Giving a Voice to ’s Regions Simplicity, Accountability, Choice and Regional Representation

December 2006

GREGORY D. MORROW BScArch, BArch (McGill); SMArchS, MCP (MIT); PhD Candidate (UCLA)

USA CANADA School of Public Affairs c/o John Olson University of California, Los Angeles 45 Florence St. 3250 Public Policy Building Kingston, ON Los Angeles, CA 90095-1656 K7M 1Y5 [email protected] [email protected] 1-323-551-7539 1-323-551-7539

Giving a Voice to Ontario’s Regions Simplicity, Accountability, Choice and Regional Representation

Contents 1. The Need for Change ...... 2 2. What Principles are Most Important? ...... 3 a. Simplicity and Practicality b. Fair Regional Representation c. Accountability d. Voter Choice 3. Strengths and Weakness of Our Current System ...... 3 a. Strengths i. Accountability ii. Simplicity and Practicality b. Weaknesses i. Fair Regional Representation ii. Voter Choice 4. Best of Both Worlds - A Local-Regional Parliament ...... 5 5. Difference From Other MMP Systems ...... 6 6. System Characteristics ...... 8 a. Parliament Size b. Local-Regional Split c. Number/Size of Regions d. Nomination Process e. Dual Candidacy f. Minimum Threshold g. Overhang Seats h. Election Day/How It Works 7. Testing It: 2003 Election Simulation ...... 14 8. Conclusion ...... 14 About the Author ...... 15 Appendix A: Maps of Regions ...... 18 Appendix B: Comparison of FPTP and MMP ...... 29 GIVING A VOICE TO ONTARIO’S REGIONS SIMPLICITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, CHOICE AND REGIONAL REPRESENTATION

