen its influence in Caucasus.

The situation when Tbilisi tried to solve the problem with military force reflected all the negative moments of current situation in the development of international relations which had been predicted in Putin’s Munich speech and Medvedev’s Berlin report: those are unilateral reactions (which are against multilateral diplomacy), preference of military force over peaceful settlement of conflicts, complicated dialectics of such principles as territorial integrity and right of nations to self-determination.

Actions of Russia against Georgian aggression on August, 8-12, 2008 when Russian army saved population of South Ossetia from physical

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destruction and de-facto genocide on the side of the regime of Saakashvili which has been armed and financed by the US Administration; and following Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states has radically changed the situation in the world and of course influenced the political processes in Middle Eastern countries. Russia once again has shown that it can – and does – participate in world politics as a great power. Official attitude of the most of Arab countries towards all these events can be considered as restrained and neutral. They didn’t join to anti-Russia propaganda campaign which unfolded in the West but at the same time didn’t support Russia openly. The only member of NATO that supported Russia’s actions was Turkey. Its President Abdullah Gül in his speech on the 13 th of August 2008 appreciated the decision of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev dedicating to peacemaking in South Ossetia including the joint Russia-EU measures. At the same day Turkish Prime-Minister Tayyip Erdo ğan decleared at the meeting with Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow that he had come to show solidarity with Russia in view of situation in South Ossetia”. Turkish politician expressed a hope that “in the future this solidarity will only strengthen” and called Russia “a friendly country, relations with which has been developing very fast in recent years (in different spheres – political, economic, trade, and military). At the same time Turkish prime-minister put forward an initiative of the formation of “The Platform for Stability and Cooperation in Caucasus” which was valued positively by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov who said that “Russia supports the Turkish initiative aiming at formation of

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a mechanism for settling the conflicts and strengthening stability in the region”. For Russia the support of Turkey, a member of NATO and a state which becomes more and more influential in solving international conflicts (Arab-Israel and Iraqi ones) is undoubtedly very important and valuable.

I think it wouldn’t a mistake and exaggeration to say that the events in South Ossetia can become a turning point in big process which will lead to reformation of modern political map of the world. In a determinate sense this process is already proceeding. We can see that it’s not a single process but a complex of parallel processes that make the structure of new world order. Thus, one example in the initiative of Turkish prime-minister Tayyip Erdo ğan to formulate “The Union for Cooperation and Security in Caucasus”. Of course somebody would consider such an initiative of Turkish prime-minister in solution of complicated problems in Caucasus very strange. But if we look at the situation taking into account the situation in the region within recent ten years we’ll see that the reaction of Ankara towards the events on its border can be even counted as a bit belated. To say the truth Erdo ğan for the first time spoke loudly about the perspective of Turkey’s full-scale participation in problems of highly important and strategic region of the world – I mean the Caucasus. Ankara has a long history of cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan in realization of significant regional projects however the level of its political influence in the region is still relatively low.

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Whereas with his initiative Tayip Erdo ğan offered to broaden the traditional format of “Caucasus society” (Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) not only with Turkey. Speaking about the essence of his initiatives Erdo ğan mentioned that “the main aim of the formation of such a union would be the provision of peace and energetic security in the region which also had a priority for OSCE”. This idea legitimates somehow possible basis for the role of USA in the region. During a press-conference in Ankara Sergey Lavrov said: “We appreciate in Turkish initiative the fact that it’s open for the other countries and at the same time, according to it, only the states of the region will determine the code of conduct there. It has a lot in common with ASEAN which has numerous partners but the agenda and life in the region are determined by the members only”. Thus we can consider these words a Russian view on the future of “The Union for Cooperation and Security in Caucasus”.

Today’s crisis in Caucasus which lead to the restoration of old confrontation between East and West, shown great vulnerability of the “unique geopolitical position” of Turkey. In case of further escalation of the conflict in Caucasus between Russia and the West, Turkey as the only state in the region which is a member of NATO would have to change its profitable position of “intermediary” for an unenviable role of frontline state with all negative consequences.

