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All Volumes (2001-2008) The sprO ey Journal of and Inquiry

2004 Berkeley’s Idealist Theory of and Whether or Not Can Lead To Stacey MacPherson University of North Florida

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Suggested Citation MacPherson, Stacey, "Berkeley’s Idealist Theory of Knowledge and Whether or Not Empiricism Can Lead To Idealism" (2004). All Volumes (2001-2008). 88. http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/ojii_volumes/88

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the The sprO ey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry at UNF Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Volumes (2001-2008) by an authorized administrator of UNF Digital Commons. For more , please contact Digital Projects. © 2004 All Rights Reserved Berkeley’s Idealist Theory of ideas in the of . This paper Knowledge and Whether or Not detail the way in which Berkeley uses Empiricism Can Lead To logical arguments in order to essentially transform empiricism into idealism. We Idealism will first discuss Berkeley’s critique of Locke’s distinction between primary and Stacey MacPherson secondary qualities. We will then examine how Berkeley denies Locke’s Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Bert Koegler, theory of representational realism and Professor of Philosophy how Berkeley then leads us to his conclusion that nothing exists except Abstract ideas. Finally, we will discuss some of the problems with Berkeley’s theory and is perhaps one ask whether or not empiricism does of the most unique and intriguing indeed lead to idealism. figures in the history of modern Berkeley begins his argument philosophy. Dissatisfied with and with an attack on ’s angered by the materialist distinction between primary and of his contemporaries, secondary qualities. Locke attempted to especially the ideas of John Locke, show that the qualities we sense Berkeley called for a return to regarding objects can be separated into "." But "common two categories. According to Locke, sense," for Berkeley, involved not just qualities which are dependent on the a skeptical view of , but mind’s ability to perceive them, such as the assertion that the material world color, sound, taste and temperature, are does not exist at all! Berkeley utilizes secondary qualities. Primary qualities, persuasive logical arguments and however, exist within the and empiricist in order to refute continue to exist whether one perceives the of . However, them or not. The primary qualities when he attempts to account for what include weight, shape, dimension and does exist, he makes a startling claim . Essentially, the primary which does not hold up to his own qualities all add up to the of rigorous logical standards. extension. According to Locke, the extension of objects is a fact that cannot The empiricist project has always be denied. We can do all kinds of things been concerned with the argument that to an object – paint it a different color, knowledge is based upon change the way it tastes or smells, move rather than innate ideas. In its pursuit of it to a different location, slice it up, crush knowledge about things other than the it, etc. But no matter what we do to the contents of our own , empiricism object, it remains extended. Extension seeks to get us out of the mind and into cannot be possible without material the “real” world. George Berkeley, one substance. Therefore, according to of the most unlikely empiricists, sought Locke, we can say we know that matter to utilize the empiricist argument in exists and that matter is the substance, order to prove his extremely unorthodox which underlies all extended objects. It theory - that matter does not exist and must be noted that Locke does admit that that all the things we perceive are really we do not have direct access to the Hylas that dimension and size are underlying substance. Instead, we have subjective by getting Hylas first to admit direct access only to our ideas, but we that all perceiving animals should can trust that our ideas represent the perceive the same dimensions of an actual external world. (As we shall see, object if indeed dimension is inherent in Berkeley will demolish this argument the object itself. Philonous then talks too.) about the foot of a mite. The mite In the first of Three perceives its own foot as a certain size Between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley relative to the mite’s body. But to Hylas, tears apart Locke’s distinction between and other larger animals, the mite’s foot primary and secondary qualities and is so tiny that it cannot even be seen with leads us to the counter-intuitive the naked eye. In other words, to a very conclusion that matter does not exist. small animal, an anthill can seem like a Berkeley argues that primary qualities mountain, while to a larger animal the are just as subjective as secondary same anthill will seem tiny. And again, it qualities. In other words, there is no would be a logical contradiction to state distinction between the two categories at that the same thing can be both huge and all. He begins by establishing a basic tiny at the same . Therefore, since foundation of empiricism - that we know all animals can have a different things only through sense experience. of size regarding the same Berkeley, in the voice of Philonous, object, then dimension is subjective. But takes Hylas (meant to be Locke) through is this a sound argument? Can’t there be such secondary qualities as heat and one “true” size of the mite’s foot – an cold, taste, sound and color. He uses the objective and actual size? Based on the following example to refute the foundation we started with – that all we existence of heat or cold in an object. A can know are things we perceive with person can make one of his hands cold the senses – the answer is no. There and the other hot. The same person can cannot be any knowledge of a “true” size then put both hands into a single vessel if knowledge is only possible through of lukewarm water. The water will feel sense perception. Therefore, size is not cold to the hot hand and warm to the an inherent in the object itself. cold hand. But it would be a Philonous uses the same contradiction to say that the same water principles to refute the objective is both cold and hot at the same time. existence of motion, shape, solidity and Therefore, temperature exists in the extension. But what about the idea that mind and not in the object. Essentially, there can be a distinction between Berkeley merely confirms what Locke “absolute” extension