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Title items-in-Congo - reports to the Secretary-General from the Officer-ln-Charge of the UN Operation in the Congo (S/4531 - S/5053/Add. 13) - Volume 1, 2, 3

Date Created 17/01/1963

Record Type Archival Item

Container s-0888-0006: United Nations Documents of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Arranged by Subject

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit EEPQETS TO SO- FROM OFFICER-IN-CHAEGE (CONGO);

and Corr. 1 and 2 of 21 September I960 2 November I960 688 and Add. 1 and 2 of 12 February 1961 4691 and Add. 1 and 2 12 February 1961 4727 and Add. I - 3 18 February 1961 4745 and Add. 1 22 February 1961 4750 and Add. 1 - 7 25 February 1961 4753 2? February 1961 4757 and Add. I 2 March 1961 4761 8 March 1961 4790 and Add. 1 14 April 1961 4791 15 April 1961 4917 4 August 1961 4940 and Add. 1 - 9 14 September 1961 (Add. 10-19 in later SECCO Suppl.)

S/505: 9 January 1962 Hdd. 1 20 January 1962 Add. 2 23 January 1962 Add. 3 29 January 1962 Add. 4 30 January 1962 Add. 5 30 January 1962 " /Corr.l 31 January 1962 Add. 6 3 February 1962 " /Corr.l 5 February 1962 Add. 7 12 February 1962 Add. 8 19 February 1962 Add. 9 9 March 1962 » /Corr.l 13 March 1962 Add. 10 2? June 1962 " /Annexes 28 June 1962 Add. 11 20 August 1962 " /Annexes 21 August 1962 « /Add. 1 23 August 1962 » " /Corr. 1 24 August 1962 Add. 12 8 October 1962 " /Corr. 1 15 October 1962 " /Add. 1 13 November 1962 i» " /Corr. 1 it * •• /Add. 2 20 November 1962 (Add. 13 26 November 1962 " /Corr. 1 29 November 1962 » /Add. 1 28 November 1962 Add. 14 11 January 1963 " /Corr. 1 17 January 1963 lAdd. 15 30 January 1963

UNITED NATIONS Distr. SECURITY GENERAL S/5053/Add.l5 30 January 1963 COUNCIL ENGLISH ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FROM THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OF 21 FEBRUARY AND 24 NOVEMBER 1961 Events in Katanga from 5 to 23 January 1963

A. Introduction

1. In his previous report on events in Katanga up to 4 January 1963, the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo had described the failure of the Katangese authorities, despite the acceptance by Mr. Tshombe of the Secretary-General's Plan of National Reconciliation, to take practical steps leading to its implementation. 2. Harassment of United Nations troops in Elisabethville had steadily increased and, whether because the Katangese authorities deliberately provoked it or because they had lost control of their own troops, had culminated in an unprovoked and unanswered six-day period of firing on United Nations positions. Protracted discussions with Mr. Tshcmbe had not led to a cessation of firing by Katangese forces. The United Nations troops, therefore, beginning on 28 December and on orders from their commander, took the necessary action to secure relief from this intolerable situation and to gain the freedom of movement to which they were entitled. 3. Thes6 actions were quickly successful, and by 4 January 1963, the end of the period covered by the last report, United Nations troops had not only removed the gendarmerie roadblocks and the gendarmerie themselves from the region of Elisabethville itself and the neighbouring mining town of Kipushi, but had also carried out a rapid advance to Jadotville, some 130 kms. northwest of Elisabethville. At the same time the town of Kamina had been entered by United Nations troops from Kamina Base.

63-02273 S/5053/Add.l5 English Page 2

B. Relations with the Katangese authorities

4. It was the hope of the United Nations that Mr. Tshombe and his colleagues would at this stage take positive steps for the immediate implementation of the Plan of National Reconciliation. .5. Mr. Tshombe, after leaving Elisabethville on 28 December and after paying a visit to Salisbury., the capital of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, had proceeded through Northern Rhodesia to Kolwezi, some 200 kns. west of Jadotville and the last important mining centre still occupied by the Katangese gendarmerie. Even prior to United Nations entry into Jadotville, he had shown some interest in returning to Elisabethville for discussions aimed at reaching a basis for ending the secession of Katanga and had expressly authorized the Director of the "National Bank of Katanga" to proceed to Leopoldville for the discussions on the question of the foreign exchange proceeds of the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga. Subsequently, through Belgian authorities, he had shown an interest in travelling by plane from Kolwezi to Kipushi and thence by car to Elisabethville. As was noted in the statement issued on his behalf on 2 January 1963,, the Secretary- General did not feel that further formal discussions with Mr. Tshombe were called for at this time, since the only discussions required were at the technical level in implementing certain provisions of the Plan. He stated, however, that the United Nations would not interfere with Mr. Tshcmbe's freedom in Elisabethville; unless he incited acts of violence against the United Nations operation and its personnel. 6. In the next few days, Mr. Tshombe was reported to have made a number of inconsistent statements. On the one hand, reports indirectly received indicated that he continued to show an interest in renewing discussions with ONUC officials. On the other hand, he was reported to say that, if pressed, the Katangese would fight to the last degree and would carry out a "scorched-earth" policy, including the destruction of valuable mining installations, power plants and bridges, especially at Kolwezi. 7. The threat of a "scorched-earth" policy was becoming increasingly serious in view of the extensive and wanton destruction of bridges already wrought during the recent operations. In addition to various road and rail bridges which had been destroyed along the line of the advance of Indian troops from Elisabethville to Jadotville and beyond, serious demolitions were carried out even in the areas where active military operations were not being conducted. In particular, the Page ;>

destruction of major bridges over the Lubilash River near Kaniama and over the Lualaba River at Bukama blocked the important rail link between Katanga and Kasai for at least several months to come. Certain essential machinery was rendered inoperative at the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga installations at Jadotville. (For a full list of bridges and other installations destroyed or damaged in Katanga from November 1962 to 14 January 1963., see Annex I.) 8. Cn 7 January, after noting that the abandonment by Mr. Tshcmbe and his ministers of their provincial responsibilities at Elisabethville had serious implications for the efforts of ONUC to restore quickly in South Katanga normal conditions of life and to achieve without delay the full implementation of the Plan of National Reconciliation, the Secretary-General deplored the "scorched- earth" statements attributed to Mr. Tshombe as reckless and irresponsible and warned that ONUC would not permit any Katangese official who returned to Elisabethville to advocate destructive action of any kind (Annex III). 9. On 8 January, Mr. Tshombe returned to Elisabethville via Kipushi, being escorted by the Belgian Consul on the road journey from Kipushi. He subsequently informed United Nations officials in a written statement delivered through the Belgian Consulate that he had returned to Elisabethville for the sole purpose of restoring peace and calm to Katanga and all of its people as soon as possible. That consisted essentially in the rapid application of the U Thant Plan without further - bloodshed or useless destruction. Mr. Tshcmbe went on to say that in the circumstances he would naturally abstain from making any statements against ONUC. However, in the course of a press conference on 9 January, Mr. Tshcmbe stated: "¥e have decided on a scorched-earth policy, we shall apply it thoroughly, and I think that it is not in the interest of ONUC or of Katanga to continue these useless acts of destruction." He added that the question of freedom of movement for ONUC troops was still "open for discussion". 10. The Secretary-General at once issued a statement in which he reiterated four basic points on which the United Nations required assurance from Mr. Tshombe if there was to be contact with him on other matters. These points were (l) the categorical renunciation by Mr. Tshombe of the scorched-earth and sabotage policy frequently attributed to him; (2) the renunciation of his often-repeated intention to fight to the last man; (3) the taking of in-mediate practical steps Page A for the implementation of the Plan of National Reconciliation which he had publicly accepted many months ago; and (4) the assurance of immediate recognition of the right of ONUC to freedom of movement throughout all Katanga. In view of Mr. TshcmbeTs renewed threats of possible violence, the Secretary-General announced that he would hold him responsible for any acts of destruction and instructed ONUC to restrain him from further irresponsible acts (Annex III). 11. On 10 January 1963., Prime Minister Adoula issued a statement condemning the policy of senseless destruction of the sacred patrimony of the Congolese nation. He stated that Mr. Tshombe would be personally held responsible for these actions (Annex IV). On the same day, ONUC distributed and broadcast a warning to the Katanga gendarmes against the destruction of bridges and other installations such as dams, factories and electric power plants. The announcement made it clear that the culprits would be caught and punished. 12. In the meantime, ONUC was preparing, at the request of the B.C.K. Railway, to take the necessary measures to reopen the rail line to Sakania on the Rhodesian border by affording protection to repair and train crews, and an operation for that p'urpose was fixed for 10 January. During the evening of 9 January, Mr. Tshcmbe announced that he was granting to ONUC full freedom of movement on the Mokambo- Sakania road and offered to communicate his order to the gendarmerie in person. ONUC noted that its freedom of movement was being exercised' throughout the Congo and that no restrictions on that freedom would be accepted. However, ONUC did not interfere when Mr. Tshombe set out for Mokambo on 10 January ahead of ONUC troops for the asserted purpose of ensuring freedom of movement for the United Nations troops involved. A detailed account of the Sakania operation and of other military events occuring during the period covered by this report appears in Section C. 13. Mr. Tshombe's attitude on that occasion gave reason to hope that he would lend his influence to facilitate the peaceful advance of the United Nations troops toward Kolwezi. However, on 12 January shortly after his return to Elisabethville, he suddenly absented himself, drove off precipitately to the Rhodesian border and then flew back to Kolwezi. 14. It was learned at this time that gendarmes and mercenaries had thoroughly mined the large industrial and mining installations at Kolwezi and were intent on blowing them up if ONUC troops sought to approach that town. The bridge over the Lualaba River near Kolwezi, the Delcommune Dam and the Lufira power plant were also in danger of destruction. Page 5

15. Several States Members of the Organization through their Consuls or other agents made vigorous representations to Mr. Tshcmbe to persuade him to call a halt to the destruction of the wealth of the Congolese people. 16. Late in the afternoon of 14 January, the Secretary-General received, through Belgian Government channels, a copy of a message without addressee emanating from "Mr. Tshombe and his ministers meeting in Council in Kolwezi" (Annex V). In this message they announced their readiness to end the secession of Katanga, to grant United Nations troops freedom of movement throughout the province and to return to Elisabethville to arrange for the complete implementation of the Secretary-General's Plan. In addition, they asked that the President of the Republic of the Congo and the Prime Minister should put into effect immediately the amnesty called for by the Secretary-General's Plan in order to guarantee the freedom and safety of the Katangese Government and all who had worked under its authority. They said, moreover, that they \irere determined to establish a loyal co-operation with the United Nations. Mr. Tshombe at the same time sent a letter to Prime Minister Adoula incorporating the text of the message. 17. On 15 January 1963, the Secretary-General welcomed Mr. Tshcmbe's message and expressed the earnest hope that it would be promptly and fully implemented, thus bringing to an end the conflict and destruction needlessly experienced in Katanga. He pledged the United Nations' full assistance and support to the fulfilment of the promise implicit in Mr. Tshombe's statement (Annex VI). 18. In letters to the Secretary-General dated 15 January, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Adoula confirmed that the amnesty proclamation of 26 November 1962 remained valid despite the changed circumstances. They laid emphasis on the need for peaceful conciliation and co-operation in the reconstruction of the country (Annexes VII and VIII). On the next day, Prime Minister Adoula replied to Mr. Tshombe in similar terms. He further announced that by Ordonnance No. 6, Senator Ileo had been named Minister of State Resident in Elisabethville for the purpose of maintaining the necessary contacts with the provincial institutions of South Katanga and of facilitating the process of reintegration. Page 6

19- Cn l6 January the Secretary-General in New York received through the Permanent Mission of Belgium a message frcm Mr. Tshcmbe to the effect that the provincial president vas prepared to meet the United Nations Representative in Elisabethville in order to discuss the modalities of QNUC's entry into Kolwezi. Having been giver- renewed assurances of free passage, Mr. Tshcmbe -went to OKUC Headquarters in Elisabethville at 17CC hours on 17 January 19^3 and met the Acting Representative in Elisabethville and the General Cfficer Commanding Katanga Area. After four hours of discussions a document setting forth the points decided upon vas signed by the three men (Annex IX). 20. In that document Mr. Tshcmbe pledged himself to facilitate OKUC's peaceful entry into Kolwezi,, which would take place by 21 January 1963. This entry was to be carried out in exercise of OMJC's freedom of movement throughout the Cor.go as granted to it by the Central Goveranent pending arrangements under the Secretary-General's plan for the reintegration of the gendarmerie. Members of the gendarmerie would not be treated as prisoners of war rr arrested and would be allowed to continue to wear their uniforms. To ensure the maintenace of lav and order and to prevent incidents, the gendarmerie would gather its arms and amnunition in one central depot to be kept there by a detachment of about fifty gendarmes who in turn would be under ONUC control and command, pending implementation of the pertinent provisions of the Plan of National Reconciliation. The Katangese authorities would immediately remove mines and other explosives which were to have been used for the destruction of Kolwezi; Mr. Tshcmbe acknowledged that his authorities would be held responsible if the withholding of information led t,c casualties among OMJC personnel. He was permitted to have a small personal gu'/rd. 21. In accordance with this agreement. United Nations troops entered Kolwezi on the afternoon of 21 January. The commander of the Indian Independent Brigade, and a representative of the Officer-in-Charge, went to meet Mr. Tshcmbe at his residence. Also present at the meeting were four provincial ministers, Mr. Kimba, Mr. Munongo, Mr. Kibwe and Mr. Yav. In a prepared speech, Mr. Tshcmbe reiterated his sincere determination to carry out the Secretary-General's Plan of National Reconciliation. 22. A number of provincial ministers had already returned to Elisabethville by 23 January, and Mr. Tshcmbe was expected on the following day. Mr. Ileo, Minister Resident of the Central Government, arrived in Elisabethville on 23 January. Page 7

C. Military Operations

23. The first phase of the operation, up to 4 January 1963., during vhich the United Nations troops secured themselves in the Elisabethville and Kipushi area., Kaminaville and finally Jadotville and its surroundings, has already "been described in the last Report of the Officer-in-Charge. (A/5C53/Add.l4). 24. On 7 January,, a Swedish patrol proceeding from the base of Karnina, pushed towards Kaniama, 198 kms. away, and entered the town without encountering any resistance. In Kaniama a mercenary, who was suspected of having blown up the Lubilash bridge, was captured. The detachment remained in the town until 10 January, when they were replaced by a company from the 2nd Ghana Eattalion. 25. On 5 January, a reconnaissance patrol of platoon strength from the Swedish Battalion advanced along the Kamina-Kabongo road, and entered Kabongo, where they found neither gendarmes nor elements of the AUG. The patrol was withdrawn from the town, but one reinforced company from the Congolese contingent of the United Nations Force when there on 10 January to assure a United Nations presence in the area. 26. On 10 January, a move toward Sakania began. This small town located some 223 kms. southeast of Elisabethville in the farthest corner of South Katanga has a great importance for the economy of the province, for it is the point of entry of the railroad from Rhodesia to Elisabethville. In the preceding days, reports had been reaching ONUC that the railroad had been cut in several places and that disorganized bands of gendarmes were looting and marauding in the area and an appeal for protection was made to ONUC by officials of the railroad company. It was therefore decided to restore normal traffic on this vital lifeline for South Katanga. 27. The 4th Ethiopian Battalion coming from Elisabethville on the morning of 10 January reached Mokambo, 178 kms. from its starting point, the same evening. After spending the night and the following day there, It resumed its move at first light on the morning of 12 January and reached Sakania, 45 knis. away, within two hours. It met no resistance on the way and was given a friendly and co-operative welcome at Sakania. 28. On the same day, the first B.C.K. train left Elisabethville in the direction of Sakania to test the line and to carry out necessary repairs. Cn board was one company of the 6th Ethiopian Battalion to protect rail repair and train crews and to clear the line of marauding groups of gendarmes. The railway was reopened to traffic on the following day. . / / • •. -•-ige d

29. On 10 January, the M;h Madras Battalion of the Indian contingent sent a patrol to the mining town of Shinkolobwe } vest of Jadotville. It discovered there and seized a large arms dump including mortars, rockets, rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition belonging to the gendarmerie. 3C. The move tovard Kolwezi, which was considered the main stronghold of Mr. Tshcmbe and his gendarmerie, was a slower one. After the entry into Jadotville, Mr. Tshcmbe reiterated his threat to "blow up all bridges and economic installations in the Kolwezi area, if UN troops continued their advance. The UN Command was unimpressed by Mr. Ishombe's threat, but wanted to do everything possible to avoid senseless bloodshed and destruction. While continuing firmly its pressure toward Kolwezi, it was careful to leave the door open at all times for a possible peaceful entry into that town. In any case, its forward progress was blocked by blown bridges. 31. On 9 January, a company group from the Indian Independent Brigade proceeded to Mulungwishi to secure an undamaged bridge, and a company group of the Uth Rajputana Rifles established a bridgehead on the western bank of the river. On lU January, there was an engagement at the Dikulwe river between UN troops on the east bank and gendarmes on the west. In this engagement, CHUG troops were supported by air action. ONUC troops succeeded in clearing the west side of the Dikulwe river of gendarmes and mercenaries and captured a substantial number of weapons, and by noon on 15 January had reached the east bank of the Eipeta river. On 17 January elements of the Uth Rajputana Rifles Battalion reached the town of Tenke, where they stood fast while arrangements for a peaceful entry into Kolwe?,! were agreed upon with the Katangese authorities (see section B above). 32. The Commander of the Indian Independent Brigade, and a representative of the Officer-in-Charge, met Katangese dignitaries at Pumpi M+ CTC hours on 21 January, as previously arranged. ONUC forces thereupon crossed the Delccrcmune Earn which was found intact, proceeded to secure the Kolwezi airfield at 11^0 hours, and entered Kolwezi at 1300 hours. Demolition charges were removed frcm the installations. Cn 23 January, ONUC troops took charge of the first depot of arms collected frcm the gendarmerie at Camp Ruwe near Kolwezi. 33- It had "been the initial plan of the United Nations Command to extend ONUC's control over the Baudouinville region after the entry into Kolwezi. But since mid--January, information had been received to the effect that all mercenaries and officers had fled the town and that the gendarmes -who were left, without direction, constituted an increasing threat to law and order. The population, African and European alike, was appealing to ONUC for protection. Conseqxiently, urgent measures were taken by the United Nations Command to reassure the population and avoid panic, and to advance the date of entry into the area. By way of air-dropped leaflets and broadcast announcements from the Elisabethville radio station, the population was exhorted to keep calm and was told that ONUC troops would soon arrive. 3^-. Barges were hurriedly assembled at Albertville and on those barges the Indonesian troops proceeded to Baudouinville over Lake Tanganyika at about noon on 19 January, They landed at Baudcuinville the next morning and shortly thereafter secured the city and its airport. Small arms fire was exchanged with stray gendarmes, but no ONUC casualties were suffered. Two gendarmes were captured and a large quantity of ammunition and military clothing was found. 35- On 20 January, ONUC troops undertook an operation to clear the "Kongolo pocket". Since lit- December 1962, shortly after the ANC had evacuated the city, an ONUC garrison of troops of the Nigerian contingent had been located in Kongolo, with the agreement of the Central Government, in order to maintain law and order. But in the area east of the Lualaba River there still remained a considerable gendarmerie force, the remnants of which constituted a constant threat to peace. 36. In the morning of 20 January, the Nigerians starting from Kongolo and the Malayans coming from Bukavu closed in on those remnants in a pincer movement. The Commander of the gendarmerie forces, Colonel Makito, surrendered to the Nigerians that day. Within two days the clearing operation was successfully completed with minimal resistance. Also on 20 January, at llj-CO hours, a detachment of the Swedish contingent left Kamina Base and moved to Sandoa, which they entered without opposition at O^CO hours on 21 January. By 21 January 1563, the United Nations Force had under control all important centres hitherto held by the Katangese and quickly restored law and order at all places. Page 10

37. The Katangese gendarmerie as an organized fighting force had ceased to exist. The military actions begun on 28 December 1962 had thus ended. During the twenty-four days of activity, the OMJC casualties were ten killed and seventy-seven wounded. There is no precise information regarding those of the Katangese, but indications are that these figures were also low. S/5053/Add.l5 English Page 11

D. Expulsion of mercenaries

38. During the last week of December 1962 and the first two weeks of January 19^3^ nine mercenaries or suspected mercenaries were apprehended by United Nations troops, three of them being in uniform during the Jadotville action. There were five Belgians, one South African, one Rhodesian, one Greek and one Hungarian. 39- On "the whole, however, it was found that the mercenary element in the Katangese gendarmerie in December 19^2, although numbering about kOO according to most sources, soon appeared to be disorganized and demoralized. It was found incapable of stiffening the morale of, or of giving effective leadership to, the Katangese gendarmerie as it has done in the past. Uo. One of the sharpest encounters with Katangese forces occurred on 1 January 19&3 when an Indian OMJC company was held, up for four hours at Lukuni on the road to Jadotville. It was faced by a groupe mobile comprising a large number of mercenaries. The Indians suffered eighteen casualties including four killed. This was the highest number of casualties inflicted on United Nations troops in a single action during the recent operations in Katanga. Ul. Before the entry of the OMJC force into Kolwezi, a large number of mercenaries were reported to have departed by train for Dilolo on the Angolan border, and no mercenaries have since been encountered by OMJC troops. The Portuguese Foreign Ministry has since announced that numerous individuals, making use of the railway and other means of transportation, have crossed the frontier of Angola declaring that they had been in the service of the Katangese authorities. They have been disarmed and interned and, after the necessary formalities are complied with, will proceed to their countries of origin, according to this announcement.

E. Restoration of services and steps towards reintegration

(a) Co-operation with local authorities and services

h2. During the period under review, there was improvement in the relations between OMJC officials and local authorities. Mr. Pius Sapwe, the Chief of Police in Elisabethville, proved willing to work under OMJC direction in the S/5053/Add.15 English Page 12

restoration of law and order in the city. Joint patrols of Tunisian soldiers and Katangese police were organized; they earned the praise of the local authorities, including the usually hostile local press for the efficiency and tact with which they carried out their functions. A curfew was established, at first from 1800 to 0600 hours, "but was later relaxed to 2200 hours. As a result, theft and looting were brought under control. ^3- Elsewhere in Katanga, local authorities, including customary chiefs, were generally co-operative when OMJC troops entered their respective areas and in some cases requested the sending of United Nations patrols to restore order. Chief Kasongo Membo of Kamina pledged his loyalty to Prime Minister Adoula after a plea for his support had been broadcast by the Central Government radio. kk. Relations with local non-Congolese technicians varied according to the sphere of activity involved. In such services as the post office and customs, these technicians showed varying degrees of willingness to co-operate with OMJC technicians and representatives of the Central Government. In some other services, such as telecommunications, co-operation was not usually extended by the non-Congolese technicians of Katanga. Moreover, the attitude of these technicians as a whole stiffened with the return of certain Katangese ministers to ELisabethville during the week beginning 21 January 196"3> when it was not altogether clear whether they were returning as members of the provincial administration or would still seek to support secession. Pending a reliable indication as to how the tide would finally turn, some of these technicians, as well as many Katangese officials, preferred to adopt an attitude bordering on passive resistance. This created a serious problem for both United Nations authorities and the Central Government Administrative Commission. It will be recalled that after the hostilities in the Elisabethville area, most non-Congolese technicians had been persuaded to return to their posts through, the intervention of the representative of the International Red Cross. ^5. At the beginning of the military operations in Elisabethville, a detailed plan was prepared by OMJC officials and the representative of the International Red Cross to provide for the free circulation of ambulances, safe conducts, and other important facilities for the Red Cross workers to carry out their functions S/5053/Add.l5 English Page 13 with the minimum of harassment in the danger zones. This close working relationship was rapidly extended to cover the movement of refugees, food distribution, the investigation of allegations against United Nations troops and efforts to determine the whereabouts and to arrange the release of political prisoners. 46. Good relations were maintained with the parquet during this period. In spite of many allegations of misconduct-by United Nations troops freely echoed in certain quarters, only two complaints were received by the office of the Katangese Procureur d'Etat allegedly involving United Nations troops. These related to the killing of a Frenchwoman and of a Senegalese man. Other allegations were found upon inquiry to be largely baseless and obviously designed to serve propaganda ends. One allegation, for example, had it that United Nations troops had fired point blank at patients in the Union Miniere hospital at Lubumbasi on 29 December 1962. It was subsequently established that important gendarmerie positions, including mortar positions, had been installed fifty metres from the hospital wards which ONUG troops had to clear before they could proceed to Simba Hill in the early morning of 29 December 1962. In the course of this action, a shooting incident occurred, in which one patient was wounded in the thigh and another was grazed. It was recognized by some of the hospital authorities themselves and other witnesses that the whole hospital area had been a strong centre of gendarmerie activity, thus explaining the need for OMJC troops to enter the hospital precincts. ^7. At the request of the Katangese Deputy Attorney-General, United Nations protection was accorded to his staff to enter the Kasapa Prison in order to collect records and to reassert authority in the prison. An escort of Indian troops accordingly was provided for them to enter the prison on 18 January 1963* At the same time, the International Red Cross started an investigation to ensure that no political prisoners were being held in this prison.