1. The Need for Change 2. What Principles Are Most Important? Ontario has grown into one of the most successful political The OCA has outlined 9 key principles; of these, in addition to jurisdictions in the world, built upon our people, businesses, legitimacy (which is a pre-condition of all democratic processes), we volunteer organizations, and, yes, our political institutions. By- feel the electoral system should provide: and-large, our current first-past-the-post electoral system has accommodated Ontario’s slow growth through the first three- a. Simplicity and Practicality: legitimacy is only achieved if the quarters of the twentieth century. However, beginning in the 1970s, people understand how the system works. We believe that any globalization has rapidly and dramatically transformed Ontario. changes to the existing system should be easy to understand by From a homogeneous, largely rural people spread out relatively everyday Ontarians and able to be implemented by 2011. evenly across the province, we are today, a heterogeneous, heavily urbanized province with large concentrations of people in b. Fair Regional Representation: while a near-match between vote a handful of cities. This presents us with social, economic, and and seat share province-wide is ideal, we feel the most important political opportunities and challenges of the like we haven’t faced criteria should be fair and relatively proportional representation in the past -- while some regions are thriving, others are in decline, within a given region. threatening to open up significant disparities from one region to another. In response to these changes, recent governments have c. Accountability: we believe all representatives should be held launched efforts to manage growth, establish regional service accountable to a given local or regional territory; only then is there delivery mechanisms, and implement a series of institutional a direct link between Queen’s Park and its constituencies. and regulatory reforms in response to Ontario’s new realities. The Ontario Citizens Assembly (OCA) is a central part of these d. Voter Choice: we believe that a free and democratic, plural institutional reforms. Ontarians are increasingly calling for greater society should provide a range of political choices. We believe political choice that represents the diversity of opinion within the that choice will increase voter participation. Effective parties are province, better regional balance within parties so that no region important umbrellas to ensure that the overall welfare of the is left behind, and a means to address regional issues that are province is taken into account (as opposed to single-issue interest becoming increasingly important. So, while our electoral system has groups). However, choice must be balanced with effectiveness of afforded us well throughout much of our history, new challenges government and opposition, to prevent the rise of many factions. and opportunities in today’s diverse, globalizing world demand We feel that balance is achieved when 3-5 parties are fairly that we explore how we might improve upon our existing electoral represented in parliament. system. Thankfully, relatively small changes to our electoral system can bring significant improvements, without radically altering our 3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Our Current System political landscape. The key is to improve upon, not replace entirely, In light of the above 4 key principles, we feel that our current our existing system. Enclosed is a proposal to reform Ontario’s electoral system -- the so-called “first-past-the-post” or “winner- electoral system, which was drafted in consultation with our takes-all” system -- scores well on 2 principles (accountability and readers at DemocraticSPACE, who provided valuable input. We urge simplicity), but scores poorly on the other 2 principles (voter choice the OCA to take a look at the enclosed recommendations. and fair regional representation). 2 3 GIVING A VOICE TO ONTARIO’S REGIONS SIMPLICITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, CHOICE AND REGIONAL REPRESENTATION Strengths: region from the party of their choice. Moreover, in all regions, there a. Simplicity and Practicality: everyone understands how our current are substantial disparities between a party’s vote and seat shares system works -- you place an X next to your preferred candidate, (for example, Liberals won 86% of the seats in on 51% of knowing that the person with the most votes win. It is simple, easy the vote, and 91% of the seats in Southwestern Ontario on 48% of to organize, and easy to count votes. the vote). No only do these disparities disenfranchise voters, they create governments with strong regional tendencies, exacerbating b. Accountability: all representatives are elected in single-member the perception that some parties serve some regions more than districts. Therefore, if a member (or his/her party) does not meet others. In part, these regional animosities result from how our the expectations of a given district, they can be removed from electoral system translates votes into seats. In order to address office. This direct link provides maximum accountability. the challenges it faces going forward, Ontario must strive for fair regional representation. Weaknesses: a. Fair Regional Representation: Among the most widely cited b. Voter Choice: Our current system has a very high threshold for problems with our electoral system is that, since only local MPPs any one party to win representation -- at least 33% is needed in a are elected (and using a winner-takes-all approach), the overall riding. This leads to a situation where many voters, fearing their composition of parliament is often at odds with the intentions of preferred candidate cannot win, vote strategically for their least- voters across the province. This results in sizeable single-party bad choice, or simply don’t vote at all. Moreover, the high barrier to majorities, despite receiving (sometimes significantly) less than entry discourages diversity of opinion. This is not surprising since a majority of the votes. This is exacerbated because Ontario has our system was designed for a two-party state. It still works within a no Senate (which typically provides “sober second thought”), 3-party state, but means that a candidate can win with significantly allowing parties to rule with very weak opposition. When control less than a majority of the votes. of government changes parties, this can have the effect of radical reversals of policy, which can destabilize the economy and social 4. The Best of Both Worlds - A Local-Regional Parliament fabric of the province. It is our belief that stability of policy is more In light of the above, it is clear that any effective system should important than the frequency of elections (the so-called stability retain the accountability and simplicity of our first-past-the-post of government). Not only is the overall parliament misaligned to (FPTP) system, yet provide for legitimate voter choice and fair voters’ choices, there is often unfair regional representation. This regional representation. Certainly, other systems -- namely pure poses a serious problem given the increasing economic and social proportional representation (PR) systems provide better voter differences across regions. In 9 of out our suggested 11 regions, choice, simplicity, and fair representation, but they do so at the voters of one of the three major parties were shut out despite expense of the local accountability that is the strength of our significant voter support. The PCs were shut out in Northwest winner-takes-all system of local representatives. Thankfully, an Ontario (over 14,000 votes) and Toronto (over 180,000 vote), while alternative exists that does precisely that -- a so-called “mixed- the NDP were shut out in Eastern Ontario and the National Capital member parliament” (MMP). This type of system combines local Region (60,000 votes), Central, Southcentral and Southwestern members elected as per usual (first-past-the-vote) with at-large Ontario (149,000 votes), and the 905 Belt (85,000 votes). Nearly a regional members elected proportional to party vote; in both cases, half-million Ontarians have no representative within their entire members are tied to a specific territory, thus maintaining 4 5 GIVING A VOICE TO ONTARIO’S REGIONS SIMPLICITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, CHOICE AND REGIONAL REPRESENTATION the accountability of FPTP, and since as many as two-thirds of the determine who goes on the regional ballot, but still allows parties to seats can be local, it maintains the simplicity of FPTP. This type of institute demographic criteria (for example, a party could mandate system is used within the UK, in Scotland and Wales, as well as that at least one of the three candidates (2 local, 1 regional) be New Zealand, Germany, and others. The proposed system takes female, aboriginal or a member of an under-represented minority). the best practices of existing MMP systems and customizes it to We suggest that the OCA strongly recommend that parties set Ontario’s circumstances, producing a genuine made-in-Ontario demographic targets, but whether such quotas should be required model, which has the benefit of being tested in other contexts. See is a matter that requires discussion among OCA members. The inset on opposite page for a quick summary of characteristics of proposed system also has a large number (and thus small size) of the proposed local-regional parliament. regions, which differs from most MMP systems which necessitate

