Boundaries of the Law Geography, Gender and Jurisdiction in Medieval and Early Modem Europe

Edited by ANTHONY MUSSON The University of Exeter, UK

ASHGATE Chapter 9

Rules for Solving Conflicts of Law in the Middle Ages: Part of the Solution, Part of the Problem

Dirk Heirbaut

To many laymen 'law in the Middle Ages' seems to be a contradiction in terms, as to them, the defining element of medieval society is its violence, and thus its lack of law as a mechanism for ordering society. There are several problems with this widespread view of medieval reality. First of all, it can be disputed whether the Middle Ages were any more violent than our own times. Even more, it is beyond doubt that medieval society rather than having not enough law, had too much of it. Law could depend on a person's status, hence another law for the peasant than for the city dweller, another law for the nobleman than for the villein, another law for the merchant than for the cleric and so on. The status of land could also intervene, for example, land could be free or unfree, noble or not and so on, sometimes without any regard to the status of the person holding it, as was the case when a non-noble held noble fiefs. On top of all that, most legal systems were very limited in geographical terms, they were applied in a very small area. The next principality, the next barony, the next town, village or even hamlet, might have a completely different set of legal rules. In practice, this meant a legal pluralism in which hundreds of legal systems were competing. I Consequently, medieval law was something of a huge warehouse, in which anyone could find something to his liking. In any dispute both parties could be sure to find at least one legal rule which was to their advantage.' This put the dispute on another level, where the issue was no longer who was favoured by the law, but who was favoured by the best, Le. the applicable, law. To solve this 'dispute in the dispute', rules were needed for solving conflicts of laws. The 'common law of Europe', the ius commune, had developed a set of legal principles for exactly this kind of problem,' but in the Middle Ages most of Europe outside the Mediterranean was not that much influenced by the ius commune. Customary law was still dominant, and it is to this customary law one must turn if one wants to study conflicts of law in the Middle Ages," As customary law was so varied all over Europe it is necessary to limit oneself to a specific case, in this article Flemish feudal law during the High Middle Ages. The choice of Flanders was determined by the extremely high number of Rules for Solving Conflicts of Law 119 local legal systems in this county. In the sixteenth century, when local customs were officially written down in the Netherlands, Flanders yielded more than two hundred of them.' Feudal law was chosen because it offers more chances for transboundary situations of all kinds. If a lord gives a fief to a man, it is perfectly possible that both the lord and his vassal come from the same place as the one in which the fief is situated, but it may be that the lord or the vassal or both of them are not and then problems can arise, even more so when one or more overlords, who mayor may not be locals themselves, come into play. Things can get even more complicated if one adds buyers of fiefs, and so on. To keep complications within limits, this article will not deal with transactions concerning fiefs, but rather with established relations between overlords, lords, vassals and fiefs. It will also restrict itself to conflicts of a geographical nature, leaving disputes about status, whether of goods or persons, unstudied.

Local and Regional Conflicts of Law

A conflict of feudal laws was caused by a transboundary element in the feudal relationship, in which either the lord, the vassal or the fief was the foreign element, and thus there was a conflict between foreign and local law. In Flanders however, the nationalities of lords and vassals were not important for determining the law to be applied to a fief.6 If a lord gave a fief to a vassal, the lord's feudal court was competent for this fief.' Thus, only two elements could determine the law to be applied to this fief: the situation of the fief and the competent feudal court. If both were in the same place, no conflict could arise. If they were not, two types of conflict were possible: local and regional. In a local conflict both the fief and the court were situated in Flanders but in different parts of it, so that only local Flemish laws were set against one another. It could be however that either the fief or the court were situated outside Flanders, in which case a Flemish custom was confronted by the law of another region (if both were outside Flanders, there was no problem, at least for Flemish law). The first type of conflicts one might call 'intercustomary' and the second 'interregional '.8

