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The Glassworks Region in South-Eastern : Long-Term Change of a Low-Tech Agglomeration a)

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The Glassworks Region in South-Eastern Sweden: Long-Term Change of a Low-Tech Agglomerationa)

The Swedish household and ornamental industry1 expanded from the mid-19th century as part of the general industrialization. Gradually the glass industry became more and more agglomerated into a small region in the south-eastern part of Småland, a county in southern Sweden. In the present paper this region will be referred to as the glass district or the glassworks region.2 The location is shown in chart 1 and it will be further presented below.

Figure 1 shows the number of glassworks3 in Sweden, Småland4 and the glass district 1860- 2013. The shape of the curves is rather distinct. Up to the early 20th century, the number of factories increased and the glass district was formed. After about 1910 there were short-term fluctuations but very small long-term changes until the 1960s. The concentration to Småland is obvious. In the 1960s a downward tendency started and two steep falls are particularly spectacular, one in the 1970s and one from the turn of the century 2000. The pattern is similar to an S-curve with four phases, infancy, expansion, maturity with the addition of decline.

Thus, in these 150-odd years, a glassworks agglomeration was established and practically disrupted and this paper deals with this course of events i.e. how this industrial district evolved, was renewed and declined. First, a short overview of some theoretical approaches to clusters and industrial districts is given. The Smalandish5 glass agglomeration has been

a) This is a preliminary draft. 1 In this paper, the term “glass industry” is used for the industry based on handicraft production in the first hand comprising the household and ornamental glass industry. The flat glass and bottle and container glass industries are also included before they were mechanized in the first half of the 20th century. 2 The district is not identical with what is nowadays known as the “”, a designation which was introduced in the 1960s, mainly to attract tourists. It was first identified as the entire county of Småland. Later it has been confined to four municipalities, Uppvidinge, , , and . See also below. 3 By a glassworks is meant a factory with at least five workers who make handmade glass. In the factory there is at least a blowing room and a grindery. This makes a difference to the glass studios, i.e. very small workshops with only one or two glass-blowers. The studios will be briefly dealt with below. 4 Småland consists of three counties, Jönköping, Kronoberg and . These counties differed as to geographic and economic features. The county of Jönköping was more industrialized than Kronoberg and Kalmar. Kronoberg was poorer than Kalmar, where the southern part was more similar to Kronoberg than the northern one. This was important for the location of the glass industry. 5 The word “Smalandish” is derived from the county name Småland. It is for instance used in advertisements for IKEA: https://dilipnaidu.wordpress.com/2010/11/23/ikea-a-global-leader/. 2 characterized in different ways. Lindqvist (2009) defines it in the following way: “One of our oldest clusters, the glass-blowing region of Småland”. Furthermore he notes that it “survives in a renewed form”.6 Malmberg, on the other hand, argues that when firms in a certain subindustry, for instance in Småland, agglomerate, this is an archetype of the industrial district.7 Hence, a short discussion on different kinds of agglomerations is justified. Then, the special technology of glassmaking is described as this is at the center of what happened. After that, the formation of the glass district, i.e. its growth, how it changed and why it declined, will be discussed. Finally, the questions of what remains today of this, once very active agglomeration, and whether the glass district has survived “in a renewed form” are dealt with.8

[Chart 1 about here.]

[Figure 1 about here.]

I

The term “cluster” has been popular for many years, not only in academic circles, where economists and geographers in particular have taken an interest in the field, but also in other contexts, for instance national and regional policy making and among journalists. This broad attention has tended to make the concept fuzzy.9 A short discussion on this term and the related one, “industrial district”, which is preferred in the present context, is thus, appropriate.10

A cluster has been defined as “a group of firms, related economic actors, and institutions that are located near each other and have reached a sufficient scale to develop specialized expertise, services, resources, suppliers and skills.” The relations between the firms should be close and well-defined to constitute a “true cluster”, which among other things is said to make the firms more resistant to shocks and strains than firms outside the cluster. 11 This definition is close to Porter’s: Clusters are “geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and associated institutions

6 Lindqvist (2009), p 124. See also Lindqvist et al (2002), p 10. 7 Malmberg (2001), p 30f. 8 Thus, in principle, the glass district differs from the agglomeration of glassworks since the former has to do both with and associated activities. 9 See e.g. Ortega-Colomer et al. (2016). 10 On these issues, see also Olsson (2007), ch 2. 11 Europe INNOVA / PRO INNO Europe paper N° 9. 3

/…/ in particular fields that compete but also cooperate”.12 Furthermore, according to Porter, a cluster may not only be restricted to a small area. It can also be country-wide and even international. However, in the present context only regional clusters are dealt with. It is also important to note that not only the firms themselves constitute a cluster but also suppliers and institutions. These characteristics are said to distinguish the cluster from agglomerations in general.13 Another feature that is often connected to cluster is the well-known diamond model created by Porter, where four driving forces interact with clustering as a result. The forces are a) factor conditions, b) firm strategy, structure and rivalry, c) demand conditions, and d) related and supporting industries. When these factors work together and strengthen each other a cluster can be dynamic.14 This will not, however, be dealt with in the present paper.

A cluster is very similar to an industrial district, a term that was coined by the well-known economist Alfred Marshall. By this he meant a gathering of a large number of similar firms in a certain area. He was primarily interested in the functions and properties of the district. According to Marshall industrial districts are formed, due mainly to the physical conditions in the area. Key factors are climate and soil conditions, the existence of mining and quarrying, and fuel supply, by which he mainly meant charcoal and coal. A strong demand for the company's products through the concentration of population in cities or elsewhere, can also give rise to a certain location.15 Thus, he considered factors that were decisive for the location of industrial districts to certain places.

