Chasing the Chimera: Preconception and Self-Deception in War

FROM FALAISE TO NIJMEGEN WITH BRITISH SECOND ARMY CHASING THE CHIMERA: PRECONCEPTION AND SELF-DECEPTION IN WAR by T. L. Cubbage II, Major, MI, USAR (Ret.) (A paper presented at the Second Conference on Intelligence and Military Operations U.S. Army War College (May 1987).) Chimera: 1a. a she-monster of Greek mythology; 1b. a similar imaginary monster; 1c. a horrible or frightening manifestation; 1d. an often fantastic combination of incongruous parts, esp. a fabrication; 2. an illusion or fabrication of the mind or fancy….1 Non semper ea sunt quae videntur (Things are not always what they appear to be). 2 1 Phillip B. Gove (ed.), Websters Third International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (Springfield, MA: Merrian-Webster, Inc. 1986), p. 389. 2 Phaedrus of Macedon, circa. 1st cent. A.D. CHASING THE CHIMERA: PRECONCEPTION AND SELF-DECEPTION IN WAR Preconception: a conception or opinion previously formed.3 The capacity to imagine the truth, to visualize the unknown, to tell a story, is indispensable for exploring the unknown.4 If there were dreams to sell, what would you buy?5 It’s a capital mistake to theorize before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgment.6 An intelligence hypothesis may become your hobby horse on which you will ride into a self-made trap.7 3 Gove, Websters Third International Dictionary, p. 1783. 4 Eric Hoffer, Truth Imagined (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1983), p. 19. 5 Thomas Lowell Beddoes (1803–1849), “Dreams-Pedlary.” 6 Sherlock Holmes to Dr. Watson. Arthur Conan Doyle, “A Study in Scarlet: The Lauriston Garden Mystery,” in The Complete Sherlock Holmes (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1930), p. 26. 7 Joseph Stalin’s advice to his intelligence chiefs, quoted in Angelo Cordevilla, “Comparative Historical Experience of Doctrine and Organization,” in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980’s: Analysis and Estimates, by Roy Godson, ed. (Washington: National Strategic Information Center (distributed by Transaction Books), 1980), p. 17. Page No. 2 CHASING THE CHIMERA: PRECONCEPTION AND SELF-DECEPTION IN WAR Self-deception: the act of deceiving oneself or the state of being deceived by oneself.8 Generally speaking, perceptual errors are the result of either projecting one’s own culture, ideological beliefs, military doctrine, and expectations of the adversary (i.e., seeing him as a mirror image of oneself) or of wishful thinking, that is, molding the facts to conform to one’s hopes.9 This was the grand delusion that brought other delusions after it.10 Trying to be objective does not guarantee accurate perception.11 The imagined truth of these storytellers is more alive, more true, than truth.12 8 Gove, Websters Third International Dictionary, p. 1783. According to Barton Whaley’s typology of perception, self-deception is a self-induced form of misperception, while deception is an other-induced form of misperception. Barton Whaley, “Toward a General Theory of Deception,” in Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, John Gooch and Amos Permutter (eds.) (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1982), p. 181. 9 Michael I. Handel, “Strategic Surprise: The Politics of Intelligence and the Management of Uncertainty (First Draft),” (U.S. Army War College, Photocopy, 1985), p. 30. 10 Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978), p. 361. 11 Id., p. 35. 12 Hoffer, Truth Imagined, p. 16. Page No. 3 CHASING THE CHIMERA: PRECONCEPTION AND SELF-DECEPTION IN WAR THE WEHRMACHT AS THE CHIMERA The German Army (the Wehrmacht), a military force which to some appeared more evil by reason of its augmentation with units of the Nazi party’s Waffen-SS, certainly was seen by the British as a loathsome force. The Wehrmacht was perceived as the dread beast that the forces of St. George were called upon to slay, and not a moment too soon. By late summer of 1944, Victory seemed to be at hand for the British and their Allies. Of course, things are not always as they seem. The German military force that was being pursued pell-mell across France and Belgium by the British in late August and early September 1944 was not, in fact, the same military force that was in hasty flight. As shall be seen, preconception and self-deception on the part of the British, and others, had turned the Wehrmacht into a Chimera.13 The estimates of the Allied forces concerning its foe did not reflect the real capabilities and intentions of the Germans; instead, they were mere illusions—fabrications of the mind. In an earlier article, this author stated that there are ten fog factors which alone, and in combination, form significant blocks to the ability of commanders and intelligence analysts to perceive correctly the capabilities and intentions of an adversary.14 On 6 June 1944 the Germans were surprised by the Allied landings in Normandy. The German estimative failure regarding the time and place of the D-Day invasion came as a result of the ten fog factors, not the least of which was the masterful deception effort mounted by the Allies.15 In turn, in mid-September 13 Here the term Chimera is used to describe an illusion, or a fabrication of the mind or the Allied political and military leaders. 