Lackey, Learning from Words.Pdf

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Learning from Words Author(s): Jennifer Lackey Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jul., 2006), pp. 77-101 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040993 . Accessed: 16/03/2013 18:35

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Philosophyand PhenomenologicalResearch Vol. LXXIII,No. 1,July 2006

Learningfrom Words*

JENNIFER LACKEY NorthernIllinois University

Thereis a widelyaccepted family of views in theepistemology of testimony centeringaround the claim that belief is thecentral item involved in a testimonialexchange.1 For instance,in describingthe process of learningvia testimony,Elizabeth Fricker provides the following: "one language-userhas a belief,which gives rise to an utteranceby him; as a resultof observingthis utteranceanother user of the same language,his audience,comes to share thatbelief'2 In a similarspirit, Alvin Plantinga says that"...a beliefon the partof the testifiee has warrantonly if thatbelief has warrantfor thetesti- fier."3In both of thesepassages, we findstrands of whatI shall call the BeliefView of Testimony(hereafter, the BVT).4 Thereare several different yet related components of the BVT. First,while statementsare necessaryfor the process of communication,they are merely vehiclesfor expressing beliefs - theyenable us to makepublic what would otherwiseremain private. Strictly speaking, then, we do not learnfrom one another'swords - we learnfrom one another'sbeliefs.5 This is one of the

Editor's Note: This paper won the Young EpistemologistPrize for the RutgersEpiste- mologyconference held in 2005. 1 As MichaelWelbourne says, "...it is moreor less standardto describethe whole testimonial processin thevocabulary of belief (1994, p. 305). 2 Fricker(1987, p. 68, emphasisadded). In a moreprecise formulation,Fricker says: "A speaker,believing that P, and wishingto communicatethis belief, makes an utterance whichconstitutes his asserting that P\ his audience,a hearer,observing and understand- ingit... as a resultcomes also to believethat P" (1987, pp. 68-9). Plantinga(1993, p. 86, emphasisadded). Proponentsof differentstrands of the BVT include Austin(1979), Welbourne(1979, 1981, 1986, and 1994), Evans (1982), Hardwig(1985 and 1991), Fricker(1987, 1994, and 1995), Ross (1986), Coady (1992 and 1994), Burge(1993 and 1997), Reid (1993), Plantinga(1993), Dummett(1994), McDowell(1994), Williamson(1996 and 2000), Audi (1997, 1998,2004, and 2006), Faulkner(2000), Owens (2000), Reynolds(2002), Adler (2002), Pritchard(2004), and Schmitt(2006). It is of interestto notethat the BVT cuts acrossthe so-called reductionist/non-reductionist debate in theepistemology of testimony. Forinstance, Fricker (1987, 1994,and 1995) is a reductionist,Plantinga (1993) is a non- reductionist,and Faulkner(2000) endorsesa hybridreductionist/non-reductionist view, yetall threeespouse strands of theBVT. 5 Forinstance, Robert Audi says that". . .ifone takesit (as ThomasReid mayhave) thatthe recipientof testimonyis (characteristically)responding to theattester's belief - or at least

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions reasons why nearlyeveryone takes sincerityon the partof the speaker to be a necessary condition for testimonial knowledge.6In orderto properly learn froma speaker's belief,there needs to be a beliefpresent from which to learn. Thus, if a speaker is insincere and expresses what she herself does not believe, thenthere is nothingfor her to pass on to a hearer. Second, the process of communicatingvia testimonyinvolves a speaker transmittingher belief to a hearer,along withthe epistemicproperties it possesses. For instance,following Fricker's talk of sharing beliefs and Plant- inga's characterizationof the transmissionof warrant,David Owens claims that "...testimony transmitsknowledge of/? by transmittingthe probative forceof reasons forbelief in p fromone partyto another."7Testimony, therefore,is said to be incapable of generatingnew epistemic features- it merely has the capacity to transmitfrom one person to anotherbeliefs that have already been renderedwarranted, justified, or instances of knowledge via anothersource.8 Third, and closely related,statements themselves are not the bearers of epistemicsignificance - beliefs are. Notice, for instance,that Plantinga does not say thata belief on the part of the testifieehas warrantonly if the testifier's statement has warrant;instead, he focuses entirelyon the epistemic status of the speaker's belief. This is a naturalconsequence of the previous two points: if statementsare merely vehicles for transmittingbeliefs that

a presumptionthereof - and notjust to a linguisticor othersymbolic act, one may findit plausibleto arguethat testimony is a conditionallybasic source of justificationand perhaps of knowledgeas well" (2004, p. 21). Similarly,Duncan Pritchardclaims thatthe paradigmcase of testimonyis "...the intentionaltransfer of a belieffrom one agent to another,whether in the usual way via a verbalassertion made by the one agentto the other,or by someother means, such as througha note" (2004, p. 326, emphasisadded). And ErnestSosa writes,"On thedefault assumption... which must be thatof sincerity,the speaker's utterancedoes give to understandwliat the speaker thinks.So, the utterance carriesa deliveranceas to thespeaker's mind....If we are to knowa speaker's mind throughhis utterances,the speaker must have a reliablecompetence to statehis mind.He mustbe able throughhis utterancesto deliversafe deliverancesabout whathe thinkson thetopic at hand"(2006, p. 121,emphasis added). For discussionsspecifically about the role of sincerityin testimony,see, for instance, Welbourne(1979, 1981, 1986, and 1994), Hardwig (1985 and 1991), Ross (1986), Fricker(1987, 1994, and 1995), Plantinga(1993), McDowell (1994), Audi (1997 and 1998),Root (2001), Owens(2000), and Adler (2002). For indirectendorsements of sin- cerityas a necessarycondition for testimonialknowledge (warranted belief, justified belief)- e.g., via the strongerrequirement that the speakerhave the knowledge(warrantedbelief, justified belief) in question-see Burge(1993 and 1997), Williamson(1996 and 2000), Audi(1997, 1998,and 2006), Dummett(1994), Reynolds(2002), and Schmitt (2006). 7 Owens (2000, p. 169). WhenI speakof warrantand justification, I am interestedin theseconcepts only insofar as theyhave some close connectionwith knowledge. Thus, there may be some subjective notionsof theseconcepts that escape some of the argumentsI give in thispaper. My interesthere, however, is in theepistemology of testimony.

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions alreadypossess epistemicproperties, then the statements themselves simply dropout of theepistemic picture. Whilethere is muchthat is intuitivelyplausible about the BVT, in what followsI arguethat this entire picture of theepistemology of testimonyis fundamentallyincorrect. In particular,I show that,both causallyand epistemically,statements, not beliefs,are the crucialitems in a testimonial exchange.9Hence, each of thecomponents that constitute the BVT is false.

