The Politics of Recovery Women in the Tablighi Jama' at and Vishwa Hindu Parishad

Sajida Jalalzai

Faculty of Religious Studies

McGiII University, Montreal

October 2005

A thesis submitted to McGiIl University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ...... ,...... iii

Abstract ...... iv ltéslllllé ...... v

Note on Transliteration ...... vi

Introduction: The Politics of Recovery ...•...••••.•.••.•...•••.•.....• 1

Chapter One: Constructing the Nation...•...••.....•.•.•...... •....•. 12

Chapter Two: Participating in the Nation ...... •...•...... 43

Chapter Three: Recovering the Nation: Women in the Tablighi Jama' at and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad...... 65

Con.clusion ...... 108

Selected Bibliography ...... 113 iii

Acknowledgements

1 would like to extend my gratitude to the Faculty of Religious Studies at McGill University, in particular, my supervisor, Dr. Davesh Soneji, for taking time out of his busy schedule to offer his insightful comments and edits. 1 am truly indebted to you for your help and encouragement.

Special thanks to my external reviewer, Dr. Bilal Kuspinar, who offered thoughtful observations and criticism on my thesis, showing true interest and expertise in the field.

1 am grateful to my professors in the Department of Religious Studies at Queen's University for motivating me to pursue this degree. My undergraduate experience at Queen's was truly memorable, and my interactions with faculty and students both inspired me and prepared me for my studies at McGill.

1 appreciate the help of Florence Ferron and Philippe Turenne for their kindness and willingness to translate my abstract into French.

1 also offer sincere thanks to my dear friends, Melissa Curley, Kirstin Sabrina Dane, Meera Kachroo, Carl Leslie, Taslim Madhani, Bridget McGregor, Sara Mogilski, Preeti Parasharami, and Jonathan Sozek, for editing, for laughs, and for thoughtful remarks, talks, and debates, and for making my M.A. experience intellectually stimulating, as weIl as extremely fun-filled. 1 will remember you aIl, 'always and forever'.

To my sister, Zubeda Jalalzai: Thank you for looking over several of my drafts, for your insight, detailed editing, and helpful comments. 1 truly appreciate your guidance. .

1 give thanks to Mohamed Abdou, for all of his support and love, for our exciting and stimulating conversations, and for his steady and unshakeable belief in me and my abilities. You are truly a source of inspiration, and 1 hope that my efforts make you proud.

Lastly, 1 take this opportunity to thank my parents, Abdur Raheem and Amina Jalalzai, who have been a constant source of support and love, and who have encouraged me in all of my endeavors. Without your help and care, this would not have been at a11 possible.

1 dedicate this thesis to my parents, and also to my grandmother, Miraj Bibi Jogezai, who is now in a much better place. IV

Abstract

This thesis examines the construction and utilization of gender in religious nationalist projects. Communalist groups sacralize gendered understandings of time, space, and community, rooted in the bifurcation of the public (masculine) realm and the private (feminine) sphere. Nationalist understandings of citizenship maintain the public and private division, but acknowledge the potential to politicize both. In this conception of citizenship, the private (feminine) is deployed to achieve social and religious change. This thesis analyzes two contemporary South Asian transnationalist groups, the Muslim Tablighi Jama 'at and the Hindu Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and investigates women's participation in the nation as cultural repositories and as pedagogues. In these roles, women are able to recover and disseminate the "true" values and identity of the degenerate community, thereby revitalizing the nation. However, while women are empowered in these roles, they are simultaneously limited by patriarchal expectations of ideal womanly behaviour. v

Résumé

Cette thèse examine la construction et le rôle de la place de la femme dans des projets nationalistes religieux. Les groupes Communautaires sacralise la compréhension de la place de la femme envers le temps~ l'espace et la communauté, qui est enracinée dans la bifurcation du domaine (masculin) publique et de la sphère (féminine) privée. Cette théorie nationaliste de la citoyenneté maintiennent la division publique et privée, mais reconnaissent le potentiel d'y mettre les deux sur l'agenda politique. Dans cette conception de la citoyenneté, le privé (féminin) est déployé pour réaliser le changement social et religieux. Cette mémoire analyse deux groupes transnationalist contemporains du sud de l'asie: le groupe musulman, le Tablighi Jama'at et le groupe hindou, le Vishwa Hindu Parishad, et analyse aussi la participation de la femme envers la nation en tant que dépôts culturels et comme pédagogues. Dans ces rôles, les femmes peuvent récupérer et disséminer les "vraies" valeurs et la "vraie" identité de la communauté dégénérée, revitalisant de ce fait, la nation. Cependant, alors que des femmes sont autorisées dans ces rôles, elles sont simultanément limitées par les espérances patriarcales du comportement féminin idéal. vi

Note on Transliteration

This thesis utilizes Arabie, Urdu, Sanskrit, and Hindi terms. AU non-English words, exc1uding the names of organizations, places, and figures from the nineteenth century onward are italicized and are transliterated depending upon the context oftheir use. Arabie and Urdu share certain vocabulary, but the spelling of the se words may differ among the two languages based upon pronunciation. 1

Introduction: The Politics of Recovery

The dissolution of British colonial rule in the fIfst half of the twentieth century led to the creation of various nation-states on the Indian Subcontinent.

While the term "nation," as defined in a modem context, entered the political reality of the Indian Subcontinent for the first time in 1947, the forging of a national identity was, and still is, a continuous process, initiated long before the official declaration of independence from colonial rule. The process of national identity formation carries with it various implications for both so-called "citizens" of the nation, as well as those named and catalogued as "other," or outsiders of the nation. Various ideologies coalesce in the marking ofboundaries between

insider and outsider, and consequently, in the construction of the nation and the

identity ofits citizens. The ideological formation of "India" and "Pakistan" and the socio-political movements in both these countries clearly demonstrate that the

relationships between religion, gender, and nation create powerful and dynamic

forces in which, as Amrita Basu explains, gender is "politicized" and

"appropriated" to achieve social change.

The purpose ofthis thesis is to present a comparative analysis of the uses

and politicization of gender in two very important religious groups in South Asia:

the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (Visva Hindü Pari~ad; VHP; "World Hindu Council")

and the Tablighi Jama'at (Tablïghï Jamii'at; TJ: "Proselytizing Group"), two of

the largest Hindu and Muslim organizations in the world, both which originated in

India. Both groups boast a worldwide presence, and have participants from

countries aIl over the globe. Thus, neither the Vishwa Hindu Parishad nor the 2

Tablighi Jama'at c1aims to be nationalist, but rather, both assert their transnational character. Notions such as the modem nation-state are limiting for these groups, who view themselves as serving Hindus and Muslims aIl over the world. Therefore, both movements c1aim popularity and relevance among widespread and varied groups of people, and consciously define themselves as apolitical, or not concemed with the issues of individual nation-states. However, this dec1aration of political detachment is itself a political act. The reality is that such groups are affected by and do, in fact affect overtly political organizations of specific countries, and also promote an understanding that their projects are transnational in nature. Furthermore, their practices and ideologies simultaneously empower and subjugate women by engaging them in projects around the retrieval of national and religious identity. Through a critical examination of historical material, recent publications by the groups and the ethnographic work ofseveral scholars, largue that both Tablighi Jama'at and the

Vishwa Hindu Parishad strategically utilize gendered constructions ofhistory and memory to fashion a place for women in the politics ofidentity. Women are not only ideologues (Bacchetta 1996), but pedagogues who inscribe and presence religious identity as preservers and retrievers of "tradition."

This thesis analyzes very important questions related to women's power, agency, and identity, as witnessed within the Tablighi Jama'at and VHP movements, since in both groups, there is a strong focus on the role of women as religious and cultural educators of society. As pedagogues, women interface with the politicization of social and religious change. The female nationalist 3 pedagogues of the Tablighi Jama'at and VHP greatly influence the formation and dissemination of Muslim and Hindu communal identities. These chapters ask the following questions: Why are women such a strong presence within these organizations? When women teach other women, as weIl as society's children, what are they teaching? Are they teaching what men have told them to teach, or are they innovatively chaIlenging existing societal "norms," thereby pioneering new pedagogical content and method? Do women have any role in the creation of religious and cultural views, or are they simply passive transmitters of the ideas?

Do they (at least temporarily) displace male authority? Ifthere is indeed any innovation in the content their instruction, how does it differ from aIready existing notions, and what do the differences between the two imply? In short, what stakes do women have in this pedagogical process?

ln the course ofthis thesis, 1 draw several conclusions. Firstly, that groups like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Tablighi Jama'at offer women an alternative means of citizenship than "the State"; Secondly, this alternative citizenship views work within the private sphere as "active" participation in the nation, which differs than traditional Western notions, in which "full citizenship" may only be enacted in the public sphere; Thirdly, women are empowered within these movements, precisely in their role as the pedagogues, actively influencing and communicating so-called essential information that willlead to the uplifting and revival of their communities; and lastIy, that this role simuitaneously reinforces traditional patriarchal views of women, and reifies women in their domestic roles. Therefore, while these groups offer women fuIl-citizenship within 4 the private sphere, they see no real reason for their participation in the public sphere. When women do enter into the public domain, it is, in fact, a very restricted participation that is informed by patriarchal controls.

Terminology

The term "nationalism" indicates an ideology that considers "the Nation" to be the fundamental element of human societyl. The means of defining the nation are complex and varied, and include notions such as ethnicity, religion, economics, or culture. Whatever the methods of determining the basis of identity,

"the Nation" is seen as a pre-existing entity, and gains legitimacy through this perception. Note that "the Nation" is not necessarily synonymous with "the

State," or the installed government of a country. Indeed, the two categories are often seen as opposing, nationalists viewing "the State" as illegitimate.

Therefore, while one may be a citizen of "the State," and gain the rights and responsibilities of state citizenship, one may simultaneously participate in citizenship of a particular "nation" outside of the state, based on religion, ethnicity, language, and other factors. Indeed, nationalists often consider their

"national" citizenship more valid than their "state" citizenship. For the purposes of this thesis, 1 do not make a distinction between "nationalism" and

2 "communalism ," as the two are very closely linked, particularly in the South

Asian context. As Yuval-Davis states, "there is no inherent difference ... between ethnic and national collectivities: they are both the Andersonian 'imagined

1 See Benedict Anderson (1983), Anthony Smith (2004), Mark Juergensmeyer (1993), Nira Yuval-Davis (1997). 2 See Ali Asghar Engineer (1989); (1985). 5 communities'" (Yuval-Davis 1997, 16). Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman define communalism as:

A discourse that attempts to constitute subjects in and through community attachment, particularly through religious community. It constitutes the way in which these subjects see and give meaning to the world around them. Through communal discourses, subjects come to understand the world around them as one based on the conflict between religious groups; Indian society is understood as fractured by the conflict between these groups. This community identity becomes the basis for social, economic and political demands, and for political mobilisation around these demands (Kapur and Cossman 84).

1 argue that the terms "nationalist," "communalist," and "transnationalist" are aU interrelated, accurate, and effective terms that de scribe the Vishwa Hindu

Parishad and the TablïghI Jamii'at. Both groups serve the larger Hindu and

Muslim "nations" on an international scale, and identify the community as the basis for their ideologies and existence.

Chapter Outline, Literature Review, & Theoretical Frameworks

For this project, 1 ground my research largely on the very large body of scholarly work that has been done on gender and nationalism in South Asia. 1 also utilize sources from within various communalist groups, such as the Vishwa

Hindu Parishad's official website, and thus consider the self-conscious ways in which groups choose to represent themselves.

This thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter One inc1udes a general examination of nationalism and the construction of national and communal identities. 1 draw on the work of scholars such as Benedict Anderson (1983), who contend that the nation is a creation of the cultural imagination - it is shifting and perpetually reconstituted rather than fixed and stable (Bhabha 1990). However, 6

Anderson believes that religion is slowly becoming less of an effective or compelling mode of identification. 1 challenge Anderson with Anthony Smith's recent scholarship (2004), which argues that religion is a potent tool in shaping sacralized, nationalist interpretations of community, time, and space. However, neither Anderson nor Smith offers significant discussion to the utilization of gender in the formation of national and communal identities. 1 focus on the work ofNira Yuval-Davis (1997) to supplement this examination ofreligio-communal identity formation, giving special attention to the power of gender, specifically, women' s roles in such agendas. Therefore, 1 interrogate the historical contexts in which South Asian nationalisms arise, as weIl as the contemporary usage of the feminine in the nationalist goal of homogenization and differentiation of identities

(Juergensmeyer 1993; Kishwar 1998; Menon 2002; Ramaswamy 1997; Yuval

Davis 1997). This chapter also notes that constructions of the feminine hinge on the patriarchal distinction between the public and private spheres, as noted by

Chatterjee (1993), Jeffery and Basu (1998), and Hancock (1999), and that this differentiation plays a role in the construction of the nation as feminine. The distinction between the public and private spheres also contributes to the view that women are repositories of the essence of the nation.

Chapter Two revolves around the concepts of citizenship and national boundaries in the shaping of national identities. This chapter is directly connected to Chapter One, but instead of focusing on gendered constructions of the nation, it examines women' s participation in the nation. There is a vast range of scholarship devoted to the notion of gendered citizenship, but my arguments are 7 primarily based on the works of Carole Patemen (1988) and Nira Yuval-Davis

(1997). Pateman examines the social contracts of Western theorists such as

Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, and argues that women's status as citizens is predicated on a sexual contract. This sexual contract is patriarchal in nature, and effectively denies women access to the larger social contract, as well as agency in the public sphere or democratic processes. Yuval-Davis extends these discussions and argues that nationalism is always a gendered process, and that the category of

"woman" is complex and diverse, rather than monolithic or homogenous. Varied groups of women face varied oppressions and challenges as members of nations, and therefore, dialogue between women is necessary. 1 utilize Pateman and

Yuval-Davis in my examination ofwomen in the Indian Subcontinent, and question whether similar notions of citizenship and gender are visible in the South

Asian context.

Chapter Two also deals with idealized feminine roles, such as that of wife and mother, that offer access to participation in the nation that "the State" and conventional notions of "citizenship" potentially denies. The welfare of the family, and by extension the nation in its totality, is dependent upon the religious devotion, obedience, and self-sacrifice of the nation's women. Women, therefore, are the biological and cultural producers of "the nation," ideally instilling a sense of valiant national heroism in the male members of their families, as discussed by

Paola Bacchetta and Margaret Power (2002), Partha Chatterjee (1993; 2002),

Mary Hancock (1999), Sumathi Ramaswamy (1998), and Patricia Jeffery and

Amrita Basu (1998). The ways in which South Asian religious nationalist groups 8 implicate women in their projects is largely though the rhetoric of"remembering" and "recreating" the imagined pasto Women are able to "recover" the "real" identity of the nation in their roles as repositories of the essence and values of the nation. This is done not only through the re-enactment and re-interpretation of ritual and myth about the nation, but also by re-training (physically and intellectually) strong and culturally knowledgeable members of society, re learning the methods of proper believing as representatives of the community, and re-educating aIl who have lost their cultural and religious selves. The idea of women as the nation's pedagogues and disseminators of national values and heritage is therefore of prime importance to nationalist groups.

ln the third part of my thesis 1 present a detailed examination of the

Tablighi Jama' at movement, as weIl as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, both founded in India in the twentieth century. Working with the research of Barbara Metcalf,

Muhammad Khalid Masud, and Yoginder Sikand, the frrst half of this chapter explores the historical context in which the Tablighi Jama'at arose, namely as a reaction to emergent Hindu reformist groups. Muhammad Ilyas, the founder of the group was concemed with the construction and bolstering of Muslim identity, and chose to do so outside of the structure of the State. However, in a sense, the

Tablighi Jama' at' s work is quite political as Muhammad Masud notes: "Making

Muslims conscious of their separate identity and aware of their social obligations from a religious perspective ultimately serves a political purpose" (Masud 2000,

99). The Tablighi Jama'at focuses on the "accurate" performance ofreligious ritual and obligations, as well as missionary work within the Muslim community 9 in an attempt to rectify internaI religious "degeneration" among Muslims. It also attempts to homogenize the diversity within Islam through the construction of a

''typological history," that charts the Tablighi community's success by reconnecting it with the sacred time of Muhammad and the early Muslim community. Therefore, sacred time and correct beliefconnects members ofthis movement, rather than sacred space (Metcalf 1996a: 125). Women, while restricted in their freedom to perform da 'wa or proselytization, are an integral part ofthe Tablighi community. Hardly passive members of society, women are actively engaged in teaching other women, in leaming, and in producing and educating the next generation ofbelievers. This section examines women's roles in Tablighi Jama'at, and the potential for both their empowerment and their subjugation in this context.

ln the second half of the chapter, 1 discuss the Vishwa Hindu Parishad

(VHP), an offshoot of the communal Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), an organization rooted in the Hindutva ("Hinduness") ideology that developed in nineteenth century India. 1 examine the organization's contextual roots, stemming from reform movements that were concerned with "purification" of the Hindu tradition, as weIl as "re-conversion" of those whose ancestors had originally been

Hindus (Bhatt 2001). This chapter focuses on the development and ideologies of the VHP, which de scribes itself as solely a religio-cultural offshoot of an already

"apolitical" RSS. In reality, the group constitutes and articulates a composite religious and national identity. Lise McKean notes that according to the VHP,

"Religion and nationhood should be complementary to each other. Religion 10 motivates culture while nationhood evokes sacrifice for one's religious identity"

(McKean 1996b, 265). While there is little scholarship on the VHP with specifie regards to the groups' views on women, I utilize the VHP internet website

(www.vhp.org), as weIl as Kalyani Devaki Menon's recent ethnography, in my examinations of the official women's branches of the VHP. Women's branches of the VHP include Durga Vahini, which runs camps for women's religio-cultural education and physical training, and Matri Shakti, a wing for older VHP women

(Menon 2002). In this section I examine the ways in which the se groups illustrate the ongoing construction of ideal womanhood in the Hindu nationalist project.

The Tablighi Jama'at and Vishwa Hindu Parishad are organizations that have shared geographical space, history and culture. This comparative examination of groups from the two largest religious communities on the Indian Subcontinent aims to reveal the ways in which women are brought into the national "politics of cultural recovery," which links women's behaviour, beliefs, speech, dress, and morals to the destiny ofthe nation. The recovery of "correct" womanly conduct, appearance, and principles directly corresponds to the revival of the community, and therefore simultaneously puts great amounts of pressure on women to behave in certain prescribed ways, but also acknowledges the power women have to affect and manipulate the status of the entire community. 1 investigate the women ofthese movements in their pedagogical roles and analyze their responsibility in the perpetuation of a certain type of education, which contributes to the formulation of religious, cultural, and national identities. This study forces one to rethink the distinct boundaries between the political, cultural, religious, and 11 domestic lives ofthose in a South Indian context, and examines women's agency in creating, destroying, upholding, or rethinking these boundaries. 12

Chapter One: Constructing the Nation

"A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form" - Homi Bhabha

" ... the state is not only a totalizing project that unifies the 'people' as a national community; it is also ... an individualizing project that produces citizens in specific ways and in specific roles ... " - Rajeswari Sunder Rajan

Amidst recent fascination with globalization, or the dismantling of certain cultural, economic, political, and social barriers between specific states in the name of "institutional intemationalization", nationalism still remains a powerful means of communal identification. In an increasingly globalized world, nationalism, like religion, finds ways of adapting to the needs of people. The concept of "nation," as conceived ofby today's standards, is a relatively recent phenomenon, but the ideology of nation hearkens to an assumed, etemal, and

inherently unified community of people. The basis for the unity of a community

varies from nation to nation, from race, religion, ethnicity, or language. However,

the overarching theme of this project is the utilization of gender in nationalist

projects, specifically the location ofwomen in such endeavors. This thesis argues

that gender is one of the many tools of nationalism that fortifies communal

feelings and advances communalist projects. Ideals ofboth manhood and

womanhood are constructed, maintained, or manipulated to establish nations and

their goals. However, 1 am primarily interested in constructions of and 13 deployments of ideal womanhood. Nationalist and communalist movements often depend upon the potency of gender symbolism, ideals, and stereotypes in painting certain worldviews, as well as gaining adherents and politicai strength.

The confluence of religion and gender aids in the manufacturing of the nation, as gender is constructed, naturalized, and manipulated in accordance with certain interpretations of religious principIes, narratives, or rituaIs, often to the benefit of communalist groups. Scholars such as Arnrita Basu (1998) have noted that gender is thus "appropriated" to achieve social change. This chapter examines various means of "constructing the nation," including the construction ofthe public and private domains, focusing on nations of the Indian Subcontinent, namely, India and Pakistan, to examine the intersection between religion, nation, and gender. 1 will also analyze constructions of nationalist identity via intersections between gender and notions of sacred time and sacred space, and investigate gendered ideals and communal identification through vehicles not often acknowledged as "political," such as clothing and language. An analysis of the politicization of language and clothing indicates how so·called "private" elements of society are utilized by nationalist groups to create national identity.

Community boundaries are founded upon gendered ideals, and are based upon

"the everyday," just as much as they are upon extraordinary or cosmological rational es.