5. Differences from Other MMP Systems QUICK SUMMARY OF PROPOSED SYSTEM While most MMP systems use “list” seats (whereby parties assemble a list of candidates as a slate, and either allow voters 1. Family Type Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) to re-order the list -- i.e. open list -- or not -- i.e. closed list), the 2. Size of Legislature 135 Total MPPs proposed system here uses a regional nomination process 3. Local/Regional Split 67% Local (90 MPPs) analogous to our existing local nomination process. It is our 33% Regional (45 MPPs) judgment that Ontarians like the potential gains that proportionality provides (fairer representation, more diverse parliaments, etc.), 4. No. of Regions 11 Regions but are skeptical of giving too much power in the hands of parties. 5. No. of People per MPP 1 per 100,000 people (average) The system proposed here addresses this concern, by creating 6. Avg. Size of Regions 8 Local + 4 Regional = 12 Total not a single “list”, but rather a regional nomination process that mirrors its local counterparts, thus locating nominations with 7. How MPPs Are Elected Local MPPs: First-Past-the-Post the people, not the party apparatus. Here, two local nomination Regional MPPs: Proportional meetings are paired; once local candidates are nominated, the 8. Regional Ballot Open Locally-Nominated Lists two ridings jointly nominate a regional candidate. This process is 9. Calculation Method % of Votes x Total Regional Seats repeated for all pairs within a region until the regional ballot is set. In the general election, voters have two votes -- one for their local 10. Nomination Process Paired Nomination Meetings: member and one for their regional member (which also counts as 2 Local Candidates + a vote for the party). The total number of seats for a given party in 1 Regional Candidate a region is equal to their share of the regional votes -- i.e. seats are 11. Minimum Threshold 3% Province-Wide assigned within each region, not the overall province. For parties 12. Dual-Candidacy Allowed that win regional seats, the person(s) with the most votes wins (therefore, the process is similar to an “open list” in other countries, 13. Overhang Seats Parties keep local seats except that regional candidates are listed on the regional ballot in Deduct from lowest region alphabetical order and there is no initial ordering of the regional 14. Demographic Rep. Min. 1 in 3 Candidates ballot). This process allows local members to Women, Minorities or Aboriginals 6 7 GIVING A VOICE TO ONTARIO’S REGIONS SIMPLICITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, CHOICE AND REGIONAL REPRESENTATION larger regions to achieve proportionality. Smaller regions means c. Number/Size of Regions they represent genuine regional identities and can better balance At over 1 million square kilometres, home to 40% of Canada’s proportionality with local accountability. population, and given its unique settlement patterns, it is understandable that Ontario would have distinct regions. Yet, 6. System Characteristics these regions are not recognized within parliament. As such, a. Parliament Size important regional issues such as growth management, regional We recommend that Ontario restore the MPPs that were removed health networks, regional transportation, watershed management, for the first time in 1999 (when provincial and federal ridings were regional economic development, among others are not adequately aligned). By 2011, the first election using the proposed system, addressed in parliament. The proposed system gives Ontario’s Ontario is expected to be home to 13.5 million people. So adjusting regions a voice in Queen’s Park, while ensuring a balance between for population, we recommend a legislature of 135 members (one fair representation, voter choice and local accountability. Through member per 100,000 people). our website, DemocraticSPACE.com, we initiated a dialogue to determine the most widely accepted regional identities. As a b. Local-Regional Split result, we have proposed 11 regions (see Appendix A). These Simulations of past election results show that one-third regional regions represent a consensus of our readers of the best balance seats is sufficient to achieve a match between vote and seat share of regional identity, shared regional concerns, and contiguous in the overall parliament.1 Some (for example, Fair Vote Ontario) geography within the smallest area that can provide proportionality. would like to guarantee perfect overall proportionality by adding a The geographic sizes and populations of the regions varies, but “safety margin” to bring regional seats up to 40%, but we feel this the 2-to-1 local-regional ratio is the same throughout. The average- is unnecessary and unwise. Having a supermajority (two-thirds) of sized region has 8 local seats and 4 at-large regional seats, but local seats ensures that the system works as much like the present Northern regions are smaller and GTA regions are bigger. system as possible. We also think that the 2-to-1 ratio that permits paired regional nominations ensures the regional ballot nomination Breakdown of the Regions by Local, Regional, and Total MPPs process is simple and intuitive. This will greatly simplify public education and public acceptance of the OCA recommendations. LOCAL REGIONAL TOTAL We therefore recommend a split of two-thirds local seats (90 1 NORTHWEST ONTARIO 4 2 6 seats) and one-thirds at-large regional seats (45 seats). This 2 NORTHEAST ONTARIO 6 3 9 3 EASTERN ONTARIO 8 4 12 necessitates a moderate reduction in the number of ridings, but 4 NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION 6 3 9 our illustrative ridings ensure that large ridings are not increased 5 SOUTHCENTRAL ONTARIO 8 4 12 (see Appendix A for maps). While some urban areas have lost 6 SOUTHWESTERN ONTARIO 8 4 12 local seats, these are compensated using at-large citywide seats. 7 NIAGARA PENINSULA 8 4 12 (For example, London would have 2 local seats and 1 city-wide 8 CENTRAL ONTARIO 4 2 6 seat, thus retaining its 3 seats). An exception is made for Northern 9 PEEL-HALTON 10 5 15 Ontario, whose large area and low population demands that the 10 YORK-DURHAM 10 5 15 current local ridings be largely retained (see Appendix A). 11 TORONTO 18 9 27 TOTAL 90 45 135

