Security Council of

BACKGROUND GUIDE

CHAIR: Elijah Spiegel

Security Council of Russia

Chair: Elijah Spiegel

Chair’s Letter

Dear Honorable Members of the Security Council of Russia,

The world is changing. The West is discovering the contradictions of its neoliberal ideology as it struggles with internal dissent represented by the likes of Donald Trump, Frauke Petry, and Marine Le

Pen. They are failing to maintain order in the Middle East. They are failing to maintain order amongst themselves. Now is the time for

Russia to take up the slack reins of power.

As members of the Security Council of Russia, you will collectively work to decide the policies that will restore Russian greatness. Your goals, in descending order of importance, are to defend Russian national security, defend against foreign influence, and promote domestic prosperity. As you see it, the primary antagonists to your goals are the Western powers (NATO, the EU, the

US). This rivalry, real or merely perceived, has been a defining feature of the Russian view of international affairs for decades. The current political climate, however, opens the opportunity to push back against these foreign powers and reassert Russian interests, if you play your cards right.

My name is Elijah Spiegel, and it’s my privilege to chair your committee at PacMUN this year. I joined Stanford’s Model United

Nations last year, went to conferences at Yale, USC, and NYU with the team, and led the crisis room for the committee at last year’s

Stanford Model United Nations Conference. I am a sophomore at

Stanford, intending to major in philosophy and mathematics. Model UN has provided me with a wonderful community and many friends. I hope that this conference will provide the same to you.

СЛАВА РОССИИ!

Elijah Spiegel

Introduction to Committee

You are a member of the Security Council of Russia, the governmental body that consults directly with the President of the

Russian Federation to address critical issues of national security.

You will have the chance to make decisions affecting the future of

Russia on the world stage, and regain the stature that Russia once had as a global power. Russia is at a turning point in deciding its future, and it is up to you and your fellow delegates to make policies that will preserve Russian security, promote Russian interests abroad, and steer Russia to greatness.

Russia is in the curious position of strengthening its position abroad at the same time as it faces challenges at home. Russia is increasing its strength beyond its borders: inserting itself as a power-broker in areas such as Syria and the greater Middle East, undermining liberal democracies abroad through its support far-right political parties in Western Europe and the United States, and maintaining its historical presence in the Donbass of Ukraine. At the same time, it faces internal issues that weaken its position as a global power: a stagnating economy dangerously dependent on commodities, an increasingly agitated and Western-minded generation of youths, and an aging population combined with falling life expectancies. The Security Council of Russia, though focused on looking outwards to secure Russia’s influence at large, will have to be mindful of issues at home that may cripple its efforts abroad if left unchecked. The State of the Nation

Military Capacities

Russia remains one of the three strongest military powers in the

world, alongside the US and China. Its defense budget is almost

$70 billion, and over three million military personnel (one third

of which is active personnel). Since around 2015, as climate

change caused ice to recede, Russia stepped up its military

presence in the Arctic Circle along its northern coast. In

January 2017, Russia signed an agreement with Turkey that, most

significantly, would expand Russia’s Tartus naval base on the

Syrian coast. Russia also has great capacities for cyber-warfare,

a strength demonstrated with a major cyberattack that cut

electricity to hundreds of millions of Ukrainians in 2015, and a

massive campaign of cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007. Russia’s

main military rivals are, of course, the United States and NATO.

Compromising them will be necessary to establish a multipolar

world order.

Military Strategy

Russia’s geographic location makes its western flank its most

vulnerable. Thus, maintaining influence over Eastern European

powers and balancing against Western countries is among Russia’s

top priorities. Russia does not currently have the military

capacity to stand up to the combined forces of NATO on the

ground. To make up for it, leverages its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent. Russia has expressed readiness to use nuclear

retaliation against non-nuclear attacks.1

Due to this reliance on its missile arsenal to defend its

interests, the presence of ballistic missile defense technology

in Eastern Europe is one of Russia’s present concerns over

regional security. NATO and the US implemented the defenses

ostensibly to guard against a potential nuclear Iran. However,

these missile defense systems are a long-term threat to Russian

national interests.

