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Durham E-Theses Durham E-Theses A Historical Analysis, Critical Interpretation, and Contemporary Application of the Virtue of Temperance KENNEY, MARIA How to cite: KENNEY, MARIA (2016) A Historical Analysis, Critical Interpretation, and Contemporary Application of the Virtue of Temperance, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11736/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 Abstract A Historical Analysis, Critical Interpretation, and Contemporary Application of the Virtue of Temperance Maria Russell Kenney The purpose of this thesis is to provide a thorough and relevant account of the virtue of temperance, working from within its status as a cardinal virtue in classical and Christian moral thought. With this objective, it undertakes an historical analysis and interpretation of temperance in the work of seven major philosophers and theologians before applying it to the contemporary issue of consumerism. Of the four cardinal virtues, only temperance has virtually disappeared from common usage. The ‘temperance movements’ of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries left temperance with a highly restricted definition and scope; at present, its principal definition is either ‘abstinence from drinking’ or ‘everything in moderation’. As a result – and despite the resurgence of interest in virtue ethics – temperance is often forgotten or dismissed, as when Peter Geach called it ‘humdrum’ virtue and ‘nothing to get excited about.’ Yet temperance was once a dynamic component of the moral life. For centuries, within both the classical and Christian traditions, temperance engaged the interest of numerous philosophers and theologians. Through an historical survey and critical analysis, this thesis explores the nuanced history of the virtue of temperance in the work of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, and Wesley. Their portrayals of temperance provide an ideal starting point for any retrieval of the virtue. Within this historical analysis, various interpretive threads begin to emerge – self-control, knowledge, mode, humility, and harmonious order. These five components of temperance are the center of this thesis and its interpretation of the virtue of temperance. The thesis then applies this new understanding of temperance to the modern issue of consumerism, using it as a lens to examine the tenets and ethos of Western consumer culture. Rather than commonplace and irrelevant, the virtue of temperance emerges again as a vibrant component of contemporary moral discussion. 1 University of Durham Department of Theology A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION, AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE A thesis by MARIA RUSSELL KENNEY submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy December 2015 2 Table of Contents Abbreviations 7 Acknowledgements 10 Chapter One 12 The Virtue of Temperance: An Introduction 1.1. Temperance: An Introduction 12 1.2. Two Primary Meanings 15 1.2.1 Christian Temperance Unions (the ‘Temperance Movement’) 15 1.2.2 Moderation 22 1.3 Literature Review 25 1.3.1 Monographs on Temperance 25 1.3.2 Other Treatments 29 1.4 Framing Questions, Sources, and Methodology 33 1.4.1 Chapter Structure and Content 34 1.4.2 Methodology and Sources 36 Chapter Two 42 The Beginning of a Journey: Temperance in Plato 2.1. Introduction to Classical Temperance 42 2.2. Ethical Foundations: Eudaimonia and Aretē 43 2.3. Plato’s Introduction to Temperance: The Charmides 47 2.3.1. Prologue 48 2.3.2. The Definitions of Temperance 49 2.3.3. Unspoken Definitions and Implicit Assumptions 55 2.3.4. Conclusion on the Charmides 58 2.4. Development of Temperance in Other Dialogues 59 2.4.1. The Gorgias 59 2.4.2. The Republic 62 2.4.3. The Phaedrus 65 2.4.4. The Laws 67 2.4.5. Additional Dialogues 70 2.5. Particularities of Platonic Temperance 73 2.5.1. Three Primary Definitions 74 2.5.2. Points of Particular Interest 75 2.6. Conclusions on Platonic Temperance 76 3 Chapter Three 78 Continuing the Classical Tradition: Aristotelian and Stoic Temperance 3.1. Aristotelian Temperance 78 3.1.1. Differences and Particularities 78 3.1.2. Ethical Foundations in the Nicomachean Ethics 81 3.1.3. The Account of Temperance in the Nicomachean Ethics 87 3.1.4. Three Particular Issues in Aristotle’s Account 102 3.1.5. Conclusions on Aristotelian Temperance 108 3.2. Stoic Temperance 109 3.2.1. Foundations