ISSUE BRIEF 03.23.18 Trump Policy in the Middle East:

Joe Barnes, Bonner Means Baker Fellow Robert Barron, Policy Assistant to the Baker Institute Director

Expanding Iranian influence in the BACKGROUND Middle East has also been worrying The United States has had, to put it mildly, to policymakers in the region and in a turbulent relationship with Iran since Washington. Ironically enough, Iran’s the Islamic Revolution of 1979. While power received a huge boost with the U.S. conflict—usually conducted through overthrow of Iraqi strongman Saddam proxies—has waxed and waned over the Hussein in 2003. His Sunni-dominated years, each country has considered the regime—though much weakened after its other an adversary. Tehran has, in general, defeat in the Gulf War of 1991—had remained viewed the United States—the “Great a counterweight to Iran. With that regime’s Satan”—as unalterably opposed both to its demise, Iran saw a major strategic adversary Islamic revolutionary government and to disappear. Since the U.S. invasion, ’s recognizing Iran’s legitimate interests in the now Shia-dominated government, though Persian Gulf. Washington, in turn, sees Iran by no means an Iranian client, has come to both as a general threat to stability in the enjoy a generally amicable relationship with region and, more specifically, as a patron Tehran over time. of terrorist groups, most notably Hezbollah Since 2011, revolutions across the and Hamas. region have created strategic challenges Over the past two decades, nuclear and opportunities for Iran. In , a proliferation has been perhaps the foremost long-time ally, it intervened militarily to driver of U.S.-Iranian antagonism. During help save the regime of Bashar Assad. In Since 2011, revolutions the administrations of Bill Clinton and, , Iran has provided support to the across the region particularly, George W. Bush, concerns Houthi rebels fighting the Saudi-backed have created strategic government of . mounted over Iran’s nuclear program and challenges and the possibility of the country acquiring In Iraq, Iranian military influence has also nuclear weapons. At the minimum, such increased due to the threat of ISIS; the Iraqi opportunities for Iran. a program would raise the risk of an government has heavily depended upon the Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facility—a often Iranian-backed “Popular Mobilization 1 strike Washington might feel compelled Forces” to fight the group. to support. Were Iran actually to acquire There is a sectarian component to nuclear weaponry, others in the region— these developments. In each instance, Iran notably —might seek to do the intervened on behalf of Shia groups (the same, creating a potentially destabilizing Houthi) or Shia-dominated governments nuclear arms race in the Persian Gulf. The (Syria and Iraq). But we should be very nuclear question became central to U.S. careful about viewing Iranian foreign policy— policy toward Iran, and rightly so. and response to it—in purely sectarian terms. On one level, Iran is acting as one RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 03.23.18

would expect any regional power to do: in absolute terms and as a percentage of courting former adversaries (Iraq), defending GDP—are a fraction of those of Saudi Arabia, embattled partners (Syria), or causing which purchased over $100 billion worth of mischief in an adversary’s backyard (Yemen). U.S. arms during Barack Obama’s presidency Moreover, Iran has been prepared to support and is massively superior to Iran in terms of Sunni groups—notably Hamas—when it views state-of-the-art weaponry. Then, of course, such measures to be in its national interest. there is the overwhelming military strength To reduce the Saudi-Iranian rivalry to an age- of the United States itself, which is sufficient old sectarian conflict is to miss other factors to crush any direct, conventional Iranian that drive the current relationship between attack on U.S. partners in the Persian Gulf. the two countries. As our colleague Mohammad Ayatollahi We should be wary Tabaar reminds us, domestic politics are THE OBAMA YEARS also important drivers in both Tehran and of exaggerating the Both Israel and Saudi Arabia perceived ,2 where elites use foreign policy to the Obama administration as feckless threat, substantial as it maintain or extend their power, deploying in handling growing Iranian influence in is, posed by expanding sectarian and nationalist rhetoric as they do the Middle East. Much of this criticism— so. Neither government is monolithic (nor, Iranian influence. particularly among Gulf Arabs—focused for that matter, is that of the United States). on Obama’s ambiguous, half-hearted Nationwide protests in Iran in January approach to supporting the anti-Assad 2018 included expressions of skepticism opposition and his related unwillingness among the Iranian public toward the Islamic to take decisive action against Russian Republic’s regional adventures, which have and Iranian power in Syria, and some cost an extravagant sum as the country observers in the United States echoed endures economic austerity. Whether this these complaints. The same is true of popular discontent will affect Iran’s foreign the Obama administration’s nuclear deal. policy is an open question. Whatever its other merits, opponents were We should be wary of exaggerating concerned that the agreement would free the threat, substantial as it is, posed by up resources for Tehran to pursue a more expanding Iranian influence. We are not robust security policy in the region—both talking about the Sassanid Empire reborn. directly, by unfreezing Iranian assets held In Syria, for instance, Iran may have in the United States, and indirectly, by successfully intervened on behalf of the There were few tears increasing Iranian exports after sanctions Assad government, but it has done so at shed by Middle East were lifted. substantial cost. And the bloody conflict has The nuclear deal—formally the Joint leaders when President left Iran arguably worse off strategically than Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—was Obama left office in it was before the outbreak of the civil war, very narrowly focused on limiting Iran’s when it could count on a strong Syrian state January 2017. ability to develop nuclear weaponry. While as a dependable partner. there was clearly some hope in the Obama Finally, we should be measured administration that the agreement might when we assess the military threat posed lead to improved U.S.-Iranian relations, by Iran. Tehran has been successful in the administration viewed the agreement leveraging its military heft in places like primarily as a pragmatic solution to a Syria and Iraq through relatively modest single—if important—threat to stability in direct deployments and support for far the Persian Gulf. Still, there was widespread more numerous local militias and “foreign mistrust, notably in Israel and Saudi Arabia, fighters.”3,4 But it remains outmatched, in of the Obama administration’s policy toward conventional terms, by the United States and Iran. There were few tears shed by Middle its Gulf Arab allies.5 Iran has a large standing East leaders when President Obama left army, but much of it is armed with obsolete office in January 2017. equipment. Its military expenditures—both

