CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE

Early Warning Issues for April 1 International Contact Groups 9 Pending PSC Issues 2 Country Analysis: Burundi 11 Pre-Election Analysis 2 PSC Retrospective: African Charter on Democracy, PSC and Small Arms 13 Elections and Governance 4 Spotlight on the PSC: Country Analysis: Togo 6 The Secretariat 14 PSC Retrospective: PSC and Important Forthcoming Dates 15 No. 9, April 2010

This report is available on the ISS website and can be viewed together with Thematic Reports on the work of the PSC at www.issafrica.org. All documents referred to in this Report can also be found on the ISS website. Peace and Security Council Protocol ‘The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council’ – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union

Early Warning Issues as part of the democratic transfor- the protests that succeeded Faure’s mation of the Sudan, in line with re-election plunged Togo into further for April the Comprehensive Peace Agreement instability. (CPA)’. For South Sudan these The scheduled Rotating Chair of elections are particularly important Burundi the African Union (AU) Peace and because they represent a precursor Security Council (PSC) for the to the 2011 referendum which will month of April is Benin. In the provide the region with the oppor- On 17 August 2009, the PSC issued absence of a country’s representation tunity to either secede or remain a communiqué, PSC/PR/BR(CXCIX), at ambassadorial level, an alternate within a unified Sudan. The logistical welcoming the various breakthroughs member will chair the Council for complexity of convening the polls in the peace process between the the month. will un-doubtedly impact upon efforts Government of Burundi and the to ensure the un-fettered participation PALIPEHUTU-FNL. The Council called Sudan: 2010 Pre-election Analysis of all Sudanese voters. upon the Government and political parties to create conducive conditions Togo for the holding of elections in mid- On 10 March 2010, the PSC issued 2010. The five polls scheduled to take a communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM. place between May and September (CCXIX), in which it acknowledged On 27 May 2005, the PSC issued a 2010 continue to raise tensions in the Report of the AU Second Pre- communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM(XXX), Burundi. In particular, there have Election Assessment Mission to the in which it urged the Togolese been violent clashes between youth Sudan, PSC/PR/2(CCXIX), which political parties to engage in ‘the had been dispatched by the Union’s promotion of national reconciliation groups of different political factions Political Affairs Department from 19 and democracy’. On 4 March 2010, in certain parts of the country. There to 24 January 2010. Ambassador B. Togo convened presidential elections. are higher stakes involved in the Adeyemi who was a member of the This was the second presidential forthcoming series of elections and mission as well as representatives of election since the death of General constructive engagement between Sudan and the European Union also Gassingbé Eyadema who ruled the the ruling party as well as other provided briefings to the Council country from 1967 to 2005. The relevant stakeholders remains crucial during this meeting. The PSC 2010 presidential race was expected to avoid potential violent confrontation stressed the ‘crucial importance to be a step forward in addressing and an escalation of crisis in the of the April 2010 general elections the governance challenges. However, country. Livingstone Formula ‘‘Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC’ – PSC/ PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs. This Report is an independent publication of the Institute for Security Studies.

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

1 Pending PSC Issues the European Union also provided suffrage, however the prospects for briefings to the Council during not achieving this ideal remain high. Issues pending for the Council this meeting. The PSC stressed In addition, the issue over the include: the ‘crucial importance of the April disputed 2008 census results, which 2010 general elections as part of was the basis upon which electoral the democratic transformation of geographic constituencies were Office of the Special Advisor the Sudan, in line with the Com- established, remains a source of of the UN Secretary-General prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)’. tension. Furthermore, the challenge on the Prevention of Genocide: of promoting country-wide civic Background to the Elections: education was evident but the most On 26 November, the PSC issued significant challenge will be ensuring a statement, PSC/PR/BR(CCX), that security prevails in areas where in which it received the Special On 11 and 12 April 2010, over voting will be taking place, since this Advisor of the UN Secretary- 18 million registered Sudanese will be the first criticism that could General on the Prevention of will participate in the first post- potentially be utilised to negate the Genocide, Professor Francis Deng. war national elections which are legitimacy of the electoral process. The Council recalled ‘the tragedy also the first polls in 24 years. The of the genocide that occurred country remains under the yoke of in Rwanda in 1994’ and‘stressed heightened political uncertainty. For South Sudan these elections the importance that should be These polls were an agreed element are particularly important because given to the prevention of of the 2005 CPA which sought to they represent precursor to the genocide’. broaden political participation and 2011 referendum which will provide The Council acknowledged the consolidate democratic transfor- the region with the opportunity on-going efforts of the UN mation in the country. However, a to either secede or remain within Secretary-General to ‘focus on series of postponements of these a unified Sudan. For the NCP the situations that may carry the risk polls, since early 2009, now means elections will provide it with an of genocide’. The PSC requested that they will be convened in a opportunity to legitimise its rule in that ‘regular consultations’ be politically volatile environment Sudan. However, key concerns have held to assess these situations where the two main ruling partners been raised about the credibility, and called for the enhancing of National Congress Party (NCP), transparency and inclusiveness of collaboration ‘between the AU led by President Omar al-Bashir, these elections. For the ordinary and the UN on the prevention and the Sudan People Liberation Sudanese citizens there are lingering of genocide, particularly in Movement/Army (SPLM/A), now led concerns about peace and security Africa’. The PSC has not issued by Salva Kiir, of the Government of not only in Darfur and the South but a communiqué outlining the National Unity (GNU) hold virtually also in other parts of the country modalities of the ‘regular consul- opposing positions on the future of as well. There are also concerns tations’ between the AU and the Sudan. as to whether the electoral system Office of the Special Advisor. will produce governments that are The CPA was meant to address the perceived as legitimate. structural deficiencies of the political system in Sudan. The Agreement An important factor that will PRE-ELECTION was also designed to promote potentially influence the outcome democratisation and advance the of the elections is the fact that ANALYSIS quest for an egalitarian and just they are being convened in an political, economic and social system. extremely volatile national political While some of the provisions of the environment. The country is still CPA have been fulfilled including oil, afflicted by the internecine war in The 2010 Sudan Polls land and human rights commissions, Darfur, the unresolved conflict in the there are still significant items East, and the prevailing insecurity in On 10 March 2010, the PSC issued in the Agreement that have not. the South. In addition, the governing a communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM. Specifically, ‘unity’ remains elusive coalition in the Government of (CCXIX), in which it acknowledged and has not been made ‘attractive’ National Unity has not functioned the Report of the AU Second Pre- as stipulated in the CPA. effectively. All political parties have Election Assessment Mission to been undertaking campaigns in the the Sudan, PSC/PR/2(CCXIX), The Sudanese Transition: lead up to the polls. There have which was dispatched by the been calls for the postponement of Union’s Political Affairs Department elections until November 2010, so from 19 to 24 January 2010. The legislation that established the that disagreements around these Ambassador B. Adeyemi who was National Electoral Commission (NEC) issues as well as the population a member of the mission as well also initiated several laws to support census and geographical constituen- as representatives of Sudan and the process of ensuring universal cies can be resolved.