1. The Transmissionof EpistemicProperties: Necessity Let us beginwith what is perhapsthe fundamental thesis of theBVT, which I shall call the Transmissionof EpistemicProperties (hereafter,TEP). Roughly,the thoughtexpressed by TEP is that a testimonialexchange involvesa speaker'sbelief, along withthe epistemic properties it possesses, beingtransmitted to a hearer.There are two dimensionsto TEP; one is a necessitythesis and the other is a sufficiencythesis. More precisely,

TEP-N: For everyspeaker, A, and hearer,B, B's beliefthat p is warranted(justified, known) on thebasis of A's testimony thatp only if A's belief thatp is warranted(justified, known).10

TEP-S: Forevery speaker, A, andhearer, B, if (1) A's beliefthat p is warranted(justified, known), (2) B comes to believethat p on thebasis of thecontent of A's testimonythat p9u and

9 Throughoutthis paper, I shallfocus on the role of a speaker's statementin a testimonial exchange.However, since a beliefmay be acquiredon thebasis of a speaker's testimonythat is notin theform of a statement- by a physicalgesture, for instance- a more precisecharacterization of thearguments in thispaper would be in termsof a speaker's act of communication.(For more on the natureof acts of communication,see my (2006a).) Nevertheless,because a discussionof the requisiteconditions for an act of communicationlies outsidethe scope of thispaper, I shall continueto framethe relevant issuesin termsof statements. 10 Proponentsof the necessitythesis (TEP-N) includeWelbourne (1979, 1981, 1986, and 1994),Hardwig (1985 and 1991),Ross (1986), Burge(1993 and 1997), Plantinga(1993), McDowell (1994), Williamson(1996 and 2000), Audi (1997, 1998, and 2006), Owens (2000), Reynolds(2002), Adler(2002), and Schmitt(2006). Fora slightlyweaker version of thisthesis, see Dummett(1994). Two pointsshould be notedregarding this condition. First, since TEP-S expresses the conditionsrequired for testimonial warrant (justification, knowledge), (2) specifiesthat thehearer must form the beliefin questionon the basis of the contentof the speaker's testimony.This is to precludecases wherea beliefis formedentirely on the basis of fea- turesabout the speaker's testimony. For instance, if you say,in a sopranovoice, thatyou have a sopranovoice and I come to believe thisentirely on the basis of hearingyour sopranovoice, then the warrant (justification) for my resulting belief is perceptualrather thantestimonial. (This exampleis a slightvariation of one foundin Audi (1997). For fur- therdiscussion of thedistinction inspired by these sorts of cases, see my(1999).) Condi- tion(2), therefore,is includedto preventcases of thissort from qualifying as instancesof

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions testimonialwarrant (justification, knowledge). Notice, however, that I do notrequire that thehearer's belief be formedentirely on the basis of the contentof the speaker's testimony.This is to allow cases wherea givenbelief is formedon the basis of boththe contentof a speaker'stestimony and, say, perception, but where, both causally and epistemically,the testimonyis sufficientfor the subjectto hold the warranted(justified, known) beliefin question.In suchcases, thoughperception plays botha causal and an epistemic role, it maybe arguedthat the sufficiencyof testimonyrenders the belief in question genuinelytestimonial. Second,there is a weaker versionof (2) (hereafter,(2*)) thatrequires only that B come to believethat p on thebasis of thecontent of A's testimony,not that such a belief be basedon thecontent of A's testimonythat p. There is also a correspondinglyweaker versionof TEP-N: TEP-N*: For everyspeaker, A, and hearer,B, B's beliefthatp is warranted(justified,known) on thebasis of A's testimonyonly if (i) A's beliefthat p is warranted(justified, known), and (ii) B's beliefthat p is appropriately connectedwith the content of A's testimony. (Condition(ii) is includedto preventbeliefs formed on thebasis of featuresdisconnected fromthe content of thetestimony in question,such as the one above aboutyour having a sopranovoice, fromqualifying as testimonial.Of course, if TEP-N is substitutedwith TEP-N*, morewill needto be said aboutwhat the appropriate connection in (ii) amounts to.) Now, thereare at leasttwo different kinds of cases thatmight support including both (2*) ratherthan (2) and TEP-N* ratherthan TEP-N. For instance,suppose that Virginia asks me whetherit is cold outsideand I respondby saying,"Your hat and gloves are in the closet." Here, one mightsay that,given the context,Virginia acquires warranted belief(justified belief, knowledge) that it is cold outsideon thebasis of mytestimony that herhat and gloves are in the closet.Thus, one mightclaim thatboth (2) of TEP-S and TEP-N are,in fact,too strongsince one can acquiretestimonially warranted belief (justifiedbelief, knowledge) thatp on thebasis of thecontent of a speaker's testimonythat q. The secondtype of case thatmay pose a problemfor both of thesetheses can be seen by consideringthe following:suppose that Edna asks me whetherI see any bald eagles throughmy binoculars and I respondwith a nod. Here, it mightbe argued thatEdna acquireswarranted belief (justified belief, knowledge) that I see bald eagles throughmy binocularson thebasis of thenon-verbal testimony provided by my nod. In thisway, one mightclaim that while warranted belief (justified belief, knowledge) that p is acquiredon thebasis of thecontent of mytestimony, itis notbased on thecontent of mytestimony that P- AlthoughI think both types of examplesprovide convincing evidence forincluding the weaker versionsfound in (2*) and TEP-N*, thereare also reasons to preferthe stronger(2) and TEP-N. Withrespect to the firsttype of case, for instance,one might arguethat Virginia's warranted belief (justified belief, knowledge) that it is cold outside reliestoo heavilyon memoryand inferenceto qualifyas testimonial.In particular,one mightclaim thatVirginia must rely on backgroundinformation stored in memoryabout therelationship between cold weatherand the wearingof hatsand gloves and explicitly inferthat it is cold outsidefrom my testimony that her hat and gloves are in thecloset. And even thoughmemory and inferencearguably play a rolein theacquisition of all testimonialknowledge, one mightclaim that here the role of memoryand inferenceis sim- plytoo significantfor the resulting warranted belief (justified belief, knowledge) to prop- erlybe regardedas testimonial.Regarding the second type of case, it may be arguedthat thoughI do notexplicitly state that I see bald eagles throughmy binoculars, there is a clearsense in whichthe non-verbal testimony provided by mynod has thisas itscontent. Forjust as myresponding "Yes" in thiscontext amounts to "I see bald eagles throughmy binoculars,"so toodoes mynodding in thiscontext amount to testifyingto thisproposition. I do notwish to here choose betweeneither (2) and (2*) or TEP-N and TEP-N*. ThoughI am leavingthe stronger (2) and TEP-N in mycharacterizations of the relevant

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions (3) B has no undefeateddefeaters for believing thatp, then B's beliefthat p is warranted(justified, known).12

There is much that is intuitive about both of these theses. For, in many respects,a testimonialchain seems to be much like a bucket brigade: in order to give you a full bucket of water,I musthave a full bucket of waterto pass to you. Moreover, if I give you a full bucket of water, then- spills aside- thebucket of wateryou now possess as a result of our exchange will also be full. Similarly,in orderto transmitto you a warrantedbelief, I must have a warrantedbelief to pass to you.13Moreover, if I transmitto you a warrantedbelief, then- defeatersaside - the belief that you now possess as a resultof our exchange will also be warranted.Despite theirintuitive plausi- bility,however, I shall argue thatboth of these theses are false and, therefore,

theses, they can easily be substitutedwith the weaker (2*) and TEP-N* for those con- vinced by the cases discussed above. 12 Proponents of differentversions of the sufficiencythesis (TEP-S) include Austin (1979), Evans (1982), Fricker (1987), Coady (1992), and Owens (2000). Burge (1993), William- son (1996 and 2000), and Audi (1997) endorse qualified versions of this thesis. For instance, Burge claims that "[i]f one has acquired one's belief from others in a normal way, and if the others know the proposition,one acquires knowledge" (1992, p. 477, fn. 16, emphasis added). Timothy Williamson writes that "[i]n normal circumstances, a speaker who asserts that P therebyputs a hearer in a position to know that P if (and only if) the speaker knows that P" (1996, p. 520, emphasis added). Similarly, Audi writes, "Concerning knowledge, we mightsay thatat least normally,a belief thatp based on tes- timonythereby constitutesknowledge... provided that the attester knows thatp and the believer has no reason to doubt eitherp or the attester's credibilityconcerning it" (1997, p. 412, emphasis added). It should be noted, however, thatthe arguments offered in Sec- tion 2 against TEP-S subsume even these three qualified versions of the sufficiency thesis. It is of furtherinterest to note that there is a version of the sufficiency thesis that is even strongerthan TEP-S. With respect to warrant and justification,it can be expressed as follows: TEP-S*: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, if (1) A's belief that p has x amount of warrant(justification), (2) B comes to believe thatp on the basis of the contentof A's testimonythat p, and (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for believing that/?,then B's belief thatp has x amount of warrant (justification). A similar principle for knowledge can be formulated by substituting"has x amount of warrant"with "is known with degree x of certainty"both in condition (1) and in the con- sequent of the conditional. In Section 2, I shall frame my arguments against the weaker TEP-S since they will apply just as well to the strongerTEP-S*. For instance, if A's belief thatp is not warrantedand B acquires warranted belief thatp on the basis of A's testimony thatp, thenobviously A and B do not share the epistemic propertyin question to the same degree. Nevertheless, I should mention that, given the picture of testimonypainted by proponentsof the BVT - in which a speaker's belief along with its epistemic proper- - ties is transmittedto a hearer it is not entirely clear what would justify endorsing only the weaker TEP-S. 13 For ease of exposition, I shall sometimes focus on only one epistemic property,such as warrant.The argumentsin this paper, however, are completely general, and apply just as well to knowledge and to many conceptions of justification(and even, at times, to rationality).