8 9 GIVING A VOICE TO ONTARIO’S REGIONS SIMPLICITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, CHOICE AND REGIONAL REPRESENTATION REGIONS d. Nomination Process 1. Northwest Ontario Where feasible, nomination meetings will be conducted with two 2. Northeast Ontario adjacent ridings for each party (if not feasible due to geographic 3. Eastern Ontario 4. National Capital Region size, nominations will use mail-in ballots). Each local riding will 1 5. Southcentral Ontario nominate a local candidate as per usual (the OCA should consider 6. Southwestern Ontario recommending that local nominations, rather than appointments 7. Niagara Peninsula by the party leader, be required as part of the new electoral 8. Central Ontario system). After local candidates are nominated, the two ridings 9. Peel-Halton 2 Southern Ontario 10. York-Durham jointly nominate a third, regional candidate. This candidate may 11. Toronto or may not be the same as one of the local candidates, provided any demographic criteria (minimum women, aboriginal or under- represented minorities) are met -- see Dual Candidacy below. These paired nomination meetings continue until the regional ballot for each party is complete.

Southern Ontario e. Dual Candidacy We recommend that decisions about whether candidates can run locally and regionally be left with the parties (thus, we recommend 4 allowing dual-candidacy). Given that the local and regional candidates are representing different geographic areas (and very likely, different issues), a candidate has the additional burden 3 of campaigning region-wide, in addition to locally, if s/he also 8 runs on the regional ballot. However, given that some parties are particularly weak locally in a given region, it may be desirable for those parties to run their best candidates in both ballots -- this 10 prevents the incidence of a regional candidate campaigning against a local candidate within the same party (although we doubt this 5 11 9 behaviour will endear him/her to potential voters!). On the other hand, dual-candidacies typically raise the prospect of electing on 7 the regional ballot candidates who have lost locally. We believe our proposal renders this moot, since regional members are elected 6 directly (i.e. they are the candidates that receive the most votes on the regional ballot, for a party that is entitled to regional seats). We recommend the OCA discuss the potential trade-offs.