Thus one of the main aims of “Caucasus Initiative” of Ankara is an aspiration to liquidate confrontation, make a platform for negotiations

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and stabilize the situation in the region. In case of even relative success of Turkey it will be possible to escape the “nightmarish scenario”: the necessity to make existential choice between contrary geopolitical poles which Ankara is destined to unite (of course according to its own interests).

Geopolitical ideas are closely associated with economic interests of Turkish elites. South Caucasus is the most important transit corridor between Central Asian and Caspian region which is wealthy with energy resources and Turkey. The war in Georgia has shown the vulnerability of all the petrol- and gas pipe-lines located on the territory of Georgia. Turkey in order to play the role of a centre for transit of energy resources to the world market has to solve two problems – first of all, to stabilize the situation in Georgia, and then, to find alternative ways of petroleum transportation. “The Union for Cooperation and Security in Caucasus” is designed to solve these very problems. So the core of all the “Caucasus Initiative” is the provision of stability for petroleum transportation. The recent statement of Turkish Foreign minister Ali Babacan only proved the fact. He said that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and including of Yerevan to the regional energetic infrastructure are indispensable conditions for Armenian’s support of the Turkish plan of stabilization of Caucasus.

Turkey and Russia are influential players on the Eurasian geopolitical scene, and the character of their relations influence the situation on the

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whole continent. And though the question of bilateral relations is important per se , today it turned out to be inscribed in big geopolitical play of Turkish establishment.

Ankara has been playing this part for log time already but the Caucasus crisis has made it more acute. To understand the anxiety of Turkish ruling elite it’s quite enough to look at the map – Turkey is steel reaping the fruits of American invasion into Iraq and hasn’t managed to solve the problem on its Eastern borders. Today we are witnesses of the situation in Caucasus and in the water area of the Black Sea, and experts keep on saying that the next war conflict would probably be in Nagorny Karabakh if only the war in Iran (which is also a neighbor country to Turkey) doesn’t break out earlier.

It will be very difficult for Ankara – a member of NATO and an ally of Azerbaijan – to preserve neutrality and those scenarios don’t match its interests at all. Turkey has got accustomed to the quiet situation in the Black Sea, economic cooperation with Russia and numerous Russian tourists coming to its resorts, and status quo is quite convenient for Turkey (by the way that status quo doesn’t interfere with the spread of Panturkist ideas). However today after the head-on crash between Russia and Georgia this status quo is already exploded and Turkish ruling elite is simply forced to search new ways of defense, protection and promotion of its interests.

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Both Russia and Turkey are two very important Eurasian states, their coordinated actions within the frame of complex multidimensional cooperation can possibly provide stability and security on a number of regions as well as reconciliation and settlement of complicated international problems. Recent five-year history of mutual relations between Russia and Turkey proves the necessity of further intensification of interaction and mutual trust between Moscow and Ankara.

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Diverging point in foreign policies of Turkey and Russia: Cyprus Re şat Arım 1

(In the absence of Ambassador. Re şat Arım, the text prepared by him on Cyprus as one of the diverging point in Turkish and Russian foreign policies was read at the Roundtable by Ambassador Oktay Aksoy.)

The media in Turkey debates the anomalies in Russian positions taken with similar issues and compares them with the position taken on Cyprus: Rejection of independence of Kosovo and at the same time recognizing the steps taken by Abhazia and Southern Ossetia. Therefore, Cyprus is definitely a diverging point in Turkish-Russian foreign policies.

“When UK wanted to relinquish sovereignty over Cyprus, the formula found was to have an independent state. Since the inhabitants of the island are Turks and Greeks, the interests of Turkey and Greece were involved. Soviet Union came into the picture as a permanent member of the Security Council. During the Cold War when Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios could benefit from the non-aligned countries at the United Nations to pursue his plan for Enosis, this was resisted by Turkey, one of the Guarantor Powers for Cyprus. The rights of the Turkish Cypriots were also recognized by the Soviet Union who accepted the idea of a “Federation” in Cyprus. Later, when Greece