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions that each of the componentsof the BVT is false as well. In this section, I focus on the necessitythesis (TEP-N), leaving the sufficiencythesis (TEP-S) forSection 2. To begin, consider the following:

CONSISTENT LIAR: When Berthawas a teenager,she suffereda head injury while ice skating and, shortly afterwards,became quite prone to telling lies, especially about her perceptual experiences involving wild animals. Afterobserving this behavior, her parents became increasinglydistressed and, after consulting various psy- chologists and therapists,finally took her to see a neurosurgeon,Dr. Jones. Upon examining her, Dr. Jones noticeda lesion in Bertha's brainwhich appeared to be the cause of her behavior, and so it was decidedthat surgerywould be the best option to pursue. Unfortu- nately, Dr. Jones discovered during the surgery that he couldn't repairthe lesion- instead, he decided to modify her currentlesion and create another one so that her pattern of lying would be extremelyconsistent and would combine in a very precise way with a patternof consistent perceptualunreliability. Not only did Dr. Joneskeep theprocedure that he performedon Berthacompletely to himself,he also did this with the best of intentions,wanting his patientto functionas a healthy,happy, and well respectedcitizen. As a resultof thisprocedure, Bertha is now- as a young adult - a radicallyunreliable, yet highly consistent,believer with respect to her perceptual experiences about wild animals. For instance, nearlyevery time she sees a deer, she believes that it is a horse; nearly every time she sees a giraffe,she believes that it is an elephant;nearly every time she sees an owl, she believes that it is a hawk, and so on. At the same time, however,Bertha is also a radi- cally insincere,yet highly consistent,testifier of this information. For instance,nearly every time she sees a deer and believes that it is a horse,she insincerelyreports to othersthat she saw a deer; nearly everytime she sees a giraffeand believes that it is an elephant,she insincerelyreports to others that she saw a giraffe,and so on.14 Moreover, because of her consistencyas both a believer and a liar, those aroundher do not have any reason for doubtingBertha's reliabilityas a source of information.Indeed, in her home community, she is regardedas one of the most trustworthypeople to consult on a

14 Noticethat because Bertha'sice skatingaccident took place when she was a teenager, the contentof her wild-animalbeliefs was alreadyfixed in a normalway, and hence thereis nothingabout the example that is incompatiblewith the truth of a causal theoryof content.

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions wide range of topics. Yesterday, Bertha ran into her next door neighbor,Henry, and insincerelythough correctlyreported to him thatshe saw a deer on a nearbyhiking trail. Since, in additionto his trustin Bertha,it is not at all unlikely for thereto be deer on the hikingtrail in question,Henry readily accepted her testimony.16

The firstpoint to notice about CONSISTENT LIAR is that even though Bertha is a radicallyunreliable believer withrespect to her animal sightings, she is nonetheless an extremelyreliable testifier of this information- indeed,even more reliable than many average testifierswho frequentlyexag- gerate,distort, or are simply wrong in theirreports about what is true. For, as a resultof the procedureperformed by Dr. Jones,nearly every time Bertha sees a deer, she believes thatit is a horse yet reportsto others that she saw a deer; nearly everytime she sees a giraffe,she believes that it is an elephant yet reportsto others that she saw a giraffe,and so on. Moreover, this point can be furtherillustrated by noticing that Bertha's statementssatisfy the counterfactualsthat are, perhaps,most likelyto capturereliability, despite the factthat her beliefsdo not. For instance,while Bertha's beliefs are not sensitive in Nozick's sense, her statementsare, i.e., though Bertha would still believe that/?if p were false, she would not state that/?if p were false.17The same can be said withrespect to Sosa's safety requirement,i.e., though Ber- tha would believe thatp withoutit being so that/?, she would not state thatp without it being so thatp. Her statements,then, are safe in Sosa's sense, even though her beliefs are not.18Thus, it is clear that Bertha's statements,

15 In order to avoid the worrythat Bertha's false beliefs would eventually be detected, we can also stipulate that,now that she is a young adult, there are very few occasions in which she either interacts with or discusses wild animals. For instance, we can assume that she lives in an urban environment,is allergic to most non-human animal hair and hence rarely has contact with such creatures,and so on. 16 A similar, though substantially less developed, example can be found in my (1999). There, however, my purpose was simply to argue against a version of TEP framed in termsof knowledge, ratherthan the general BVT that is my concern here. Moreover, it could plausibly be argued that the example found in my (1999) is a Gettier-type case, whereas I shall later argue that there is simply no compelling sense in which CONSISTENT LIAR is such a case. One furtherpoint - compare CONSISTENT LIAR with the following: I know that Margot only reports that it is snowing outside when it is not. Thus, when she reports to me that it is snowing outside, I supplement her testimony with the background informationI possess about her testimonialhabits and come to know thatit is not snowing outside. My resultingknowledge, though in part based on testimony, also relies quite heavily on perception,memory, and inductive inference. Thus, one may plausibly argue thatthis sort of case does not pose a problem for TEP-N since this thesis applies only to cases of pure testimonialbelief. But notice that this kind of move cannot be made with respect to CONSISTENT LIAR - the beliefs that Henry forms on the basis of Bertha's testimonyare purely testimonialin every relevant sense. 17 See Nozick (1981). 18 See Sosa (1996, 1999, 2000, and 2002). See also Williamson (2000).

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions unlike her beliefs, are an excellent epistemic source of informationabout wild animals. The second point that should be emphasizedabout CONSISTENT LIAR is that though the procedureDr. Jones performedon Bertha rendersher a highly reliable testifierwith respect to her wild animal sightings, she is nonethelessstill an agent with intentionalstates that affectthe statements that she offersto others. In this sense, Berthais importantlydifferent from non-agentialmechanisms, such as thermometersand odometers, that may reliablyconvey informationbut not throughanything reasonably regarded as testimony. For instance, Bertha can, if she chooses, refrainfrom telling Henryanything at all; she can talk about the weatherinstead; she could tell an unrelatedlie (e.g., "I saw an escaped elephantin the woods")- All of these possibilitiesare available to Bertha in a way that they are not for thermometers,odometers, and othersuch non-agentialsources of information.For this reason,Henry's learningfrom Bertha's words falls underthe generalcategory picked out by paradigmaticinstances of testimonyrather than that picked out by such non-testimonialmechanisms.19 The thirdsalient feature of CONSISTENT LIAR is that Dr. Jones delib- eratelyperformed procedures on Bertha's brain, not only so that her perceptual errorsand lying practiceswould be highly consistent, but also so that theywould combine in such a way so as to renderher an extraordinarilyreli- able testifier.In large partbecause of the role thatDr. Jones plays in Bertha's condition,there is no relevantaccidentality in the belief that Henry forms on the basis of her testimonyand, hence, CONSISTENT LIAR cannot plausibly be regardedas a Gettier-typecase.20 With respect to the truthof the belief in question, it is neitheran accidentthat Berthareported that therewas a deer on the hikingtrail nor thatHenry came to hold this belief on the basis of her testimony.For, because of her two brain lesions, Berthais such that nearly every time she sees a deer, she believes it to be a horse, yet reports

