Peacekeeping_4.qxd 1/14/07 2:29 PM Page 121

4.10

Iraq

After enormous efforts in 2005 to deliver and Denmark. By then, Japan and Italy had three elections and restore constitutional govern- begun the incremental drawdown of their par- ment, 2006 should have been a year when secu- ticipating troops. The force’s mandate is sub- rity and political stability were consolidated in ject to ongoing Iraqi consent, most recently . Instead, with the active insurgency con- expressed by Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari ducting nearly 800 attacks each week, the coun- in a letter to the Security Council on 9 June try looked closer to territorial breakup than to 2006. sustainable peace. The new government of The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq national unity, under Prime Minister Nouri al- (UNAMI) was established in 2003. After the Maliki, initially provided hope of building some 19 August 2003 bomb attack on its headquar- consensus around an agenda for national recon- ters, which killed Special Representative Ser- ciliation, but the prevailing security situation gio Vieira de Mello and twenty-one staff mem- cast doubt on any substantial progress. bers, many staff were relocated to Jordan and From May 2003 to June 2004, Iraq was Kuwait. But UNAMI continued to function, governed by the Coalition Provisional Author- receiving a new mandate in Security Council ity, led by the United States under its obliga- Resolution 1546, and played a role in facilitat- tions as an occupying force. Iraqi sovereignty ing the constitutional process and in the con- was restored with the creation of an interim duct of the 2005 elections. At Iraq’s request, government, established on 28 June 2004. The UNAMI’s mandate has been extended each Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I), which year, most recently in August 2006 for a fur- succeeded the coalition forces, is deployed at ther twelve months. the request of the Iraqi government under In 2006, MNF-I and UNAMI faced spiral- arrangements set out in a pair of letters from ing sectarian violence that accompanied months the interim prime minister and of negotiations over Iraq’s new government. then US secretary of state Colin Powell to the Final election results were declared on 10 Feb- Security Council on 5 June 2004. Its mission is ruary. A 22 February suicide bomb attack on a to contribute to security in Iraq, including Shi‘a shrine at Samarra killed over eighty peo- through combat operations against forces hos- ple, triggering reprisals that derailed the nego- tile to the transition and by training and equip- tiations and made March 2006 one of Iraq’s ping the Iraqi Security Forces. most violent months since 2003. This was sur- MNF-I was authorized by Security Coun- passed in October when the UN estimated that cil Resolution 1546 (8 June 2004), and later more than 3,700 were killed, most in sectarian was extended until 31 December 2006. Apart attacks. In the period 1 May to 30 June 2006, from the United States, which supplies 87 per- UNAMI’s human rights unit estimated 100 cent of its troops, leading contributors as of civilians were killed each day, and that be- October 2006 included the UK, South Korea, tween February and June a further 100,000 Italy, Poland, Australia, Georgia, Romania, were displaced from their homes. Some 600