(b) Co-operation with the Central Government

U8. During the first week of January 1963, twenty-two officials and officers representing the Central Government were flown .to Elisabethville. They made up the Administrative Commission, headed by Mr. Franqois Kalala, whose functions s/5053/Add.i5 English Page lA included making contact with the provincial authorities and preparing the vay for the integration of the provincial administration within the Central Government. This Administrative Commission gradually established itself., setting up offices and making preliminary contacts, but did not concern itself with IEV and order, which remained the over-all responsibility of OMJC, working in co-operation with the Katangese police. 49. On l6 January 1963, the President of the Congo nominated Mr. Joseph lieo as Minister of State, Member of the Council of Ministers, resident at ELisabethville with the special duty of ensuring the necessary contacts with the provincial institutions and of facilitating the process of reintegration of South Katanga within the Republic. ) 50. Following this nomination, Prime Minister Adoula requested the Officer- in- Charge of OMJC, in a letter dated 22 January, to give Mr. Ileo all assistance and co-operation which the latter might require in order to facilitate his- task and to ensure the full success of his mission. After receiving this letter, the Officer-in-Charge had detailed discussions with the Prime Minister and Mr. Ileo regarding the manner in which OMJC could best provide the assistance and co-operation which were requested of it. 51. During the discussions, the question of joint patrols by OMJC and ANC contingents in Elisabethville was also raised. It was agreed that all military forces in Katanga, especially those at Elisabethville, would be placed under one command, that of OMJC, and that the principle of single command would be applied in particular to OMJC-ANC joint patrols which might be authorized. It was also agreed that OMJC should provide Mr. Ileo, to all extent possible, with the assistance and co-operation which the latter might request in the normal exercise of his functions. Finally it was agreed that for all questions requiring an interpretation/ OMJC would strictly abide by the provisions of the Lol fondamentale. These three points were confirmed by the Officer-in-Charge in a letter dated 22 January 1963 to the Prime Minister. 52. Mr. Ileo and his party arrived at Elisabethville on 23 January to assume his duties. He was met at the airport by the members of the Congolese Administrative Commission in Elisabethville, Katangese provincial authorities, S/5053/Add.l5 English Page 15 including the Chief of Police, and ONUC senior officials. A guard of AKC and another of the Katangese police were at hand to render honours.

(c) Postal services

53 • An ONUC postal expert arrived in ELisabethville on 3 January 1963 to assist in the integration of provincial postal services with those of the rest of the Congo. On 9 January 19&3; almost a ton of Congolese stamps were flown in from Leopoldville, and these have already "been brought into circulation in ELisabethville, Kaniama and Karainaville. Stocks of Katangese stamps have been withdrawn. Katangese stamps are no longer valid, but the public may exchange them for Congolese stamps. The withdrawal of Katangese stamps from all parts of the province was expected to be completed soon after the writing of this report. 5^. In the course of his work at the Kaminaville post office, the ONUC expert found fifty-four sacks of undelivered mail dating back to 1960 and brought these to ELisabethville for delivery. 55. A Fercepteur en Chef was installed in the ELisabethville postal services by the Central Government. He is working under the existing management, which is now responsible to the Central Government. His relations and those of the ONUC expert with the Katangese officials and Belgian technicians have been satisfactory. There is some anxiety among the Katangese lest disciplinary action be taken against them for their actions over the past two and a half years. 56. In ELisabethville, measures were taken to end the censorship of mail that had been established during the secessionist period in accordance with the Katangese Ordonnance-loi No, 3°/77 of 1 March 1961. As censorship is illegal in the Republic of the Congo, a continuation of such a sytem could no longer be tolerated, although efforts were made by some former Katangese post office employees to carry on this activity.

(d) Customs

57- An ONUC customs adviser had been in ELisabethville since mid-September 1962, serving as a member of the Joint Commission on Revenues. He was subsequently S/5053/Add.l5 English Page 16 joined by a verificateur, and OMJC intends to provide experts in receipts and inspection. 58. The Director of Customs of the Central Government paid a short violt of inspection to Elisabethville, and one percepteur and one veriflct.Teur fi-om

Leopoldville have been installed. Relationsi with the existing staff, both Katangese and Belgian, are good. 59• There is some anxiety among Katangese officials that they may be transferred to other parts of the Congo. 60. There are no trained Kat:;mges& verificateurs; therefore, ,\id in thii -v.rc;_ i; especially important. The possibility of providing a customs training establishment in Elisabethville is under consideration. 61. The Central Government has issued instructions that all customs and tax receipts should in future be paid to the representative of the Vonetsry Council in Elisabethville, to be credited to an account of the Central Goverri'^-.-r.t, the allocation of such receipts to be determined later. In the -aer-inti^c:, customs duties are being gradually rationalized so as to cake them uniform throughout the Congo.

(e) Immigration

62. On 5 January 19^3; Central Government immigration offices were installed at Elisabethville airport and in the city centre. Flans are in progress to establish immigration offices in other key towns of the province by the end of the month. 63. While henceforth Central Government visa and other immigration formalities were required of foreigners travelling to and from the province of South Katanga as well as residents of this province, nevertheless it was announced that for a transition period of several months Katangese immigration formalities Already established with regard to foreigners visiting or resident in Katanga vould be recognized concurrently with the new regulations, allowing a reasonable period of time for those concerned to regularise their situation. A communique setting out the details of the above immigration policy was published by the Central Government Administrative Commission in South Katanga on 9 January 1963. S/5053/Add.l5 English Page 1?

(f) Resumption of commercial air traffic

6k. As previously reported (S/5053/Add.lU, para. 95), commercial air traffic was resumed at Elisabethville airport on h January 1963. On 11 January, the first Air Congo flight took place from Leopoldville to Elisabethville and return. Regular Air Congo services were soon established between the two cities, in addition to Sabena service to Europe. 65. At the request of the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Elisabethville airport runways were completely cleared of all military installations, provisions and equipment, the placement of which had been made necessary there by emergency conditions.

(g) Radio Katanga

66. Radio Katanga, which was taken under OMJC custody on 1 January 1963, resumed broadcasting on 7 January 1963 with the announcement "This is the Congolese National Radio, Provincial Station of South Katanga", followed by the Congolese National Anthem. This was heard clearly in Leopoldville and throughout the Congo and was reported to have had a great impact. 67. At present, out of a daily total broadcast time of seven and a half hours, the Congolese National Radio broadcasts for five and a half hours, operating as the provincial station of South Katanga, while two hours are devoted to United Nations radio programmes. Fifteen Congolese technicians arrived from Leopoldville to run the Central Government Radio. Radio Katanga's 100 kw transmitter is used for both Central Government and United Nations programmes.

(h) Telecommunications

68. Two technicians from the International Telecommunications Union arrived in Elisabethville on 2 January 1963 with the immediate task of repairing the radio transmitter to permit resumption of broadcasting. A third one followed to put the studios in working order, as some pieces of equipment had been damaged and others had disappeared. An expert on small transmitters and receivers was also provided, and experts on the multiplex telegraph and on the teletype were expected to arrive very soon. S/5053/Add.l5 English Page 18

69. Radio, telegraph and telephone services are now functioning. There is some dissatisfaction among the European population, however, because direct telephone and telex services to Brussels have "been discontinued on the instructions of the Central Government, and, as with other provinces, all such services are now routed through Leopoldville. 70. Relations between OKUC experts and Katangese and Belgians, which were | somewhat strained at first, are now generally good. There is an urgent need for training of Katangese personnel. All staff are anxloi.c about their pay, and about the possibility of being transferred to other parts of the country.

(i) Bank of Katanga 71. Acting under a decree of 9 January 1963, the Monetary Council of the Congo has assumed control of the "National Bank of Katanga". The Monetary Council met and designated its vice-president as administrator of the Bank, as a first step in the reunification of the fiscal authority of the Congo. 72. Efforts were at once begun to undertake a complete inventory of the assets of the Bank. On the morning of 23 January 1963.? however, the provincial Minister of Finance, Mr. Kibwe, addressed to the directors of the Bank, with copies to the Administrateur-Ge'rant and the OWUC Representative, a letter asserting that the measures decided upon did not fall within the reconciliation Plan and accordingly forbidding the directors to comply therewith. In reliance on these instructions, officials at the Bank withheld from the Administrator such limited co-operation as had previously been vouchsafed. This letter was subsequently withdrawn. However, it was only on 29 January 19^3 and after it had been necessary to detain the directors of the Bank temporarily that it was possible to obtain access to the vaults of the Bank and to its records. These showed that some records had been destroyed, others had been improperly kept and that large sums of money were unaccounted for.

(j) Negotiations with Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga 73- In a letter dated 12 December 19^2, Mr. Moise Tshombe communicated to the Secretary-General his "offer" whereby he would authorize the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga under certain conditions to transfer to the Monetary Council of the Republic of the Congo all foreign exchange generated by the company's S/5053/Add.l5 English Page 19 exports. This "offer" was referred to in the last report of the Officer-in- Charge, as well as the latterrs suggestion that this question be discussed by the Central Government and the UMHK representatives, and Mr. Tshombe's view that the contacts with the Monetary Council would have to be effected not by the UMHK but by his representatives accompanied by a UMHK expert (s/5053/Add.l4, paras. 25-26). Jh. On k January 19^5^ a representative of the UMHK sent from its Brussels headquarters arrived in Leopoldville. The discussion between him and the representatives of the Congolese Government (the President of the Monetary Council and the Governor of the National Bank of the Congo) took place from h- to 15 January 1963. 1he representatives of the Office of Economic Co-ordination of the Central Government, as well as a representative from the UMHK of Elisabethville, participated in the discussions. It may be noted also that Mr. Van Roey, Director of the Bank of Katanga, who arrived in Leopoldville on 8 January, was authorized by the Prime Minister to attend the discussions as an observer. 75. As a result of the discussions, an agreement on foreign exchange was reached and formally signed on 15 January. However, because of the UMHK's fear that its installations might be sabotaged by the Katanga authorities if the agreement came to be known, it was decided to keep it secret until the United Nations had assumed control over Kolwezi. In brief, the agreement of 15 January provides that the UMHK should remit all its export proceeds to the Monetary Council, which should in turn allocate to the UMHK the foreign exchange required for meeting its essential needs and maintaining its activities, provided that the utilization of such foreign exchange be made under the supervision of the Monetary Council. 76. This agreement does not deal with the allocation of foreign exchange by the Central Government to the provincial authorities of South Katanga. It had been agreed that this question would be discussed separately after agreement had been reached between the Central Government and the UMHK. Mr. Van Roey, who had left for Elisabethville on 11 January, had promised to come back within four days for the purpose, but he did not appear at the appointed time. S/5053/Add.l5 English Page 20

77 • No negotiations were undertaken with the representatives for the payment of taxes, duties and royalties to the Central Government. It was decided that such negotiations would not be necessary as the UMHK would have to "be submitted to the same general measure regarding all companies operating in South Katanga. Instructions have already been given by the Minister of Finance of the Central Government to the Chief of the Administrative Commission in Elisabethville, Mr. Kalala, to ensure that all customs receipts recorded in Katanga should be paid to the representatives of the Monetary Council at E]isabethville exclusively to the account of the Central Government. In the instructions, it was specified that the division of receipts between the Central Government and the provincial authorities would be decided upon at a later stage.

(k) Repair of bridges and resumption of transport 78. During the military action in Katanga, thirty-five road bridges and seven railway bridges were damaged or destroyed (see annex l). Several of the road bridges between Elisabethville and Kolwezi have been replaced provisionally by the erection of Bailey Bridges by Indian engineers of OMJC. The railway bridges, however, present a greater problem, and for the time being three main rail arteries so vital to the economy of the Congo are cut both within Katanga itself and from Katanga to other parts of the Congo. 79. The first of these routes, the line ELisabethville-Luluabourg-Port Francqui with connexions by river and rail to Matadi, which is owned by the Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga (B.C.K.), is blocked by the destruction of the Bukama and Lubilash bridges; the B.C.K. network is also blocked between Elisabethville and Kolwezi by the destruction of bridges over the Lufira Eiver at Mulungwishi and over the Dikulwe River. The second route, the line from ATbertville via Kabalo and Kongolo to Kindu with onward connexions by river and rail to Stanleyville and to Matadi, which is owned by the Chemin de Fer du Congo Superieur aux Grands Lacs (C.F.L.), is obstructed by blown bridges at Kongolo over the Lualaba River and at Lubunda. The line from Kamina to Kabalo which links these two systems is obstructed by the destruction of the Lenge bridge over the Luguvu River northeast of Kabongo. This last stretch of railroad, which is state-owned but operated by the two companies, offers an outlet to English Page 21 the production of South Katanga both in the direction of Stanleyville and via Albertville and Kigoma to Dar es Salaam. 80. Two main points have to be taken into consideration in connexion with the repair of the bridges: first, their great importance from the standpoint of transport and the economy of the country, and secondly the availability of the requisite material, funds and technical staff. The B.C.K., being affiliated with the Socie'te' ge'ne'rale, has the funds at its disposal and is in a position to acquire the necessary material and technicians for the reconstruction work and is working out a programme for doing so. The railway bridges at Bukama and across the Lubilash River are so badly damaged that they cannot be repaired in under six months. However, the B.C.K. believes that it will be able to repair the three railway bridges destroyed on the line ELisabethville-Jadotville-Kolwezi in the course of the next six weeks. 81. The C.F.L. railroad is not in the same fortunate position as the B.C.K. Operating mainly in North Katanga, the C.F.L. has had a heavy fall-off of traffic since the events of I960; it is therefore likely that it is unable to finance the repair of the bridges on the lines operated by it, although it is willing to undertake reconstruction work, if it can be given financial assistance. Estimates for the repair of the state-owned Lenge-Luguvu bridge and the Lubunda'bridge are approximately 5,850,000 CF, and it will take about four months to complete the work. Altogether, it is estimated that funds in the amount of 38,000,000 CF will be required to put the railway lines in Katanga in service again. In the meantime, the C.F.L. may reactivate transport from Kabalo to Kongolo by waterway. It is understood that they have the vessels available, and as soon as the water channels are demarcated by buoys this route can be put into service. (Before 19^0, the only transport available between Kabalo and Kongolo was by the Lualaba River.) 82. Close co-operation will be given the two companies by the public works section, the military command and the transport and communications sections of OMJC, working with the corresponding services in the Central Government, including their service of navigable waterways. In particular, Lt. General R.A. Wheeler of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been asked to undertake, on behalf of OMJC, a special and urgent S/5o53/Add.l5 English Page 22 survey of the problem for the purpose of ascertaining the detailed requirements in materials, technical personnel and finance for the restoration, both temporary and permanent, of communications in Katanga and for determining in what ways this work can be expedited. English Page 23

(l) Integration of Gendarmerie

83. OMJC has to look forward to assisting in the solution of the problem of the permanent disposition of large numbers of gendarmes who have been put out of action by recent events including the disintegration and disappearance of their organized units. Such a solution would eventually have to be based on the rapid reintegration and unification of all Congolese military and gendarmerie units into a national armed forces and gendarmerie structure. 81)-. On 7 January 19&3; Prime Minister Adoula issued a declaration on reintegration in which he stated, inter alia, that gendarmes rejoining the ANC by a date to be determined would retain their ranks. 85. A significant event occurred on 10 January when Col. Kiembe, Chief of Staff of the gendarmerie, gave himself up to CMJC troops between Elisabethville and Mokambo. While it was United Nations policy to avoid taking prisoners and to let disarmed gendarmes go free, an increasing number of gendarmes now began to ccme to CWUC or to Central Government representatives in Elisabethville with requests to be reintegrated in the ANC. 86. On the same date, twenty-two ANC officers arrived in Elisabethville; it was their mission to enter in contact with their gendarmerie colleagues with a view to explaining to them the provision of the Prime Minister's declaration and thus preparing the way for reintegration. They were subsequently and unexpectedly joined by a little more than ICO other Al'IC personnel, all cf when have been housed in a military camp in the suburban commune of Karavia, under the general authority of the commanding officer of the OMUC Katanga area. 87. On 15 January, these Congolese military personnel were inspected by Congolese Defence Minister Anany, in company of the commanding officer of the Ethiopian Brigade. In the course of their visit to Karavia, they met 107 armed gendarmerie officers and other ranks lined up and saluting. Mr. Anany addressed them in Swahili to inform them that they would now be part of the National Army and would retain their gendarmerie ranks, that they must serve the Congo and forswear politics. 88. The temporary arrangement with Mr. Tshcmbe concerning the treatment of the gendarmerie personnel at Kolwezi has been described in Section B above. S/5053/Add.l5 English Page 2k

Elsewhere in Katanga, local recruits of the gendarmerie who have given up to United Nations troops have usually been disarmed and permitted to disperse.

(m) Disturbances in the former Kasai Province

89. Since the break-up of the former Kasai Province into five provinces, there has been tribal conflict in the border areas, particularly in cases where the frontiers are not yet clearly defined. At one trouble-spot, Kakenge, on the Unite Kasaienne-Luluabourg border,, violent fighting broke out in January between the Luluas on the one side and the Bakete and Bakuba tribes on the other. The Luluabourg fTcvernment reported that 370 Luluas had been killed, though this figure has not been confirmed and may well have been exsggerated for propaganda purposes. Two Belgians of the Exforcas Timber Company are known to have been killed, and, when the ANC arrived to re-establish order, the ANC reported two killed and several wounded. 9C. Another area of conflict was close to Bakwanga, where full-scale guerilla warfare was being waged by Jeunesse and remnants of the former Kolonjist gendarmerie, terrorizing the civil population in the areas of Miabi, 26 kms. south-west of Bakwange, Merode, k-7 kms, south-west of Bakwanga and Kabeye, ^0 kms. north-west of Bakwanga. 91. Cn 13 January the Officer-in-Charge paid a brief visit to Bakwanga, accompanied by the United Nations representative in Luluabourg, and after discussions with provincial President Wgalula and other members of the provincial government, it was decided that the rebels should be warned by leaflets and broadcasts to surrender their arms immediately, failing which, OMJC would take necessary measure to restore order. The leaflets would also exhort the civil populations to return to their villages with the assurance of United Nations protection. 92. Cn l8 January leaflets in Tshikylba and Lingala were dropped over Tshinshanku, Kenda, Matabi and Kabeye^ calling on the Jeunesse to give up and hand in their arms. 93. ONUC intends to intensify its efforts to assist the Congolese Government to maintain law and order in this region, which forms an unhappy contrast with other s/5C53/Add.l5 English Page 25 ' regions where civil strife has largely ended. *n 20 January, the Officer-in-Charge visited Albertville, Goma and Stanleyville, where the situation was found to be entirely quiet and normal and interest was largely directed toward restoring the economy of the country. S/5053/Add.l5 English. Annex I Page 1

ANNEX I

Bridges and installations destroyed or damaged by mercenaries and gendarmes from November 19&2 to January

A. Rail and Road Bridges 1. Kongolo sector (a) Kongolo Bridge across Lualaba river: two spans destroyed, a length of about 72 metres. Pillar "between two spans also heavily damaged. The bridge served dual purpose of rail and road service. ("b) Kabeya-Maji road bridge over Lukuga river, 30 kms. north of j Wyunzu: break of 100 metres and entire bridge down in river. (c) Luhembwe road bridge: destroyed west -northwest of Kongolo. (d) Lubunda railway bridge, 50 kms. northwest of Kongolo: destroyed - ^4-0 -metre break. (e) Lusendoie road bridge and railway bridge on Kongolo -Kiotwe road: both destroyed . (f) Kohila road bridge northeast of Lubunda: destroyed. (g) Mukebwe railway bridge over Lufutuka river on Kabalo -Kongolo railway: slightly damaged. (h) Road bridge over Luika river 50 kms. north-northeast of Kongolo: destroyed. 2. Axis Kabalo-Kamina (a) Masengo Goi (Lenge) railway bridge over Lugubu river ^4-0 kms. northeast of Kabongo: ^0 metres destroyed. (b) Lugubu road bridge: destroyed over Lugubu river southwest of Kombe, 3« Axis Kamina-Kaniama-Mwene Lubilash railway bridge, 35 kms. northwest of Kaniama: two spans of this major bridge are destroyed; 127 -metre break. k. Axis Kamina-Sungu-Monga-Bukama (a) Roxyzonga destroyed. (b) Bukama railway bridge, 95 kms. southeast of Kamina base: destroyed - 100-metre break. S/5053/Add.l5 English Annex I Page 2

(c) Bukama road bridge: destroyed - 100-metre break. (d) Lovoi road bridge, 30 kms. east of Kamina base: U5-metre break. (e) Two small bridges (Kiowa and W. Kantobe) near Kamina base: destroyed, 5 • Axis Nyunzu-Manono (a) Makimbo road bridge: destroyed. (b) Mukebo road bridge: destroyed. 6. Malemba-Nkulu area Kiluewa road bridge on Malemba-Nkulu road: destroyed. 7. Axis Manono-Mitwaba Five road bridges have been destroyed between Kibindi and Mitwaba. 8. Axis Manono-Pweto Kipaila road bridge: destroyed. 9. Kipushi Kipushi road bridge on road to Elisabethville: destroyed. (Temporarily repaired). 10. Elisabethville-Jadotville axis Road bridges between Jadotville and Elisabethville have been temporarily repaired. (a) Both Lufira road and railway bridges destroyed. (b) Luafi river road bridge: destroyed. (c) Kafubu river bridge: destroyed. (d) Panda road bridge, approximately 25 Ions, east of Jadotville: destroyed. (e) Lukoshi road bridge, northeast of Lac de Retenue: destroyed: gap of 70 feet. (f) Two small bridges 5 kms. apart, Lukutfe and Tanga road bridges, are destroyed. 11. Axis Jadotville-Kolwezi (a) Mulunguishi road and railway bridges: both destroyed. (b) Guba road bridge over Dikulwe river: destroyed. (c) Fungurume road bridges, one to the east (Dipeta) and the other to the west of town: both destroyed. S/5053/Add.l5 English Annex I Page 3 B. Other installations 1. Kongolo sector Ferry at Kasiba, 15 kms. from Muyumba on the Ankoro-Muyumba, has been sunk. 2. Jadotville-Kolwezi axis (a) Fungurume transformer building: destroyed. (b) Certain essential machinery damaged at Jadotville. S/5053/Add.l5 English Annex II Page 1

ANNEX II Statement on the position of the Secretary-General vis-a-vis Mr. Tshombe issued by a United Rations spokesman on 7 January igbj

In a statement of 2 January 1963 (Press Release 30/1^0^-00/280) the position of the United Nations vis-a-vis Mr. Tshombe was clarified. That position stands. The Secretary-General is continuing to take note of the situation created by the'flight of Mr. Tshombe and his ministers from Elisabethville and the continued lack of any effective Provincial Government or authority in South Katanga. Mr. Tshombe left Elisabethville voluntarily, apparently on 28 December. He was under no restraint from ONUC at the time, and no action against him was contemplated. He fled for reasons best known to him. All of his ministers apparently had fled before him. There has thus been abandonment by Mr. Tshombe and his colleagues of their provincial responsibilities. This has serious implications for the efforts of OMJC to restore quickly in South Katanga normal conditions of life and to achieve without delay the full implementation of the plan for national reconciliation. These implications are being carefully studied by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General is aware of certain statements attributed to Mr. Tshombe in recent days threatening "a scorched earth" policy in South Katanga including destruction of valuable mining installations, power plants and bridges. If such statements have actually been made, the Secretary-General deplores them as reckless and irresponsible and against the interests of the people of Katanga and of the Congo nation as a whole. It is shocking that the head of a province - for purely political, if not personal, reasons - would threaten to destroy the economy of that province and thus bring great deprivation and suffering to its people. The United Nations Operation in the Congo, in pursuance of its mandate to assist in the maintenance of law and order, will exert every effort to prevent the application of any such policy in Katanga by Mr. Tshombe or anyone else. It must be assumed that it is understood by everyone concerned, including Mr. Tshombe, that OMJC will not permit any Katangese official who returns to Elisabethville to advocate destructive action of that kind. English Annex III Page 1

ANNEX III

Statement on the position of the Secretary-General vis-a-vis Mr. Tshombe issued by a United Nations spokesman on 9 January

Once again, in view of the completely contradictory nature of various statements made, or reported to have been made, by Mr. Tshombe in the past thirty- six hours, and especially in view of the statements of Mr. Tshombe at his press conference in Elisabethville on 9 January, the Secretary-General feels it necessary to make the position clear. It has always been, and remains, the aim of the United Nations Operation in • the Congo to achieve national reconciliation in the Congo by peaceful means. With this end in view, the Secretary-General has made repeated efforts in the last three days, through various channels and by the good offices of various Governments, to secure from Mr. Tshombe the necessary assurances on four basic points with a view to the re -establishment of contact with him on other matters. These points are (l) the categorical renunciation by Mr. Tshombe of the scorched earth and sabotage policy frequently announced by him; (2) the renunciation of his often-repeated intention to fight to the last man; (3) the taking of immediate practical steps for the implementation of the plan of national reconciliation which he has publicly accepted for many months; and (h) the assurance of immediate recognition of the right of ONUC to freedom of movement throughout all Katanga. As was pointed out in the United Nations statement of 7 January, the (T incitement by Mr. Tshombe to destruction of the economic installations of Katanga is a criminal act which cannot be accepted. In spite of Mr. Tshombe 's previous ^ statements on this subject, the Secretary-General has made all possible efforts to secure from Mr. Tshombe the basic minimum assurances upon which a peaceful solution can be reached. Unfortunately, Mr. Tshombe 's most recent statements to his press conference on 9 January would appear to have made it fruitless to pursue these efforts. S/5053/Add.l5 English Annex III Page 2 On 8 January Mr. Tshombe was variously reported to have said in various places that he would hold firm in Kolwezi, that the installations in that area were mined for demolition, and that he had returned to Elisabethville for the sole purpose of restoring, as soon as possible, calm and peace to Katanga and its people, specifically by assuring the rapid application of the plan of national reconciliation. On 9 January Mr. Tshombe's spokesman announced that Katangans had on the previous night blown up an electric power sub-station and transformer between Jadotville and Kolwezi, while later in the day Mr. Tshombe himself informed a press conference of his intention to pursue a scorched earth policy and added that the question of freedom of movement for ONUC troops was still "open to discussion". Should the destruction threatened by Mr. Tshombe continue to occur, he alone will be held responsible for all the tragic consequences of such acts of criminal sabotage, consequences which are particularly serious for the people of the Congo. A clear and unequivocal renunciation of all such threats and activities by him is therefore imperative. Failing such an immediate undertaking, other measures will become a matter of urgent necessity in order to prevent the disasters threatened by his incitement to destruction. As regards freedom of movement for OMJC personnel anywhere in Katanga, a categorical statement is required frcm Mr. Tshombe and, specifically, he must himself make immediate practical arrangements, including orders to any elements which he may still control, for the immediate peaceful entry by ONUC into the Kolwezi area for the protection of the population and installations, a protection which they are earnestly requesting. In view of the interminable prevarications and contradictions of Mr. Tshombe in the past, the only practical test of such undertakings is the actual peaceful entry of ONUC into Kolwezi. The most recent statements of Mr. Tshcmbe to the Press make it more essential and urgent than ever for him to prove that the undertakings given by him have some practical validity. Unless such proof is given, there can no more be any question of contact with

Mr. Tshombe on other matters-} and therefore ONUC has been instructed to restrain him from further irresponsible acts. English Annex IV Page 1

AMEX IV

Statement made "by the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo on 10 January 1963 regarding the installations threatened with destruction

For more than two weeks n«w Mr. Moise Tshombe and his accomplices have been advocating a scorched-earth policy in South Flatanga, for purely personal reasons and without any consideration for the welfare of the population. They have been inciting the population to violence and taking every opportunity to destroy installations that are essential to the economy of the country. Their acts of vandalism have already resulted in the destruction of saveral bridges and considerable damage to the installations of the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga in the Ja/lotville area. There is a danger that during the next few days economic installations in the areas of South Katanga which have not yet been liberated may be destroyed. In its concern for the welfare of the people, the Government of the Republic of the Congo, conscious of its sacred duty to preserve the national heritage, cannot remain indifferent to this state of affairs. The economic installations at Kolwezi and other places not yet liberated, which are now threatened with destruction because of Mr. Tshombef s senseless and irresponsible policy, constitute the sacred heritage of the Congolese nation. If they should be destroyed or damaged, the Government of the Republic will hold Mr. Tshombe personally responsible and will adopt the most severe measures against him, in accordance with the laws of the Republic. S/5055/Add.l5 English Annex V Page 1

ANNEX V

Message from "Tshombe and his Ministers meeting in Council at Kolwezi" on 1^- January 19^5? a-t 9 a.m.