19 It may be furtherobjected that even if Bertha'sstatements are an excellentsource of information,they do not qualifyas testimonysince our ordinaryusage of this term requiresthat the speaker believe the propositionin question.By way of responseto this objection,notice that it makesperfect sense to speak of a witnesstestifying in a court- roomto somethingthat she herselfdoes notbelieve - it is called perjury.Moreover, I have elsewhereargued (2006a) thatthe central feature of testimonyis thatthe speaker in questionlias theintention to expresscommunicable content when making the statementin question.Bertha, unlike non-testimonial sources of information,such as thermometers and odometers,clearly satisfies this criterion since she intendsto expresscommunicable content,even if she does notintend to expressthe particular content that she does. (I am gratefulto Liz Camp,Mark Heller, and IshaniMaitra for pressing an objectionthat led to theinclusion of thispoint.) See Gettier(1963) forthe initial formulation of the problemand Shope (1983) forsome of themany permutations of Gettiercases. Forthis response to the sortof testifierfound in CONSISTENT LIAR (i.e., thatit is a Gettier-typecase), see, for instance,Plantinga (1993, pp. 82-3) and Chakrabarti(1994, p. 110).

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions that it is a deer. Thus, Bertha's deer-reportsnearly always covary with her deer-sightings,despite taking a slight detour throughhorse-believings. Fur- thermore,given all of Henry's excellent inductiveevidence on behalf of Ber- tha's testimonialpractices, there is also no relevantaccidentally in his com- ing to formthe belief in question on the basis of her report.With respectto the warrantor justificationof Henry's belief, similar remarkscan be adduced: Dr. Jones deliberatelymodified Bertha's firstbrain lesion and addeda second one preciselyso thatBertha would turnout to be a reliable testifier.21More- over, thereare no close possible worlds in which Dr. Jones did not perform thesurgery on Bertha,and hence thereare no close possible worlds in which Berthadoes not have thecondition she has. Because of this, thereis no sense in which it is an accident thatBertha is a reliable testifierand hence a source of warrantedor justifiedbelief. The fourthfeature of CONSISTENT LIAR that is here relevant is that Henry not only fails to possess reasons to doubt Bertha's competence and sincerity,he is also in possession of excellent positive reasons to accept her testimony.For, Henry has no reason to doubt that a deer was in fact on the hiking trail in question, nor does he have counterevidenceof any kind for Bertha's testimony.Moreover, because beliefsthat are formedon the basis of Bertha's statementsnearly always turn out to be true, Henry has acquired excellentinductive evidence forbelieving her to be one of the most trustworthypeople to consult on a wide range of topics. So, when Bertha's extreme reliabilityas a testifieris combined withhis very high degreeof justification foraccepting her report,there is simply no reason to deny that Henry's true belief that therewas a deer on a nearby hiking trail qualifies as warranted, justified,and known. Thus, in CONSISTENT LIAR, we finda clear case in whicha hearernot only acquires warrantedand justifiedbelief on the basis of testimonythat is insincere,but also comes to have testimonialknowledge of the propositionin question. Furthermore,notice thatBertha fails to possess a belief withthe epistemicproperties in question, yet Henry formsa belief on the basis of her testimonythat does possess these epistemic properties.Here, then,we find a case of testimonialknowledge {warrant,justification) without testimonialtransmission?2

21 For a compellingdiscussion of thedistinction between accidentaltruth and accidental justification,see Reed (2000). For thosewho findsome of thedetails of CONSISTENT LIAR a bit too fanciful,the followingcase can be substitutedas a counterexampleto TEP-N: DOUBTING THOMAS: Thomasis a scientistconducting research on the migratory patternsof graywhales and, thoughhe is brilliant,he is crippledby self-doubt. Afteruncovering evidence that the whales' patternof migrationis actuallyimpor- tantlydifferent from what scientific consensus had thought,his doubtsprevent him fromcoming to believe in the truthof thisevidence. Nevertheless,his intellectual integrityleads himto feel an obligationto presenthis true and reliablyacquired researchto his colleagues,most of whomreadily accept his testimonyabout the

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The upshotof theseconsiderations is thatthe statements of speakersare notonly the basis, both causally and epistemically,of thebeliefs that hearers acquire via testimony,they are also the bearers of epistemicsignificance. For as CONSISTENT LIAR reveals,a speakerdoesn't even needto believethe statement she is reportingin orderfor a hearerto acquirea belief thatis warranted,justified, or knownon the basis of her testimony.This showsthat in orderto have a unifiedepistemology of testimony,the epis- temicconditions for testimonial beliefs need to be imposedon thestatements of speakers,not on theirbeliefs.23 Hence, TEP-N is false.24

whales' migratorypatterns. (Thanks to David Buller for suggestingthis type of case.) Now, even thoughThomas's self-doubtprevents him frombeing a reliable believer regardingthe migratory patterns of graywhales, he is nonethelessa highlyreliable testi- fierof thisinformation and so his colleagues can acquire knowledge(warranted belief, justifiedbelief) via his testimony.Hence, as withCONSISTENT LIAR, we have a case in whicha heareracquires knowledge (warranted belief, justified belief) on the basis of thetestimony of a speakerwho does notbelieve and hence does notknow (believe with warrant,justifiedly believe) the propositionto which he is testifying,thereby showing TEP-N to be false. For additionalcounterexamples to TEP-N like DOUBTING THOMAS, though employedfor different purposes, see my(forthcoming). See also my(1999) forcounter- examples to TEP-N thatinvolve speakers whose own beliefs are defeated but who nonethelessreliably convey informationto hearers withoutthereby conveying their defeaters. It shouldbe emphasizedthat it is notopen to theproponent of theBVT to argueon behalf of a so-calleddisjunctivist view of testimonyin whichbeliefs are thebearers of epistemic propertiesin cases where testimonialknowledge is successfullyacquired, while statementsare thebearers of epistemicproperties in thosecases where it is not.For notice: testimonialknowledge is acquiredin CONSISTENT LIAR. Hence,a proponentof a dis- junctiveview of testimonywould have to endorse a completelyarbitrary division, accordingto whichbeliefs are the bearersof the relevantepistemic properties in all of thosecases thatdo notpose a problemfor the BVT whilestatements are the bearersof theseproperties in cases thatare counterexamplesto the BVT. Butthis view beginsto looksuspiciously ad hoc. It is muchlike an epistemologistresponding to the Gettierprob- lemby insisting that knowledge is justifiedtrue belief in non-Gettiercases, whileadmit- tingthat it is morethan this in Gettiercases. 24 It is of interestto notethat even in thoserare cases whereit has beenargued that belief is notthe central item involved in a testimonialexchange, it is simplyreplaced withanother mentalor cognitiveitem rather than with a linguisticor communicativeitem, as I am here suggesting.For instance,in his (1994), Welbourneargues againstcertain strands of the BVT on thegrounds that while beliefs are notappropriate items for transmission, states of knowledgeare. Thus,he claimsthat "...our conceptof knowledge,unlike our conceptof belief,is a conceptof somethingwhich is essentiallytransmissible" (1994, p. 309). Of course,since thearguments offered in thissection subsume a knowledgeversion of TEP- N, movingfrom belief to knowledgeleads us in thewrong direction. But even if we were to bracketthis point and accept Welbourne's proposal,we wouldstill be leftwith the problemof characterizinghow beliefsthat fall short of knowledgebut nevertheless possess warrantand justification are acquiredvia testimony.