Table 9.1 Intercustomary and Interregional Conflicts of Law

Location offief Feudal court Outcome

Flanders Same part of Flanders No conflict Flanders Another part of Flanders Intcrcustomary conflict Flanders Elsewhere Interregional conflict Elsewhere Flanders Interregional conflict Elsewhere Elsewhere No conflict 120 Boundaries of the Law

This terminology of 'intercustomary' and 'interregional' law is different from the specific term 'private international law' . It is, however, in a medieval, and certainly in a feudal, context hard to use the latter term, The later (Continental) distinction between private law and public law was not very important in the Middle Ages9 and it would be impossible to fit feudal relationships into this framework anyway. Another problem is 'international', as it implies conflicts of national laws, which are absent in this part of Europe at the time. Intercustomary and interregional, without any mention of 'private', are better able to express medieval realities.

Solving Problems: Intercustomary Law

Originally, intercustomary law was not needed in Flemish feudal law. The count of Flanders was the dominant feudal lord in his county'? and, therefore, his feudal court, the curia, led the way for all others which resulted in a uniformity of feudal law in Flanders. But, from the middle of the 12th century a network of local comital feudal courts in the castellanies of Flanders gradually came into existence, a process completed in 1244 when the central curia relinquished almost all its feudal powers to these local courts, so that one generation later the original unity of Flemish feudal law starts to disappear. For example, in inheritance law the rule used to be that the eldest son, as principal heir, had to provide for his siblings, but now this rule was to be formulated in more detail: in some parts of Flanders the eldest had to cede a third of the fiefs, in others a fifth; his siblings, in return, handed over their non-feudal goods, or not; they had an equal share in their third or fifth, or not, and so on. The reason for this divergence is that the feudal courts of others lords no longer looked to the central curia for guidance, but to the comital feudal court in their casteIlany, which was eagerly developing its own variant of what before then had been a uniform law for all Flanders. Although in many cases a feudal court in one castellany was competent for fiefs situated in another, this led to very little, if any trouble. The 'law of the court', the lex curiae" was applied." There were exceptions to this rule. In Aalst the special law of succession (younger children received one third of the fiefs which had to be divided equally among them) was applied to all fiefs, whether the competent feudal court was an Aalst court or not.13 It remains unclear why the normal rules were not followed in Aalst and why the exception to them was so limited. Another exception was Lille, where originally the same rule as elsewhere was applied, but at the beginning of the fourteenth century this was changed. The lex loci, the law of the place where the fief was situated, was henceforward applied'" for reasons which will be explained below. Even taking into account these exceptions, intercustomary law did what it had to do: solve a conflict of laws by determining the applicable law in a way which left no room for further disputes. Rules for Solving Conflicts of Law 121

