Strategic Snapshots

Snapshot 1: Cheonan Choices

Malcolm Cook and Andrew Shearer » August 2010

ensions are running high on and around the “South Korea, the United States, Japan Korean Peninsula. US and South Korean warships  and China and the wider region face the exercised together in international waters  T unsettling reality that despite its political off Korea in response to North Korea’s sinking of the  South Korean corvette Cheonan on 26 March 2010. fragility and economic weakness it is Pyongyang has reacted with predictable bluster. Beijing North Korea’s choices that are setting – which has refused to condemn North Korea’s latest the security agenda in Northeast Asia.” provocation and claims the US-ROK exercises are intimidatory – has conducted its own naval manoeuvres  in the Yellow Sea.1 The risk of miscalculation is high. For South Korea and the United States the risks of  South Korea’s choices holding combined exercises are likely much lower in the The North Korean attack forced the Lee Myung-bak long run than not holding them. Passivity would have sent government to make a series of rapid choices about how the message to Pyongyang and its supporters and to US  South Korea should respond to this act of war. allies and partners in Asia that the North could attack  South Korea at no cost. The conservative ROK government avoided both the understandable temptation to strike back against the North In Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures2 we and pressure from the Left for a return under duress to identified two sets of choices by regional political and the Roh government’s policy of appeasement. Instead it military leaders as particularly important in determining  moved swiftly to establish a 49-person multinational group how shifting power balances will shape Asia’s future of experts to study the causes of the Cheonan sinking security order. The sinking of the Cheonan and subsequent and then offered a large group of countries, including events highlight the impact both of immediate crisis North Korea’s only formal ally, the People’s Republic of responses and of long-term strategic choices that aim to China (which refused), and Russia (which accepted) the secure a country’s place in the order that will emerge from opportunity to review the group’s findings. These findings the region’s present flux in great power relations. provided very compelling evidence of North Korean responsibility.4 North Korea’s choices As always Pyongyang’s calculations are opaque, but  The strength of the evidence uncovered and the legitimacy most experts agree that the decision to torpedo and  of the investigation and review process – as well as sink the Cheonan was related to the leadership transition Seoul’s highly effective public diplomacy campaign – made from an ailing Kim Jong-il to his third son, Kim Jong-un.3 it easy for regional powers like the United States, Japan Senior South Korean officials and Western analysts  and Australia and global organisations like the G-8 (which worry that the sinking may mark the start of a new  includes Russia) to offer strong support for South Korea’s North Korean escalation cycle and that further provocations approach to the sinking. These same factors undercut are likely over the next couple of years. The reported Pyongyang’s bombastic rejection of the report and clarified execution of the senior North Korean negotiator in the  the strategic choice Beijing has made in favour of its Six Party Talks seems to confirm that Pyongyang is turning “lips and teeth” alliance with North Korea by refusing the its back on diplomacy. invitation to review or support the investigation’s findings. Contact us 31 Bligh Street Sydney NSW 2000 Tel: +61 2 8238 9000 Fax: + 61 2 8238 9005 PO Box H-159 Australia Square NSW 1215 ABN 40 102 792 174 Strategic Snapshots 1 www.lowyinstitute.org Domestic reactions to the Lee government’s response consolidation and move southward of the US military  reflect deep and longstanding divisions in South Korean footprint will increase efficiency and flexibility. The recent society about the threat posed by the North and how to  ROK-US agreement to postpone for three years until late  deal with it. The ruling Grand National Party suffered a 2015 the transfer of wartime Operational Control from the surprise defeat in city and provincial elections in early United States Forces Korea will further strengthen and stabilise June. Some South Koreans blame the Lee government the alliance and its focus on deterring and defeating a North because the Cheonan was sunk on its watch. Many are Korean attack. understandably concerned that too robust a response to the sinking could precipitate war. And, despite its palpable More quietly, the Lee government has also promoted  failure to reduce the threat from the North, a sizeable stronger strategic relations with Japan: proportion of the population still supports the  Roh government’s “Sunshine” policy and is unnerved by  Cooperation among Korea, the United States and Lee Myung-bak’s firmness. The ruling party’s surprise Japan should be rooted in a partnership based on victories in the July by-elections have further muddied these free democracy and free market values … In addition, domestic political waters. it is important to strengthen intelligence sharing and strategic coordination among the three countries Nonetheless, the attack on the Cheonan and subsequent in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue events support the underlying strategic analysis and  and maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula.8 long-term choices laid out by the Lee government. This shift has seen the establishment of a regular As soon as it was elected, the Lee government adopted a US-Japan-ROK strategic dialogue and significantly  firmer, less idealistic approach to North Korea that identified enhanced Japan-ROK defence and intelligence links  North Korea and its pursuit of nuclear weapons as the at the operational level. “most fundamental military threat and obstacle to peace on the Korean peninsula and to its unification.”5 The United States responded firmly and promptly to  the Cheonan sinking, restating its unequivocal In line with this more realistic approach to inter-Korean commitment to the defence of South Korea and offering  relations, in 2009 the Lee administration revised its its ally strong diplomatic and military support. Washington predecessor’s Defence Reform 2020 plan.6 The new plan pressured Beijing (albeit unsuccessfully) to support a  reversed the previous assumption that the threat from the strong UN Security Council response to the attack and  North would decline over time and focuses on developing made an early commitment to combined anti-submarine and strengthening South Korean and alliance capabilities  exercises. It also announced additional unilateral sanctions to deter and defeat asymmetrical threats from North Korea. against North Korea. Secretary of State Clinton and  The attack on the Cheonan supported the thrust of these Secretary of Defense Gates visited Seoul and the DMZ 2009 revisions and has prompted a greater focus on air and together to underline US support for South Korea. Although  naval assets to deal with North Korean maritime threats. not directly related to the sinking, President Obama’s call  for ratification of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement served Overall, these short-term and long-term choices have the same purpose. strengthened the international authority of the Lee Myung-bak government and South Korea’s position globally. Japan also responded forthrightly, condemning North Korea South Korea has received widespread international support for the attack and emphasising its solidarity with South Korea. – with a couple of telling exceptions – for the tragic loss  The US, Japanese and South Korean defence ministers met of life and the firm but measured approach it has taken to trilaterally at the June Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore (the this crisis. second time this has happened) to discuss the North Korean threat and how to strengthen three-way security cooperation  Regional choices and coordination. Since coming to power in 2008, the Lee government  has prioritised strengthening alliance relations with he heonan sinking could prove something of the United States. This goes beyond jettisoning the “T C Roh government’s ‘autonomous balancer’ rhetoric. The a watershed in South Korea’s relationship with United States and South Korea are reviewing their China. South Korean officials are scathing of contingency plans for the Peninsula, streamlining command Beijing’s refusal to condemn its North Korean arrangements, improving intelligence and other systems, ally for the attack and boosting readiness and combat capability.7 The .”