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

2 Political Parties: demarcation of geographical con- respectively. Voters will be casting stituencies. The SPLM maintains that votes for the: National presidency; these discrepancies are designed to President of Southern Sudan; State Sixty-six political parties, a total of disenfranchise voters and preempt Governors; National Legislative about four thousand candidates, the outcome of the vote in the State. Assembly; Legislative Assembly of will participate in the elections Consequently, the elections have Southern Sudan; and Legislative and there are eleven individuals been postponed in South Kordofan. Assemblies of States. As a con- competing for the presidency of In Darfur, a majority of the politico- sequence, political parties have the Sudanese republic. The key military movements have advised on questioned whether these multiple positions are the Presidencies of the the need to postpone the elections. polls will generate confusion. National Government and of the The Sudan Liberation Movement Government of the South. For the (SLM), which is also a partner of the national Presidency in Khartoum, The logistical complexity of con- unity government, has called for the there are 10 candidates challenging vening the polls will undoubtedly postponement of the elections in Omar al-Bashir, with Sadiq Al-Mahdi impact upon efforts to ensure Sudan and specifically for Darfur. (Umma Party) using his democratic the unfettered participation of all The SLM maintains that free and credentials (last elected civilian Sudanese voters. It will also impact fair elections cannot be convened leader in Sudan, toppled by Bashir’s upon efforts to observe and monitor in Darfur without the disarmament National Islamic Front (NIF) in 1989) the elections across the country, of the Janjaweed and other to gain support, and Abdallah Deng particularly in areas with limited government-backed proxy militias; Nhial (Popular Congress Party) as infrastructure and remote rural the return of refugees and displaced the only Southerner in the race regions where access is constrained persons to their villages; and the campaigning on a ticket to mobilise or in regions where armed militia return of international humanitarian for unity. The NCP has decided not are still active. organisations to the Darfur region. to contest the Presidency of South Surprisingly, it appears that a Sudan, leaving Salva Kirr Mayardit majority of internally displaced Addressing the surge of inter- of the SPLM to face former comrade persons in Darfur who were anti- communal violence in the South that Lam Akol Ajawin, from the recently Bashir boycotted the registration led to over 2000 deaths in 2009, a formed SPLM – Democratic Change process, and consequently they number that the UN claims is higher (SPLM-DC). The SPLM-DC is a will not be able to vote. This was than the death toll in Darfur for that breakaway faction of the SPLM perhaps due to a lack of confidence same period, will become more and according to analysts it is in the proposed electoral process problematic if ethnicity continues supported by the NCP to ostensibly and concerns about whether to be mobilised by candidates as a split the vote in the South. For the being registered as voters in the means of enhancing their chances positions of State Governors there camps would negate their ability to of victory. are 189 candidates, for the national return to their homes. Essentially, assembly 4136 candidates, for the the criticism has been that the state legislatures over 8000 and The Impact of the International conditions are not optimal for the for the Southern Sudan legislative Criminal Court (ICC) Arrest transparent conduct of elections in assembly over 627 candidates. Warrant: Darfur. An arrest warrant has been issued Incumbency always has its ad- Logistical Complexity of the for President Al-Bashir based on vantages and this also applies Elections: charges of war crimes and crimes to President Al-Bashir. His most against humanity committed in significant advantage is that between The complexity of the elections in Darfur. Naturally, Al-Bashir has November and December 2009, his declined to appear in The Hague party was able to mobilise resources terms of the number of seats that are being contested as well as the to respond to the charges against and institutions to register voters him. The NCP has utilised this ICC particularly its supporters. electoral models that are being utilised will appear alien to a arrest warrant to mobilise support significant proportion of the popu- for Al-Bashir during the election Despite the fact that the elections lation which has not participated campaign. Al-Bashir has argued will be taking place shortly there in democratic elections for several that the ICC intervention is an have been some dissenting voices years. The replacement of the First- attempt by the West to undermine about the appropriateness of Past-the-Post System with a Mixed- the sovereignty of Sudan, which is convening them. The SPLM in Member System and a multi-list has embodied in his presidency. Southern Kordofan State will left the majority of voters confused. boycott the elections in protest over Voters will be casting between what it perceives as significant nine and thirteen different ballots discrepancies in the results of depending on whether they are population census and in the voting in the North or in the South

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

3 The Prospects for the Election: allegations of potential rigging. potential for an escalation of This could produce a zero sum localised instances of violence game that will ultimately pre- following the announcement of There are substantial challenges cipitate a new cycle of conflict the results. facing the Sudanese elections which and the escalation of ethnic or cast serious doubts about their political tensions. future credibility. In particular: Historically, no single party has won an outright majority in the vast • The census results have fuelled expanse that is the Sudan, as a • The advantages that the incumbent mistrust. Specifically, the oppo- consequence of its diversity and NCP has over the other parties is sition parties claim that the census the nature of shifting alliances self-evident. Specifically, the NCP figures have been grossly over- and affiliations to political parties. continues to monopolise access calculated and over-estimated Analysts have suggested that one to the national media, and a raft in the North and deliberately potential outcome would be a of repressive laws which restrict decreased in the South so as to hung parliament, which would then the ability of opposition parties assure a victory for the NCP in open the possibilities for a coalition to freely contest the elections are national electoral competitions. government with all the political still intact. Election observers and complexities that this would opposition parties have already generate. reported incidences of fraud, • The two governing partners NCP vote buying and intimidation and SPLM as well as the main during the course of the voter opposition parties have been Key international organisations have registration process. They have afflicted by internal division and committed themselves to monitoring warned against the potential for dissension. This has been fuelled the forthcoming elections including “phantom” votes, vote rigging mainly by the candidate selection African Union, the Inter-Govern- and heightened insecurity and processes. Those who have lost mental Authority on Development increased human rights abuses out on the opportunity to contest (IGAD), UN, European Union and prior, during and after the for these elections have in some the Carter Centre. So in theory elections. instances proceeded to put their there will be an objective presence names forward as independent to assess whether the polls are free candidates. This issue raises the and fair. • It is not clear whether the results will be accepted given the

The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance

There has been a resurgence in manipulation, the continent has The 1990 OAU ‘Declaration on the the unconstitutional changes of also witnessed an increase in post- Political and Socio-Economic government in Africa. In August electoral violence as contenders Situation in Africa and the Funda- 2008, Mauritania witnessed a refuse to accept the outcome of mental Changes Which are Currently putsch against a democratically polls. Taking Place in the World’, (AHG/ elected government and, in March Decl.1-2(XXVI), emphasised the 2009, Madagascar was also afflicted importance of upholding democracy, by this scourge. More recently, It is in the context of this trend human rights, the rule of law, as on 18 February 2010, the AU was that on 18 March 2010 the AU well as enhancing social and compelled to impose sanctions on convened a technical and expert economic governance. These issues the military regime in Niger, which level meeting in Banjul, Gambia, with were further enumerated in the ousted President Mamadou Tandja. Regional Economic Communities 1999 Algiers ‘Decisions on Uncon- The military leadership in Niger (RECs) and other stakeholders to stitutional Changes of Government’, had ostensibly accused Tandja of assess the African Charter on AHG/Dec 142 (XXXV), and the manipulating the constitution to Democracy, Elections and Gover- Lomé Declaration on Uncon- extend his rule. This has led some nance, Assembly/AU/Dec. 147 (VIII). stitutional Changes of Government, commentators to describe the take- The session was presided over by of 2000. In April 2003, the AU, the over in Niger as a ‘good coup’, the AU Commissioner for Political Independent Electoral Commission because it replaced an illegitimate Affairs, Julia Dolly Joiner, and sought of South Africa and the African and corrosive government. The to assess the ‘popularisation and Association of Electoral Authorities fact that a coup can be described ratification’ process of the Charter jointly hosted a conference in as a ‘good coup’ suggests that since it was adopted three years Pretoria, South Africa, focusing there are serious anomalies in ago and to establish a strategy to on Elections, Democracy and terms of democratic governance in enhance the pace of the ratification Governance. The meeting laid the Africa. In addition to constitutional of the document. foundation for an experts meeting

