Singapore Management University Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Research Collection School Of Law School of Law 10-2010 Constitutional Fiats: Presidential Legislation in India's Parliamentary Democracy Shubhankar DAM Singapore Management University,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Legislation Commons Citation DAM, Shubhankar. Constitutional Fiats: Presidential Legislation in India's Parliamentary Democracy. (2010). Columbia Journal of Asian Law. 24, (1), 1-61. Research Collection School Of Law. Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/1246 This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email
[email protected]. CONSTITUTIONAL FIAT: PRESIDENTIAL LEGISLATION IN INDIA'S PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY Shubhankar Dam Abstract India and Pakistan are parliamentary democracies. The governments of both have a lawmaking feature at odds with parliamentary norms: presidential legislation. The President, acting through the Council of Ministers, is authorized to enact legislation in the form of "ordinances" without input from Parliament. In a sense, ordinances are constitutional fiat, or legislation without legislature. This article will explore this anomalous feature in India and Pakistan, arguing that use of ordinances violates fundamental tenets of parliamentary democracy. As the judiciaries of the two nations address challenges to ordinances by interpreting the constitutional provisions mustered in their support, they must consider the interaction between ordinances and the principles on which the parliamentary system of government is founded.