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 2. The Transmissionof EpistemicProperties: Sufficiency In this section,I take up the remainingthesis of TEP- the sufficiency dimension.I shall argue that speaker-warrant (justification, knowledge) is not sufficientfor hearer-warrant (justification, knowledge), and hence that the picturedominating the epistemology of testimony,in whichepistemic prop- ertiesare transmitted from a speaker'sbelief to a hearer's,is thoroughlymis- guided. Beforeproceeding, however, one featureof TEP-S thatis importantto noticeis the no-defeaterclause (condition(3)). For, on this view, even if thereare some cases in whichspeaker-warrant (justification, knowledge) is sufficientfor hearer- warrant (justification, knowledge), the belief that a hearer acquiresfrom a speakerdoes notalways possess therelevant epistemic prop- ertyto thesame degreeas the speaker's- a hearermay have a defeater for believingthe proposition in questionthat the speaker simply does not possess. Thereare two differentkinds of defeatersthat are hererelevant. First, thereare what we mightcall psychologicaldefeaters. A psychological defeateris an experience,doubt, or beliefthat is hadby S, yet indicatesthat S's beliefthat p is eitherfalse or unreliablyformed or sustained.25Defeaters in this sense functionby virtueof beinghad by S, regardlessof theirtruth value or justificatorystatus.26 Second, there are whatwe mightcall normativedefeaters. A normativedefeater is a doubtor beliefthat S oughtto have, yetindicates that S's beliefthat p is eitherfalse or unreliablyformed or sustained.27Defeaters in thissense functionby virtueof beingdoubts or beliefs

25 To be even more precise, thereare two differentkinds of psychologicaldefeaters: rebuttingdefeaters are thosethat indicate that the target belief is false whileundercutting defeatersare thosethat indicate that the targetbelief is unreliablyformed or sustained. See Pollock(1986) for furtherdevelopment of the distinctionbetween rebuttingand undercuttingdefeaters. For variousdiscussions of whatI call psychologicaldefeaters see, forexample, BonJour (1980 and 1985), Nozick (1981), Pollock (1986), Goldman(1986), Plantinga(1993), Lackey(1999, 2003, 2005a, 20056, and 20066), Bergmann(1997 and 2004), and Reed (forthcoming). Followingthe distinctionin note 25, thereare rebuttingand undercuttingnormative defeaters.The centraldifference is thatwhile psychologicaldefeaters are doubtsor beliefshad by the subject,their normative counterparts are doubtsor beliefs thatthe subjectshould have. Moreover,psychological and normativedefeaters may themselves be eitherdefeated or undefeated.For instance,suppose that Daphne acquires a psychological defeaterfor her beliefthat there is bamboogrowing in her backyardwhen she acceptsClifford's testimony that bamboo doesn't grow in California.But suppose further thatDaphne laterlearns that Clifford compulsively lies aboutCaliforaian plant life. In such a case, Daphneacquires a psychologicaldefeater for the beliefthat she formedon thebasis of Clifford'stestimony, thereby providing her witha defeater-defeaterfor her originalbelief that bamboo is growingin her backyard.And, as mightbe suspected, defeater-defeaterscan be defeatedby furtherexperiences, doubts, beliefs, and reasons, which,in turn,can be defeatedby furtherexperiences, doubts, beliefs, and reasons,and so on. Now, whenone has a defeaterD forone's beliefthat p thatis notitself defeated, one has whatis calledan undefeateddefeater for one's beliefthat p. As specifiedin con-

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions thatS should have (whetheror not S does have them) given the presenceof certainavailable evidence.28 However, even though the presence of a defeatermay rendera hearer's beliefless warrantedthan the speaker's fromwhom it was acquired,this does not threatenthe spiritof TEP-S. For what happens in such a case is that the speaker's belief thatp, along with its warrant,is transmittedto the hearer, but the warrantfor the hearer'sbelief that p is thendefeated. What would con- tradictthe spiritof TEP-S would be a case in which a hearerbelieves thatp purelyon the basis of a speaker's belief that p, possesses no defeatersfor believing thatp, and yet still has a significantlydifferent epistemic relation to p thanthe speaker.29This is preciselythe sortof case I shall provide. To begin,consider the following:

COMPULSIVELY TRUSTING: Bill is a compulsively trusting person withrespect to the testimonyof his neighbor,Jill, in whom he has an obsessive romanticinterest. Not only does he always trust Jillwhen he has verygood reason to believe her, he is incapable of distrustingher when he has verygood reason to not believe her. For

dition(3), itis the presenceof undefeateddefeaters, not merely defeaters, that is rele- vantto TEP-S. For discussionsinvolving what I call normativedefeaters, approached in a numberof differentways, see BonJour(1980 and 1985),Goldman (1986), Fricker(1987 and 1994), Chisholm(1989),Burge (1993 and 1997), McDowell (1994), Audi (1997 and 1998), Lackey (1999, 2003, 2005a, 20056, and 20066), Williams(1999), BonJourand Sosa (2003), Hawthorne(2004), and Reed (forthcoming).What all of thesediscussions have in commonis simplythe idea thatevidence can defeatknowledge (warrant, justification) even whenthe subject does notform any correspondingdoubts or beliefsfrom the evi- dencein question. In additionto psychologicaland normativedefeaters, there are whatwe mightcall factualdefeaters. A factualdefeater is a trueproposition, D, suchthat if D were added to S's beliefsystem, then S wouldno longerbe justifiedin believingthat p. Defeatersin this sensefunction by virtueof beingtrue. For instance,you maycorrectly believe thatyou saw a coyotein JoshuaTree NationalPark and yetthe fact thatthere are dogs thatyou wouldnot be able to distinguishfrom coyotes that frequently visit this park may nonetheless preventsuch a belieffrom being an instanceof knowledge.In particular,that there are dogs indistinguishabletoyou from coyotes tliat frequent the park in whichyou saw the real coyoteis a trueproposition which, if added to yourbelief system, would result in yourbelief being unjustified. (See, for instance,(Lehrer (1965 and 1974), Lehrer and Paxson(1969), Klein (1971, 1976, 1979,and 1980), Sosa (1974 and 1979), and Swain (1981).) In whatfollows, however, I shall focus onlyon psychologicaland normative defeaterssince theseare the kindsof defeatersgenerally taken by proponentsof the BVT to be incompatiblewith testimonial knowledge. In contrast,the attemptto rule out Gettier-typecases via thisthird class of defeatersis notendorsed by all such proponents of theBVT. 29 In his (2000), PeterGraham proposes two differentcounterexamples to a versionof TEP-S, bothof whichcan be interpretedas involvingthe presenceof factualdefeaters. In contrast,what I shallprovide are counterexamplesto TEP-S thatdo notdepend in any way on defeaters,thereby showing that the entirepicture of testimonyas involving transmissionis fundamentallyincorrect.