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

4

The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (continued) in 2004, convened in Addis Ababa, bent government to relinquish power African States (ECOWAS) pre- which further engaged with the to the winning party or candidate after empted the continental initiative d e l i b e rat i o n s of t h e P r eto r ia m e et i ng , regular, free and fair elections. The by adopting its own Protocol on and recommended the development Charter touches upon the practice Democracy and Good Governance, of a Draft Charter on Democracy, of using elections to legitimise power in 2001. The ECOWAS Protocol Elections and Governance. Con- that was illegally procured through has been invoked to impose sequently, the AU adopted the a coup. Specifically, the Charter sanctions on Togo and Guinea Charter on 30 January 2007 in denounces those who have illegally Bissau for digressions from the Addis Ababa. acquired power and stipulates that norms and principles of democratic such perpetrators should not contest governance. In August 2006, The Charter has four main areas of the elections that are subsequently ECOWAS deployed an electoral focus, namely: held to pave the way to a restoration mission to the Gambia, followed of constitutional order. In addition, by similar missions to Guinea, the Charter states that those who in February 2007, Nigeria, in i) democracy, human rights illegally acquire power should be April 2007, and Mali, in April and rule of law; brought to justice and tried in com- 2007. ECOWAS also upheld its ii) elections and democratic petent AU courts. However, the AU commitment to its principles by institutions; currently lacks a judicial framework condemning the irregularities in the iii) unconstitutional change with the criminal jurisdiction to April 2007 Nigerian elections and of government; prosecute perpetrators who illegally appealed for significant electoral iv) political, economic and acquire power. Neither the AU Court reform in the country. social governance. of Justice nor the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is com- The adoption of the Charter petent to exercise a jurisdiction on The Charter promotes a culture of represents a concretisation of the these matters. constitutionalism predicated on AU’s determination to promote and a respect for the values and strengthen governance through principles of democracy and Chapter 10 of the Charter outlines the the institutionalisation of tran- human rights. It also re-articulates ‘mechanisms for application’ for the sparency, accountability and partici- the principle of transparency and implementation of its provisions. This patory democracy. However, AU accountability in government and section states that there is a division member states have to also advocates for the independence of of labour, or a duty of application, demonstrate an equal commitment the judiciary, legislative, executive between individual member states to ratify the Charter. So far only 29 and administrative branches of and the Commission of the African of the 53 member states of the AU government. The provisions of the Union. Specifically, according to the have signed the Charter and only Charter outline the AU’s com- Charter the Commission has a re- four (Ethiopia, Mauritania, Sierra mitment to a transfer of power sponsibility to harmonise efforts to Leone and Burkina Faso) have premised on regular, free, fair and promote its recommendations and ratified it. The Charter requires 12 transparent elections conducted provisions. The Commission also has additional ratifications in order by competent, independent and the responsibility of ensuring the to come into effect. The March impartial national electoral bodies. availability of financial resources and 2010 meeting in Banjul sought to The Charter seeks to bring about technical assistance from the Democracy develop a collective Action Plan a change in political culture which and Electoral Assistance Fund and for Popularisation of the Charter will reinforce democratic governance Unit to achieve the objectives of the which is expected to facilitate the through the institutionalisation of Charter within member states. Article ratification and domestication participatory democracy. 44(b) of the Charter also recognises of the document. According to the role of the RECs in encouraging Article 3(f) of the PSC Protocol, Article 23 of the Charter defines member states to ratify the document. the Council has a mandate to the unconstitutional changes of In addition, it designates regional focal promote and encourage democratic government as any illegal means points for the coordination, evaluation governance and the rule of law of accessing or maintaining power and monitoring of the implementation as part of its conflict prevention against a democratically elected of the Charter in order to ensure strategy. Therefore, the Council can government through a putsch, coup the widespread participation of stake- play a positive role in referring to d’état, intervention by mercenaries holders, particularly civil society the Charter during its interventions or armed militia. The Charter’s organisations. as well as actively advocating for reference to unconstitutionality also its ratification. encapsulates a refusal by an incum- The Economic Community of West

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

5 assumed the leadership of Togo. ment signed a Global Political COUNTRY ANALYSIS Under pressure from ECOWAS and Agreement (GPA), brokered by the AU as well as the EU, the President Blaise Compaoré of Togolese authorities convened a Burkina-Faso, on 20 August 2006. Togo controversial election that legitimised Faure as Eyadema’s successor. The Previous PSC and REC T h e A g r e e m e n t p r o p o s e d t h e c r e a t i o n majority of the Togolese population of two commissions that would be Communiqués and protested against this manipulation responsible for establishing the truth Recommendations: of the poll, but the military brutally of past post-electoral crimes and suppressed the protests. More than human rights violations, and for On 27 May 2005, the PSC issued 400 people died and more than promoting national reconciliation. a communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM 40,000 citizens migrated into The agreement also modified the (XXX), in which it urged the neighbouring countries for safety. composition of the Independent Togolese political parties to engage The 2010 presidential race was National Electoral Commission in ‘the promotion of national expected to be a step forward in (CENI) granting 10 seats to main reconciliation and democracy’. On addressing the governance challenges. opposition parties (five each), five to 16 February 2010, the ECOWAS H o w e v e r, t h e p r o t e s t s t h a t s u c c e e d e d the ruling Rally of Togolese People Authority of Heads of State Faure’s re - election plunged Togo into (RPT) and two to civil society and Government, met in Abuja, further instability. organisations. Of critical importance Nigeria, to discuss a range of issues was the resolution that the army and including peace and security with Key Issues and Internal security forces should refrain from reference to the current situations in Dynamics: interfering in the political dialogue. Niger, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Côte The 2006 Global Political Agreement d’Ivoire and Togo. On Togo, the also came as a response to the Summit took note of the Presidential The 2010 Presidential election took EU 22-point engagements calling election originally scheduled for place in a volatile socio-political upon the government in Togo to 28 February 2010, but postponed environment marked by protracted create a conducive environment for to 4 March 2010. It welcomed the democratic reforms and a failed the emergence of a democratically deployment of an ECOWAS civilian- coup d’état in April 2009. Allegedly governed state, as a pre-condition military election observer mission s t a g e d b y Fa u r e G n a s s i ng b e ’s b r ot h e r for the resumption of foreign aid. as an important confidence building and former Defence Minister Kpatcha measure. The Heads of State placed Gnassingbé, the coup was seen as The implementation of these various an emphasis on building upon the the manifestation of deep divisions resolutions faced significant chal- gains of national reconciliation not only within the ruling party but lenges. Togo required financial resulting from the inter-Togolese also within Eyadema’s family in the resources to implement some of dialogue and appealed to all stake- struggle for succession. the provisions, and consequently holders involved in the electoral the GPA was partially implemented process to take necessary measures The March 2010 election should leading to the 2007 legislative to ensure a peaceful environment for have laid the foundation for the elections hailed as free and fair for the organisation of free, transparent country’s transition to democracy the first time in the history of the and credible elections with respect and ease the political tension in country. The reforms enabled all to the provisions of the country’s Togo since the 1960s. The 2010 political parties to take part in the constitutional order. electoral contest could have become process. In addition, opposition the country’s first genuinely free and forces were able to win substantial Crisis Escalation Potential: fair presidential election, if the higher seats breaking the hegemony of standards adhered to in the par- the ruling party. In that election, liamentary poll in 2007 were main- the ruling party managed to win 50 On 4 March 2010, Togo convened tained or improved upon. Indeed, seats out of 81, UFC was able to win presidential elections. This was the with the 2005 electoral debacle, 27 seats and CAR won 4 seats while second presidential election since regional as well as international the other small parties attained a the death of General Gnassingbé partners increased pressure on Togo combined total of 15 percent but Eyadema who ruled the country to embark on political transformation failed to win a seat. Even though the from 1967 to 2005. The departure aimed at restoring good governance opposition could obtain the majority of Eyadema in 2005 created the op- and democracy. To that end, major of the seats, the 2007 legislative portunity for potential political political parties including Gilchrist elections introduced a new political reforms based on democratic norms. Olympio’s Union of Forces for dynamic in Togo as it concluded However, the constitutional pro- Change (UFC), Yaovi Agboyibor’s RPT’s monopoly of the political visions were not upheld. Instead, a Action Committee for Renewal process in Togo. The fact that military coup ensued and Faure (CAR) and the Rally of Togolese the RPT could achieve this broad Gnassingbé, one of Eyadema’s sons, People (RPT) dominated Govern- margin with slightly more than a