1 Ambassador (Rtd.)

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instigated a coup in the Island and declared Enosis it was again Turkey who used the right in article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee and prevented the annexation of the island to Greece. But, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriot administration continued. The Turkish Cypriots were not condemned anymore to small enclaves, but they were living in their separate territory, as a result of the exchange of population decided in 1975 between Mr. Denkta ş and Mr. Clerides. Of course, they needed their own administration. Already during the Geneva Conference in 1974 Turkey, Greece and Great Britain had accepted in their declaration that there existed in Cyprus two autonomous administrations, that of the Turkish Cypriots and that of the Greek Cypriots. These two autonomous authorities came to administer the Turkish and Greek zones respectively. The Turkish Cypriot administration in charge of the homogenous population transformed itself into the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. However, talks between the two sides, guidelines and agreements signed by the leaders could not produce a comprehensive settlement. The Greek Cypriots were trying to gain the support of the UN General Assembly to further their aims; the Turkish Cypriots were pushed to declare the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983.This state is functioning with all its executive, legislative and juridical powers. Therefore, the UN Plan put forward by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan recognized the existing situation and offered as a solution a state to be formed by the two constituent states existing in the Island. Annan Plan was accepted by

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the Turkish Cypriots in a referendum; however it was rejected by the Greek Cypriots.

The UN Secretary General gave a report in 2004 to the UN Security Council and proposed that the unnecessary restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots be eliminated, e.g. the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots be ended. Unfortunately, this report could not be discussed at the Security Council due to the objection of the Russian Representative.

After more than forty years since the Greek Cypriots created the Cyprus problem, it should have been clear to everyone that it is the Turkish side that wants to solve the problem. The Turkish Cypriots have shown that by supporting the Annan Plan in the referendum of 2004. The Greek Cypriots voted against it. Turkey also has been in favor of the Annan Plan. Today, there are fresh talks between the two sides in Cyprus to solve the problem. Turkey supports these talks and very much hopes that they will find a comprehensive solution based on the realities in the Island.

The isolation of the Turkish Cypriots continues unabated. The Russian side, including President Putin, expressed the view that this isolation was unacceptable. In his press conference of 31 January 2008, he said that they should have joint economic activities with the Turkish Cypriots.”

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The public opinion feels that the Turkish Cypriots are being unjustly punished for their efforts to find a solution with the aim of integrating with the Greek Cypriots in a federation. It is the Greek Cypriots who prevented this solution because they prefer to be the sole power in the Island and yet they are being rewarded for their intransigence. However, the patience is running out on the Turkish side and if the ongoing negotiations do not produce any acceptable and tangible result, it will not be a surprise for the public opinion in Turkish Cypriot part of the Island to look for other solutions, including seeking independence.

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Also available at the Foreign Policy Institute:

Turkey’s Neighborhood . Edited by Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaro ğlu. This book deals with Bulgaria, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Syria, Iran and Iraq. Part II of the book is contributed by Polish researchers and discusses the political issues of the South Caucuses from EU and Turkish perspectives, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Turkey, EU perceptions on the security challenges of Ukraine and Moldova, EU external policy and Turkey, and security and strategic issues in the Middle East from Polish-EU perspective. The book is available at the Foreign Policy Institute for the price of 30 USD.

Caspian Energy Diplomacy since the end of the Cold War . By Dr. Tuncay Babalı. 260 pages. This book gives a comprehensive analysis of the most complicated issues concerning exploitation of oil and gas sources and their transportation and sales issues. This book is available at the Foreign Policy Institute at a price of 25 USD.

The Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pittfalls . Edited by Prof. Ali Karaosmano ğlu and Mr. Seyfi Ta şhan. Contributions to this book were mainly made by Turkish authors. It discusses mainly from theoretical and practical perspecpectives the Europeanization of Turkey’s security policy. The book is 283 pages long and is available at the Foreign Policy Institute at a price of 30 USD.

Cyprus and International Law . Edited by Re şat Arım (Amb. Rtd.). It deals with the different aspcts of the Cyprus question from mainly the Turkish point of view. The book is available at the Foreign Policy Institute at a price of 25 USD.

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