Rather than rely on conventional warfare, Russia has embraced the

usage of hybrid warfare, a strategy that combines conventional

and unconventional tactics. Today, these unconventional tactics

can include cyber warfare and political manipulation. That is not

to say that Russia is not prepared for conventional warfare.

Russia recently restructured its military command structure to

focus on bigger picture threats like NATO.2 However, by pursuing

indirect strategies to fracture alliances and cause instability

in the West, Russia can pursue its national interests more freely

among its Western neighbors.

Ukraine

There is currently a ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine, after the

fighting that took place in recent years. Pro-Russian separatist

1 Lamrani, Omar. "The U.S. and Russia Plan for Conflict." Stratfor Worldview. May 25, 2016. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-and-russia-plan-conflict. 2 Ibid forces, which some believe are propped up by Moscow, are still

present in the region. The Minsk II settlement, reached in 2015

and intended to put an end to hostilities in the Donbas region,

has yet to be implemented.3 Some have suggested abandoning the

Minsk agreement, but without a viable alternative, the agreement

will probably remain on the table in limbo for now. Residents of

the contested regions are divided on how to proceed politically.

One-third is in support of remaining in Ukraine, another third is

in support of having a special status within Ukraine, and the

final third is in support of having a special status within

Russia.4 Continuing to maintain a ceasefire could persuade

Western European countries to lift sanctions against Russia, but

at the cost of holding off on pursuing regional interests in

Ukraine by military means.

Syria

Russia has reasserted itself on the world stage by playing in the

oft-repeated game of world powers: acting as power broker in the

Middle East. Russia currently supports the Bashar al-Assad regime

in Syria. Western powers currently support anti-Assad rebels,

although they do not technically recognize Rojava, a de facto

autonomous region in Northern Syria that supports principles of

democratic socialism, gender equality, and secular polity.5

3 Hill, Fiona, and Steven Pifer. "Dealing with a simmering Ukraine-Russia conflict." Brookings. February 01, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-a-simmering-ukraine-russia-conflict/. 4 Sasse, Gwendolyn. "Little Success for Little Russia." Carnegie Europe. July 24, 2017. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/72618. 5 "Rojava." Wikipedia. October 14, 2017. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rojava. Another actor in the conflict is the Islamic State of Iraq and

Syria (ISIS, ISIL). Russia has primarily acted by providing air

support to the Assad regime. Russia’s interests in the region can

be traced back to Soviet influence in Syria that was lost after

the dissolution of the USSR. Syria is an opportunity for Russia

to show that it is regaining its former influence on the

international stage as well as an opportunity to show its

military might.

North Korea

It is difficult to be certain, of course, but there are

indications that North Korea enjoys Russian backing. Russia

currently provides economic support to North Korea in trade,

internet traffic routing, and fuel6. Russia’s interests in the

region are primarily to prevent U.S. meddling abroad, since

Russia can’t itself compete with China as the major regional

player in the Northern peninsula. More concerning, though, is the

possibility that Russia is assisting North Korea in developing

missile technology. Many weapons experts notice similarities

between North Korea’s recent advances in weapons technology and

Russian technology seen in the Cold War. Over the past several

decades, there has been a steady flow of weapons engineering

expertise from Russia to North Korea. The benefits of this Soviet

knowledge have come to fruition over the past few years in a

6 Osborn, Andrew, “Russia throws North Korea lifeline to stymie regime change” Reuters. October 4, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-russia-analysis/russia-throws-north-korea-lifeline-to- stymie-regime-change-idUSKBN1C91X2 rapid acceleration of North Korea’s offensive technological

capacities.7

7 Warrick, Joby. “The secret to Kim’s success? Some experts see Russian echoes in North Korea’s missile advances”. The Washington Post. July 8, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-secret-to-kims- success-some-experts-see-russian-echoes-in-north-koreas-missiles-advances/2017/07/08/5d4f5fca-6364-11e7- a4f7-af34fc1d9d39_story.html?utm_term=.841a8deb1982 Economy

Macroeconomic Indicators

Russia is only just recovering from a recession triggered in 2014

by falling oil prices and economic sanctions. Oil and natural gas

account for two-thirds of Russia’s exports,8 and remain so

despite years of promises to diversify the Russian economy.

