Even Presumed Damages Must Be Proven By: Charles E

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Even Presumed Damages Must Be Proven By: Charles E Article Even Presumed Damages Must Be Proven By: Charles E. Harris II Plaintiffs’ attorneys salivate at the mere possibility on the kind and amount of evidence that the of a potential defamation per se claim because plaintiffs presented in several cases, including two they think that, if the case gets past summary leading Seventh Circuit cases, to recover judgment, the defendant will feel pressure to presumed damages. Next, there is a discussion of settle due to the amorphous nature of presumed the recent recognition by Illinois courts that the damages. In fact, ask any plaintiff’s attorney what presumption of damages in a defamation per se evidence of reputational harm they have to action is a rebuttable one. Finally, the advisability produce at a defamation trial to recover presumed of moving for summary judgment due to a lack of damages. Their likely response would be: “Are you damages is reviewed. kidding? None.” Defamation Generally Under Illinois Law Defense attorneys and their deep-pocket clients, and the Types of Damages Available in who are often the targets of defamation per se claims, should not fret. In fact, case law has shown Defamation Per Se Actions that even presumed damages must be supported In Illinois, as in most states, there are two by competent evidence and that the presumption categories of defamatory statements: statements of damages can be overcome. Defense attorneys that are defamatory per se and statements that are should strongly consider moving for summary defamatory per quod. A statement is defamatory judgment based on a lack of presumed damages per se if it is so obviously and inevitably hurtful to where there has been no evidence of reputational the plaintiff, on its face, that extrinsic facts are not or emotional harm to the plaintiff adduced during needed to explain its injurious character. In discovery. Even if the motion is unsuccessful, it contrast, a statement is considered defamatory per would still help remind the court of the type and quod when it is not obviously hurtful on its face, amount of evidence that the plaintiff must present thus requiring extrinsic facts to establish its at trial to recover presumed damages. Also, the defamatory nature. court will likely be more inclined to give a The main difference between per se and per quod restrictive jury instruction if actual injury is actions for the purposes of this discussion is that, questionable. In any case, defense attorneys must when a statement is considered defamatory per se, be vigilant in making sure that jury instructions actual damages are said to be “presumed.”1 The explain the proper parameters for deciding availability of this “extraordinary presumption” is presumed damage. what sometimes persuades plaintiffs’ attorneys to This article will first discuss defamation under race to the courthouse to file obviously marginal Illinois law and the types of damages recoverable defamation per se claims against corporate in defamation per se actions. We will then focus defendants. They know that if the case can get This article was previously published in the spring 2010 edition of the Cook County (Illinois) Bar Association News. past summary judgment, corporate defendants recognized that, in Illinois, presumed damages will often feel pressure to settle rather than go to should never be substantial. A jury instruction trial because of the lack of predictability as to the setting forth this general rule should be sought. amount a jury may award in presumed damages. Punitive damages. Under Illinois law, the court In fact, just recently, a Los Angeles jury awarded must function as a gatekeeper in deciding whether $370 million in presumed damages to five former the facts of a particular case justify the imposition employees of Guess Jeans co-founder, Georges of punitive damages. If the court determines that Marciano, in a defamation suit against him. As punitive damages are appropriate, the jury may discussed below, it is a defense attorney’s job to let award them where a plaintiff can show actual opposing counsel and the court know early and malice. However, punitive damages cannot be often that she plans to actively defend the matter awarded where there are no presumed damages, based on a lack of damages. and likely cannot be awarded where a plaintiff has only sustained nominal damages. NOMINAL, PRESUMED AND SOMETIMES PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE AVAILABLE. Plaintiffs Must Produce Some Evidence of The types of damages available for defamation per Actual Injury to be Entitled to Presumed se in Illinois generally include presumed damages, Damages as discussed above, and nominal damage. Punitive damages may also be available if the plaintiff can The US Supreme Court first addressed the show that the defendant acted with actual malice. “oddity” of allowing the recovery of damages in Each type of damage is discussed below. defamation cases without evidence of actual loss in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.2 Recognizing the Nominal damages. Nominal damages are need for limitation on the reach of such damages, awarded when the insignificant character of the the Court found that the customary types of actual defamatory matter, or the plaintiff’s bad character, harm resulting from defamatory statements such leads the jury to believe that no substantial harm as “impairment of reputation and standing in the has been done to her reputation. It is critical in a community, personal humiliation, and mental defamatory per se action that the jury be anguish and suffering” must be supported by instructed concerning nominal damages; the jury competent evidence concerning the injury and should know awarding such damages is a viable that juries must be limited by appropriate jury option where it believes the plaintiff was defamed instructions.3 The Court did not use the term but has presented only modest proof of harm. “presumed damages” to describe the defamation Presumed damages. Under Illinois law, damage it was referring to in Gertz, but it was presumed damages are defined as personal clearly referring to presumed damages; indeed, humiliation, embarrassment, injury to reputation the same harms enumerated by the Court fall and standing in the community, mental suffering, under the definition of presumed damages in and anguish and anxiety. Importantly, courts have Illinois. Like Gertz, Illinois state and federal regularly recognized that Illinois law does not courts now require that a plaintiff support allow for recovery of economic damages, such as an award of presumed damages with lost profits, as presumed damages. Nevertheless, competent evidence. plaintiff’s attorneys will often attempt to argue to For instance, in Brown & Williamson Tobacco a jury that such losses should be considered in Corp v. Jacobson,4 a jury awarded the plaintiff determining presumed damages. One effective cigarette company $3 million in presumed way to prevent such an argument is through a damages based on allegedly defamatory motion in limine. Furthermore, defense attorneys statements made by a local CBS broadcaster should be aware that courts have repeatedly 2 Mayer Brown | Even Presumed Damages Must Be Proven who claimed the company adopted an advertising area…. [The company] also argued that the policy designed to attract children. The district [broadcast] was especially devastating court set aside the presumed damages award and because Chicago area viewers believe that entered an award in favor of the cigarette [the broadcasts] are reliable.6 company for $1.00, finding that the company The Seventh Circuit also recognized that presumed submitted no evidence showing actual injury. The damages must be supported by competent evidence court reasoned that: “[I]f [plaintiffs] want in Republic Tobacco Co. v. North Atlantic Trading damages they must prove them. * * * * ‘Presumed’ Co.7 In Republic Tobacco, representatives of the damages does not … mean that a plaintiff is defendant cigarette paper company sent two entitled to any amount a jury sees fit to award, purportedly defamatory letters to its customers entirely independent of the evidence…. Any other and potential customers—many of whom were interpretation would allow a plaintiff to recover also customers of the plaintiff tobacco company— substantial sums without even attempting to attacking the integrity of the plaintiff’s business introduce evidence as to injury and would conduct. The court remitted the original preclude judicial review of the amount awarded.”5 $18.6 million jury verdict to $1 million. In On appeal, the Seventh Circuit did not disagree doing so, it explained that “presumed damages with the district court’s holding that presumed serve a compensatory function—when such an damages must be supported by evidence; however, award is given in a substantial amount to a party it reinstated the presumed damages award to who has not demonstrated evidence of concrete $1 million based on the following evidence of loss, it becomes questionable whether the award is reputational harm that the plaintiff cigarette serving a different purpose.”8 company introduced at trial: Illinois courts appear to have followed suit. In First, [the cigarette company’s] general Knight v. Chicago Tribune Co.,9 a former DuPage counsel testified that after the broadcast County prosecutor brought a defamation action there were calls from the field sales force against the Chicago Tribune and two reporters, indicating that their contacts were asking claiming that a false statement in a newspaper ‘how in the world could [the company] have report
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