A Comparison of R. V. Stone with R. V. Parks: Two Cases of Automatism

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY A Comparison of R. v. Stone with R. v. Parks: Two Cases of Automatism Graham D. Glancy, MB, ChB, John M. Bradford, MB, ChB, and Larissa Fedak, BPE, MSc, LLB J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 30:541–7, 2002 Both the medical and legal professions recognize that The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis- some criminal actions take place in the absence of orders, fourth edition (DMS-IV),3 does not define consciousness and intent, thereby inferring that these automatism, although it does include several diag- actions are less culpable. However, experts enter a noses, such as delirium or parasomnias, that could be legal quagmire when medical expert evidence at- the basis for automatism. tempts to find some common meaning for the terms The seminal legal definition is that of Lord Den- “automatism” and “unconsciousness.” ning in Bratty v. A-G for Northern Ireland: 1 The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines autom- . .an act which is done by the muscles without any control by atism as “Involuntary action. (Psych) action per- the mind, such as a spasm, a reflex action, or a convulsion; or an formed unconsciously or subconsciously.” This act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing, seems precise and simple until we attempt to de- such as an act done while suffering from concussion or while 4 fine unconscious or subconscious. Fenwick2 notes sleepwalking. that consciousness is layered and that these layers This was developed by Canadian courts in R. v. Ra- largely depend on subjective behavior that is ill de- bey: fined. The definition becomes more relevant to the Automatism is a term used to describe unconscious, involuntary law by using the term involuntary, but this, too, is behavior, the state of a person who, though capable of action, is difficult to define. Fenwick suggests the following not conscious of what he is doing. It means an unconscious, definition of automatism: involuntary act where the mind does not go with what is being done [adopted by R. v. Rabey (Ref. 5, p 18) from an earlier case, An automatism is an involuntary piece of behavior over which R. v. K (Ref. 15)]. an individual has no control. The behavior itself is usually in- appropriate to the circumstances and may be out of character for The law in England and those jurisdictions whose the individual. It can be complex, coordinated, and apparently law is derived from English law6 has a fundamental purposeful and directive. They were lacking in judgment. Af- terward, the individual may have no recollection, or only par- basis in the dictum “actus non facit reum nisi mens sit ticular and confused memory of these actions. In organic au- rea. ” This means that the act does not make a person tomatisms, there must be some disturbance of brain function, guilty unless his or her mind is guilty. However, it has sufficient to give rise to the above features. In psychogenic au- been argued that the actus reus has its own mental tomatisms, the behavior is complex, coordinated, and appropri- element and, therefore, the act must be voluntary for ate to some aspects of the patient’s psychopathology. The sen- sorium is usually clear but there will be a severe or complete the actus reus to exist. This is distinguished from the amnesia for the episode [Ref. 2, p 272]. mens rea, referring to the wrongful intention of the accused. It is this concept of voluntariness that has Graham D. Glancy is Assistant Professor, Department of Psychiatry, become the crux of the criminal liability component University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, and Clinical Assis- when applied to the concept of automatism. There tant Professor, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. John M. Bradford is Professor and Head of Division, Forensic Psychi- are certain acts that the public and the medical and atry, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. Larissa Fedak is legal professions agree do not appear to qualify as an a barrister and solicitor in Hamilton, Ontario. Address correspondence to: Graham D. Glancy, 302 The East Mall, Suite 400, Etobicoke, act for which an individual should be held responsi- Ontario M9B 6C7, Canada. E-mail: [email protected] ble. To put this at its least contentious, if a person, Volume 30, Number 4, 2002 541 Automatism while asleep, rolls over and crushes his wife’s specta- duced by a disease of mind. A disease of mind is cles that she left on the bed, there would be a general assumed to be a state caused by the internal or psy- consensus that this was done in an automatic state chological makeup of the accused and, therefore, in- and that he should not be held responsible. The psy- cludes a mental disorder and, perhaps most perti- cholegal cases before the courts are rarely so simple or nently when addressing automatism, an organic so innocuous. However, as Judge Schroeder ob- mental disorder such as delirium. Non-mental disor- served, “Automatism (is) a defense which in a true der automatism includes an automatic state resulting and proper case may be the only one open to an from external causes such as administration of insu- honest man, but it may just as readily be the last lin,10 drugs (not self-induced), or concussion.13,14 It refuge of a scoundrel” (Ref. 7, p 608). also includes a psychological blow5,15–17 and possi- The waters become even muddier when voluntary bly posthypnotic suggestion or hypnosis, although intoxication is involved, which, it could be argued, the latter has not been tested by the courts as far as we could give rise to a defense of automatism.8 It is the know. Mental disorder automatism is presumed to position of the Canadian Psychiatric Association be automatism produced by a disease of mind. We (CPA) that voluntary intoxication should not be are clearly told in Rabey that the definition of disease used as a defense except when issues of specific intent of mind is a question of law for the judge to deter- are raised or when the intoxication causes a distinct mine. In practice, judges solicit psychiatric input to mental disorder—for example, in a case of delirium help make this determination. However, psychiatry tremens or the rare pathological intoxication. has difficulty defining the terms mental disorder or Amnesia, whether partial or complete, is usually at mental illness, especially when it comes to transient issue in cases of automatism.9 A conclusion of amne- behavioral states produced by such entities as som- sia, unfortunately, relies to a significant degree on nambulism or dissociative states. Thus, it is no won- subjective data, which poses significant problems, es- der that the courts have preserved the right to make pecially in the psycholegal area. It is the present state this distinction themselves, based on the input given of the art that the optimal opinion that psychiatrists to them. Lord Denning is often quoted as defining can offer is to place a period of amnesia in the context disease of mind as “any disorder that manifests itself 18 of the patient’s history, the history of previous peri- in violence and is prone to recur.” This is inter- ods of amnesia, witness statements, and any other preted in Rabey as meaning a state that manifests descriptions of the behavior resulting in the offense. itself in violence but leaves a residual mental illness Automatism has come to be used as a defense in that requires treatment to ensure the protection of court based on the fundamental principles of crimi- the public. nal law that only voluntary actions attract findings of The foregoing analysis is used by the judge as an guilt. It is assumed that a sane and conscious person analytic tool, but a holistic, or case-by-case, approach acts under voluntary control and is therefore respon- should be taken. sible for any act or omission. This is generally easy to prove in the ordinary course of a trial. As we will see R. v. Parks later in the article, a distinction is made between the related but not synonymous concepts of “uncon- The Facts scious” and “involuntary.” The Supreme Court of In the late evening of May 23, 1987, Kenneth Canada in R. v. Rabey5 held that automatism that James Parks19 fell asleep on the living room couch. cannot be attributed to any external cause such as a Sometime after falling asleep, he put on shoes and blow on the head, should be characterized as a “dis- jacket, but no socks and underwear, and left his ease of mind” based on R. v. Quick.10 This has come house, leaving the front door open. He then drove to be dichotomized into “insane” and “noninsane” to the townhouse of his parents-in-law, which was automatism. Since amendments to the Criminal 23 kilometers away, mostly by highway. He entered Code made in 1991,11 this should more properly be the townhouse using his key, taking a tire iron referred to as “mental disorder” automatism and that was in his car trunk with several tools that in- “non–mental disorder” automatism.12 Further anal- cluded a hatchet and two knives. He then apparently ysis of these concepts then suggests that mental dis- killed his mother-in-law and seriously injured his order automatism includes any automatic states pro- father-in-law. 542 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Glancy, Bradford, and Fedak His first recollection was seeing his mother-in- incident occurred, then this would lead to a finding law’s face.

Load more