10 11 GIVING A VOICE TO ONTARIO’S REGIONS SIMPLICITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, CHOICE AND REGIONAL REPRESENTATION e. Minimum Threshold they earned the lowest fraction of a seat (Niagara Peninsula). We In order to encourage parties to work province-wide, we recommend recommend that OCA members discuss whether it is desirable to that a minimum province-wide threshold be instituted in order for make these adjustments or not. In practice, it impacts relatively few a party to win regional seats. Note: The regions themselves have seats. a built-in threshold, because there are only a limited number of regional seats available, but a province-wide threshold is necessary g. Election Day/How It Works to prevent a new party from becoming a one-region party, thereby On election day, voters cast a two-part ballot. On the left side of ignoring the concerns of other regions, pitting one region against the ballot is the familiar local candidate (one per party). Voters another (it is possible for a party to gain, say, 15% of the vote in one place an ‘X’ beside their first choice. The person with the most region and none elsewhere, giving them < 3% of the overall vote, votes wins. On the right side of the ballot, voters choose one of the but enough to win regional seats in one region; thus, a province- regional candidates, again by placing an ‘X’ beside their first choice wide minimum threshold is necessary to prevent regional parties). (here, any vote for a candidate is also considered a vote for his or We recommend a minimum of 3% province-wide (although OCA her party). This gives voters the option of splitting their ballot, thus members may discuss raising this to 5%, or allowing this to be avoiding having to choose between their preferred local choice changed by the legislature with the consensus of all parties; some and their preferred party choice. This produces a more genuine jurisdictions allow regional seats based on winning one local seat election result, and reduces the incidence of strategic voting. So regardless of their overall vote share -- we prefer a minimum vote how are regional MPPs elected? Total party votes on the regional share to ensure broad province-wide support). The 3% threshold ballot are tallied for a given region (for example, Eastern Ontario). is just above the Green Party’s 2003 result of 2.8%, thus it is Parties receive a total number of MPPs in a region proportional to expected that in future elections, the Greens would be eligible to its votes on the regional ballot (provided it meets the 3% province- win regional seats. wide threshold). For example, if Party X receives 50% of the vote in Eastern Ontario, we should expect it to receive close to 50% of f. Overhang Seats the seats (i.e. 50% of 12 total seats is 6 seats). The total seats It is possible that a single party will win most of the local seats are compared with the number of local seats won — the difference within a given region, yet receive a significantly lower share of the between the local seats won and the total seats won determines regional votes. For example, consider a party that wins 50% of how many regional seats a party will receive. The people elected to the vote in a 12-seat region, yet manages to win 7 of the 8 local those seat(s) are the regional candidate(s) who receive the most seats. They should receive only 6 seats total instead of 7. In some votes for that party in a given region. For example, if Party X won MMP jurisdictions, additional seats are added to the legislature 5 of the 8 local seats in Eastern Ontario and had received 50% of to compensate other parties (in order to ensure proportionality) the votes, they would receive one of the Eastern Ontario regional - these are called ‘overhand seats’. We do not recommend adding seats, to bring them to 6 seats total. That seat would go to the Party overhang seats. However, we recommend deducting regional X candidate who won the most votes on the regional ballot. In other seats from other regions to ensure relative proportionality. For words, the system works just like it does now, except that voters example, in 2003, this occurred once, in Toronto; the Liberals also choose a regional candidate in addition to a local candidate. should have won 14 Toronto seats total, but since they won 15 local seats, one regional seat was deducted from the region in which 12 13 GIVING A VOICE TO ONTARIO’S REGIONS SIMPLICITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, CHOICE AND REGIONAL REPRESENTATION 7. Testing it: 2003 Election Simulation In the 2003 election, the Liberals won 70% of the seats on 46% of 2003 ELECTION SIMULATION the vote, while the PCs won 23% of the seats on 34% of the vote, OVERALL - FPTP and the NDP won 7% of the seats on 15% of the vote. So, assuming 100% the same number of votes for each party (which is unlikely, since 90% voter behaviour will undoubtedly change given more choice), what 80% result would the proposed system have produced? The Liberals +24% would have received 48% of the seats, the Conservatives 36% 70% of the seats and the NDP 16% of the seats. The Greens, since 60% they were below the 3% province-wide threshold would not have MAJORITY won seats. More importantly, however, is that each region would 50% be fairly represented. As you can see from the comparison to the 40% right, the proposed local-regional system produced near-perfect proportionality (see Appendix B for comparisons across all regions). 30% -11% As you can see, the electoral “bonus” provided by our first-past-the- 20% post-only system is reduced from 24% to 1.7% with the introduction 10% -8% of regional members. 0% LIBERAL PC NDP 8. Conclusion Ontario’s rapid, diverse, and uneven growth in the age of OVERALL - MMP globalization has produced unique opportunities and challenges 100% that our current first-past-the-post system has not fully addressed. 90% Despite serving us well historically, recent changes in Ontario 80% necessitate changes to our electoral system. Thankfully, relatively small changes can significantly improve the system. Electing two- 70% thirds of our MPPs locally, using the existing first-past-the-post 60% system, and adding one-third regional members elected by party +1.7% MAJORITY 50% vote (but nominated in paired local nomination meetings, and elected by gaining the most votes on the regional ballot), provides 40% +1.5% the best balance to meet our desired principles -- legitimacy (which 30% is a pre-condition of any democratic process), but also simplicity +1.5% and practicality, fair regional representation, accountability, and 20% voter choice. Re-establishing the seats that were removed prior 10% to 1999 allows minimal disturbance to local ridings, and provides 0% most of the regional seats, producing a 135-seat parliament (one LIBERAL PC NDP member per 100,000 people) with 90 local MPPs (67%) and KEY % OF VOTES % OF SEATS 14 15 GIVING A VOICE TO ONTARIO’S REGIONS 45 regional MPPs (33%). Simulations illustrate that this system provides near-perfect proportionality regionally and overall, which will only improve when, as expected, the Green Party reaches the 3% minimum province-wide threshold. The result is a parliament that: accurately reflects the desires of Ontario’s 11 regions, retains local accountability of both local and regional members, gives a voice to growing regional concerns within Queen’s Park, and yet still produce stable, province-wide parties, governments and oppositions, and reduces the likelihood of radical policy reversals. We feel that this proposed model gives Ontarians the best balance among the many demands. We urge the OCA to consider this approach.

About the Author Gregory D. Morrow is completing his PhD in the School of Public APPENDICES Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Born in Belleville, Ontario and raised in rural Eastern Ontario, Morrow was Lecturer in Urban Studies and Planning at the Massachusetts InstitutePlanning of Technology (MIT) 2003-05, where he previously received his Master in City Planning and Master of Science in Architecture & Urbanism. He also holds undergraduate and professional Architecture degrees from McGill University. He is editor of Critical , and former editor of Projections, and is working on a book that explores the origins of zoning/urban regulations in Toronto. Morrow is founder and President of DemocraticSPACE, one of Canada’s leading election websites (http://democraticSPACE.com).