of Stoic Ethics 109 3.2.2. Virtue 113 3.2.3. Assent, Passion, and Apatheia 114 3.2.4. Stoic Accounts of Temperance 116 3.2.5. Cicero – From Sōphrosynē to Temperantia 121 3.2.6. Particularities of Stoic Temperance 130 3.2.7. Conclusions on Stoic Temperance 133 3.3. Conclusions on Classical Temperance 133 Chapter Four 136 The Intersection of Traditions: Augustinian and Thomistic Temperance 4.1. Early Christian Moral Reflection 136 4.2. Augustinian Temperance and Continence 138 4.2.1. Philosophical and Theological Location 138 4.2.2. Foundations of Augustinian Ethics 142 4.2.3. The Complicated Relationship Between Augustine and Virtue 148 4.2.4. Augustinian Temperance 154 4.2.5. Augustinian Continence 158 4.2.6. Particularities of Augustinian Temperance and Continence 164 4.2.7. Conclusions on Augustinian Temperance and Continence 167 4.3. Thomistic Temperance 170 4.3.1 Theological and Philosophical Bases 170 4.3.2 Virtues and the Virtues 175 4.3.3 Thomistic Temperance 179 4.3.4 The Potential Parts of Temperance 187 4.3.5 Particularities of Thomistic Temperance 192 4.3.6 Conclusions on Thomistic Temperance 195 4.4 Conclusions on Patristic and Medieval Temperance 197 4 Chapter Five 200 Virtue During and After the Reformation: Temperance in Calvin and Wesley 5.1. Virtue Ethics and the Reformation 200 5.1.1 Martin Luther and the ‘Honest Sinner’ 201 5.1.2 Calvin’s ‘Christian Philosophy 203 5.1.3 Calvin’s Complicated Virtue 205 5.2 Temperance in the Thought of Calvin 207 5.2.1 Foundations of Calvin’s Ethics 208 5.2.2 Moderation 214 5.2.3 Temperance 221 5.2.4 Conclusions on Temperance and Moderation in Calvin 226 5.3 Wesleyan Temperance 229 5.3.1 Theological Foundations 229 5.3.2 Virtue in Wesley 235 5.3.3 Wesleyan Temperance 239 5.3.4 Associated Virtues 242 5.3.5 Conclusions on Wesleyan Temperance 245 5.4 Conclusions on Temperance During and After the Reformation 246 Chapter Six 249 An Interpretation of the Virtue of Temperance 6.1. A Summary of the Present Understanding of Temperance 249 6.2. A Fresh Interpretation of the Virtue of Temperance 253 6.2.1 Self-Control 256 6.2.2 Knowledge 262 6.2.3 Mode 268 6.2.4 Humility 276 6.2.5 Harmonious Order 284 6.3. Particularities of the Virtue of Temperance 292 6.3.1 The Components and the Whole 292 6.3.2 Comparisons with Other Accounts of Temperance 298 6.3.3 A Tao of Temperance? 305 6.4. A Summary of the Interpretation of the Virtue of Temperance 313 5 Chapter Seven 314 A Virtue of Revolutionaries: Temperance and Consumerism 7.1. Consumerism and Consumption 315 7.1.1 The Creation of Consumerism and the ‘Consumer’ 315 7.1.2 Consumerism as Ethos and Happiness 318 7.2. Temperate Consumption 323 7.2.1 Modal Consumption 323 7.2.2 Informed Consumption 328 7.2.3 Controlled Consumption 332 7.2.4 Humble Consumption 334 7.2.5 Temperate Consumption 337 7.3. A Virtue of Revolutionaries 339 Bibliography 344 6 Abbreviations Aquinas ST Summa Theologiae Ambrose de off. De Officiis On the Duties of the Catholic Clergy Aristotle de an. De Anima Eth.Eud. Eudemian Ethics Meta. Metaphysics Eth.Nic. Nicomachean Ethics Augustine conf. Confessiones Confessions b. uita De beata uita On the Happy Life de bono conj. De bono coniugale On the Good of Marriage cont. De continentia On Continence ciu. De ciuitate Dei City of God diu. qu. 83 De diuresis quaestionibus 83 On Eighty-Three Different Questions Gn. litt De Genesi ad Litteram On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis Gn. adu. Man. De Genesi aduersus Manicheos On Genesis Against the Manichees lib. arb. De libero arbitrio On Free Will mor. De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae On the Morals of the Catholic Church mus. De musica On Music ep. Epistulae Letters Jo. eu. tr. In Joannis euangelium Tractus Tractates on the Gospel of John ord. De ordine On Order retr. Retractationes Retractions s. Sermones Sermons sol. Soliloquia Soliloquies trin. De Trinitate On the Trinity uera rel. De uera religion On True Religion Calvin, John Inst. Institutes of the Christian Religion Comm. Commentaries 7 Cicero Disp. Tusculan Disputations Fin. De Finibus Inv. De Inventione Leg. De Legibus Off. De Officiis Diogenes Laertius D.L. Lives of Eminent Philosophers Epictetus Disc. Discourses Galen de Plac. De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis Plato Char. Charmides Euthd. Euthydemus Gorg. Gorgias Phdr. Phaedrus Phdo. Phaedo Phil. Philebus Prot. Protagoras Rep.
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