14 T. L. Cubbage, “German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process,” Intelligence and National Security 2 (July 1987): pp. 114, 118–62, reprinted in Michael I. Handel, Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1987), pp. 114, 118–62. 15 See T. L. Cubbage, “The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh’s History of Strategic Deception,” Intelligence and National Security 2 (July 1987): pp. 328–46, reprinted in Michael Page No. 4 CHASING THE CHIMERA: PRECONCEPTION AND SELF-DECEPTION IN WAR of 1944 the Allied forces in Northwest Europe were surprised in Holland. It would not be correct to say that the forces under Field-Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery’s British 21st Army Group—particularly British Second Army and the Allied First Airborne Army—were intentionally surprised by the Germans. The Germans did not try to deceive the Allies regarding the capability of the Wehrmacht to send reinforcements to Holland, or to rally an army then in full retreat, or to form a defense in depth. Moreover, the Germans certainly did not deceive the Allies about the presence of two SS Panzerdivisionen in the Arnhem area. Instead, the British (and the intelligence officers at SHAEF, as well) were the victims of their own self-deception—a self-deception that mirrored certain false preconceptions about the war-making capabilities of both Germany and the German armed forces. This paper illustrates a vicious cycle in which the command thinking influenced intelligence estimating, while the latter reinforced and influenced the former. The author’s intuitive idea for this thesis was focused by “Formula for Fiasco,” a chapter in Daniel Goleman’s book, Vital Lies, Simple Truths: The Psychology of Self-Deception, about which more will be said later in the article.16 To illustrate the preconception behind, and the self-deception reflected in, the Allied intelligence reports concerning action in Northwestern Europe in the late summer and early fall of 1944, we will deal primarily with the Daily Intelligence Estimates of the British Second Army during the time period from 15 August 1944 to 30 September 1944. Since British Second Army was the ground force that rolled across Northeastern France and across Belgium, only to be stopped in I. Handel, Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1987), pp. 328–46. Cf. Klaus Jürgen Müller, “A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations in the Second World War, Intelligence and National Security 2 (July 1987): pp. 301–26, reprinted in Michael I. Handel, Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1987), pp. 301–26. Müller suggests that German self-deception had as much or more to do with the actual course of events than did the Allied efforts—with the FORTITUDE deception being the exception. Letter to author, 12 December 1986. 16 New York: Touchstone Books, 1985. Page No. 5 CHASING THE CHIMERA: PRECONCEPTION AND SELF-DECEPTION IN WAR Holland when it mounted Operation GARDEN, the daily intelligence summaries it produced will form the core of the information about how one key preconception led to the widespread self-deception in the Allied higher commands. In addition, the Weekly Intelligence Summaries of SHAEF and those of certain other higher headquarters—particularly those associated with the airborne invasion of Holland (Operation MARKET)—and the Orders of 21st Army Group will be referenced to fill out the story. These other reports also illustrate that this self-deception was not merely an isolated phenomenon associated only with the G-2 staff of the British Second Army. Two maps illustrate the situation along the Western Front on 14 September 1944 (MAP I at Page 155) and theplan of attack for Operation Market/Garden, the land and air invasion of Holland on 17 September 1944 (MAP II at Page 156). A third map shows how certain of the German forces escaped capture in western Holland and surviced to block utilization of the port city of Antwerp (Map III at Page 157). THE FALSE PRECONCEPTION: THE WAR IS ALMOST OVER No sooner was the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA) command activated, in August 1944, than there came upon the Allies the belief that war in Europe might end suddenly in 1944. Beginning in mid-August 1944, after two months of hard fighting following the Normandy D-Day landings, a great feeling of euphoria swept over the Allied commanders.

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