and “sensible” has already admitted – that secondary extension? For example, can’t we admit qualities are entirely subjective and exist that we perceive size differently simply only within the mind of the perceiver. due to our own size in relation to the But Berkeley goes much further object? Likewise, can’t we assert that we than this. He next attacks the idea of perceive extension differently due to our primary qualities and shows that the own distance from an object? In other primary qualities are also mind- words, can’t there still be a true and dependent and therefore do not exist absolute quality of size and a true and within the object. Philonous proves to absolute quality of extension that exists within the object, no matter how the that Berkeley’s goal is not to simply put object is perceived by our mind? forth with regard to material Berkeley says this is impossible. There substance, but to actually deny material cannot be any such thing as “absolute” substance. This of course is crucial to his extension. In order to make a case for project, which is to prove that the world such a thing as absolute extension, one consists only of ideas. By denying the would have to conceive of extension in existence of matter, Berkeley denies the an abstract form. In other words, one existence of the external world. But then must be able to think of pure extension, what does exist? According to Berkeley, without relating such extension to any only ideas exist. And if the refutation of object. Berkeley says this is impossible matter is not enough to convince us of because nobody can conceive of pure this fact, then Berkeley has another extension – we always must assume argument to prove that nothing can exist some thing which is extended. The except ideas. world is comprised of particulars – not In his second argument, Berkeley of . Even if we try to argue refutes Locke’s theory of that extension is the quality common to representational realism. Locke asserted all extended things and that motion is the that external objects exist and that we quality common to all moving things, we receive data about the external world are effectively asserting nothing at all. through our sense . Locke We are admitting that we do not know admitted that we do not have direct anything definitive about what we call access to the object itself – we only can “extension” or “motion”. directly know our own ideas with regard Berkeley remains consistent in to the object. But to avoid skepticism his logic by sticking to the empiricist and to assert that we can have that all we can really know are knowledge of the external world, Locke “sensible” things. If all we know are proposed that our ideas are sensible things and our senses constantly representations of objects. In furnish us with different data regarding other words, although we can only the “same” object, then we cannot know directly know our ideas, we can trust that anything at all about the object itself. our ideas actually represent the “real” And because is invalid, we things. Ideas in the mind are reflections cannot say that anything like “true” size of . or “absolute” extension exists. By Berkeley strikes down this theory dismantling all arguments in favor of with two major arguments. First he asks Locke’s primary qualities, and by how can it be possible for us to know demolishing the very of that our ideas truly reflect the real thing? extension, Berkeley has effectively If Locke agrees that we only have direct refuted that there can be any knowledge access to our minds, then how can we of the existence of material substance. ever be “outside” our minds in order to And, again, if all we can know are compare our ideas with the things they sensible things, and, according to supposedly represent? This one question Berkeley’s argument, we cannot know strikes a serious blow to Locke’s theory. material substance, then there is no If we cannot be in a position to compare logical way to assert that material ideas in the mind with objects in the real substance exists. We must remember world, then we simply cannot know whether or not our ideas truly represent word, can anything be like a sensation or real things. In order for a comparison to idea, but another sensation or idea?” take place, we need to have access to (Three Dialogues…Part II, Section 241) both things which are compared. Therefore, only ideas can exist. According to Berkeley, Locke makes an And here is Berkeley’s main invalid inference when he asserts that thesis. There is no evidence to support our ideas represent . We simply the theory of an external world. In fact, cannot know this with any certainty at the existence of a material world is all. contrary to logic. Therefore, of the two This brings Berkeley to another proposed substances – mind and matter – argument regarding the unbridgeable gap only mind can exist. Reality is composed between ideas and the “real” world. of ideas, and since we have direct access Since ideas cannot ever be compared to our ideas, there is no gap between our with reality, then it would seem that the knowledge and reality. But without an mind and the external world are of two external world, where do all our ideas different substances. Although it seems come from? According to Berkeley, intuitively correct that there is a they come from God. distinction between mind and matter, This is the problematic part of and that both mind and matter exist, the Berkeley’s theory. So far, he has used idea of substance dualism creates many logical arguments to deny the existence problems for epistemologists. Dualism of matter and has led us to question what poses a question which is still being our intuition has always told us – that asked today – how do the two distinct there is a material world and that it is substances of mind and matter interact this material world which comprises with one another? What exactly is the reality. But why does he now jump to a connection between the body and the seemingly unfounded conclusion – that mind, and how can one affect the other? God exists and that “reality” is Berkeley argues that two unlike comprised of ideas in the mind of God? substances cannot causally act on each Well, he does have an argument for this, other. After establishing that we only and we shall discuss whether or not the perceive sensible things, and that argument is a good one. (From here sensible things are all mind-dependent, onward, when we refer to “reality” and he concludes that there can only be one “real” things, we mean not a material substance – that of ideas or the mind. reality but Berkeley’s definition of The argument is as follows. We have reality – reality as ideas.) already established that we can only know sensible things – things accessed Berkeley’s argument is as follows: through the senses. But since “sensible” things are all mind-dependent, then the 1. We have established that only material world (if it exists) is itself ideas exist and that reality is “insensible”. That which is sensible comprised of ideas. cannot be like that which is insensible. 