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

6 third of the general vote could be AU and the ECOWAS. All of these banning of opposition protest, form explained by the disproportionate reports acknowledged that the part of the government strategy to system of representation in which electoral process took place without contain dissidence in the aftermath the less-populated north has more serious violent incidents as witnessed of the elections. The government members of parliament than the in 2005. However, they pointed out justified its raid on security grounds more populated south. It was a number of irregularities ranging and alleged that opposition leaders expected that the flaws identified from a sudden increase of ten were manipulating the results. By during the 2007 legislative elections percent (additional 320,000 voters doing this the government deprived would be addressed ahead of the in favor of the ruling party) in the the opposition of the opportunity recent presidential contest. voter’s roll, the absence of serial to challenge the result in a court number on the ballot papers, the of law using its own evidence that Indeed, what is at stake in Togo abuse of state resources during the might contradict the data from the goes beyond the current electoral campaign to the lack of transparency independent national electoral com- process. At the heart of the political in the counting of the votes and mission. As the deadline to file claims instability in Togo lies the over- in the publication of the results. is closed, it is highly unlikely that any whelming domination of Eyadema’s The use of the satellite dish VSAT legal challenge will prevent Faure’s family backed by the Kabye ethnic to transmit the results from the inauguration. Any attempt by the group dominated army for over four periphery to the center was not as opposition to disrupt the process is decades. Though Faure has shown effective as initially billed, while likely to be suppressed by a govern- signs of opening up the political the independence of the electoral ment initiated military response. space, he could not overcome the commission was questioned. While resistance of some conservative the European Union has withheld Geo-Political Dynamics: elements in both the army and the its verdict on the electoral process, security forces who feared revenge the AU and ECOWAS have already from the victims of President recognised Faure’s re-election. The Pan-African and RECs Dynamics: Gnassingbé Eyadema 38 years of indications are that the AU’s reaction political repression. What opposition is based on the necessity to maintain ECOWAS mediation initiative was parties call the ‘perpetual electoral stability in Togo. Though the chances vital in stabilising Togo after the hold-up’ needs to be understood of a divided opposition might look violent electoral process in 2005. In against the background of a weak, it could have been prudent for appointing Burkina Faso’s President functioning patrimonial system. The regional organisations to wait for the Blaise Compaore to serve as a foiled attempted coup d’état in April filing of, and investigation on, the mediator in Inter-Togolese political 2009 was intended to put an end allegations of fraud by competent dialogue, the regional organisation to the reforms carried out by Faure electoral institutions put in place understood that the further and his government since 2005 to deal with post-election disputes deterioration of the political situation under international pressure. As the before issuing any official statement. would have a serious impact on Togolese people headed toward regional stability. Since the early the March presidential election, Opposition parties did not have con- 1990s, elections in Togo had Kpatcha Gnassingbe, the alleged fidence in the electoral tribunals. frequently resulted into violence that displaced thousands of citizens mastermind of the coup had not yet UFC leaders do not also see it creating a security and humanitarian been tried. If the trial were carried necessary to launch a legal challenge challenge for the region. President out before the election, it would knowing that the process was Compaore’s role helped in the have had serious implications for likely to be lengthy and would negotiation of the Global Political Faure’s re-election mainly with the ultimately result in maintaining Agreement that paved the way Northern votes. Faure Gnassingbé as the winner. for the gradual normalisation of Instead, the Union of Forces for the political life. However, it was Change called for street protests Nonetheless, the Independent not sufficient to obtain assurances which had been banned by the National Electoral Commission’s re- from the government the two- government, which deployed strong sults that proclaimed Faure round electoral process that could special security units to suppress Gassingbé winner of the March 2010 have added to the fairness of the elections, with 60.94 percent of the dissent. More than that, the security presidential race. ECOWAS also votes, were immediately challenged forces in Togo raided the opposition sent a multinational force to assist in by opposition parties. They alleged communications headquarters con- securing the electoral process. that the electoral process was fiscating important materials and marred by serious irregularities documents including computers that compromised its integrity. and minutes of the elections, which, UN Dynamics: Leaders of the opposition seemed according the UFC gave an outstan- encouraged by preliminary reports ding victory to its leader Jean-Pierre Political developments in Togo are of from various observation teams Fabre. The arrest and detention of concern to the UN. The organisation including the European Union, the some opposition leaders and the continues to pay close attention to