We are ready to proclaim to the world that the Katangese secession is ended. We are ready to allow the United Nations troops freedom of movement throughout Katanga. We are also ready to return to Elisabethville to arrange for the complete application of the Thant Plan. We request that, at the same time as we make this declaration, the President of the Eepublic of the Congo and the Prime Minister may put the amnesty provided for in the Thant Plan into effect, in order to guarantee the safety and freedom of the President and the Government of Katanga, all their officials and agents, and all the people who have worked under their authority. We are resolved to establish loyal co-operation with the United Nations in the performance of its mission and we ask that the day and hour for a meeting may be set. In order to spare the people suffering, we hope that our proposal may be put into effect as rapidly as possible. Highest consideration.

(Signed) TSHOMBE and his Ministers, meeting in Council at Kolwezi, 1^ January 196?, at 9 a«m« S/5053/Add.l5 English Annex VI Page 1

ANNEX VI

Statement made by the Secretary-General on 15 January concerning the message of Mr. Tshombe and his ministers

Late in the afternoon of 2.k January, I received a note from the permanent representative of Belgium to the United Nations, to which was annexed a message, without addressee, emanating from "M. Tshombe and his Ministers meeting in council at Kolwezi". The message was signed on lU January at 0900 hours. I welcome the message, which indicates a readiness to end secession, to give freedom of movement to United Nations personnel throughout Katanga and to undertake the full implementation of the plan of national reconciliation. I most earnestly hope that this statement will be promptly and fully implemented and thus bring to an end the conflict and destruction which have been needlessly experienced in Katanga. The United Nations will certainly give its full assistance and support to the implementation of the promise implicit in Mr. Tshombe's statement. s/5053/Md-15 Engli sh Annex VII 1

ANNEX VII

Letter dated 1$ January 19^5 from the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo addressed to the Sec retary-General

Sir, Following my conversation with the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Mission in the Congo, I have the honour to confirm that, in the spirit of the U Thant Plan as concerns the amnesty, and although Mr. Moise Tshombe and his colleagues have up to now persisted in following a secessionist policy, my Government is prepared to give the leaders of South Katanga all the necessary protection and assurances, in accordance with the statement made by President Kasa-Vubu on 2.6 November 1962 announcing a general amnesty for political offences, and in particular with the last paragraph, which ran as follows:

"Neither the Government nor I myself harbour any hatred against anyone. The doors are open to all who will come back. In the spirit that prevailed at the meeting of Parliament at Lovanium in July and August 1961, when we were able to overcome and bury our hostilities and the most serious differences of opinion, I solemnly renew the offer I made on that occasion and proclaim that a general and complete amnesty will be granted to all who rejoin our fatherland, this great Congo, whatever political offences they may have been guilty of.

"We hope that they will all return, without exception, and we await them open-armed, with peace in our hearts, so that all the vital forces of the nation may work together, hand in hand, to construct the country as the nation intends, as the members of our great family desire, in understanding and prosperity." I I should also like to recall that, after President Kasa-Vubu's statement, I spoke in the same vein in my speech of 28 November 1962 to the Chamber of •r-/ Representatives and in my New Yearrs message to the Congolese people. I send you herewith the text of these documents.

(Signed) Cyrille AEOULA S/5053/Add.l5 English Annex VIII Page 1

ANNEX VIII

Letter dated 15 January 1963 from the President of the Republic of the Congo addressed to the Secretary-General

Sir, Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula has brought to my attention the message dated 15 January 19^3 transmitted to him by the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Mission in the Congo, in which he informed him that the Provincial Government of South Katanga has declared its readiness to proclaim the end of the secession of South Katanga but requests that the amnesty provided for in the U Thant Plan should be applied. Concerned as I am to restore harmony in the country, and despite the fact that circumstances have changed radically since my statement of 26 November 1962 concerning a general amnesty for political offences, I should like to inform you that all the promises I made in my statement are still completely valid. I repeat that neither the Government nor I myself harbour hatred against anyone and that the doors remain open to all those who return in good faith to the bosom of the Republic. I should like to affirm this to you in the most solemn manner.

(Signed) Joseph KASAVUBU

I

I English Annex IX Page 1

ANNEX IX

Summary of the decisions taken at ELisabethville on 17 January 19&3 concerning the modalities of the entry- of ONUC into Kolwezi

On 17 January 19^3 Mr. George L. Sherry and Major-General D. Prem Chand, representing the United Nations Operation in the Congo, received President Moise Tshombe at the OMJC Headquarters at Hisabethville for the purpose of discussing the modalities of the entry of OMJC into Kolwezi. The following decisions were taken: 1. President Tshombe will take all necessary and effective measures to - ensure that ONUCfs entry into Kolwezi shall take place peacefully and with the co-operation of all concerned, including the gendarmerie and the local authorities. To that end President Tshombe will issue the necessary orders and make the necessary appeals to the population in and around Kolwezi. OMJC will make its technical facilities available for this purpose. 2. OMJC will complete its peaceful entry into Kolwezi by 21 January 1963. This entry will be carried out in exercise of ONUCfs freedom of movement throughout the Republic of the Congo, granted by the Central Government of the Republic pursuant to the resolutions of the Security Council. 3. Pending arrangements for the integration of the gendarmerie, in accordance with the provisions of the National Reconciliation Plan, the security of its members will be fully assured by OMJC. ONUC gives its assurance that they will not be treated as prisoners of war or arrested except in instances of F I _. violation of law and order, and that they will be able to continue to wear their ; uniforms. A personal guard of company strength, armed with rifles, will be ' authorized at the Provincial President's residence. A few members of that guard will be authorized to escort him in his movements. I U. In order to ensure the maintenance of law and order and to prevent the ' danger of incidents, the gendarmerie shall proceed to the gathering of its arms I and ammunition in one central dump, and such arms and ammunition shall be :. entrusted to the care of a detachment of about fifty gendarmes under the general 1 control and command of ONUC, pending the implementation of the pertinent provisions S/5053/Add.l5 English Annex IX Page 2 of the National Reconciliation Plan. The provisions of this paragraph shall not in any way curtail the right of ONUC to search for and seize arms and ammunition clandestinely held; the gendarmerie will co-operate with ONUC in this activity. 5. All mines and other explosive material which irresponsible elements contemplated using for the destruction of essential installations in Kolwezi shall be removed immediately by the Katangese authorities in co-operation with ONUC forces. President Tshombe has acknowledged that the Katangese authorities would be responsible if the withholding of information with respect to mines and other explosive material should lead to loss of lives or other casualties among OMJC personnel.

(Signed) G.L. Sherry, Major-General Prem Chand, Moise Tshombe.

UNITED NATIONS Distr. SECURITY GENERAL S/5053/Add.lVCorr.l COUNCIL IT January 1963 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT TO THE SECRETAFY-GEHERAL FROM THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO OH DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OF 21 FEBRUARY AND 2k NOVEMBER 196l Corrigendum

1, paragraph 38, fifteenth line; At the "beginning of the new sentence read "Speaking in Kiswahili". 2, Paragraph 39 > sixth line and paragraph 55, first line: Read "Gorkhas" instead of "Gerkhas", 3, ANNEX XXXIV, paragraph 1, first line: Insert the word "requested" at the end of the line.

63-OlUT UNITED NATIONS Dlstr. GENERAL SECURITY \WI I I iJT «** V *t * -I fcTJ ~ / s - s -si •* *• —*• COUNCIL jfessar sassr'1963 ORIGINS: ENGLISH/FRENCH

REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FROM THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OF 21 FEBRUARY AND 2k NOVEMBER 196].

Events in Katanga from 26 November 1962 to k January 1963

A. Introduction

1. The report of the Officer-in-Charge of 26 November 1962 (G/5C53/Add.l3) presented an account of the largely unsuccessful efforts made over a period of three months to persuade the President of the province of Katanga to carry out his part of the Secretary-General's Plan of National Reconciliation which the Central Government had accepted on 27 August 1962 and Mr. Tshombe on 3 September 1962. By and large , Mr. Tshombe had made certain gestures of a largely procedural nature. He would be prepared for protracted negotiations on terms and grounds predefined by him; he had written lengthy letters and made statements; but he had taken no significant step to achieve the reintegration of Katanga. The Secretary-General's Plan enunciated a programme of specific measures which were to be taken in a specified time sequence, at the end of which Katanga would have been reintegrated in a federal Republic of the Congo. Mr. Tshombe paid only weak lip-service to this and his acts belied even that. 2. At the same time, Katanga's provincial authorities were engaged in an increasingly intensive campaign of harassment against ONUC forces and civilian personnel in the Elisabethville area, who found themselves more and more in a position akin to a siege. These tactics were in part deliberately designed to make the position of ONUC in Elisabethville untenable; on the other hand, they demonstrated Mr. Tshombe's diminishing control over tae gendarmerie. The hostilities initiated by the gendarmerie at the end of December were probably due to a combination of both these factors.

63-00723 /... S/5053/Add.lit- English Page 2

B. Harassment of United Nations personnel

3. On 22 September 1962, two Tunisian ONUC soldiers were reported missing. On 5 October, a third soldier was abducted by the gendarmerie in Kenya commune, south of Elisabethville. This was arranged by a non-Congolese, who, it was later learnt, was engaged in para-military activities. On 2k October 1962, a fourth Tunisian soldier was abducted by gendarmes; he managed to ask his commanding officer, Lt. Col. Hassan Remiza, for help by telephone from Kolwezi. k. The United Nations Representative in Elisabethville, Mr. E.W. Mathu, repeatedly requested Mr. Tshombe to return the soldiers to their battalion. Cn 13 November, Mr. Tshombe informed Colonel Lasmar of Tunisia and the United Nations Representative that he was prepared to return the soldiers provided the Tunisian Government undertook not to penalize them. With Colonel Lasmar's support, the United Nations Representative informed Mr. Tshombe on 18 November that this procedure would be at variance with the arrangements made by Governments with the United Nations under which the United Nations has assumed full responsibility for ONUC contingents contributed by them; he requested the immediate release of the four soldiers (Annex l). On 23 November Tshombe asked ONUC to give the assurances which he had previously requested of the Tunisian Government (Annex II). In the morning of 7 December 1962, Mr. Tshombe promised orally that the men would soon be released unconditionally. He noted that the Tunisian contingent was scheduled to return to its country in the near future. During the afternoon of the same day, however, a fifth Tunisian soldier was abducted by the gendarmerie, and on 18 December Mr. Tshombe informed the United Nations Representative that the return of the five men would only take place ten days before the repatriation of the Tunisian contingent, a position which the United Nations Representative refused to accept. He continued to press for the immediate return of the men in question. 5. On U December 1962, the Katangese police arrested Mr. Salim Eraser Lombe, an ONUC interpreter, on trumped-up charges of embezzlement which were promptly denied by the head of the Adventist Mission for which Mr. Salim occasionally made collections. On k December 1962, another ONUC civilian employee, Mr. Adan Ali, was likewise arrested; this time, no effort was made by the Katangese authorities to hide the fact that he was being questioned in connexion with his work for the

United Nations, as was Mr. Salim. Strenuous efforts were madex by Mr. Mathu to English Page 3

secure the release of the two men. He pointed out that their detention was a flagrant violation of the Status Agreement between the Republic of the Congo and the United Nations. In a letter of 11 December 1962, Mr. Mathu again protested vigorously against the men's detention, pointing out that the Katangese authorities were evidently seeking to harass the United Nations and to restrict the movements of its personnel in Katanga. On a number of occasions promises were made that the men would be released, most notably on 20 December 1962 by Mr. Kimba. On the very next day, however, Mr. Kimba's promise was withdrawn by a telephone message from the provincial President's office. In commenting on this flagrant breach of faith, the United Nations Representative in Elisabethville urgently requested Mr. Kimba, in a letter of 21 December, to refrain henceforth from his practice of making promises which he did not intend to honour (Annex III). 6. Mr. Salim escaped from Gendarmerie custody on 22 December 1962, one week before the CHUG troops moved into Kipushi where he was being held. According to Mr. Salim, Mr. Adan Ali was shot and is feared dead. 7. During the night of 7 December 1962, seven ONUC officers who were travelling in a jeep were arrested by the Katangese gendarmes and policemen. Taken to the Police Station at Commune Albert, they were slapped and beaten by the policemen and by General Moke, Commander of the Gendarmerie, before being released to ONUC military authorities. On 1^ December 1962, four representatives of the Central Government who were in Elisabethville for the purpose of co-operating with the Katangese authorities, in the implementation of the Secretary-General's Plan of National Reconciliation, were arrested while shopping in town. They were released shortly thereafter. Mr. Mathu protested against these attempts at harassment in letters addressed to Mr. Tshombe on 10 and lU December 1962 (the letter of 10 December forms Annex IV). 8. Gradually, Mr. Tshombe's campaign against the United Nations - of which only the salient examples are given here - was extended to nationals of Member States of the Organization whose Governments were co-operating in the implementation of the Secretary-General's Plan and of the United Nations mandate in the Congo. A demonstration was organized in front of the Consulate of Belgium on 3 December 1962. There was a large-scale demonstration before the United States Consulate on 2C December, in the course of which a structure on the Consulate grounds was burnt down and most Consulate windows broken, protesting United States assistance to ONUC.

A-. 3/5053/ Add. Ill- English Page 4

9. When the Italian Government announced that it would make fighter aircraft without crews available to CNUC, Messrs. Kibwe and Munongo, acting in the President's absence, ordered the Italian Consul, Mr. Natali, "expelled" on thirty minutes notice on 6 December 1962. The United Nations Representative in Elisabethville protested the lawless action of the authorities, which the Provincial President appeared at one stage to regret. ONUC also gave protection to the Consul's family and to the Consulate premises in Elisabethville. Nevertheless, Mr. Natali was forcibly taken to Mokambo and thence to N'dola in Rhodesia. In a letter of 11 December 1962, the United Nations Representative drew attention to the flagrant violation of international law and usage involved in the abduction of the Consul, over whose status the Provincial authorities had no competence, all the more so as, under the Plan, Tshombe had acknowledged that foreign affairs did not fall within the Province's purview. Mr. Mathu warned that Mr. Tshombe was being inexorably pushed by his advisers into the position of an enemy of the United Nations as well as of its African Member States, a policy bound to lead Katanga to ruin. Mr. Mathu appealed to Mr. Tshombe to accept the hand offered by the international community to bring peace and prosperity to Katanga and to the whole Congo (Annex V). Mr. Tshcirbe never rescinded the lawless action taken against Mr. Natali. 1C. Another offensive aspect of Mr. Tshombe's campaign of harassment against ONUC related to United Nations property. Several wagonloads of ONUC goods were seized by Mr. Tshombe at the border points of Sakania and Dilolo in July. Mr. Tshombe had given the formal promise to allow United Nations goods to be shipped by rail in exchange for liberal ONUC attitude in regard to the passage of Katangese rail traffic through Elisabethville. In the face of demands by the Officer-in-Charge and the United Nations Representative in Elisabethville, Mr. Tshombe repeatedly promised to release the goods, but he never did so. It subsequently transpired that most of the items in question, worth nearly $1,CCC,OCO, were transported to Kipushi and Kolwezi and distributed to Mr. TshombeTs gendarmes. This situation, in effect, obliged ONUC to bring in by expensive air-lift all the goods required for maintaining its civilian and military establishment in the Elisabethville area. 11. On numerous occasions, moreover, business men in Elisabethville supplying goods or services to OWUC were threatened or victimized by the Surete. s/5053/Add.iii- English Page 5

C. Clashes, bombings and destructions in North. Katanga

12. It will "be recalled that a draft "cease-fire" accord initialled on l6 October 1962 by Central Government and Katangese representatives (S/5C53/Add.l3, para. 15) had been rejected by Prime Minister Adoula for the reason that the draft called for the institution of observation groups only in Worth Katanga and not in South Katanga. 13. It soon became clear that military movements which gave rise to sporadic hostilities were continuing in Worth Katanga, and that the Central Government's (AWC) forces were gradually gaining the upper hand in the fighting, especially in the area around Kongolo. In connexion with this development., the Katangese began to spread accusations that the United Wations was supporting AWC in its operations. The Katangese also resorted to bombing attacks and demolition tactics. All the aircraft from which bombs were dropped on the AWC and on the civilian population were piloted by mercenariesj similarly, demolitions were carried out by mercenaries, experienced in that type of activity. 14. On 1^4- November 1962, the Officer-in-Charge expressed his great regret at the Katangese resort to aerial action, and warned that ONUC would not remain inactive in the face of the bombing of civilians ( Annex VI). Mr. Tshombe's charge that OWUC was helping the AWC advance was made in a statement and letter of 28 November 1962, and was denied by the United Wations Representative in Elisabethville in a letter of 3 December 1962 (Annexes VII and VIII). On the next day, it was reported that AWC troops had entered Kongolo. CWUC aerial observation verified the fact that before fleeing the gendarmes had blown up two spans of the bridge over the Lualaba river near Kongolo. 15- This instance of wanton destruction of the country's vital infrastructure was vigorously protested by the Officer-in-Charge by a letter of 8 December 1962, in which Mr. Tshombe was further informed that an CEUC military detachment had been despatched to Kongolo to maintain law and order and prevent civil war and fratricidal clashes (Annex IX). Ey letters dated 7 and 10 December 1962, addressed to the United Kations Representative in Elisabethville and to the Officer-in-Charge, Mr. Tshcmbe sought to put the blame for the gendarmerie reverses on the United Wations (Annexes X and XI). The charges were so baseless that the Officer-in-Charge refrained from replying. On 14 December, United Wations troops entered Kongolo and remained there. s/5053/Add.i4 English Page 6

D. Question of implementation of the Plan of National Reconciliation

16. No action was taken "by Mr. Tshombe's authorities during the period under review to carry out Katanga's part of the Secretary-General's Plan of National Reconciliation. Discussions went on in Elisabethville between Katangese and Central Government representatives on the foreign exchange and customs commissions, but no steps were taken to achieve the reintegration of Katanga, nor was anything done to carry out the five measures listed in the Officer-in-Charge's letter of 16 November (G/5053/Add.13, para. 28 and Annex XX). 17. On 10 December 1962, the Officer-in-Charge sent a letter to Mr. Tshombe to inform him of the Secretary-General's deep disappointment at his failure to implement the Plan. He said that Katanga had made no serious efforts to carry out the Plan, especially since Mr. Tshombe had by no means renounced his secessionist designs. Accordingly, Mr. Tshombe was informed that Phases II-IV of the Course of Action of the Plan would henceforth be applied, and that ONUC would press for compliance with the United Nations resolutions on the Congo. The Officer-in- Charge demanded in particular that bombings and demolitions in North Katanga should cease forthwith, that the blockade on United Nations supplies at Sakania and Dilolo should be lifted, that the Tunisian soldiers detained by Katangese authorities should be released, that Gendarmerie road-blocks in the Elisabethville area should be promptly dismantled since they were only set up for purposes hostile to ONUC and served to increase tension and foster incidents. The Officer-in- Charge stressed the Secretary-General's position that the United Nations Force was a peace force which was at war with no one and would take no offensive military action, but would vigorously use its weapons if attacked, and would henceforth take such protective measures as it might deem necessary to prevent recurrence of attacks (Annex XII). 18. On 11 December 1962, the Secretary-General appealed to the Belgian Government, as one of the original supporters of the Plan, for assistance in bringing to a peaceful end the Katanga problem. The crux of this problem, the Secretary-General pointed out, rested on the continuing payment by the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga (U.M.H.K.) of revenues and taxes in substantial amounts to the authorities of Katanga Province rather than to the Central Government. As the U.M.H.K. is a Belgian corporation with its headquarters in Brussels, the Secretary-General English Page 7 requested that the Belgian Government exert every possible influence on the U.M.H.K. to cause it to desist forthwith from paying revenues to Katanga Province. Until such time as the question of payment of U.M.H.K. revenues to the Central Government and their division with Katanga was settled, the Secretary-General added, a provisional settlement should be made and implemented immediately (Annex XIII). 19. The Secretary-General also appealed to the Governments of Portugal, the Republic of South Africa and the United Kingdom. Noting that substantial amounts of the copper production of Katanga were shipped out through the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Portugese territories of Angola and Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa, the Secretary-General requested that the three Governments take the necessary measures to prohibit the shipment of Katangese copper ore through the territories under their jurisdiction, until such time as the question of payment of U.M.H.K. revenues to the Central Government and their division with Katanga was settled. The letters to Portugal and the Republic of South Africa were dated 11 December 1962 (Annex XIV), that to the United Kingdom, 12 December (Annex XV). 20. On 11 December 1962, Prime Minister Adoula addressed identical letters to seventeen interested Governments requesting them, pursuant to Phase II of the Plan, to refuse to permit the import of copper and cobalt from Katanga into their territories. The text of the letters was transmitted to the Secretary-General on the same day for his information and for such supporting action as he might find it appropriate to take (Annex XVI). 21. By letters dated 1^ December 1962, the Secretary-General informed the interested Governments that he considered the request of the Congo Government as fully in accord with the provisions of Phase III of the Plan, and fully supported it (Annex XVII). 22. In his reply to the Secretary-General, dated 12 December, Mr. Tshombe professed his ignorance concerning the four phases of the Plan (Annex XVIII). A copy of the document containing the text of the Plan (S/5053/Add.l3), published on 26 November, was promptly sent to Mr. Tshombe by the United Nations Representative in Elisabethville on lU December. On 17 December, the Officer-in- Charge explained in detail to Mr. Tshombe that the phases of the "Course of Action" referred not to measures to be taken by him, but the steps which the Secretary- General and the States Members were to take in consulation with the Central Government, in order to put an end to the secession of Katanga (Annex XIX). 25. On 12 December 1962 Mr. Tshombe communicated to the Secretary-General his "offer" under the Plan of National Reconciliation. He stated that his authorities English Page 8 intended to authorize the U.M.H.K. to transfer to the Monetary Council of the Republic of the Congo all the foreign exchange generated by Katangese exports. The Monetary Council would then return to Katanga, under the joint guarantee of the United Nations, the United States, the United Kingdom and Belgium, and after deduction of the sum required to cover the needs of the Union Miniere du Faut Katanga. 50 per cent of such exchange, but no less than 250,000,,COO Belgian Francs monthly (Annex XX). 2'-!-. By a letter dated 17 December 19^2, the Officer-in-Charge informed Mr. Tshcmbe that the Secretary-General appreciated his gesture and hoped that it would constitute an important forward step towards the achievement of the Plan. He said that the proposals raised questions which could best be clarified by the Central Government and U.M.H.K. (Annex XXI). 25. On the next day, Mr. Tshombe replied that the contacts with the Monetary Council would have to be effected not by the U.M.H.K., but by officials whom he would appoint accompanied by a U.M.H.K. expert (Annex XXII). 26. On 21 December, Union Miniere was reported to have denied that its representatives were proceeding to Leopoldville to discuss the matter. As regards the Katangese authorities, the principal figure involved was Mr. Van Roey, Director of the "National Bank of Katanga", On 23 December, he informed ONUC that despite OMJC's being prepared to facilitate his immediate transport to Leopoldville, he could not go because Mr. Tshombe had denied him authorization to do so. Again, on 2& December 19&2, the Officer-in-Charge wrote to Mr. Tshombe to make it clear that all ONUC facilities were available for the dispatch of the Bank of Katanga official to Leopoldville to elaborate with the Monetary Council the details of Mr. Tshcrnbe's offer on the question of foreign exchange (Annex XXIII). When an attempt was made by the office of the United Nations Representative in Elisabethville to deliver the letter on that day, Mr. Tshombe had left his residence and could no longer be found. 27. It was becoming ever more obvious that the reintegration of Katanga, under the Secretary-General's Plan or otherwise, was far removed from the minds of the secessionist leaders, 28. They emphasized the province's "right of self-determination" more and more - notably in a speech by Mr. Kimba, the "Foreign Minister", on 20 December 1962 - and spoke of the Plan of National Reconciliation less and less. They often referred to the possibility of a redrawing of the map so as to join Katanga with Northern Rhodesia, and perhaps other neighbouring territories. Furthermore, Katangese S/5053/Add. Ill- English Page 9 statements returned to the theme of the Tananarive Conference recommendations of March 19^1, whose chief provision called for the abolition of the Central Government of the Congo. In private conversations Katangese leaders made it clear that, while negotiations over the Plan might continue, action was not contemplated, and concessions offered by them might be withdrawn. They also intimated that a settlement that was not fully acceptable to them might be caused to collapse after the withdrawal of the ONUC military presence. 29. More ominously, the Katangese propaganda was referring with increasing frequency to alleged ONUC plans to "conquer" the province, attack the gendarmerie, and impose its will on the provincial authorities by force.