The demarcation of borders, whether geographical, ideological, cultural,

or social, is an essential task of the nation, and is often achieved through the

intentional bifurcation between the "self" and the "other," highlighting those 14 included in membership of the community (as citizens) and those excluded from citizenship. These distinctions are naturalized and situated in the communal ideology through cultural symbols from the everyday lives of people in an ongoing struggle to legitimize the community. Nationalism is therefore a perpetuai process ofhegemonic creation and accommodation, and utilizes symbols, myths, and ideals to continually justify the nation's existence. These symbols do not simply represent ideals of the culture, but produce and embody them, simultaneously depending upon and creating a link between tradition and modernity. This chapter argues that gender is an underlying force in "nation- building," and that women are utilized in the larger nationalist goal of homogenizing various groups of people and incorporating them into their projects, and then examines womanhood as a tool in this process. Chapters One and Two of this thesis are closely related and focus on this general theme, the former centering on the construction of nation in gendered terms, and the latter questioning women's participation and roles within the nation.

Constructing Imagined Communities

Benedict Anderson establishes the foundation of recent research on nationalism in his definitive work, Imagined Communities. In his analysis,

Anderson explores the reasons for the rise of nationalism, as well as the creation of "nation-states." He argues that nations are "imagined," insofar as they are socially constructed entities that manufacture a sense of unity, limitedness, and equality, countering nationalist rhetoric that claims otherwise:

It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet 15

in the minds of each lives the image of their communion ...Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist ... The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind1 ... It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm .. .It is imagined as a community, because regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived of as deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings (Anderson 15- 16).

Anderson does not use the word "imagined" to insinuate that such communities are not real, but rather, that the notion of a shared collectivity is constructed, and that a major goal of such movements is the creation ofcommonality, through various technologies of nation-building. These tools include reference to a common origin, history, race, heritage, language, or culture, amongst others. The nation, therefore, is "real," but does not exist "naturally," nor is it eternal.

Nationalism is an "ongoing process of transformist hegemony through which elements of diversity are appropriated within the metanarrative of the nation without the dissolution of the differences that constitute that diversity. In this process, the groups that are not envisioned as part ofthe nation's core are marginalized ... " (Menon 2002: 4).

One example of an "Andersonian imagined community" is evident in

Vinayak Damodar Savarkar's construction of Hindu identity. In his 1932 work

1 While some might argue that globalization efforts attempt to erase such limits, and indeed, to create a "global village," this view is rather narrow. Such a position assumes that globalization occurs on equal planes and with equal consent from nation to nation, and denies the economic and power discrepancies that occur between so called "developed" and "developing" countries. Globalization indeed depends upon these regionally based relationships, and therefore maintains dichotomies between communities. 16

"Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?" Savarkar utilizes the term Hindutva, or "Hindu- ness" to define aU those who belong to the Hindu community at large. He articulates a specifie form of nationalism based on three main factors, namely, geography, race, and culture, aIl three ofwhich unite seemingly disparate communities in lndia into a cohesive and powerful assembly. Interestingly,

Savarkar's defining factors ofHinduness are not based on "real" notions of geography, race, or culture, but on Andersonian "imagined" conceptions of such.

For example, the geographical feature of Hinduness, linking lndia to its people, is not strictly a territorial geography, with plotted borders such as those on a political map, but rather, hearkens to a mythical ancestral homeland, which has been lost due to foreign invasions (namely, Muslim [Mughals] and Christian

[British]) and internaI degeneration. What Savarkar refers to as "race" is open- ended as weIl, and doesn't point to a "biogenetic" category. Therefore, the definitive aspect of Hindutva is "culture":

Savarkar is keenly aware of irreducible diversity, be it in conceptions of sacred geography, racial intermingling, or religious beliefs and practices. That is why he attempts to identify an essence, a commonality. Everything, then, cornes down to understanding the essence of Hindu culture. But unfortunately, when identifying what is distinctly Hindu, he goes back to a religious concept: to be Hindu is to take India as the holy land. This is what distinguishes the Hindu from the Christian or the Muslim (although, on other accounts, the possibility of Christians and Muslims being "Hindus" is granted). This is difficult to follow through, since the concept of what is holy itself is a religious one, but the religion involved derives its identity form a culture- which culture, exactly, Savarkar is attempting to essentialize in the first place" (Ram- Prasad 2003: 528).

Savarkar manufactures commonality in the midst ofboundless diversity, and hearkens to imagined notions ofunity through geography, race, and culture to 17

"create" the "Hindu community." Furthermore, Savarkar indicates that the reason for the degenerate state of affairs for lndia's Hindus is partially the effeminacy of

Hindu men2 (BaneIjee 2005: 28-9). Sikata BaneIjee states that "Hindu effeminacy (weakness, treachery, lack of martial ability, cowardice) constructed in opposition to masculine Hinduism (strength, patriotism, martial prowess, valor) is an internaI threat to the proper establishment of an independent, united, martial nation" (Banerjee 53). The implications of this mentality will be discussed

3 shortly. Hindutva is portrayed as a timeless reality, the essence of "Hinduism ," rather than a nationalistic construct. Therefore, according to the principles of

Hindutva, the Hindu nation is not an Andersonian "imagined community," but rather, hearkens back to an ancient Vedic primordial pasto "'This sense of

nationality was already present four thousand years ago in the 'Vedic Nation' as a

cultural self-consciousness that took root through the development and refinement

2 See Banerjee, Sikata. 2005. Make Me a Man! Masculinity, Hinduism, and Nationalism in India. Albany: SUNY Press; Sinha, Mrinalini. 1995. Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 3 It is interesting to posit Hindu nationalist claims of an etemal and unified "Hinduism" in line with Hindu Reformist movements ofnineteenth century, such as the Arya Samaj, which corresponded with imperialist efforts to stress the unity amongst the diversity of Hindu traditions. Recent scholarship acknowledges the constructedness ofthe term "Hinduism," which developed through British colonists' attempts to study, codify, and classify the various religious traditions in the Indian Subcontinent. In short, anything that could not be readily excluded from the body of generic "Hindu" traditions, namely, those religions deemed "foreign," (such as Islam or Christianity), was categorized into a unified body of Hinduism. However, solely examining this construction in Imperialist discourse denies lndian agency in promoting ideals of a cohesive Hinduism, as groups such as the Arya Samaj certainly did. Hindu nationalist use of Hindutva ideology reflects contemporary constructions of such indigenous manufacturings of unified communal identities. The Arya Samaj will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three ofthis thesis. For more information, see King, Richard. 1999. Orientalism and Religion: Postc%nial Theory, India and 'The Mystic East' ; Salmond, Noel. 2004. Hindu Iconoelasts. Rammohun Roy, Dayananda Sarasvati and Nineteenth Century Polemics Against Idolatry. Waterloo: Wilfred LaurierUP. 18 of a common language, Sanskrit, and a common body of philosophy and ritual practices'" (Menon 2002: 19).

The partition of India upon independence from British imperial forces into the nations of India and West and East Pakistan also reflects the manufacturlng of multiple levels ofnationhood and national identity. The creation of the state of

Pakistan in 1947 was the effort of certain figures, such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the nation' s frrst Govemor General, as well as organizations such as the Muslim

4 League, which constructed the need for an independent Muslim nation • While various justifications for the creation of a separate Muslim nation-state exist,

5 inc1uding religious needs, economic factors, as well as minority rights issues , the fact remains that the nation of Pakistan (at th~t time, both East and West Pakistan) was ideologically validated by constructing the notion that the community of

South Asian Muslims was inherently different and unable to coexist with the

Hindu communities of India. Certain figures in the struggle for Independence,

4 The AII-India Muslim League was founded in 1906 with the growing political dissatisfaction of Indian Muslims. Frustrated with the politics of the secular Indian National Congress, the goal of the League was to unite Muslims and to conceive and express Muslim concems in the Indian government. With the promise of Independence, the League began to petition for the creation of a separate Muslim home land, Pakistan. Indeed, Ziring comments that "The Muslim League gave voice to Muslim fears in the slogan 'Islam in Danger' and, in short order, it assumed the role of spokesman for a people and a culture which it deemed to be under siege" (Ziring 1997: 6). For more information, see Singh, Amrujit. 2001. Purifab Divided: PoUties ofthe Muslim League and Partition. New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers; Ziring, Lawrence. 1997. Pakistan in the Twentieth Century. A Politieal History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5 For more information on the justifications for the creation of Pakistan, see Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2002. Pakistan. Nationalism Without a Nation? New Delhi: Manohar Publishers ; Jangda Haroon Ishaque. 2000. The Battle for Pakistan. Lahore: Ferozsons ; Jawed, Nasim Ahmad. 1999. Islam's Political Culture: Religion and Politics in Predivided Pakistan. Austin: University Texas Press; Malik, Iftikhar H. 1999. Islam, Nationalism and the West: Issues ofIdentity in Pakistan. Oxford: Palgrave; Ziring, Lawrence. 1997. Pakistan in the Twentieth Century. A Polîtieal History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 19

6 such as Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad , stressed

South Asian Hindu and Muslim composite culture as a unifying force that extends beyond religious dividing lines, to combat petitions for a separate Muslim homeland. However, arguments countering these claims resulted in the division of India into two nations. Islam entered the Indian Subcontinent shortly after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in the sixth century, C.E. with the various invasions and migrations of Arab Muslims. Therefore, Muslims acknowledge their historical "entry" into the Subcontinent (and therefore cannot c1aim indigenous nor etemal presence in South Asia), but use their long history in South

Asia to legitimate themselves as a Subcontinental national community.

Furthermore, as religious minorities in India, even with the regional, ethnic, sectarian, and economic diversity of the Muslim communities in the Subcontinent,

Muslims are more easily identified, united, and mobilized as a collective than the

Hindu majority. Thirdly, along with their South Asian identity, Muslims in the

Subcontinent also identify with the transnational Muslim ummah, or global

Muslim community, thereby highlighting multiple and complex levels of communal identification. This acknowledgment of "foreignness" allows Muslims easier identification with the greater Muslim ummah, and simultaneously increases the potential for Hindu xenophobia, as Hindu communalists have indicated that Indian Muslims' primary loyalties are to Mecca, and not to India.

V.D. Savarkar writes, "Their [Indian Muslims'] holy land is far off in Arabia or

Palestine .... Their mythology and Godmen ... are not the children ofthis

6 See Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam. 1998. India Wins Freedom. The Complete Version. New Delhi: Orient Longman; Zakaria, Rafiq. 1999. Gandhi and the Break-Up oflndia. Mumbai: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. 20 soil. ...Their love is divided" (Banerjee 2005: 55). Therefore, the recognition of

Muslim "foreignness" in India strengthens communal dividing lines, fortifies communal identity,justifies the existence ofthe nation of Pakistan, and highlights complexities of self-definition.

Anthony Smith critiques and expands on Anderson's discussions of national self-definition. Smith points. out that while Anderson acknowledges the uses of religious elements in nationalist movements, he mainly relegates the power of religious objects, rituals, and communities to the past. Smith argues that

''the religious" continues to underscore nationalist movements, primarily through the sacralization of various communal elements, such as:

The community itself... [and] the holy land in which the people dwell, with its memories, heroic exploits, monuments, and the resting place of ancestors. Then there was the great and glorious past, our past, the golden age of the people, before the present sad decline ... These became the stuff of the new religion of authenticity that is nationalism (Smith vii-viii).

Notions of sacred community, geography, and time, thus serve as the

"technologies ofnationalism." However, both Smith and Anderson fail to inc1ude an essential element in their examinations of nationalism. This thesis argues that gender often provides the means in which disparate members of a collectivity relate to and connect with one another. White both masculine and feminine gender symbolism and ideals are employed in communalist agendas, this thesis focuses on women and womanhood as a potent nationalistic force. Gender is appropriated to solidify sacred nationalist constructions of land, community, and time. Whether in viewing women as repositories of the nation's essence, in constructions of the nation as feminine, or in perceiving women as the link 21 between a glorious national past and triumphant future, gender acts as a bonding agent, linking individuals in collectivities. Both Hindu and Muslim communalist groups in South Asia have utilized gender in the construction and legitimizing of nationalist agendas. Before discussing examples of how the feminine is employed and appropriated, it is necessary to discuss the division between the public and the private spheres, upon which gendered nationalist rhetoric is based. The following section discusses the partition of and distinctions between the two realms, and evaluates the implications such a division has upon both men and women in communalist groups.

The Public and the Private: Ghar and Bahir

Many religions foster a vision ofthemselves as being uniquely holistic enterprises. Various traditions, Islam and Hinduism inc1uded, often purport to be distinct in that they are not simply "religions", but rather, are "complete ways of life." This implies that such traditions construct themselves as unable to be compartmentalized or applied only to specific areas of life. These traditions, in fact, demand that their adherents infuse every facet of their lives with their religiosity. However, British Colonialism in India is often criticized as a force that undermined the "completeness" ofSubcontinental religions, creating a divide

7 between the "public" and "private" realms oflife • Colonial subjects were forced to recognize British dominance over certain aspects of life, but naturally retained

pride in those areas which the British Administration had no direct control of.

The "public" domain is similar to what Partha Chatterjee refers to as the

7 See Chatterjee, Partha. 1993. The Nation and Its Fragments. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 22

"material," and marks the areas in which the British were "proven" superior: economics, statecraft, science, and technology. Since these spheres oflife were not seen as "essential" to Indian (especially "Hindu Indian") identity and honour, emulation of the British in these domains was encouraged so that they could positively benefit from such successes in modemization. The "private" realm, which relates to what Chatterjee caUs the "spiritual," is an "'inner' domain bearing the 'essential' marks of cultural identity. The greater one's success in imitating Western skills in the material domain ... the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of one's spiritual culture" (Chatterjee 1993: 6). The familial and private sphere represented the last mainstay of the "defeated" nation as weIl as the site of opportunity and prospects its reconstruction (Jeffery 92). While the public realm suffered from the contamination of colonization, the home represented that which was "authentic, pure and sacred" (Jayawardena 44). Therefore, while the

British colonialists may have gained political and economic control of the

Subcontinent, they were seen as powerless at damaging the core of Indian identity, which was preserved in the inner sanctums oflndian life and culture, namely, the domestic and religious spheres of life. It is in these realms that there was a fervent effort to retain and preserve that which was viewed as fundamental for the survival of Indians, Hindu and Muslim alike, against the "degenerative powers" of British Colonialism.

Feminist scholarship builds on Chatterjee's theories and proposes that the division of Indian society into "public" and "private" spheres has definite implications with regards to gender. TraditionaIly, distinctions between the 23 public and private realms are exemplified through gendered imagery. The public sphere is equated with masculinity, while the private, domestic realm is associated with the feminine. Therefore, women represent the "true" borders of the community, signifying a designated area of purity and oflegitimacy. They are the repositories of the nation, storehouses of that which is fundamental to the community, and represent the essence of the collectivity. While they allegedly maintain the intimacy of the innermost and uncontaminated realm of the nation, their position as the border of the community also situates them dangerously close to potentially polluting and destructive forces. This ambivalent position leads to a preoccupation with the protection of women, whether in concrete terms, relating to issues such as physical safety, or in abstract terms, related to notions such as

"sexuality" and "honour". As Sikata Banerjee states, "An emphasis on the chastity of women and control of female sexuality during times of social uncertainty can be interpreted as a form of resistance to uncontrollable external changes ... Controlling women and womanhood may be read as a metaphorical control of the nation" (Banerjee 17). These ideals will be more fully examined in the following chapter.

Gendering the Nation

Land, as a physical object and as an abstract notion is often central to a community's understanding of itself. Anthony Smith refers to the Hnk between land and the history of a community as the "territorialization of memory" (Smith

135). The appropriation of gender is readily witnessed in nationalistic purposes is the construction of the nation as feminine. Many communalist groups utilize the 24 opposition between the public and private realms discussed above to create a gendered image of the nation, which requires constant care and protection to secure the core of the communities' identity and values. "Nation" however, is often constructed as distinct from the "state," and refers to the ideological and abstract notion of a community, culture, or ideal, rather than the official government structures. "In the South Asian context, the nation is represented as a motherland and the state as father" (Jefferey & Basu 6). The "state," then, may be construed as "masculine," and should ideally offer the support and protection of the feminine nation at all costs. The purity of the nation, and indeed, the performance of ideal womanhood, depends upon the actualization of proper manhood, which amongst other values, inc1udes bravery, martial skill, activism, spiritual discipline, and decisiveness. Indeed, "motherland or nation as woman protected by brave citizen-warriors is a common metaphor for nationalism"

(Banerjee 2005). Therefore, for the nation to reach its fulfillment, mutually codependent and holistic gender interaction is required (within specified strictures, such as marriage), as masculine ideals depend upon the enacting of feminine ideals, and feminine ideals require the execution of masculine ideals.

This complex and interconnected relationship between the masculine and feminine lends itself to constructions of the nation as an extended family, which is based upon naturalized sexual divisions of labour.

The nation itself embodies the microcosm of the home, and is thereby

"feminized," as made obvious by the epithet, Bharat Mata or "Mother India."

Bharat Mata is the personification of the nation of India as a mother, and is 25 worshipped as a Hindu goddess ofwomanly ideals and fertility. As a ehild of

Bharat Mata, one has the obligation to proteet, defend, and uphold the nation, as

8 sons and daughters devote themselves to their biologieal mothers • Hindu nationalist groups, sueh as the RSS and the VHP have helped increase popular devotion to Bharat Mata, fashioning her into a "national deity," bypassing regional, religious, and linguistie differenee to unite the "Hindu nation." The divination of Bharat Mâta in her present form owes itselfto an early twentieth century Bengali novel by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Anandama!h, in which the goddess rouses her 'ehildren' to conquer British forces. The novel describes

Bharat Mata in three forms: an imposing and magnificent map of India, indieating her pre-Colonial state; a tearful woman in rags with a sword over her head, the sword indicating her simultaneous Colonial subjugation and means of freedom; and finally, a heavenly, golden, and radiant map ofIndia. When a devotee asks a sage when Bharat Mâta will be her golden and radiant state, he replies, 'Only when all the children of the Motherland shall call her Mother in all sincerity"

(McKean1996: 254).

It is important to note here that the construction of afeminine nation is most predominant in Hindu constructions of lndia, and less so in Muslim constructions of Pakistan. Little theoretical work has been produced on gendered constructions of Pakistan. However, the context of nation building in India is markedly different than that of Pakistan. Hindu nationalism utilized, as its frame of reference, British nationalism, which often drew upon feminine symbolism and

8 See footnote on Tamilttay on pp. 35 ofthis chapter. 26 imagery to construct its own identity as well as to imagine India.9 This approach follows the rationale that emulation of the British was condoned in spheres of life such as statecraft, where Hindu Indians felt they could gain from the colonial experience, while discouraged in other areas oflife. However, this is not the only reasoning behind emulation of British models. Hindu nationalists did not simply accept or react to Colonial models of nationalism. They were impelled to interact with (that is, to accept, reject, or manipulate) the structures imposed upon them by

10 the British, following Queen Victoria's Royal Proclamation of 1858 • However,

9 India was often represented by the British as a primitive and feminine state of nature, which required Colonialist "civilizing". Exotic and feminized images of the rawness and chaos of the Subcontinent pointed to the need for the rational, domineering, imperialist, and "male" colonizer. The inherent femininity of the land also carried over to an emasculation ofindigenous men, especially the Hindu male. On the other hand, the British nation was also effeminized as "Brittania," the embodiment of "a female figure based on images of Athena, the Greek goddess of war" (S. Banerjee 12). 10 The 1857 Sepoy Rebellion, where Muslim and Hindu soldiers refused to use rifle cartridges believed to manufactured with cow and pig fat (both offensive substances to many practicing Muslims and Hindus), marks a watershed in the history ofIndia. The Queen's Proclamation of 1858 effectively shifted control of India from the British East India Company to the British Crown, officially making India a British colony. Following the Rebellion, the British rewarded those factions of people who remained loyal to them with prestigious posts in Indian Administration. In the Proclamation, Queen Victoria also vowed to grant lndians autonomy in some areas of life, including "private" affairs such as religion, but also, certain Ievels of governance. In terms of employment, candidates for civil service occupations were required to go to England to compete in the examination, which emphasized classical European subjects. Traditional Islamic madrasa education was therefore less privileged under British mIe, and Muslim representation in government service remained low, due to commitment to "Islamic" forms of schoo ling. Therefore, at this point in history, the Hindu population of lndia was more closely affiliated with the British administration. The Muslim communities in lndia reacted in various ways, exemplified by the difference between educational reforms, such between Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who attempted to narrow the gap between "traditional Islamic" and "modem Western" education with the founding of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh in 1875, and the Deoband school, also founded in Uttar Pradesh in 1866, which utilized and lack of government support and funding and made it a princip le oftheir establishment. Both systems reflect the fact that with direct British mIe, the growing need for "useful knowledge (that is, knowledge functional in the public sphere, as opposed to the private sphere, such as religious knowledge) impelled both Hindu and Muslim communities to either engage in, reject, or manipulate those structures which were imposed upon lndia by the British. For more information, see Forbes-Mitchell, William. 2002. Reminiscences ofthe Great Mutiny of 1857-59: 1ncluding the Relief, Siege, and Capture ofLucknow, and the Campaigns in Rohilcund and Oude. New Delhi: Asian Education Services; Lahiri, Abani. 2001. The Peasant and India's Freedom Movement. New Delhi: Manak Publications; Quraishi, Salim al-Din, ed. 1997. Cry For Freedom: Proclamations ofMuslim Revo/utionaries of 1857. 27

Hindus had very little large scaIe and formaI means of identifying as a cohesive nation prior to the British Orientalist project of categorizing and dassifying the

ll various communities in the Indian Subcontinent , unlike the South Asian Muslim community. Gupta discusses how in this case, women's gender was appropriated as a method ofuniting the greater Hindu community. "Women could prove a means to rework that imagined past and assert a civilized national identity in the present. Women thus provided one of the glues ... for daims ofwider Hindu unity, and in promoting an internai solidarity in heterogeneous urban surroundings" (Gupta 27-8).

ln the case of South Asian Muslims, however, there was a distinct, larger community outside of the immediate geographical context of India with which they could identify: the global Muslim ummah. Movements such as the Khilafat movement, supported by many renowned members of the Indian Independence

Movement, draws attention to Subcontinental Muslims' identification with the

Il Sikata Banerjee (2005) discusses the various ways in which the British essentialized various "races" in the Indian Subcontinent, primarily based upon notions of manliness. A principle categorization divided between "martial" and "non-martial" races. Banerjee states, "Colonial military historians ... classified Indian soldiers in terms ofboth muscular Christianity and the multifaceted notion of Christian manliness ... These stereotypes then emerged in popular adventure stories and instructional monographs aimed at British boys and young men, many of whom were eager to come to India to seek adventure and fortune" (Banerjee 28). The scale ranged from the most effeminate, namely the Bengali, to the masculine Sikh, among other divisions, such as the "devious Maratha" and the "loyal Gurkha" (32-33). 28 larger, transnational ummah, or global Muslim community12. The Khilâfat

Movement, however, is not the only example of a Muslim transnationalist movement. It is important to view the development in a context of Muslim anti- colonialist transnationalism, which espoused the belief that Colonists had the power to defeat the ummah due to internal dividedness and weakness. Jamal al-

Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), for example, traveled widely throughout the Muslim world, condemning Muslims alienation from one another. Muhammad 'Abduh

(1849-1905), Rashid Rida, Sayyid Abu al-' A' la Mawdudi (1903-1979), and many more thinkers and activists, inc1uding militant figures such as Osama bin Laden,13 advocate the unity of the Muslim ummah and the rejection "superficial divisions" as resistance to colonial oppression.