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would oppose any such effort, and all the ENTER PRESIDENT TRUMP other parties to the agreement are generally While Donald Trump’s administration has satisfied with it. Moreover, the unilateral maintained Obama’s policy toward ISIS, it reimposition of sanctions could create a rift has differed widely in its approach to Iran. with our allies in Europe. The administration This difference is starkest when it comes may push for additional sanctions—by the to the Iran nuclear agreement. The JCPOA U.S. and perhaps the EU—related to Iran’s was signed in April 2015 by Iran, the United ballistic missile program and its support States, Russia, China, France, the United for groups like Hezbollah. The Europeans, Kingdom, and Germany (the so-called “P5 however begrudgingly, appear prepared to + 1”). The agreement put substantial limits at least discuss additional measures against 7 on Iran’s nuclear program—particularly on Iran. China and Russia—the other P5 + 1 the enrichment of uranium—for periods signatories of the agreement—are, however, ranging from 10 to 15 years. In return, less likely to accommodate U.S. desires. Iran received relief from U.S., EU and U.N. President Trump’s nomination of CIA director sanctions. The Obama administration Mike Pompeo to replace Rex Tillerson as expended a substantial diplomatic effort secretary of state further clouds the JCPOA’s in negotiating the JCPOA; it also invested future, as Pompeo is widely considered to be significant political capital in fighting back a hawk when it comes to Iran and has been congressional efforts to kill the agreement. a harsh critic of the nuclear deal. The JCPOA is clearly one of the signature The Trump administration’s hostility foreign policy achievements of the Obama to the JCPOA is merely part of a broader administration. But it was—and remains— policy of confronting and rolling back Once in office, Trump highly controversial. Congressional support Iran’s influence throughout the region. moved quickly to Once in office, Trump moved quickly to for the deal largely fell along partisan lines, consolidate the U.S. with Republicans opposing it. In the 2016 consolidate the U.S. relationship with both Republican primary, then-candidate Donald Israel and Saudi Arabia, two of Iran’s most relationship with both Trump was not the only contender who bitter enemies. He clearly sees Israeli Prime Israel and Saudi Arabia, opposed the JCPOA; indeed, most of the Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Saudi two of Iran’s most Crown Prince as key major Republican candidates announced bitter enemies. their opposition to the deal. Senator Ted partners in his strategy of confronting Iran. Cruz, for instance, declared that he would rip The Trump administration has announced up the agreement on his first day in office.6 major arms sales to both countries, given a The agreement was also controversial in major concession to the Israeli government Middle East, with Israel publicly opposing it by announcing the United States would and Saudi Arabia uneasy, at the very least, recognize Jerusalem as the country’s with what it viewed as a weakening U.S. capital, and continued to support the Saudi commitment to the kingdom’s security. intervention in Yemen. Early on in the President Trump remains hostile to dispute that broke out among the countries the JCPOA. He has twice “decertified” of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) last Iranian compliance under the Iran Nuclear summer, President Trump appeared to Agreement Review Act of 2015. But he has be aligning the United States with Saudi refrained from pulling the United States Arabia (and its allies) against , but with out of the JCPOA by reimposing sanctions time, the administration has taken a more (he can do so without congressional even-handed approach. As we noted in our 8 approval). President Trump has apparently previous paper on the , been persuaded by senior figures in his U.S. policy in Syria appears to be driven in administration (former Secretary of State part by an attempt to constrain Iranian (and Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense James Russian) influence within that country. The Mattis, and National Security Advisor H.R. Trump administration also supported Israel’s McMaster) that simply walking away from February airstrikes against targets in Syria the JCPOA would be counterproductive. Iran in the wake of an Iranian drone entering