Creating Problems: Interregional Law as an Instrument of Power

For interregional conflicts it was necessary that contemporaries perceived not only differences between feudal courts, as they did for intercustomary conflicts, but also differences between larger entities, regions, and their legal systems. For Flemish feudal law to be in conflict with foreign feudal law, it was necessary that the Flemings perceived Flanders as a separate entity, which moreover had its own law. The former was present as early as 1127-28 when Galbert of Bruges saw Flanders as a 'land' (patria), even a 'realm' (regnum),1S and it would remain so in the centunes. thereafter. 16 One may, however, wonder whether this also implied a consciousness of a specifically Flemish law. After all, there is great similarity between the laws of Flanders and neighbouring regions." Yet, already in 1127 Galbert of Bruges stressed that the Flemish vassals did homage to their new count 'according to the custom of the counts of Flanders, his predecessors' (secundum omnem modum praedecessorum suorum comitum Flandriae),18something which would have gone without saying, if not for the fact that the new count, WiIliam Clito, was of Norman origin.19 Regular references to Flemish law only appear after 120420 and even then the expression 'law of the land' (lex patriae) is much more popular." F1emings were, at least from the early twelfth century, conscious of the fact that they had their own Flemish law and in the thirteenth, they sometimes put their own law next to that of a neighbouring region as countess Margaret did in 1267, when she distinguished the 'usages and customs of Flanders' (us et coustumes de Flandres) from those of Champagne (us et coustumes de Champainge).22 In some of these neighbouring principalities references to their own regional law are clearly linked to Flemish influence, as in Namur, where they appear after the county had been bought by countess Margaret for her son Guy.23 Unfortunately, their great consciousness of the distinct quality of their own law did not lead the F1emings to develop a good mechanism for solving interregional conflicts. One way of doing so would have been to leave lords and vassals free to make a choice of the applicable law at the moment of infeudation, but a choice of law is almost never made in the High Middle Ages. The main exceptions concern two Flemish abbeys, Anchin and Marchiennes. Both were in or near Ostrevant, the part of Hainault between the rivers Scarpe and Scheldt, which had passed from Flanders to Hainault in the eleventh century.24Anchin was on an island in the Scarpe and its vassals held their fiefs either by the law of F1anders2S or by the law of Hainaulr" as determined at the moment of investiture. The vassals of Marchiennes, a Flemish enclave in Ostrevant, held their fiefs by Flemish law, but had the possibility of expressly opting for the law of Hainault, if they wanted to do so.21 As a choice of law was rather exceptional mandatory rules were normally applied. The most common situation was the application of the lex patriae, the law of the place where the fief was situated. There are a lot of references to this principle, e.g. 'according to the usage and custom of the land where the goods are situated' Cselonc l'usage et le coustume dou paiis DU les dittes choses gisent,).28 That this rule was so popular should come as no surprise, as references to the 'law 122 Boundaries of the Law of the land' are very abundant from the thirteenth century on, even in situations in which no foreign element was present. However, there was also a second, and competing principle, the application of the lex curiae, the law of the competent feudal court. For example, Flemish law was applied to a fief in Petrieu in Hainault, which was subject to the court of Eine in Flanders.29 The two principles: lex patriae and lex curiae seem to be contradictory and irreconcilable, but they are not. A litigant was not free to choose either one of these two, as was made clear by the count of Flanders to William of Nevele at the end of the thirteenth century. WiIliam had a fief in Westouter in Flanders, which he held from the lord of Leuze in Hainault, who held it in turn from the overlord, the count of Hainault. As WiIIiam had not enough vassals of his own to sit as judges in his feudal court, he wanted to borrow some from his immediate lord, the lord of Leuze, and, needless to say, these would use the law of Hainault when making judgments in William of Nevele's court. To avoid this the count of Flanders had his men close WiIliam's court and William was forbidden to have anyone other than Flemish vassals, who would of course use Flemish law, as judges in his court." As this example shows, the lex patriae had to be used when the fief was in Flanders (which was the most common case), no matter where its competent court was. On the other hand, when a foreign fief depended from a Flemish court, as in the case the Petrieu fief, the lex curiae was applied. This led to the following result:

Table 9.2 Rules for Solving Interregional Conflicts of Law

Location offief Location of court Rule Law Applied

In Flanders In Flanders No conflict Flemish law In Flanders Outside Flanders Lex patriae Flemish law Outside Flanders In Flanders Lex curiae Flemish law Outside Flanders Outside Flanders No conflict Foreign law

The last possibility, if both the fief and the court were outside Flanders, is not relevant as in that case the relationship was completely foreign and of no interest to Flanders. In all other cases, Flemish law was applied. If the fief only was in Flanders, Flemish law was used under the lex patriae; if only the court was situated there, Flemish law applied because it was the lex curiae. Thus Flemish law always came out the winner and what at first seems to be a contradictory application of two principles can be reduced to one: the maximal application of Flemish law. However, Flanders was not acting in a vacuum. In fact, other principalities had similar goals, as in the case of William of Nevele, in which his lords, the lord of Leuze and the count of Hainault, wanted to promote the law of Hainault as much as possible. According to their interregionallaw of conflicts the lex curiae (here the law of Hainault) should be used, whereas according to the Flemish law of conflicts, the lex patriae (here the law of Flanders) was to be preferred. In this Rules for Solving Conflicts of Law 123 case, Flemish and Hennuyer rules for solving conflicts of laws were themselves in conflict.