12 The Khiliifat Movement (1919-1924) marks an attempt by Muslims to restore the Caliphate System after World War 1 and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Initiated by South Asian Muslims (Maulana Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali), the movement aimed to rescue the last mainstay ofIslamic political power, as most other Muslim nations were crippled and defeated by various Colonial regimes. With the collapse of the Mughal Empire in India, South Asian Muslims perceived an urgent need to retain the Turkish Caliphate. The main goals of the movement included: preservation ofthe Turkish Caliphate, maintenance of the unity of the Ottoman Empire, and protection of Muslim holy places. Eventually, South Asians' struggles at consolidating Muslim political power translated into relatively united effort for the creation of the nation of Pakistan. (For more information, see Jalal, Ayesha, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850, 2000; Minault, Gail, The Khi/afal Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in 1ndia, 1982 ; Shakir, Moin, Khilafat to Partition- A Survey ofMajor Political Trends Among Indian Muslims during 1919-1947, 1970

13 For more information, see Corbin, Jane. 2003. AI-Qaeda: In Seareh ofthe Terror Network That Threatens the World. New York: Thunder Mountain Press; Esposito, John. Voiees of Resurgent Islam, 1983 ; Kedourie, Elie. 1966. Afghani and Abduh; an Essay on Religious Unbelief and Politieal Aetivism in Modern Islam. New York: Humanities Press; Kerr, Malcolm H. 1966. Islamie Reform: The Politieal and Legal Theories ofMuhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida. Berkeley: University of Califomia Press; Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 1996. Mawdudi and the Making of1slamie Revivalism. New York: Oxford UP ; 29

Linking Time, Saving History

As mentioned previously, constructions of time assist in nationalist efforts to sacralize the fate of the nation, forming a connection between the past, present, and future of the community. This endeavor places the nation centrally amidst an unfolding of sacred history. Anthony Smith explains that the symbol of a nation's "golden age" impels members of the collectivity to seek the "true self' of the people. He states:

Golden ages have also served the recurrent quest for collective dignity ... The need to restore the dignity of oppressed, submerged, or divided ethnies is closely linked to the sense of chosenness in degradation. To the outside 'we' may appear backward, subject, shamed, and humiliated, but 'inside'- in reality- we are pure and noble (Smith 213-14).

The mission of the nationalist, then, is to rediscover the nation's glory, and to organize its citizens with the aim of self-fulfillment, that is, the recovery of the

"true" collectivity. Indeed, "golden ages provide essential blueprints for realizing the national self and for encouraging the process of collective regeneration"

(Smith 215-16). Once more, gender is utilized as a technology of nationalism, where essentializations of women are employed to connect the multiple layers of sacred time. As the repositories of the nation's essence, women are able to remind both citizens of the nation and outsiders ofthe community's past glories.

Women are able to perform this role thanks as a result of the purity they retain in the private realm. As conduits between tradition and modemity, women occupy an ambiguous place in time, and exemplify the nationalist straddling of past and future. In this way, there is a simultaneous hearkening to tradition, as well as movement towards a new and glorious future, which either matches or supercedes 30 the community's mythical former grandeur. Religious communalism refers back to the imagined sacred past in which women were ''truly liberated," before the corrupting influence of outside invasion and internal degeneration forced men to

l4 take "protective measures" against the corruption of "their" women •

The following sections examine the politicization of language and clothing, and analyze the role that these seemingly "private" elements of society have in the definition of national boundaries. Often linked to gendered ideals, language and clothing are involved in nationalist conceptions of history, perceived 'degenerations' in both linked to the ultimate condition of the nation.

Nationalist groups naturalize and eternalize gendered notions of clothing and language, connecting the private realm to both the identity and the fate of the nation.

Manufacturing Mother Tongues

Language serves various functions in society, other than as a communication tool. It represents a powerful ideological force which aids in community identity formation and the definition of communal boundaries, whether geographical, ethnic, or cultural. Salil Misra discusses the notion of

"linguism," or the belief in language' s potency, and identifies it with bOth culture and political boundaries. Along with religion and culture, Misra describes language as a power that is capable of defming the success or failure of a modem nation-state. He points out that the growth of linguism in different societies follows several phases:

14 See Chapter Two ofthis thesis. 31

One, it expresses itselfin efforts to enrich one's regionallanguage. Two, it then creates around it a hallow of sanctity, and three, it invents a history and an antiquity along with a passion for greatness. Finally, it sets in motion a motive force that develops expansionist tendencies and seeks to create political boundaries with total disregard for existing social or geographic realities" (Misra 276: 2005).

However, Misra comments that within the Indian Subcontinent, the relationship between the languages of Hindi and Urdu did not initially correspond to linguism's insistence that language should match religious community. However, beginning in the nineteenth century, ardent debates lS conceming the national language of India set the two languages in opposition to each other, despite their complex and interwoven history. Misra argues that initially, the two languages were closely linked and shared the same heritage. However, British attempts to codify information regarding their colonial subjects included a desire to standardize linguistic scripts and to connect language with ethnicity.

Furthermore, during the Independence movement, and continuing till present day, various religious groups themselves have utilized language as a communal differentiator. Though both languages shared a common lineage, common grammar, and common linguistic roots, both communities increasingly sought to distinguish one from the other. Full differentiation between the distinct languages

"Hindi" and "Urdu" occurred as late as the nineteenth century. Urdu, written in

Arabic script (and therefore, sacralized as Islamic) represented the Muslim community, and Hindi written in DevanagarI script (therefore, sacralized as

Hindu), demarcated the Hindu population. Language was therefore directly

15 For a detailed examination of the HindilUrdu debate, see Salil Misra's "Transition from the Syncretic to the Plural- The World of Hindi and Urdu" in Malik, J. & Helmut Reifeld's Religious Pluralism in South Asia and Europe. 2005, pp 268-297. 32 linked to culture, religion, and nation, and was seen as one of the strongest forces of communal preservation. The protection of language ensured the protection and preservation of the community as a whole. 16

However, Misra does not investigate gender in his examination of language debates in the Subcontinent. Nationalists' concerns regarding language reflect a somewhat abstract linkage of feminine power and communal identity.

Language represents one of the most subtle examples of the equation of the nation with the feminine. The language of a community is often gendered feminine, as in the idea of the "mother tongue." The term "mother tongue" indicates several possible links between the feminine and language. Firstly, it may literally mean the language passed from a mother to her infant, a product of the intimate maternaI relationship between (female) parent and child. Secondly, and more abstractly, the term potentially points to correlations between "mother" and

"origin." Thirdly, the "mother tongue" often refers to the language reserved for the home, or the private sphere of life, untouched by external influences, as opposed to more formaI or standardized language that one may use in the public sphere at school, work, or otherwise. Once more, the private realm is connected with the feminine. Sumathi Ramaswamy, in her examination of Tamil devotion

16 The complete differentiation between Urdu and Hindi occurred, in part, due to the "linguistic purification" of Urdu, where words of Indic origins were replaced with Arabie and Persian words. It is of interest to note that this linguistic purification occurred during the same period as Islamic Reformism in the Subcontinent, by the likes of Shah Wali Ullah, "who attempted to bring about a return to pristine Islamic glory by eschewing non-Islamic practices and traditions brought into Islam by converts from other faiths and by Sufi saints with their stress on syncretism" (Misra 281). This effort to "cleanse" Islam may not directly be linked to linguistic purification, but it is likely that there is a parallel between the quest for Urdu and the quest for "high Islam" in the Indian Subcontinent. The pursuit of "high Islam" often involves the purging of so-called "cultural" elements from Islamic practice, which was often linked with the lower-classes ofIndian society. High-class, educated Muslims, the ashrâf, were therefore juxtaposed with the ajlâf, or "common" Muslims, who were viewed as never having fully "converted" from their previous Hindu state. For more information, see Chapter Three ofthis thesis. 33 in South India in twentieth century, investigates the ideological formulation of

"mother tongue" and questions, "Why in so many contemporary societies who se patriarchal foundations have been only further updated with modemity, and where everything from property inheritance to the generational transmission of one's very name is reckoned through the father, does the figure of the mother come to be associated with language?" (Ramaswamy 16). She notes that the term "mother tongue" in the South Asian context gained salience in the latter part of the mneteenth century, and has graduaIly increased in prominence. During this period of reform of religion and language, why did gender prove such an effective device in the solidification of communal identity?

1 argue that gender is utilized to unite the community based on the creation of the linguistic boundaries of a nation, distinguishing it from other languages

(and hence, cultures, ethnicities, religions, nations), and also, to unite those within the community, creating familial relationships between language (the mother), and aIl oflanguage's children (the nation). Charu Gupta points out that in Hindu nationalist movements during the Colonial Period in Uttar Pradesh, Hindi was constructed as the ideal feminine, whereas Urdu, the language of the "other," or the Muslim, was either conceived of as masculine, in terms of its use in the public sphere, or in terms of negative or deviant femininity, and was viewed as a

"prostitute" (Gupta 207). While Hindi speaking men leamed Urdu for use in the public sphere oflife (for example, for employment purposes), women had no use for leaming or speaking it. "Urdu was incapable of giving expression to Hindu ideals and aspirations" (Gupta 298). This quotation illustrates a c1ear bifurcation 34 between Islam and Hinduism, and highlights the perception that the two traditions are fundamentally different, as demonstrated through linguistic "allegiances."

Language, then, is perceived as ultimately linked to the essence and purpose of a religious tradition.

Christopher King describes a theatrical play written in the late 1800s by

Babu Ratna Chandra in Allahabad , in which Hindi and Urdu are personified.

"Urdu" is put on trial by the plaintiff "Hindi," for her loose moral conduet. Urdu is labeled a prostitute, and in her testimony to the Hindu judge, Maharajah

Righteous-Rules, Urdu states:

This is my work: passion 1'11 teach Your household tasks we'llleave in breach. We'H be loyers and rakes, living for pleasure, Consorting with prostitutes, squandering our treasure. Give heed, youofficials, batten on graft, Deceiving and thieving, til1riches you've quaffed. Lie to your betters and flatter each other, Write down one thing, and read out another." (King 1994: 137).

"Urdu," a shameless and immodest corruption ofwomanhood stands in stark contrast to "Hindi," the former being mothered by the dark and tyrannical

"Persian" and the latter being mothered by the honorable and righteous

"Sanskrit," once more employing maternaI imagery to denote and legitimate community. King also describes and illustration appearing on the coyer of the

November 1902 Saraswatf, a popular Hindi journal. "On the left stood a Muslim prostitute, decked out in aH the finery of her profession. On the right, faeing her rival, sat a Hindu matron, modestly clothed in an ordinary sari. The caption-

'Hindi-Urdu' ... clearly indicated that on the left stood Urdu personified and on 35

17 the right sat Hindi " (King 1994: 139). The figure of the prostitute is thereby juxtaposed with the image of the mother, the ideal relationship between the feminine and language contrasted with the corrupted and degraded connection, thereby highlighting the boundaries of the community. Urdu, the language ofthe public realm, is corrupted and 'common', while Hindi is sheltered and protected within the home, this image linking language to the dichotomy of public and private.

A final point regarding the construction of "mother tongues," is that while the nation of Pakistan was justified, in part, as the home land and safeguard for the official language of Urdu, "it was the mother tongue of no more than 4 per cent

(3.8 to be exact) of the people of Pakistan and stood fifth in the list after Bengali,

Punjabi, Sindhi, and Pashtu" (Misra 292). This indicates that the rationalization for the creation of Pakistan does not correspond with the linguistic realities of the nation, and that the notion of "mother tongue" was manipulated to strengthen nationalist ties. Likewise, in Uttar Pradesh, whereas a 1951 poIl indicated that approximately 6.7 million people identified Hindustani (the shared linguistic tradition of Urdu and Hindi) as their mother tongue, another survey in 1961

17 It should be recognized that the UrduIHindi debate was only one ofmany linguistic disputes that occurred in the Indian Subcontinent that related gender to community. While Hindi and Urdu "battled" for ideological importance, the numerous vernaculars and regional dialects also figure into the construction ofvarious national identities. An alternative example of gendered linguistic movements is the South Indian context, where Tamil as the "mother tongue" cornes to embody the land, the community, and the culture ofTamilians. Dedication to these communal ideals manifests in devotion to the goddess Tamilttay, the personification and deification oflanguage, who must be always protected and saved from potential abuse, neglect, and danger. Tamilttay (literally, "Mother Tamil"), is "the apotheosis of language as goddess, queen, mother, and maiden" (Ramaswamy 17). Gender is once again utilized to forge communal identity, combining feminine images with language to construct the borders and identify the "insiders" of a collective. For more information, see Ramaswamy, Sumathi. 1998. Passions ofthe Tongue- Language Devotion in Tamillndia, 1891-1970. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal. 36 showed that this number had decreased to less than 2 percent. This indicates a linguistic "displacement" from Hindustani to the distinct forms of Hindi and

Urdu. It is not that people began speaking a different language during this time period. Rather, based on nationalistic rhetoric, which often involved gendered imagery, communities began to identify themselves along certain religious, cultural, and linguistic boundaries, indicating an "ideological rather than a linguistic shift" (Misra 294). Therefore, "mother tongues" in the South Asian context, were often manufactured in gendered terms to "create" and "affirm" distinct nationhoods.

Sartor Resartus- Fashion and Gender in Nationalism

Clothing is another aspect of "everyday" Indian life which links gender to nationalist projects. Scholars concemed with sartorial issues acknowledge the dynamic worId of fashion, pointing to the fact that changes in clothing reflect pivotaI moments of change in a society's history. Certain communities, including nationalist groups, ignore the vitality of fashion, and instead attempt to naturalize and eternalize certain fashion codes, making it seem that members of their collectivity have always dressed in a specific way. However, scnolars like Emma

TarIo examine the various

controversial moment [s] when individuals and groups choose to change their clothes or combine one type of clothing with another. In analyzing specific historical and contemporary sartorial dilemmas the aim is to reveal the active role that clothing has played in the identity construction of individuals, families, castes, regions, and nations (Tario 1).

This section examines clothing as a serious topic of sociological inquiry in individual and communal identity formation, with particular regards to the notion 37 of gender. Clothing in the Indian Subcontinent during the late nineteenth century and onwards reflects a conscious effort to construct communal identities, utilizing gendered ideals to link fashion, gender, and nation.

British colonial interest in the clothing of Indians ranged from missionary concerns with lack of clothing ofindigenous peoples (related to morallaxness), to

18 economic production oftextiles . While there was no imposition of British dress on Indian subjects, sorne Indians took an interest in "Western" clothing.

Beginning in the late nineteenth-century, certain professional Indian men adopted

Western-style clothing, mostly in the workplace, but also sometimes at home.

While the donning of British attire was not met with unanimous or unquestioned social acceptance, men's ability to do so greatly outweighed Indian women's

19 capacity to dress as a "memsiihib ". This is, in part, related to the fact that women represented the essence of the community's identity, stood as its borders, and could not tolerate foreign infringement or advances. Men, on the other hand, were either seen as strong enough to resist British influence, or as impelled to partake in the "colonialist' s world" in order to gain or maintain economic or social status in an unstable time. Men's "contribution" to their own person success, to their families, and to their culture meant delving into certain aspects of

British culture, while women's "role" was to refrain from involving themselves in

18 Early nationalist leaders such as Dadabhai Naoroji, Justice Ranade, B.G. Tilak and G.K. Gokhale, Mohandas Gandhi, and Abul Kalam Azad linked the struggle for Indian independence with the manufacturing and choice of clothing. The purchase of swadeshi (Indian-made) textiles served to further economic growth and self-sufficiency, as weIl as a means to develop national self-respect and independence. Indeed, "having defined a number of Indian beliefs about the 'moral' and 'transformative' properties of c1oth ... Gandhi rekindled these essentially dormant beliefs when he encouraged Indians to reject British dress and return to Indian c1othes" (Tarlo 11- 13). .

19 "Mistress." Usually used to refer to Colonial British women. 38 it. Women, in their "domestic" realm had both the choice and the duty to remain alooffrom "Western" culture. Therefore, while men's adoption of Western clothing was perceived to be innocuous (or even necessary for social, economic, or political success in Colonial India), women's acceptance of British fashion threatened the very identity and core oftheir community. This tendency once again links the so-called "private" and "everyday" affairs of women with the fate of the nation. Thus, while Indian dress during the colonial period was a concern for both sexes, it became an obsession of certain nationalist and religious reformist groups. Women' s bodies, in particular, became sites of political, religious, and social identity formation, the manner in which the body was covered (or exposed) demarcating communal boundaries and testifying to the uprightness of the community. For Muslim women, this usually involved the full covering of the body with a shalwar kamis, headscarf, and in sorne cases, facial covering. A 'modest' sari, covering most of the body was deemed appropriate for

Hindu women. This body politic linked women, clothing, and nation together in a complex and intricate relationship. Clothing, then, has the power to communicate, much like language, and convey an individual's "morality" and communal affiliation.

Himani Bannerjee examines the social effects of British imperialism in

Colonial Bengal, in particular, the rise of the middle class and reformist movements, which were often related to the improvement of "women and gender relations prevailing in the family" (Bannerjee 1995: 69). Taking their cue from the missionaries' association of clothing, modesty, gender, and morality, reformist 39 groups in Bengal strove to "refonn" many areas ofwomen's lives, including that of dress. Portions of the Hindu Bengali middle-class intelligentsia sought to define "appropriate" clothing for women, suitability reflecting the religion, economic class, and other such socially defining characteristics. The ideal feminine, known as bhadramahiliï ("gentlewoman") brought those female members "of the propertied classes within the purview of 'civilization', 'progress' and utility" (Bannerjee 70). Middle class, Bengali Hindu women were expected to wear clothing that differentiated them from other classes and religions, and were to reflect the inner core of the woman, marked by a sense of lajjiï, that is, shame or modesty. Clothing that is sheer, revealing, or overly decorative was linked to primitivism and immorality, connecting colonialist discourse and fetishism to indigenous refonn movements. Bannerjee quotes Soudamini

Khastagiri: "The duty consists ofwearing clothing which shows one's national culture, covers one's body fully and which indicates instantly that one is a woman

of Bengal" (Bannerjee 95). Similarly, Charu Gupta, in her research on

communalism and gender in Colonial Uttar Pradesh, remarks that women's

fashion was an essential aspect of Hindu refonn. W omen were criticized for

frivolous fashions, which pointed to women's vulnerability to Western products

and standards, sexual immorality, and destabilizing of the family (Gupta 141).

Indeed,

These assertions became a fonn of social control and social organization, and dress a mechanism of inclusion as well as exclusion, a marker to differentiate between Hindu, Muslim and European women. While men had abandoned their pagri and dhoti and taken to European clothes .. .it was their duty to see that their women did not follow suit. Dressed in indigenous styles, women were seen as having retained the customs, 40

manners and prestige ofthe Hindus ... Hindu reformers thus had to introduce changes and new norms of dress, i.e. by making clothes longer and thicker, leaving no part of the body, including the navel, exposed. These immediately became 'indigenous' and 'traditional' (Gupta 142).

Hindu Nationalist groups response to British critiques on "immodest" clothing involved referring a "golden past" where the women were "properly clothed".

Women's dressing in decadent and disgraceful clothing is attributed to outside influence, corruption, and invasions, along with the nation's own degeneration, ignorance, and alienation from their "proper heritage." Therefore, nationalist groups naturalize certain fashion trends as organically "Hindu," which best represented the culture and values oftheir community, in response to Colonialist critiques on clothing, and also as a means of solidifying group identity.

For example, Debendranath Tagore, founder of the ecumenical Hindu group, Brahmo Samaj, made women's clothing part ofhis reform movement.