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Israeli airspace. Despite its harsh line against more important to Iran than they are to Tehran, however, some critics have argued the United States. Indeed, in the case of that the current administration hasn’t gone Iraq—a country that, under Saddam Hussein, far enough—as of yet—in countering Iran in launched a protracted and deadly war the region.9 against Iran (with implicit U.S. support, it should be noted)—the stakes could not be higher from Tehran’s point of view. Perhaps U.S. INTERESTS some future Iranian government—whether within the current institutional framework It is not difficult conceptually to enumerate of an Islamic republic or as a successor to core U.S. interests vis-à-vis Iran. These it—will begin to view its current assertive include ensuring that Iran does not foreign policy as an ill-advised and costly acquire nuclear weapons, keeping the exercise in overreach. But we should not Strait of Hormuz open to the transport of count on it: whatever the government in hydrocarbons from the Persian Gulf, and Iran, it is hard to imagine it surrendering its stopping Iran—or its proxies—from directly decades-long relationship with Hezbollah or threatening our partners in the region. The the Syrian regime (under Bashar Assad and, difficulty comes in formulating policies before him, his father Hafez). that advance these goals at an acceptable cost. Keeping the Strait of Hormuz open is surely the least problematic; thanks to LOOKING FORWARD overwhelming military dominance, the U.S. has long been in a position to stop All signs point to rocky times ahead for Iran from closing the strait for longer than U.S.-Iranian relations. Any U.S.-Iranian an extremely short period. But the other rapprochement—a faint prospect under the goals raise complex issues. The JCPOA Obama administration—is even unlikelier The simple truth is was—as most of its supporters admit—an under Trump. But rolling back Iranian imperfect agreement. But should we be influence will be difficult. As noted, we may that Iraq and Syria prepared to scuttle it, even if it could lead see additional sanctions on non-nuclear are far more important to Iran resuming its nuclear program and an aspects of Iranian behavior, though these to Iran than they are eventual U.S., Israeli, or combined military would be unlikely to substantially alter to the United States. strike against Iranian nuclear facilities? Does Tehran’s regional calculus; a unilateral U.S. our support for Saudi Arabian security include decision to exit the agreement in toto might what may be a costly and counterproductive cause a crisis with our European allies. The intervention in Yemen? Is there such a thing United States can work at the margins to as too close a relationship with a strategic encourage the Iraqi government toward a partner? Specifically, could it lead the United more inclusive decision-making process that States to support policies inimical to U.S. could accommodate Sunni grievances. And interests? Managing alliances is always a we can seek ways, again at the margins, delicate balancing act. The United States to lessen the dependence of Iraq on Iran, must of course take its partners’ priorities perhaps through more generous provision of into account, but this cannot rise to the level reconstruction assistance. But these are most of complete deference when important U.S. unlikely to end Iranian influence in Baghdad. interests are at stake. Yet any attempt to The best outcome in Yemen would be some create strategic distance—as happened under power-sharing arrangement between the President Obama—can lead to protests of Houthis and the Saudi-backed government, abandonment and retreat. but that might be a bitter pill for Saudi Arabia Moreover, as we assess our interests to swallow. Even were a deal in Yemen to in the region, we must recall that Tehran be struck, Iranian influence with the Houthis has its own. Iran may be, by any reasonable would likely continue, though it would take a standard, a middling regional power less deadly form. compared to the United States. But the In Syria, constraining Iranian influence simple truth is that Iraq and Syria are far will be difficult—and also risky. We could, 4 TRUMP POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: IRAN