2. For an idea to be existing, it Therefore, only sensible things can must be perceived by affect sensible things. In other words, someone or something. only ideas can affect ideas. As Berkeley 3. But real things continue to states in the voice of Philonous, “In a exist even when no person is perceiving them. (For will still exist when we leave it? example, when everyone Berkeley says he knows it “by leaves the room, the room experience”. But this does not fit with does not disappear.) the rest of his theory. If all experience 4. Therefore, ideas which are comes from sense perception, and all unperceived by people must sensible things are ideas, then all still be perceived by experience turns out to be mental. How something. can he be sure that everything is not 5. That something else is the existing in his own mind? We can still infinite mind of God. agree with Berkeley regarding the reality of ideas and the need for ideas to be In other words, all of nature perceived in order to exist, but why must continues to exist because it is always they be perceived by something other being perceived by God. Berkeley states, than ourselves? In effect, Berkeley “…it is plain (things) have an existence needs premise number three to avoid exterior to my mind, since I find them by both skepticism and . But he experience to be independent of it. There has no real argument for premise number is therefore some other mind wherein three. they exist during the intervals between Berkeley was able to refute the of my perceiving them, as Locke’s materialism because the burden likewise they did before my birth, and of was on Locke. In other words, it would do after my supposed was up to the materialist to show annihilation. And as the same is true evidence for the existence of matter – it with regard to all other finite created is not up to the doubter to give proof for spirits, it necessarily follows there is an the non-existence of something. But omnipresent external Mind which knows starting at premise number three, and comprehends all things and exhibits Berkeley is positing the existence of them to our view in such a manner and something without proving it. Now the according to such rules as He Himself burden of proof lies with Berkeley, and has ordained…” (Three Dialogues…Part the skeptic can easily dismiss the rest of III, Section 13). his argument by using the same criteria Is Berkeley’s argument a sound Berkeley used to defeat Locke. There is one? It seems there are several problems no supporting evidence for premise with it. First of all, even if we allow that number three. For us to accept the premise number one and premise premise, Berkeley must first give number two are true (and Berkeley has evidence for both God and other minds. done a brilliant job at arguing for these But instead, he uses the premise to infer premises), it seems that we can disagree the and other minds. with the truthfulness of premise number Berkeley was relentless in his three. This is what the skeptic would do. refutation of the materialist’s evidence Has Berkeley shown it to be undeniable for the existence of matter. But he that the world still exists even when we himself must also be prepared to be are not perceiving it? If we can allow the relentlessly questioned on his case for counter-intuitive idea that matter does God and other minds. Berkeley does try not exist, why can’t we allow that we to give evidence for both God and other don’t know for certain whether the room minds, but what he proposes does not seem solid enough to act as supporting consists of ideas, Berkeley tries to close evidence. Berkeley says that he knows the gap. He argues that since everything “intuitively” that he himself exists. He is an idea, and we can know ideas, then knows it not through sense perception, we can know reality. By overcoming the but immediately and through intuitive gap between reality and ideas, Berkeley . He states that he knows God and has seemingly overcome skepticism. other minds in a similar way. (“…I But in order to account for ideas, perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a Berkeley leaves the empirical road he notion of Him, or know Him by started on, and ends up on a rationalistic reflection and reasoning. My own mind notion of God. Berkeley’s argument and my own ideas I have an immediate against materialism is the compelling knowledge of; and, by the help of these, part of his theory. He did not propose a do mediately apprehend the possibility sound enough argument for the rest of of the existence of other spirits and the theory. In this way, empiricism does ideas.” (Three Dialogues…Part III, not lead to idealism, because it doesn’t Section 17) In other words, Berkeley follow necessarily. Instead, if we are to knows himself and God through follow Berkeley’s arguments to their intuition, and he knows other minds by logical conclusion, empiricism seems to analogy. His tells him that if he lead us further toward skepticism. as a self exists, then he can assume that other selves exist too. But this is not an References empiricist answer – it’s based on the rationalist theory that we can know Berkeley, George, Three things innately. Berkeley began his Dialogues between Hylas and argument by establishing that we know Philonous, Reason and Responsibility, things through sense experience – an 6th ed., ed. Joel Feinberg, Wadsworth, empiricist foundation. But now he has Belmont, CA, 1985. (originally abandoned that first foundational criteria published in 1713). in order to make a case for things known only through intuition. Berkeley was much better at tearing down the materialist’s argument than at building up his own argument for an idealistic theory of knowledge. Berkeley effectively proved that we cannot know that reality is composed of material substance. But if he stopped there, he would simply remain a skeptic. is concerned with what we can know. There has always been a great gap between our ideas and the reality which our ideas are supposed to represent. This gap needs to be overcome if we are to be able to say that we have real knowledge. By denying matter and making the case that reality