E. The incidents of 2h- to 28 December 1962

30. The state of tension deliberately fostered by the Katangese authorities came to a head at 100C hours on 2k- December 1962., when gendarmes facing United Nations positions in the Lubumbashi and Avenue Tornbeur area engaged in sustained small arms fire at OWUC Ethiopian troops there. Some 5CC rounds were fired, wounding one OHUC soldier. Shooting continued sporadically for about five hours. The Ethiopians maintained self-restraint and did not return the fire. The United Nations Representative in Slisabethville protested vigorously to Mr. Tshombe, demanding that the firing be stopped. 31. One hour after the beginning of the incident referred to above, Katangese troops fired at an CWUC helicopter on a routine observation flight. The craft, which was unarmed except for the side arms of the occupants, was brought down within gendarmerie lines near the golf course. 32. Mr. Mathu and Brig. R.S. Noronha, Commander of the ONUC Indian Brigade group, made vigorous representations. OMJC troops were placed on alert on the site to recover the helicopter and crew by force if necessary. Before carrying out this plan, Brig. Noronha, Wing Comdr. Mullick and Major D'Souza approached the gendarmerie position and over a loud speaker asked the Katangese company commander to come forward. After some parleying, the OHUC group met the gendarmerie battalion commander, to whom the demand for the return of the craft was conveyed. At that point, Major Mbayo, dispatched by Mr. Tshombe at Mr. Mathu1s insistence, arrived with orders that the helicopter be returned to OKUC. S/5053/Add.lA Englisa Page 10

33. At the time of the forced landing, one Indian officer in the craft, Lieut. S.S. Kang, was gravely wounded by the "bullets which brought it down. He died of his wounds, because the Katangese took hours to bring him to a hospital, which they did only after demands to that effect were made by the United Nations Representative. The remaining five ONUC personnel on board - an Indian captain and two sergeants, one Norwegian lieutenant and one Swedish corporal - were savagely beaten by the Katangese and taken to gaol before being returned to OMJC custody. 3^-. Before the incident was resolved, the United Nations Representative in Elisabethville temporarily ordered all United Nations road-blocks to turn back Mr. Tshombe or his ministers if they tried to leave town. Several of them who did so were turned back. This measure was taken to ensure that persons in authority would be in town and available for the purpose of stopping the incident. Mr. Mathu made it clear that the restrictions would only be relaxed if the helicopter was returned to ONUC, the crew brought to the ONUC hospital and the firing stopped, Mr. Mathu also protested to Mr. Tshombe over the incident, and over the gendarmes' indiscipline, and stated that he would hold him responsible for the measures which OMJC might have to take to restore the situation (Annex XXIV). 35- On 25 December the Katangese gendarmerie resumed intermittent firing at Ethiopian positions in the Lubumbashi area. There were no casualties, and the OMJC troops did not return fire. Gendarmerie officers who were invited and had agreed to participate with ONUC officers in a tour of the positions to verify the source of firing failed to turn up. Minister Kimba visited the United Nations Representative's house and promised that the firing would stop. For its part, ONUC proposed to relax its restrictions on the movement of Katangese officials. In the evening, however, the gendarmes in the golf course area did some intermittent firing at ONUC. 36. Two days later Mr. Tshombe addressed to the United Nations Representative an astonishing letter in which he claimed that the restrictions on the movements of Katangese ministers were part of a plan for United Nations military operations involving the arrest of Mr. Tshombe and his cabinet. He claimed that such steps by the United Nations would be dangerous as they would deprive the country of an important moderating element and plunge it into war (Annex XXV). In the course of a press conference on the same day, the provincial President claimed that a meeting of high United Nations officials had been held in Elisabethville together S/5055/Add.lli English Page 11

•with the United States Consul and Lieut. Gen. Truman, of the United States, to plan for an ONUC military attack on Katanga, in order to impose American domination. (He associated this scheme with the name of Mr. G.L. Sherry, a United Nations official temporarily assigned to Elisabethville, who had already been subjected by Mr. Tshombe in public statements a few days earlier to similar fictitious accusations.) No such meeting ever occurred. 37« The United Nations Representative replied in a letter dated 27 December (Annex XXVI), in which he gave an account of the recent incidents, noted the self- restraint and discipline of the United Nations troops, and placed the whole situation in its context - that is, the increasing harassment of ONUC in Elisabethville, the plundering of its supplies, the siege of United Nations forces by gendarmerie road-blocks, etc. He dismissed the notion that ONUC planned to arrest Katangese ministers, all the more so as several of them, including Mr. Tshombe, had come to Mr. Mathu's house on 2k- and 25 December, and had left unmolested. Mr. Mathu suggested that instead of imagining plots and warlike campaigns, Mr. Tshombe and his ministers might more usefully employ their energies in carrying out the Secretary-General's Plan of National Reconciliation. 38. There was more sporadic firing by the Gendarmerie in and around Elisabethville on 27 December^ by nightfall ONUC troops were under fire in the Jadotville Road and golf course areas from gendarmerie road-blocks positions. The United Nations Representative then invited Mr. Tshombe by telephone to come to his house and to proceed with him and with Maj. Gen. D. Prem Chand, ONUC Commander of the Katanga area, and Brig. R. Noronha, on a tour of the scenes of firing. There the Katangese official could see with his own eyes that all the firing was being done by the gendarmes and that all CNUC troops were withholding their fire. The party, including a Katangese minister and the provincial chief of police, visited the areas in question from 11 p.m. on 27 December to the early hours of 28 December. It came repeatedly under gendarmerie fire. After it arrived at the Presidency, heavy automatic firing broke out there, apparently caused by jittery gendarmes. Mr. Mathu and General Prem Chand pressed Mr. Tshombe to order the gendarmerie to stop firing. Mr. Tshombe professed peaceful intentions, but then went to another room and was heard making a telephone call to Kolwezi. Speaking is Kiswahili, he demanded that the Katangese Air Force should immediately carry out raids on United Nations positions. Eventually, he agreed, whether earnestly or not, to take English Page 12 all necessary measures to have gendarmerie positions stop their firing by the early hours of daylight; there would then be another meeting with the United Nations Representative to review the situation. 39• In "the 'meantime, eight heavy mortar bombs were dropped at 03CC hours on Ethiopian troops holding the Lido; one CNUC soldier was wounded. At C5CC hours the gendarmes opened small arms fire towards Camp Massart, wounding an Indian soldier there. Wear the airport and in the golf course areas intermittent gendarmerie fire, including automatic and mortar fire, continued through the night. \t C6CC hours, six heavy mortar bombs were dropped on the CNUC Gerkhas at the Golf area, and another fifteen on the Ethiopians at the Lido and Avenue Tomheur. Five Ethiopian soldiers were wounded. Fire was continuing at many points at 1CCO hours, despite Mr. Tshombe's promise, when Mr. Mathu, General Prern Chand and Mr. Tshoube got in contact by telephone. he. iir. Tshombe wished to meet Mr, Mathu and the General at his office at J.CCC hours, but it was made clear to him that this meeting hinged on the immediate fulfilment of the cease-fire promise. General Prem Chand emphasized to Mr. Tshorribe that OlfUC troops had not fired and that this could be verified, as had been done .luring the night to Tshombe's own satisfaction, by another tour of CNUC positions together with Tshombe and General Muke. Eventually, Mr. Tshombe agreed to come with a few officials to Mr. Mathu's house to discuss the situation, but only on the guarantee that he would be assured safe conduct by the United Kingdom and United States Consuls. 41. Mr. Tshombe and Minister Nyenibo arrived at the United Nations Representative's residence about 1130 hours in the company of the two Consuls. The situation was discussed at length and Mr. Tshombe was categorically informed that the continued firing by the gendarmerie was affecting the security of United Nations troops and of the town. He was therefore asked to sign and personally order and ensure the implementation without delay of a document calling for the immediate removal of the Katangese road-blocks from which United Nations troops had been attacked for the past few days. The freedom of movement of United nations troops in the Elisabethville area would thus have to be restored and their security ensured. English Page IJ k-2. After lengthy discussions, Mr. Tshombe (l) agreed to stop the firing by his gendarmerie, (2) agreed in principle to the removal of the road-blocks, and to a •withdrawal of the Katangese Gendarmerie away from areas in the vicinity of Elisabethville from which they had been attacking United Nations troops. i|-3. However, when Mr. Tshombe was asked to sign the declaration incorporating the above points (Annex XXVTl), he refused to do so on the grounds that the cease-fire agreement would have to be approved first by his ministers. The United Nations made it clear that it would be acceptable if Tshombe signed the agreement and then secured the concurrence of the members of his cabinet. However, as long as the shooting at ONUC positions continued it was impossible for the United Nations to accept anything less than a binding agreement to stop the fire which was beginning to affect gravely the security of United Nations troops and the town. In fact, while the shooting had abated to some extent for an hour or so, it regained in intensity thereafter. Throughout the time when Mr. Tshombe was at Mr. Mathu's residence, the Katangese troops continued their unprovoked fire at ONUC positions while ONUC forces continued to abide by orders not to shoot back at the gendarmes. By that time, the situation had deteriorated considerably. MK In the end, the United Nations formally notified Tsiicrr.bc that the continued firing by the Katangese could not be permitted. It was stated by the United Nations that as lie did not intend to withdraw the read-blocks and siege positions from which the firing vas being carried out, United Nations troops would have to take such action as they considered necessary to remove these road-blccks, in accordance with the terms of the statement presented to Mr. Tshombe -which the provincial President had refused to sign. ^•5. The answer of the Katangese authorities was issued on 29 Tecembf "•"• a statement over Mr. T hombe's name. It accused the United Nati of . attacked Katanga, and stated that ONUC and its troops would be fought as !s worst enemy. All means of resistance including traps and poisoned arrows were recommended. Furthermore, the statement warned that if ONUC troops did not stop the clearing of road-blocks within 2k- hours, bridges, darns and other installations would be blown up until Katanga's economic potential was completely destroyed (Annex XXVIII). English Page lk-

F. OMJC action in Elisabethville to restore its security and freedom of movement, 28-31 December 1962 46. Mr. Tshombe left Mr. Mathu's house, where the negotiations had been conducted, at 1600 hours on 28 December. At l6l5 hours Elisabethville time, the United Nations launched the action to restore the security of OMJC troops in the Elisabethville area and their freedom of movement by clearing the gendarmerie road-blocks from which fire had been poured at United Nations troops. kj. The first to move at l6l5 hours was the Indian Independent Brigade, which occupied the area of the Gymnasium Yellow house and moved on to take the Katanga radio colony west of the Golf Course. The Indian troops then turned southward in the direction of Karavia, and secured that commune by 1815 hours. kQ. Wherever the ONUC troops appeared, the gendarmes abandoned their positions after offering little or no resistance and fled or scattered into the bush. At Karavia, the fleeing gendarmes apparently were accompanied by the population since the commune was found deserted. 49. Total Indian casualties in the advance were one walking wounded and one junior commissioned officer slightly injured. Gendarmerie casualties were not immediately known. 50. Elisabethville itself was completely quiet during the action. The streets were patrolled by Tunisian troops which also occupied the post and telegraph office, the presidential palace, the railway station and the Radio Katanga broadcasting studios. An Indian major drove through the streets of the city, broadcasting by loudspeaker a message in French to the population to explain the nature of the OMJC operation and to make it clear that they had nothing to fear if they committed no hostile acts. The response of the people was friendly and relieved. 51. During Friday, 28 December, the Ethiopian brigade remained in its positions, where it sustained intensive fire from gendarmerie heavy weapons, mortars and small arms. For the first time since the gendarmerie had begun firing on the 2Uth, the Ethiopians returned fire. They lost one killed and five wounded. English Page 15

52. The Ethiopians went into action at 0730 hours on Saturday, 29 December, and almost immediately cleared two roadblocks on the Kipushi Road, one near the Union Miniere plants and the other at the road fork where the Sakania road branches off. Shortly thereafter they effected a junction with an Indian detachment, including armoured cars, which quickly swept down from captured Karavia. Upon completing this operation, the Ethiopians moved on in the direction of Simba Hill, which overlooks Kipushi, and took over that vital point near 1300 LT on 29 December. They were then joined there by the Irish battalion. One Irish soldier was slightly wounded. 53 • Later in the day the 6th Ethiopian battalion began to move southward from its positions in the Lubumbashi area. It was under fire from Commune Albert. 5^-. Gendarmerie resistance was overcome at all points. One gendarmerie mortar shell fell in Camp Massart, killing one Ethiopian officer, and wounding three others. 55° Meanwhile, the Gerkhas directly north of OMJC headquarters advanced on Kasapa, where they occupied the jail and the commune itself in the face of moderate gendarmerie resistance, while the Rajputana Rifles cleared the gendarmerie roadblcck northwest of the airfield in the Kimbembe area. One Rajrif unit moved up to Martini road junction north of the field. 56. At 1100 hours on 30 December, the 38th Irish Battalion, supported by a troop of armoured cars, moved from their positions at Simba Hill (occupied by the Ethiopians on 29 December) and swept 3 kms all the way into Kipushi. The town was fully occupied by the Irish at noon on 30 December 1962. The population cheered the OMJC troops, and the local authorities welcomed them into town, which was formally 'urrendered by its mayor. Immediate steps were taken for the restoration of normal civilian services there. 57. The Rajputana Rifles, under Lt. Col. F.S. Shinde, had attacked and captured the Martini Track junction at 1500 hours on 29 December. They cleared a minefield on Martini Road and moved into the area north and east of the airfield. Then they drove 6 kilometres eastward to the Kasenga Road, returning tc town along that road. They also cleared the Waviundu roadblock on Kilobelobe Road in the face of moderate resistance, and occupied the intact Radio Katanga transmitting installations at Kilobelobe. s/5053/A.dci.iU English Page 16

5?. All gendarmerie roadblocks around Elisabethville had thus been cleared.

The captured strongpoints were the following: Jadotville Road, Kasapa; Golf Course, Kipushi Road, Avenue Tombeur, Munama and Naviundu. OHUC forces were in effective control of the general area extending approximately 2C kilometres around the city and the first phase of the United Nation operation at Elisabethville was completed. 59- Life in the city itself gradually returned to normal as ONUC military and civilian authorities took steps for the maintenance of law and order. Efforts to keep the fighting out of Elisabethville town had been successful. ''• ". Elsewhere in Katanga, Ghanaian and Swedish troops from Kamina Base advanced west in a two-pronged attack which brought them to Lukeka, north of Kaminaville, and to a point on the railway between the town and the Base. On 30 December the Swedes and Ghanaians pushed forward again, and the 18th Swedish Battalion at 1CCO hours occupied Kaminaville against some resistance, but without suffering casualties. 61. In the Elisabethville area on Jl December, Ethiopian troops cleared the area to Keyberg farm and moved into Kenya Commune.

G. ONUC action to secure freedom of movement: the move to Jadotville, 1-4 January 19&3

62. United Nations forces, in the period 31 December to k January, moved much , '( re rapidly than had been supposed possible in earlier planning towards strongholds in Katanga and then into Jadotville, a major mining city in which mercenaries were concentrated. 63. A company of the Rajputana Rifles in a probing and patrol action on 31 December 1962 moved into the village of Lukuni near Elisabethville on the Jadotville road. Another company of foot soldiers, towards dusk on that day, went f) miles past Lukuni, where it came under heavy mortar and machine gun fire at about 19GC hours from entrenched gendarmerie and mercenary elements. The firing continued heavy until OJCO hours on 1 January 19^3^ when United Nations heavy mortars moved up and silenced the gendarmerie weapons, and the Rajrifs cleared the Katangese positions. Rajrif casualties were h- dead and 19 wounded. 6U. _-,t 0^15 hours on 1 January, the 4th Madras battalion moved out of Elicabethville along the Jadotville road. By 0830 hours it reached the Lukufwe river, 60 kilometres along the Jadotville road. The gendarmerie, who S/5053/Add.llj- English Page 17 had withdrawn from their position west of Lukuni, now offered resistance at the Lukutwe river, having blown up the culvert. Fighting took place for an hour, at which point the resistance was overcome and the Madrasis secured the high ground on the other side of the river. 65. The stream, however, was still impassable for vehicles and heavy equipment owing to the broken bridge. Instead of trying to repair it, the engineers decided for the time being to improvise a bypass. Bulldozers and men piled earth and gravel into the stream, reaching the level of the bridge, and the advance resumed. 66. Shortly after noon on 1 January, OMJC advanced elements reached the Luafi River, where they met no resistance, and continued on to the Lufira River, 38 kilometres beyond Kukutwe. There are two bridges at Lufira - a road and a rail bridge. Both had been blown up by the gendarmerie. By nightfall on that day, OMJC forces had crossed the river, securing both banks. 67. On 2 January the OMJC forces pushed forward on foot while helicopters and a raft ferried heavy mortars and recoilless guns across the Lufira River. Gendarmerie resistance was again met, and mortar fire was directed at United Nations positions in the bridge area from 1000 to 1200 hours. 68. The OMJC advance was resumed in the early morning hours of 3 January after mines were cleared along the Jadotville road. One prong of the advance of the Madras battalion proceeded along the railway line, while the other prong moved by road. 69. On 3 January, unopposed and with no opposition and no obstruction except for a demolished bridge over the river Panda, which was quickly by-passed, OMJC Forces moved the short distance to Jadotville, entering the town itself at 1200 hours LT, where they were greeted by the cheers of the population. The chief bourgmestre of the town and the general manager of the Union Miniere installations there received the commander of the troops, who discussed with them ways and means of restoring normal services and economic activity. 70. On k January, Jadotville airfield, 8 kilometres north of the town, was secured. 71. It was found that serious damage had been done by the gendarmes at Jadotville, especially at the cobalt processing plant of the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga. Meanwhile, Union Miniere-Sogelec repair teams, under OMJC

escort; managed to hook up the Elisabethville power network to the Mwcdingusnf-. plcnt on Lake lufira, and electricity was restored to the city in the afternoon of 3 January. / English Page 18

72. Although United Nations Headquarters had approved far in advance a plan for military entry into Jadotville if peaceful entry continued to be denied, the exact timing and speed of the move came as a surprise to United Nations Headquarters. This may be explained as follows: Finding less resistance and fewer mines along the road than had been expected in the planning, and that by engineering ingenuity and boldness the obstacles presented by the two blown bridges could be quickly surmounted, the commanding officers in the field decided on the spot, in accordance with good military practice, to exploit the situation and keep going. The Lufira River, l60 feet wide, 25 feet deep and swift-flowing, was considered to be the major obstacle between them and Jadotville, at which, since they had not received the required bridging material, which was still on order, they presumably would have to stop, since it could be taken for granted that the two bridges over the river, one vehicular and one railroad, would be destroyed. They were. In this regard, however, the United Nations troops enjoyed two strokes of good fortune. The railroad bridge was completely down, but one of its twisted steel girders was left in such a position that foot soldiers were able to scramble across it to the west bank of the river, where they established a firm bridgehead. Moreover, a scouting party found in the river not far from the vehicular bridge a small wooden raft on floats. By rigging this with cables and pulleys a hand-pulled ferry was devised on which jeeps and mortars could be taken across the river, with only one jeep toppling overboard. From the bridgehead on the west bank of the river, it was but a short distance to Jadotville itself. To have withdrawn from the west bank might well have been costly in OMJC lives as well as material. It would certainly have been severely damaging to the morale of the ONUC troops to have halted at the bridgehead without going into and through the city, in order to secure the airfield beyond the city on the road to Kolwezi, and would have created very serious supply problems. Thus, militarily, there seemed to be no sound alternative to going into the city, and the officers acted accordingly. As indicated above, the entry into Jadotville was unopposed and orderly and the reception was friendly. English Page 19

73. In retrospect, it is clear that the elements of surprise and speed,, together with the bravery and skill of the officers and men, accounted for the remarkable success of the operation at a low cost in ONUC casualties. From a captured mercenary it was learned that the advance caught both mercenaries and gendarmerie off guard, for they had not expected to encounter ONUC troops on that road until two days later. A delay in the move, therefore, might well have been' far more costly in United Nations lives. 7^-. The Jadotville operation was the first experience of a strictly United Nations armed force under United Nations command with combat'conditions in the field. The stress and strain of battle revealed serious deficiencies in communication and co-ordination as among United Nations Headquarters in New York, the Leopoldville Headquarters of the Congo Operation, and the military detachments in action in the field. It should also be pointed out that the telecommunication facilities between Leopoldville and Elisabethville are badly hampered by weather conditions during this time of the year, which is the rainy season. Urgent measures are being taken to correct these defects and it may be accepted with confidence that there will be no recurrence of the Jadotville lapses.

H. ONUC air activity 28 December 1962-^ January 1963

75. From 28 December highest readiness was maintained by ONUC fighter aircraft armed with canons and rockets, but not bombs. In the event of action being necessary, the specific task defined for United Nations fighter aircraft was to prevent any Katangese air activity against ONUC. The plan was to destroy Katangese aircraft found in the air or at Kolwezi Kengere military airfield and other airfields in South Katanga which were likely to be used for Katangese air activity in the Elisabethville area. However, to avoid unnecessary damage and casualties, Katangese private aircraft flying in the air or taxiing on the ground, as well as Kolwezi Town airfield located in a populated area, were not to be targets. The two airfields at Kipushi adjacent to the Ehodesian border were also excluded from any such action. Snglish Page 20

76. In the early morning of 29 December Kolwezi-Kengere airfield was attacked by six Swedish fighter aircraft (j-29's). On the approach, one Harvard was met in the air and hit. On the ground, one Harvard and two petrol dumps were set on fire and a second Harvard, as well as a Dove, hangars and other buildings, were wholly or partly destroyed. Later, it was learned that one Vampire and one Piper Comanche had been destroyed in the hangars. 77. During the remainder of the day, United Nations aircraft attacked Kolwezi- Kengere airfield, patrolled the air and checked the other airfields in South Katanga. At Ngule airfield, one Dragon JRapide aircraft was destroyed in the hangar. 78. On JO December patrolling of the air and checking of the airfields continued. Two Harvards were destroyed on the ground - one at Kolwezi-Kengere and the other at Kamatanda airfield close to Jadotville. 79- ONUC's action against the Katangese Air Force eased on 31 December. CHUG fighter pilots were instructed thereafter not to attack any type of Katangese aircraft unless it was positively observed to commit a hostile act or was flying directly over United Nations air bases. From that date until k January, patrolling of the air and checking of airfields continued, together with photo reconnaissance missions to meet the increasing number of requests from ONUC ground forces. No attacks were carried out, and no Katangese aircraft was observed, with the exception of a Tri-Pacer at Kolwezi Town airfield. 80. From 28 December to 4 January inclusive, a total of seventy-six sorties, comprising more than 100 hours flying time, were carried out. Seven United Nations fighter aircraft and one reconnaissance plane were hit by ground fire during the operations, but none of the pilots was injured. 81. A Katangese Air Force as such is no longer in existence. Of the ten combat aircraft (two Vampires and eight Harvards) present in Katanga when the United Nations emergency operation began, only one or possibly two Harvards were not destroyed. All vital air installations at the Kolwezi-Kengere air base were demolished by United Nations fighters.

I. Casualties

82. While they were under gendarmerie fire from 2h to 28 December 1962 and in the course of their operations from the latter date to h January 1963, S/5053/Add.l1! English Page 21

OMJC forces sustained total casualties of nine dead and seventy-two wounded. They were distributed as follows: Killed Wounded Indian Independent Brigade 7 ^1 Third Ethiopian Brigade 2 26 Thirty-eighth Irish Battalion - 2 Fourteenth Tunisian Battalion - 3 There are as yet no reliable estimates of gendarmerie casualties. Civilian casualties have been estimated at between forty and fifty. 83. In the few cases in which allegations have been made that OMJC troops were responsible for any civilian casualties, immediate investigations have been conducted by the OMJC authorities. In a case in which an allegation of homicide by United Nations soldiers was made, Major General D. Prem Chand ordered a board of inquiry to be instituted and to make a prompt and thorough investigation.