Seeking a style of fashion that represented both the culture and morality of

Bengal, Tagore linked the "inner and the outer self ofwomen and saw·her clothing as a moral signifier ofher social role and thus ofwhat they saw as the culture oftheir samaj (society) or class" (Bannerji 73). After searching through many Indian styles of clothing, Tagore found what he deemed as "appropriate":

"a civil and elegant attire in imitation of Gujarati women. This attire, an integral combination of indigenousness, decorum and modesty, was just what he had wanted. It suited what he desired and removed a fundamental deprivation of the

daughters of Bengal" (74). Therefore, Tagore selected Gujarati clothing as best

expressing Bengali principles and customs, naturalizing a certain type of clothing

as representing the true morality and culture of a community, indicating that the 41 perversity and misrepresentation of the existing fashion standards. Clothing, therefore, constructs the nation on the basis of a common culture. In this example, Gujarati culture and dress is transposed upon and natura1ized in Bengali society by reformers, who stress that they are aIl "just Hindus".

Muslim women also faced similar sartorial expectations. Shahnaz Rouse discusses Muslim women and fashion ideals in Pakistan. Once again, women' s clothing communicates religious and regional affiliations. She describes:

Men had taken to Western clothes early on in the colonial administration. This trend continued after independence, especially in the cities. Women, on the other hand, were expected to wear Pakistani clothes- with whatever regional distinctions prevailed. In other words, modesty in clothing, as manifested in local dress, came to be another marker of difference between men and women. It also became a marker ofwomen's identity and belonging. Women who wore skirts were invariably outsiders or treated as such. Pakistani Christians, who had taken to Western-style clothing from the colonial period, were thus clearly demarcated from Muslims" (Rouse 1998: 56).

The preoccupation with women's dress, manifested in the Colonial Subcontinent, continues to this day, linking fashion to communal identity, class, and religion.

The difference between the shalwar kamïs ("Muslim"), a sarï ("Hindu"), and a skirt ("Christian") marks gendered essentializations and communicates group affiliation. Women's fashion, a subject usually confined to the "private" realm, is politicized by certain collectivities to represent morality and communal allegiance.

Conclusion

Nationalist groups often utilize sacralized and gendered notions oftime, space, and community in their attempts to define the nation. Gender is foundational to the "nation-building" process, where women and womanly ideals 42 are utilized in the homogenization and incorporation of varied groups of people into larger communalist projects. Such gendered concepts are often based upon the division between the public and private spheres, which relegate the feminine to the private realm in order to retain the purity of the community. This conception generates the assumption that the "political" only applies to the public, masculine realm. 1 challenge this notion, highlighting the very political nature of so-called "private" and "everyday" life through an examination of the politicization of dothing and language. These "private" elements of society are gendered and utilized by nationalist groups in the perpetuaI and hegemonic construction of national identity. The following chapter further analyzes the traditional bifurcation of the public and the private through an examination of women and citizenship, questioning women's participation and roles within the nation. 43

Chapter Two: Participating in the Nation

"A country' s strength lies not in sky scrapers, roads, big schemes, nice c10thes but in their citizen's character, especially their women's decency, their cultures" (Sadhvi Kamlesh Bharati)

"If you have acquired real knowledge, then give no place in your heart to memsiiheb-like behavior" (Kundamala Debi)

"My mother died when 1 was a baby; 1 was nurtured by my motherland." (Vijrayraje Scindia)

This chapter continues discussion regarding the utilization of gendered ideals to construct, maintain, and transform the nation, but focuses on the notion of citizenship, as weIl as women' s roles in the creation and maintenance of national boundaries and identities. 1 question women's abilities to participate in the nation through challenging previous conceptions of citizenship. Following

Chapter One's investigation offeminine constructions of the nation, Chapter Two analyzes the various ways women interact with the nation, highlighting

"communalism's" diverse methods towards constructions ofwomanhood and the various roles women perform in such movements. These roles inc1ude, but are not limited to, that of wife, mother, and pedagogue, which encompass powerful and compelling ideals that give women an agential position in their movements.

Drawing on "historical," "mythical," and "historical-mythical" characters in

South Asian history, women in these roles are elevated and heralded as models worthy of emulation. In fulfilling these various idealized roles, women restore the nation to its hallowed and pristine status, by being "true" to the former glory of 44 the nation, which inevitably involves restoring men to their rightful place in society. Therefore, the performance ofideal womanhood in nationalist discourses grants women an alternative "citizenship" to state citizenship, which only sees active citizenship as occurring in the public sphere. Through this process, women also strengthen the community' s men, and in so doing, fortify the nation as a whole. Nationalism thus involves reclamation oflost manhood via the performance of ideal womanhood.

Gender ideals are never static or unchanging, but, like most performative prescriptions, are affected by the realities of those engaging with them.

Therefore, prescribed gender ideals are fluid, helping build the nation, but are also shaped, affected by, and revitalized by the nation-building process. Thus, while nationalist ideals often limit women's role in society, women have sorne power to manipulate these roles to gain access to social realms and to behaviours that, if not in a nationalist context, may be prohibited or taboo. 1 focus on gender ideals to argue that the politics of the so-called "domestic" sphere is not separate from that of the "public" sphere, and that the construction ofideal womanhood is at the centre of the creation of a national culture. This chapter will give special focus to the role women play as mothers and pedagogues, that is, disseminators of communalist histories, ideologies, and values, as an example of how that which has previously been to as the "private" should not be separated from "the political."

While this chapter examines how constructions of womanhood and femininity effect "real" women involved in these movements, it also questions the 45 ways in which these groups build on the gendering of the public and private spheres, discussed in Chapter One. What is the benefit of a group constructing itself entirely within the private sphere (read, "feminine" sphere)? Certain groups utilize the gendered rhetoric of the public/private distinction in order to portray themselves as the repositories of tradition. Casting the group in the private sphere, as an apolitical group, allows such organizations to claim that they truly represent "the people," as opposed to the corrupted "State." This points to the conclusion that as communalist groups construct ideals of womanhood, these ideals also shape the groups themselves, nuancing them and adding depth and appeal to those who may find the groups otherwise unappealing. The two particular organizations 1 focus on in the following chapter, the Muslim Tablighi

Jama' at and the Hindu Vishwa Hindu Parishad, gain support and certain benefits by relegating themselves in the private, "feminine" sphere.

Passport Please ... Women and Citizenship

The construction of citizenship offers insight into the complex relationship between individuals, collectivities, and the state. A basic understanding of citizenship emphasizes an individual's rights and duties in a collectivity.

However, this chapter stresses the complex and multi-faceted nature of citizenship, and gives special attention to the relationship between gender and citizenship. As highlighted by scholars such as Nira Yuval-Davis, citizenship indicates a "multi-tier construct, which applies to people's membership in a variety of collectivities- local, ethnic, national and transnational" (Yuval-Davis

1997: 68). An examination of gender and citizenship underscores multiple and 46 intricate methods ofidentity-formation, and highlights women's varied interactions with the state. Membership in nationalist groups offers an alternative to state citizenship, which has, through out history, been limited in terms of gender. Various nationalist groups in South Asia acknowledge "traditional" women's roles, and still consider such functions as consisting of "active" citizenship. Indeed, many traditionally idealized roles, such as mother and wife, are "activated" in nationalist discourse, the performance of these roles considered full participation in the nation. Therefore, communal constructions of citizenship build on the gendering of the public and private spheres, but also challenge

"modem" Enlightenment notions of citizenship where full, active participation in the collectivity only OCCurS within the public realm.

Throughout history, citizenship has been defined by diverse criteria, inc1uding both rights and responsibilities, such as the ability to vote or to own land, or the requirement to pay taxes. However, recent feminist scholarship reevaluates the notion of citizenship, and exposes the fact that social contract theory often overlooks the criteria of gender as affecting one's status in the nation.

Carole Pateman examines Western Enlightenment social contract theory and its relation to the construction of citizenship, and conc1udes that historically, gender has been overlooked as a factor that determines one's ability to participate in society. She states that, " ... the social contract presuppose[s] the sexual contract, and that civil freedom presuppose[s] patriarchal right ... ," (x [italics addedD indicating that men's power and influence over women foundational to the construct of citizenship. Exclusion of women has therefore been essential to both 47 the theoretical and the actual construction of citizenship. Pateman theorizes that patriarchal rule was eventually replaced with "fratemal" leadership (manifested as civil govemment), and had a social contract as its basis. This contract involves:

the transformation of the hegemonic power relations in the society from a patriarchy, in which the father (or the king as a father figure) rules over both other men and the women, to a fraternity, in which the men get the right to rule over their women in the private domestic sphere, but agree on a contract of a social order of equality among themse1ves within the public, political sphere. Women, therefore, were not exc1uded from the public sphere incidentally but as part of a bargain between the new regime and its member citizens (Yuval-Davis 1997: 79).

Therefore, civil freedom is not universal, but rather, is "a masculine attribute and depends upon patriarchal right" (Pateman 2). Full citizenship, therefore, is defined by masculinity, as the notion was based upon and built around ideas of patriarchy and naturalized gender distinction. A c1ear example ofthis mode of thinking from the Indian Subcontinent is Muhammad Iqbal, poet, philosopher, and one of the founding figures of Pakistan, who viewed citizenship as something available only to men. "Men were supposed to conceive ideas ... Women's role in history was as loyal wives, sisters and mothers, faithfully following the Shariat

[Islamic laws], he1ping men implement their ideas" (Jayawardena 44). Therefore, according to Iqbal, while women are valued for their contributions to the

Pakistani cause in certain prescribed roles, they are biologically prec1uded from fully participating in the nation-state.

More recent scholarship on gender and citizenship builds on Pateman' s arguments, and questions the assumption that the "private" sphere is necessarily

"apolitical." Nira Yuval-Davis questions the equation of the public domain with 48 the political sphere, and pronounces that the very construction of the boundary between the public and the private, "is a political act itself' (Yuval-Davis 1997:

80). Yuval-Davis proposes that instead of depending upon the strict dichotomy between the public and private domains, that there should be recognition of three specific spheres in which citizenship is enacted, and where so-called "political" activity takes place: the state, the domain offamily and kinship relations, and civil society. While the first two are rather self-explanatory, the term "civil society" de serves sorne explanation. The domain of civil society includes economic, social, and political relations, such as political parties, social movements, trade unions, education, media, and "formaI and informaI organizations, associations and institutions ... which are organized by/for members of particular ethnic/racial/national collectivities" (82). The following chapter of this thesis supports Yuval-Davis' acknowledgement that political activity is not only relegated in the domain of the "state," but recognizes the intricate interplay between aIl three spheres.

Yuval-Davis also challenges the typology of citizenship based upon the active/passive dichotomy, popularized by Bryan Turner. "Activity" and

"passivity" have been defined in different ways in various societies. "Activity" may refer to the exercising of voting rights, participating in warfare, or being financially successful, whereas "passivity" often denotes the opposite. Yuval

Davis speculates that once again, the active/passive dichotomy, along with the public/private dichotomy, does not take into account certain factors which affect ones' status in a collectivity. Gender, sexuality, age, physical and mental ability, 49 ethnicity, c1ass, and economic status are aIl extremely important in determining one's capacity to be an active member of a collectivity. Yuval-Davis poses the specific question, how does gender quantify one's worth in society? Are women viewed as "full-fledged" members of communities? 1 further this question by examining the cross-section between gender and religion in determining one's communal roles and influence. For example, if the state views full exercise of citizenship as the ability to participate in the military, that is, to risk one's life for the well-being of the nation, and men are ultimately constructed as those naturalized to do so, then women are automatically exc1uded from full citizenship.

Sikata Banerjee, discussing the construction of ideal Hindu manhood in nationalist agendas, examines the traits of the male Hindu "warrior" and contrasts them with that of a "typical woman":

The idea of the Hindu warrior ... is rooted in a notion ofmasculinity defined by attributes of decisiveness, aggression, muscular strength, and a willingness to engage in battle, [and] is opposed to a notion of femininity that is defined by traits such as weakness, nonviolence compassion, and a willingness to compromise (BaneJjee 2005: 14).

Men, as actualized and complete members ofHindu society, are diametrically opposed to women, who by their very nature, cannot participate in the nation as

"full citizens". This is not to say that female warriors and martial heroines do not exist in Subcontinental history. However, like most renowned images of martial women, "these images usually have either enhanced the constructed unnaturalness of women as fighters, or been made in such a way as to collude with more generalized notions of femininity and masculinity in the society from which the women fighters have come" (Yuval-Davis 1997: 94). 50

Many feminists, aware of the problematic gender issues involved in the notion of citizenship, have attempted to equalize power imbalances in the context of the state. These measures include the fight for women's suffrage, the participation of women in governmental positions, and the inclusion of women in national militaries, amongst other efforts. However, sorne women prefer to forgo involvement in the state, and seek empowerment outside of such structures.

Recent feminist scholarship examines how women' s agency and ability to participate in their community potentially lies outside of formai state organizations. However, this does not mean that their activity is not political, nor does it mean that their deeds do not affect "state" politics. Indeed, maintaining the notion that the "political" only occurs in the "public realm" upholds the binary oppositions between public and private, as well as active and passive discussed above.

Various nationaIist movements in the Indian Subcontinent demonstrate a

l challenge to modem , Western notions of citizenship, exemplified by the thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. While such groups maintain the gendered split of the public and private realms, the private realm is not seen as passive.

Indeed, the performance of idealized gendered roles is considered the enacting of full citizenship. Sorne strands of feminism try to equalize the imbalance created by the "Sexual Contract" by diminishing (or attempting to e1iminate) traditionally maintained gender differences, by promoting women's participation in public politics, encouraging women's involvement in the military, and other such

l ln this context, 1 invoke "modemity" to refer to Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment notions of citizenship. 51 methods. Therefore, in this framework, the traditional construction of citizenship remains unchallenged, while conventional gender roles are defied. However,

certain nationalist groups in South Asia oppose the very foundation of modern

notions of citizenship in their stance that women in traditional gendered roles (that

is, roles enacted within the private sphere) are fully participating as citizens in the

nation. Furthermore, as Yuval-Davis explains, the private sphere is not, and never

truly has been, divorced from the public sphere. It must be noted that the

2 development of the "Women's Movement " in South Asia has a different history

and development than those of Western feminist movements. According to

certain feminist theories, any ideology that maintains gender difference is not

radical enough in its efforts, nor is it "evolved" enough in its ideology. Therefore,

the place of women in nationalist movements develops into a hegemonic debate

concerning gender and citizenship. In this dispute, certain "Western" feminists

declare women in 'right-wing' groups to be "oppressed," while those that support

women in traditional roles assert that "Western" feminists are immoral and

irreligious. The groups that 1 discuss in Chapter Three, the Tablighi Jama'at and

the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, maintain gender differences, but see women's

2 Aiso known as the "Feminist Movement," or "Women's Liberation," which encompasses a vast array ofhistorical movements, which, overall, struggles for "women's issues," such as women's work and economic rights, domestic abuse issues, reproductive issues, sexual harassment, and other similar concems. The diversity offeminist movements must be acknowledged, as women of different ethnicities, nationalities, classes, and ages may aIl be working for different causes. Therefore, it is problematic to see "feminism" as a monolithic enterprise. For more information, see Khan, Ayesha. 1999. Rhetoric and Reform: Feminism Among lndian Muslims: 1900-1940. Lahore: ASR Publications; Kishwar, Madhu. 1999. Off the Beaten Track: Rethinking Gender Justicefor 1ndian Women. New Delhi: Oxford UP ; Kumar, Radha. 1993. The History ofDoing: An 11lustratedAccount ofMovementsfor Women's Rights and Feminism in lndia, 1800-1990. London: Verso; Nelson, Lise & Joni Seager, eds. 2005. A Companion to Feminist Geography. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 52 traditional roles in the private sphere as essential for the survival of the nation.

Therefore, women in "conventional" roles such as wife and mother are considered full and active citizens, rather than simply passive repositories that are acted upon by men, the "genuine" citizens of the nation. The next section highlights sorne of these traditional gendered roles, and offers sorne examples in South Asian nationalist discourses of women as model citizens in these roles.

Women and the Roles They Play

This chapter is interested in how feminine ideals affect the everyday experience ofwomen, and how the performance of the "ordinary" constructs the nation. Women's encounters with such ideals, however, is not passive or static, but involves an interaction, and a simultaneous upholding, resistance, and recreation of ideals. Tanika Sarkar (1995) contends that women are the

"guardians of. .. nationalist traditions, values, morals and ideology whose primary responsibility is to cultivate these ideas in their children" (Menon 49). However, women's interactions with these ideals create other spaces in which they locate themselves in nationalist agendas. This section explores various feminine ideals, such that ofmother, wife, and teacher. Nationalist movements often utilize gender essentializations to attract potential members and to further their causes.

The figures of wife and mother are two important gendered ideals of womanhood in communalist movements. Kalyani Devaki Menon addresses this ideal in Hindu nationalism, which portrays women as "mothers of their biological families and of the larger family or the Hindu nation. This image requires women to be chaste and self-sacrificing, placing the needs of family and nation above 53 their own" (Menon 188). Various interpretations of certain Hindu myths, figures, and frames of reference contribute to the construction of the feminine ideal.

These interpretations are not static, but like nationalist discourses at large, are

3 dynamic and cater to particular situations and to needs of the people • Women' s bodies represent important sites of the construction of nationalist ideals, as the numerical population ofthe community is dependent upon mothers' biological productivity. "Women as bearers of the children of an ethnic group are

'guardians' of the 'race', keeping ethnic boundaries intact, and demarcating the juncture between internaI cohesion and external difference" (Gupta 8). An ideal

3 This thesis does not suggest that women's involvement in nationalist movements is limited to their roles as wife and mother. On top of the many parts women play (other than wife, mother, sister, etc.) in nationalist ideologies, much recent scholarship focuses on women's roles as ascetics and warriors within communalism, which offers interesting insights into women's interaction with gendered ideals and sexuality. Asceties and warriors, for example, adopt many different responsibilities and rights than women in "domestic" roles, and often subvert, invert, challenge, or manipulate "normative" womanly behaviour, forging new positions of respect and "independence" within nationalist movements. Paola Bacchetta, studying RSS women as Hindu nationalist ideologues, devotes portions ofher examination to female ascetics and warriors, and their challenge to the domestic, maternallifestyle: "Here, the woman who chooses independence through celibacy, dedieation to other women (the Samiti), and an ideal (the Hindu Nation) instead of dedieation to an individual male, her own spatial mobility and the process ofbecoming a space for-herself over functioning as a space for a man to come home to, is valorized and provided with the means to realize such choiees, albeit solely within the parameters carved out by the organization" (Bacchetta 2004: 71). Amrita Basu also examines three of the most prominent Hindu nationalist w0II:len activists, Sadhvi Rithambara, Uma Bharati, and Vijayraje Scindia, all of whom are Hindu celibates, the fIfSt two being siidhvïs ("celibates"), and the latter being a widow. These powerful spokespeople have stepped out oftypieal domestic roI es and emerged in the public sphere as evocative public speakers, often rousing and mobilizing large groups of people for their causes. However, take note that these particular women have forfeited their sexuality in order to gain safe entry into the public sphere, which reinforces the Hindu notion that female sexuality is simultaneously "powerful and dangerous" (Basu 1995: 162). Therefore, women work with many of the "typical" domestic ideals espoused by communalist ideologies, but they also participate in the manipulation, reinterpretation, and recreation ofthese ideals in the forging of alternative paths within the nationalist movements. Note that while religious asceticism is an option for certain Hindu women, the same is not true for Muslim women. In general, asceticism is frowned upon in Islam for both men and women, and marriage is seen as "half the religion" according to Prophetie tradition. Therefore, the structures of asceticism are already in place in the Hindu tradition, and Hindu women may draw on them while still remaining 'within' the tradition, while Islam does not pro vide Muslim women with the opportunity to enter the public realm through these means. While this topie offers valuable insights to women's constructions and manipulations of gendered ideals in nationalist movements outside of the so-called "domestic sphere", the issue extends beyond the scope ofthis thesis. 54 religious nationalist woman not orny gives birth to future nationalists, but also acts as the carrier of the community' s culture, honour, and value systems.

Therefore, the destiny of the nation rests biologically and socially on women, who physically carry the generation to come, but who also act as the repositories of the culture, honour, and values of the community. Women are able act out this role because of their supposed distance from the contaminating forces of the outside world in the "private sphere."

Many examples of revered wifehood and motherhood exist in Hindu traditions. The most famous model of ideal womanhood is that of SUa, idealized wife of the deity-king, Rama, glorified in the epic RiimiiyGl}a. SUa is an exemplar

4 ofwhat is commonly referred to as apativratii, or a virtuous and ideal wife •

However, an increasingly popular figure utilized in Hindu nationalist groups is

Jïjabaï, a seventeenth century woman and mother of Sivajï, a Maratha king in

Westem India. While there is much folklore and focus on Sivajï in Hindu nationalist discourse, his mother, Jïjabaï, is fast becoming an icon in many female

Hindu nationalist chapters. Mythology of Jïjabaï' s life and influence on her son exemplify the admiration of certain feminine ideals, such as motherhood. The

4 The termpativratâ relates to the wordpâtivratya, or faithfulness to one's husband. A wife's religious experience is inextricably tied to the way she treats her husband, ideallyas a deity, regardless ofhis character or actions. An excerpt from Viilmiki's Râmâya1}a demonstrates this concept: "'Whether he lives in the city, or he lives in the woods, whether he is evil, or he is inauspicious, the woman who loves her husband atlains the best regions ... Evil women whose hearts are dictated by passion and who behave as superior to their husbands do not understand the merits or demerits in this manner. Maithilï, such women who have been overpowered by wrong actions indeed destroy their own code of conduct, and atlain disrepute in addition. But women like you [Sïtii], who are well-qualified, and who can visualize the later regions, good or bad- such women will atlain to heavenjust as weIl as ones who have done meritorious deeds'" (Aklujkar, Vidyut. 2000. "Anasuya. A Pativratâ with Panache." In Faces ofthe Feminine in Ancient, Medieval, and Modern India. Mandakranta Bose, ed. New Delhi: Oxford UP. pp 57-58). 55 following story is one told during a stikhti, or a training session of a women' s wing of the RSS:

Jijabai was ... Shivaji's mother. She was born in 1597. Since childhood Jijabai saw the atrocities committed by Mughals against Hindus, their temples, and Hindu women. She saw screaming women being abducted during the day. One day during her childhood, she was standing on the terrace with a friend. She saw a man urinating on the wall of the Shiva temple. She became very angry. She complained about this to her family, but everyone remained silent. An elderly person said: 'Daugher, he is a Muslim. He is a govemment worker. We cannot say anything to him.' Her soft heart was filled with di stress seeing all this and [she wondered] whose victory are these Hindus stmggling for? Why couldn't this event show them the way to independence? Who would motivate them? Nobody was prepared to give her the answers to her questions.