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

7 the reform process as a guarantee Togo’s close relations with France media presence in the country. for sustainable peace in Togo and remains an important factor in the in West Africa. A week prior to the international relations of the country Organisations and social movements 2010 race, the UN Secretary-General and the survival of the regime. from the country and the Diaspora Ban Ki-moon stressed that the form the Togolese civil society. presidential election was a ‘crucial It is important to point out that This duality is due to the fact that opportunity’ for Togo to continue its the single most important event in many activists of the civil society, efforts to consolidate democracy. He consolidating the government’s persecuted by the regime were further appealed for stability during recently won credibility among forced into exile. The National the poll. For the UN, the electoral the international community, and Congress of the Civil Society (CNSC- process provides an occasion to among the Togolese population was Togo) and the Togolese Diaspora ‘foster national cohesion, stability the convening of free, fair and form the most important alliance and sustainable development.’ transparent presidential elections in of non-partisan democrats in Togo 2010. Meanwhile, as of now there for Democracy and Development Wider International Community are still two deeply contrasting (DIASTODE). For several years, the Dynamics: interpretations of the government’s two organizations are co-operating actual intentions: those who believe for democratic change in Togo. A Togo has been subject to European in genuine transformation and are newly formed youth group – Citizen Union’s economic sanctions since hopeful that a democratic era has Movement for Change – claiming 1993. These sanctions were later just begun, and those who believe hundreds of members trained in renewed on 14 December 1998 the government’s attitude is a ‘democracy vigilance’ has been due to the lack of progress in the masquerade camouflaging its at- created to contribute to the country’s human rights record and tempt to stay in power at all costs. democratisation debate. According the slow process of transition to to its leader Guillaume Messan, his supporters are prepared to die for multiparty democracy. This was Civil Society Dynamics: in accordance with Article 96 of the liberation of the country. the ACP-EU Cotonou agreement that ties foreign aid to good Since the beginning of the demo- Scenario Planning: governance. Meanwhile, substantial cratisation process in Togo in the early 1990s, freedom of association support from EU donors to the Scenario 1: Togolese government only resumed has been guaranteed in principle when political dialogue began but only partially upheld in practice. in 2006, when an initial com- For the civil society organisations As the AU and ECOWAS have re- mitment was shown in upholding and the political opposition parties, cognised the victory of the ruling democratic norms and human rights. the 2006 Global Political Agreement party; Faure Gnassingbé is likely In February 2008, the World Bank engendered a degree of confidence to remain President in Togo for the and the International Monetary Fund regarding potential free association next five years. Opposition protests (IMF) also resumed cooperation, and meaningful participation in the will certainly subside but Faure approving the country for debt relief political process. There has also leadership could remain tainted by under the Highly Indebted Poor been some level of commitment a lack of legitimacy. Countries Initiative. Togo’s external from the judiciary in addressing human right violations. Nevertheless, debt was estimated to total more Scenario 2: than US $2 billion. there is still tremendous fear that the brutality and oppressiveness of the past could be repeated if the Protests could continue as the op- The numerous activities and co- current regime looses the presi- position refuses to concede defeat operation programs in Togo, such dential election. and decline to recognise Faure’s as the HIPC completion point are victory in the election. Security clearly connected to the progress forces could continue to resort to made in political transformation. The media has also gained from arbitrary arrests and repression to The fact that Togo is trying to the reforms. More importantly, the quell the post-electoral challenge. participate in the African Peer repression of journalists and state This might become a serious factor Review Mechanism (APRM) is also control of mass media that charac- of instability that could negate the clearly a sign of the willingness to terised General Eyadema’s regime political achievements since the change. However, the initiative and also marked the beginning 2006 Global Political Agreement. should not end with the APRM of President Faure Gnassingbé’s alone. Mechanisms and the rule has now lost momentum. political will to truly implement Major human rights organisations Scenario 3: the recommendations to transform recognise that there is currently a the political system will be crucial. more vibrant and controversial >>page 9

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

8 The ECOWAS facilitator, President Documentation PSC/PR/COMM. 3 (CLXXVII), in Blaise Compare, could step in again which it decided that the Rotating to define a framework for an in- Chairperson of the Council would clusive government that allocates ECOWAS CWW/HOSG/ABJ/37/ represent it in international meetings some government positions to mem- Rev.1 (16 February 2010) Final on peace and security issues in bers of opposition party in an attempt Communiqué of the Authority of Africa. On 6 April 2009, the Council to safeguard the gains of the ongoing Heads of State 37th Session, in met and decided to deploy its reform process. Abuja, Nigeria. Chairperson for the month of May 2009 to represent it at the Scenario 4: Relevant AU Documents: meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea due to take place PSC/PR/2(XXX) If the electoral dispute is not in Conakry, from 4 to 5 May 2009, (27 May 2005) Report of the a d e q uate l y a d d r e s s e d , i t c o u l d u n d e r- PSC/PR/COMM. 3(CLXXXV). Chairperson of the AU Commission mine the political reform process in on the Develop-ments in Togo the country, particularly the truth Contact Groups in Africa tend to and reconciliation exercise. This include the AU, the relevant Re- could also affect the confidence of PSC/PR/COMM.(XXX) gional Economic Community (REC), Togolese citizens’ about the govern- (27 May 2005) Communiqué on the UN, EU and if applicable the ment’s willingness to end impunity. the Situa-tion in Togo Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), the Common- Early Response Options: PSC/PR/COMM.(XXV) wealth and Organisation of the (25 February 2005) Communiqué Islamic Conference (OIC). In addi- on the Situation in Togo tion, representatives of the donor Option 1: community also participate in Contact Group meetings. In Africa, PSC/PR/COMM.(XXIV) The PSC, working in tandem with International Contact Groups have (7 February 2005) Communiqué ECOWAS, could continue to closely been convened to address the on the Situation in Togo monitoring the implementation of conflict situations in Madagascar, the 2006 Global Political Agreement Mauritania, Liberia, Somalia, and and assist in reaching consensus on UN Documents: Guinea. On 14 January 2009, an the remaining contentious issues International Contact Group on including the reform of the electoral Statement Attributable to the Piracy off the Coast of Somalia system and laws and advancing the Spokesperson for the Secretary- was established and included the truth and reconciliation process. General on the Presidential Elec- AU, in response to the increasing tion in Togo, New York, 2 March impact of piracy on humanitarian aid, commercial shipping aid, and Option 2: 2010. regional trade in the Horn of Africa. The Contact Group was established The PSC could call upon the govern- Useful Additional Resources: as an international cooperation ment to respect due process and mechanism against piracy, in re- proceed with the trial of Kpatcha Adewale Banjo, ‘Constitutional and sponse to UN Security Council Gnassingbe or at least to settle the Succession Crisis in West Africa: Resolution Res 1851, of December problem without further delay. The Case of Togo’, African Journal 2008. of Legal Studies, Vol.2, 2008, pp 147-161. The AU has taken the lead in establishing an International Con- tact Group on Guinea (ICG-G) to facilitate political negotiations PSC RETROSPECTIVE: PSC and International which laid the foundation to Contact Groups convene parliamentary and pre- sidential elections in the country, following the political crisis that International Contact Groups have African Peace and Security Archi- was precipitated by the death of become a prominent feature in tecture, the PSC has undertaken its long-serving President Lansana efforts to promote peace and to ensure that its voice is represen- Conte. This Contact Group met security on the continent. As a key ted in contact groups. On 11 March under the co-chairmanship of the decision making institution of the 2009, the PSC convened a meeting, Chairperson of the AU Commission,