Table 9.3 A conflict of Regional Rules for Solving Interregional Conflicts of Law

Type of Law Rule Law Applied

Flemish law lex patriae Flemish law Hennuyer law lex curiae Hennuyer law

This way the rules for solving conflicts of laws only contributed to the problems instead of solving them. In fact, in William of Nevele's case there would have been no problem at all, if the count of Flanders had not intervened. Even more unfortunate than William, was Johannes le Prinches, a servant of the lady of Cohem. In 1313 the king of France ordered his troops assembled in Arras against the count of Flanders and the lady of Cohem had this order published in the church of Blaringhem by Johannes. As she held Blaringhem from Artais and ultimately from the king of France, this was no more than her and Johannes' duty. However, Blaringhem was Flemish, and therefore, according to Flemish law, this proclamation could only be seen as an insult to the count. The lady herself was safe, but Johannes was arrested by the Flemish bailiff of Cassel, chained by hand and foot, thrown into a prison for three weeks, thereafter branded thrice in the face and sent home in disgrace.i' To people like William or Johannes interregional conflict law was the most perverse kind of law imaginable, as it aggravated or created problems instead of solving them. Even though only the underlings suffered, one might wonder why the count of Flanders and his neighbouring colleagues had as their goal the maximum application of their own law, which could only lead to more trouble. Interregional rules of conflict were more than mechanisms for solving legal problems, they were also instruments of power. If land was Flemish, it had to follow Flemish law,32the counterpart of that being, that if a piece of land was under Flemish law it was Flemish too. For example, at the end of the thirteenth century, the Flemings argued that Lessines, which was disputed between Flanders and Hainault, was Flemish, because the widow of the lord of Oudenaarde held her dower there by Flemish law.33

Perverse Mechanisms at Work in Other Situations

The same mechanism of the perversity of a solution which only enlarges the problem can also be found elsewhere, for example in the rules dealing with double vassalage. Again, several possibilities exist: the vassal and both his lords can be Flemings, only the vassal is a Fleming, both his lords are foreigners, one of them is a Fleming, but not the other and so on. As the count had a monopoly over warfare in his county since 1164, the only possible conflict could be between the count and 124 Boundaries of the Law a foreign lord. In this case, the rules were simple: Flemings were the count's subjects and therefore, he had the first claim on their services; the same applied to foreigners who were his liege vassals." One can imagine the ensuing chaos, if other princes acted likewise. For example, at the start of the Franco-Flemish war in 1297, the king of France called upon his French subjects and his Flemish vassals, whereas the count of Flanders did the same for his Flemish subjects and his French vassals, which was a problem as some Flemish subjects were French vassals and some French subjects were Flemish vassals. The reality was that the Flemings followed their count and the Frenchmen their king, ensuring that a lot of people lost or had to give up their fiefs,3sa solution which, in all likelihood, was not to their liking. It would be wrong to see these perverse mechanisms only at work in feudal law, for they can also be found outside it, for example, in Flemish succession law. If a person died, the rules given above (lex curiae or lex patriae) determined what law would apply to his fiefs. For non-feudal goods the situation was different for burghers and countrymen. For the latter, the law of the place of death had to be applied, whether the goods concerned were in that place or not. For burghers, however, the rule was different, as the law of their town was applied to their non-feudal inheritance, no matter where they died.36 Needless to say, this system was to the advantage of the towns. As such, it is one more expression of the great power the Flemish cities held over the surrounding countryside," as an unequal relation of power was translated into an unequal treatment in the rules of the law of conflicts. Nevertheless, amongst the towns themselves there was reciprocity, i.e. because of the so-called 'confraternity' of their customs they were willing to let houses, lands and rents inside their walls be governed by the laws of another town. All this was typically Flemish, in neighbouring principalities the law of one's city or of one's place of death could only determine what would happen with moveable property. To immoveable property only the lex loci, the law of the place where they were situated, could be applied.38 That Flemish law was different can be explained by the power of the big Flemish towns who in their own 'quarters' dwarfed what anywhere else would have been sizeable townS.39 Yet, it is interesting to note that even the most powerful cities could not extend their power over fiefs, which shows that, even in this very urbanised part of Europe, the feudal lords (who after all had the count among their number) had managed to keep more power than is sometimes thought. Other indications of this, like the general confiscation which accompanied a death penalty, can be found. It was not popular with the towns, because it not only punished the criminal, but also his relatives, who lost their inheritance. Therefore, the city of Ghent obtained from the count in 1294 that there would no longer be a general confiscation if the criminal was a Ghent citizen, but, in spite of this, the criminal's fiefs would still go to his lord." . Rules for Solving Conflicts of Law 125 Territorialism: a Cure for Perversity