According to Krugman's interpretation of Marshall's thoughts, important characteristics of industrial districts and the reasons for their existence are:16

1) An industrial center generates a single labor market for skilled workers. Such a market will be an advantage both for employees and the company. 2) An industrial center creates a cheaper and more diverse range of production factors that are specific to a particular industry. Subcontractors will be present and can provide the industry with accessories and materials, organize the traffic, et cetera. Where appropriate, they can keep expensive special equipment in constant use and thus make them profitable. 3) An industrial center generates so called technological knowledge effects because information flows more easily in a small place than over great distances.

12 Porter (1998), p 197. 13 See also Wolfe/Gertler (2004), s 1085. 14 See e.g. Malmberg (2001). 15 Marshall (1920), chapter X. 16 Krugman (1996), s 40-41. 4

In Marshall’s districts tacit knowledge is a constituent factor based on practical experience. Other terms with similar meaning are implicit knowledge, idiosyncratic knowledge and uncodified knowledge. It has been pointed out that "the transfer of tacit knowledge requires personal contact and physical proximity" and that "networking interactions in close geographic space of firms and persons with different types of 'idiosyncratic' tacit knowledge may promote innovation.”17

The interaction between the firms can include information, social relationships and other things in the industrial atmosphere; in other words informal institutions – to use North’s terminology – become important. Furthermore, agreements regarding various issues are reached in which also sanctions are stipulated; they are formal institutions. Organizations may be formed for different purposes and become actors at the side of the firms.18

The economic historical background and change of clusters and industrial districts, i.e. how and why they arise, evolve and are phased out, has for long taken an unobtrusive place in agglomeration theories and studies. They have instead focused on the features, characteristics, and functions of the agglomeration. “However, the strong research focus on the way clusters function is contrasted with a disregard for their evolutionary development, i.e. how clusters actually become clusters, how and why they decline and how they shift into new fields...” 19. Hence, in recent years a widening of interest to longer term studies of clusters and industrial districts can be noticed. In particular, an S-curve model has been used and referred to as a “cluster life-cycle model" with four phases: emergence, expansion, maturity and decline.20

This is important for economic historical studies where, of course, chronology is constituent. Thus, economic history can take advantage of the spatial dimension in which location of firms and business activities are central. Through the time perspective not only the agglomerations’ function but also their changes can be analyzed.

II

Agglomeration studies often deal with modern high technology firms; the term high-tech cluster is common. This classification of technology is used inter alia by OECD where manufacturing industries are divided into four categories based on R&D intensities: High-

17 Kleinknecht/ter Wengel (1998), p 646. 18 The concepts formal and informal institutions are often used by economic historians interested in institutional theory. Then, organizations are not seen as institutions. See for instance North (1990). 19 Menzel and Fornahl (2009), p205. 20 See e.g. Menzel and Fornahl (2009), s 229. 5 technology industries, medium-high technology industries, medium-low technology industries and low-technology industries.21 Technological intensity can also refer to the degree to which machines substitute for human action in production. One way to express this is by the capital/labor ratio, i.e. the amount of capital per unit of labor input. A high capital/labor ratio indicates a high-tech industry. Another term that could be used is capital intensity. A number of high-tech firms form a high-tech agglomeration but a corresponding feature is also true for low-tech firms which can form low-tech agglomerations.

An example of longitudinal studies in which technological intensity is central is Østergaard and Park’s study of a high-tech cluster in Denmark: “The high-tech cluster emerged in the 1980s and grew quickly during the 1990s; however, it showed signs of decline around 2004.”22 Around 1990 there were 15 firms which in the early 2000s had increased to 45. Then around 2010 the number had decreased to 40 and the number of employees had shrunken from c. 4000 to c. 2000. Thus the performance of the cluster was characterized by technological disruptions followed by adaptations. Even if the time perspective in the Danish study is 25-30 years and, hence, differs from the one in the present paper where it is a good 150 years, it is in both cases a question of rise and decline of an agglomeration.

In contrast to high-tech in the Danish case, the glassworks are hand plants and, thus, low- technology factories which means that they formed a low-tech agglomeration in south-eastern Småland. The technology is basically the same today in the remaining production units as it was in the emergence phase and, actually, thousands of years ago. To acquire the skills needed for hand-making, the workers have to go through a long time of training. For most of the time treated here it was on-the-job-training and practically no theoretical studies. Thus, the skills acquired can be seen as a special form of human capital which is different from that in high-tech production where theoretical knowledge is more important. Furthermore, high technology in general has developed continually unlike the craft technology.

A short description of the production methods in the glass industry, i.e. the craft technology, may clarify this. Glassworks in the Swedish household and ornamental glass industry were, and still are, organized in principally the same way as were the proto-factories.23 This means centralized workplaces where a number of craft teams, each led by a master craftsman, are

21 https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/48350231.pdf. 22 Østergaard/Park (2015), p 835. 23 On the concept “proto-factory” see for instance Nilsson and Schön (1978). Another term for this is manufactory. 6 working in one building independent of each other but with a common employer. Basically, two kinds of organization developed in the 19th century in the glassworks, industrially organized craft production and pure craft production. This relates in the first hand to the work in the blowing room but in other parts of the factory there is also a craft organization.