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions instance,even when he has available to him overwhelmingevidence for believing that she is deliberatelylying or being deceitful,Bill cannot come to believe this about Jill.Indeed, Bill is such that there is no amountof evidence that would convince him to not trustJill. Yesterday,while taking his afternoonwalk, Bill ran into Jill, and she told him that she had seen an orca whale while boating earlier that day. Bill, of course, readilyaccepted Jill's testimony. It turns out that Jill did in fact see an orca whale on the boat trip in question,that she is veryreliable withrespect to her epistemic practices, both in generaland in this particularinstance, and that Bill has no reason to doubt the profferedtestimony. Given his compulsively trustingnature with respect to Jill,however, even if he had had massive amounts of evidence available to him indicating,for instance, thatJill did not see an orca whale, thatshe is an unreliable epistemic agent,that she is an unreliabletestifier, that orca whales do not live in this partof the country,and so on, Bill would have just as readily accepted Jill's testimony.30

It is, of course, clear that Jill's belief about the orca whale possesses all of the epistemic propertiesin question- she is a reliable epistemic agent, both in generaland in theparticular case at issue, and she did, in fact, see an orca whale while boating yesterday.31The crucial question for our purposes is whetherBill knows,or is warranted(justified) in believing, that therewas an orca whale in the relevantbody of wateron the basis of Jill's testimony.And here,the answer should clearlybe no. To see this, notice that because of his compulsively good nature with respect to Jill's testimony,Bill is simply incapable of being sensitive to the presenceof defeatersregarding her reports. In thisrespect, he is no betterepis- temicallythan a subject who has been brainwashedor programmedto accept any reportthat Jill makes. For were Bill to be inundatedwith massive amountsof counterevidence,he would have acceptedJill's testimonyjust as readilyas he did in thecomplete absence of such counterevidence.Indeed, Bill is such that he would have accepted Jill's testimonyunder any circumstances?1 Because of this, Bill's belief that therewas an orca whale in the

30 An examplethat bears some similarities to COMPULSIVELY TRUSTING can be found in my(2003). In thatpaper, however, I have a differenttarget - thereI argue specifi- cally againststandard characterizations of non-reductionismin the epistemologyof testimony,not the BVT. Moreover,since thereis nothingunusual about Jill's experience of the orca whale, we can assume thatshe has excellentreasons for formingthe correspondingbelief. This avoidsthe objection that Jill possesses the relevant knowledge only if an externalistview of epistemicjustification is assumed. In thissense, Bill's epistemicrelationship to Jillis importantlydifferent from the epistemic relationshipa child bears to her parentsor teachers.For whilechildren may be trusting

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions relevantbody of wateris evidentiallyinsensitive in a way thatis clearly incompatiblewith warrant, justification, and knowledge.33Therefore, while Jill's beliefpossesses all of theepistemic properties in question,the belief thatBill formson thebasis of hertestimony possesses none of them.Hence, TEP-S is false. WhatCOMPULSIVELY TRUSTING revealsis thatwhile a speakermay be botha perfectlyreliable believer and testifier, a hearer may be so consti- tutedas toprevent the epistemic properties of a speaker's belieffrom being transmittedto her. This has significantconsequences for the BVT. For proponentsof theBVT portraythe transmission of beliefsas being much like thegiving of gifts:if I giveyou a wrappedbox, all youhave to do to receive thegift is to receivethe wrapped box - thegift, so to speak,comes along for theride. Similarly, it is thoughtthat if I transmitto you mybelief that /?, all you have to do to receivethe epistemic properties it possessesis to receive thebelief - theepistemic properties itpossesses, so to speak,come along for theride. But as we saw in COMPULSIVELY TRUSTING, beliefsare not connectedwith their epistemic properties the way thatgifts are connected withthe wrapped boxes thatcontain them. A hearermay acquirea beliefon thebasis of a speaker'stestimony, and yet not acquirethe epistemic proper- tiespossessed by the speaker's belief. Moreover, this can happenwhere it is not explainableby appealto thedefeat of epistemicproperties that were in facttransmitted. For Bill's compulsivelytrusting nature does not makehim suchthat epistemic properties are transmitted to him via Jill's testimony,yet immediatelydefeated; he is such thatepistemic properties cannot even be transmittedto him in the firstplace?* Hence, the pictureof testimony paintedby proponentsof theBVT, in whichbeliefs are passed along with theirepistemic properties from a speakerto a hearer,is fundamentallyincorrect.

with respect to theircaretakers, they certainlyare not compulsively trusting.For instance, when I said to my young daughter that houses withoutchimneys do not pose a problem for Santa Claus because children perhaps do not live in such houses, even at three years old she skeptically responded, "Surely thereare some houses without chimneys that have children in them!" In this sense, children, unlike Bill, certainly have the capacity to be sensitive to defeaters with respect to the testimonyof their caretakers, even if such a capacity is not frequentlyexercised. Moreover, if children were like Bill with respect to the testimonyof theirparents and teachers, then I would have no problem denying testimonial knowledge to them as well. (I am grateful to comments from Fred Dretske and Ishani Maitra thatprompted the inclusion of this point.) For a more detailed discussion of the natureof this incompatibility,see my (2005a). 3 Furthermore,as COMPULSIVELY TRUSTING is described, Bill, as a matter of fact, does not have any relevant defeaters for the testimonyin question: Jill is very reliable with respect to her epistemic practices, both in general and in this particularinstance, and Bill has no reason to doubt the proffered testimony.The epistemic problem with Bill is that,even if there were defeaters, he would accept Jill's testimonyjust as readily as he did in theircomplete absence.

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Furthersupport for this conclusion can be providedby examininga second typeof case thatundermines TEP-S. Consider the following:

ALMOST A LIAR: Phil is compulsively-trusting-Bill's twin brother,though he is not himselfcompulsively trustingwith respect to Jill's testimony.In fact, he is, froman epistemic point of view, quite healthy:he truststhose whom he has good reason to trust- or at least those whom he has no clear reason to distrust- and distrusts those whom he has good reason to distrust.Yesterday, while taking his afternoonwalk, Phil ran into Jilljust afterBill did, and she also told him that she had seen an orca whale while boating earlierthat day. Phil, having acquiredvery good reasons for trustingJill over the five years he has known her, readilyaccepted her testimony. It turnsout that Jill did in fact see an orca whale on the boat trip in question,that she is veryreliable withrespect to her epistemic practices, both in general and in thisparticular instance, that she is generally a very reliable testifier,and that Phil has no reason to doubt the profferedtestimony. However, in order to promote a whale watchingbusiness she is in the process of starting,she would have - reportedto Phil- in preciselythe same manner thatshe had seen an orca whale even if she hadn't. (Of course, she wouldn't have believed that she had seen an orca whale if she hadn't.) Moreover, given the patternof the whales' travelcombined with the particular time of year it is, it is in fact quite surprisingthat Jill saw an orca whale whenand whereshe did.

There are two centralfeatures of ALMOST A LIAR that are importantto notice. First,because she wishes to promote her futurewhale watchingbusiness, Jill would have reportedto Phil that there was an orca whale in the relevantbody of watereven if therehadn't been one. And second, given the schedule of the whales' travel coupled with the time of year it is, it was in fact much more likely for Jill not to have seen an orca whale when she did thanfor her to have seen one. The combinationof these two featureshas the following result: thereare nearbypossible worlds in which an orca whale was not in the relevantbody of water,Jill nonetheless reports that there was, and Phil, being in the same evidentialsituation as he is in the actual world,readily forms the correspond- ing belief on the basis of Jill's testimony. More generally, Phil's belief about therehaving been an orca whale in the relevantbody of water is coun- ter/actuallyinsensitive to the truth.For instance, his belief is neithersensitive (a la Nozick) nor safe (a la Sosa): ifp were false, Phil would still believe thatp, and Phil would believe thatp withoutit being so thatp. Otherwise put,in nearbyworlds where it is false that an orca whale was in the relevant

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions body of water,Phil believes that therewas one, and thereare nearbyworlds wherePhil believes that an orca whale was in the relevantbody of water withoutthis being so. Given this,the truebelief thatPhil formson the basis of Jill's testimonynot only fails to qualifyas knowledge,it also fails to be warrantedor justified.35Thus, while Jill's belief possesses all of the epistemic propertiesin question, the belief that Phil formson the basis of her sincere testimonypossesses none of them. Hence, once again, we see that TEP-S is false.36 To fully appreciate the consequences of ALMOST A LIAR, it will be helpfulto compare it withCONSISTENT LIAR fromSection 1. Notice first that while CONSISTENT LIAR shows that an unreliable believer may nonethelessbe a reliable testifier,ALMOST A LIAR reveals that a reliable believer may nonetheless be an unreliable testifier. This is why Henry acquires knowledge(warranted belief, justified belief) on the basis of Bertha's testimony,despite the fact that she fails to have the knowledge (warranted belief,justified belief) in question, and why Phil fails to acquire knowledge (warrantedbelief, justified belief) on the basis of Jill's testimony,despite the fact that she possesses the knowledge (warrantedbelief, justified belief) in question. For, recall that while Bertha's belief is neithersensitive nor safe, the statementthat she offersto Henry is both sensitive and safe. In contrast,