The general idea underlying the rules for solving conflicts of laws, as so far expounded, seems to be that they were first of all an instrument of power and that finding an equitable solution was only a very distant second. Therefore, the preference was not for multilateral rules, making possible the application of foreign law, but for the unilateral promotion of one's own law. However, what one wants and what one gets are two very different things. In theory, every prince could try to promote his own law as much as he wanted, but in practice he could only do so in his own territories. William of Nevele and Jobarmes le Prinche had to follow Flemish law, because they were on Flemish soil. Likewise the Flemings followed their count in the war with France, and the Frenchmen their king. The next logical step was for the princes to realise this and to apply the 'law of the land' wherever they could. An early example of this is to be found in Lilie at the beginning of the fourteenth century,"· when local law was preferred over the law of the court, a change which might be attributed to the fact that Lilie was first occupied by the French, and later ceded to France...2 As many fiefs in the castellany of Lilie were held from courts in other castellanies which had not become French,"3the new rule may have been meant to avoid troubles with these Flemish enclaves. (Lilie would later in the fourteenth century be recovered by Flanders, but by then its law and institutions had become very distinct.....) Territorialism was the way of the future and, in fact, in the early modern period other rules, like the lex curiae, had almost diIsappeared.4S The trend towards territorialism was also present in Flanders. From the thirteenth century on, the counts tried to eliminate enclaves as much as possible, e.g. by buying lands which the German abbey ofCornelimUnster had in F1anders.46 Even more illustrative of this is the 1249 agreement between the Avesnes and Dampierres about the inheritance of Margaret, Countess of Flanders and Hainault. The Avesnes were the children of her first mariage, the Dampierres of her second, but there was considerable dispute about the validity of her first union, which led to a bitter feud between Avesnes and Dampierres.V The agreement intended to give Flanders to the Dampierres and Hainault to the Avesnes, but fiefs held from Margaret by the Counts of Namur and Luxemburg went to the Avesnes, unless they were located in F1anders.48 Even so, territorialism did not break through in Flanders and this demands an explanation. A part thereof may be that territorialism was not in the interest of those the existing rules favoured, the count of Flanders, or, for non-feudal goods, the cities, which as long as they had power would enforce rules which were to their advantage. That this holds true for the cities became clear in the sixteenth century, when the local customs were officially written down, during the 'homolagation of the customs'." which gave the then prince of the Low Countries, the Emperor Charles V, an occasion for amending the existing customs. One of the changes was the limitation of the rule that the law of his town governed all the goods, wherever they were located, of a deceased burgher, to movables and immovables located in F1anders.so Thus to lands outside Flanders belonging to burghers of Flemish cities, 126 Boundaries of the Law

local law was to be applied. Charles could afford to do so, because he definitively broke the power of the Flemish cities. In 1540 even his native city of Ghent, the most rebellious and powerful of the Flemish cities, had to humiliate itself before him: the leaders of the city had to ask his pardon for its latest revolt wearing a' noose around their necks." With their power, the Flemish cities had lost the ability to enforce their rules, but this explanation is only part of the truth. For fiefs nothing changed,s2 because the rules for solving conflicts of feudal laws were linked to the prince's power. Yet, when the Low Countries were united under one prince by the dukes of Burgundy and their Habsburg successors, this was no longer important. If all the neighbouring principalities, where most of the foreign courts were, had the same prince there was no longer any need to use the lex curiae, but this was only true if one looked at the regional level. At the local level Flanders had a network of local comital courts, in which the lex curiae was still applied, so that it was hard to give it up at the regional level.