Even if the boundary between the two kinds of organization is not crystal-clear it can be maintained that they result in two categories of glass, utility glass from the industrially organized production and luxury glass from the pure craft production. The latter can also be characterized as art glass. 24

In industrially organized production, or as it could also be called, mass production of handmade glassware, items of various shapes are produced, for instance wine , tumblers and jugs, or ornamental products, such as flower vases. In the manufacturing process, every worker in the team is specialized in one operation, for instance making a stem or a foot or gathering glass from the melting pot on a blowpipe or a pontil (a short metal rod) for further processing. This organization was dominant in all glassworks in the period dealt with here.

The industrially organized glass manufacturing is built on specialization of the work, clearly reminding of Adam Smith’s famous example of pin-making, which at that time meant craft manufacturing: “One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business; /…/ the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided in about eighteen distinct operations”.25

In pure craft production, 26 art glass is produced in small quantities or, sometimes, as unique pieces. When complicated techniques are employed the skills of the glass blowers, especially the master blowers, are crucial for the result and, therefore, a long time of training is required.27

That the basic techniques of the glassworks has survived from early industrial times means a static character of the production in an otherwise dynamic national and international

24 Of course also utility glass can be – and often is – of good design as well. 25 Smith (1961), p. 8. (Smith’s work was originally written in 1776.) In contrast to glass, the manufacture of pins was mechanized in the 19th century. See Pratten (1980). 26 Pure handicraft production is also practiced in studios by one or two glassblowers who are often also educated artists. 27 The difference between the two kinds of organization was accentuated from the 1910s onward, when artists, permanently or temporarily, were employed in the glassworks as designers. 7 economic and industrial environment. Certainly, various rationalizations and technical changes were made particularly from the 19th century onwards, for instance concerning kilns, annealing, glory holes, and tools as well as certain rearrangements of the work, but the basic organization with handicraft manufacturing has nevertheless dominated.28 The basic tools, for instance the blowpipe, pontil, and tweezers, have been of the same kind for about two thousand years. Hence, the household and ornamental glass industry was and still is based on a non-mechanized technology, in other words, it is, as mentioned, a clear-cut case of low-tech firms.

This is contrary to other sub-industries in glass production, i.e. the flat glass and hollow glass container industries, which are entirely mechanized with large-scale technology. The flat glass industry was mechanized in the first decades of the 20th century. The last factory in Sweden for handmade flat glass was closed in 1934 and thereafter two mechanized glassworks remained for some decades.29 Nowadays, no such glass is produced in the country. The container industry was mechanized more gradually. In some glassworks semi-automatic machines were used particularly in the first half of the 20th century while some large factories were wholly mechanized. Later, the semi-automatic machines became unprofitable and were taken out of business while the large mechanized factories grew bigger. There were three of them in Sweden up to the 1970s when one was closed down and in the 1990s another one was discontinued which means that today only one is left. 30 Thus, in all these cases the glassworks became high-tech compared with the household glass producers.

That the organization of the household and ornamental glass industry deviated from the otherwise mechanized industry in the modern economy became obvious from the 1960s onwards, when the dominating part was driven out of business.31

28 One invention in the early 19th century was to press glass. Then the glass objects are “formed by placing a blob of molten glass in a metal mould and pressing it with a metal plunger or ‘follower’ to form the inside shape. The resultant piece, termed ‘mould-pressed’, has an interior form independent of the exterior, in contrast to mould-blown glass, whose interior corresponds to the outer form. The process of pressing glass was first mechanized in the United States between 1820 and 1830.” (http://www.cmog.org/research/glass-dictionary/p (1 july 2013)). From then it did not last long until the method was adopted in Sweden, first at Reijmyre glassworks in the 1830s. See e.g. Mörkfors, Reijmyre glasbruk, p 23. 29 Nordström (1999). 30 Holmér (2017). 31 The pottery industry had certain characteristics in common with the glass industry even if it was more mechanized. It had also a similar historical course in the second half of the 20th century with discontinuations of firms and a flourishing studio movement. 8

III

Before the mid-19th century, i.e. in Sweden’s pre-industrial period, there was no concentration of the glass industry to Småland. Instead, the glass factories were spread all over the country as displayed in chart 2. There were 19 glassworks in Sweden in the 18th century and only one of these in and one in the northernmost part of . Most of the 19 factories were situated near the Swedish coast and close to the market. This meant a location typical for consumption goods industries. In this period glass manufacturing was also similar to most other manufacturing in that it was using craft technology.

[Chart 2 about here.]

After the mid-19th century things changed. As mentioned above, the long-term pattern of expansion of the Swedish glass industry, illustrated in figure 1, can be seen as an S-curve with four phases, emergence, which also could be called infancy – it is not seen in the figure – expansion, maturity, and decline.

The expansion of the glass industry32 and the concentration process to the eastern part of Kronoberg and the south-west part of Kalmar counties had to do mainly with two factors. One was the low-tech character of the existing industry in the region and the other was its relative poverty which in turn was due to the agricultural situation and the population density. There were two important industries, both with a long history. The iron industry was based on the good supply of bog-iron ore, which was suitable for the techniques of iron production used and which had given rise to a large number of ironworks.33 This kind of production, however, became more and more obsolete in the 19th century due to the large-scale ingot steel processes based on mountain ore that developed internationally and in other parts of Sweden. The Smalandish iron industry was not competitive and the production units had to close down. The other large industry in the region was the paper industry. It was based on handicraft production with rags as raw material but in the period under review, a machine technology broke throw. This also meant a shift to wood as raw material and large, mechanized production units.34 As in the iron industry this occurred in other parts of the country. Consequently, the old paper industry with its small production units disappeared. Thus, in both these industries high-tech production elsewhere crowded out the low-tech one and an

32 The following about the history of the glass district is based on Krantz (2015). 33 See for instance Berglund (2000). 34 Gaunitz (2004) 9 industrial vacuum ensued which could be filled with something else. However, factory knowledge in the tradition of low-tech and craft production remained in the region which suited the glass industry.