>>page 10

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

9

PSC RETROSPECTIVE: PSC and International Contact Groups

Jean Ping, and the then President permanent members of the UN The growing prominence of Inter- of the ECOWAS Commission, Security Council. On 6 January national Contact Groups has the Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas. The 2010, the Group convened its potential to substantially impact Group was also composed of Fourth Consultative Meeting in upon the work of the PSC. The regional economic community Addis Ababa under the aegis of presence of the key international CEN-SAD, the UN, EU, the the AU. The meeting reviewed political and financial actors pro- Mano River Union (MRU), the the developments in Madagascar vides a unique forum to coordinate OIC, OIF, as well as the Chair since the previous meeting of the planning, logistics and ensure of ECOWAS, the Chair of the leaders of the country’s various predictable funding for peace pro- AU Peace and Security Council, political factions, which was cesses as required. The added value the African members and the held in Addis Ababa from 3 to 6 of Contact Groups is that they bring permanent members of the UN November 2009. The purpose together a range of institutions Security Council. Spain, Japan and of the meeting was to re-launch and actors who would otherwise Germany, as well as the World the process for a way out of the pursue their own agendas and Bank also participated in this crisis in Madagascar, following the potentially undermine a coherent particular Group. The meetings deadlock in the implementation approach to peacemaking in Africa. of the Group were intended to of the Addis Ababa Additional The trade-off is that the grouping compliment and support the Act of 6 November 2009. The of a wide number of actors and decisions and initiative of the Contact Group warned against institutions each with their own PSC and ECOWAS. The Guinean any unilateral move to legitimise strategic interests and agendas can International Contact Group has the unconstitutional change that undermine the internal coherence recommended the deployment occurred in Madagascar, including of International Contact Groups and of a combined force of military the organisation by the de facto their ability to effectively address a and civilian personnel to provide authorities of a national conference particular situation. Indeed, despite the necessary security to lay the and elections without an inclusive the existence of International foundation for elections which is political agreement, and firmly Contact Groups the reality on the a pre-requisite for the restoration rejected any attempt to impose an ground is that institutions and state of constitutional order. However, exclusionary form of government. actors still continue to appoint their the political will to implement this own special envoys to various crisis recommendation seems to be situations on the African continent The International Contact Group on elusive for the time being. and therefore the coherence sought Somalia (ICG-S) was established by by these Groups are not always the UN to support the Transitional achieved in these situations. The The International Contact Group Federal Government (TFG) and to PSC could urge the assessment on Madagascar (ICG-M) was bring a degree of focus on how to of the procedures for convening established following the coup address the challenges of delivering such groups and recommend that d’etat which brought Andry humanitarian assistance, as well as International Contact Groups Rajoelina to the helm of govern- promoting security and furthering function in line with the decisions ment in the country. The ICG-M political reconciliation within the of the UNSC and the PSC to avoid was convened through the country. The ICG-S includes the duplication of efforts and initiative of the Chairperson of the UN, AU, EU, IGAD, the League competition, which will ultimately Commission of the African Union. of Arab States, OIC, World Bank, not serve the interests of peace Its members include the Common Canada, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, processes. It becomes evident Market for Eastern and Southern Italy, Kenya, Norway, Sweden, therefore that the PSC needs to Africa (COMESA), Indian Ocean United Kingdom, United States. articulate its position on its role Commission (IOC), UN, OIF, The Contact Group has ostensibly in Contact Groups, and devise Southern African Development sought to function as an a preliminary set of criteria for Community (SADC) and the EU. international platform to generate convening these forums and for Libya as the then current chair of support for the operations being determining their membership. the AU, and Tunisia, in its capacity led by the African Union Mission as the country chairing the PSC in Somalia (AMISOM). However, for the month of January 2010, insufficient capacity on the was also involved in the initial ground as well as limited sources meetings of the ICG-M. The Group of funding have undermined also included African and the AMISOM’s efficacy.

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

10 the national army reportedly caused will be more competitive than those COUNTRY ANALYSIS by discontent over issues related to held in 2005. This has created some ranks, salaries and benefits. apprehension on the part of the ruling party which was a former rebel Burundi movement and has for the past five In the meantime, preparations for years been faced with the challenge the polls continue. By mid-March Previous PSC Communiqués of governing a post-conflict society. 2010, approximately US$ 20.8 million The revised Electoral Code, of Sep- and Recommendations: remains outstanding (out of a total tember 2009, altered the sequencing budget of US $ 52.8 million) of the polls and as a result Burundi’s On 17 August 2009, the PSC issued a although optimism prevails among series of polls will begin with communiqué, PSC/PR/BR(CXCIX), main stakeholders that the remaining communal elections. The communal welcoming the various break- funds will be raised. The majority elections will be followed by the throughs in the peace process of political parties have already presidential poll which will give between the Government of Burundi submitted their campaign emblems. the opposition an opportunity to and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. The CENI is scheduled to organise a assess their popularity amongst the Council called upon the Government meeting in due course to discuss electorate and reassess whether and political parties to create this issue with all political parties they need to form coalitions to conducive conditions for the holding involved. The challenge here may be contest the presidential poll. Unlike of elections in mid-2010. This state- that certain ‘splinter’ political parties in 2005, this year the presidential ment also noted the PSC’s request (including the now officially regis- candidate will be elected by to the Chairperson of the AU tered break-away party of Agathon universal suffrage. The ruling party Commission to deploy a mission Rwasa’s FNL, called FNL – Iragirya is aware of the collective strength to meet with the Burundian parties rya Gahutu and headed by Jacques of the opposition and has been involved in the elections of 2010. On Kenese) could have submitted the accused of efforts to divide its main 21 January 2010, the AU issued same emblem as the ‘original’ party. competitors, including the National a communiqué confirming that a The deadline for the submission of Liberation Forces (FNL), a former mission of AU and RECs experts names of candidates for the com- rebel movement that only recently had been deployed to Burundi (as munal elections has been postponed disarmed and transformed itself into well as to the DRC). The multi- as several political parties, reportedly a political party. There is therefore disciplinary mission aimed to assess including the ruling party, have not an unprecedented focus on the com- the situation in the country and to yet finalised the process of selecting munal elections and several inter- make recommendations on how the candidates to contest for the position national organisations will deploy following polls could be supported. of members of Communal Councils. observer missions during these polls.

Crisis Escalation Potential: Overall, the situation appears to have Geo-Political Dynamics: improved moderately in the early months of 2010, with several political The f ive polls scheduled to take place Pan-African and RECs Dynamics: between May and September 2010 parties indicating that they have continue to raise tensions in Burundi. experienced fewer restrictions on As a key member of the Great Lakes Despite the conclusion of the their activities and a decrease in the region Burundi’s stability remains of negotiations on the composition of harassment. Several political parties concern to neighbouring countries. the country’s National Electoral also appear to have made some Tensions between the DRC and Commission (CENI), as well as the efforts to restrain their youth groups. Burundi have been lukewarm for more revised electoral code, tensions were However, on 21 May 2010 the first than a decade. In early March 2010, especially high towards the end of poll, namely the communal elections, Burundi reappointed an ambassador 2009 due to certain restrictions will be held. There are higher stakes to the DRC after 15 years of thawed imposed on several political factions involved in the forthcoming series of diplomatic relations. The AU has and civil society organisations. elections and constructive engage- maintained its interest in the situation Another concern has been the mili- ment between the ruling party as in Burundi through regular monitoring tarisation of various political parties well as other relevant stakeholders and diplomatic intervention. and youth leagues. In particular, remains crucial to avoid potential there have been violent clashes violent confrontation and an escala- between youth groups of different tion of crisis in the country. UN Dynamics: political factions in certain parts of the country. Lastly, concerns have Key Issues and Internal In December 2009, the Government been raised about the alleged lack Dynamics: of Burundi requested the UN of neutrality on the part of some Secretary-General to recall and elements of the national police replace the Executive Representative force as well as the unrest within The upcoming elections in Burundi >>page 12