J. Maintenance and restoration of lav and order and of civilian services

8IK As previously stated, the OMJC operation to clear gendarmerie positions in the Elisabethville, Kipushi and Jadotville areas gave rise to little or no street fighting with the exception of mortaring in some communes (Albert), where there were entrenched gendarmerie positions from which heavy automatic and mortar fire had been directed at OKLIC troops. There were a number of civilian casualties in these communes, chiefly from mortar fire, but none in Elisabethville, Kipushi or Jadotville proper. Similarly, there was virtually no damage in these towns other than that caused by deliberate Katangese demolitions. OMJC civilian and military authorities made strenuous efforts, while the events referred to in sections F and 0- were going on, to maintain law and order as well as essential civilian services. The steps taken in Elisabethville, the more salient of which are mentioned below, were repeated on a smaller scale, so far as applicable, in Kipushi and Jadotville. English Page 22

85. The provincial chief of police of Zlisabethville was invited to OWUC Headquarters in Elisabethville on 29 December 1962 together with his principal assistant. He agreed to facilitate the return of 300 policemen who had fled from town, and to help enforce law and order under the control of the ONUC Tunisian Battalion. Joint patrols were eventually organized. 86. To prevent looting and other crimes, ONUC imposed a curfew in Elisabethville and warned that looters would be shot on sight. The problem was kept under effective control, and its solution was at hand when electric service was restored, bringing light to the city at night. Movement of civilians in and out of the city was also temporarily restricted, but the restrictions were relaxed on 2 January 1963. 87. Despite inflammatory leaflets handed out on Mr. Tshombe's behalf, there was no sabotage or terrorism in town, and his appeals for a "scorched earth" policy were completely ignored. 88. Electric power had been shut off early on 28 December, partly owing to mortar fire and partly by deliberate gendarmerie demolition activity, such as the blowing up of bridges. This caused the immediate stoppage of the pumps which feed the city's water network. CWUC facilitated the starting of emergency generators in the Union Miniere's Lubumbashi compound and water service was restored in the evening of 29 December. 89. ONUC requested Union Miniere to provide for the repair of electric transmission lines, and furnished military escorts to protect teams of Sogelec Company technicians who did that work. As indicated in paragraph 69 above, electric power was restored in Elisabethville on 3 January 1963. 90. The postal service was restored on 29 December 19^2, when technicians on loan from and partly paid by the Belgian Government agreed to return to their posts under Red Cross auspices. It was subsequently arranged that such technicians in other departments should also resume their work at the request of the Belgian consular representative. 91. ONUC officials took the Bank of Katanga under protection on 31 December, and reopened that institution for most normal transactions. Efforts were also made to reopen Radio Katanga, which had been partly sabotaged,, so as to provide information to the public. In the meantime, ONUC broadcast news and announcements over its own makeshift facilities. English Page 23

92. On 1 January 1963, the United Nations Representative met with representatives of nearly all municipal departments of Elisabethville to encourage them to restore normal services for the population. A commission consisting of the United Nations Representative, representatives of the departments, and a Red Cross spokesman was established to discuss day-to-day problems. 93. OMJC made efforts, in co-operation with transport firms and food distributors, to facilitate the reopening of normal supply channels for the population. Certain problems had to be faced in this connexion on account of the presence, in the countryside east and south of Elisabethville, of disorganized gendarmes who were apt to loot shipments, and on account of some damage caused by gendarmes to the rail line running into Rhodesia. This problem required speedy solution if sporadic food shortages in Elisabethville were not to be allowed to become aggravated, and if law and order were to be maintained between Elisabethville and Sakania. 9^-. While there was no extensive flight or evacuation of non-Congolese civilians from Elisabethville, the gendarmerie spread rumours in certain communes which caused many Congolese to flee to the south. OMJC assured these persons that they would be safe, and has facilitated Red Cross efforts to arrange for their return from areas where ONUC is in control of the maintenance of law and order, such as Kipushi. The return of fugitives from there was largely completed on k January. ONUC also sought, for humanitarian reasons, to encourage the return of fugitives from areas between Kipushi and Sakania, where there was no direct OMJC military presence. 95• With the.sanction of the Central Government, commercial air traffic was resumed at Elisabethville airport on k January 1963. 96. Beginning on 3 January, certain Central Government officials began arriving in Elisabethville to explore the problem of restoring proper relationships, communications and liaison between Leopoldville and Elisabethville authorities. 3/5053/Add.lU English Annex I Page 1

ANNEX I

Letter dated 18 November 1962 from the United Nations representative at Elisabethville to Mr. Tshombe

I have the honour to draw your attention to the question of the four Tunisian soldiers whom you have been holding for a long time. Enticed by people in your service, these soldiers fell into your hands successively, as follows: the first two, Corporal Larbi Ben Ali and Corporal Mohamed Tahar Ben Airmar, have been missing since 22 September 19'52; the third, Corporal Hedi Ben Salah Fehal, was taken to you on 5 October by the gendarmerie in the commune of Kenya through the intermediary of a young Belgian engaged in para-military activities; the fourth soldier, Corporal Mohamed Tahar Khediri, was carried off by your gendarmerie on 2^ October 1962 and requested help by telephone from Colonel Remiza as soon as he arrived at Kolwezi. After the disappearance of the first two soldiers, followed later by the disappearance of a third and then a fourth, I requested you, during a series of talks on the subject, to return these men to the Tunisian Battalian at Elisabethville. Your reply Wo. SR/l^Jl/MV of 6 November 1962 to letter KG-26l which I sent you on 30 October on the subject of the four Tunisians was so undignified that I felt it preferable to refrain from replying to it. To put it briefly, you have so far refused to return these soldiers to us. Having been informed of your underhand abduction of these soldiers entrusted to ONUC, the Tunisian Government sent as its representative Colonel Lasmar, with whom you talked in my presence during the morning of Tuesday, 13 November 1962. You then stated that you were ready to return the four soldiers in exchange for a letter or telegram from the Tunisian Government guaranteeing that they would not be punished in any way as the result of their desertion for which you are responsible. You are of course aware that the forces placed at the disposal of the United Nations in the Congo by the various Member States comes under the direct authority of Mr. R.K. Gardiner, Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo. The Governments which sent their troops to the Congo consider without any doubt that ONUC assumes the entire responsibility for the fate of S/5053/Add.lU English Annex I Page 2 these soldiers. The procedure which you suggest for the return of the four soldiers is absolutely contrary to the official policy of the United Nations,, which does not allow you to deal directly with a sovereign State on questions concerning the troops which have "been sent for the purpose of facilitating the peaceful solution of the Congolese problem. Like any other person, you must deal direct with ONUC on questions of this kind. You will no doubt understand the importance of such a procedure: your proposal of 13 November would play havoc with the control of the United Nations forces in the Congo. In view of all these circumstances, I am writing to you again to insist on the immediate and unconditional return of the four Tunisian soldiers whom you have held for so long in spite of the protests mentioned in the third paragraph of this letter. Colonel Lasmar is in full agreement with the substance of this letter. Since you have repeatedly declared that the Congolese problem must be solved by Africans, I am making this request to you on the part of Africans such as Mr. Gardiner, Colonel Lasmar and myself. I hope that you will take this opportunity of achieving your desire, since only Africans, including yourself, are involved. I should be very grateful if you would comply immediately with the request made to you in the sixth paragraph of this letter.

(Signed) E.W. MATHU S/5053/Add.lA English Annex II Page 1

AMEX II

Letter dated 23 November 19&2 from Mr. Tshombe to the United Nations representative at Elisabethville

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter KG-282 of 18 November. In this letter you mention four Tunisian soldiers and you claim that we have been "holding" these soldiers for a long time. You write that these soldiers "fell into our hands", that they were "carried off" by the Katangese gendarmes; you describe these operations as our "underhand abduction" of these soldiers entrusted to OMJG. All these allegations are false. Your soldiers, weary of the cause they were serving,, came to us volunteer'.".\ and asked us for protection. Even before leaving you they conveyed to us under their signature a letter expressing their desire to join Katanga, to stay there and to make their lives there. These letters will be shown to you as soon as you express a desire to see them. You will understand., therefore, that it is not possible for us to hand these men over to you without first obtaining from their Government formal and written guarantees that they will not be brought to justice or punished.

(Signed) M. TSHOMBE S/5053/Add.lA English Annex III Page 1

ANNEX III

Letter dated 21 December 1962 from the United. Nations Representative at Llisabethville to Mr. Kiniba

I have the honour to refer to our interview of yesterday concerning the two civilian employees of OMJC whom you have been holding for four weeks in one case and more than two weeks in the other. At the end of the interview you premised me to release them and to send them back to me today. As evidence I need only quote the following extract from the record of that interview:

"I shall ask (Madam, remind me to telephone tomorrow morning) the Surete (police) to make sure that they are released tomorrow."

At about 3=50 this afternoon, Madame Vermuellen, the President's Secretary, gave us the following message over the telephone:

"With reference to the two persons arrested by the Katanga Police who are employees of the United Nations., we are informed that these two men are at present at Kipushi for interrogation purposes.

"As Mr. Mathu told Mr. Kimba yesterday that the two persons were in a poor physical condition, Mr. Kimba sent a doctor to Kipushi to examine them and to give them the care they needed. As soon as the interrogation is concluded the necessary steps will be taken and Mr. Mathu will be informed."

I consider this change of attitude a,flagrant violation of the premise you gave me yesterday. You did not in any way raise the question of the state of health of the :wo men as a factor which might prevent their being handed over to me. In reality I told you that the sick man should be transferred immediately either to your hospital at Slisabethville or to the ONUC hospital to receive proper treatment. We laaew that he was in hospital at Kipushi and that lie was probably receiving medical care. It therefore seems to us unnecessary to send another doctor from Elisabethville to examine him and we can only see in this new action another example of your habitual double-dealing. This kind of behaviour is much too frequent on the part of the Katanga authorities. I therefore urge you to refrain in future from making promises which you have no intention of keeping. (Signed) Eliud W. MATHU S/5053/Add.llj- English Annex IV Page 1

AJWEX IV Letter dated 10 December 1962 from the United Nations representative at Elisabethville to Mr. Tshombe

I have the honour to refer to your telephone call of 7 December towards midnight; in which you informed me that the gendarmes and the police had just arrested some ONUC officers wrongly accused of having tried to enter the Commune of Albert in a jeep. Although these officers were finally handed over to my military authorities, their jeep remained in the hands of your authorities. When the gendarmes brought the officers back to headquarters, they were informed that if the jeep was not returned that same evening, the OMJC forces would seek to recover it by their own means. This threat disturbed you and you asked me to make sure that the recovery of the jeep did not set off an incident. Upon your promise that the jeep would be returned to our headquarters first thing the following morning, 8 December, I gave instructions that no action was to be taken by our troops before the following morning, and I kept my promise. Since that conversation, I have received a detailed report on what took place between my officers and your gendarmes and their superiors. After being handed over by your gendarmes to the Albert Commune police station, they were ill-treated and struck by policemen. General Muke, who soon arrived on the scene, subjected them to further brutality. I protest strongly against these uncouth breaches of military and police ethics. I request you to make an immediate inquiry into this affair and to inform me of the disciplinary measures you intend to take. I ought not to have to remind you that whenever your gendarmes have been questioned by our officers they have always been treated with courtesy and with the respect due to their uniform and their rank. That is a rule which no self-respecting military or police force could fail to observe. If we find that the behaviour of your officers in this affair reflects a deliberate policy on the part of your troops, you will be entirely responsible for the consequences of that policy. (Signed) Eliud W. MATEU S/5053/Add.l^ English Annex V Page 1

ANNEX V

Letter dated 11 December 1962 from the United Nations Representative at Elisabethvllle to Mr. 'Jshombe

I have the honour to refer to our recent conversations concerning the "brutal kidnapping of the Italian consul at Elisabethville by the Katangese authorities.

On the morning of Thursday} 6 December, I informed you of my indignation at the outrageous "expulsion11 so summarily ordered by your Ministers Kibwe and Munongo. Asserting that the two Ministers had been badly advised by persons who could not claim to be true friends of Katanga, you emphasized that the incident had unfortunately occurred in your absence and that you would inform me of the results of the thorough investigation which you intended to carry out. In reply to the doubts I expressed, you assured me that the Consul was actually at N'Dola, but he did not in fact arrive there until late in the afternoon of 7 December. When you telephoned me towards midnight that evening, I took the occasion to protest once more against the infamous treatment to which the Italian Consul had been subjected, in defiance of all legality. You promised to telephone me 'at 8.30 the following morning, adding that the Consul's wife was to visit you at 8 o'clock and the Italian Ambassador at 9 o'clock on the morning of 8 December. However, I did not receive the promised telephone call. At about 10.30 a.m. on 8 December, during the inauguration ceremony for the Annex to the Elisabethville University, you informed me that, following your conversations with the Italian Ambassador and the Consul's wife, you had agreed to let them go to N'Dola to see the Consul in order to satisfy themselves that nothing had happened to him. I repeated to you that I considered this kidnapping to be unworthy of a political institution that lays claim to maturity and I urged you to consider seriously redressing the wrong done on 6 December to the Italian Consul, who was kidnapped by your police and gendarmes with the most utter disregard for diplomatic usage. English Annex V Page 2

As "between Africans, I wish to tell you quite frankly that the way in which the Italian Consul was forcibly removed from Elisabethville to N Tola in Northern Rhodesia cannot fail to arouse world public opinion against the provincial authorities of Katanga, who have flouted a universal principle of international law according to which consular agents are entitled to special protection and to the respect due to the representatives of foreign States. In accordance with that principle, your authorities should have forestalled any attempt on the freedom and dignity of the Consul and should have guaranteed the inviolability of his person. It was in the course of his efforts to explain to the Finance Minister, Mr. Kibwe, who was deputizing in your absence, the Italian Government's attitude regarding the fighter aircraft offered to the United Nations that the Italian Consul was handed over to the police and informed that he would be expelled from Elisabethville. He asked for twenty-four hours1 notice, which was bluntly refused, as was his request for a glass of water and for permission to telephone to his wife. Escorted by five soldiers, he was immediately taken to Mokambo, where he spent the night of 6 December in very painful conditions. He was removed to N'Dola in the evening of 7 December and arrived there in a state of moral prostration. The Italian Consul was appointed to Elisabethville because the Italian Government recognizes the Central Government of the Congo. Under the Thant Plan, which you make an official show of accepting, foreign affairs in the Congo fall within the exclusive competence of the Central Government. If you were sincerely applying the provisions of the National Reconciliation Plan, your authorities would not have ventured to expel the Italian Consul in a manner as summary as it was illegal, which merely confirms my impression that, notwithstanding your public statements, the Katanga authorities have no intention of acting in accordance with their avowed intentions. Your provincial authorities have given as the reason for the seizure of the Italian Consul the fact that the Italian Government has offered fighter aircraft to the United Nations. Such a method of reasoning, in my opinion, has no valid basic. The Italian Government is a loyal Member of the United Nations and is fully entitled to contribute to any of its undertakings. In the case of the English Annex V Page 3

United Nations Operation in the Congo, it is the duty of all Member States to accept the terms of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions relating to the United Nations mission in the Congo. ' It is thus on perfectly legal grounds that the Italian Government has offered its contribution to the maintenance of the sovereignty of the Congo and of its territorial integrity through the peaceful ending of the Katangese secession. All the sovereign States of Africa, including the Republic of the Congo, are Members of the United Nations. They all support the United Nations Operation in the Congo, both in the interest of the Congolese themselves and for the maintenance of international peace. Your subordinates, through their acts, are inexorably forcing you into the role of an enemy of the United Nations and, consequently, of the African States which belong to it. I find it difficult to believe that a great African patriot would accept such a role. Since your secessionist policy is not accepted by any of the non-African Members of the United Nations and is by definition contrary to the policy of African solidarity embraced by all the African States, I fail to see where your isolationism will lead you. I suggest that you ask your advisers what political destiny they envisage for Katanga as a separate entity of the Congo. I am convinced that you will then understand that their policy can only lead Katanga to ruin and that you will be eager to accept the aid which the international community is offering you in order to adopt a constructive attitude that will bring peace and prosperity to Katanga and to the whole of the Congo. If you allow yourself to be convinced by these much wiser counsels, it is still possible for you to use all your influence in urging your provincial authorities to co-operate to the full with the United Nations with a view to ending the Katangese secession and uniting the Congo in a federal framework.

(Signed) Eliud W. MATHU S/5053/Add.li)- English Annex VI Page 1

ANNEX VI

Letter dated Ik November 1962 from the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to Mr. Tshcmbe

I have already informed the United Nations representative at Elisabethville of my astonishment at Katanga's sudden resort to offensive air activities. Throughout the week preceding my visit to you,, OMJC studied your accusations that the Central Government had taken the initiative in launching attacks on Kongolo, and it took various steps in connexion with this matter. Following my talks with you, OMJC hoped to continue to press for the despatch of tripartite groups of observers, presuming that there was a sincere desire to put an end to troop movements and to settle the Katangese problem by peaceful means. There is not the slightest doubt that Katangese aircraft have carried out bombing attacks in North Katanga. The only facts which still remain to be established with precision relate to the extent of the damage and the number of victims. OMJC deeply regrets this new development,, which cannot fail to complicate the problem. After our talks concerning your reply to the letter I had sent to you yourself as well as to Prime Minister Adoula on behalf of the Secretary-General, OMJC had hoped that we were on the point of entering a constructive phase in our efforts to solve the problems which have been afflicting the Congo since its accession to independence. You do not, I imagine, think that the United Nations will merely stand by and watch the arbitrary massacre of a defenceless population by aerial bombardment. In these circumstances the air units of OMJC have received instructions to put a stop to Katangese offensive air operations. OMJC hopes that with your co-operation it will be possible to end such operations immediately. Under its mandate, OMJC has the duty of putting &n end to these murderous attacks and it is resolved to use all the means at its disposal to do so. How can we reconcile your statements that there are no more mercenaries in Katanga with the fact that mercenary pilots were used for these bombing attacks? S/5053/Add.lA English Annex VI Page 2

In undertaking these offensive operations the Katangese authorities have confirmed the worst fears concerning their "bad faith, even on the part of those who so far have hesitated to accuse them of it, and have assumed full responsibility for the consequences which might result at the present decisive stage in the evolution of the situation in the Congo.

(Signed) R.K. GARDINER English Annex VII Page 1

ANNEX VII

Press release issued by Mr. Tshombe on 28 November 1961?

Mr. Moise Tshombe, President of the State of Katanga, has just made a very vigorous protest against the activities of the United Nations forces in North Katanga, which are supporting the general attack of the ANC on Kongolo. This was confirmed to us on 2k November 1962 and is proved today by the facts. The ANC's general attack on Kongolo has begun and the Canberra aircraft of the United Nations are flying over the area and supporting the attack. These actions of the United Nations in Worth Katanga are contrary to the decisions of the Security Council and to the mandate received by the Organization for its action in the Congo. It was, in fact, specified that the United Nations forces could never take part in a domestic Congolese conflict in support of one or other of the parties. The Government of Katanga does not understand how an Organization which was created for the sake of peace and freedom can use such methods in a country whose people ask for one thing only: to live in peace. s/5053/Add.ili- English Annex VIII Page 1

ANNEX VIII

Letter dated 3 December 1962 from the United Hations Representative at Elisabethville to Mr. Tshombe

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter SR/1547/DS of 28 November and I wish in reply categorically to deny the allegations that the United Nations forces in ITorth Katanga are supporting the general attack of the ANC on Kongolo with the participation of United ITations aircraft flying over the region. The OMJC air force has never lent its assistance to the ANC and has received no instructions to this effect. Consequently, I cannot regard your letter of protest as anything other than a diversionary manoeuvre designed to divert attention from the "bombings which your own aircraft have recently carried out against defenceless civilians in North Katanga. It is precisely in order to prevent any further bombings of this odious type that our aircraft regularly patrol the skies in this area in the discharge of their mission of peace. I should like to repeat, in accordance with the terms of Mr. Gardiner's letter of ill- November (KG-276), that ONUC cannot stand by inactive when such arbitrary massacres are taking place but is in duty bound to put a stop to them by all the means at its disposal. Nothing can prevent its fulfilling this fundamental duty. I deplore the fact that your inability to restrain the muderous activities of some of your mercenaries and the measures to which you resort to try to cover up their actions are likely seriously to compromise the genuine efforts r '^ now being made to reach a peaceful solution of the Congolese problem. ! I should like, however, to think that it is still not too late for reason to triumph and to lead to the success of Mr. Thant's proposals for national reconciliation in the Congo. It is your duty towards the African communities in your country to support the efforts made in this direction without the slightest reservation.

(Signed) Eliud V. MATHU S/5053/Add.ll* English Annex IX Page 1

ANNEX IX

Letter dated 8 December 1962 from the Officer-in-Charge of UNUC to Mr. Moise Tshombe

Reports received by OHUC indicate that the road and railway bridge over the river Lualaba at Kongolo has been destroyed by units of the gendarmerie led by mercenaries under your authority. This is an unspeakable act of vandalism, committed -without any valid motive. Indeed, this is not the first time that the gendarmerie has indulged in senseless destruction; you will of course remember the destruction of the bridge over the Lubilash by mercenaries last year. According to independent sources, this latest act of vandalism was manifestly and deliberately intended to disrupt the infrastructure of the country. In fact, if the mercenaries had simply wished to cover their retreat from Kongolo, they would have been content to burn the short wooden section which had served to repair damage caused to the bridge previously. Moreover, the nature of the destruction indicates that the explosive charges must have been placed by trained military engineers. In other words, the Congo has had to suffer anew from the activities of mercenaries, whose services you continue to hire to support the purposes of your secessionist policy. According to preliminary estimates, it will require six months and 50 million Belgian francs to repair the bridge temporarily, while its permanent restoration will need a year1s work. The United Nations cannot stand aloof while the economy of the country is attacked in the execution of a secessionist policy of civil war. I must warn you that, whatever may be your attitude to the resolutions of the United Nations, ONUC will be bound by them and will carry them out, at Kongolo and elsewhere. Consequently, I have despatched an ONUC military detachment to Kongolo in order to maintain law and order there and to prevent civil war and fratricidal fighting provoked by irresponsible elements.

(Signed) Robert GARDIEER S/5053/Add.l4 English Annex X Page 1

ANNEX X

Letter dated 7 December 1962 from Mr, Tshombe to the United Rations Representative at Elisabethville

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter KG-292/sp of 3 December 1962 in which you categorically deny that any assistance was given "by ONUC troops in the general attack on Kongolo by the AMC. Once again you falsely accuse us of offensive air bombings of the defenceless civilian population.

However} contrary to all your earlier denials, especially since 21 August, when General Mobutu announced the offensive of the sixth parallel, it is apparent from your letter that you no longer deny the aggression of the invading AKC troops in the north of Katanga. In any case, the capture of Kongolo and the statements made by General Mobuto confirm this. The attack continued after the cease-fire agreement had been concluded on l6 October and it is now quite clear why the Adoula Government denounced that agreement on 17 October. But the attack has been going on ever since, in violation of the statement which the United Nations has repeatedly made to the effect that the Secretary-General had requested and obtained a cessation of all troop movements in lieu of the cease-fire. In the second place, notwithstanding the false pretexts it gives, your letter admits that ONUC provided air cover for the ANC invasion. ONUC has been given the task, and has the primary duty, of preventing civil war, which the ANC troops are introducing into Katanga. Moreover, the military assistance the ONUC troops are giving the AWC is borne out by the statements made by the United Nations Secretary-General., as reported in the summary record of the seventieth meeting of the United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo, held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 12 October, at 3 p.m. This summary record (62-22587), compiled for the information of the members of the Security Council, reads as follows: "The Acting Secretary-General recalled that, as the result of a decision adopted recently by the Parliament, seventeen new provinces had been created. Although, strictly speaking, order had not yet 3/5053/Add.llj- English Annex X Page 2

been completely restored, there was comparative stability in the country as a whole and there was reason to believe that the Congolese National Army could handle the situation, even •without OMUG." Here, again, a number of OMJC's denials are officially contradicted.

(Signed) M. TSHOMBE English Annex XI Page 1

ANNEX XI

Letter dated 10 December 1962 from Mr. Tshombe to the Officer-in-CIiarge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter KO-296 of 8 December 1962. The territory of Kongolo was peaceful and was one of the most advanced from the economic point of view. The Katangese gendarmes who keep order there are recruited from among the local population, the Bahembas. The United Nations bears full responsibility for the vandalism that has destroyed all economic life in the region, which we had kept going despite the civil war waged by the ANC with the help of ONUC. In December 1961 the ANC massacred ^00 Bahemba Africans and twenty European missionaries at Kongolo. The United Nations did not intervene either to prevent or to halt the civil war. Katanga restored order in February 1962 and the local people were able to take up their work again. But the invasion forces of the ANC resumed their attacks, particularly after the offensive from the sixth parallel announced by General Mobutu on 21 August. The United Nations' Mandate is to prevent civil war. Civil war is being waged against us by the invasion forces of the ANC. The capture of Kongolo and the statements made by General Mobutu on 4 December confirm the validity of the protests which we have made times without number since 21 August and the mendacity of the denials issued by the United Nations. We repeat that the United Nations bears full responsibility for any destruction in the Kongolo region. It has done nothing to prevent the ARC from waging civil war in Katanga. On the contrary, it has encouraged and aided the ANC in its criminal ventures. In November the ANC Command once more ordered the troops to take Kongolo by 21 November, telling them that they would be supported by ONUC aircraft. Munitions were provided by ONUC, from Dar es Salaam. A thousand drums of petrol were ordered by ONUC at Mombasa to aid the ANC. One could quote many other examples of the military assistance given by ONUC in the S/5053/Add.l^ English Annex XI Page 2 civil war waged by the ANC in Katanga. Moreover, the fact that the United Nations is giving such assistance to the ABC was acknowledged by the Secretary- General at the meeting of the Advisory Corrmittee on 12 October. It is at this stage that the United Nations is thinking of preventing civil war in Kongolo, at a time when the civilian inhabitants of Kongolo have followed their brothers, husbands and sons, Bahembas serving in the Katangese gendarmerie, in order to defend their region against the ARC invaders. It is astonishing to see from your letter that the United Nations is now showing a concern for our economic life, a concern of which it gave no indication at any time in September or December 1961. We are still in favour of applying the Plan of National Reconciliation, and of applying it in full. But the United Nations will bear full responsibility before the world and before posterity for any destruction which its actions nay cause in Kongolo or elsewhere.