Conclusion

This paper has studied geographical conflicts of law in a very small area and it would not be wise to make any general statements based on its data. Yet, some things may have a wider import. First among these is that rules for solving conflicts of laws were in the High Middle Ages more an instrument of power than an effective means of solving conflicts. Because of this they were only successful in internal relationships, inside one principality, at the intercustomary level. At the interregionallevel, they could not work, as the rules for solving conflicts of laws themselves conflicted, becoming part of the problem rather than the solution. In the end this would lead to the rise of territorialism. This historical process needs to be studied more, to determine its exact stages and causes. It also has an importance which transcends legal matters. Rules for solving conflicts of laws were in the High Middle Ages expressions of power, and therefore they can serve for historians as indicators, signs of power relationships, since they show who had the upper hand, as in the case of the Flemish cities and their surroundings, or where a stalemate existed, as between the count of Flanders and his neighbours. It is to be hoped that more historians will study rules for solving conflicts of laws from this angle, as they offer a unique view of medieval balances of power.

Notes

I wouldliketo thankProf.em. dr. R. van Caenegem,P. Carsonand G. Sinnaeve,whohave read the draft of this text, for their comments.Needlessto say any remainingerrors are entirelymyown.

I I R. van Caenegem,'Law in the MedievalWorld', Legal History Review 49 (1981),pp. IS- 19. Rules for Solving Conflicts of Law 127