(Menon 2005: 109)

This story points to several important facts: it is JljlibaI who acts as the visionary, teaching others in traditional power positions (exemplified by the 'elderly person') of their duty to fight Muslim mIe. She is the only one who does justice to the glory and honour of the Hindu nation's past, exemplified by the Siva temple, and is the only one with the courage to motivate the passive members of the community against the injustice of foreign domination, represented here by the Muslim govemment worker. It is this sense of responsibility that she passes onto her son, SivlijI, and inspires him to reclaim power and masculinity, which had been undermined by the Muslims invaders. In this way, JïjlibliI, through enactingfeminine ideals, also teaches men how to regain their masculinity.

Motherhood is equally extolled in an Islamic context, relying upon biological gender distinctions and thereby naturalizing women's nurturing qualities. These important factors render her essential in the collective Islamic

"project" via her physical, emotional, and ideological rearing of the future 56 generation of Muslims. Furthermore, insisting on alternative lifestyles which

"counter" a woman's maternaI role diminishes the importance ofher role in the development of the community, and therefore undermines nature and God:

She alone can be impregnated, carry and deliver the child, and then suckle the baby. Rer gentle, caring and se1f-sacrificing temperament is best suited to bringing up children and looking after the home. To say that she should also earn a living is an unacceptable injustice and implies that everything she does for her home and children is worthless and needs to be supplemented by an outside coyer. A woman already has to play in society a great and noble role as mOther of a new generation, a role for which no man can cIaim the honours (Abdullah 199ge: Il).

The role of the mother in Islam is therefore naturalized and sacralized, and constructed as one aspect of the "feminine ideal." Sayyid Abu al-' A'la Mawdudi was a writer, politician, theologian, and Muslim ideologue, and founded the

5 Jama'at-i-Islami, an Islamist political party in Pakistan in 1941 • Mawdudi, a prominent thinker who influenced Egypt's Sayyid Qutb6 and shaped many Islamic revivalist movements, sought to "to restructure Indian society in an Islamic pattern through the creation of a small devout group to act as leaven for society as a whole" (Shehadeh 25). The creation of Pakistan in 1947 provided Mawdudi and the Jama'at with the perfect opportunity to cultivate this ideal. Mawdudi's ideal

5 See Chapter Three ofthis thesis. 6 Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), a significant Egyptian Muslim theoretician, formed the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that was implicated in the assassination ofEgyptian Prime Minister Gamal 'Abd-al Nasr. Qutb declared that aIl modem day states (including Muslim societies) to be illegitimate, as they were ruled by human law and thus betrayed the tenets ofIslam. He employed the termjiihilïyya ("ignorance") to describe the state of such societies. The termjiihilïyya is conventionally used to describe the state ofpre-Islamic Arabia, but Qutb's politicized usage ofthe term indicates his beliefthat aIl modem Muslim societies are ruled illicitly, and that only the foundation of an Islamic State will grant Muslims the opportunity to fulfill their religious obligations, by obeying only the law of God. For more information, see Abu-Rabi, Ibrahim. 1996. lntellectual Origins oflslamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World. Albany: SUNY Press; Moussalli, Ahmad S. 1992. Radical lslamic Fundamentalism: The ldeological and Political Discourse ofSayyid Qutb. Beirut: American University of Beirut. 57 society relied on naturalized gender roles and segregation to develop and nurture the nation. Shehadeh quotes Mawdudi:

'to preserve the morallife of the nation and to safeguard the evolution of society on healthy lines, free mingling of both sexes [should be] prohibited. Islam effects a functional distribution between the sexes and sets different spheres of activity for [each]. W omen should in the main, devote themselves to the household duties in their homes, and men should attend to their jobs in the socio-economic spheres' (Shehadeh 29).

The major problem with "modem" society, caused by many factors, such as

British Imperialism, was the distortion of gender relationships and boundaries and ensuing social chaos. Mawdudi cites that his inspiration to become a Muslim political activist was partially fueled by an experience he had in Delhi in 1973, in which he saw that Muslims were '''rapidly moving away from Islam .. .1 saw

Muslim shurafa [honorable] women walking the streets without purdah [veil], an unthinkable proposition only a few years ago. This change shocked me so greatly that 1 could not sleep at night, wondering what had brought this sudden change among Muslims '" (Shehadeh 31). The solution to this dilemma was the fostering of stable familial relations, which has at its core, the ideal wife and mother, which

Mawdudi cites as an Islamic gender ideal, which he compared to Westem notions of gender equity, which would:

have women share the workplace with men, attain economic independence, and mingle freely with the other sex, thereby promoting immorality, promiscuity, perversion, and declining birthrates. This would subvert their natural duties and create a social imbalance that would bring about a breakdown of the family unit, the pillar of society (Shehadeh 31).

While the husband provides for the family, the wife, loyal to him, remains responsible for the home and family. As mentioned above, women's denial of 58 this natural domestic ability contradicts her innate qualities, such as love, mercy, and gentleness, that is, qualities which render her inefficient in the public sphere.

Indeed, Mawdudi states that based on the Qur 'an and haazth traditions that

"women have no place in government or state councils, and their only sphere of action is the home" (Shehadeh 41). Therefore, Mawdudi's idealization of motherhood, and womanhood at large, upholds the distinction between the

"public" and "private" realms, and "de-politicizes" aIl action that occurs within the domestic sphere.

In light of the perceived deterioration of society, safeguards are erected to maintain the private, feminine realm, which is the last bastion of purity and hope of the nation. Many ofthese safeguards concem themselves with women's sexuality, both in physical terms and in more abstract fashions. As Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin argue, "it is because the honour of men and their communities is located in women's bodies that women become the targets of violence both at the hands of their communities as weIl as ofthe rival community" (Menon 2002:

60-1).

An example of a physical defense against danger and contamination in both the Muslim and Hindu nationalist communities is purdah, or seclusion.

Purdah (literally, "curtain" in Urdu), whether in the form ofveiling or domestic seclusion, is part ofmany women's daily existence. While viewed as a "proper" means of female religious expression in sorne religious communities, purdah also carries socio-economic implications, both of which affect the status of women.

Whatever the interpretation,purdah is attributed to women's need for male 59 protection, and increases women's dependency on men in many aspects of daily life (Jeffery 209). The male is thus responsible for working and providing income, for acquiring the material needs of the household, and for representing the family in the public sphere, thereby reinforcing separation between the public and private spheres. For example, various Hindu nationalist groups cite the institution ofpurdah as being a result of anxieties towards the "over-sexed"

Muslim male. Likewise, child marriage also gains validation in certain nationalist movements as a safety-measure for the community. Gupta refers to a common

Hindu viewpoint demonstrating the relationship between purdah and child marriage, stating, '''The habit ofkeeping [Hindu] women in purdah had its basis in the lustful Muslim. The evil system of child marriage began because it was better to give girls to a Hindu, so that their chastity could be protected, than to wait for them to flourish into youth, as a sheer glimpse of their beauty would

7 result in them becoming a prey of the evil and cruel yavan " (Gupta 245-6).

Likewise, the practice of satï, or the ritual fire immolation of Hindu widows upon their husband's funeral pyre, is also justified as a social guard ofwomen's safety and chastity. Widows illustrate their fidelity by burning themselves alive, so that no external forces (namely, foreign men) may corrupt her, as she is vulnerable without the protection ofher husband. In her recent field study, Kalyani Devaki

Menon quotes a woman in the women's branch of the RSS: "'Things like satï are new [to Hinduism]. It happened when Muslim invasions got worse. Satï custom was invented at this time" (Menon 172). The institutions of child-marriage,

7 From the Sanskrit, yavana. Implies 'the fair skinned,' 'the Greeks,' or more generally, 'foreigners. ' 60 purdah, and sati therefore represent examples of measures sometimes critiqued by nationalists from within the movement, but justified as a defense of the community's women against the threat of the "other." AlI ofthese practices are condemned as not being part of "true" Hinduism, but rather, were necessary meaSures which arose due to the Hindu nation's degenerate state. In particular, the encroachment of foreigners into India demanded extreme measures to ensure the purity of the women of the community. The historical degeneration of society therefore requires a loss of the so-called fundamental and due rights of women.

Dissemination

One gendered role in communalist projects that highlights the intersection between women, state, civil society, and family is that of religious and cultural educators of the nation. As pedagogues, women interface with the politicization of social and religious change. As the repositories of the nation's glory, history, virtue, and honour, women have the capacity to link the past with the future, and to connect the microcosm of the family to the macrocosm of nation. Women are able to "recover" the "true" nation by remembering, retraining, and re-educating their community, specifically in matters of culture and religion, that is, the essence of the nation. There is a critical need to initiate change and develop the future of the community in the home, with what a mother teaches her child. In this capacity, women, especially older women of the community, are empowered to decide what "right behaviour" is by their community' s standards, and therefore, decide who "deviants" are. Therefore, women link and sacralize nationalist notions oftime (past greatness and future recovered glory), space (geographical or 61 ideological), and community (as women represent the borders of the nation) in their role as pedagogues. While they disseminate knowledge and customs

"approved of' by the men of the community, women as teachers are not simply passive conduits of patriarchal knowledge. Women participate in the creation of religious and cultural views, though the construction of such views is often limited by the community' s men.

An example of the importance of women as pedagogues in nationalist movements is Paola Bacchetta's work on the RSS, a Hindu nationalist group.

Bacchetta compares ideological and practical differences between men' s and women's factions ofthe RSS The original organization, the Rashtriya

Swayamsevak Sangh was created in 1925, while the Rashtriya Sevika Samiti, the women' s branch of the organization, was created in 1936 as the first "family organization." The very existence of a special women's wing of the Sangh indicates that women have a unique place in the group, with gender-distinct needs and responsibilities that the Sangh cannot itself provide. This is due to the belief that women are inherently distinct from men in their nature and roles in the nationalist movement. Indeed, "the [Samiti's] name contains initiaIs identical to the Sangh's (RSS), but in it the term swayam (self) is absent. The justification is that a man's selfis individual, while a woman's 'implies not only the individual selfbut also family, society, nation, religion and culture'. The 'development of a man is the development of an individual' while the 'development of a woman is the development of the whole society'" (Bacchetta 2004: 7-8). Therefore, women' s societal functions as nurturers of the family and collectivity formulates a 62 re1ational identity, and therefore necessitates a different approach to the dissemination of communal ideologies. Bacchetta argues that while much of the ideology espoused by both groups is necessarily the same, there are indeed

8 distinctions between the interpretations of rhetoric, belief, and practice . Both the

Sangh and the Samiti focus on women as mothers, who are "supposed to give birth to sons, educate them, send them to battle, but for the Samiti, mothers also have a primary role in the sons' self-realisation, and are direct agents in the resurrection of the Nation" (Bacchetta 2004: 41). Therefore, as evidenced by the story of Jijabai re1ated above, women, as repositories of communal glory and purity, and as disseminators ofnationalist ideology, have unique and essential roles in nationalist movements, instrumental in the attainment ofindividuals' self- awareness as part of a collectivity. These ideas will be more fully explored in the following two chapters.

Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the concept of citizenship, and argued that previous discourses on citizenship have been incomplete, specifically with regards to gender. Previous feminist scholarship confronts this deficiency and claims that the very classification of citizenship has been founded upon patriarchy. In light of the contentions and gender issues surrounding state citizenship, nationalist and communalist groups offer women an alternative to traditional state citizenship and a different means of participating in their communities. These groups stress the insufficiency of the political rights granted by citizenship to achieve women's full

8 For specifie examples, see Baeehetta, Paola. Gender in the Hindu Nation: RSS Women as Ideologues. 2004. 63 equality and autonomy. Instead oftrying to eliminate gender difference and gain equality for women by positing them in traditionally male-dominated roles and arenas (namely, the public sphere), many communalist organizations offer women full and active citizenship based on traditional feminine roles in the public sphere, such as those discussed in the previous chapter. The tension between the different methods of gaining equai and valid citizenship for women reflects a competition ofhegemonies, and reflects the diversity offeminist approaches towards gender equity.

In the following chapter, 1 examine two South Asian communalist groups, namely, the Muslim Tablighi Jama'at movement, and the Hindu Vishwa Hindu

Parishad, or VHP. 1 have chosen these groups based on several points. Firstly, both fit the description of "nationalist", "transnationalist", or "communalist" movements. Secondly, within these groups, there is a strong focus on the role of women as religious and cultural educators of society. ThirdIy, both of these groups make a strong appeal to define themselves as apoliticai "cultural" communities. It is my hypothesis that by labeling themselves as apolitical, these groups uphold the public/private distinction attributed to the Colonialist Period in the Subcontinent, and make an effort to portray themselves as confined to the

"private" realm. In doing so, there is a denial of the complex interplay between the beliefs, rituals, and discourses of these groups with the domestic, civic, and national spheres oflife., In light of the corrupting influence ofthe public/masculine/political sphere, these movements build on the gendered split between the public and the private realms, so that like the idealized women of 64 communal movements, they can uphold the "true" and "authentic" Muslim or

Hindu tradition. 65

Chapter Three: Recovering the Nation: Women in the Tablighi Jama'at and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad.

"We have left our homes to reform ourselves, before we reform others" (Maulana Muhammad

Ilyas)

"1 understand that one has to learn English to build one's career in today's times, but 1 don't approve ofwearingjeans" (VRP Girls' Camp Participant).

The first two chapters of this thesis contend with the construction of feminine ideals within nationalist rhetoric, as well as women' s participation in communalist movements. 1 have discussed the constructions and implications of the nation as feminine, as weIl as interpretations of women as the repositories of the essence of a culture or nation, and their related roles as reproducers and domestic pedagogues of the nation. This chapter locates these discussions within examinations on two specifie communal groups, namely, the Muslim Tablighi

Jama'at and the Hindu Vishwa Hindu Parishad, two of the most widespread

Muslim and Hindu movements in the world today. Both of these Subcontinental movements arose in similar historical contexts of religious reform, with similar motivations and goals. These groups criticize the corruption of official party politics and accuse "the State" of not truly representing "the People," and portray themselves as working solely within the "private sphere." This characterization relies upon the gendered distinctions between the public, "contaminated" realm and the private, "pure" sphere discussed in previous chapters. Both Tablighi

Jama'at and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad therefore depict themselves as "populi st,"

"transnationalist," and "nonpolitical" movements, and provide alternative modes of citizenship for both Hindu and Muslim men and women. 66

This chapter focuses on the rhetoric of women as cultural repositories and pedagogues within the Tablighi Jama'at and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and the potential for both their empowerment and subjugation in these contexts. These roles are extremely important to these groups, as both are motivated by the anxiety of conversion. Therefore, women, as the essence of the nation, as weIl in their capacity as teachers of women and children, safeguard the community

(especially those liminally situated on the borders of the community), which has been weakened by various means, such as foreign invasion, or ignorance of one's own history, beliefs, or traditions, and is therefore susceptible to encroachments of other religious communities. Therefore, female nationalist pedagogues of the

Tablighi Jama'at and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad greatly influence the formation and dissemination ofnationalist ideology. They are the sustainers of the core values ofthe group, mostly within the patriarchal framework of ideai womanhood, but simultaneously challenge existing societal "norms." Therefore, women are not simply passive sources of ideas, but rather temporarily displace male authority. While, in certain ways, the two movements reinforce traditional foundations of women' s subordination, they also offer women a certain degree of mobility, as well as innovative ways to engage as citizens of a community.

Indeed, women in these groups contribute to the formation of religious, cultural, and national identities. This alternative understanding of what it means to participate in the nation is made possible by a reconsideration and reformulation

of the notion of citizenship, and reflects the opinion that "state" citizenship is

somehow lacking. 67

While the Tablighi lama'at (henceforth Tl) and the Vishwa Hindu

Parishad (henceforth VHP) were founded almost fort Y years apart from each other, (the former founded circa 1927 and the latter, 1964), both groups are intimately tied to the so-called "Missionary Wars" of the nineteenth century. In order to contextualize these organizations, 1 now turn to the historical background in India in the early twentieth century, which witnessed a preoccupation with religious conversion in both Hindu and Muslim communities. Fears oflosing those perceived of as on the "borders" of the community to proselytization contributed to anxieties about the status of the religious community as a whole, particularly due to British colonizers' stress on the numerical strengths ofvarious religious communities in South Asia.

Proselytizing and Purifying: Missions and Reformist Groups in the

Subcontinent

The decline of the Muslim Mughal dynasty and consolidation of British presence in the Indian Subcontinent, culminating in the 1858 Royal

I Proclamation , had an obvious impact on religio-political affairs in South Asia.

Relations between social and religious groups shifted, altering existing power structures between religious groups, and also within religious communities, as weIl. For example, the relationship between upper class Muslims, known as the ashraj and the ajlal, or lower classes, who often engaged in "syncretic" practices, shifted during this period. With the deterioration of Muslim rule and the erosion of elitist control, the divide between the variéd Muslim classes

1 See footnote in Chapter One. 2 From the Arabie, "noble." 3 From the Arabie, "uneivilized." 68 narrowed, forcing members of different social statuses to see themse1ves as

"members of a single, separate and distinct community or even as a separate nation ... " (Sikand 2002: 19). At the same time, British missionaries challenged the "irrationality" of indigenous religions, particularly Hinduism, countering what they sawas "backwards" religiosity with a "rational," "civilized," and monotheistic form ofChristianity4. Furthermore, relations between Hindus and

Muslims of North India came under immense strain during the late nineteenth century with the attempt to solidify and homogenize Hindu and Muslim re1igious communities, as weIl as the effort to retain adherents located on the margins of the tradition. In this context, "marginality" applies to those South Asian communities involved in "syncretic" practices. In 1871, the British introduced the decennial census, in which communities that adhered to a syncretic form of

Islam or Hindu traditions were forced to identify themselves as either 'Muslim' or

'Hindu,'

the se terms themselves defined according to an extremely reified understanding of religion. The census can also be credited with actually creating, among others, two completely new categories that never existed before- the pan-Indian 'Muslim' and 'Hindu' 'communities'. These were wholly new categories, and must be seen, in a sense, as colonial constructions to facilitate imperial control (Sikand 2002: 25- italics added).

4 For more information, see Sen, Amiya P. 2003. Social and Religious Reform: the Hindus of British India. Delhi: Oxford UP ; Copley, A.R.H, ed. 2003. Hinduism in Public and Private: Reform, Hindutva, Gender, and Sampraday. New Delhi: Oxford UP; Flood, Gavin, ed. 2003. The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 69

These ideological and policy shifts resulted in preoccupation with numeric populations of religious communities, as the larger the community was, the more jobs and seats it was granted in Imperial services and councils. Therefore, this point in history marks an extreme effort on the part of both Muslims and Hindus in lndia to consolidate, unite, and define their communities, to mobilize existing members, to reach out and gain new adherents to the religion, and to look after those in the community who exist on its peripheries. This is the backdrop for the development ofmovements such as the Tl and the VHP.

Both reformist religious groups, the TJ and the VHP should be understood within the context of the suddhi, or purification movement led by the Arya

Samaj5. The Arya Samaj is a Hindu reform group whose aim is the consolidation ofvaried Hindu communities into a universal movement. Founded by Dayananda

Sarasvati in 1875, the group responded to British missionary critiques on certain issues, in particular, image-worship, the status of women, and polytheism. As

Killingley states, Hindu reformists responded by:

justifying the beliefs and practices in question, or by repudiating them as aberrations from the true Hinduism, or as misrepresentations on the part of its opponents. Moreover, the dominance of Enlightenment ideas in the arena of public debate, together with widely held assumptions of Christian and British superiority, meant that the resulting body of Hindu apologetic was presented in terms of Western ideas of reason and morality which were assumed to be common to aIl civilized people (Killingley 2003: 513).

Swami Dayananda wished to combat feelings of Hindu inferiority spurred by such criticisms, and therefore stressed the notion that Hinduism was rational and scientific, and consciously emulated what he considered to be the opponents of

5 "The Society of Nobles." 70

Hinduism, namely, scriptural Islam and Christianity (Sikand 2003: 100). The doctrines of the Samaj reflect direct responses to Colonial critiques, stressing a formless (singular) God, a single corpus ofholy texts (the Vedas), and a socially engaged consciousness. Womens' issues, a major concem of Christian missionaries, were also the target of the Samaj' s reforms, which stressed widow remarriage and girls' education. Swami Dayananda also condemned idolatry, animal sacrifice, child marriage, ancestor worship, and the caste system (in

6 particular, untouchability), and attempted to universalize Hinduism •

The overarching goal of the Arya Samaj was a missionary one, and various schools and proselytizing organizations were established for this purpose.