(Signed) Moise TSHOMBE S/5055/Add.lU English Annex XII Page 1

ANNEX XII Letter dated 10 December 1962 from the Offleer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to Mr. Tshombe

The Secretary-General has asked me to inform you of some of his views about the situation created by the failure to achieve implementation of the Plan. There is deep and widespread disappointment at the United Nations over the lack of any serious step on the part of Katanga toward implementation of the Plan, despite your formal acceptance of it. It is widely believed, and the record sustains this belief, that the Plan has been defeated thus far primarily because you, despite your protestations to the contrary on several occasions, have not given up your secessionist ambitions and efforts. In this latter regard, I must point out to you once again that the United Nations flatly rejects any notion of Katangese secession or separation and stands firmly behind the territorial integrity of the Congo. Indeed, the United Nations takes note that no State in the world has accorded recognition of statehood for a separate Katanga, although you have sought such status since mid-July I960. As you have failed to take the implementation steps, the need for which I pointed out to you in my letters of 2 and 16 November 19&2, I am to inform you that it is now the intention of the Secretary-General to seek national reconciliation through the courses of action set forth in Phases I to IV of the Plan and by such other steps as may prove necessary. The Secretary-General wishes you to know that in the period immediately ahead States will be called upon by him for actions of various kinds, designed to impress upon you and your colleagues the advisability of abandoning your policy of secession and civil war.- While calling upon States to support the action phases of the Plan, he also intends to instruct the United Nations Operation in the Congo to pursue the objectives of United Nations resolutions on the Congo with increasing vigour. In this regard, your attention is called particularly to Section 7 of the Plan, entitled "Co-operation with the United Nations", which calls for your co-operation in the application and execution of the United Nations resolutions. You will also note that in paragraph C of Phase I it is stressed that the United Nations Force in the Congo has the right of free movement throughout the territory English Annex XII Page 2

of the Congo. Wot only have you endorsed this in accepting the Flan, "but you have also approved it in talks on separate occasions with Mr. Linner and myself. The United Nations Operation in the Congo may therefore be expected to intensify its efforts to eliminate all active mercenaries from Katanga, to prevent or put a halt to civil war and to assist in maintaining lav and order. The recent outrageous seizure of the Italian Consul at Elisabethville underlines the latter need. In pursuance of these ends the United Nations Operation finds it necessary to insist on the exercise "by its personnel of complete freedom of movement throughout Katanga. In the foregoing context, I may make specific mention of a few matters which are regarded by the United Nations as of immediate urgency. The bombing activities in North Katanga of Katangese aircraft piloted by mercenaries must be brought to an end. Similarly, there must be an end to the wanton destruction of bridges and other communications in North Katanga by the Katangese gendarmerie, as in the cases of the Lubilash and Kongolo bridges, about which I protested to you in my letter of 7 December. The blockade which you have maintained against the movement of United Nations supplies from Sakania arid Dilolo and which continues despite your promises to lift it must also be ended. Similarly the four Tunisian soldiers whom you continue to hold despite our protests must be released without delay. Again we must demand the prompt removal of all Katangese roadblocks in the Elisabethville area, since they can only be regarded as proof of hostile intentions against United Nations personnel and serve no purpose other than to heighten tension and increase the danger of incidents and of fighting. I must also draw your attention most forcefully to the intolerable attempts made recently to intimidate the representatives at Elisabethville of States Members of the United Nations who are co-operating loyally with ONUC, as also to the incitements to demonstrate against them. Such practices must cease at once. The Secretary-General wishes me to assure you that you are quite wrong in your occasional statements that the United Nations is "at war" with Katanga. The United Nations Force is a peace force. It is not at war with anyone. It operates in Katanga strictly within the mandates defined for it by United Nations S/5053/Add.lll Znglish Annex XII Page 3 reolutions. These resolutions were not adopted lightly "by the General Assembly and Security Council but "because the Members are fully aware of the importance of a solution to the Congolese problem not only for the Congo itself but also for world peace and security. I appeal to you to recognize this broader significance of the problem. The United Rations is not intervening in your internal affairs. It will not initiate any offensive military action. It is a strong force, however, and is well armed. Its arms are for defensive purposes only, but it will use those arms vigorously whenever and wherever it may be attacked, and in such situations it will henceforth take the protective measures deemed necessary to avoid a recurrence of the attack. I trust that you will permit ice to presume upon our association by urging upon you the course of implementing the Plan without further delay. Such a course would, I am certain, be in the best interests of Katanga as well as of the Congo as a whole. S/5053/Add. Ill- English Annex XIII Page 1 ANNEX XIII

Letter dated 11 December 1962 from the Secretary-General to the Foreign Minister of Belgium

I have the honour to make to your Government, as one of the original supporters of the Plan of National Reconciliation, a most solemn and urgent appeal for assistance in bringing to a peaceful end the problem of the relations between the Government of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) - the Central Government - and the provincial government of Katanga headed by Mr. Moise Tshombe. The crux of this problem rests in the continuing payment by the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga of revenues and taxes in substantial amounts (estimated at more than $30 million per year) to the authorities of Katanga province rather than to the Central Government, which asserts its legal claim to these monies. The Union Miniere, on its part, avers that it has no choice but to pay revenues on its operations to the "authorities which exercise effective power in Katanga", where its installations are located. The Union Miniere, as you know, is a private commercial firm and has not been responsive to the appeals that have been made to it to change its policy and make the proper payments to the Central Government. I now appeal directly to you because it is possible for your Government to take measures which could have a possibly decisive bearing on this question. I refer to the fact that the Union Miniere is a Belgian corporation with its headquarters in Brussels. My appeal, therefore, is to request that you and your Government exert all possible influence on the Union Miniere to cause it to desist forthwith from paying revenues to Katanga province. Until such time as the questions of the payment of Union Miniere revenues to the Central Government and of their division with Katanga are settled, a provisional settlement covering all receipts in foreign currencies from the Union Miniere should be made and implemented immediately. I owe you, no doubt, a rather full explanation as to why I make this approach at this time. I do so, first of all, because I believe firmly that if your Government were to co-operate with the United Nations in the way indicated, the crisis over Katanga would be quickly ended. It is a logical step to take, for I am certain that it would enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations should I ask for a resolution along these S/5053/Add.l^ English Annex XIII Page 2

lines, which, however, it is not my present intention to do. Moreover, it would seem to ire that this sort of action might be expected of one State from another friendly State. In this regard, I must point out that in my view no question of "sanctions" is involved here, respite Mr. Tshombe 's ambitions and declamations, Katanga is just a province and not a State. In over two years of striving, Mr. Tshombe has von recognition for his attempted secession from no State and there is no apparent prospect that this situation will change. Mr. Tshombe's declarations have not achieved independence or statehood for Katanga. Indeed, even Mr. Tshombe, on several occasions, as in the declaration he signed at Kitona last Eecember and in his formal acceptance of my Plan, has renounced secession by accepting, in principle, integration in the Congo as a whole. What I ask you, therefore, is only to respect the lavs of the Republic of the Congo, which forbid the export of mineral ores on which the legal duties and taxes have not been paid, and the Fpirit of the resolutions of the Security Council. Most important of all, I ask you to take this step because it will afford maximum help to the United Nations and in my estimation will do the most that can be done to end the possibility of further fighting and consequent loss of life in Katanga. You are aware that for over a year I have been doing my utmost to achieve a peaceful reconciliation of the differences between Leopoldville and Elisabethville. Those efforts have not succeeded largely because of the intransigence of Mr. Tshcmbe. The latest and most striking example of Mr. Tshombe's attitude is related to my Plan. Both Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe informed me last August, soon after the Plan was submitted to them, that they accepted it. The Plan had been formulated as a reasonable and moderate compromise which the authorities, both in Leopcldville and Elisabethville, should be expected to accept. This was my view and, as you know, the view of the original supporters of the Plan. Mr. Adoula and his Government have not yet done all that is required of them by the Plan, but I am convinced that they have been making an earnest effort to fulfil their commitment and to ensure the success of the Plan. Mr. Tshombe, on the other hand, has done little or nothing to indicate that he has any serious intention to implement the provisions of the Plan. S/5053/Add.l4 English Annex XIII Page 3

This refusal to live up to agreements he has made is not new for Mr. Tshombe. For example, on 2k June 1961 in Leopoldville, Mr. Tshcmbe signed an agreement supporting the reopening of Parliament and the constitution of a new Central Government. But this agreement was never implemented, since on his return to Elisabethville Mr. Tshombe., on 29 June 1961, stated that he had signed the agreement under "duress". Again., at Kitona on 21 December 19°~1, Mr. Tshcmbe signed and handed to a United Nations representative an eight-point declaration. But as soon as he returned to Elisabethville, he nullified the declaration by stating that it was for the provincial assembly of Katanga to decide upon it. He did, however, fulfil two of the eight points by sending Katangese parliamentarians to Leopoldville and also by appointing Katangese representatives on the Government Constitutional Commission. Mr. Tshombe engaged in talks with Mr. Adoula in Leopoldville in two sessions in 1962, from 15 March to l6 April and from l8 May to 25 June. It appeared that good progress was made in these talks and that agreement was reached on the setting up of four commissions to deal with four topics, namely, military, monetary, economic and fiscal, and transport and communications. All of the effort was wasted, however, because Mr. Tshombe insisted at the end on the insertion in the final communique of a clause which would have rendered meaningless the agreements reached since it would, in fact, maintain Katanga's secession. Under the Plan, in the event of failure to get agreement on reconciliation, a number of measures are envisaged if pressure must be applied. It is my intention, if it is finally necessary, to apply these and other non-military forms of pressure to induce Mr. Tshombe to implement his acceptance of the Plan and thus in fact to abandon his secessionist aims. I realize, of course, that one or another of these measures could lead Mr. Tshombe to resort to military force in aoother rash attack upon the United Nations Force in Katanga, although I doubt that this will happen. The Force, in such an eventuality, would, of course, defend itself energetically and it has a much stronger capacity to do so today than it has ever had. I would wish to avoid any development involving fighting if at all possible. I strongly believe that the action I am asking your Government to take would go far towards eliminating this risk. This, manifestly, is of highest significance to the United Nations, to the peace of Africa, to the Congo and Katanga, and to y«ur S/5053/Add.lA English Annex XIII Page k

Government and all other Governments in or directly connected with the continent of Africa. It is my intention, in due course, to circulate this letter to the Security Council. I trust most earnestly that I may count upon your serious consideration of my request and a favourable response.

(Signed) U THAMT English Annex XIV Page 1

AKHEX XIV

Letters dated 11 December 1962 from the Secretary-General to the Foreign Ministers of Portugal and the Republic of South Africa

I have the honour to make to your Government a most solemn and urgent appeal for assistance in bringing to a peaceful end the problem of the relations between the Government of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) - the Central Government and the provincial government of Katanga headed by Mr. Moise Tshombe. The crux of this problem rests in the continuing payment by the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga of revenues and taxes in substantial amounts (estimated at more than $30 million per year) to the authorities of Katanga province rather than to the Central Government, which asserts its legal claim to these monies. The Union Miniere, on its part, avers that it has no choice but to pay revenues on its operations to the "authorities which exercise effective power in Katanga", where its installations are located. The Union Miniere, as you know, is a private commercial firm and has not been responsive to the appeals that have been made to it to change its policy and make the proper payments to the Central Government. I now appeal directly to you because it is possible for your Government to take measures which could have a possibly decisive bearing on this question. /Portugal; I refer to the fact that a substantial amount of the copper production of Katanga is shipped out via the Route Elisabethville-Jadotville- Kolwezi-Dilolo-Benguela (Angola) or from Elisabethville-Sakania-Lusaka to Beira (Mozambique). My appeal to you, therefore, is to request that you and your Government take the necessary measures to prohibit the shipment of Katangese copper ore through Angola or Mozambique until such time as the questions of payment of Union Miniere revenues to the Central Government and their division with Katanga are settled^/ /South Africa; I refer to the fact that an amount of the copper production of Katanga is shipped out via the route Kolwezi-Jadotville- Elisabethville-Sakania-Lusaka and thence to the Republic of South Africa. My appeal to you, therefore, is to request that you and your Government take the necessary measures to prohibit the shipment of Katangese copper ore into the territory of the Republic of South Africa until such time as the questions of Snglish Annex XIV Page 2 payment of Union Miniere revenues to the Central Government and their division with Katanga are settled^ I owe you, no doubt, a rather full explanation as to why I make this approach at this time. I do so, first of all, because I believe firmly that if your Government, together with some other Governments similarly in position to act effectively, were to co-operate with the United Nations in the way indicated, the crisis over Katanga would be quickly ended. It is a logical step to take, for I am certain that it would enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations should I ask for a resolution along these lines, which, however, it is not my present intention to do. Moreover, it would seem to me that this sort of action might be expected of one State from /Portugal: an adjacent/ /South Africa; another/ friendly State. In this regard, I must point out that in my view no question of "sanctions" is involved here, respite Mr. Tshombe's ambitions and declamations, Katanga is just a province and not a State. In over two years of striving, Mr. Tshombe has won recognition for his attempted secession from no State and there is no apparent prospect that this situation will change. Mr, Tshombe's declarations have not achieved independence or statehood for Katanga. Indeed, even Mr. Tshombe, on several occasions, as in the declaration he signed at Kitona last Eecember, and in his formal acceptance of my Plan, has renounced secession by accepting, in principle, integration in the Congo as a whole. What I ask you, therefore, is only to respect the laws of the Republic of the Congo, which forbid the export of mineral ores on which the legal duties and taxes have not been paid, and the spirit of the resolutions of the Security Council. Most important of all, I ask you to take this step because it will afford maximum help to the United Nations and in my estimation will do the most that can be done to end the possibility of further fighting and consequent loss of life in Katanga. You are aware that for over a year I have been doing my utmost to achieve a peaceful reconciliation of the differences between Leopoldville and Elisabethville. Those efforts have not succeeded largely because of the intransigence of Mr. Tshombe. The latest and most striking example of Mr. Tshombe's attitude is related to my Plan. S/5053/Add.lA English Annex XIV Page 3

Both Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe Informed me last August, soon after the Plan vas submitted to them, that they accepted it. The Plan had "been formulated as a reasonable and moderate compromise which the authorities, both in Leopoldville and Elisabethville, should be expected to accept. This was my view and, as you know, the view of the original supporters of the Plan. Mr. Adoula and his Government have not yet done all that is required of them by the Plan, but I am convinced that they have been making an earnest effort to fulfil their commitment and to ensure the success of the Plan. Mr. Tshombe, on the other hand, has done little or nothing to indicate that he has any serious intention to implement the provisions of the Plan. This refusal to live up to agreements he has made is not new for Mr. Tshombe. For example, on 24 June 1961 in Leopoldville, Mr. Tshombe signed an agreement supporting the reopening of Parliament and the constitution of a new Central Government. But this agreement was never implemented, since on his return to Elisabethville Mr. Tshombe, on 29 June 1961, stated that he had signed the agreement under "duress". Again, at Kitona on 21 Eecember 1961, Mr. Tshombe signed and handed to a United Nations representative an eight-point declaration. But as soon as he returned to Elisabethville, he nullified the declaration by stating that it was for the provincial assembly of Katanga to decide upon it. He did, however, fulfil two of the eight points by sending Katangese parliamentarians to Leopoldville and also by appointing Katangese representatives on the Government Constitutional Commission. Mr. Tshombe engaged in talks with Mr. Adoula in Leopoldville in two sessions in 1962, from 15 March to 16 April and from 18 May to 25 June. It appeared that good progress was made in these talks and that agreement was reached on the setting up of four commissions to deal with four topics, namely, military, monetary, economic and fiscal, and transport and communications. All of the effort was wasted, however, because Mr. Tshombe insisted at the end on the insertion in the final communique of a clause which would have rendered meaningless the agreements reached since it would, in fact, maintain Katanga's secession. Under the Plan, in the event of failure to get agreement on reconciliation, a number of measures are envisaged if pressure must'be applied. It is my intention, if it is finally necessary, to apply these and other non-military S/5 05 3/Add. Ill- English Annex XIV Page k forms of pressure to induce Mr. Tshombe to implement his acceptance of the plan and thus in fact to abandon his secessionist aims. I realize, of course, that one or another of these measures could lead Mr. Tshombe to resort to military force in another rash attack upon the United Nations Force in Katanga, although I doubt that this will happen. The Force, in such an eventuality, would, of course, defend itself energetically and it has a much stronger capacity to do so today than it has ever had. I would wish to avoid any development involving fighting if at all possible. I strongly believe that the action I am asking your Government and other Governments to take would go far towards eliminating this risk. This, manifestly, is of highest significance to the United Nations, to the peace of Africa, to the Congo and Katanga, and to your Government and all other Governments in or directly connected with the continent of Africa. It is my intention, in due course, to circulate this letter to the Security Council. I trust most earnestly that I may count upon your serious consideration of my request and a favourable response.

(Signed) U THAKT English Annex XV Page 1

ANNEX XV

Letter dated 12 December 1962 from the Secretary-General to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom

I have the honour to make to your Government, as one of the original supporters of the Plan of National Reconciliation, a most solemn and urgent appeal for assistance in bringing to a peaceful end the problem of the relations between the Government of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) - the Central Government and the provincial government of Katanga headed by Mr. Moise Tshombe. The crux of this problem rests in the continuing payment by the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga of revenues and taxes in substantial amounts (estimated at more than $30 million per year) to the authorities of Katanga province rather than to the Central Government, which asserts its legal claim to these monies. The Union Miniere, on its part, avers that it has no choice but to pay revenues on its operations to the "authorities which exercise effective power in Katanga", where its installations are located. The Union Miniere, as you know, is a private commercial firm and has not been responsive to the appeals that have been made to it to change its policy and make the proper payments to the Central Government. Yesterday, I appealed to the Government of Belgium to exert every possible influence on the Union Miniere to cause it to desist forthwith from paying revenues to Katanga province. Until such time as an agreement has been reached on the matter between the Central Government and the authorities of Katanga province, I have also proposed that a provisional provisional settlement shall be implemented immediately. I am sure that you will appreciate the significance of this proposal. I now appeal directly to you because it is possible for your Government to take measures which could have a possibly decisive bearing on this question. I refer to the fact that a substantial amount of the copper production of Katanga is shipped out via the route Kolwezi-Jadotville-Elisabethville-Sakania-Lusaka. My appeal to you, therefore, is to request that you and your Government take the necessary measures to prohibit the shipment of Katangese copper ore through the territory of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland until such time as the questions of payment of Union Miniere revenues to the Central Government and their division with Katanga are settled. English Anijex XV Page 2

I owe ytu, no doubt, a rather fu]1 explanation as to why I make this approach at this time, I do so, first of all, because I believe firmly that if your Government, together ¥ith some other Governments similarly in position to act effectively, were to co-operate with the United Nations in the way indicated, the crisis over Katanga would be quickly ended. It is a logical step to take, for I am certain that it would enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations should I ask for a resolution along these lines, which, however, it is not my present intention to do. Moreover, it would seem to rr.e that this sort of action might be expected of one State from an adjacent friendly State. In this regard, I must point out that in my view no question of "sanctions" is involved here. Despite Mr. Tshombe's ambitions and declarations, Katanga is just a province and not a State. In over two years of striving, Mr. Tshombe has won recognition for his attempted secession from no State, and there is no apparent prospect that this situation will change. Mr. Tshombe's declarations have not achieved independence or statehood for Katanga. Indeed, even Mr. Tshombe, on several occasions, as in the declaration he signed at Kitona last December, and in his foriral acceptance of my Plan, has renounced secession by accepting, in principle, integration in the Congo as a whole'. What I ask you, therefore, is only to respect the laws of the Republic of the Congo, which forbid the export of mineral ores on which the legal duties and taxes have not been paid, and the spirit of the resolutions of the Security Council. Most important of all, I ask you to take this step because it will do the most that can be done to end the possibility of further fighting and consequent loss of life in Katanga. You are aware that for over a year I have been doing my utmost to achieve a peaceful reconciliation of the differences between Leopoldville and Elisabethville. Those efforts have not succeeded largely because of the intransigence of Mr. Tshombe. The latest and most striking example of Mr. Tshombe's attitude is related to my plan. Both Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe informed me last August, soon after the Plan was submitted to them, that they accepted it. The Plan had been formulated as a reasonable and moderate compromise which the authorities, both in Leopoldville and S/5053/AdcLli' English Annex XV Page 3

Elisabethville, should "be expected to accept. This was my view and, as you know, the view of the original supporters of the Plan. Mr. Adoula and his Government have not yet done all that is required of them by the Plan, but I am convinced that they have been making an earnest effort to fulfil their commitment and to ensure the success of the Plan. Mr. Tshombe, on the other hand, has done little or nothing to indicate that he has any serious intention to implement the provisions of the Plan. This refusal to live up to agreements he has made is not new for Mr. Tshombe. For example, on 2k June 1961 in Leopoldville, Mr. Tshombe signed an agreement supporting the reopening of parliament and the constitution of a new Central Government. But this agreement was never implemented, since on his subsequent return to Elisabethville, Mr. Tshombe, on 29 June 19^1, stated that he had signed the agreement under "duress". Again, at Kitona on 21 Eecember 1961, Mr. Tshombe signed and handed to a United Nations representative an eight-point declaration. But as soon as he returned to Elisabethville, he nullified the declaration by stating that it was for the provincial assembly of Katanga to decide upon it. He did, however, fulfil two of the eight points by sending Katangese parliamentarians to Leopoldville and also by appointing Katangese representatives on the Government Constitutional Commission. Mr. Tshombe engaged in talks with Mr. Adoula in Leopoldville in two sessions in 19^2, from 15 March to 16 April and fi'om 18 May , to 25 June. It appeared that good progress was made in these talks and that ( agreement was reached on the setting up of four commissions to deal with four I topics, namely, military, monetary, economic and fiscal, and transport and | communications. All of the effort was wasted, however, because Mr. Tshombe insisted at the end on the insertion in the final communique of a clause which would have rendered meaningless the agreements reached since it would, in fact, maintain Katanga's secession. Under the Plan, in the event of failure to get agreement on reconciliation, a number of measures are envisaged if pressure must be applied. Your Government's formal reservations with regard to the measures set forth in the Courses of Action of the Plan are, of course, kept in mind. Nevertheless, I would point out that the situation now is quite different from that prevailing at the time the S/5053/Add.lU English Annex XV Page it- reservations were made. It is my intention, if it is finally necessary, to apply these and other non-military forms of pressure to induce Mr. Tshombe to implement his acceptance of the Plan and thus in fact to abandon his secessionist aims. I realize, of course, that one or another of these measures could lead Mr. Tshombe to resort to military force in another rash attack upon the United Nations Force in Katanga, although I doubt that this will happen. The Force, in such an eventuality, would, of course, defend itself energetically, and it has a much stronger capacity to do so today than it has ever had. I would wish to avoid any development involving fighting if at all possible. I strongly believe that the action I am asking your Government and other Governments to take would go far towards eliminating this risk. This, manifestily, is of highest significance to the United Nations, to the peace of Africa, to the Congo and Katanga, and to your Government and all other Governments in or directly connected with the continent of Africa. It is my intention, in due course, to circulate this letter to the Security Council. I trust most earnestly that I may count upon your serious consideration of my request and a favourable response. (Signed) U TEANT S/5053/Add.lil- English Annex XVI Page 1

ANNEX XVI

Letter dated 11 December 1962 from Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula to the Secretary-U-eneral

With reference to Phase III of your Plan of National Reconciliation, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for your information and. such supporting action as you may find it appropriate to take, a copy of identical letters which I have addressed to the Governments of Belgium,, Italy, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom,, the United States of America, the Union of South Africa, the Netherlands, Sveden, Portugal, Union of India, Austria, Southern Ehodesia, Denmark, Switzerland, Japan, Brazil.

(Signed) Cyrille AEOULA

ANNEX

Text of identical letters from Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula to interested Governments

The Plan of National Reconciliation of the United Nations provides, in Phase III, that if the authorities of Katanga should fail to implement the Plan within the stated period of time, the Government of the Congo is to request all interested Governments to refuse to permit the importation into their territory of copper and cobalt exports from Katanga which are not authorized by the Central Government at Leopoldville. My Government considers that the period of time referred to above has long lapsed and that it is now time to pass on to the implementation of the provisions of Phase III of the Plan. Consequently, my Government has decided to place an immediate embargo on all copper and cobalt exports from the province of South Katanga until such time as the secessionist activities of that province can "be considered to have ended and its integration in the State of the Congo is assured. In pursuance of the law of my country, I have the honour to request your Government to take all measures available to it to assist in the implementation of this decision, in accordance with the provisions of the Plan of National Reconciliation.

(Signed) Cyrille AIDULA S/5053/Add.lU English Annex XVII Page 1

ANNEX XVII

Text of letter addressed by the Secretary-General to the Governments concerned, in pursuance of Prime Minister Adoulars request

/ I have been informed "by Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula that the Government of the Republic of the Congo has decided to place an embargo on all exports of copper and cobalt from the province of South Katanga until such1 time as the secessionist activities of that province can be considered to have ended and that it has requested your Government to take all the steps available to it to assist in the implementation of this decision. I consider the request of the Congo Government to be fully in accord with the provisions of Phase III of the Plan of National Reconciliation and I fully support it. I therefore urge your Government to be so good as to take the necessary action in response to Mr. Adoula's appeal. English Annex XVIII Page 1

AMEX XVIII

Letter dated 12 December 1962 from Mr. Tshome to the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in tiie Congo

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter KG-297 of 10 December 1962. We have given this document a thorough study and we note that it refers to "the line of action indicated in phases I to IV of the Plan" and to "section C of phase I". On 2h- August last you sent us a document dated 10 August entitled Plan of National Reconciliation, which comprised eight points. Nowhere in it is there any question of phases I to IV of the Plan. The Press has recently been mentioning these successive phases of the Plan and measures of sanction or pressure. We presume, therefore., that your letter refers to a document other than that which we received on 2U August or to some document following up that one. We have never received any notification or information about this second document either from yourself or from any other person. And this second document,

or this continuation of the document} is not even in our possession. We should therefore be grateful if you would send us the text of the document which is referred to in your letter of 10 December, so that we may study its contents and reply to your letter in full knowledge of the facts.