NOTES 1 For example, in 1987, 33.7% regional seats would have been required to achieve perfect proportionality. In 1990, it was 31.6% and in 2003, it was 32.7%. It was even lower in 1995 and 1999. Germany uses 50% regional seats, New Zealand uses 44%, Scotland uses 43% and Wales uses 33%. 16 APPENDIX A: MAPS OF REGIONS APPENDIX A: MAPS OF REGIONS 1 NORTHWEST ONTARIO 2 NORTHEAST ONTARIO

INCLUDES EXISTING RIDINGS OF: 4 LOCAL RIDING MPPs INCLUDES EXISTING RIDINGS OF: 6 LOCAL RIDING MPPs KENORA-RAINY RIVER ALGOMA-MANITOULIN THUNDER BAY-ATIKOKAN 2 REGIONAL AT-LARGE MPPs 3 REGIONAL AT-LARGE MPPs THUNDER BAY-SUPERIOR NORTH 6 TOTAL MPPs NIPISSING 9 TOTAL MPPs TIMMINS-JAMES BAY SAULT STE. MARIE SUDBURY TIMISKAMING-COCHRANE PARRY SOUND-MUSKOKA (PARRY SOUND HALF)

NOTE NOTE RECOGNIZING ITS UNIQUE CHALLENGES (LOW POPULATION AND LARGE AREA), THE NORTH RECOGNIZING ITS UNIQUE CHALLENGES (LOW POPULATION AND LARGE AREA), THE NORTH LARGELY RETAINS ITS EXISTING RIDINGS (EXCEPTIONS: MUSKOKA IS MOVED TO CENTRAL LARGELY RETAINS ITS EXISTING RIDINGS (EXCEPTIONS: MUSKOKA IS MOVED TO CENTRAL ONTARIO, PARRY SOUND MERGES WITH NIPISSING AND A SMALL PORTION OF NIPISSING IS ONTARIO, PARRY SOUND MERGES WITH NIPISSING AND A SMALL PORTION OF NIPISSING IS MOVED TO TIMISKAMING-COCHRANE). MOVED TO TIMISKAMING-COCHRANE).

NEW RIDINGS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY NEW RIDINGS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY

MANITOBA MANITOBA

KENORA-RAINY RIVERNORTHWEST Moosonee KENORA-RAINY RIVER TIMMINS-JAMES BAY NORTHWEST TIMMINS-JAMES BAY ONTARIO QUEBEC ONTARIO QUEBEC

THUNDER BAY- THUNDER BAY- SUPERIOR NORTH SUPERIOR NORTH Cochrane Kenora Kapuskasing Timmins THUNDER BAY- THUNDER BAY- ThunderATIKOKAN Bay TIMISKAMING- ATIKOKAN TIMISKAMING- ALGOMA- COCHRANE ALGOMA- COCHRANE MANITOULIN NICKEL MANITOULIN NICKEL NORTHEASTBELT NORTHEASTBELT ONTARIO SAULT- SUDBURY SAULT-Sault Ste Marie SUDBURYSudbury Bay STE. MARIE NIPISSING STE. MARIE NIPISSING U.S.A. U.S.A. PARRY SOUND- PARRY SOUND- MUSKOKA MUSKOKA Parry Sound

18 19 APPENDIX A: MAPS OF REGIONS APPENDIX A: MAPS OF REGIONS 3 EASTERN ONTARIO 4 NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

INCLUDES EXISTING RIDINGS OF: 8 LOCAL RIDING MPPs INCLUDES EXISTING RIDINGS OF: 6 LOCAL RIDING MPPs CARLETON-MISSISSIPPI MILLS NEPEAN-CARLETON GLENGARRY-PRESCOTT-RUSSELL 4 REGIONAL AT-LARGE MPPs 3 REGIONAL AT-LARGE MPPs KINGSTON & THE ISLANDS 12 TOTAL MPPs OTTAWA-ORLEANS 9 TOTAL MPPs LANARK-FRONTENAC-L&A LEEDS-GRENVILLE OTTAWA-VANIER PRINCE EDWARD HASTINGS RENFREW-NIPISSING-PEMBROKE STORMONT-DUNDAS-S.GLENGARRY NORTHUMBERLAND-QUINTE WEST

NEW RIDINGS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY NEW RIDINGS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY

QUEBEC QUEBEC Hawkesbury GLENGARRY- GLENGARRY- Pembroke

Renfrew Ottawa Kanata NORTHERN OTTAWA NORTHERN NATIONAL ONTARIO Cornwall ONTARIO CAPITAL Nepean REGION

EASTERN Perth Bancroft 2 EASTERN2 ONTARIO ONTARIO

Brockville

CENTRAL CENTRAL ONTARIO ONTARIO

Madoc Kingston U.S.A. U.S.A. Napanee

Belleville

Brighton

YORK-DURHAM LAKE ONTARIO YORK-DURHAM LAKE ONTARIO 20 21 APPENDIX A: MAPS OF REGIONS APPENDIX A: MAPS OF REGIONS 5 SOUTHCENTRAL ONTARIO 6 SOUTHWESTERN ONTARIO