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

11 of the Secretary-General (ERSG) in US. The international community, be raised and the security situation Burundi, Youssef Mahmoud, who however, appear less coordinated could remain stable enabling the headed the UN Integrated Office in than in the past and they hold forthcoming electoral polls to be Burundi (BINUB). The rationale differing opinions on the prospects organised in a relatively free and fair behind this was that the UN mission for free and fair elections. manner. in Burundi has transformed itself from implementing a peacekeeping Civil Society Dynamics: Scenario 2: mandate to a political and peace- building one. Therefore, according Civil society activities have been Tensions could escalate in the to the Burundian authorities the new generally constrained in the lead immediate run-up to the elections Integrated Office should fall under up to the poll. At the beginning of and violent clashes between youth the rubric of the UN Department of August 2009, the Ministry of Interior leagues could increase. The security Political Affairs (DPA). However, the indicated that because some civil challenges as well as lack of funds recent UN SRSG report on Burundi society organisations have a ‘double could be provided as a reason to suggested that the perception that objective’ with their activities, they postpone the elections, further Mahmoud was viewed as sympa- must request a ‘mission order’ from escalating tensions in the country. thetic to the opposition as the source the Ministry in the event that they of the request by the Burundian wish to travel overseas. They must government for his reassignment. Early Response Options: also inform the Ministry when they Burundi was one of the first coun- are organizing events or activities tries, together with Sierra Leone, in the rural regions of the country. Given the above scenarios the fol- to be considered by the country- In September, two coalitions of civil lowing options can be considered: specific configurations of the UN society organisations, namely the Peacebuilding Commission, in New Civil Society Coalition for Election York. On 18 September 2009, Option 1: Monitoring (COSOME) and the the UN Development Programme Forum for the Strengthening of (UNDP) signed an agreement with The AU PSC could continue to Civil Society (FORSC) convened a the Government of Burundi to engage all the Burundi stakeholders joint meeting to define their role commit itself to managing and to promote dialogue and ensure before, during and after the elections financing some of the polls. The that the polls are convened in an and to strategize on how they UNDP has retained the overall co- atmosphere without intimidation. can contribute towards ensuring ordination of the designated fund a transparent and inclusive poll. for the elections whilst BINUB FORSC’s license to operate was Option 2: continues to implement its mandate, revoked in November 2009, and which was extended in December subsequently, in early March 2010, 2009 through UN Security Council The PSC could liaise with the AU it called for dialogue with the Resolution 1902. Democracy and Elections Unit to Ministry of Interior to resolve issues support CENI’s efforts to manage and of divergence. support the elections. These efforts Wider International Community could also prepare ‘the ground’ for Dynamics: Scenario Planning: the post-electoral political dispen- sation, which is unlikely to see the Due to the upcoming elections, victory of one political party and Given the above analysis the Burundi still receives significant would therefore require several poli- following scenarios could take place: attention from the wider inter- tical parties to collaborate. national community which has contributed funds for the electoral Scenario 1: process. Key partners include the EU, France, Belgium, the UK and the The outstanding electoral funds could

Documentation: SP/ASSEMBLY/PS/RPT(I) on the UN Peace-Building Com- (31 August 2009) Report of the mission Relevant AU Documents: Chairperson of the Commission on Enhancing Africa’s Resolve PSC/PR/COMM.(LXXXVI) and Effectiveness in Ending AU Communiqué on the Visit of (10 August 2007) Communiqué Conflict and Sustaining Peace a Multidisciplinary Assessment on the Burundi Ceasefire Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi, PSC/PR/BR(CXIV) PSC/PR/COMM.(LXXXI) Addis Ababa, 21 January 2010 (10 March 2008) Communiqué (20 July 2007) Communiqué on

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

12 the implementation of the Com- (17 August 2004) Communiqué General on the United Nations prehensive Ceasefire Agreement on the situation in Burundi Integrated Office in Burundi of 7 September 2006 between the government of the republic PSC/PR/COMM.(VII) PBC/3/BDI/6 (19 October 2009) of Burundi and the Palipehutu- (3 May 20 04) Communiqué on the Conclusions of the third bi-annual FNL of Agathon Rwassa African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peace- PSC/PR/COMM.(LXIII) PSC/PR/COMM(IV) building in Burundi (9 November 2006) Communiqué (6 April 2004) Report of the on the Comprehensive Peace Chairperson of the Commission S/2009/445 (8 September 2009) Agreement of 7 September 2006 on the international conference Letter dated 3 September 2009 between the government of on the Great Lakes Region from the Secretary-General to the the republic of Burundi and the President of the Security Council Palipehutu of Agathon Rwassa PSC/PR/COMM(II) (25 March 2004) Communiqué S/2009/270 (22 May 2009) Fifth PSC/PR/COMM.(XXXVII) on the situation in Burundi, with report of the Secretary-General (8 September 2005) Communiqué particular reference to the man- on the United Nations Integrated on the situation in Burundi and date of the African Mission in Office in Burundi the Islamic republic of Mauritania Burundi (AMIB)

Useful Additional Resources: PSC/PR/COMM.(XX) UN Documents: (15 November 2004) Communiqué Jamila El Abdellaoui, ‘Another on UN Security Council meetings S/RES/1902 (17 December 2009) Crossroad for Burundi: From the in Nairobi, protection force for Resolution 1902 adopted by the FNL to Peaceful Elections in political leaders in Burundi and Security Council 2010’, Situation Report, Institute on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire for Security Studies, 19 November S/2009/611 (30 November 2009) 2009. www.issafrica.org PSC/PR/COMM.(XV) Sixth Report of the Secretary-

PSC RETROSPECTIVE: Small Arms and Light Weapons

On 21 August 2009, the PSC was of SALW is undermining peace and convened its first Ministerial briefed by the Director of the security in Africa. The widespread Conference on SALW in Bamako, United Nations Regional Centre for and unrestricted proliferation and Mali. The meeting adopted the Peace and Disarmament in Africa illicit trafficking of these weapons Bamako Declaration on the (UNREC) on the disarmament magnify the levels of violence caused African Common Position on the agenda of the United Nations and by conflict. The AU estimates that Illicit Proliferation, Circulation the working relations between the one fifth of the total international and Trafficking of Small Arms and center and the AU. The Council proliferation of these illicit weapons Light Weapons. The Conference issued a communiqué, PSC/PR/ takes place in Africa. The portability recommended a number of COMM(CC), e x p re ssi ng it s s at is f ac- and relative inexpensiveness of measures to be taken at national, tion at the efforts made by the UN these weapons makes them easy to regional and international levels Center to extend its operational access. For example, the AK 47 to deal with the problem including capacity to Africa in the areas of can be traded for about 10 dollars. the development and implemen- peace, security and disarmament. The fact that small arms are easy tation of national programmes The Council also called on the to access, use, conceal, maintain, to manage illicit arms, voluntary strengthening of cooperation with and traffic has enhanced their surrender of illicit arms and the the Center on a range of issues, popularity among armed militia in reintegration of demobilized youth including the development of a Africa. It is worthwhile to note that from armed militia. The Bamako continental Strategy on Small small arms do not cause conflict, Declaration further urges member Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). but their widespread availability states to codify and harmonize emboldens armed militia to pursue relevant legislation and enhance violent confrontation as a means of regional and continental co- The threat caused and posed by addressing their grievances. operation among police, customs S A LW i s h i g h l i g h t e d i n t h e P r e a m b l e and border control services while of the PSC Protocol which states working to eliminate the practice the impact of the illicit pro- In November 2000, the Organi- of dumping excess weapons in liferation, circulation and trafficking sation of African Unity (OAU) Africa. In addition, the Bamako