(Signed) TSHOMBE 3/505 3/Add. 11+ English Annex XIX Page 1

ANNEX XIX

Letter dated 17 December 1962 from the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to Mr. Tshombe

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 12 December 1962 (SR/1626) concerning phases I-IV of the Thant Plan. You could have seen from the text of the document itself that the phases in question are those of the "course of action" which was drawn up by the Secretary-General and his representative, indicating the actions which the Governments .of States Members of the United Nations "are prepared to take .... { in order to support the adoption of the proposal for national reconciliation and to achieve the reintegration of Katanga". It was arranged, moreover, that in phase I certain measures to make national reconciliation possible should be submitted to the Central Government, and then, if the Prime Minister agreed to them, to the Katangese authorities, so that they might be put into effect. You are aware that that is exactly what was done. Phases II to IV provide for the holding of consultations, for the action to be taken by the United Nations in conjunction with the Central Government and for the measures to be taken collectively by the Member States concerned in support of the Secretary-General's policy. In accordance with my instructions, I transmitted the first part of the Plan, which concerns Katanga, to you and to your colleagues. In view of the fact that phases II-IV of the Plan were not transmitted to you, I suggest that you consider all references to these aspects of the Plan, as also my letter of 10 December 1962 (KG-297), as indicating the steps to be taken by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Central Government and the Member States concerned in order to end the secession of Katanga. The full text of the Plan of National Reconciliation was published in a Security Council document and the ONUC Representative at Elisabethville has informed me that, following the request you made in the letter referred to above, he sent you a copy for your information.

(Signed) R.K. GARDINER s/5053/Add.: English Annex XX Page 1

ANNEX XX

Letter dated 12 December 1962 frcm Mr. Mpise Tshcmbe to the Secretary-General (concerning the foreign exchange derived from Katanga exports)

I have the honour to send you herewith the offer we are making to ycu in conformity with the United Nations Plan of National Reconciliation.

(Signed) Moise TSHCMBE

TEXT OF THE OFFER (dated 1J December 1962)

Katanga, conscious of African solidarity and of the fact that if peace is threatened at one point in Africa the entire continent is affected,, has decided to go still further forward in the application of the U Thant Plan, even though the other parties concerned have not fulfilled their obligations in the manner expected of them. The Government of Katanga proposes, without awaiting the outcome of the work of the committees set up to prepare the formula for a settlement, to advise the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga that it is authorized henceforward to transfer to the Monetary Council or to any other international institution which may be designated and accepted by the parties concerned, the total amount of the foreign exchange derived from the export of its products. The Monetary Council or the international institution designated under the guarantee of the United Nations and that of the United ^ingdom, the United States of America and Belgium, will hand over to Katanga for the conduct of its economy, after deduction of the sum required to cover the needs of the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga, 50 per cent of the foreign exchange paid by the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga, but the sum transferred may not be less than 250 million Belgian francs a month. This minimum will be augmented by the sums which may be necessary for the purchase abroad of the products traditionally supplied by the other regions of the Congo. English Annex XX Page 2

With a view to the restoration of confidence in the Congo and the removal once and for all of the threat of causing African "bloodshed, the Government of Katanga requests the Government of Leopoldville, in application of the U Thant Plan;, to promulgate a general amnesty law and to ratify the cease-fire agreement concluded on l6 October last under the guarantee of the United Nations. Engli sh Annex XXI Page 1

AMEX XXI

Letter dated 17 December 1962 from the Offleer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to Mr. Tshcmbe

The Secretary-General instructs me to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. SR/1620 of 12 December 1962 and to inform you that he has taken note of your proposals regarding the implementation of the Plan's provisions concerning foreign exchange. I must point out that your proposals give rise to certain questions which it will be necessary to clarify. These questions can be appropriately discussed between the Central Government and the representatives of the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga. The Secretary-General asks me particularly to tell you that he appreciates this gesture of yours and of your colleagues and that he sincerely hopes that it will constitute a first important step towards the attainment of all the conditions laid down in the Plan and designed to bring about the speedy and peaceful ending of the secession of Katanga.

(Signed) R.K.A. GARDINER English Annex XXII Page 1

ANNEX XXII

Letter dated 18 December 1962 from Mr. Tshcmbe to the Offleer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the communication from the Secretary-General of the United Rations which you sent me in your letter KG-306 of 17 December. We are prepared to instruct the persons whom we have appointed to deal immediately with the implementation of our proposal to contact the Monetary Council. They could be accompanied by an expert appointed by the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga. It would seem pointless for the Union Miniere alone to take up the matter of the implementation of our proposal.

(Signed) Moise TSHOMBE English Annex XXIII Page i

-AMEX XXIII

Letter dated 28 December 1962 from the Officer-in-Gharge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to Mr. Tshombe

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter SR/1649/ES of 18 December 1962. I note your view that in order to implement the proposal you communicated to us in .your letter of 12 Eecemter it would be necessary for an expert from the Eank of Katanga to come to Leopoldville to arrange the details with the officials of the Monetary Council. I understand that the Monetary Council has "been authorized to carry out this work with this expert. As you know, OMJC has alrady offered transport and hospitality facilities to the expert who will come to Leopoldville for this purpose.

(Signed) R.K.A. GARDIEER English Annex XXIV Page 1

AEWEX XXIV

Letter dated 2k December 1962 from the United Nations Representative at Elisabethville to Mr. Tshombe

I have the honour to refer to the deplorable incidents which occurred today. Your gendarmes fired at Ethiopian soldiers in the sector of the Union Miniere and shot down an ONUC helicopter in Shiniama Avenue. This morning the Katangese gendarmes posted near the Union Miniere began firing in the direction of the Ethiopian soldiers of CNUC, without the slightest provocation. Their firing went on almost the whole morning and a good part of the afternoon. One of our Ethiopian soldiers was wounded and is now in hospital. This morning, too, your gendarmes fired at one of our helicopters and forced it to land. The pilot and crew, six men in all, were taken by your gendarmes to Karavia, where they were subjected to disgraceful brutalities. An officer who was seriously wounded by one of the bullets which hit the helicopter has since died at the Queen Elisabeth Hospital. I take a very serious view of this matter and I must protest vigorously against these incidents, in which our troops showed such restraint that they did not return fire. I hold you entirely responsible for any measures which OMJC may feel compelled to take to restore a situation which has been gravely compromised by the lack of discipline of your gendarmes.

(Signed) E.W. MATHU S/5053/Add.U English Annex XXV Page 1

ANNEX XXV

Letter dated 27 December 1962 from Mr. Tshombe to the United Nations Representative at Elisabethville

I have the honour to protest against the action which was taken by your services on 24 December 1962 and maintained on the following days, whereby the roadblocks manned by the soldiers of the United Nations prohibited the passage of Katangese Ministers and official vehicles of the Katangese Administration, I regret to note that this situation is continuing, whereas on the afternoon of 25 December 1962 the highest officials of the United Nations at Elisabethville assured the Minister, Mr. Kimba, who had protested against this state of affiars that it would be remedied immediately. This measure is all the more intolerable in that we have serious reasons to believe that it is part of a general plan and that the operation on 2k December was simply a rehearsal of one of its predetermined episodes. This plan provides for my arrest and that of all the Katangese Ministers, with the object of paralysing the country and plunging it into chaos if the United Nations should decide to pass on to the application of military measures. The rehearsal would appear to have been arranged for 2k December so that the desire of the Katangese people to celebrate Christmas in peace should prevent any serious deterioration in the situation as a result of the incident. I think it hardly necessary to point out how untimely such manoeuvres are at this moment when negotiations are due to take place and considering that the U Thant Plan provides, in its first phase, for a general amnesty for all the Congolese leaders. In this connexion I should like to remind you of my letter of 12 December 1962, in which I asked you kindly to send me the text of Phases II to IV of the Plan, which has never been transmitted to Katanga although the United Nations requests Katanga to apply it in its entirety. The receipt of this text would enable us to find out whether the arrest of the Ministers is one of the measures advocated. English Annex XXV Page 2

I should like, "before concluding, to drav your attention to the danger inherent in such a measure. You must know that my Government and I represent an important moderating element and that we are constantly obliged to calm the indignation of our people, who are outraged "by the veritable occupation to which they are subjected. The disappearance of the present leaders would plunge the country into a full-scale war which nothing would be able to stop. I venture to hope that the United Nations will understand the gravity of the situation and that it will take care not to jeopardize its labour of peace by actions whose possible repercussions it does not perhaps fully appreciate.

(Signed) Moise TSHCMBE English Annex XXVI Page 1

ANNEX XXVI

Letter dated 27 December 1962 from the United Nations Representative at Elisabethville to Mr. Tshombe

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 27 December 1962 (SR/1675) in which you protest against the restrictions I temporarily imposed on 24 December 1962 on the movements of certain Katangese officials and of which I warned you "by telephone. You know very well that these restrictions were imposed in consequence of the unlawful actions which your gendarmerie had just perpetrated and which I shall recount again here: (a) On 24 December, in the Union Miniere sector, from 10 a.m. onwards your gendarmes subjected the CMJC positions to intense fire, without the slightest provocation, wounding one Ethiopian soldier; (ID) They shot down a United Nations helicopter, which was unarmed, while it was carrying out a regular observation mission and wounded Lieutenant S.S. Kang, who was on board and who died of his wounds a short time afterwards; (c) They seized the six occupants of the helicopter, beat them up savagely at Karavia and put them in prison. I had to insist that they should be taken to hospital, where they finally arrived too late for Lieutenant Kang's life to be saved. In the face of this intolerable provocation, the United Nations troops showed exemplary self-control and discipline, for they did not fire a single round from their positions in the direction of the Katangese forces. OMUC demanded the immediate return of the helicopter and its crew, failing which it would decide to recover them by force if necessary. GWUC also demanded that the firing on its positions should cease. I was obliged to impose these restrictions on the movements of certain official vehicles solely in order to ensure that there would be senior Katangese officials at Elisabethville possessing sufficient powers to give orders and to take the necessary steps. It is clear English Annex XXVI Page 2

that these restrictions were merely further proof of the determination of ONUC to prevent a serious deterioration in the situation resulting from the incident provoked by your authorities. These restrictions, which were soon removed, should also "be viewed in the light of the fact that your gendarmes brutally "beat up soldiers of CWUC, that they left Lieutenant Kang to die of his wounds, that your authorities are still detaining two civilian employees'of CNUC, that two trainlcads of goods "belonging to ONUC were looted at Sakania and Dilolo, and that the United Nations forces at Elisabethville are surrounded "by a "belt of roadblocks maintained "by your gendarmes. It is astounding, therefore, to read in your letter that the United Nations intends to arrest the Katangese Ministers and yourself, to plunge the country into chaos and so on. I can only reject such insinuations and protest against the unseemly way in which you try to shift the responsibility for the scandalous incidents of Christmas Eve. It is a fact that during the evening of 24 December you came to our Headquarters accompanied "by three of your Ministers, Mr. Kibwe, Mr. Kitenge and Mr. Muhona, and one of your deputies. The purpose of your visit was to study the question of roadblocks. Afterwards you all came to my residence, which you left, if I am not mistaken, quite freely. The following day Mr. Kimba and two senior officers of the Katangese police, Mr. Sapwe and Mr. Mwambe, also visited me at my home; it is my "belief that I received them in accordance with the "best rules of hospitality and I know that they left again without the slightest hindrance. I am surprised to note in your letter a reference to the Secretary-General's Plan of Reconciliation, which you accepted four months ago "but which you have not strictly speaking put into effect. In your letter of 12 December 1962 you asked me to send you the text of Phases II to IV of the Course of Action annexed to the Plan. In my Note Verbale No. KG-jQlj- of lU December 1962, the receipt for which was signed at the President's office, I sent you promptly a copy of the Security Council document in which the Plan itself and the programme of action are set forth in full. You telephoned me a little later to thank me for sending you this document. S/5053/Add.lU English Annex XX7I Page 5

Cn 17 Eecember 1962 I sent you a letter from the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations mission in the Congo. In it he explained to you clearly that Phases II to IV of the Course of Action concerned measures to "be taken "by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Central Government and the Governments of the States Members of the United Nations in order to put an end to the secession of Katanga; these Phases did not provide for any action to "be taken "by Katanga. What is expected of the Katangese authorities, and that in which they have largely failed, is the implementation of the provisions of the Plan itself. ONUC, I repeat, has not the slightest intention of launching a military offensive against Katanga. It is a peaceful Force which will defend itself if it is attacked. As you so rightly point out, your Government and you yourself could be an important moderating influence in the situation created "by the secession of Katanga and "by the siege imposed on the United Nations troops at Elisabethville. This would be the case if, instead of imagining that plots were being hatched and warlike campaigns prepared against your persons, you and your Ministers would take an active part in putting the Secretary-General's Plan of National Reconciliation into effect.

(Signed) Eliud W. MA.THU ! S/5053/Add.lij. [• English (' Annex XXVII i Page 1

I ANNEX XXVII

I Draft agreement presented to Mr. Tshombe on 28 December 1962

!_, President Moise Tshombe, agree to dismantle, "before 0800 hours on 29 December 1962, all Katangese roadblocks in Elisa"bethville and the surrounding area. The dismantling is to start immediately. The forces of the Katangese gendarmerie will withdraw in the areas fixed "by Major General Prem Chand, such as that of Lakuni on the Jadotville Road, the Comnune of Karavia, Simba Hill on the Kipushi Road, and the Keyberg Farm on the Sakania Road. The purpose of this agreement is to ensure freedom of movement for the United Nations forces. The Katangese forces will no longer he deployed in combat positions. Elisahethville, 28 December 1962

E.¥. Mathu Moise Tshombe United Nations Representative President of Katanga at Elisahethville

Major General Dewan Prem Chand Commander-in-Chief} Katanga Area English Annex XXVIII Page 1

ANNEX XXVIII

Declaration published on 29 December 19^2 in the name of Mr. Tshombe

The President of Katanga communicates the following: the ONUC troops then attacked on Thursday evening, 2J December. We spent the whole of Friday saving the peace and the prestige of the United Nations in international life despite the desire of the United Nations to make war. But they tried to make us sign an agreement that would have handed the country over without resistance to the troops which without any right are seeking to impose on us by force the political solution of foreign imperialism. A people which defends itself cannot perish. Thanks to the mischievous policy of the United Na'tions, the die is cast. For the past forty-eight hours our troops have been facing troops which do not know what they are fighting for but are equipped with superior weapons. Foreign radio services are announcing that the United States is sending the United Nations ten jet aircraft to make the situation even more abominable. The Katangese people will defend themselves to the death. Everywhere the ONUC and its troops will be combatted as our worst enemy. We shall resist them by every means until, as we have declared, our whole economic potential has been destroyed. First of all, if within twenty-four hours the ONUC troops have not put an end to their aggression and persist in forcing the roadblocks, we shall immediately blow up the Lufira bridge. That will be followed by the destruction of other such structures, which has already been prepared, beginning with the Mwadingusha Dam. The hour for this action will soon be decided. I have today signed a decree making the ordinance of 2 April 1961 concerning the state of enmity with ONUC applicable throughout the whole of Katangese territory, as from today. It prohibits the supply of any goods or services to ONUC. I appeal to all the men and women of Katanga to resist to the death the shameful aggression of the ONUC forces. I call upon them to resist with every possible means: ambushes, poisons, spears, poisoned arrows. I place.my full confidence in our valiant gendarmerie, in its bravery and in its spirit of sacrifice in the service of Katanga. May God protect Katanga I /••• Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has deemed it advisable to append to the report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo certain statements issued "by himself or "by a United Nations spokesman on his behalf during the events of 28 December 1962-it- January 1963. These form Annexes XXIX to XXXIII. In the last paragraph of Press Release C0/28l, issued on 3 January 19^3 (Annex XXXIII of this report), the Secretary-General referred to "a serious breakdown in effective communication and co-ordination between United Rations Headquarters and the Leopoldville Office". The Secretary-General subsequently requested Dr. Bunche, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, to investigate this situation on his trip to the Congo and to report to the Secretary-General about it. On his return from the Congo, Dr. Bunche submitted a special report on this matter to the Secretary-General and the text of that report appears as Annex XXXIV of this report. The Secretary-General has studied carefully the special report and accepts its analyses, conclusions and recommendations. He intends to take immediate steps, in pursuance of these recommendations, with a view to improving communication and co-ordination and avoiding in the future any recurrence of the difficulties which arose at the time of the Jadotville action. Indeed, there has been already a noticeable improvement in the system of clearance, reporting and communication of information from the field. S/5053/Add.lA English Annex XXIX Page 1

ANNEX XXIX Statement on the situation in South Katanga issued by a United Nations spokesman on 30 December 1962 T/

Cn 30 December the United Nations forces in Elisabethville completed their operations to remove all gendarmerie roadblocks in that area. From these roadblocks Katangese fire had teen directed on United Nations positions during the previous week. In this operation, only slight resistance has been encountered from the gendarmerie. The transmitter of Radio Katanga is also in United Nations hands and apparently is undamaged. An area within a radius of 20 kilcmetres around Elisabethville is now under United Nations control. The airfield is also now secured from gendarmerie fire. To the southwest of the city, Irish United Nations troops entered the town of Kipushi, on the Rhodesian "border, on the morning of JO December. United Nations casualties since 27 December are four dead and twenty-four wounded. In the city of Elisabethville, Tunisian troops of the United Nations are maintaining order and are in control of key points, including the post office, the railway station and the radio studios, and are acting in full co-operation with the local police. United Nations civilian officials are working with local authorities to restore the water supply and the electricity supply, "both of which were damaged by Katangese mortar fire. The pumps have already started and water is flowing in some of the coiununes and is expected to reach all levels in the city toward the evening of JO December. Efforts are also being made for the resumption of postal services and internal communications with the co-operation of local technicians and the Red Cross. There have been reports in certain newspapers that United Nations aircraft have "bombed" Elisabethville. It is necessary, therefore, to state once again that this report is wholly false and that United Nations aircraft in the Congo possess no bombs, nor have United Nations fighter aircraft operated over the city of Elisabethville.

_!/ Issued as Press Release CO/272. S/5053/Add.llj- ' English Annex XXIX Page 2

It may "be pointed out that Mr. Tshombe, who is now in Salisbury, Southern Khodesia, left Elisabethville of his own volition. He was not at the time under any United Nations restraint, nor were his ministers. Having left the city voluntarily, the decision to return to their responsibilities is also their own entirely. S/5053/Add.lU English Annex XXX Page 1

ANNEX XXX

Message dated 30 December 1962 sent by the Secretary-General to the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo and to the Commander of the United Nations Force in the Congo I/

I extend to you "both; to Mr. Mathu and General Frem Chand, and to all of those associated with you in the Congo operation, military and civilian alike, my thanks and warmest congratulations for the exemplary way in which you have carried out your duties in the Elisabethville area in the past two days. I extend my profound condolences to the relatives of those who gave up their lives in the recent action and my deep sympathy and hopes for their full and early recovery to those who were wounded in the action. It was an unhappy circumstance and a matter of regret to me that it "became necessary for our operation to again resort to military force in Katanga in a defensive action. As you know, this was not "by our choice but was forced upon us. The United Nations troops in the Elisabethville area exercised remarkable restraint and patience while under fire most of last week without returning the fire. It was only after all other efforts failed that the order was given to undertake the defensive action of removing the hostile gendarmerie roadblocks, which has now been completed so successfully, and with such skill and expedition and fortunately with a minimum of casualties. A vital contribution to the cause of order and peace in a United Congo and to the success of the United Nations has been rendered by the action just concluded.

I/ Issued as Press Release CO/273. English Annex XXXI Page 1

ANNEX XXXI

Statement by the Secretary-General dated 31 December 1962, with regard to recent events in the Elisabethville area!/

1. I was informed by the Offlcer-in-Charge at Leopoldville, Mr. Robert Gardiner, and by the Commander of the Force, Lt. General Kebbede Guebre, yesterday, 30 December, that the ONUC operation which had begun on the afternoon of 28 December to remove all of the road blocks of the Katangese gendarmerie in the Elisabethville area had been completed. Thus, all firing and fighting had ceased on that date. From these numerous road blocks positions the gendarmerie, on 22 December, resuming again on the 2Uth and continuing through the morning of the 28th, had been firing intermittently and at times heavily upon United Nations troops in the Elisabethville area. On the night of 27-28 December, heavy mortar fire joined the previous small arms fire, indicating the participation of mercenaries. All during this period, the United Nations troops, with remarkable restraint in the face of unprovoked and continuing firing upon them and in spite of casualties of two killed and ten wounded, strictly observed the orders of their Commander not to return the fire. The Katangese gendarmerie, incidentally, is the regular Katangese army and not, as sometimes misstated in the press, police. They are said to number about l8,000, they are heavily armed and are often led in battle by some of the 500 or more white mercenaries still on the Katanga payrolls, thanks to mining revenues. 2. It has been reported that in the early hours of the morning of 28 December, Mr. Tshombe sought to stop his troops from firing, but, whether because his officers and troops would not obey him or for some other reason, he did not succeed in doing so. Later in the day, although he again agreed to bring about a cessation of firing and also agreed that the gendarmerie road blocks and strong points from which the fire was coming should be removed, he refused to sign a statement to this effect. Consequently, since the firing persisted, in mid- afternoon of the 28th the United Nations troops, in. self-defence, were ordered at last to protect their security and their freedom of movement by clearing away the road blocks and strong points. This has been accomplished now in an action of two days' duration in which there has been only light fighting and

I/ Issued as Press Release CO/277. /... S/5053/Add.l^ English Annex XXXI Page 2 light casualties. That is, "by normal military standards, they vould be considered light, but they must be taken as heavy for a United Nations force whose function is peaceful, with arms for defence only. The United Nations casualties during the period 27-30 December were seven dead and twenty-nine wounded. We have no figures on Katangese casulaties but they also are thought to be light, since the gendarmerie and their mercenary officers usually fled in the face of impending combat, leaving their weapons and sometimes their vehicles as well. 3. The gendarmerie forces have been cleared away from the perimeter of Elisabethville to a considerable distance and they will not be permitted to return or to re-establish their positions. Having in mind the unhappy experience of September 1961 with the wanton bombing of ONUC personnel by mercenary-piloted Katangese Fouga jets and the recent extensive bombing and strafing activities in Worth Katanga by the greatly enlarged Katanga air force, protective sorties by OMJC aircraft were launched on 29 and 30 December against the Katangese military aircraft based at the Kolwezi military air field with a view to ensuring that aircraft and airfield could not be used for offensive strikes against the United Nations troops. The Swedish jet fighters rendered most effective support in this respect, in an indispensable defensive action, and thus contributed significantly to the success of the valiant Ethiopian, Indian, Irish and Tunisian troops engaged in the Elisabethville-Kipushi operation, the Ghanaian and Swedish troops in the Kaminaville area and the Congolese contingent safeguarding Kamina base. In this context, I am bound to deny categorically reports that 03MUC fighter planes undertook'bombing raids. They employed only cannons and rockets. Indeed, they have no bombs. Nor did they carry out any sorties against any targets in the Elisabethville area. Their sorties were centred only on the Kolwezi-Kengere military airfield. The airfield in Kolwezi Town was avoided. h. Some may loosely say that there was a "third round" in Katanga. That was not the case. There would have been no fighting at all, if the Katangese gendarmerie had not made it unavoidable through their several days of senseless firing. In view of the results of the OMJC operation, there may be some who English Annex XXXI Page 3 would be inclined to refer to a United Nations "military victory". I would not like this to "be said. The United Nations is seeking no victory and no surrender in Katanga, for the United Nations is not waging war against anyone in that province. We are there, as we are in the rest of the Congo,, only because in mid-July of 1960 we were appealed to by the Central Government to come to the aid of that newly independent Government in order to help it secure the withdrawal from its territory of all non-Congolese military personnel and to maintain law and order within a Congo whose territorial integrity and political independence needed protection. In this connexion, resolutions of United Nations organs also called for vigorous United Nations action to safeguard the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo; and entrusted to the United Nations Congo operation the mandates of eliminating mercenaries from Katanga and preventing the occurrence of civil war. The United Nations operation in the Congo, and now we must particularly emphasize Katanga, firmly seeks to discharge all of these responsibilities. But it has no other purpose there and will move in no other direction. We operate always in the hope that these objectives can be obtained without resort to force. We have never initiated force in Katanga or elsewhere in the Congo and we do not intend to do so. We do not use the force we have for political ends and we do not intend to intervene in the political affairs of the Congo, of the province of Katanga or of any other province. 5- On the other hand, it must "be clearly said that we support the Central Government as the only legitimate government of the Congo and we do not and will not, therefore, recognize any claim to secession or to independence of the province of Katanga, or deal with Mr. Tshombe or any other official of Katanga in any status other than that of provincial officials. 6. Mr. Tshombe, apparently on 28 December, left Elisabethville by some means and route unknown to me, but entirely of his own volition. It seems that his colleagues in the top echelon of Katangese officialdom, such as Mr. Munongo, Mr. Kimba and Mr. Kibwe, also left. But in general the local officials remained and the city is being run as usual by them. S/5053/A(id. Ill- English. Annex XXXI Page h

7- On the 28th of December, after four days of intermittent firing which, had then "become heavy in Elisabethville, I sent a message to Mr. Gardiner in Leopoldville suggesting that he might go to Elisabethville to have a very frank and serious talk with Mr. Tshombe. I advised Mr. Gardiner that he might assure Mr. Tshombe that the United Nations in the Congo has no designs on him or on his future position or career in or out of Katanga province. Then he should seek to convince Mr. Tshombe that the United Nations Operation in the Congo is determined to move without further delay to the full implementation of its mandates under the Security Council's resolutions. Mr. Gardiner was to inform Mr. Tshombe that the gendarmerie road blocks and strong points in the Elisabethville area would have to be removed., and that ONUC personnel must have full freedom of movement throughout Katanga, which would necessarily mean freeing the Jadotville road and establishing ONUC presences in Jadotville, Kolwezi and Kipushi. Mr. Gardiner also was to seek agreement of the provincial president on a plan to be devised, by Mr. Gardiner for the complete and immediate elimination of mercenaries from Katanga and for bringing Katangese aerial offensive activity to a quick end. Unhappily, Mr. Tshombe left Elisabethville surreptitiously, before Mr. Gardiner could get there to see him. I understand that he has been in Salisbury, Rhodesia, seeing Sir Roy Welensky and holding a press conference. 8. Mr. Tshombe and his ministers were not under any United Nations restraint and were not being molested by the United Nations in any way at the time of their voluntary departure from Elisabethville. In fact, Mr. Tshombe's ministers, apparently in anticipation of the gendarmerie attack, which I suppose they knew to be coming, seem to have left the town some days in advance of their President, or at least they were not at all in evidence there last week. Should they return to the city, which is a matter of their own decision, they would not be interfered with by the United Nations, unless they should undertake to incite hostile acts against United Nations personnel. The United Nations is not interfering with the processes of government, administration and economy of Katanga, whether municipal or provincial. I have no idea whether Mr. Tshombe will actually return to Elisabethville. English. Annex XXXI Page 5