2 D. Heirbaut, 'Le cadre juridique. Institutions et droit en Flandre vers 1302', in R. van Caenegem (ed.), 1302. Le desastre de Courtrai. Mythe et realite de la bataille des Eperons d'or (Antwerp, 2(02), p. 108. 3 See, for example, K.. Neumeyer, Die gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung des internationalen Privat- und Strafrechts bis Bartolus (Munich, 1901-16; repr., 2 vols, Berlin, 1969). 4 See D. Heirbaut, 'Feudal Law: the Real Ius Commune of Property in Europe, or: Should we Reintroduce Duplex Dominium?', European Review of Private Law 11 (2003), pp. 304- 6. S For a list, see J. Gilissen, 'Les phases de la codification et de I'homologation des coutumes dans les XVII Provinces des Pays-Bas, Legal History Review 18 (1950), pp. 36-7, 239-90. 6 For example, Ghent, State Archives, Charters of the counts of Flanders, collection de Saint-Genois, no. 673 (1293). 7 For example, 'Het archief van de bisschoppen van Doornik: een inventaris uit 1477', ed. M. Vleeschouwers-van Melkebeek, Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor de uitgave der oude wetten en verordeningen van Belgie 149 (1983), no. 16, pp. 191-2 (1244). 8 See E. Meijers, Etudes d'histoire du droit international prive (Paris, 1967; posthumous translation in French oftwo studies in Dutch published in 1914 and 1922), p. 19. 9 See J. Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law. A Historical and Comparative Perspective on English Public Law (Oxford, 1996); G. Giordanengo, 'De I'usage du droit prive et droit public au moyen age', Cahiers de recherches medievales 7 (2000), pp. 45-66. 10 D. Heirbaut, Over heren, vazallen en graven. Het persoonlijk leenrecht in Ylaanderen, ca. 1000-1305 (Brussels, 1997), pp. 310-14. For the special situation of the 'vassal counties' in southern Flanders, see J. Nieus, 'Aux marges de la principaute: les "comtes vassaux" de la Plandre, tin Xe-tin XIIe siede', in Sixieme congres de l'association des Cercles francophones d'histoire et d'archeoloqie de Belgique. Congres de Mons (Mons, 2002), pp. 309-24. 11 For this expression, see, for example, Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Cysoing et de ses dipendo.nces (867-XVIle s.), ed. I.de Coussemaker (Lilie, 1883), no. 129, pp. 160-71 (1253). 12 E.g. Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Beaulieu, ed. A. de Ghellinck-d'Elseghem (Bruges, 1894), no. 34, p. 57 (1235). 13 R. Opsommer, "Omme dat leengoed es thoochste dine van der weerelt". Het leenrechi in Vlaanderen in de 14de en 15de eeuw (2 vols, Brussels, 1995), 11.p. 793. 14 Les lois, enquhes etjugements des pairs du castel de Lilie. Recueil des coutumes, conseils et jugements du tribunal de la Salle de Lilie, 1283-1406, ed. R. Monier (Lilie, 1937), no. 250, pp. 162-3 (1301); no. 228, pp. 145-6 (1307). is Galbert of Bruges, De multro, traditione, et occisione gloriosi Karoli comitis Flandriarum, ed. J. Rider (Turnhout, 1994), eh, 1, pp. 5-7 (for example). 16 E.g. Codex diplomaticus Flandriae. Inde ab anno 1296 ad usque 1325, ed. T. de Limburg- Stirum (2 vols, Bruges, 1879-89), I,no. 48, pp. 159-61. 17 P. Godding, 'Peut-on deceler un droit commun dans l'histoire du droit prive beige?', Sartoniana 16 (2003), p. 125. 18 Galbert of Bruges, eh. 52, pp. '101-2 (English translation lB. Ross, Galbert of Bruges. The Murder of Charles the Good, Toronto, 1982, p. 197). 19 For a detailed explanation, see D. Heirbaut, 'Not European Feudalism, but Flemish Feudalism. A New Reading of Galbert of Bruges' Data on Feudalism in the Context of Early Twelfth Century Flanders' (forthcoming). 20 Oorkondenboek van Holland en Zeeland tot 1299, I, Eind van de Zde eeuw tot 1222, ed. A. Koch (The Hague, 1970), no. 272, pp. 451-2 (1204). 21 For example, Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Flines, ed. E. Hautcoeur (2 vols, Lilie, 1873), I. no. 114, pp. 115-16 (1258-9). 128 Boundaries 0/ the Law