Understanding both Christianity and Islam as missionary religions, Swami

Dayananda decided that the only way to counter such potential threats was to render Hinduism into a proselytizing religion as welt1. "He decided in 1860 to target first those Hindus who hadjoined Islam or Christianity, and he launched a movement to caU them back to Hinduism. This doctrine came to be known later as "Shuddhf' (purification)" (Masud l). A ceremony known as suddhikaran was

6 See Lata, Prem. 1990. Swami Dayanand Sarasvati. New Delhi: Sumit Publications; Arya, Krishan Singh. 1987. Swami Dayananda Sarasvati: A Study of His Life and Work. Delhi: Manohar ; Sa1mond, Noel. 2004. Hindu Iconoclasts. Rammohun Roy, Dayananda Sarasvati and Nineteenth Century Polemics Against Idolatry. Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier UP. 7 While Hinduism is rarely defmed as a "proselytizing" religious tradition, this does not indicated that conversion ofnon-Hindus never occurred. Rather, through out time, non-Hindus existing in the areas of caste Hindu societies have often been pressured through various means into being incorporated into the Hindu fold. Indeed, Sikand states that " ... Over the centuries, non-Hindu groups living on the fringes of caste Hindu societies have been gradually absorbed into the Hindu fold as castes, generally relegated to the position of Shudras or 'untouchables', if from artisan, labouring or tribal groups, or else as Kshatriyas, if recruited from ruling tribal groups. This process ofHinduisation, which extended over several generations, often, though not necessarily always, resulted in the transformation of the local religious tradition through the incorporation of beliefs and practices associated with Brahmanical 'Hinduism'. What sociologists calI Sanskritisation was, in effect, precisely a process of conversion of non-Hindu groups into the Hindu caste order (Sikand 2003: 100). 71 posited as an ancient Vedic ceremony, and the targets of such missions primarily being Muslims who had converted to Hinduism being received back into their

"original" religion and caste. While the initial response to suddhi was mixed, over time, it came to be accepted by the so-called "orthodoxy" of Hinduism, and was no longer limited to a concem of the Samaj, particularly after events such as the Mapilla rebellion in 1921.8 The rebellion impelled even stronger missionary efforts in North lndia, particularly regarding the Malkana Rajput community, who engaged in so-called syncretic Hindu and Muslim practices, but identified themselves as Muslim in the census. According to the 1911 census, 1052 Muslim

Rajputs converted to Hinduism between the years of 1907 and 1910 (Masud li). lndeed, as Sikand indicates, "appeals were .. .issued to target virtually all the

Muslims ofIndia for shuddhi" (Sikand 2002: 35). Suddhi was aimed at entire

9 communities , which increased apprehension of religious and cultural sublimation, as individual conversions resulted in social ostracism from both the new and the old religious communities, leaving the individual in limbo.

The Muslim community met such missionary efforts by the Arya Samaj with anxiety of cultural absorption, and in tum, formed what came to be known as

8 In 1921, the Mapillas, a Muslim peasant community in South India, staged a violent rebellion against the British and their local supporters, the majority ofwhich were high-caste Hindus. In this rebellion, alleged "forced conversions" of Hindus to Islam occurred, though reports on the numbers of such conversions vary according to different accounts.

9 Suddhi was directed at entire communities because individual Muslim converts were often shunned by their families and old communities upon conversion, and were also rejected by their new Hindu communities, due to anxieties of pollution. This often led new converts to revert to their former tradition. Therefore, converting entire communities minimized the possibility of revers ion, as an individual's support network remained intact (Sikand 2003). 72 tablïghlO movements. Muslims, questioning the success of the conversion efforts of the Arya Samaj, came to the conclusion that the community's failure rested in a lack of basic and fundamental religious education of the "common Muslim". The ashraf and 'ulama', or religious scholars, had little connection with the religious education and activities of the ajlaf but in the wake ofthe success ofthe Samaj, many Muslim thinkers began to stress that Islamic awareness was the only method at retaining their community' s strength and identity. The 'ulama' were no longer the only Muslims responsible for the religious education of the community. Instead, tablïgh movements stressed the importance of every individual's role in uplifting and cultivating Muslims, especially those on the margins of the community:

Muslims themselves had been neglectful in properly educating them as weIl as other nau-Musiims ["new Muslims"] in the essentials of Islam, as a result of which they had still retained many Hindu customs. Consequently, it was possible for them to slide back into Hinduism at the instigation of the Aryas. The Muslims ... had been complacent about the Islamic education of the nau-Muslims because they believed that once they renounced Hinduism there was no way they could go back to their ancestral faith (Sikand 2002: 43).

Therefore, the end of the nineteenth century represents a period of great political and social instability, in which Musiim and Hindu groups attempted to reform those elements deemed contradictory to "true" Islam and Hinduism (both

10 The word "tablïgh" derives from the Arabic verb "bal/agha," which means "to cause something to reach, to communicate, and to report," (Masudxx) highlighting the focus ofsuch movements as the conveyance of a message, rather on the "success" of a conversion. "Conversion is not the duty or the mission of a prophet or a preacher; this is left to the free choice of the addresses ... The duty of a preacher ends with the communication of the message" (Masud xx-xxi). 73

1 homogenized and reified categories constructed in the Colonial Period) 1. Both religious communities intensified efforts at bringing their message to a wider audience, to de-mystify traditions usually only practiced by or understood by the religious and social elite, and to fortify their traditions through the religious education of the "common" person. Indeed, the perception that both communities were threatened led to a preoccupation and anxiety concerning religious conversion, and efforts were made by both Hindu and Muslim reformist groups to retain those members oftheir religion who were at the margins of the community, usually identified as relatively recent converts, or those who engaged in syncretic practices.

Interestingly, women were often the primary targets ofboth Muslim and

Hindu reformist efforts. If women exhibited any behaviours or expressed any beliefs that could possibly threaten the purity of estahlished religious norms, they were either ignorant of their own heritage or "tainted" by outsider traditions, and therefore must he re-educated to once again represent "true" Islam or Hinduism.

Women's ignorance of and deviation from their own tradition symbolized the degeneration of the entire religious community. To re-educate the women of the

Il Discussion on ''true'' Islam or Hinduism offers interesting insights on conceptions of the "centers" and the "margins" of religious traditions. Delineating precise borders of a religious community sometimes results in the perception ofa "sliding sc ale" ofreligiosity, in which "orthodoxy" is equated with the religious beliefs and practice of those at the so-called "center" of a tradition. According to sorne scholars, "centrality" in religious tradition is linked to geographical centrality, creating an urban/rural dichotomy. The lower classes, low-caste Hindus or ajlafMuslims, often located in village settings are therefore conceived by reformists as being on the low end of the "scale" ofreligiosity, and in sorne cases, are considered to have never been "fully converted" from their "former traditions." "Village" or "folk" traditions, then, are to be distinguished from "authentic" and "rational" traditions exemplified by the urban elite. For more information, see von Schwerin, Kerrin Graefm. 1981. "Saint Worship in Indian Islam: The Legend of the Martyr Salar Masud Ghazi". In Ritual and Religion Among Muslims in India, Imtiaz Ahmad, ed. New Delhi: Manohar. 74 community, then, was to initiate a process of communal rejuvenation. Yoginder

Sikand highlights this preoccupation with women's purity ofbelief and action.

Muslim reformists, he states, began to pay more attention to Muslim women,

"whom they saw as bastions of 'Hinduistic' customs and traditions. The reformed

Muslim woman was now seen as playing a central role in the project of reforming the Muslim family and, in the process, the Muslim community as a who le"

(Sikand 1999: 42)

The Formation and Ideology orthe Tablighi Jama'at

As indicated above, many Muslim groups at the turn of the twentieth century were concerned with tablïgh, or the practice of conveying information about the basic beliefs and rituals ofIslam. The TJ was one of several movements

l2 concerned with da 'wa , or missionary work. Maulana Mohammad IIyas (1885-

1944) the founder of the TJ, came from a religious family in New Delhi in 1885, and graduated from the Darul 'Ulum Deoband, a reformist theological seminary which counters rationalism and secularism, associated with Western culture, and which emphasizes the sunna13 of the Prophet Muhammad. Initiating his tablïghï work with the Meos,14 IIyas deduced that the main problem with the Muslim community was a lack of the basic understanding of Islam. This lack of religious education made nau-Muslims ready targets of missionary movements, such as the

Arya Samaj:

12 From the Arabie root da 'li, "to calI on." 13 Literally, "custom," "way of acting," usualIy referring to the actions and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, and collected and remembered in a literary form known as f:zadïth ('report'). 14 Ilyas was initially concemed with a group ofnau-Muslims living in Mewat, known as the Meo Muslims, who practiced what was considered a "syncretic" form of Islam, venerating Muslim saints and Hindu deities, and who also participated in Hindu festivals, such as Holi. 75

The essential thrust ofthe movements was to 'purify' the borderline Muslims from their Hindu accretions and to educate them about their beliefs and rituals so that they would not become an easy prey to the Hindu proselytizers. Its aim was thus to bring about a reawakening of faith and a reaffirmation of the religiocultural identity of Muslims. The Tabligh movement, however, did not try to convert non-Muslims to Islam; its exclusive focus remained on making Muslims better and purer Muslims (Ahmad 1991: 511).

Ilyas believed that Muslims needed to develop their faith and to and cultivate their practice. While he did not completely reject the 'ulamii', he implicitly criticized them for not offering sufficient education to those in the Muslim community who needed it most. The TJ' s official origin dates to circa 1927, just after the main thrust ofthe Khilafat Movement,15 and should be seen Maulana IIyas' response to

Hindu efforts of suddhi. The movement also stems from IIyas' perception that

Muslims require guidance on the proper performance of religious rituals and obligations in order to strengthen their communal identity.

The Tablighi Jama' at: Major Tenets and Practices

Maulana Muhammad lIras envisioned the TJ as a movement of ordinary

Muslims performing the same roles in the community previously on1y assigned to the 'ulamii' or ~üfi sheikhs, namely, that ofteacher and preacher. The TJ's main method for producing a "lay leadership" was through the actual mission, or tablïgh process, which involves a highly systematic method of proselytization.

The rationalization of the tablïgh tour is that "aIl Muslims could teach others the key values and practices of Islam and that the very act of teaching others would in fact best teach the teachers" (Metcalf 1998: 109). Therefore, the practice of performing tablïgh benefits both the preacher and the audience, as it educates

15 See footnote in Chapter One. 76 both parties. Indeed, Ilyas explicitly stated that " .. .it was the journeyer, not the audience, who would be most significantly changed" (Metcalf 1998: 109). The tablïgh tour is Ilyas' most significant departure from the typical methods of the

'ulamâ', his goal to promote 'moving madrasas' , rather than permanent educational institutions (Metcalf 1996b: 51). The process also eradicates social hierarchies between the religious elite and the "common Muslim," the gap between the two perceived as one of the main reasons for the amount of uneducated Muslims on the Subcontinent. Ideally, one performs tablïgh once a week, three consecutive days per month, fort Y consecutive days per year, and three consecutive periods of fort Y days in one lifetime. Groups of about ten to twelve individuals engage in missionary tours, staying in a mosque, praying, and preaching to members of the community's they travel to. In doing this, members of the Tl engage in "sacred time," the act of tablïgh viewed as a return to the pristine time of the Prophet Muhammad, those involved reliving his sunna by educating those around him of the truth of Islam. "What turns out to be at stake is not [sacred] space ... but time, in which the past and future converge in the present. In Tabligh, participants seek to relive the highest moment ofhuman history, the Prophet's society in Medina, and in so doing to taste the joys of the eternal happiness promised to them in Paradise ahead" (Metcalf 1996: 123).

Through tablïgh, individuals leave the normal circumstances of their daily life, shed alI vestiges of worldly wealth and status, and participate in a movement in which hierarchy is consciously dissolved, as "this world" (duniya) is temporary and illusory. It is the âkhira, or afterlife that concerns the Tl. AlI Muslims are 77 equal in the afterlife, the only thing that sets individuals apart from one another in the afterlife being the deeds they performed in the duniya.

Ta actualize the beHefthat the mundane world is temporary and illusory, the Tl cultivate notions of simplicity, through the use of plain speech, dress, and subject matter. "Rationalism" and "philosophy" are not ofinterest to the groups' endeavours. Indeed, reading books other than those written by the leaders of the

Tl is highly discouraged (Ahmad 516). Members of the Tl are encouraged to wear simple clothing and while on tour, men dress very much alike, donning

"white cotton above-the-ankle straight-Iegged pajamas, long shirt, and cap, regarded as Prophetically enjoined" (Metcalf 1996b: 55), though for women, such detailed prescriptions are not given. Women are supposed to dress simply and always maintain purdah while out of the house. However, wives are encouraged to beautify themselves to the extent that they are pleasing to their husbands. As

Sikand states, " ... Particular importance came to be placed on the symbolic value of the physical body as a repository or reflection of Islamic commitment, as a site of crucial markers of identity c1early setting apart Muslims from others. Thus,

'Islamic' dress was seen as inseparable from one' s own commitment to and practice ofIslam" (Sikand 2002: 77). In terms oflanguage, the Tl utilizes very simple Urdu in its missions, instead of technical or philosophical terminology or high Arabic, in order to increase the size of its listening audience (Mayaram 228).

Ofparticular interest to this thesis is the TJ's supposedly apolitical nature.

Following the logic of the deceptiveness of the duniya, the Tl emphasizes that affairs ofrule and govemance are secondary to those of religion and spirituality, 78 and hence, the group defines itself as apolitical. The degeneration of the Mughal

Empire acts as an indication that Muslims of the Subcontinent are not focused enough on religious devotion. Ilyas conceived of the TJ as having no party or formaI type of organization. Members pay their own way while on tablïgh to avoid the issue of governmental or political funding. Indeed, during Partition, the

TJ advised Muslims not to become involved in protests, demonstrations, or

16 looting. Ilyas challenged groups such as Maulana Mawdudi's Jama'at-i-Islami , commenting that the groups' approach to religion is solely political motivated and therefore lacking religious substance. "Political power is thus 'a gift of God bestowed by Him at His own discretion when and where He wills,'" (Ahmad

520). If Muslims gain political power, it should not be forfeited, but rather, practiced in accordance with the teachings of the Qur'ëm and sunna. However,

Muslim rule should not be sought after, as it will be a natural byproduct of the regeneration of true Muslim faith and practice. The only "nation" that the group concems itself with is that of the global Muslim nation, or the ummah. The TJ

16 The Jama 'at-i-Islami, ("Islamic Assembly" [JI]) founded in 1941, less than a decade before the partition ofIndia. Along with the TJ, the JI represents a reaction to the hegemony of"the State." However, unlike the TJ, the JI overtly identifies itself as a political party, and stands for the implementation of the "lslamic State," as Muslims should only be ruled by "Divine Law." Mawdudi initially opposed the formation of the state of Pakistan, declaring all national borders to be superficial and divisive. Indeed, the JI was not originally formulated as a political party, but as the Pakistani Independence movement grew, the group was forced to contend with the reality of Partition, and chose to work with the reality of the state to advance a more 'Islamic' version of Pakistan. Indeed, the JI ho Ids that to be apolitical is to be unlslamic, as the denial ofIslam's relevance in the political sphere is to deny the holistic nature of the religion. AIso, while the TJ portrays itself as a grassroots, egalitarian organization, the JI holds that only a small, elite group of individuals can guide Muslims in their religious and political endeavors. For more information, see Ahmad, Mumtaz. 1991. "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia." ln Fundamentalism Observed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Ahmed, Rafiuddin. 1994. "Redefining Muslim Identity in South Asia: The Transformation of the Jamifat-i-lslami." ln Aeeountingfor Fundamentalisms: the Dynamie Charaeter ofmovements. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Rahman, Khalid, Muhibul Haq Sahibzada, and Mushfiq Ahmed, eds. 1999. Jama 'at-e-Islami and National and International PoUlies. 79 defines therefore itself as a transnational organization 17, and is adamant that the group has absolutely nothing to do with politics. However, it is plain that IIyas' message does indeed have political overtones. He states, "If Muslims were to unite once again, no power in the world could harm them ... Muslims are being subjected to oppression throughout the world because they are disunited'"

(Mayaram 238). This statement highlights Maulana IIyas' conception that the unit y of Muslim people around the world will restore Muslims to their former glory, and that this utopian unity can be achieved through the efforts of the Tl.

However, ifMuslims ignore the message oftab!fgh, the outcome will be fragmentation and oppression. Therefore, the Tl not only works outside the operations of"the State," but offers Muslims an alternative membership and means ofparticipating in the religious community. However, the Tl's efforts at universalization results in a homogenization of Islam.

The Tablighi Jama' at and Women

As stated previously, the Tl was formed in order to recover the perfected teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, to retrieve his examples and legitimate practices, and to remove sources perceived as outside of the "pure" tradition of

Islam. In many senses, women, as repositories of a community's lost glories (see

Chapter One), are central to the movement, although Tl women are significantly less visible than Tl men. Maulana lIras encouraged women's involvement from the inception of the movement, understanding that his goal would be incomplete ifwomen were not included in the effort. However, women's work primarily

17 After Ilyas' death, his son, M. Yusuftook on a leadership position in the movement, and is associated with the globalization and systematization of the Tl (Mayaram 1997: 223). 80 began after his death, during the career ofhis son, Maulana Muhammad Yusuf.

Essentially, women of the Tl are obliged to perform the same actions as their male counterparts, though with certain restrictions. W omen are encouraged to engage in tablïgh tours and religious pursuits (discussed below), but are mostly confined to the private sphere. Women's status as wife and mother in the discourse of the Tl augments her devotion. However, women are not limited in their domestic capacity. They are urged to be active in the revival of Islam, but this activism is to remain within the private sphere.

In the tabïghï worldview, women are not biologically or mentally inferior to men. In this sense, Ilyas' drew from his Deobandi background and from the works of the influential Deobandi scholar, Maulana Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi (1864-

1943). One of Thanawi's most popular works was the Bihishti Zewar ("Heavenly

Omaments"), which was "intended to provide a basic education for a respectable

Muslim woman" (Metcalf 1990: 3). In the Bihishti Zewar, Thanawi indicates that:

Women and men are essentially the same, endowed with the same faculties and equally responsible for their conduct. Both must contend with the fundamental human condition of the struggle between intelligence or sense, 'aql, on the one hand, and the undisciplined impulses of the lower soul, nafs, on the other ... Though men and women are identical in aIl that matters, Thanawi never questions their different social roies. Women are meant to be socially subordinate to men and to adhere to the shari 'at standard of sec1usion, when possible, inside the home (Metcalf 1990: 8-9).

The Tl draws from this philosophy, and articulates that one of the aims ofits reforms is the ordering of society, which inc1uded the restoration ofwomen to their "rightful place". Regarding women's participation in tablïgh, Maulana 81

Yusuf is quoted as saying, "only the following should be allowed: women should read and teach religious books. They should abide by the Islamic customs in their entirety and make their relatives conform to them also ... " (Masud 2000: 104).

Therefore, secular education is not viewed as useful to women, as men only require it to earn a living and support their family. Women have no need for this sort of education, because the earning of income is the primary responsibility of male family members. However, since women are essentially intellectually identical to men, the central activity in the TJ, the tablïgh tour, remains a fundamental component ofwomenjama'ats. Only married women are allowed to participate in tablïghï tours, and they must be accompanied by a male family member, preferably their husband. Iftheir husband is unavailable, any mal;tram, or person with whom marriage is forbidden to the woman, is allowed to accompany her on the tour.