2 Cheonan Choices: Asian Security Futures By contrast it took China’s political leaders over a  The attack and its likely links to North Korea’s opaque month even to offer public condolences to South Korea  succession process clearly highlight the tensions between for the 46 Cheonan fatalities.9 As a result, South Korean this lofty aspiration and the realities of the divided Korean public opinion – traditionally quite sympathetic to  Peninsula and the demands this continues to place on South China for cultural and historical reasons – is also turning. Korea. The United Nations’ toothless Presidential Statement In a poll taken just after the attack, 86% of South Korean on Cheonan also highlighted the severe limitations of global respondents considered China’s emerging military  diplomacy when – as seems increasingly likely in the future power a bad thing.10 This result is consistent with a – two or more major powers do not agree.14 broader trend of mounting concern in South Korea  about China’s growing power in the region. South  Beijing’s strategic choices have served as something of a Korean views of the United States and the bilateral  wake-up call to South Korea and to the wider region about alliance have significantly improved over this same  the limits to China’s commitment to preserving a peaceful period. There is an emerging sense in Seoul that  and stable regional security order. The episode has been China’s long-term strategic interests are divergent  a further demonstration that China, despite its increasingly from South Korea’s, which is further reinforcing ROK-US confident and assertive claims to great power status, still and ROK-Japan security ties. Growing South Korean conceives its national interests narrowly. In doing so it has concerns about China’s military modernisation find an  underlined that the new “strategic and cooperative” South- echo in public opinion elsewhere in the region. In the  Korea-China relationship and upgraded cooperation on same poll cited above, 88% of Japanese and 79% of “political and security agendas” will be difficult to sustain. Americans polled considering China’s emerging military power a bad thing. The Lowy Institute Poll 2010 found Australia’s role in the international investigation into the that nearly half of Australians polled think China is either sinking highlights the significant improvement in South very likely or somewhat likely to become a military threat Korea-Australia relations under the Lee government, to Australia in the next 20 years.11 including the signing in 2009 of a joint declaration on security cooperation.15 Given the close relations between Implications Seoul and Canberra and Canberra’s fulsome support for The strategic choices made by South Korea, the United Seoul’s approach to the Cheonan, the two countries States, Japan and other powers following the Cheonan should use the Cheonan crisis to deepen strategic and sinking will have lasting repercussions for Asia’s emerging military links: security order. They will reinforce the emerging balancing dynamics we identified in Power and Choice. • At the bilateral level, the two could deepen the sharing of intelligence assessments on the Korean peninsula America’s alliances with South Korea and Japan have and on wider regional security developments, including been strengthened, as has the strategic consensus among China’s military modernisation. The annual Australia-ROK these three powers. This convergence has highlighted the meeting between foreign ministers could be expanded importance of political values in informing the strategic into a 2+2 meeting including defence ministers. choices states make – particularly when contrasted with • At the regional level, future US-Korea anti-submarine China’s obstructive response. The fact that North Korea’s warfare exercises could be expanded to include Japan attack and China’s defensive response may be tied to and Australia, and a senior officials’ quadrilateral succession plans in both authoritarian states further process could be established between the United underlines this point.12 States, South Korea, Japan and Australia, with an initial focus on responding to Korean Peninsula However, North Korea’s surprise attack has also contingencies. These steps would allow South complicated two of the Lee government’s strategic choices. Korea to send the strong message that deterring The Lee government is committed to a “Global Korea”: and if necessary defeating North Korean attacks is a recognised regional responsibility and not simply one By “Global Korea,” we mean a Republic of Korea that for South Korea or for the US-South Korea alliance. not only cooperates actively, but also offers solutions • At the multilateral level, Australia and South Korea for dealing with common issues facing the world could work together to develop a Proliferation Security community … It refers to a Korea that leaves behind a Initiative exercise around South Korea with significant habit of diplomacy geared to the Korean Peninsula and involvement by the ADF and other Australian agencies adopts a more open and enterprising posture that sees to maximise the benefits of South Korea’s recent the world stage as the appropriate forum for its foreign decision to join this practical and important global policy and national interest.13 security initiative.