presumably, reverse Trump’s decision to Mistrust between Washington and Tehran stop arming the anti-Assad opposition (with has shaped U.S.-Iranian relations for decades. the exception of the Syrian Defense Forces That mistrust is surely at a higher level under in the north). The idea would be to raise the Trump than under Obama. This raises the cost of supporting the Assad government risk of miscalculation on both sides and the for Iran. Maintaining a semi-permanent chances of escalation when and where an U.S. military force in northeastern Syria— incident occurs, whether in Syria, the Strait apparently the current policy of the Trump of Hormuz, or between Israel and Hezbollah. administration—might provide leverage It will require goodwill and deft diplomacy to in peace talks that would include, as part avoid such conflict; both are in notoriously of their outcome, the removal of Bashar short supply in the Middle East. Assad. But whether the simple removal of Assad would, by itself, significantly reduce Iranian influence—much less eradicate it—is ENDNOTES a different question altogether. Everything 1. Rhys Dubin, “Iraq’s Militias Set Their would depend upon the nature of the regime Sights on Political Power,” Foreign Policy, that succeeds him. Iran (like Russia) might, January 30, 2018, http://foreignpolicy. conceivably, acquiesce to Assad’s exit from com/2018/01/30/iraqs-militias-are- office. But they would surely adamantly setting-their-sights-on-power/. oppose any arrangement that would not 2. Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, “Iran- protect their interests in Syria. Still, Assad’s Saudi Relations: Factional Politics All The departure—even if Iran retains substantial Way Down,” in Policy Roundtable 2-4: influence in Syria—might provide a fig leaf The Saudi-Iranian Cold War (International for the United States and, particularly, the Security Studies Forum, February 20, 2018), EU to move forward with reconstruction. https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/2- Whether Gulf Arabs, an obvious source of 4-saudi-iranian. funding for such rebuilding, would go along 3. Ken Hubbard, Isabel Kershner, and with such an approach is far from clear. Not Anne Barnard, “Iran, Deeply Embedded in least, unexpected events—Assad’s overthrow Syria, ‘Expands Axis of Resistance,’” The in a coup, for instance—could create new New York Times, February 19, 2018, https:// opportunities to end the Syrian Civil War. www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/world/ But it is hard to imagine Iran surrendering its middleeast/iran-syria-israel.html. traditional influence in Syria without a fight. 4. Mujib Mashal and Fatima Faizi, “Iran And it has the armed proxies on the ground Sent Them to Syria. Now Afghan Fighters to make the fight a nasty one. Are a Worry at Home,” The New York Times, November 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes. CONCLUSION com/2017/11/11/world/asia/afghanistan- iran-syria-revolutionary-guards.html. The Trump administration will find rolling 5. Trita Parsi and Tyler Cullis, “The back Iranian influence a heavy lift and, at Myth of the Iranian Military Giant,” Foreign times, a dangerous one. The EU and others Policy, July 10, 2015, http://foreignpolicy. in the international community (notably com/2015/07/10/the-myth-of-the- Russia and China) will be wary of efforts iranian-military-giant/. to further isolate Iran. For their part, Israel 6. Julian Hattem, “Cruz: ‘I will Rip to and Saudi Arabia surely welcome the Trump Shreds’ the Iran Deal,” The Hill, September administration’s stance. But a perceived 16, 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/national- carte blanche from Washington might security/253962-cruz-promises-to-rip-to- prompt leaders in Saudi Arabia and Israel shreds-iran-deal. to act in ways that do not conform to U.S. 7. Mark Landler, David E. Sanger, interests; the utterly avoidable crisis within and Gardiner Harris, “Rewrite Iran Deal? the GCC is a case in point. Europeans Offer a Different Solution: A New Chapter,” The New York Times, 5 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 03.23.18

February 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/02/26/us/politics/trump- europe-iran-deal.html. 8. Robert Barron and Joe Barnes, “Trump Policy in the Middle East: Syria” (Issue brief no. 03.07.18, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas, March 7, 2018), https://www.bakerinstitute.org/ media/files/files/2883be8c/bi-brief- 030718-cme-syria.pdf. 9. Dennis Ross, “Trump Is All Talk On Iran,” Foreign Policy, February 8, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/08/ trump-is-all-talk-on-iran/.

AUTHORS

Since coming to the Baker Institute in 1995, Joe Barnes has written extensively on foreign affairs and economic policy. In recent years he has focused on U.S. policy in the Middle East and the geopolitics of oil and gas. In addition to numerous institute studies, his work has appeared in newspapers, journals, and books. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. State Department, serving in Europe, See more issue briefs at: www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.

This publication was written by a Robert Barron is the policy assistant researcher (or researchers) who to Ambassador Edward Djerejian, the participated in a Baker Institute project. director of the Baker Institute. Barron also Wherever feasible, this research is helps to coordinate the activities of the reviewed by outside experts before it is released. However, the views expressed institute’s Center for the Middle East. He herein are those of the individual previously lived and worked in Cairo as author(s), and do not necessarily a journalist covering the energy industry represent the views of Rice University’s and other business news for , Baker Institute for Public Policy. an independent online newspaper. Barron

© 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute graduated from Texas A&M’s Bush School for Public Policy of Government with a master’s degree in Middle East affairs and international This material may be quoted or development. reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

Cite as: Barnes, Joe and Robert Barron. 2018. Trump Policy in the Middle East: Iran. Issue brief no. 03.23.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.

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