Old-fashioned industries that were closed down were not the only economic disadvantage of the region. Fertile soil was limited, which, in combination with scarcity of other employment opportunities and population increase, meant poverty. One consequence of this was that emigration from the region, relatively seen, was among the largest in Sweden in the second half of the 19th century. Still, however, the area had the lowest per capita income in Sweden.35 The resulting good supply of labor and low wages suited the labor intensive glass production. That this industry got foothold was also facilitated by the existence of Kosta glassworks founded in 1742 and Hofmantorp started in 1861, actually without influence from Kosta. These glassworks facilitated recruitment of qualified workers to new factories and workers could also found their own glassworks, often in cooperation with peasants who saw a market for firewood in the fuel-demanding glass industry. In the region there were big forests, to a great extent owned by peasants. Furthermore, raw material such as quartz sand and potash was accessible and many lakes and streams made motive power accessible for grinderies and other needs. It should be added that the capital costs of starting a glassworks were small. In sum, the economic backwardness of the area was crucial for the expansion of the low-tech glass industry.

The expansion phase lasted up to the first decade of the 20th century. Glassworks were also founded in other parts of Sweden as seen in figure 1, but the concentration to the small area in Småland is obvious. How can this area, i.e. the glass district be identified? Here, a simple method has been used on the basis of the municipalities in Sweden before the municipal reform 1952 and the number of glassworks in each municipality. Then there were c. 2500 municipalities in the country36 of which 44 were situated in the county of Kronoberg and 50 in Kalmar County. The total number of glassworks that were in use in part of or the whole period from 1850 onwards in each municipality was then determined.37 Every municipality with two or more glass factories was defined as belonging to the glass district together with some directly adjacent municipalities with one factory. They are all seen in chart 1. It is a

35 Enflo et al (2014). 36 After the reform there were ca 1000. The numbers are taken from http://www.scb.se/sv_/Hitta- statistik/Regional-statistik-och-kartor/Regionala-indelningar/Lan-och-kommuner/. 37 Weidow (1969) and Nordström (1999). 10 small region with fourteen municipalities and a total of 58 glassworks. This is c. 40 per cent of all in Sweden in the period.38

In the expansion phase the lion’s share of the output consisted of glass of a standard character and a very small portion comprised products of sophisticated and original design. This means that industrially organized production dominated totally. For a long time there was not much of adaptive capability or interest to renew production in response to signals from the market and criticism from design experts. There were clear tendencies towards lock-in.

In the 1910s something happened that radically changed the situation. A businessman and industrialist, Johan Ekman, bought a glasswork, , which had earlier been an ironwork founded in the early 18th century. As such it needed much charcoal and therefore it had acquired large woods. These were the direct reason for the purchase since Ekman owned a big paper mill in northeastern Småland for which he wanted to secure the supply of raw material, i.e. timber. He had no experience or knowledge of glass manufacturing but became immediately interested, even fascinated, of the production and its possibilities. Hence, he decided to develop and modernize the design of the products. With the help of skillful master blowers, cutters, engravers and etchers recruited from other glassworks, creative designers and a dedicated managing director he practically revolutionized the Swedish glass production with a modern and sophisticated design. The success of the new style was great, also on the international market, and the other glassworks just had to follow often reluctantly. Thus, a new Swedish tradition of first-class glass design and qualitatively good production was instigated and it characterized most of the Swedish glass industry during the maturity phase; the industrial district renewed itself and trademarks such as Orrefors, Kosta, and Strömbergshyttan became well-known. Art glass and products for everyday use not only from these firms but from many other glassworks as well were widely acclaimed. As to glass products the term “vackrare vardagsvara” (more beautiful everyday things) got a real meaning.39

As to macroeconomic change, the maturity phase comprised episodes of different character, for instance the first decades after World War II. This period was characterized by uniquely swift economic growth and, therefore, the period has sometimes been called the Golden

38 The total number is calculated from Nordström (1999). There a wider definition of glassworks is used than in the present paper. Thus, the percentage is slightly uncertain and possibly it should be somewhat higher. 39 The term was coined by art historian Gregor Paulsson in a seminal booklet (1919). Paulsson was also chairman of Svenska slöjdföreningen (The Swedish Society of Industrial art) which was a leading forum for discussions on renewal of the Swedish art industries. See further Ivanov (2004). 11

Quarter Century. This brought optimism about the future in the glass industry, particularly in the 1950s and early 1960s but for a time signs of an emerging crisis were concealed. However, this changed in the late 1960s when the situation rapidly became severe.

There were several causes for the grave crisis of the glass industry that now turned out with full force. One, but not the most severe, had certain similarities with the situation in the early 1910s. Then, there was a certain lack of adaptive capability to signals from the market on renewal of production and design but the threat was broken by the above-mentioned entrepreneur who introduced a new style of elegant and sober design. Now this style tended to be too rigid but there were signs of renewal. An entrepreneur, the CEO at Boda glassworks, Erik Rosén, launched a design that was rustic and simple. It became very popular and was followed by other producers. However, in contrast to the 1910s, the new style did not solve the basic problems which showed up with great force in the late 1960s and were much more severe than ever before.

