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Ferdinand Pecora: the Hellhound of Wall Street

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Ferdinand Pecora: the Hellhound of Wall Street St. John's University School of Law St. John's Law Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications 2011 Ferdinand Pecora: The Hellhound of Wall Street Michael A. Perino St. John's University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/faculty_publications Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Legal Biography Commons, and the Legal History Commons This Article is brought to you for free and open access by St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Michael Perino Michael Perinois the By Dean George W. Matheson Professor of Law at St. John's University School of Law in New York and aturday, March 4, 1933-Inauguration Day-was one of has taught at Stanford, Columbia, and Cornell those raw March days when it seems that spring will never law schools. He has served as an advisorto the U.S. come. The thick layer of steel gray clouds sheathing the sky Securities and Exchange Hill. Commission and has threatened rain, and a northwest wind whipped across Capitol testified in both the U.S. dull and fleeting Senate and the U.S. House Sunshine broke through on occasion, but it was of Representatives. and did little to relieve the dreariness of that damp, chilly day. Image: Corbis Images 15 Vol. 21, No. 3, 2011/EXPERIENCE Historians would later pinpoint thousands still milling in the capital. that winter as the nadir of the Great Through clouds of tear gas, the tanks Depression, but Americans hardly need- and soldiers drove the bonus army from ed to be seers to realize that the economy the city and burned their encampment could not get much worse. Thirty-eight along the Anacostia River to the ground. states had closed all their banks, and Seven months later, Washington still had everywhere else withdrawals were an ominous, wartime feel. Government sharply curtailed. Outright bank failures buildings were heavily guarded, police numbered in the thousands annually. patrols ringed the White House, and In those days before deposit insurance, machine gun nests were strategically one in four families lost their life sav- placed along the inaugural parade route. ings. The economy was in full retreat, The new president made his way industrial production was half what across the crowded platform, gripping it had been just four years earlier, and his son Jimmy's arm with one hand and unemployment was an appalling 25%. leaning on a cane with the other, giv- Farm incomes were decimated after ing the crowd the illusion that he was a decade of plummeting crop prices. walking. After being sworn in by Chief Shantytowns of the dispossessed, sar- Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Roosevelt castically dubbed Hoovervilles, dotted turned to address the gathered crowd. the landscape, and breadlines stretched Despite the chill March air, he shed his around many blocks. Homes were fore- hat and overcoat. Grim-faced, his usual closed, renters evicted, and signs of mal- broad smile absent on this solemn occa- nutrition among schoolchildren were sion, he told the assembled crowd and increasingly evident. On Friday, March radio listeners that the only thing they 3, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was had to fear was fear itself-"nameless, 86% off its wildly inflated pre-crash unreasoning, unjustified terror which peak in September 1929. At the end of paralyzes needed efforts to convert trading that day, the New York Stock retreat into advance." Roosevelt's Exchange announced that it would be address is rightly remembered for that closed indefinitely. hopeful phrase and for his call for the In the midst of the economic chaos, government to launch a war on the Great a shivering crowd of at least 100,000 Depression. Positioning himself in stark gathered near the east portico of the contrast with Herbert Hoover, who sat Capitol to hear Franklin Roosevelt's stonily just a few feet away, Roosevelt plan of attack, some perched in the icy, pledged "action, and action now." bare trees, others crammed in bleach- The Inaugural Address, however, did ers or crowded atop adjacent buildings. more than just announce a vision for Pundits from all points of the politi- fixing the economy; Roosevelt used it to cal spectrum were openly calling for assign blame. Along with most everyone Roosevelt to assume dictatorial powers else at the time, Roosevelt pointed his to address the crisis. In some parts of finger at Wall Street, but his goal was not the country the possibility of revolution demagoguery. He wasn't trying to accrete was openly discussed, and Lloyds of power, but to stoke reform. The largely London was doing a booming business silent crowd stirred when Roosevelt told in riot and civil disturbance