35 I should again emphasize, as I did in note 8, that I am concerned with the epistemic properties in question only insofaras they bear an intimate connection with knowledge. Thus, theremay be some subjective notions of these propertiesthat Phil does plausibly possess. 3 For those who have reservations about either COMPULSIVELY TRUSTING or ALMOST A LIAR in isolation, we can simply combine the features from both so as to have COMPULSIVELY TRUSTING ALMOST A LIAR. This would simply involve imagining Bill in Phil's scenario, so thatwe have a hearer who is both evidentially insensitive and counterfactually insensitive to the truth.Given this combination, both reduc- tionistsand non-reductionistsin particular, and externalists and internalistsin general, should agree that the epistemic propertiesin question fail to be acquired by the hearer. Moreover, the following represents a thirdkind of counterexample to TEP-S that should be generally persuasive: A LUCKY CHOICE: Upon arrivingin Chicago for the firsttime, Alvin asks the first passerby thathe sees, Zoe, for directionsto the Sears Tower and she reports that it is six blocks east. While Zoe knows thatthis is the case, and Alvin has no reason to doubt eitherher credibilityas a speaker or the truthof the proposition to which she is testifying,she is the only reliable speaker in this part of Chicago, completely sur- rounded by incompetentsand liars. Because of this, that Alvin chooses a reliable testifierwho correctly points him in the direction of the Sears Tower is entirely a matterof good luck. Now, even thoughZoe knows thatthe Sears Tower is six blocks east, and Alvin does not possess any relevant defeaters for the reportin question, A LUCKY CHOICE represents a testimonial Gettier-typecase for the recipientof testimony.In particular, Alvin's luckily choosing the only reliable testifieramong the surroundingincompetents and liars is analogous to a perceiver luckily seeing the only real barn among surrounding barn facades. Hence, Alvin does not come to know that the Sears Tower is six blocks east on the basis of Zoe' s testimony,despite the fact that conditions (l)-(3) are satisfied. Once again, we see thatTEP-S is false.

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Jill's orca-whale-beliefis both sensitiveand safe, but the orca-whale-statementthat she offersto Phil is neither.In particular,though Jill would not believethat p if p werefalse, she would statethat p if p werefalse, and thoughJill wouldnot believethat p withoutit beingso thatp, she would statethat p withoutit beingso thatp. Thus,just as Berthacan give epistemicproperties to othersthat she failsto possessherself, Jill can failto give epistemicproperties to othersthat she possesses herself (even when testifying sincerely).Both cases, therefore,support the same generalconclusion: statementsof speakers,not theirbeliefs, are whatmatter for an epistemologyof testimony.

3. The SVT We have seen thatboth theses of TEP are false and, accordingly,that each componentof theBVT is falseas well.We are now in a positionto also see thatthere is a counterpartversion of each componentthat is true- one involvingthe statements of speakers.Let us call this alternativefamily of thesesthe Statement View of Testimony(hereafter, the SVT). Accordingto theSVT, theprocess of communicatingvia testimonydoes notinvolve a speakertransmitting her belief to a hearer,along withthe epistemicproperties it possesses.Instead, a speakeroffers a statementto a hearer, alongwith the epistemic properties it possesses,and a hearerforms the correspondingbelief on the basis of understandingand accepting the statementin question.Statements are not, therefore, merely vehicles for expressing beliefs but,rather, they are the central bearers of epistemic significance themselves. Thereare at leastthree significant consequences of rejectingthe BVT in favorof theSVT. First,because proponents of theBVT portraythe testimonial exchangeas involvingmerely transmission, testimony is said to be incapableof generatingnew epistemicfeatures for beliefs - it merelyhas the capacityto transmitfrom one personto anotherbeliefs that have alreadybeen renderedwarranted, justified, or an instanceof knowledgevia anothersource. As AlvinPlantinga says, "...testimonialwarrant, like water,rises no higher thanits source... if you tell me somethingand I believeit on yoursay-so, I havewarrant for it only if you do."37 But as we saw in CONSISTENT LIAR, this is not so: a hearercan acquirea beliefthat is warranted,justified, and knownfrom a speakerwhose own belief possesses none of therelevant epistemicproperties. Thus, not only can testimonyfunction as a generativeepistemic source, but testimonialwarrant (justification, knowledge) - unlike water- can risehigher than its source.38

37 Plantinga ( 1993, p. 84 and p. 87). For arguments leading to a similar conclusion with respect to the epistemic status of memory,see my (2005/?).

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Second, and closely related, proponents of the BVT maintain that- defeatersaside - testimonialwarrant (justification, knowledge) cannot fail to rise as high as its source. We have seen, however,that this is false as well: a hearer'sbelief may fail to be as warranted(justified, known) as its source, either for reasons having to do with the hearer- as COMPULSIVELY TRUSTING revealed- or for reasons having to do with the speaker- as ALMOST A LIAR revealed. Third,it is nearlyreceived wisdom in the epistemology of testimonythat thereare two centralcriteria that need to be fulfilledin orderfor a speaker's testimonyto be epistemically acceptable: "...the sinceritydimension, concerningthe attester'shonesty, and the competencedimension, concerningthe attester'shaving experience or knowledgesufficient to make it at least likely thatif the attesterforms a belief thatp, thenp is true."39Otherwise put, in orderfor a hearerto acquire knowledge(warranted belief, justified belief) on the basis of a speaker's testimony,the speaker must be both a competent believer and a sincere testifier. As we saw in CONSISTENT LIAR, however, neithera speaker's competentbelieving nor her sincere testifyingis necessary for the acquisition of testimonial knowledge (warrantedbelief, justified belief). And, as we saw in COMPULSIVELY TRUSTING and ALMOST A LIAR, a speaker's competentbelieving combined with her sincere testifyingis not sufficientfor the acquisition of testimonialknowledge (warrantedbelief, justified belief). What really mattersfor the epistemic status of testimonyis whetherthe speaker is a competent testifier, where this is understoodin terms of the reliabilityof the statementin question. More precisely, according to the SVT, TEP-N should be replacedwith the following Reliability of the State- ment-Necessity(RS-N) thesis:

RS-N: For every speaker, A, and hearer,B, B's belief that p is warranted(justified, known) on the basis of A's testimony that/?only if A's statementthat p is reliable or otherwise truth-conducive.40

39 Audi (1997, p. 409). See also thereferences in note6. For thosewho findthe cases in note 11 compelling,RS-N may be substitutedwith the weaker: RS-N*: For everyspeaker, A, and hearer,B, B's beliefthat p is warranted(justified,known) on thebasis of A's testimonyonly if (i) A's statementis reliable or otherwisetruth-conducive, and (ii) B's beliefthat p is appropriately connectedwith the content of A's statement. Of course,if RS-N is replacedwith RS-N*, more will need to said about the "appropriate connection"found in condition(ii).