There were two fatal threats: radically changed market conditions and rising costs. Mechanization of glass production accelerated internationally and caused a new kind of competition, which the Swedish glassworks with their craft production could not stand up to. At the same time trade barriers more or less disappeared. Imports of relatively cheap machine- made glass for everyday use grew and a large part of the market for the Swedish glassworks simply disappeared. The rising costs were mainly caused by steeply rising wages which in turn to a great extent were due to a new wage policy in Sweden, the so-called “solidaristic wage policy”. This implied that the same wage should be paid for comparable jobs irrespective of the profitability of the firms. If the firms could not rationalize and increase the productivity they had to close down. For a labor-intensive industry like the glassworks this meant problems; actually they formed a case in point on the consequences of the new policy. Clamped between these pressures the glass industry ran into a full-blown crisis which became visible towards the end of the 1960s. Gradually, much of the industrially organized handicraft production of glass faded away and the pure handicraft production was not large enough to compensate for the reduction.

Thus, the phase of decline had begun. The glass industry met with major profitability problems and glassworks after glassworks were forced to close down. Table 1 shows what happened and that the phase lasted at least to 2013 when Orrefors and Åfors were closed down. After that, the only factories left were Kosta and Målerås with reduced size together 12 with Bergdala and Skruf which had become very small.40 These factories together have today about 100-150 workers to compare with about a total of 3000 when the phase started.

[Table 1 about here.]

The situation in the late 1960s was precarious. It could be characterized as a critical juncture where the decisions taken had crucial consequences for the future course of events. The decisions in this case departed from an initiative taken by the biggest glassworks Kosta and Orrefors, at that time actually competitors. A survey of the problems was made41 which resulted in a number of measures, the main one being to merge glassworks. This was meant to lead to economies of scale and productivity increases. In other words, large-scale production was alleged to be the solution of the problems. A tacit premise was that the glassworks with their craft production, were similar to highly mechanized industries and could be treated and rationalized in the same way. It should, however, turn out that this premise was wrong; craft production was not suitable for such reorganizations. Mergers accompanied by more administration and marketing had to be financed practically without productivity gains. This was not perceived by the state authorities, the branch organizations and the trade unions who instead accepted the suggested solutions, almost without discussion.

A first attempt was made in 1974 when five glassworks, Skruf, Gullaskruv, Målerås, Björkshult and Åseda, merged into a concern called “Royal Crown” (Kronabruken). These well-known firms with good repute gave up their individual trademarks and a brand new name should be established. After the merger, big investments were planned, however mainly not comprising production methods, but only a few were completed. Profitability problems showed up and a number of employees were dismissed. Discontinuation of one or two factories was discussed but not carried out within the concern since it went bankrupt in 1977. Then two companies were closed down and the other three were taken over by two company groups that the state authorities had decided to support, namely the “Orrefors group” the “Kosta Boda group”.

Kosta and had for a long time been family-owned but in the 1970s they were taken over by big business corporations, Kosta by Uppsala-Ekeby which was a company, and Orrefors by Incentive which was a conglomerate owned by the Wallenberg family. In the late 1970s and 1980s these glassworks groups acquired several insolvent glassworks on advantageous conditions, but after a short time the factories were

40 There was also one small glassworks, Reijmyre, left in another part of Sweden, in Östergötland. 41 af Trolle (1969). 13 closed down due to profitability problems. Furthermore, reductions of the production in the remaining factories were made.

These changes were, however, not regarded as sufficient; large-scale thinking was still pre- dominant. It was soon maintained by the state authorities and various experts that the two concerns were too small. Consequently, in 1990 the Orrefors group bought Kosta Boda. It can be added that in the course of the process sketched, investments in tank furnaces, machines and robots were made in Orrefors and Kosta but this did not solve the problems and the attempts were given up. A couple of years later the new company group through discontinuations of glassworks and reductions of the remaining ones had shrunk to a very small producer. After the close-down of Orrefors and Åfors in 1913 only Kosta was left in the concern and the number of workers in this factory had diminished from 350-400 when it was as biggest to less than 100. Most of the glass with Orrefors and Kosta as trademarks is now produced by glassworks in other countries. Thus, today the concern is a design and business group more than a producing company.

There were also a number of independent, mostly small glassworks in the glass district outside the company groups and for them the story in the period of decline was similar to that of the bigger ones, i.e. unsuccessful mergers, bankruptcies and close-downs. The only factories left in this independent group are Målerås with about 50 employees and Bergdala and Skruf with about ten employees each. Målerås is rather successful due to a very special artistic line, and Bergdala and Skruf have found niches for certain products and for attracting tourists.

As mentioned, the late 1960s can be described as a critical juncture in the performance of the Swedish household and ornamental glass industry. Something had to be done and the way that was chosen was large-scale production, but was this the most appropriate way to handle the problems that had become acute in the late 1960s? This question is counterfactual and an attempt to give an answer or, rather, to make some reflections on alternatives may contribute to shed light on the situation. A basic premise is then that it is a question of handicraft production which could either have the form of industrially organized production – the lion’s share – or be of pure handicraft character. The part that was seriously hit by the devastating competition and the rising costs was the first one. If instead of large-scale organization, small- scale had been the purpose of the policy it is possible that more glassworks, though smaller than before and with mainly pure handicraft production, had survived and thrived today than 14 is actually the case. More glassworks had meant more variation of design and products and, maybe, a larger number of glassblowers, in short: a more lively glass district.