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

13

PSC RETROSPECTIVE: Small Arms and Light Weapons (continued)

Declaration advocated for the Council endorsed the provisions of against the illicit trafficking of small establishment of national co- the Windhoek Common Position arms. The Steering Committee ordination bodies and institutional and called on the Commission ‘to recommended that the AU infrastructure for policy guidance, take the necessary steps towards the develop an African SALW Strategy, research and monitoring of all establishment of a legally binding and consequently a draft document aspects of SALW and restriction instrument to prevent, combat and was discussed at the second of the trade in small arms and light eradicate the illicit trade in small meeting of the Committee in weapons only to governments arms and light weapons in all its Bamako. and authorised registered licensed aspects’. traders. Even though a raft of policies have Other regional initiatives have been been developed a legally-binding In July 2001, the OAU Summit of pursued to a adopt a series of instrument both at the regional Heads of State and Government, regulatory and control measures to and continental level is still held in Lusaka, Zambia, welcomed tackle the problem. These include elusive and remains a necessity to the Bamako Declaration. The Sum- the Southern African Development address the proliferation and illicit mit also adopted a Decision, CM/ Community (SADC) Protocol on the trafficking of SALW. The Bamako Dec.599(LXXIV), on the Illicit Control of Firearms, Ammunition Declaration states that such Proliferation, Circulation and and Related Materials, of 2001; activities should be undertaken Trafficking on Small Arms and the Nairobi Declaration and the with the effective participation of Light Weapons. This Decision Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms the African civil society urged OAU member states to and Light Weapons, of 2004, organisations, particularly women endorse the implementation of which includes the Great Lakes and youth organizations. The inter- the continental common position and Horn of Africa countries; and national community also needs as well as take part in the UN the ECOWAS Convention on Small to play its role in preventing the Conference on the Illicit Trade in Arms and Light Weapons, of 2006. illicit trade of these weapons. Small Arms and Light Weapons In December 2009, the Second Strengthening working relations which was to be convened later in AU-Regions Steering Committee on with the UN Security Council and 2001. Subsequently, in December Small Arms and Light Weapons was the wider UN system including 2006, the AU convened an held in Bamako, Mali. The Steering UNREC is central to the implemen- experts meeting and adopted the Committee on SALW is an ad hoc tation of the Bamako Declaration Windhoek Common Position on forum which incorporates RECs and and the actualisation of an Small Arms and Light Weapons. regional bodies with a mandate to effective continental strategy. In January 2007, the AU Executive share experiences in the campaign

Spotlight on the PSC Secretariat

The PSC Secretariat was established The Council Secretariat provides sub- Given the broad remit of the PSC, to provide the administrative, plan- stantive, administrative and logistical its Secretariat could benefit from ning and logistical services neces- support to the Council, to enable it a more robust staff complement. sary for the effective functioning and its subsidiary bodies to perform While the AU Conflict Management of the Council. On 25 May 2004, their functions effectively. In this Division (CMD) back-stops the work the AU issued ‘the Report of the regard, the Secretariat’s core responsi- of the PSC with situation analysis, Chairperson of the Commission bility is to facilitate the functioning of the Council’s Secretariat needs to on Establishment of a Continental the PSC. The Secretariat also produces be able to also provide individual Peace and Security Architecture Council publications including com- AU member states with analysis and Status of Peace Process in muniqués and press statements. as required. In addition, the PSC Africa’, PSC/AHG/3(IX). The PSC Secretariat could benefit from an Secretariat was formally established additional staff member who can in 2006 as a Division within the The Secretariat’s responsibilities also liaise directly with civil society, Peace and Security Department includes an elaboration of policy briefs based on the Council’s Livingstone (PSD) of the Union. Article 10(4) and papers for the Commissioner for Formula which states that CSO’s of the PSC Protocol states that Peace and Security. It also drafts and ‘may provide technical support to the Council Secretariat shall be tables PSC decisions as well as the AU by undertaking early warning established to support the Chairper- compile reports of the PSC on its reporting, and situation analysis son of the Commission in providing activities and the state of peace in which feeds information into the support to the effective functioning Africa. The Secretariat coordinates decision-making process of the PSC’ of the PSC. the Council’s programme of work and PSC/PR/(CLX). follows-up on the implementation of the PSC decisions.

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

14 Important Forthcoming Dates

1 April 2010 – inaugural meeting of the newly elected members of the PSC who were formally endorsed by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government during the 14th AU Summit held between 31 January to 2 February 2010 7 April 2010 - The Commemoration of the Rwanda Genocide 27 April 2010 – The 14th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, Luxembourg 25 May 2010 - Africa Day 31 May to 11 June 2010 – International Criminal Court Review Conference, Kampala, Uganda 19 to 27 July 2010 - The 15th Summit of the African Union, Kampala, Uganda African Election Calendar for Next Six Months in 2010

Country Election Date

Burundi Communal 21 May 2010 President 28 June 2010 National Assembly 23 July2010 Senate (indirect) 28 July 2010 Colline 7 September 2010

Central African Republic Presidential & National Assembly 16 May 2010

Côte d’Ivoire President Late February or early March 2010 (postponed from 29 November 2009)

Ethiopia House of People’s Representatives 23 May 2010 Regional State Councils

Guinea-Bissau President (1st round) Postponed from 28 June 2009 to June 2010, due to the assassination of president

Kenya Constitutional referendum April 2010

Lesotho Local Government April 2010

Somaliland (autonomous region) President April 2010 House of Representatives September 2010 Local Government Late 2010

Sudan President (1st round) 11-19 April 2010 (postponed from National Assembly, Council of July 2009) States Southern Sudan President (1st round) Southern Sudan Assembly, State Legislatures, State Governors, Local Government

Tunisia Local Government May 2010

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

15 Contributors to this Volume:

ISS PSC Report Programme: Dr. Tim Murithi, Hallelujah Lulie, Eden Yohannes Yoseph

ISS African Conflict Prevention Programme Addis Ababa: Dr. Muna Abdalla, Jamila El Abdellaoui

ISS African Conflict Prevention Programme Pretoria: Dr. David Zounmenou, Paula Roque

Donors:

This Report is published through the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of Denmark, the Foundation Open Society Institute, and the Humanity United Foundation. In addition, the Institute for Security Studies receives core support from the Governments of Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.

As a leading African human security research institution, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) works towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security and gender mainstreaming.

© 2010, Institute for Security Studies

Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of the Institute. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its trustees, members of the Advisory Council or donors.

Contact

Programme Head Peace and Security Council Report Programme Institute for Security Studies P.O. Box 2329 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Tel: +251-11-372-11-54 Fax: +251-11-372-59-54 Email: [email protected] website: www.issafrica.org

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

16