121 Peacekeeping_4.qxd 1/14/07 2:29 PM Page 122

122 • MISSION NOTES

US troops were killed in the year to October, offices and constitutional expertise in support as were over 1,700 members of the Iraqi Secu- of the political process. The mission also con- rity Forces. tinued to work on donor coordination and Against this backdrop, UNAMI conducted efforts to develop medium-term funding mech- human rights monitoring, and provided good anisms for Iraq’s reconstruction. UNAMI aimed to expand its activities in other areas, includ- ing development of public services and the judiciary. However, its operations remain se- verely restricted by security concerns. The Spe- Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) cial Representative of the Secretary-General’s repeated appeal for dedicated air assets to sup- • Authorization date 16 October 2003 (UNSC Res. 1511) port the mission finally bore fruit, with Den- 8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546 modified) mark offering an aircraft in June. Additionally, • Start date November 2003 • Head of mission General George W. Casey Jr. in September, Japan began a dedicated airlift (United States) support mission solely for UNAMI-related pas- • Strength as of Troops: 162,000 sengers and cargo. 30 September 2006 MNF-I claimed further progress in train- ing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which it undertakes in conjunction with the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). By Septem- ber 2006, about 307,800 military and police NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) had reportedly been trained, approaching the overall target of 325,000. In the same month, • Authorization date 8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546) the Iraqi Security Forces assumed autonomous 30 July 2004 (NAC establishment of responsibility over the southern Dhi Qar prov- Training Implementation Mission) 16 December 2004 (modification into ince from 1,800 Italian troops. NTM-I, which full-fledged training mission) leads officer training, made progress on a • Start date August 2004 major objective with the opening of Iraq’s • Head of mission Martin E. Dempsey (United States) Training and Doctrine Command in July. • Budget $16 million (October 2005– September 2006) There remain serious concerns about ISF • Strength as of Troops: 200 development. Even the more capable army 30 September 2006 units are heavily reliant on MNF logistics, com- munications, and intelligence, desertion rates are high, and units in Sunni areas are espe- cially understrength. Sectarian divisions are UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) most worrying in the police, where poor vet- ting and politicized appointments have allowed • Authorization and 14 August 2003 (UNSC Res. 1500) Shi‘a militias to infiltrate and control the pow- start date erful National Police counterinsurgency units. • Budget $179.6 million (1 January– The year 2006 has been declared “Year of the 31 December 2006) Police,” with MNF-I stepping up efforts to • SRSG Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) • Senior military adviser Colonel Peter Jeffrey (Australia) reform the force. An additional 41,000 police • Strength as of Troops: 223 were trained at the Jordan International Police 30 September 2006 Military advisers/liaison: 11 Training Center, bringing the total active Iraqi International staff: 228 police up to 188,000. Local staff: 352 MNF-I and ISF ran a series of operations For detailed mission information see p. 250. against insurgent and militia activity, one of which resulted in the 9 June 2006 killing of Peacekeeping_4.qxd 1/14/07 2:29 PM Page 123

IRAQ • 123

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, head of Al-Qaida in vote, citing the divisive impact the law would Iraq. In an effort to crack down on Shi‘a mili- have on Iraq. A 22 percent spike in sectarian vio- tias in Baghdad, 50,000 Iraqi and 12,000 US lence between the Sunni and Shi‘a ensued. The troops deployed under a new security plan that single deadliest attack since the March 2003 seemed initially to provoke a sharp rise in intervention occurred on 23 November, killing violence. about 200 and injuring 250 in Sadr City, a Shi‘a The summer saw promising developments area of Baghdad. In subsequent reprisals, thirty on the political front. On 20 May, Iraq’s Coun- were killed in a Sunni-Arab area of the Iraqi cap- cil of Representatives successfully approved a ital. Meanwhile, was convicted government of national unity under Prime of crimes against humanity and sentenced to Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Appointing a broad- death on 5 November. based cabinet including Sunni and other oppo- As civil violence and terrorist attacks con- sition figures, al-Maliki announced a national tinue, contributors are under increasing pres- reconciliation plan on 25 June, establishing the sure to identify a timetable for withdrawal (in- Iraqi Reconciliation and National Dialogue cluding in the US Congress, control of which Committee, a new mechanism for the disarma- passed to the Democratic Party in the Novem- ment of militias, and a review of policy toward ber 2006 mid-term elections), which would re- former members of the Ba’ath Party. In late quire handing over to the Iraqi Security Forces, August, a conference of 700 tribal leaders whose capacity and neutrality are patchy at endorsed the program and called for an end to best. The December report of the bipartisan sectarian killing and human rights violations— Iraq Study Group chaired by James Baker III including by ISF and MNF-I forces. and Lee Hamilton fueled further debate in the October 2006 saw the adoption of a regional United States about the need for a fundamental autonomy law by the Iraqi parliament. The leg- change in course. With more and more com- islation moved Iraq closer to a federalist model mentators describing the conflict as civil war, of statehood, allowing provinces to merge into risks of a further deterioration remain, bring- regions where they would be afforded substan- ing the prospect of a territorially divided Iraq, tial governing autonomy. The law was adopted regional conflict, and foreign forces, interna- by only 138 of the parliament’s 275 members, as tional terrorists among them, ungoverned in a Sunni and Shi‘a elements abstained from the country awash with sophisticated weaponry.