IV

With only a few glassworks left in the region it is an open question whether there is still an agglomeration; to call four glassworks so seems to be an overstatement. On the other hand, does an industrial district based on glass production still exist in south-eastern Småland.42 As mentioned above, such a district may not only comprise the constituting firms, in this case glassworks, but also other firms which in some way have to do with glass production, as well as various suppliers, associated institutions, and organisations linked to the basic components.

There is a type of glass manufacturing that has thrived at the same time as the decline of the Swedish glass industry went on, namely the glass studios and other very small workshops where glass is produced. This type of very small-scale glass production was made possible in the 1950s with the invention of minor, inexpensive furnaces in which glass could be melted and then formed by one or two gaffers. They can be artists and skilled glassblowers who make art glass of high quality – sometimes not high. In other types of small workshops popular glass, mostly for tourists, is produced with less artistic ambitions. The studio movement in Sweden started in the 1960s when Åsa Brandt opened a glass studio in Torshälla in Södermanland County with inspiration from the studio movement in the USA.43 Later, a great number of workshops have been founded and many have closed down. As far as known there is no statistics that show the continuous change over time of the number of studios and their location, only scattered information exists.

Nordström has provided some figures up to the year 2000, when there were 77 studious.44 Furthermore, for the present work data for 2017 have been collected. Information was found in telephone directories for Sweden45 and complementing evidence at Google. Another source of information was Glasakademin.46 According to these sources there were 87 studios in 2017 in Sweden. Probably the available figures do not show the total numbers since workshops of this kind are easy to establish and close down. Nevertheless, the available figures probably show the main tendencies over time of number and location. They are displayed in table 2.

42 Cf. Lindqvist (2009) and Malmberg (2001).. 43 On the Swedish glass studio movement, see Molin (1999). 44 Nordström (1999). 45 https://www.eniro.se/ and https://www.hitta.se/. 46 http://www.glasakademin.se. This is an organisation that represents the glass studios in Sweden. 15

[Table 2 about here.]

The figures indicate that there was only a small increase between the years 2000 and 2017, less than one a year on average. Thus, it can be assumed that something like a maturity stage in the development of the studios was reached in the early 2000s. As mentioned the first one was established in the 1960s which means that there was a large increase to 77 in 2000. According to Nordström there were two in 1970, 14 in 1980 and 37 in 1990 but these figures are also uncertain. Nevertheless, they suggest that there was a growth phase in these decades.

As to location there are some noteworthy features. The counties where the glass district was established, i.e. Kronoberg and Kalmar, had 21 studios in the year 2000 or 28 percent of the total, and 19 in 2017 or 22 percent. According to Glasriket AB (see below) there are 10 in the four municipalities constituting the company, which is about half of all small glass producers in Kronoberg and Kalmar counties. These figures and shares are much smaller than were those for glassworks, even before the phase of decline identified above. Furthermore, the share seems to have decreased, also this in contrast to the glassworks. This means that a concentration of glass studios to the glass district was not spectacular. Instead there is a tendency towards location to the big cities Stockholm, and Malmö, which, thus, is similar to the economic activities in general in the country. Nevertheless, the figures on the small glass workshops may be an indication that there is still something in south-eastern Småland that can be called a glass district.

There are other organisations and institutions relevant for the question whether there is still an industrial district in Småland based on glass production. Many studios, both in Sweden and in other countries, have a connection to the glass district since the glassblowers/artists were educated at the glass school situated there.47 The school started at Orrefors glassworks in the early 1960s with the aim to secure the supply of workers. Soon it was integrated in the educational system of where the company was situated. This meant among other things more theoretical education than before. The school developed successively and there were not only trainees from the vicinity but also from other parts of Sweden and from other countries as well. When Orrefors glassworks was closed down 2013 the school moved to Pukeberg, a former glassworks situated in the town of Nybro, and thus also in the glass district. In the former glassworks’ localities a glass studio was and still is situated and, furthermore, there is an important design archive, among other things containing

47 The following on the glass school is based on http://riksglasskolan.nybro.se. 16 material about glass.48 Thus, it was considered as a suitable place for the glass school. However, as there are very few glassworks left, the demand for glassblowers in the glass industry is small and many persons trained in the glass school have founded their own studios or joined existing ones.49

A firm connected to the glass industry is GLASMA in Emmaboda, situated at the edge of the glass district. It was founded in 1979 to solve the environmental and quality problems of the Swedish glass industry.50 In the beginning GLASMA supplied pelletized batch to the Swedish glass industry and studios, but later it has also exported their products to a growing number of customers in other countries.

When Boda glassworks had closed down there was a discussion on what to do with the land and buildings of the factory; Boda was an out-of-the-way located small hamlet under risk to be deserted. The outcome was that in 2009 the municipality of Emmaboda, where the hamlet is situated, in various ways saved extensive historical glass collections from being dispersed and placed them in Boda. The collections do not only contain glass from Boda but also from Kosta and Åfors glassworks. This led to the establishment of The Glass Factory, a large glass museum and also a knowledge center and meeting place for artists, designers, other interested parties Exhibitions and other events connected to glass production and design are also on the agenda.51

Another organisation linked to the glass district is AB Glasriket.52 It is an organisation with the aim of attracting tourists to the area called the Kingdom of Crystal, which as mentioned above today is defined as the four municipalities Emmaboda, Lessebo, Nybro and Uppvidinge. It is an official sales and marketing company for the kingdom, and the company is owned by the glassworks and the four municipalities.