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The reliabilityof the statementin question can, in turn,be fleshed out in any 41 number of ways. For instance, it may be necessary that the speaker's statementbe sensitive,safe, properlyor virtuouslyformed, and so on.42 What is of importfor our purposes, however,is that being a competentbeliever and a sincere testifierare epistemicallyrelevant only insofaras they bear on the speaker's capacityto be a competenttestifier.43

41 It maybe objectedthat requiring the reliability of thestatement in questionis too stronga conditionfor testimonial justification. For instance, wouldn't I be justifiedin believingthat thePresident is currentlyin Iraq on thebasis of readingthe New YorkTimes even if,for some reason,the reporter'sstatement fails to be reliableor otherwisetruth conducive? WhatI wouldsay is first,as mentionedin notes8 and 35, 1 am concernedwith testimonial justificationonly insofar as ithas an intimateconnection with testimonial knowledge. So, theremay be some subjectivenotions of testimonialjustification that do notrequire the reliabilityof thestatement in questions.Second, the conceptionof justificationintimately connectedwith knowledge that I favor has two essentialaspects: (i) a reliability,or objective,component and (ii) a rationality,or subjective,component. (I argue for this view of testimonialjustification in my(2006b).) Given this,my belief about the Presi- dent'swhereabouts clearly satisfies the subjective,rationality constraint, despite its fail- ureof theobjective, reliability constraint. More precisely, even though such a belieffails (i) and is thereforenot justified, my satisfactionof (ii) showsthat I am nonethelesssub- jectivelyrational in myacceptance of the reporter'stestimony. (Indeed, such a belief possessesmany other positive epistemic properties, such as beingheld in an epistemically responsibleway, being epistemically virtuous, and so on.) This enables us to explainthe intuitionthat the belief in questionboth possesses and lacks somethingepistemically important:it possessessubjective rationality, but lacks objectivereliable formation and, hence,justification. (Alternatively, it could be arguedthat my belief about the President's whereaboutsis subjectivelyjustified, but not objectively justified. For moreon the distinctionbetween subjective and objectivejustification, see BonJourand Sosa (2003, pp. 153- 5). It is of furtherinterest to notethat it is notat all uncommonin the literatureto find justificationbeing discussed, either entirely or partially,in externalistterms. To namejust a few,see Alston(1989), Goldman(1992), and BonJourand Sosa (2003).) 42 See Nozick(1981), Sosa (1996, 1999,2000, and 2002) and Williamson(2000), Plantinga (1993), and Sosa (1991), respectively. Of course,often times, it is preciselybecause a speakeris insincereor an incompetent believerthat she is an incompetentor unreliabletestifier. For instance,if I frequentlylie or forminaccurate beliefs, more often than not thiswill preventyou fromacquiring knowledge(warranted belief, justified belief) on the basis of mytestimony. But the reason whyyou are so preventedis thatmy insincerityor incompetencehas made mytesti- monyunreliable. Moreover, a hearer's beliefsabout a speaker's sincerityand competence can have epistemicsignificance. For instance,if I believe that you are a compulsiveliar or an unreliableepistemic source, then even if you are neitherof these, themere fact that I believe thatyou are can provideme witha defeaterfor accepting yourtestimony. Hence, my beliefs about your sincerity and competencecan preventme fromacquiring knowledge (warranted belief, justified belief) on the basis of yourtestimony. But whatif statementsthemselves cannot be understoodapart fromthe beliefs of speakers?Will myview stillbe importantlydifferent than the BVT? (I am gratefulto Kent Bach, Michael Glanzberg,and GurpreetRattan for pressing this point.) Yes. For even ifstatements cannot be understoodapart from some of the beliefsof therelevant speakers,all I need for mypurposes is thatsuch speakersdo not need to believe the particularpropositions to whichthey are testifying.In particular,what I need for myRS- N to be importantlydifferent from the BVT is the falsityof TEP-N. And thereis no

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Now, as withTEP-N, RS-N expresses only a necessarycondition for testimonial warrant(justification, knowledge). A complete view of the epistemology of testimonywill, then,require further conditions, such as (2) and (3) fromTEP-S. Thus, at a minimum,the SVT will include the following:

SVT: For every speaker, A, and hearer,B, B's belief that p is warranted(justified, known44) on the basis of A's testimony thatp only if (1) A's statementthat p is reliable or otherwisetruth-conducive, (2) B comes to believe thatp on the basis of the contentof A's statementthat p, and (3) B has no undefeateddefeaters for believing that/?.45

It is not my purpose here to providea fully complete account of testimonial warrant(justification, knowledge), and so I shall not defendSVT as such.46 Rather, SVT providesthe framework for a complete epistemology of testimony,one thatplaces the statementsof speakers at the centerof the acquisition of testimonialknowledge.47

reason to thinkthat plausible accounts of statementswill need to depend on the truthof TEP-N. Of course, for testimonialknowledge, a condition will need to be added to SVT requiring the truthof B's belief thatp. Again, following notes 1 1 and 40, SVT may be substitutedwith the weaker: SVT*: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B's belief thatp is warranted (justified, known) on the basis of A's testimonyonly if (1) A's statementis reliable or otherwise truth-conducive,(2) B comes to believe thatp on the basis of an appropriateconnection with the content of A's statement,and (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for believing thatp. As mentionedin note 40, more will need to be said about the "appropriate connection" in (2) if SVT is replaced with SVT*. In fact, in other work, I have argued for conditions on testimonialwarrant beyond those found in (l)-(3). See, for instance, my (2003 and 2006fc). What if the proponent of the BVT were to argue that while the SVT may be true of a broader category of testimonialknowledge, the BVT nonetheless accurately captures a narrowercategory of testimonial knowledge, such as knowledge that we acquire through transmissionof belief or via trustin testimony?(For this type of response, see Fricker (forthcoming). I am also grateful to Mark Heller, Brian McLaughlin, and, especially, David Sosa, for pressing this point.) By way of response to this objection, notice that in the absence of any reason to think that this narrower category of testimonialknowledge is of epistemic interest,it is unclear why such a distinctionshould be drawn in the epistemology of testimony.For my view of testimonyprovides an account thatsubsumes both of these categories of knowledge. Moreover, my view has the resources to explain transmission (if or when such a process actually occurs): the epistemic properties of a speaker's belief is transmittedvia her statement(or other act of communication) to the recipientof her testimony.Thus, transmissionis epistemically importantonly insofar as it bears on the satisfactionof RS-N. (This is evidenced by the fact that testimonialknowledge can be acquired even after the counterfactual removal of a speaker's belief, so long as the statementin question remains reliable.) What would a theory of testimonyin the narrowersense add to this? Proponentsof this approach do not say. And why would anything need to be added? We already have a theory- the SVT - that explains the epistemic propertiesof both of these categories of testimonialknowledge.

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This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:35:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hence,strictly speaking, we do not learnfrom one another'sbeliefs - we learnfrom one another'swords** A failureto appreciatethis has resultedin the widespreadacceptance of a pictureof testimonythat is fundamentally incorrect.Thus, in orderto make genuineprogress in the epistemologyof testimony,we needto stop lookingat whatspeakers believe and focus, instead,on whatspeakers say.49

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48 As mentionedin note 9, it would be more precise to say that we learn from one another's acts of communication (so as to allow for learning from others in non-linguistic ways, such as througha nod or pointing). 49 For very helpful comments on previous draftsof this paper, I am grateful to Kent Bach, Mike Bishop, David Buller, Liz Camp, Fred Dretske, Jeremy Fantl, Richard Fumerton, Michael Glanzberg, Sandy Goldberg, Peter Graham, John Greco, Liz Harman, John Hawthorne, Mark Heller, Tom Kapitan, Jason Kawall, Matt McGrath, Brian McLaugh- lin, Ishani Maitra, Gurpreet Rattan, David Sosa, Ernie Sosa, and audience members at Northern Illinois University,the Universityof Iowa, the 2005 Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, the 2005 Rutgers Epistemology Conference, and the 2005 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference. Most of all, I am indebted to Baron Reed for, among countless other things,being the most stimulatingand invaluable philosophical testifierI have ever met.

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