insurance. them that the "rulers of the exchange of The previous spring, tens of thou- mankind's goods have failed, through sands of unemployed World War I vet- their own stubbornness and their own erans and their families had marched on incompetence, have admitted their Washington, demanding early payment failure, and abdicated. Practices of the of a promised bonus for wartime ser- unscrupulous money changers stand vice, many protesting on the very spot indicted in the court of public opinion, where the inaugural crowd now gath- rejected by the hearts and minds of ered. The bonus never came, and in late men." Applause erupted for the first July, the Army chief of staff, General time when Roosevelt proclaimed that Douglas MacArthur, let loose his cav- the "money changers have fled from alry, sabers and bayonets drawn, on the their high seats in the temple of our Vol. 21, No. 3, 2011/EXPERIENCE6 16 civilization. We may now restore that economic impact, and long-lasting legis- temple to the ancient truths." lative accomplishments, Pecora's inves- Somewhere in Manhattan, perhaps tigation must rank as the most successful sitting by the radio in his Upper West inquiry in the more than 200-year history Side apartment, Ferdinand Pecora must of congressional probes. have been smiling. It was Pecora, more Those hearings are largely forgotten than anyone else, who deserved credit for now. Those few who have heard of them those lines. Though Roosevelt claimed frequently get the basic facts wrong. And, that the lines had come to him a week of course, even at the time not everyone earlier while he was sitting in a service applauded Pecora's efforts. Raymond at St. James Episcopal Church, it was Moley, a key member of Roosevelt's Pecora-the man reporters called the Brain Trust, said that "Pecora was like Hellhound of Wall Street-and the Senate a police chief who rounds up all the hearings he'd wrapped up just two days suspicious characters in town to solve a earlier that had made those lines true. jewel robbery." Pecora was accused of Few Americans today know who grandstanding, with one writer calling Ferdinand Pecora was, although he was him "three-quarters righteous tribune of once a media superstar, a nearly daily the people [and] one-quarter demagogic fixture in newspapers and radio broad- inquisitor." Critics charged that his reck- casts across the country. With the onset less unveiling of Wall Street's sins only of our current economic woes his name exacerbated the banking crisis gripping has slowly begun to crop up again. In the country. April 2009, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi Pecora was ambitious, and he certainly called for a new "Pecora Commission" loved the limelight, but he was no more to investigate "what happened on Wall a demagogue than Roosevelt. He was Street." The next week, the Senate avowedly liberal and reform minded; invoked Pecora's name in voting to create to those who knew him best he was an an independent committee to investigate idealist with "an inveterate passion for the financial crisis, and in January 2010 justice." No Wall Street expert, his con- the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission clusions about the impropriety of certain held its first hearings. stock market practices were sometimes It's almost impossible not to hear in today's financial problems the echoes of those hearings held more than 75 years ago. Pecora, a diminutive Sicilian immi- off base. In the end, though, those mis- grant and a former assistant district steps didn't matter. His success lay not attorney from New York City, was chief in his talent for inciting passions and counsel for the Senate Committee on inflaming prejudices nor in the intellectu- Banking and Currency, charged with al purity of his arguments, but in his abil- investigating the causes of the 1929 ity to crystallize the zeitgeist of the early stock market crash. As he recounted in Depression years-the politicians' vague his own memoir of the hearings, Wall and vitriolic denunciations of Wall Street Street under Oath: "Before [the commit- and the bitter grousing of a broken-down tee] came, in imposing succession, the populace-into hard facts and concrete demigods of Wall Street, men whose evidence. names were household words, but whose Ultimately, the acclaim Pecora gar- personalities and affairs were frequently nered was justified because the hear- shrouded in deep, aristocratic mystery.... ings he led fundamentally changed Never before in the history of the United the relationship between Washington States had so much wealth and power and Wall Street. Before 1933 the fed- been required to render a public account- eral government had taken a hands-off ing." In terms of rapt public attention, approach to the stock market. But the Vol. 21, No. 3, 2011/EXPERIENcE 17 Vol.
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