To conclude, it can be questioned whether an industrial district centred on glass production still exists in Småland. The four remaining glassworks, two very small and two slightly larger, are not the only actors connected to glass production. There are also a number of studios and very small workshops. Then there are the organisations mentioned above. Since no strict definition of industrial district exists, the region under review could still be called so but it is a

48 Formally, the archive belongs to Kalmar art museum. 49 There was also – and still is – a glass school at Kosta glassworks but it is smaller than that in Nybro. 50 http://www.glasma.se/index.php?id=5 51 http://www.theglassfactory.se/. 52 https://www.glasriket.se/en. 17 diluted district. Furthermore, to call the four glassworks an agglomeration can be regarded as an overstatement.

IV

The formation of an industrial district in south-eastern Småland started in the mid-19th century as part of the Swedish industrialisation. The industrialisation was based on high-tech industries such as ironworks and paper mills and engineering factories and the economic growth of the country was fast, actually in the first half of the twentieth century, it was among the swiftest in Europe. However, glass production did not belong to the high-tech industries. On the contrary, with its craft technology and relatively low wages it was located to a poor region where it survived up to the mid-20th century. Then, the gap between the high-tech industry including mechanized household glass production abroad and the Swedish craft production became too large which resulted in a fatal crises. The industrially organized handicraft production, which was the totally dominant part of the Swedish glass industry became unprofitable and faded away and the pure handicraft production was too small to compensate for this reduction. The glass industry had become very small.

References

Berglund, Bengt (2000), Småländsk järnhantering under 1000 år. 1, Järn i Småland: forskningsläge, utgångspunkter och övergripande resultat, Stockholm: Jernkontoret. Enflo, Kerstin, Henning, Martin and Schön, Lennart, (2014), Swedish regional GDP 1855– 2000: Estimations and general trends in the Swedish regional system, Research in Economic History, vol. 30, pp 47-89. Fogelberg, Torbjörn (1989), Direktör Carl Gottwald Fogelberg och hans tid som chef för Kosta 1905-1926, II, Ekeberga. Gaunitz, Sven (2004), Företagsstruktur i ett förnyelseskede. Svensk pappersindustri byter råvara (1830-1880), in Andersson-Skog, Lena and Lindmark, Magnus (eds.), Strukturernas dynamik. Kontinuitet och förändring i ekonomisk historia, Umeå: Institutionen för ekonomisk historia. Glasindustrins Arbetsgivarförbund 1908-1958 (1908), Växjö: Glasindustrins Arbetsgivarförbund. Holmér, Gunnel (2017), Flaskor på löpande band – arbete och arbetskraftsrekrytering vid Surte glasbruk 1943-1970, Växjö: Linneus University Press. 18

Ivanov, Gunnela (2004), Vackrare vardagsvara – design för alla? Gregor Paulsson och Svenska Slöjdföreningen 1915-1925, Umeå: Skrifter från Institutionen för historiska studier. Krantz, Olle (2015), Den småländska glasregionens uppgång och fall. En ekonomisk historia, Möklinta: Gidlunds förlag. Krugman, Paul, (1991), Geography and Trade, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Kleinknecht, Alfred/ter Wengel, Jan (1998), The Myth of Globalization, Cambridge Journal of Economics. Lindqvist Göran, (2009) Disentangling Clusters: Agglomeration and Proximity Effects, Stockholm: EFI, Stockholm School of Economics. Lindqvist, Göran, Malmberg, Anders and Sölvell, Örjan (2002), Svenska klusterkartor: En statistisk inventering av kluster i Sverige 2002, Uppsala: Centre for Research on Innovation and Industrial Dyamics, Uppsala Universitet. Malmberg Anders (2001), Lokala miljöer för industriell innovations- och utvecklingskraft, in Ekstedt Eskil (ed.) Kunskap och handling, förföretagande och regional ekonomisk utveckling. Arbetsliv i omvandling, Stockholm: Arbetslivsinstitutet. Marshall, Alfred (1920), Principles of Economics, London: MacMillan (first published in 1890). Menzel, Max-Peter and Fornahl, Dirk (2009), Cluster life cycles—dimensions and rationales of cluster evolution, Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 19. Molin, Kerstin (1999), Studioglaset i Sverige – ett vitaliserande fenomen? http://www.kerstinmolin.se/studioglas/index.html. (4 may 2017) Mörkfors, Gunnel (red.) (2010), Reijmyre Glasbruk – formgivare, konstnärer och yrkesmän under 200 år, Linköping: Östergötlands länsmuseum. Nilsson, Carl-Axel and Schön, Lennart (1978), Factories in Sweden 1820-1870, A Typological Approach, Economy and History XXI. Nordström, Olof (1999), Förteckning över glasbruk och hyttor i Sverige 1150-2000, Glasteknisk tidskrift 3. Nordström, Olof (2000), De svenska glasbruken och hyttorna år 2000, Glasteknisk tidskrift 3. North, Douglass C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Olsson, Fredrik (2007), Järnhanteringens dynamik. Produktion, lokalisering och agglomerationer i Bergslagen och Mellansverige 1368-1910, Umeå Studies in Economic History 35. Ortega-Colomer, Francisco, Molina-Morales, Francesc, and Fernandez de Lucio, Ignacio (2016), Discussing the Concepts of Cluster and Industrial Districts, Journal of Technology Management & Innovation. Østergaard, CR and Park, E (2015), What makes clusters decline? A study on disruption and evolution of a high-tech cluster in Denmark, Regional Studies. Paulsson, Gregor (1919), Vackrare vardagsvara, Stockholm: Svenska slöjdföreningen. 19