During the tour, women must remain in strict purdah, as they must not come into contact with any non-mal;tram males, and therefore, usually stay in peoples' homes, rather than mosques. Women engage in activities similar to those performed by men on tablïgh. This includes discussion of what are known as the Chhe Btitën, or "Six Points," which indicate the fundamental points which

18 the TJ focuses its education on, namely, the article offaith (Kalima Tayyiba );

19 prayer ($altit ); knowledge of Islamic princip les ('Ilm) and remembrance of God

18 NameIy, Lii iliiha illa 'lliihu MuJ:tammadur rasü/ulliih, or "There is no God worthy ofworship except Allah, and Mul).ammad is the Messenger of Allah.") 19 Rituai prayers that occur five times daily. The TJ stresses the importance of congregationai prayers for men 82

21 (DhiVO); respect for Muslims (Ikram-i-Muslim ); sincerity of purpose (Ikhlii~-i-

2 3 Niyyar ); and sparing time (from worldly endeavors) (Ta.frïgh-i-Waqr ) (Masud

2000: 21-23). The TJ defines itselfas distinct from traditional "orthodox" Islam in terms of its understandings of the last four points, especially the notion of

"sparing time." Other than the Chhe Batën, women read and discuss texts known asfaza'il Qur'an (merits ofreading the Qur'an), or which recount stories from the lives of early Muslims, and exemplify Muslim ethics and beliefs. These teachings inc1ude a section on women and les sons learned from the example of early

Muslim women. However, in many cases, the qualities which are so celebrated in women in these stories is also carried over to male tablïghs, also: "The women enjoined as models in such cherished texts as the I:Iildiyatus ~aJ)aba are celebrated for just what it is that men should also be: humble, generous, pious, scrupulous in religious obligations, brave in the face of persecution, and so forth" (Metcalf

2000: 50). Furthermore, lectures, known as bayans, conceming various religious discourses, are delivered to women, usually from a learned male tablïgh, either a mal;ram of one of the jama 'at 's women, or a leader from the community. When delivered by a man, these lectures are given from behind a curtain to maintain the regulations ofpurdah. However, knowledgeable and experienced women of the

20 The TJ "defines 'ilm and dhikr differently than do the' ulamii' and the ~üfis ... The Tablighi literature speaks about the magical effects and extraordinary rewards of dhlkr, but it restricts this within the Scriptures and within the' ulamii 's accepted framework. The Tablïghi Jamifat defines knowledge as learning the virtues ifaq.ii 'il [fazii 'il]), and rewards in the Hereafter, of aIl obligatory acts and other things a person does. Obviously, such knowledge can be obtained by studying the Qur'an and a~iidïth (traditions of the Prophet)" (Masud 2000: 22). 21 Cultivating a feeling of respect and forbearance towards an Muslims n an attempt to strengthen communal ties. 22 Performing an acts with the sole intention of eaming the pleasure of Allah. 23 That is, taking time away from one's mundane life and devoting oneselfto tablïgh. 83 community may also address the female jama 'at. That being said, certain restrictions are in place in this scenario, as weIl:

Extreme care should be taken that a woman does not speak in an authoritative tone as if she is delivering a lecture. The reason for this, says a tablïghï eIder, that this is the age ofjitna (disorder), of great corruption and degeneration, and 'much evil', he warns, can come out ofthis. Just as women should 'always keep their bodies completely concealed', he says, so too 'must their voiced be kept in complete pardah '. Unlike a man, who can give a lecture from the pulpit (minbar) or while sitting on a chair, if a woman is to address her sisters she must, like them, sit on the floor and speak to them. In no case should she stand up to speak to the others, as that goes against what are seen as notions offeminine modesty. She must speak as she would in an ordinary conversation and not try to imitate the forceful, emotive style of the male tablïghï speakers" (Sikand 1999: 44-5).

The above excerpt highlights that even in female audiences, women of the TJ

must maintain certain behaviours which distinguish them from their male

counterparts, adhering to specific ideal feminine qualities and traits. Due to the

degenerate state of worldly affairs, women must educate in a tone of modestly and

4 submissiveness, as the voice is part of the 'awrct . Authoritative behaviour is

viewed as unbecoming for TJ women, as firmness and zeal are markedly male

characteristics.

Along with the tablïgh tour, women are involved in weekly meetings

(ijtima's), which inc1ude discussions of the Chhe Batën and narrations of the laza 'il. However, these weekly meetings only take place with the approval of the

local male tablïghïleaders (Metcalf2000: 50). While the meetings are

educational and reinforce the TJ's teachings, they also give women a chance to

socialize in contexts where women' s congregation is often limited due to strict

24 That is, part ofher being whieh must be guarded or eovered. From the Arabie, meauing "weak spot." 84 regulations on purdah25 or the stress of domestic duties. Both "spiritual" and

"mundane" issues are addressed. Therefore, the Tl offers women the chance to bond and form a strong sense of community within the movement. The purpose of such meetings is thus twofold: to serve as a pedagogical gathering, teaching women about Islamic ideals and practices for the strengthening of dïn, but also for the creation and maintenance of a strong, unifiedfemale community. The social interactions promoted by the Tl, whether on tour or in weekly gatherings, are meant to make women (and men) active participants in the teaching and remembrance of the Prophet Muhammad and his example. In doing so, tablïghïs take on the responsibility of tapping into the sacred time of the Prophet, and encouraging each other to live according to his example, and thereby reviving the

Muslim community.

Furthermore, women's ijtimii's highlight another special obligation of female members ofthe Tl. Along with their own obligation to perform tablïgh, women should also encourage their male family members to go on tour. As

Metcalfmentions, "women's meetings should include ... the identification of men from their families who will go out for Tablïgh. This entails writing down the names of male relatives, the time they should spend on tour, and the expenses they can meet" (Metcalf 1998: 113). Women should encourage their husbands, fathers, brothers, and other male relatives to perform their obligations, and thus act as reminders of spiritual obligation. AIso, when men return from tablïgh, they

25 In the South Asian context, women are not typically allowed in mosques. Indeed, a common justification for this is that a woman's home is her mosque: her centre of activity for mundane and spiritual matters. For more information, see Metcalf, Barbara. 1996. Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe. Berkeley: University of Califomia Press. 85 should impart what they have learned on tour to their female relatives. Therefore, women receive religious benefits from the tours of TJ men. Along with the increase of religious knowledge, women who send their menfolk on tablïgh are said to earn blessings for the afterlife: "A woman who sends her husband 'on the path of Allah' for tablïgh and maintains her modesty while he is away wilL .. 'enter he aven 500 years before her husband, where she will be crowned as

26 the sardar of70 thousand angels and heavenly houris ", (Sikand 1999: 49).

The TJ emphasizes women's obligation as primary educators ofher children, as weIl as other women. Their involvement in the Tl provides useful in imparting this education on those she is responsible for. The sharing of knowledge, within the confines ofpurdah, makes women actively influential in the well-being ofher community. Mothers are often referred to as the "first madrasa oftheir children," (Sikand 1999: 49). She therefore has a huge influence on the future of the Muslim ummah, as Ilyas' vision of the regeneration ofthe

Muslim community hinges on the proper education ofMuslims in religious matters. Women should also take every opportunity to:

spread the message of tablïgh to aIl their female relatives, guests, and neighbours who come to their homes, as well as even to female beggars who knock on their doors, soliciting alms. W omen, thus, are provided with a new instrumentality that they hitherto have lacked (Sikand 1999: 50).

In educating others, women take on the role of making every Muslim a repository of the true essence of the community, and actively perform a role in the restoration of the Muslim community. lndeed, women of the Tl express their

26 From the Arabie l}Üfïya, meaning "virgin ofParadise" or "nymph." 86 instrumentality by highlighting that it is often women, not men, who get their families involved in tablïgh. In her research, Metcalf comments that upon asking

a group of women if they became involved in the Tl through the men in their families, "they were indignant at my failure to recognize how often it was women- dating back to the Prophet' s day- who had offered correct guidance to men" (Metcalf 1996a: 116).

While the Tl enforces very traditional and "orthodox" gender roles, it also

offers opportunities, for men and women alike, to simultaneously unsettle such norms. It is true that a woman'shome is her mosque, and that domesticity is

viewed as the fulfillment of a woman's dïn. As Sikand states, "Great divine

blessings also await that woman who does aIl her domestic chores properly and tends to her children ... The woman who sweeps her house while engrossed in zikr

will receive with the reward for sweeping the holy Ka'aba itself' (Sikand 1999:

47). However, within these confines, both men and women partake in activities

that deviate from so-called "traditional" behaviour. While on tour, male tablïghïs

have to cook, clean, sew, assist, and wash for one another, aIl of which are

typically seen as "womanly" activities. The reduction of hierarchicallines forces

men, young and old, wealthy and poor, to serve one another and to create a fraternity of dependence on one another. In the process, many male tablïghs gain

a new appreciation for their wives, and the daily chores that they perform.

Women, on the other hand, take on what are commonly viewed as male

responsibilities. "They sustain the household so that men can go out, thus earning

themselves equal reward" (Metcalf2000: 50). AIso, women can potentially 87 devote their lives to tablïgh instead of raising a family, (Metcalf 1996: 116) but this is rarely the case, as the roles of wife and mother are so highly esteemed.

Many critiques of the Tl comment on men's lack ofresponsibility in leaving their wives for substantial amounts of a time, while she stays at home, acts as a single parent, and is unable to leave the confmes ofpurdah for any reason, thus rendering her dependent on other male relatives. However, members of the Tl insist that Allah rewards those who make the sacrifice to go out on tablïgh by taking care of all domestic issues while the man is away.

Therefore, women' s involvement in the Tl denotes an ambiguous reinforcement of traditional gender values, as weIl as a simultaneous opening of opportunities for women to gain mobility and influence as educators of women and children. Women are valued for their domestic roles of cooking, cleaning, washing, and in short, nurturing the family. However, they are also expected to provide religious sustenance as weIl. Indeed, during the tablïgh tour, women

acquire independence not afforded to many women in traditional contexts.

Within the Tl, the act ofteaching elevates women to the same status of the

'ulama', a role denied them (and many male Muslims) in most contexts. As pedagogues, and the first "madrasas" oftheir children, Tl women help retrieve

and relive the sacred time of the Prophet MuJ:.lammad, thereby recovering the

pristine Muslim nation. The tablïgh process draws women into the

transnationalist discourse, as the education of the community in the fundamentals

in faith and beliefunites Muslims across traditional boundaries. However, while

women gain status and mobility through their involvement in the Tl, at the same 88 time, aIl power gained is dependent upon the allowance of males of the community and of the family. Male expectations of dress, behaviour, and attitude must be followed for women to have access to such social advancements. AIso, while men and women are expected to cultivate similar ideals, such as simplicity of language, women are still restricted by gendered ideals, and therefore, women's speech must still be less commanding and fIrm than male speech. Thus, while the tablïgh tour grants women power as pedagogues, after the tour is completed, both men and women must go back to performing traditional gendered roles.

The Tl offers women the opportunity to participate in their religious community in ways different from overtly Muslim political groups, such as

Pakistan's lama'at-i-Islami. Citizenship in the transnational Muslim ummah, according to the Tl, does not require "state citizenship," since the realm of politics has become corrupted through forces such as secularization and

Colonization. Muslims must seek internaI spiritual renewal, and the pursuit of worldly affairs such as politics mns counter to this endeavour. However, this viewpoint furthers the dichotomy and widens the gap between the religious and political realms by a complete focus on private, religious renewal. Concentration on the private has implications for men and women both. The private, "feminine" realm is idealized, and seen as the only sphere where Muslim rejuvenation can occur. Therefore, the Tl is not concerned with venturing outside of the community and proselytizing to non-Muslims, but rather, focuses on the interior solidifIcation of communal boundaries, providing defenses against perceived 89 threats such as outside encroachment, conversion, or assimilation. W omen, as discussed in the previous chapters, both require protection to maintain the purity

ofthe community (via mechanisms such as purdah), and also uphold the boundaries of the community through the performance of ideal womanhood.

Women of the Tl are wives, mothers, and pedagogues, and in the se roles, they are brought into the discourse ofteaching Muslims how to enact "true" belief.

Females of the Tl are se en as active members of the community, behaving and

operating very similarly to Tablzghzmen. However, women's activity is

especially obvious in their roles as teachers and proselytizers. By teaching

women and children the basics of belief and the proper ways in which to perform

religious obligations and rituals, Tl women are empowered, and help their

community "recover" its "true identity." However, while the Tl grants women

freedoms in terms of mobility and leadership, these freedoms are limited by the

socio-religious expectations by the men of the community. A sisterhood of

Muslim women may be cultivated through membership in transnational Tl, but

this community is guided and monitored by the Tl Muslim fraternity.

VHP: Beginnings

Like the Tl, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, or "World Hindu Council," must

be seen in the context of movements like the Arya Samaj, in which efforts were

made to consolidate a singular Hindu community, giving special attention to those

considered on the periphery of Hinduism. Indeed, those following the Samaj

philosophy perceived Hinduism as being in degenerate state, as a result of both 90 foreign invasion and Hindus' own ignorance of their own traditions. During this time, the doctrine of Hindutva, (see Chapter One), informed the creation of various nationalist, political, social, and cultural organizations. The first organization founded upon the doctrine of Hindutva was the Rashtriya

Swayamsevak Sangth (RSS)27. The RSS was founded in 1925,just two years after the officiallaunch of the TJ, and portrayed itself as a cultural group, rather than a political group, its aim being the revival of Hinduism and Hindu society.

The RSS gained vast popularity after its foundation, and consequently, laid the foundation for the formation of other Hindu organizations, sorne overtIy political,

such as the Bharatiya Janata Party ("Indian People's Party," BJP), as well as the

8 Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHPi • These various organizations formed a loose

29 network of Hindu associations known as the Sangh Parivar , or "family of

organizations." It is extremely important to note that all groups belonging to this

"family" impact one another. While each group has its own specific motivations

and goals, their pursuits are perceived as the same: the rejuvination of the Hindu

nation. Therefore, while groups such as the RSS daim to be apolitical, their

beliefs and actions affect and are affected by the overtIy political BJP, and vice

versa. Indeed, there is much overlap in terms of membership in the various

organizations. In many cases, groups of the Sangh Parivar equate the Indian

nation with the Hindu nation.

27 Association ofRindu Volunteers (lit. "self-servants."). 28 Literally, "World Rindu Council." 29 As of2005, the Sangh Parivar inc1udes the RSS, the BJP, the VRP, the Bajrang DaI (an offshoot of the VRP), and the Swadeshi Jagran Manch. 91

The VHP arose during the 1950s and 60s, when, under the direction of

RSS ideologue, M.S. Golwalkar, Shivram S. Apte (formerly a high ranking RSS official, and later to become general secretary of the VHP) began a campaign to launch a Hindu organization to deal with various "Hindu" issues. Apte corresponded with hundreds of leading Hindu thinkers, philosophers, and organizations of various Hindu sects, both inside and outside of India, to gather support for such an organization. The formulation for the Vishwa Hindu Parishad occurred during this August 1964 meeting, and the officiallaunch was then scheduled for 1966 in a "world convention" of Hindus. The basis for this convention was couched in Vedic terms, Apte commenting that, "It is our tradition ever since Vedic days to come together in the hour of Crisis in the anxiety to reform the society and remedy the ills" (VHP Website: History). The

VHP was formed in a period of perceived cri sis to unify Hindus and to promote

"Hindu values," and was therefore formulated as a non-political, cultural-spiritual group. The non-political nature of the group was emphasized by the decision that no office bearer of any political party was allowed to simultaneously hold a position in the VHP. In the first meeting, the definition of Hindu was outlined, following V.D. Savarkar's open-ended description: "The word 'Hindu' is not to be taken in its narrow, restricted sense. The term 'HINDU' embraces "all people who believe in, respect or follow the etemal values oflife- ethical and spiritual that have sprung up in Bharat'" (VHP Website: History). Indeed, from the perspective of the VHP, all various divisions of Hinduism, induding Vai1?navas,

Saivas, Saktas, as well as religions that arose from Bhiirat (the Sanskritized, 92 mythologicalland of India, as opposed to the modern, nation-state of India) , including Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs are included in the umbrella term "Hindu."

The VHP: Major Aims and Ideologies

The VHP portrays itself as a Hindu populi st movement, and sees itself as carrying out several of the aims of the Arya Samaj, namely, the unification of

Hindus in belief, practice, and goals. The main aspiration of the group is to

"bring the image of a united, strong, and nonsectarian Hindu community to ordinary folk" (Sikata Banetjee 87). In general, the VHP aims to:

consolidate, strengthen and make invincible the global Hindu fraternity by following the eternal and universallife values based on Sanatan Dharma and work for total welfare of humanity on the basis of the unique cultural ethos of Bharatvarsha; To promote activities of education, medical aid and relief to the poor or any other activity in the advancement of general public utility for furtherance of literature and scientific and socio-religious research ... (VHP website: Aims and Objects- italics added)

Specifically, the goals of the group include the provision offinancial and medical relief to those areas affected by political and climatic upheaval, the education of the community regarding Hindu religious, social, and ethical principles, the portrayal of Hinduism as a religion compatible with "modern" scientific and

"rational" thought, the protection and cultivation of Hindu religio-cultural markers such temples, as weIl as the Sanskrit language, and the offering of economic assistance to those facing social injustice, such as untouchables or widows (VHP Website: Aims and Objects). While the RSS is more systematic in the creation of an elite class of Hindu leaders, the VHP is more of a grassroots, mass organization, reaching out to Hindus aIl over the world. 93

Another aim of the VHP is the consolidation and codification of Hindu ritual and belief, in order to homogenize the tradition, thereby unifying and mobilizing significant amounts of people. In its 1979 World Conference, the

VHP formulated "six do' s for every Hindu". This list directs aIl Hindus to perform devotional rituals to the sun every morning (süryanamaskiira); to

acknowledge the om symbol as holy, and wear it around their necks and use the

emblem on their personal items; that the Bhagavad Gïtii is the sacred Hindu text,

and should be kept in every Hindu home; that aIl Hindu homes must have an

image of the family deity in it and residents should worship it daily; that Hindu

homes must grow tulasï, a holy plant; and that every Hindu should go to the

temple regularly for religious inspiration (Bhatt 2001: 185). These six proposaIs

are meant to unify the varied Hindu communities around the world- especiaIly

those Hindus living outside of India- and simplifies the irreducible diversity of

Hindu traditions to formulate a single Hindu identity. It is interesting to note that

like the Arya Samaj, the VHP, as evidenced in this list of "Six Do's", responds to

criticisms most likely issued by Christian missionaries. Indeed, the designation of

a single religious symbol, the regulation and simplification of daily ritual actions,

the appointment of a single required holy text, and the requirement for regular

temple attendance marks a departure from previous Hindu traditions, and bears

resemblance to traditional Christian understandings of religious practice.

Until the 1980s, the VHP was somewhat limited in its actions. However,

the group developed as an activist branch of the Sangh Parivar especially after

their success in the town of Meenakshipuram, Tamil Nadu in 1981. During that 94 time, a group of Tamil untouchables, faced with social rejection and ostracism, converted to Islam. Much like the case of the nineteenth century, this mass conversion alarmed and enraged caste Rindus, and propelled many nationalist groups into action to "redeem" the situation. The VRP responded in several ways, including a jnana ratham, or chariot of religious wisdom, which consisted of a van outfitted with "audiovisual equipment and a 'powerful public address system,' as weIl as images of the Tamil deity Murukan. During the chariots' travels, low castes and untouchables gained the chance to perform püja, or the offering ofprayers to the deity, as weIl the opportunity to perform abhi~eka, or ritual washing ofthe deity. A "learned individual" traveled with thejnana ratham, and preached 'in the most simple and appealing manner.' Re was accompanied by VRP workers whose mission was 'to promote the tenets of

Rinduism and to prove its superiority over any other religion or faith" (McKean

107-8). In this way, the VRP utilized religious images and tools to petition a response to those who converted to Islam. This example highlights the VRP' s utilization of religious ritual (in the form of püja and abhi~eka) in their communal efforts, as weIl as their anxiety regarding the loss of members of the Rindu community, to other "competing" religious traditions in the Subcontinent.

Rearkening back to the suddhi efforts of the Arya Samaj, the VRP assumes that all Muslims and Christians, and even "indigenous" people (what the VRP refer to

30 as vanavasis ) in India were, at one point in history, Rindu:

30 The VRP refers to the "tribals" oflndia as vanaviisis ("forest dwellers"), rather than the common term, iidiviisis ("fust peoples"). In refusing to use the term iidiviisi, the VRP extends the myth that Hinduism is the most ancient tradition in India, and further the notion of Sanskritic 95

The VHP has renamed this movement paravartan and translates it as 'homecoming.' Like advocates of shuddhi, the VHP relates its homecoming campaign to a decreasing Hindu population and offers as proof census figures which show a decline in Hindu population ... As if the shuddhi movement never existed, paravartan or homecoming is depicted as a wholly new phenomenon within Hinduism. The VHP asserts that those brethren who were lost to alien faiths in the last 1,000 years had not been 'welcomed back' by Hindus. However, this is no longer the case (McKean 106).

Interestingly, according to the VHP,paravartan does not actually classify as

"conversion," as it only involves the return of individuals to their so-called original religion. The perception is that individuals have somehow been tricked or coerced into conversion, because otherwise, one would never willingly convert from Hinduism. The VHP's assistance with "homecoming" is therefore seen as a service to individuals who require integration into the Hindu fold and who may require "rehabilitation." McKean comments, "The VHP does not specify the processes involved in their 'rehabilitation and integration." Their 'rehabilitation' may well entail an 'integration' which demands deference to and dependence on upper-caste VHP leaders and supporters" (McKean 107).

The emphasis on cultural preservation of Hindu values is readily witnessed in the VHP' s focus on the "reclamation" and conservation of Hindu sites. The most contentious of such sights the site of a disputed Rama Temple in

Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. According to the VHP and other Sangh Parivar affiliates, the Babri Masjid, a sixteenth-century mosque, was built over a razed temple commemorating the birthplace of the Hindu deity-king, Rama. The VHP

hegemony. By utilizing the term vanaviisi, there is an implicit understanding that those who live in the forest are simply degenerate Hindus who have forgotten "true" Hindu practice and belief. 96 was one of the leading voices in the Ramjanmabhumi Movement, which demanded the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the construction of a new

Hindu temple on the same exact spot. The group organized the manufacturing and consecration ofbricks (riimiïlii, or bricks of Râma) , as weIl as processions to transport them to Ayodhya for the construction of the new temple, spreading mass communal riots through out India. The movement culminated in the 1991 destruction of the mosque, a temporary ban on the VHP, and massive outbreaks of communal violence through out the country. "The Babri Masjid was transformed into a potent symbo1 of the way in which the Hindu majority was 'threatened' by the Muslim 'Other'" (Corbridge and Harriss 113). Emphasis on the Babri Masjid reflects the VHP's eagerness to reclaim the 'lost glories' of Hindu history, and to do away with aIl symbols of foreign domination and oppression. Once again, the utilization of Hindu ritua1s and traditions casts a religious light on the VRP' s nationalism, the publicization of Hindu ritual making "public" what is commonly a "private" affair. In this way, the VHP unites all Hindus towards the common goal of the reinvigoration of the Hindu nation.