Depending on oil and natural gas prices, the Russian GDP is

expected to grow by about 1.3 percent for 2017, 2018, and 2019.9

Its unemployment rate stands at about 5%.10 Russia is expecting

rising consumption and investments to bolster the economy in the

coming years and hopes that a shake-up in world leadership may

help to roll back existing sanctions.

Oligarchs

When talking about the Russian economy, the Russian oligarchs are

one of the first topics to come to mind. It is difficult to know

how they operate, since most of their political and economic

maneuvering happen is not public knowledge, and those who seek to

expose them often die in mysterious circumstances. For example,

Gareth Williams, a mathematician helping trace international

money-laundering tied to Russia was found dead, stuffed in a

padlocked bag in a bathtub in his own apartment. The death was

8 Vinik, Danny “Chart: Russia Is Insanely Dependent on Oil and Gas Money” New Republic. July 23, 2014. https://newrepublic.com/article/118827/russias-natural-gas-and-oil-exports-are-68-percent-total-exports 9 Sanghi, Apurva. "Russia Economic Report." World Bank. 2016. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/rer. 10 "Russia | Economic Indicators." Trading Economics. https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/indicators. ruled “a tragic accident”11 by Scotland Yard. What little is known

is that there are close ties between Russia’s wealthiest and

Russia’s political elite.12 Russian billionaires make gifts to

Russian leaders in the form of yachts, villas, and other

luxuries. It is more difficult to say what the billionaires ask

for in return, but it is unlikely that they give these gifts out

of pure charity.

11 Williams, Gareth “MI6 spy found dead in bag probably locked himself inside, Met says” The Guardian. November 13, 2013 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/13/mi6-spy-dead-bag-locked-himself-gareth- williams 12 Kolesnikov, Andrei :”Navalny Has Exposed the Russian Prime Minister’s Corruption. Now What?” Carnegie Moscow Center. March 6, 2017. http://carnegie.ru/2017/03/06/navalny-has-exposed-russian-prime-minister-s- corruption.-now-what-pub-68191 Political

Russian politics can be roughly divided into two camps: the

military siloviki and the financially-minded civiliki. The two

camps are typically pitted against each other to maintain a sort

of balance, but in recent years the stability of this balance has

been questioned. Among the populace of Russia, there are growing

trends in anti-Kremlin sentiment as well as in the opposite

direction in nationalist views. It is widely known, though rarely

acknowledged, that Putin has used unorthodox tactics to remove

particularly troublesome political elements.

The current political composition of Russia’s Federal Assembly is

unabashedly pro-Putin. In the Duma, roughly equivalent to the

U.S.’s House of Representatives, 342 of the 450 seats are held by

members of the party.13 The United Russia party

holds an ideology of “Russian Conservatism.” Despite the term,

United Russia is largely a centrist party.

The second most popular political party in Russia is the

Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). As the name

suggests, it is the spiritual successor to the Communist Party of

the . It supports policies such as nationalization of

national resources and industry. The brand of socialism the CPRF

13 “State Duma” Wikipedia. October 1, 2017. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Duma advocates for is a “socialism for the 21st century,”14 different

than previous iterations.

The third most popular political party in Russia is the Liberal

Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). It is a far-right party,

although its economic policies are leftist. It supports a

managerial position for the government in the economy, and a

strongly nationalistic foreign policy. The borders it advocates

for Russia would include Ukraine, Belarus, and all other former

Soviet states.15

Although the Communist Party and the LDPR are nominally

considered opposition parties to the government, both have

extensive ties to the Kremlin and President Putin. Thus, most

analysts and critics of the Kremlin will assert that a real

political opposition does not exist in Russia.