Porter, M. E. 1998. On Competition, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.7. Pratten, Clifford F. (1980), The Manufacture of Pins, Journal of Economic Literature, March. Smålandsposten. Smith, Adam (1961), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, vol I- II, London: Methuen. (Original from 1776). The concept of clusters and cluster policies and their role for competitiveness and innovation: main statistical results and lessons learned, Europe INNOVA / PRO INNO Europe paper N° 9. Trolle, Ulf af (1969), Kommentar, in Hansson et al, (1969): Hansson, Lars, Problem inom svensk manuell glasindustri, Dyrssen, Gustaf and Göransson Åke, Marknadsföring vid svensk export av manuellt glas, med förord och kommentar av Ulf af Trolle, Handelshögskolan i Göteborg, Skrifter 2. Weidow, Jarl (1969), Svenska glasbruk 1555-1965, Växjö: Svenska Glasbruksföreningen. Wolfe, David A. and Gertler, Meric S. (2004), Clusters from the Inside and Out: Local Dynamics and Global Linkages, Urban Studies, 5/6. http://www.scb.se/sv_/Hitta-statistik/Regional-statistik-och-kartor/Regionala- indelningar/Lan-och-kommuner/ (24 May 2017) https://dilipnaidu.wordpress.com/2010/11/23/ikea-a-global-leader/ (13 February 2017). http://www.cmog.org/research/glass-dictionary/p (1 july 2013) https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/48350231.pdf. (13 February 2017). http://www.glasakademin.se/ (3 May 2017) http://www.theglassfactory.se/ (3 May 2017) https://gulasidorna.eniro.se/hitta:glasbruk (4 May 2017) https://www.hitta.se/s%C3%B6k?vad=glasbruk(4 May 2017) https://www.google.se/?gws_rd=ssl#spf=1 (4 May 2017) https://www.eniro.se/ (7 May 2017) https://www.hitta.se/ (7 May 2017) http://riksglasskolan.nybro.se/ (13 May 2017)

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Figure 1. Number of glassworks in Sweden, Småland, and the glassworks region 1860- 2013 70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Sweden Småland The glass region Source: See table 1. 21

Chart 1. Sweden with Småland marked (left) and Småland with the glass district (right)

The glass district Municipality Glassworks Municipality Glassworks 1. Algutsboda 6 9. Dädesjö 1 2. Ekeberga 4 10. Nottebäck 2 3. Helleberga 6 11. Långasjö 1 4. Hovmantorp 5 12. Ljuder 1 5. Lenhovda 7 13. Fagerhult 1 6. Älghult 11 14. Kråksmåla 2 7. Madesjö 4 8. Nybro 6

Note: The map shows the municipalities where the glassworks were situated and the number of glassworks in each in the whole period from 1860, altogether 57. These municipalities existed before the reorganization of the Swedish communes in 1952.

Source: Krantz (2015) 22

Chart 2. Glassworks in Sweden 1700-1800

Source: Nordström (1999)

Table 1. Glassworks closed down 1960-2013 and the number of workers 1954.

1960-65 1976-80 1981-85 Flerohopp 69 Ekenäs 141 Gullaskruf 86 Björkå 45 Nybro Glödlampshyttan 23 Värend 45 Hovmantorp 83 1991-95 1966-70 57 Ronneby 30d Gadderås 56 Åseda 101a 67 Björkshult 80 2001-2005 Glimma 69 Smålandshyttan 25c Rosdala 86 Rydefors 43 Hyllinge 17d Älghult 66 Sölvesborg 42 Strömbergshyttan 62 Sandvik 89 Elme 63 190 Engshyttan 46 Fåglavik 82 2006-2010 Alsterfors 69 Boda 143 1971-75 Lindshammar 73 Ryd 45 SEA 47c Ruda 75 Nybro 30b Johansfors 121

2010-2013 Orrefors 198 Åfors 94 a) 1956. b) 1962. c) 1958. d) 1971.

Note: 1954 the total number of workers was 3226 and in the glassworks remaining today: Kosta 302, Målerås 112, Bergdala 57 and Skruf 97. Source: Weidow (1969), Nordström (1999), Smålandsposten, Glasindustrins Arbetsgivarförbund (1958).

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Table 2. Glass studios and other small glass workshops in the Swedish counties 2000 and 2017 County 2000 2017 County 2000 2017 Stockholms 8 13 Västra Götalands 8 11 Uppsala 2 3 Värmlands 3 1 Södermanlands 2 1 Örebro 2 0 Östergötlands 3 5 Västmanlands 2 0 Jönköpings 2 2 Dalarnas 1 1 Kronobergs 15 10 Gävleborgs 2 2 Kalmar 6 9 Västernorrlands 2 0 Gotlands 4 3 Jämtlands 1 3 Blekinge 2 2 Västerbottens 3 3 Skåne 6 7 Norrbottens 2 5 Hallands 1 6 TOTAL 77 87

Source: Nordström (2000) and for 2017 https://gulasidorna.eniro.se/hitta:glasbruk and https://www.hitta.se/s%C3%B6k?vad=glasbruk complemented by https://www.google.se/?gws_rd=ssl#spf=1 (4 May 2017)

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