The VHP and Women:

Like the TJ, the VHP began with no special focus on women's involvement. However, during the Ramjanmabhumi campaign in the 1980s, the

VHP formulated the Bajrang DaI (Hanuman's Army), a male youth activist group, as well its female branch, known as Durga Vahini ("Durga's Army"). Along with

Matri Shakti ("The Power of Motherhood"), the branch of the VHP geared towards older women, the VRP gathers much support for its goals from Rindu 97 women. Feminine ideals, often based on the domestic notions ofwomen as mother and wife, are employed to create and sustain the 'Hindu nation'. These ideals include self-sacrifice, the ability to nurture and sustain, and the ability to aid in the VHP's efforts to unite all Hindus and to preserve "Hindu culture and values." However, unlike the Tl, the performance ofideal womanhood in the

VHP is taken out into the public realm, made visible, and put in the context of the

'true Hindu nation' as Bharat Mata. Therefore, while the 'masculine' and secular lndian "State" may not provide for all of the citizens of Bharat, the VHP offers an alternative citizenship, especially to those on the margins of the society, including women, low-caste individuals and untouchables and tribals. However, the cost of participating in this alternative citizenship is incorporation into the VHP's homogenized vision of the Hindu community.

As opposed to the RSS, which is highly militarized and centres on physical discipline and training, the women's wings of the VHP are more concerned with, as one RSS woman put it, "dharm ka kam ", or re1igious work

(Menon 34) than in training camps:

Durga Vahini and Matri Shakti spend most of their time organizing religious functions for the movement such as devotional song sessions, or events during the major Hindu festivals, and religious teaching sessions by Hindu ascetics who are part of the movement. They also spend time engaging in various social work projects in hospitals and sIums in Delhi (Menon 34).

Durga Vahini draws on the image of the Hindu goddess Durga, who is simultaneously a nurturing mother and a fearsome warrior, while Matri Shakti draws attention to the power of motherhood. This section focuses on Durga 98

Vahini and Matri Shakti in the context of cultural education, preservation, and social reform, rather than more militant branches, and analyzes these arenas in which women effectively carry out the VHP's larger agenda: the renaissance of the Hindu nation. Hindu culture is perceived of as threatened by various forces, most notably, Islam, Christianity, Westemism, and secularism. Thus, women as preservers of Hindu values are depended upon to remind the community oftheir heritage.

Founded as the woman's arm of the militant Bajrang DaI, Durga Vahini offers young Hindu women the opportunity to participate in camps that offer physical defense and training, as weIl as cultural and religious edification. The physical component of such education offers insight to the notion that Hindu women are, at least in part, responsible for their own protection. This attitude admits that as repositories of culture, women's bodies are often the site of communal conflict, representing the essence of a society. TraditionaIly, it is believed that men should act as the protectors of women. While this is still true, and many branches of the Sangh Parivar stress the physical training of men as

"warriors of the Hindu nation," Durga Vahini, as weIl as the female branch of the

RSS, view women as accountable for their own protection, as weIl. This training includes rifle-shooting, river-crossing, and rappelling (Nandgaonkar: Indian

Express, Nov. 13,2002). However, what separates Durga Vahini from the RSS women' s branch is the emphasis on cultural training. Members of Durga Vahini often arrange and participate in bhajans and satsangs (devotional congregational sessions), in which women leam about cultural values. These events include 99 members of an castes, in an attempt "t~ construct a national culture and identity that unifies Hindus across caste divisions" (Menon 153). In Satish

Nandgaonkar's 2002 interview with participants in one of Durga Vahini's camps for The lndian Express, the values of the VHP c1early visible. A participant,

Anita Landge, stresses that 'forced' conversions should be banned, that it is important to construct a Ram temple in Ayodhya, and that "frivolous" holidays like Valentine's Day should not be celebrated by Hindus, as it implies that friendship should only be recognized one day a year (Nandgaonkar: lndian

Express, Nov. 13,2002). Another participant, fifteen-year-old Neha Dubey comments that

'Western culture worships stree murti (women's physical form), while the Hindu culture worships stree shakti (the power ofwomanhood). I understand that one has to learn English to build one's career in today's times, but I don't approve ofwearingjeans' (Nandgaonkar: lndian Express, Nov. 13,2002)

This quotation highlights the opposition between so-called "Western" values and perceptions ofwomanhood, and "Hindu" ideals and images ofwomen. Western education may be useful in terms of career opportunities, but the unnecessary adoption of Western cultural values, exemplified in the donning ofWestem c1othes, is unacceptable for the ideal Hindu woman. From the VHP's perspective,

Hinduism remains the only religious tradition that properly respects women for their praiseworthy qualities, instead of their sexualized form.

Matri Shakti, the branch of the VHP geared towards adult women, focuses on both social work and religious activities. The basis for this arm of the VHP is the belief in the power and importance of motherhood, in particular, the unique 100 ability and responsibility ofmother as the teacher ofher child. Much like in the

TJ, mothers are seen as the first educators of the next generation, and therefore, great significance is placed on what is taught to the future actors. As evidenced in the figure of JIjâbâï (see previous chapter), a mother has the potential to lay the foundation of cultural and religious values in her child, highlighting the ideal of miitrtva, or enlightened motherhood. Menon gives an example ofwhat kinds of instruction Matri Shakti stresses mothers to give their children:

According to Jamuna Sinha, one of the leaders of the Delhi wing of Matri Shakti and Durga Vahini, Matri Shakti was based in the belief that only a mother can teach her children the right values and culture. She told me that the organization teaches women important things like teaching their children how to celebrate birthdays in the correct fashion by discouraging them from cutting cakes and engaging in Western practices such as blowing out candIes. Jamuna inforrned me that Hindus should not blow out candIes because fire is sacred and one should therefore not blow it out or spit on it. She said that Matri Shakti instructs mothers to teach their children to obey their parents and wear lndian clothes" (Menon 34-35).

The above passage indicates that the very act of blowing out candIes of a birthday cake is of significant consequence in the edification of children. Matri Shakti, as weIl as all other branches of the VHP, discourages emulation of "Western customs and practices," participation in them indicating shame of one's own

Hindu culture. By blowing out the candIes of a birthday cake, not only is one participating in "Western" traditions, but mothers are teaching their children to participate in an activity that runs counter to Hinduism, as it denies the sacrality

31 offire •

31 Fire is deemed a sacred element in Hinduism, and is deitied as the god Agni. In Hindu rituais in which tire is used, the flame isfanned out by the hand instead ofblown out, in respect of the deity. Blowing the flame out is seen as disrespectful, as human saliva is seen as a potentially polluting substance. 101

According to Matri Shakti, motherhood should not be kept within the confines of the home, but should extend to the entire nation. The VHP places great emphasis on social projects, such as the establishment of orphanages and financial relief programs to those facing social and financial difficulties.

Untouchability is seen as a social evil that must be purged in Hindu society, widow remarriage is advocated, and so-called ''tribals'' are offered education. It is worth examining these projects in light ofthe VHP's focus on offering assistance to those on the "margins" of society. The VHP insists that Hindus should take care oftheir "own community," to avoid potential dependence on "other communities." McKean states the VHP's rationale:

Because of a lack of Hindu institutions, 20,000 Hindu orphans are being brought up in Christian orphanages. Hindu nationalist arguments concerning the 'denationalization' oftribals by Christian missionaries are implied with the assertion that 'projects taken up by the VHP are producing nationalist leadership amongst the Tribals" (McKean 106).

Matri Shakti's social welfare projects are bolstered by anxieties that those who

Hindus will not offer assistance to will abandon the Hindu community.

Therefore, the nurturing and preservation of those liminally located in Hindu society acts both as a method of unification, as weIl as a me ans to prevent the loss ofthose who feel neglected or disillusioned with their religious community.

Indeed, the VHP even goes so far as paying for girls' dowries when their own families cannot afford it, for fear of financial difficulty being a reason for conversion (Menon 103).

Both Durga Vahini and Matri Shakti participate in the VHP method of publicizing Hindu ritual and translating such rituals in their nationalist context. 102

For example, after the Kargil War32 the VRP hosted ayajiïa, or a religious ceremony involving a fire sacrifice, for Rashtra Suraksha (national safety)

(Menon 114). Besides the large yajiïa in New Delhi, many smaller sacrifices took place in various communities in solidarity of the commemoration. Menon describes the event in detail, distinguishing the traditional Vedic method of performing of the yajiïa, in comparison with the VRP's execution of the sacrifice33 to highlight the reinvention of ancient Rindu ritual to accommodate the goals of the VRP. What is of particular interest to this study is the reinterpretation of widowhood that the celebration offered. In the context of the

Kargil War, where in sorne cases, husbands were killed in the defense oftheir country, Rindu nationalist movements have reinterpreted the widow, usually seen as a symbol of inauspiciousness, into a heroic figure:

in contexts in which the ideology ofpativratii is prevalent, widows are generally considered to be inauspicious and at least partly responsible for the death oftheir husbands because it is believed that a women's 'chastity protects his welfare and contributes to longevity. lfher husband pre deceases her, she may be suspected ofunfaithfulness, in thought ifnot in deed'. lnterestingly, the movement's glorification of the widows of Kargil provides a challenge to these traditional constructions of widowhood (Menon 124).

The VRP emphasizes the ideal that women should not be afraid to sacrifice their male family members in pursuit of national achievements, thereby recasting the figure of the widow. Traditionally, widowhood was interpreted as a lack of

32 The Kargil War occurred in 1999, and involved armed conflict between India and Pakistan at the Kashmiri border. The war started with Pakistani soldiers crossing into Indian territory at Kashmir, and resulted in heightened tensions between the two countries, as weIl as increased defense spending in India.

33 See Menon, Kalyani Devaki: "Dissonant Subjects: Women in the Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, 2001, pp.114-127. 103 women's sacrifice for her husband, but the VHP renders the widow the embodiment of sacrifice, extending the arena of sacrifice to include the entire nation. Women's strength in the face ofloss also impels men to reclaim their masculinity that has been compromised with various foreign invasions. This example shows that the VHP, and other Hindu nationalist movements, utilize ancient Hindu ritual and feminine ideals to promote a sense of unity and gain support for their cause, but reinterpret these rituals to promote their agendas.

Women's involvement in the VHP highlights several interesting points.

Firstly, as was the case with the TJ, the VHP offers women an alternative means of participating in the nation and claiming full citizenship within their religious community. As opposed to overtly political groups, such as the BJP, the VHP highlights the private realm of religion and culture as the site where Hindu values are to be reclaimed. Women, therefore, hold a special place within the movement, and are offered intellectual and religious training and instruction, which in many cases, were previously denied to them. Women gain agency to promote their vision of the world, but at the same time, the VHP does not fundamentally challenge their traditional domestic roles as wives and mothers.

As witnessed in the case of the TJ, there is a fortification of "traditional" gender norms, and simultaneous reinterpretation of such values. Women are the reservoirs of Hindu cultural values, and again act as the teachers of children and

other women. In their capacity as pedagogues, women are actively involved in the constant redefinition of VHP ideals, as in the case of the Kargil yajna,

indicating their active contribution in the reshaping of tradition. The transmission 104 of Rindu cultural heritage through the education of women and children is an essential task in the definition of the nation, and exhibits how the transnational

Rindu community is brought together through the dissemination Rindu communal values. Women are indeed the teachers of "Rindu values," but are also the creators ofthese ideals as weIl. As pedagogues, VRP women unite the Rindu community through the dissemination of "correct" Rindu belief and practice, and are thus brought into the transnationalist discourse, thereby rejuvenating the

Rindu nation. VRP women have somewhat more mobility than TI women, as they do not face the limiting factor ofpurdah and are thus, to a degree, allowed into the public sphere. VRP people have a level of more freedom to interact with non-related men, but in most contexts, gender segregation is still certainly preferred. Within the discourse of the VRP, women are conceived of as the borders of the nation, and require protection from the community' s men. But at the same time, women have a key role in physically and ideologically protecting themselves, as weIl as the whole community. Thus, as pedagogues, VRP women gain agency and authority but within the limits of patriarchal expectation.

Conclusion

In my examination of the TI and the VRP, 1 discuss women's roles in two of the most popular transnationalist Muslim and Rindu movements today. Both of the se movements articulate alternative methods ofparticipating in the "nation," besides the formaI "state," and portray themselves as apolitical or non-political.

The TI and the VRP utilize this "apolitical" identity by building on gendered constructions of the private realm, which, as discussed in Chapter One, is viewed 105 by nationalist groups as a sphere of cultural purity, uncorrupted by external influences such as Colonialism. Women's roles in the TJ and the VHP reflect a simultaneous hearkening to traditional gendered roles ofwife and mother, as weIl as an expansion and reinterpretation of these roles. Women, as repositories of the essence of the nation, act as the teachers of women and children, and therefore sustain and safeguard the community. Therefore, they are active in cultivating these groups' ideologies, and at least temporarily displace male authority.

Therefore, the TJ and VHP offer women the opportunity to contribute to the formation of religious, cultural, and transnational identities.

The "alternative" me ans of self-identification offered to women by the TJ and the VHP reflects the confrontation ofhegemonies concerning "citizenship."

Certain strands of feminism argue that equal citizenship is only available to women through the overcoming of traditional and domestic feminine roles, and the full integration of women in the public sphere, by such efforts as inclusion of women in the military. When the ideal for women remains in the private sphere, as mothers and wives, it is an indication of an oppressive and patriarchal society, and women ofthese societies must be educated about (and then liberated from) their subjugation. However, the TJ and VHP dispute the se claims, stating that the private sphere is a realm in which women are active and full-fledged citizens.

In certain senses, women are empowered as educators and pedagogues of the nation, roi es which stem from their status as repositories of the nation's values and culture. Women of the TJ and the VHP are essential in the cultural and religious education oftheir children, as well as other women. As "grassroots" 106 movements, these organizations are concemed with the status of all their members, and reflect a historical anxiety of conversion and loss of power. These apprehensions are dealt with through the unification and homogenization of religious communities. The VHP and TJ do not concentrate these efforts in abstract realms ofphilosophy. Both organizations simplifY their respective religions, and focus on basic theological principles and rituals to unite and strengthen their communities. Women are equipped to assist in these efforts through religious and cultural edification, teaching both women and children the essential requirements that shape their religious identities. However, although there are many instances in which women are empowered by these groups through religious or household leadership, these roI es simultaneously reinforce traditional patriarchal views of women, reified in their domestic roles. These groups offer women full-citizenship within the private sphere; hence there is no real reason for their participation in the public sphere. When women do enter into the public domain, it is, in fact, a very restricted participation, these limitations informed by patriarchal controls.

However, there are distinct differences between the methods, operations, and ideologies of the TJ and the VHP. While both groups idealize women in the private sphere, the VHP grants women more access to the public realm than does the TJ. Women in the TJ are expected to perform fullpurdah, to avoid acting in an authoritarian manner, and to refrain from fervent speech. Modestyand humility, and complete deference to the males of the community, are the guides for the proper conduct of a Tablïghï woman. However, the VHP's most 107 prominent women, including Sadhvi Rithambara and Vijayraje Scindia34 are the loudest and most zealous voices of the movement. These women helped lead the

Ram Janmabhumi campaign, as weIl as other VRP operations, and most interestingly, commandingly challenge Rindu men to reclaim their masculinity.

Rowever, as stated in Chapter Two, this is not the "norm" for most VRP women, and is likely related to their celibate state, which diminishes the ambiguous power ofwomen's sexuality. AIso, the Tl appears more wary of "modernity" than does the VRP, which fully utilizes modem technological advancements such as the internet for the dissemination oftheir values. The Tl's desire to hearken back to the pristine time of the Prophet Muhammad leads to a suspicion of certain elements ofmodernity, and an emphasis on very basic and simple methods to transmit their ideologies and practices.

On the whole, both the Tl and the VRP emphasize the important role that women have in safeguarding and disseminating their core values and traditions, and fashion a unique place for women as pedagogues within their respective movements. As the community' s teachers, Tl and VRP women interface with the politicization of social and religious change.

34 See footnote in Chapter Two, pp 53. 108

Conclusion:

Women's involvement in nationalist religious movements is a topic of considerable fascination, especially considering the common perception that such organizations are overtly oppressive to women. Why are women actively and enthusiastically involved in movements that "limit" them to particular spheres of life, and that reify women in traditional roles? Do such groups offer women potential means of emancipation or liberation, and if so, what are they? This thesis analyzed the complex relationship between gender, power, identity, and citizenship within religious transnationalist movements, namely, the Tablighi

Jama'at and Vishwa Hindu Parishad. Both groups emphasize the role ofwomen as cultural and religious pedagogues, and politicize this position to achieve social change. The previous chapters asked questions relating to women's potential in the formation and in the dissemination of Muslim and Hindu communal identities, and analyzed the simultaneous potential for empowerment and subjugation within their roles as cultural preservers and pedagogues.

Chapter One examined nationalist constructions of women, and investigated sacralized and gendered conceptions of time, space, and community in the formation of communal identity. Within these capacities, womanhood is utilized to homogenize diverse groups of people into a unified and coherent unit.

1 examined the gendering of the public and private realms and argued that women hold a unique position in nationalist perspectives, due to their position in the private realm, which is seen as "uncontaminated" by forces such as colonization, secularization, Westemization, or modernization. This bifurcation and gendering 109 of the public and private often leads to the supposition that the "political" only occurs in the masculine, public realm, and fails to acknowledge the political nature of the private sphere. An assessment of "private" and "mundane" life, via an examination of clothing and language, disclosed ways in which such "every day" elements of society are gendered and politicized by nationalist groups to construct communal identity.

Chapter Two further analyzed the division between the public and the private through an investigation ofwomen and citizenship, and the various roles women have traditionally played within the nation. This chapter contended that previous discourses on citizenship have been insufficient, specifically conceming gender, as most conceptions of citizenship have been based upon patriarchal norms and fratemal pacts. In view of the problematic nature of this definition, many communalist groups extend a different conception of citizenship to women, other than state-citizenship. These movements argue that full and active participation in the "nation" cannot be achieved by eliminating gender difference, but by stressing such differences and fulfilling traditional gender ideals. Women are empowered by honouring their roI es within the private sphere, as wives, mothers, and teachers, rather than by positioning them within the public sphere.

This competition of hegemonies illustrates the various methods groups have advocated in the struggle for equal citizenship.

Chapter Three builds on the previous chapters and examined two transnationalist movements, the Tablighi Jama'at and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. 110

Both groups utilize gender to construct their conceptions of "the Nation," and also articulate alternative methods of communal participation besides "state citizenship." Indeed, both the Tl and the VHP portray themselves as apolitical or non-political, and employ this "apolitical" identity by building on gendered constructions of the private, "uncontaminated" realm. Women's traditional roles of wife and mother culminate in their position as communal pedagogue, teaching the community' s women and children the essentials of practice and belief. In the dissemination of cultural values and traditions, women unite, uphold, and rejuvenate the community. Women, in traditional roles, are therefore viewed as active and full citizens within their communities, and in ways, challenge male

authority. Thus, as essential disseminators of cultural and religious education, women of the Tl and the VHP are empowered, and contribute to the formation of religious, cultural, and transnational identities. However, these roles concurrently

fortiry established patriarchal views of women, glorified in their domestic roles.

Women are granted sorne access to the public realm, but on the whole, such

admissions are limited (and limiting), seen they are mostly seen as unnecessary.

Overall, this thesis presented a comparative analysis of the uses and

politicization of gender in Subcontinental communalist organizations. 1 argue that

both Tablighi lama'at and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad utilize gendered

constructions ofhistory, space, time, and community to create an active place for

women within the community. Both groups strongly assert themselves as

apolitical, and focus on women's roles as the community's religious and cultural

educators. The Tl and the VHP uphold women within the private realm and 111 attempt to fashion their movements within the same sphere, thereby insinuating their similar capability to recover and to uphold the "true" and uncorrupted"

Muslim or Hindu cornrnunities.

This thesis disc10ses the vast and complex ways in which gender is utilized to unify and mobilize religious nationalist groups. It is important to examine the ways in which cornrnunalist movements simultaneously empower and limit women, in order to better understand both the substantial amounts of support and criticism surrounding these groups. Dismissing members of nationalist movements as "fanatical" diminishes the varied and complex motivations for participating in such groups. At the same time, overemphasizing the empowerrnent ofwomen within cornrnunalist groups is also problematic, as it overlooks the ways in which patriarchal controls limit the ways and degrees to which women are granted certain freedom within these movements.

In particular, more fie1dwork is necessary vis-à-vis the role ofwomen in the Tablighi Jama'at. Most extant scholarship on the subject is theoretical, and the actual voices of TJ women remain unheard or undocurnented. The insularity of the TJ, in particular, with regards to women, along with the sparseness of primary texts and sources renders entry into and examination of the group difficult. AIso, more scholarly work on women's branches ofthe VHP, as distinct from the group as a whole or from the Bajrang DaI, is necessary. Kalyani Devaki

Menon's research provides a valuable foundation for this study, but more depth and specificity regarding women in the VHP would expand and develop the study of women in Hindu nationalist movements. A particularly interesting avenue for 112 further study would involve the roles and experiences ofwomen ofboth the TJ and the VHP within the North American and European communities. The

"transnational" feature of both groups begs further investigation, and a comparison of the experiences of South Asian and "Western" women of these movements would provide useful insights into the gendered ideologies and practices of the TJ and the VHP. The intricate connections between politics, religion, and gender compel one to acknowledge the multiple and competing discourses in which women gain agency as citizens and interact with their communities. 113

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