Although there is ostensibly little actual opposition in the

government, there is political opposition to the Kremlin on the

ground among Russia’s populace. Led by Alexei Navalny, a lawyer

and political activist, a large force of demonstrators and

activists has gathered to challenge Putin’s authority. Throughout

14 “Communist Party of the Russian Federation” Wikipedia. October 2, 2017. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_the_Russian_Federation 15 “Liberal Democratic Party of Russia” Wikipedia. October 2, 2017. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_Democratic_Party_of_Russia 2017 (so far), protesters and riot police have clashed repeatedly

in a series of anti-Kremlin protests.16

16 MacFarquhar, Neil and Nechepurenko, Ivan. “Across Russia, Protesters Heed Navalny’s Anti-Kremlin Rallying Cry”. The New York Times. June 12, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/world/europe/russia-aleksei- navalny-kremlin-protests.html Suggested Resources

Stratfor Brookings Institution Council on Foreign Relations Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Center for Strategic and International Studies Cato Institute Milken Institute Foreign Policy Suggested Articles (in no particular order)

Kolesnikov, Andrei “Navalny Has Exposed the Russian Prime Minister’s Corruption. Now What?” Carnegie Moscow Center. March 6, 2017. http://carnegie.ru/2017/03/06/navalny-has- exposed-russian-prime-minister-s-corruption.-now-what-pub-68191 Stratfor, “Russia Stirs the Hornets Nest” March 28, 2017. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-stirs-hornets-nest Legrand, Jerome “Russia’s National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine and their Implications for the EU” European Parliament Directorate-General for External Polices Policy Department. February 1, 2017. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578016/EXPO_IDA(2017)578016_ EN.pdf Hill, Fiona, and Steven Pifer. "Dealing with a simmering Ukraine-Russia conflict." Brookings. February 01, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-a-simmering-ukraine- russia-conflict/. Rumer, Eugene. “Russia’s China Policy: This Bear Hug Is Real” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. July 25, 2017. http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/72671 Naím, Moisés and Weiss, Andrew S. “Putin’s Latest Anti-American Intervention: Venezuela” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. September 6, 2017. http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/06/putin-s-latest-anti-american-intervention-venezuela- pub-73032 Rumer, Eugene and Weiss, Andrew S. “’s Russia Goes Global”. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. August 4, 2017. http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/08/04/vladimir-putin-s-russia-goes-global-pub-72736 Dorell, Oren. “Alleged Russian Political Meddling Documented in 27 Countries Since 2004” USA TODAY. September 7, 2017. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/09/07/alleged-russian-political-meddling- documented-27-countries-since-2004/619056001/# “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections” National Intelligence Council Office of the Director of National Intelligence. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3254239/Russia-Hacking-report.pdf Heller, Sam. “Russia Is In Charge In Syria: How Moscow Took Control Of The Battlefield And Negotiating Table”. War On The Rocks. June 28, 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/russia-is-in-charge-in-syria-how-moscow-took-control-of- the-battlefield-and-negotiating-table/

Character List

President Vladimir Putin

Prime Minister

Chair of the Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko

Chair of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin

Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration Anton Vaino

Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev

Deputy Secretary of the Security Council Rashid Nurgaliyev

Minister of Defense

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Minister of Internal Affairs

Director of the Federal Security Service Aleksandr Bortnikov

Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Sergey Naryshkin

Director of the National Guard Troops Service Viktor Zolotov

Minister of Industry and Trade

Minister of Finance Anton Siluanov

Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov

Commander of the Ground Forces Oleg Salyukov

Commander of the Navy Vladimir Korolev

Commander of the Aerospace Forces Viktor Bondarev

Aide to the President