INCLUDES EXISTING RIDINGS OF: 8 LOCAL RIDING MPPs INCLUDES EXISTING RIDINGS OF: 8 LOCAL RIDING MPPs BRUCE–GREY–OWEN SOUND CHATHAM-KENT-ESSEX CAMBRIDGE 4 REGIONAL AT-LARGE MPPs ELGIN-MIDDLESEX-LONDON 4 REGIONAL AT-LARGE MPPs DUFFERIN-CALEDON (DUFFERIN HALF) 12 TOTAL MPPs ESSEX 12 TOTAL MPPs GUELPH OXFORD HURON-BRUCE LONDON-FANSHAWE CENTRE KITCHENER–CONESTOGA KITCHENER-WATERLOO SARNIA-LAMBTON PERTH-WELLINGTON WINDSOR-TECUMSEH SIMCOE-GREY (PART)

NEW RIDINGS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY NEW RIDINGS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY

CENTRAL CENTRAL ONTARIO ONTARIO

Owen Sound

YORK- YORK- DURHAM DURHAM SOUTHCENTRAL SOUTHCENTRAL ONTARIO TORONTO ONTARIO TORONTO

PEEL- PEEL- HALTON HALTON Guelph Waterloo Kitchener Cambridge Stratford

NIAGARA NIAGARA PENINSULA Woodstock PENINSULA

London

Sarnia U.S.A. SOUTHWESTERN U.S.A. ONTARIO SOUTHWESTERN ONTARIO

Chatham

Windsor

U.S.A. U.S.A.

22 23 APPENDIX A: MAPS OF REGIONS APPENDIX A: MAPS OF REGIONS 7 NIAGARA PENINSULA 8 CENTRAL ONTARIO

INCLUDES EXISTING RIDINGS OF: 8 LOCAL RIDING MPPs INCLUDES EXISTING RIDINGS OF: 4 LOCAL RIDING MPPs ANCASTER-DUNDAS-FLAMB.-WESTDALE 4 REGIONAL AT-LARGE MPPs BARRIE BRANT HALIBURTON-KAWARTHA L-BROCK 2 REGIONAL AT-LARGE MPPs HALDIMAND-NORFOLK 12 TOTAL MPPs PARRY SOUND-MUSKOKA (MUSKOKA HALF) 6 TOTAL MPPs PETERBOROUGH HAMILTON EAST-STONEY CREEK SIMCOE-GREY (PART) NIAGARA FALLS -GLANBROOK ST. CATHARINES WELLAND

NEW RIDINGS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY NEW RIDINGS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY

PEEL-HALTON NORTHERN LAKE ONTARIO ONTARIO SOUTHCENTRAL ONTARIO

EASTERN Huntsville U.S.A. ONTARIO Dundas St.Catharines Hamilton Haliburton

Niagara Falls Gravenhurst CENTRAL GEORGIAN BAY ONTARIO Brantford NIAGARA Welland

PENINSULAHAMILTON MOUNTAIN Orillia Dunnville

Lindsay Peterborough SOUTHWESTERN Barrie ONTARIO Simcoe Tillsonburg

LAKE YORK-DURHAM ERIE SOUTHCENTRAL ONTARIO

U.S.A. LAKE ONTARIO PEEL- HALTON TORONTO

24 25 APPENDIX A: MAPS OF REGIONS APPENDIX A: MAPS OF REGIONS 9 PEEL-HALTON 10 YORK-DURHAM

INCLUDES EXISTING RIDINGS OF: 10 LOCAL RIDING MPPs INCLUDES EXISTING RIDINGS OF: 10 LOCAL RIDING MPPs BRAMALEA-GORE-MALTON AJAX-PICKERING -SPRINGDALE 5 REGIONAL AT-LARGE MPPs DURHAM 5 REGIONAL AT-LARGE MPPs 15 TOTAL MPPs MARKHAM-UNIONVILLE 15 TOTAL MPPs BURLINGTON NEWMARKET-AURORA DUFFERIN-CALEDON (CALEDON HALF) OAK RIDGES-MARKHAM HALTON OSHAWA - PICKERING- -COOKSVILLE RICHMOND HILL MISSISSAUGA-ERINDALE THORNHILL MISSISSAUGA SOUTH VAUGHN MISSISSAUGA-STREETSVILLE WHITBY-OSHAWA OAKVILLE YORK-SIMCOE WELLINGTON-HALTON HILLS (HALTON HILLS HALF)

NEW RIDINGS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY NEW RIDINGS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY

CENTRAL CENTRAL ONTARIO ONTARIO CENTRAL CENTRAL ONTARIO ONTARIO

Georgina

Uxbridge

SOUTHCENTRAL SOUTHCENTRAL YORK- YORK- ONTARIO ONTARIO DURHAM Newmarket DURHAM Clarington

Oshawa Markham Whitby Richmond Ajax Hill

Vaughn Thornhill Pickering Caledon TORONTO TORONTO Brampton LAKE LAKE PEEL- ONTARIO PEEL- ONTARIO HALTON Mississauga HALTON Halton Hills Oakville

U.S.A. U.S.A. Burlington 26 27 APPENDIX A: MAPS OF REGIONS APPENDIX B: 2003 SIMULATION, COMPARISON OF FPTP AND MMP 11 TORONTO FPTP MMP NORTHWEST NORTHWEST 100% 100% INCLUDES EXISTING RIDINGS OF: 18 LOCAL RIDING MPPs 90% 90% BEACHES-EAST YORK TRINITY-SPADINA 80% 80% DAVENPORT WILLOWDALE 9 REGIONAL AT-LARGE MPPs 70% 70% 27 TOTAL MPPs 60% 60% -WESTON 0% +14% 0% EGLINTON-LAWRENCE YORK CENTRE 50% 50% CENTRE 40% 40% -3% 30% 30% ETOBICOKE-LAKESHORE 20% 20% +5% PARKDALE-HIGH PARK 10% 10% -12% SCARBOROUGH-AGINCOURT 0% 0% SCARBOROUGH CENTRE LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP SCARBOROUGH-GUILDWOOD NORTHEAST NORTHEAST SCARBOROUGH-ROUGE RIVER 100% 100% 90% 90% ST.PAUL’S 80% 80% +21% 70% 70% TORONTO-DANFORTH 60% 60% +6% NEW RIDINGS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY 50% 50% 40% 40%

30% 30% +3% -3% 20% -6% -11% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP YORK-DURHAM EASTERN EASTERN 100% 100% 90% 90% 80% 80% Scarborough 70% 70% +11% 60% 60% +1% 50% 50% +3% +5% North 40% 40% York 30% 30% 20% 20% 10% 10% -1% -9% 0% 0% TORONTO LIB PC NDP East LIB PC NDP York NATIONAL CAPITAL NATIONAL CAPITAL 100% 100% 90% +36% 90% Toronto Etobicoke 80% 80% 70% 70% 60% 60% +9% 50% 50% LAKE 40% 40% -3% ONTARIO PEEL- 30% 30% HALTON 20% -19% 20% -1% 10% 10% -12% 0% 0% LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP 28 29 APPENDIX B: 2003 SIMULATION, COMPARISON OF FPTP AND MMP APPENDIX B: 2003 SIMULATION, COMPARISON OF FPTP AND MMP FPTP MMP FPTP MMP SOUTHCENTRAL SOUTHCENTRAL PEEL-HALTON PEEL-HALTON 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 90% 90% 90% 80% 80% 80% 80% 70% +24% 70% 70% 70% 60% 60% 60% +9% 60% +7% 50% 50% 50% +4% 50% +3% +4% +2% 40% -5% 40% 40% 40% 30% 30% 30% 30% 20% 20% 20% 20% 10% 10% -3% 10% 10% -1% -11% -9% 0% 0% 0% 0% LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP SOUTHWESTERN SOUTHWESTERN YORK-DURHAM YORK-DURHAM 100% 100% 100% 100% +43% 90% 90% 90% 90% 80% 80% 80% 80% 70% 70% 70% 70% 60% 60% 60% 60% +2% +7% +7% +5% 50% 50% 50% 50% +1% 40% 40% +5% 40% 40% 30% 30% 30% 30% 20% 20% -3% 20% 20% -19% -2% 10% 10% 10% 10% -20% -10% 0% 0% 0% 0% LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP NIAGARA PENINSULA NIAGARA PENINSULA TORONTO TORONTO 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 90% 90% +35% 90% 80% 80% 80% 80% 70% 70% 70% 70% +15% 60% 60% 60% 60% +5% 50% 50% 50% 50% -3% 40% 40% +2% 40% 40% 30% 30% +4% 30% 30% 0% -11% -1% +2% 20% 20% 20% -3% 20% 10% 10% 10% 10% -26% 0% 0% 0% 0% LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP

CENTRAL CENTRAL 100% 100% 90% 90% 80% +32% 80% 70% 70% 60% 60% +7% 50% 50%

40% 40% -5% 30% -13% 30% 20% 20% +3% 10% 10% -14% 0% 0% KEY LIB PC NDP LIB PC NDP % OF VOTES % OF SEATS 30 31 NOTES to comment on this proposal please visit us at DemocraticSPACE: http://democraticSPACE.com/blog/ontario-electoral-reform democraticSPACE where democracy happens. ™