Market Liquidity: a Primer

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Market Liquidity: A Primer June 2015 l The Brookings Institution Douglas J. Elliott, Fellow, Economic Studies Introduction Overview and recommendations US financial markets are critical to the Market liquidity refers to the ability of buyers functioning of our entire economy, providing and sellers of securities to transact efficiently more credit, for example, than banks do. Our and is measured by the speed with which large unusually large financial markets have been an purchases and sales can be executed and the American competitive advantage for years, transaction costs incurred in doing so. These providing a cost-effective means of matching investors with worthy companies and projects. costs include both the explicit commission or Therefore, the current debate about whether bid/ask spread and the, often larger, loss from market liquidity is drying up is an important moving the market price by the act of making one, since the ability to buy and sell securities is the bid or offer for a large block. This latter central to market functioning. This primer effect ties market liquidity to price volatility, as provides an introduction to the issues by transaction volumes lead to bigger price addressing the following questions. movements when markets are illiquid. • What is market liquidity? We care about market liquidity because it • Why do we care about it? affects the returns for investors, such as those • Has it actually declined? saving for retirement or college, and the costs • What do the recent bouts of market to corporations, governments, and other volatility mean? borrowers. Further, illiquid markets are more • Why would we expect market liquidity volatile. At the extreme, volatility can help to be down? trigger or exacerbate financial crises. Even the • Will market liquidity decline further? average level of volatility matters, as it is • What factors might offset tightening factored into the interest rates demanded by liquidity? investors and paid by borrowers. • What should be changed to improve market liquidity? Market liquidity is a complicated issue in part because it is not clear what is happening to Before going systematically through these underlying liquidity. Pretty much everyone questions, the following section provides an agrees that markets are less liquid than they overview and recommendations. were in the run-up to the financial crisis, but it is not clear that this is a problem, since those liquidity levels were unsustainable and evaporated quickly under stress. The harder parts are to compare liquidity to an optimal sustainable level and to project liquidity into the future. There is no agreement on either the optimum level or the future course of market liquidity. Market Liquidity: A Primer Brookings 2015 Despite the uncertainties, policymakers are at least four incidents in the last couple of years right to take this issue seriously and to worry in which markets showed extreme volatility that about the risks. There appears to have been a may have been exaggerated by lower liquidity, decline in underlying liquidity in the markets such as the “taper tantrum” in the bond and this seems highly likely to worsen to some markets. It is difficult to know if these are extent. There are numerous factors at work, isolated incidents or the tip of a dangerous including the evolution of the structure of iceberg. On the other hand, there are a number financial markets and the effects of unusual of indicators, such as average bid/ask spread, economic conditions, especially extremely loose that do not show signs of a less liquid market, monetary policies and massive direct central so while there appears to have been an overall bank purchases of bonds. I also believe we have decrease in liquidity, the evidence is overshot in our regulations in a way that will ambiguous. cramp market liquidity excessively, producing more social costs than the benefits of greater Thus, the effects we have seen already are not financial stability. To be clear, most of what has deeply worrisome on their own. The bigger been done is positive; it is a matter of issue is the probability that market liquidity will recalibrating the details to reduce the social considerably worsen going forward. First, the costs while keeping the core benefits. very loose monetary policies of central banks Unfortunately, this cost-benefit analysis is around the world appear to have provided complex and still subjective at this point, in part considerable support for market liquidity while because so much of what is happening to also holding down price volatility. When liquidity remains ambiguous and the largest monetary policies eventually tighten, market effects are likely to be in the future. liquidity is likely to be more of a problem. Second, banks and large dealers are almost Whatever the overall conclusions about certain to cut back further on their liquidity regulation, it is clear that the cumulative effects provision and to raise their prices over the next of a series of regulations have made it more couple of years. Many of the rules that increase difficult and expensive for banks and large their costs are only now being finalized or are securities dealers to act as market makers. being phased in over time. Further, dealers (These rules include the liquidity coverage ratio, know they will lose customers if they make one the net stable funding ratio, the supplementary big move, rather than spreading the pain over leverage ratio, various changes to the capital multiple years, especially if their competitors rules under the Basel capital accords, the take smaller steps. Volcker Rule, and others.) Smaller dealers, hedge funds, and similar firms will pick up some In sum, there are good reasons to worry about of the slack as the large dealers pull back, but market liquidity and to believe that there are real limitations on their ability to do policymakers may have unintentionally so cost-effectively. The markets can also adapt, overshot. However, the disaster scenarios that such as by moving to agency rather than some suggest do not seem plausible, nor does principal models and by embracing electronic any regulatory overshoot mean that we have to markets, but, again, there are some serious redo financial reform in major ways. This is a limits on how far these moves can go. matter of taking the issue seriously and recalibrating a series of technical measures to The net result should logically be decreased reduce the damage to market liquidity without liquidity and we have already seen much lower increasing the risks to financial stability in any securities inventories held for market-making significant way. At this point, the key is to revisit purposes by dealers along with some other the various key regulations and to seriously signs of lessened liquidity. There have also been 2 Market Liquidity: A Primer Brookings 2015 review the costs and benefits of the choices One of the major effects of this market that were made about the details. structure is that the great majority of bonds are bought and sold through dealers rather than What is market liquidity? traded on exchanges, since there is not enough transaction volume to support exchange trading In financial terms, the “liquidity” of any asset of each of the individual bonds. These dealers refers to the combination of the degree of ease do not normally charge a commission, but are with which it can be sold (or bought) in a timely paid through their expected profits from manner and the level of costs associated with bidding for bonds at one price and offering to that sale, either in terms of transactions costs sell them at a higher one. The “bid/ask” spread or the acceptance of a lower price in order to between the two quotes can be viewed as find a buyer in a reasonable time. Houses are consisting of two parts. A portion is the relatively illiquid assets, since they can take equivalent of a commission and is necessary to months to sell, there are quite substantial cover expenses and provide a reasonable profit transaction costs, and, depending on market for helping customers to execute transactions. conditions, the seller may have to take a hit to The second part compensates dealers for the move the house in a reasonable time period. On risk that they will lose money on a transaction the other hand, a US Treasury bond is highly by buying too high or selling too low, as well as liquid. It can easily be sold within hours, covering the costs of holding a securities transaction costs are minimal, and there are inventory to facilitate transactions, including many potential buyers who are willing to pay the necessary levels of capital and liquidity to roughly the bond’s theoretical market value. back their inventories. Therefore, one of the significant measures of market liquidity is the Recent concerns about “market liquidity” refer average bid/ask spread, since it represents an to the functioning of markets for purely important transaction cost. financial assets, particularly bonds issued by both governments and corporations, also Why do we care about it? known as “fixed income” instruments since they promise a fixed set of payments to the owner. Most of the credit provided to businesses and Sometimes these discussions have broadened households in this country is ultimately supplied out to reference derivatives based on these through financial markets. (This is a contrast bonds or the related markets in foreign with the rest of the world, where credit currencies and commodities. primarily ends up on bank balance sheets). The suppliers of credit are insurers, pension funds, It is important to understand that the fixed mutual funds, individual investors, and others. income market is quite different from the stock The ultimate sources of all these funds are markets with which most people are more households who rely on their returns from familiar.
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