Strategic Snapshots 3 Strategic Snapshots

Notes About The Authors

1 Ben Blanchard and Emma Graham-Harrison, China Andrew Shearer is the Director of Studies and a Senior shows military strength ahead of US drill. Reuters India,  Research Fellow at the Lowy Institute. Malcolm Cook is  20 July 2010. the Institute’s East Asia Program Director. 2 A copy of this publication can be found here: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1306 3 Seong-Ho Sheen, The Cheonan incident and succession in North Korea. Seoul, 2010, EAI Issue Briefing. General Sharp, Commander of the United States Forces Korea, supported this possibility in a public speech to the MacArthur Asia Security Initiative meeting organised by  the East Asia Institute at the Westin Chosun Hotel on  9 July 2010. 4 A summary of the report’s conclusions can be found here: http://www.korea.net/detail.do?guid=46843. 5 Global Korea: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea. Ed. Office of the President.  Seoul, 2009. 6 Defense Reform 2020 to be revised for NK threat. Korea Times, 26 May 2010. 7 Speech by General Walter L. Sharp, Commander, UNC/ CFC/USFK, to East Asia Institute, Seoul, 9 July 2010. 8 Global Korea: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea, p 25. 9 China offers condolences to S. Korea over Cheonan tragedy. Korea Times, 29 May 2010. 10 China’s growth a ‘bad thing’ says international poll. Bangkok Post, 18 June 2010. 11 Fergus Hanson, The Lowy Institute Poll 2010. Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 2010, p 11. 12 Mike Green makes the potential link between China’s 2012 leadership succession plans and their Cheonan responses. Michael J. Green, Cheonan reveals China’s true colors. JoongAng Daily, 2 August 2010. 13 Global Korea: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea, p 12. 14 A copy of the statement can be found at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9975.doc.htm 15 A copy of the statement can be found here: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/rok/fta/090305_joint_statement.html

Contact us 31 Bligh Street Sydney NSW 2000 Tel: +61 2 8238 9000 Fax: + 61 2 8238 9005 PO Box H-159 Australia Square NSW 1215 ABN 40 102 792 174 www.lowyinstitute.org