22 Archives departementales du Nord (Lille), Series B, 1561, no. 93, fol. 31 r"-vo. 23 P. Sauvage, 'Droit et principaute. Seconde enquete: le droit territorial' in L Genicot (ed.), Etudes sur les principautes lotharingiennes (Leuven, 1975), pp. 331-2. 24 E. Delcambre, 'L'Ostrevant du IXe au XIIle siede', Le Moyen Age 37 (1927), pp. 241-79. See also 1. Gerzaguet, L'abbaye d'Anchin de sa fondation au XlVe siede: essor, vie et rayonnement d'une grande communaute benedictine (paris, 1997). 2S Archives departementales du Nord (Lille), Series 1 H, 157/1995 (1255). 26 Archives departementales du Nord (Lille), Series 1 H, 140/1495 (1235). n See also Archives departementales du Nord (Lille), Series 10 H, 119/1818 (1250). 28 Archives departementales du Nord (Lille), Series B, 140213679 (1296). 29 Coutumes de la ville d'Audenarde, ed. T. de Limburg-Stirum (2 vols, Brussels, 1882-6), n. no. 15, pp. 21-5 (1292). 30 Archives departementales du Nord (Lille), Series B, 1266114676 and 14676bis not dated, but WilIiam of Nevele is mentioned in charters from 1286 to 1304 (E. Warlop, The Flemish Nobility (4 vols, Courtrai, 1976),1111. no. 121136, pp. 925-6). 31 Additions au Codex diplomaticus Flandriae, ed. F. Funck-Brentano (paris, 1896), pp. 62-8 (1313). 32'Notice sur un cartu1aire concemant les terres dites "de debar" (Hainaut et Flandre)', ed. L DeviIlers, Bulletin de la Commission Royale d'Histoire, 4th series 3 (1876), pp. 467-512. 33 Archives de l'Etat a Mons, Tresorerie des chartes des comtes de Hainaut, no. 318 (end of thirteenth century). 34 D. Heirbaut, 'Flanders: a Pioneer of State-orientated Feudalism? Feudalism as an Instrument of Comital Power in Flanders during the High Middle Ages (1000-1300)" Anthony Musson (ed.), Expectations of the Law in the Middle Ages (Woodbridge, 2(01), pp. 26-7. 35 Heirbaut, Heren, vazallen en graven, pp. 124-6. 36 E. Meijers, Het Ligurische erfrecht in de Nederlanden (3 vols, Haarlem, 1929-36),11. pp. 15-17; Ill. pp. 25-30. 37 D. Nicholas, Town and Countryside: Social, Economic and Political Tensions in Fourteenth-Century Flanders (Bruges, 1971). 38 P. Godding, Le droit prive dans les Pays-Bas meridionaux du 12e au 1Be siede (Brussels, 1987), p. 376. 39 P. Stäbel, Dwarfs among Giants. The Flemish Urban Network in the Late Middle Ages (Leuven, 1997). 40 Heirbaut, Heren, vazallen en graven, pp. 81-2. 41 For an example outside Flanders, see P. Guyard, 'Un traite de droit feodal aux confins du Chartrain et de l'I1e de France', Cahiers de recherehes medievales 1 (1996), pp. 36,38. 42 For other effects this had on the law of Lille, see D. Heirbaut, 'Les lois, enquetes et jugements des pairs du castel de Lilie: een unieke getuige van het Vlaamse recht rond 1300', in De rechtspraktijk in beeld. Van Justinianus tot de Duitse bezetting (Tilburg, 1997), pp. 11-27. 43 Codex diplomaticus Flandriae, I. no. 193, pp. 427-9 (1314; date based on Additions au Codex diplomaticus Flandriae, p. 47) .. 44 See Opsommer, Omme dat leengoed, I.pp. 130-31. 45 Meijers, Etudes, pp. 76-7; P. Timbal, 'La contribution des auteurs et de la pratique coutumiere au droit international prive du moyen äge', in Etudes de droit contemporain. Contributions Franceises awe llle etlVe Congres intemationaux de droit compare (Paris, 1959), pp. 42-4. 46 Monuments pour servir a l'histoire des provinces de Namur; de Hainaut et de Wxembourg, ed. C. de Reiffenberg, (Brussels, 1844), I. no. 33. pp. 166-9. Rules for Solving Conflicts of Law 129

47 For the Avesnes-Dampierres feud see D. Heirbaut, 'On and Over the Edge of the Empire: the Counts of Flanders and Hainaut and the Election of the Kings of the Romans (1000- 1314) in A. Wolf (ed.), Königliche Tochterstämme, Königswähler und Kurfürsten (Ftankfint,2002),pp.434-52. 48 La querelle des d'Avesnes et des Dampierres jusqu'ä la mort de Jean d'Avesnes (1257),11. Preuves (1200-1310), ed. C. Duvivier (Brussels, 1894), no. 124, pp. 205-6 (1249). 49 R. van Caenegem, An Historical Introduction 10 Private Law (Cambridge, 1992), p. 37. 50 Godding, Droit prive, p. 376. 51 This ritual of submission made such an impression that even today the nickname of the inhabitants of Ghent is 'stropdragers' ('noose-bearers') (1. Decavele, Gentenaars. Slropdragers (Ghent, 1999», a name which, through a strange twist of history, has become a token of pride. 52 See E. Bellette, .La succession aux fiefs dans les coutumes flamandes (Paris, 1926), pp. 30 -32.