9. In Elisabethville, quiet has prevailed, since fighting in the city, itself, was largely avoided, the population, African and European alike, has been calm, the local police and other officials have "been co-operative, and normal conditions have virtually returned. In Kipushi, the United Nations troops were cheered by the local populace as they entered the town. There has been no hint of earth scorching in those localities. 10. This military action just concluded in a sharp way which, indeed, could prove decisive, punctuated the persistent efforts which have been under way for more than a year now to achieve through talks at Kitona and Leopoldville, and more lately through the Plan of National Reconciliation, a peaceful solution of the problem of Katanga. Wow that the fighting has stopped, attention may again be focussed on the course of peaceful actions to be pursued. It is my intention to persevere in the effort to achieve implementation of the Plan of National Reconciliation. I considered that to be a thoroughly reasonable basis for accommodation of the differences between the Central Government and Katanga province at the time I presented it last August and I still consider it to be sound and reasonable. It was accepted by both parties. I would now hope, therefore, for a speedy implementation of its provisions. By this I mean a short period, perhaps a fortnight or so, before other measures would have to be weighed. The time has passed for long delays, protracted discussions and talk of negotiations, which in the past have served only Mr. Tshombe's interests, in any case. Only acts can now count. 11. As an immediate step, I would hope to see 'at the earliest possible date the arrival in Leopoldville of the long-overdue representative of the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga to discuss with Mr. Adoula and with the Conseil Monetaire the arrangements for paying to the Central Government, through its Conseil Monetaire, all of the Union Miniere foreign exchange and tax revenues, as foreseen in Mr. Tshombe's offer in his letter to me dated 12 December. I had understood that this UMHK representative was coming to Leopoldville long ago, and I really do not understand why he has not appeared there. Similarly, since the United Nations has seme time ago assured transportation and protection, and since English Annex XXXI Page 6

Mr. Moula has approved his coming for technical discussions; I would hope that there would be no further delay in the arrival in Leopoldville of the representative of the Bank of Katanga whose participation in the technical aspects of the talks on revenue arrangements is indispensable. 12. As to Mr. Tshombe, who, after all, has on more than one occasion signaled his acceptance of my Plan, it is clearly to be expected of him that he would at once send the senior officers of the Katanga gendarmerie to Leopoldville to take the oath of allegiance to the President of the Republic of the Congo, thus registering the integration of the gendarmerie into the National Army. These officers would be protected both by the Central Government's amnesty proclamation and by the United Nations, which would also guarantee their transport. He should also, as I have just indicated, authorize a representative of the National Bank of Katanga to go to Leopoldville forthwith. He must assure full liberty of movement for all ONUC personnel throughout Katanga; and he must co-operate with the United Nations in devising a plan for the immediate elimination of all mercenaries from Katanga. Finally, he must accept the customs and immigration officers of the Central Government in the pursuance of their functions in Katanga as elsewhere in the Congo. 15. As to Mr. Adoula, I would expect that he and his Government would support and press for early action in the Parliament of the Constitution called for in the Plan which, as I understand, would be subject in Parliament to amendments desired by any of the provinces, including Katanga, or by others, I am confident that Mr. Adoula is fully aware of the very great importance attaching to this aspect of the Plan. I also assume that Mr. Adoula and his Government will take all necessary steps to ensure that the amnesty recently proclaimed by President Kasa-Vubu will be applied fairly and effectively. I have been gratified by Mr. Adoula1s readiness to meet and discuss with the representative of the Union Miniere and to accept in Leopoldville for discussions of revenue matters all other interested parties, including a representative of the Bank of Katanga. lU. I would reiterate my previous call upon both parties, which they have both agreed to heed, to halt all troop movements in Katanga province while the efforts for a final settlement are under way. English Annex XXXI Page 7

15. I also call attention to the several letters addressed to certain Governments some time ago seeking support of the Plan. I expect early replies to those letters and I hope that they will generally "be positive. I trust that it will "be unnecessary to send reminders. 16. Having said all this, and repeating that the United Nations hopes for and continues to seek a settlement without further recourse to armed force, I wish to make it entirely clear that the United Nations Force in the Congo, pending the settlement, will not relax its vigilance nor cease to develop its readiness to meet any contingency. It definitely will not again tolerate attacks upon it. without quick and sharp response. 17. I am seeking, and I believe there is now within sight, an early end to the critical divisions "between the Central Government and the province of Katanga. In a unified Congo, Katanga province, its people and its leaders will play the influential role clearly "belonging to a section of the country so "bountifully endowed with natural resources. I am sure this reflects the wishes of the Members of the United Nations as well as of the overwhelming majority of the Congolese people, including very many Katangese. I am convinced that we must witness an early "beginning of the reduction of United Nations military strength in the Congo and an increasing concentration en United Nations technical assistance to the people of that country. I call upon the leaders of the Congo with great earnestness and urgency to assist me in a speedy achievement of these ends. 18. A detailed report covering the matters touched upon in this statement will "be submitted to the Security Council "before long. S/5053/Add.lij- English Annex XXXII Page 1

AfflEX XXXII

Statement on the position of the Secretary-General on the Katanga problem issued by a United Nations spokesman on 2 January igbj I/

The Secretary-General feels that in view of certain interpretations of his position on the Katanga problem which have gained currency, some clarifications may be helpful. The Secretary-General is not in communication with Mr. Tshombe, is not himself sending or having Mr. Gardiner or anyone else send any message to Mr. Tshombe, and is not expecting any communication from the provincial President. The Secretary-General's statement of Jl December gives the views of the Secretary-General on the actions required of Mr. Tshombe to implement the p

Plan. These call only for actions by Mr. Tshombe and not words} written or oral. The Secretary-General is not involved in the projected return of Mr. Tshombe to Elisabethville, beyond the statement of assurance requested by certain Governments that the United Nations in Katanga will not interfere with Mr. Tshombe's freedom in the city, unless he incites acts of hostility against the United Nations Operation and its personnel. The Secretary-General is definitely not seeking a resumption of negotiations over the Katanga problem. He is not trying to bring Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe together again, and sees no need for further discussions except at the technical level. The Secretary-General believes, as emphasized in his statement, that it is now too late for negotiations. The only discussions required are on technical matters in implementing certain provisions of the Plan. Past experience with cease-fire agreements with the Katangese gendarmerie indicates their futility, since they are not respected. Indeed, in the light of last week's events in Elisabethville, it may be questioned whether there is any responsible and effective control over that force. The United Nations Force will resort to fire only when fired upon.

I/ Issued as Press Release CO/280. S/5053/Add.l^ English Annex XXXIII Page 1

ANNEX XXXIII

Statement on the Jadotville operation issued by a United Nations spokesman on 3 January 1963 I/

From a purely military standpoint the United Nations Force in the Congo has just completed a "brilliantly executed action along the Elisabethville-Jadotville road, which has taken the United Nations troops into the city of Jadotville itself, on the morning of 5 January. There, we are informed, the United Nations commanding officer has held amicable talks with the Mayor of the city and with representatives of the Union Miniere with a view to maintaining normal activity in the city and to protecting installations, which have on numerous occasions been threatened with destruction by Mr. Tshombe in pursuance of his alleged "scorched-earth" policy. Initial reports indicate that there was little or no fighting in the city and very little damage from acts of sabotage. The troops participating in this action are commended by the Secretary- General for their professional competence and soldierly courage. For some time past, the United Nations Operation has been demanding of Mr. Tshombe the freedom of movement to which it is entitled throughout the Congo. Mr. Tshombe has on more than one occasion agreed in principle to this demand but has always refused to implement it. It is regrettable that this finally could be achieved at Jadotville only by military force, but in view of the Katangese official attitude, there was no other choice. Another source of regret is found in the fact', that' in the Jadotville operation there occurred, for the first time in the experience of OMJC, a serious breakdown in effective communication and co-ordination between United Nations Headquarters and the Leopoldville office. Steps are being taken to determine the cause of this lapse and to ensure that it will not recur. All United Nations field missions and operations, are the responsibility and are' under the control of the Secretary- General and there will be no exception to this principle, in the Congo or • elsewhere.

I/ Issued as Press Release CO/281. S/5053/Add. Ill- English Annex XXXIV Page 1

ANNEX XXXIV

Special Report to the Secretary-General "by Ralph J. Bunche, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, on the subject of communication and co-ordination as between United Nations and ONUC Headquarters, with specific reference to the Jadotville Action

Part A

The Assignment and the Problem

1. On 3 January 1963.1 a United Nations spokesman announced that you had me to go to the Congo "for the purpose of consultation with the Officer-in-Charge and the Force Commander on a number of matters, political, military and administrative, affecting the operation in its present and future activities" (Press Release SG/1^07). One of these natters -was the "serious "breakdown in effective communication and co-ordination between United Nations Headquarters and the Leopoldville office" (Press Release SG/1^C6 of 3 January 1963). 2. In pursuance of your directive, I left New York at 8.^0 p.m. on 3 January, arriving at Leopoldville at 11.1)-5 p.m. on k January. Unfortunately, during the day of my travel to the Congo, Press and radio carried distorted reports of the purpose of my travel to the Congo, alleging that "authority had been exceeded", predicting that "heads would roll" and making other equally unfounded assertions. These, of course, had all "been monitored in Leopoldville and Elisabethville. 3. Immediately on arrival in Leopoldville, I began discussions on the Jadotville events with Mr. Gardiner and continued them throughout the day of 5 January with Mr. Gardiner and General Kebbede. The purpose of these talks was to obtain the clearest possible view of what actually happened during the period from late on 31 December 1962 through 3 January 1963> "both, as regards the military action itself and communication regarding it with United Nations Headquarters and, if only to lesser extent, between the field command and the Officer-in-Charge and the Force Commander in Leopoldville. I also checked on the message exchanges in that period between the Leopoldville and Elisabethville offices. 1)-. Both the Officer-in-Charge of ONUC, Mr. Robert Gardiner, and the Commander of the Force, Lieutenant-General Kebbede Guebre, had already in preparation, in S/5053/Add.llj- English Annex XXXIV Page 2 response to your cabled request, their accounts of what happened during the days in question. Mr. Gardiner, General Kebbede and Kajor-General D. Frem Chand, General Officer Commanding, Katanga area, have also submitted to you in personal letters given to me for delivery to you their expressions of concern and regret at the embarrassment caused by the failures in effective communication during the Jadotville action. 5. I also made a short visit to Elisabethville for the purpose, among others, of discussing co-ordination and communication with Mr. Eliud Mathu and General Prem Chand, and paid similar visits to Jadotville, Kipushi, Kamina and Kaminaville. From Elisabethville, I went by car to Jadotville for the purpose of seeing the road and the scenes of action at first hand. 6. The background of the problem is summarized in the following paragraphs. 7. A plan of operations to achieve freedom of movement for ONUC throughout Katanga in the event of a continued denial of this freedom by Katangese authorities, which would also ensure the elimination of mercenaries and assist national unity, was devised in the course of consultations involving Mr. Gardiner, the Force Commander, General Prem Chand and myself during my visit to Leopoldville in October of last year. That plan was subsequently approved by you for ultimate execution, if all non-military efforts finally failed. 8. The first phase of that plan had unexpectedly to be activated on 28 December, when General Prem Chand, with Headquarters concurrence, ordered the removal of all gendarmerie road blocks and the elimination of the gendarmerie themselves from the Elisabethville-Kipushi area. This order was issued only after the United nations troops had been subjected since 22 December to unprovoked, intermittent and at times heavy firing from gendarmerie roadblock positions without returning fire, although ONUC suffered some casualties. All during the very heavy gendarmerie firing throughout the night of 27-28 December, Mr. Mathu and General Prem Chand had striven tirelessly to induce Mr. Tshombe to stop his troops from firing. 9. This first or road block removing phase of the operations plan was quickly and successfully concluded in two days. Then, the United Nations troops in the Elisabethville area, finding that all opposition to them had crumbled and disappeared, undertook forward moves in essentially probing and patrol actions. S/5053/Add.lU English Annex XXXIV Page 3

Thus,, after briefly stopping at Simba Hill outside of Kipushi, as the operations plan called for, they moved unopposed into Kipushi town itself, "being encouraged there "by a welcome from the Mayor and the populace. The halt at Simba Hill called for by the operations plan was for political rather than military reasons. Again, the troops "based at Kamina carried out a fully successful action to secure Kamina Sase and airfield by sealing off the town of Kaminaville through occupying two outlying railroad points. Anticipating no further opposition, they went on into the town with the encouragement of the local authorities and population to ^ guarantee law and order. 10. On the Jadotville road, the situation developed in such way as to lead to a sudden, unanticipated and almost unavoidable telescoping of the first and second phases of the plan of operations to establish freedom of movement, the second being the contemplated move to Jadotville, followed by an ultimate move to Kolwezi. There was consequent on-the-spot revising of the plan and some improvising. 11. On the evening of 31 December 1.962, a company of United Nations troops moved out of Elisabethville on a patrol along the Jadotville road. I have been assured by the GOC, Katanga, that when this detachment set out, there was no intention that it should go to the Lufira River or do more than probe along the road. The troops probing forward_, however, after overcoming the first resistance at Lubumi, not far from Elisabethville, encountered much less opposition thereafter than had been envisaged in the plan. They continued to press forward, therefore, and were able to cross the Lufira River by a bridge not completely demolished and establish a bridgehead on the western bank without meeting any formidable opposition, beyond the destruction of the bridges. It was only at this time that an order of the Force Commander, who was acting in concert with United Nations Headquarters, was received calling for a halt of the advance and for no crossing of the river. The Force Commander was concerned that the troops should not be overextended or subjected to undue risk. But the river had already been crossed when the order was received, and since night had fallen, it would have been risky militarily, and quite possibly costly in lives, to undertake a nightwithdrawal under mercenary and gendarmerie fire. Thus, the men holding the bridgehead, being under machinegun and mortar fire from gendarmerie and mercenaries on high ground not far from the River, had either to retreat across the River or move ahead and clean out the sole remaining pocket of resistance. They wisely did the latter. S/5 05 3/Add. 11+ English Annex XXXIV Page ij-

12. The final move from the river bridgehead over the few miles remaining into the town of Jadotville does frankly present a rather disconcerting picture with regard to communications to and from the field in such a situation. It is a picture of delays and uncertainties, of difficulties of interpretation and understanding in a situation -wherein a field commander,, whose troops were under fire at the Lufira River, would have to seek a review and clarification of instructions. This would have to be done over field communications apparatus which must first reach Slisabethville, then clear with the Officer-in-Charge and Force Commander in Leopoldville, who would in turn refer to the Secretary-General in New York. Moreover,, the local time at the Lufira River and at Elisabethville is seven hours ahead of New York local time and that at Leopoldville is six hours ahead. The commanding officer in the field decided that militarily, at any rate, he had no choice but to deal with the military situation before him. In this decision he WRS having in mind, particularly, his military training, the security and morale of his troops, the scorched earth threats of Mr. Tshombe and the information obtained from two captured mercenaries that Mr. Tshombe had just been exhorting them to hold up the OMJC advance for "three days" after which world public opinion would force the United Nations to withdraw, and the mercenaries' assurance that there would be no opposition ahead. There was very little, as the ONUC troops entered the town without firing a shot, preceded by their commander who undertook, immediately, amicable talks with the Mayor and representatives of the Union Miniere. At this particular stage, it appears that Leopoldville and apparently Elisabethville as well, for some time, were not very closely in touch with, and therefore were uncertain and had little information about, the exact whereabouts and the forward progress of the expedition along the road. It followed that United Nations, New York, was equally uninformed. 13. It bears mention that there was at the time of the Jadotville action a considerable overload on the coding facilities at the Elisabethville office. It was ascertained that at one point "priority" messages were lagging behind as much as forty-eight hours (that is, from the moment of their transmission in Leopoldville to their receipt in Elisabethville, and vice versa). The time lag in messages even of the highest priority was as much as six hours. The coding S/5053/Add.llj- English Annex XXXIV Page 5

personnel at Elisabethville worked indefatigably, at times for forty-eight hours at a stretch, but additional personnel and equipment, which could also be of improved models, are needed. ih. The physical transmission of messages between New York and Leopoldville and between Leopoldville and Elisabethville is occasionally, and at this time of the year (being the rainy season in the Congo) not infrequently, /object to interruption by weather and atmospheric conditions. Such interruptions are ~t times for ^tended periods and result in a backlog of messages waiting to be transmitted. Language differences and difficulties are also a constant factor in slowing the preparation and transmission of messages. This seems to be especially pertinent to the military personnel and messages. There is in the United Nations, also, and especially with regard to a highly sensitive operation such as ONUC, in a region where the Katangese surete is, or was all pervasive, a heavy emphasis on security, with a resultant tendency which may well be excessive, to rely on coded messages. Such messages, of course, require much more time for transmission, as they must be coded and decoded.

Part B

Conclusions

1. From the frank and full discussions on the problem I have had in the Congo, and from observations on the spot, I have drawn seme conclusions which are set forth in this part of the report. 2. Everyone in the top echelon of OKUC who was concerned with the matter, agrees that the machinery of prior clearance, co-ordination and reporting did not function } well on the Jadotville action, and that consequently you, United Nations Headquarters, Leopoldville Headquarters and even the Elisabethville office either did not get proper information or got it inadequately and much later than should o have been the case. The fact is that the reporting to Headquarters by ONUC, as with all field missions, on both military and non-military activities, is a continuous problem, although there has been much improvement in the Congo Operation during the past year. S/5053/Add.l^ English Annex XXXIV Page 6

3. There Is no basis that I could find for concluding that the deficiencies in conmunication and co-ordination vere other than unintentional, resulting from a serious malfunctioning of the machinery of intercommunication and from at least one important misunderstanding. k. The most serious misunderstanding came about with regard to the entering into the second or Jadotville phase of the plan of action. The GCC Katanga properly considered that once action was under way on a phase of the plan, it was not necessary to seek clearing orders from each specific step. In this instance, however, the start of operations caused by the six days of firing on ONUC troops by the gendarmerie. and the abrupt telescoping of the first and second phases occurred without clear advice to Leopoldville, and thus from Leopoldville to you, that this telescoping had occurred, and that ONUC was actually embarked on the second or Jadotville phase. This occasioned worry at Leopoldville headquarters, for, apart from other considerations, the second phase of the plan called for the filling of some vital needs In the way of vehicles, equipment and aerial support before it could be undertaken without undue risk. These had not been met on 31 December, when the move along Jadotville road began, or on the afternoon of 1 January, when you first learned of the move from Leopoldville headquarters, at which time the troops were already beyond the Lufira. United Nations Headquarters was disturbed for this and other reasons, not the least of which was the dismaying breakdown in communication with the field, resulting in little or no knowledge for far too many hours, of the actions, whereabouts and objectives of a considerable body of United Nations troops. 5. I found at Elisabethville, also, a broader interpretation of a cable of encouragement from Headquarters on 30 December than had been intended by it. That message had been sent as a follow-up to a message sent earlier on that day specifying that any further military action in Katanga other than that required in self-defence would be undertaken after Headquarters' clearance. It was quickly recognized that this directive was too restrictive, in that it would unduly restrict and handicap the patrol, probing and perimeter expanding actions normal and necessary in military field practice. The follow-up message of the thirtieth was designed to relax the restrictiveness of the first message. It also sought to S/5053/Add.ll4- English Annex XXXIV Page 7 avoid any sharp letdown after the success of the Elisabethville road block action, and to give assurance to our people in the field that there would "be no repetition of the experience of the fighting of December 1961 after which the gendarmerie were permitted to resume their threatening positions of strength in the city's environs. This time, on the assumption that there would be little or no further firing from the gendarmerie in that area, the military were being advised to exploit their road block action success, to extend their Elisabethville perimeter and to keep the gendarmerie and mercenaries off balance and on the run. In any case, we had supposed that there was an automatic limit on how far the United Nations troops might proceed along the Jadotville road because the required reinforcements in troops, air support and material, particularly bridging, had not yet arrived. Also, because of transmission delays, the Secretary-General's statement of 31 Eecember on the end of the fighting and on United Nations intentions was not received in Elisabethville until after the Lufira had been crossed. 6. From both a military and a practical standpoint, I believe that there can be no question that the action taken along the Jadotville road and the entering into Jadotville were entirely sound. Militarily, there was, in fact, no other proper course, and the actions were brilliantly executed. From the point of view of the population of Jadotville, the rapid entry of ONUC troops was received with relief. 7. I have encountered amongst our senior officials in the Congo mixed feelings about the Jadotville episode. There is sincere regret and concern about the blemish on the record of the achievement owing to the obvious breadkdown of communication and co-ordination, and the distress this has visited upon you. I have spoken in clearest possible terms about this to all concerned and have strongly cautioned that such lapses in reporting must not happen again. On the other hand, there is satisfaction, in which I frankly share, at the entry, at long last, of the United Nations into Jadotville and relief that this was accompanied by a minimum of fighting and casualties. 8. I have found nothing to suggest that the authority of the Secretary-General and his full control over the Force and the operation as a whole has ever been questioned by anyone in the Organization. That authority and control are recognized by all. There was and there is no question of the military branch of S/5053/Add.lU English Annex XXXIV Page 8 the operation exceeding authority, getting out of hand or taking matters into their own hands. The position of the Officer-in-Charge as your representative and his directives on your "behalf are recognized and accepted throughout the operation. There was no weakness or breakdown in this sphere. I have no reason at all to doubt that had the order to halt been received before the river was crossed, it would not have been crossed. Seen in retrospect, that in my opinion, as events turned out, would have been a pity, although I could not have known so at the time, 9. I am convinced that the underlying cause of the difficulties that arose in the conduct of the Jadotville action was that the United Nations troops and the OKUC organization suddenly encountered far less resistance and far more local encouragement than they had anticipated or were fully prepared for so far as co-ordination, communication and clearance were concerned, and it descended on them more quickly than they could digest it. Could I find any individual in the Organization on whom blame could justly be placed, I would not hesitate to point the finger at him, whoever he might be, and recommend to you that stern action be taken against him. I have not done this because I have found beyond doubt that it is our machinery that is at fault, far more than individuals. That machinery is simply not adequate 'and not geared to cope with serious and unexpected combat situations. It is, I believe, because the Force has had only two brief combat experiences heretofore, and these both confined to Slisabethville where we have an office and an efficient communications apparatus, that the weaknesses and deficiencies which became so apparent in the Jadotville action have not hitherto been apparent. We have, I believe, learned much from Jadotville which will be of benefit not only to the Congo Operation henceforth but also to any future United Nations operations involving military personnel which may become exposed to combat conditions. 10. I take it that the misunderstandings and communications inadequacies which characterized the Jadotville action are by no means peculiar to OMJC. They cannot justify any generalization about the incapability of the international organization to maintain an efficient military force or carry out a clear military action. I understand that occasional experiences of this kind are not unknown even to the well organized military ica chines of the big Powers. S/5053/Add.li|- Engli sh Annex XXXIV Eage 9

11. It Is clear that OMJG's entire system of co-ordination and communication under the stress of the unusual conditions created when its troops are in action needs thorough review and overhauling. Kew and more precise directives are needed defining the requirements for prior clearances before actions are taken, "both as "between the units in the field and OMJC headquarters, Leopoldville, and between Leopoldville and United Nations Headquarters, Mew York. Similarly, the methods of informing and reporting must be revamped. The GOG, Katanga, for example, now realizes that the military practice to which he is accustomed in his national military service of two a day situation reports (sitreps) cannot adequately serve United Nations information and co-ordination needs. Experienced military men, moreover, are not accustomed to the need for clearing each military move before it is made, once a plan is approved. It has to be soberly re-ckoned with at United Nations Headquarters that once a fighting situation develops - and particularly when a plan is being executed in an area of combat activity - efforts to regulate the details of military moves and tactics by political levers at Headquarters may put many men's lives in jeopardy. Once a military action is afoot there can be no push-button action at Headquarters to control that action in response to political or other considerations, without doing violence to sound military judgement and tactics at serious cost to the security of the troops involved and of the local population. 12. The United Nations, being so highly sensitive politically and on such delicate ground when its troops engage in combat action, must have fuller information about such actions than even national governments would require, and must have it quicker. There must be a more.acute awareness on the military side, in Leopoldville as well as in the field, of the imperative necessity of reporting fully and promptly to United Rations Headquarters. This needs higher priority, timewise, than it now enjoys. It is recognized, of course, that an officer in the field, in the heat and under the pressures of battle action, is little likely to give much thought to keeping New York up to date. I have, therefore, advised the Officer-in-Charge and the Force Commander that an obvious remedy for this defect would be to assign to every unit of ONUC troops likely to see fighting action on any assignment a mature reporting officer detached from OMJC headquarters, S/5053/Add.l^ English Annex XXXIV Page 10 whose sole responsibility it would be to report fully and speedily to the Force Commander on the progress of the action. Similarly, senior officers on the staff of the Force Commander should be assigned the duty of supervising and expediting all reporting on military matters to United Nations Headquarters. Since the Officer-in-Charge, as the representative of the Secretary-General, bears responsibility in the Congo for all of the activities of the Operation, including the military, a closer working relation and a more effective system of co-ordination between the offices of the Officer-in-Charge and the Force Commander are indicated. A high-level liaison officer might provide the answer. I have also asked the Commander to issue new, precise and very firm orders to all of his field commanders to initiate no military actions, other than those spontaneously necessary in self- defence, without prior clearances with the Force Headquarters and from there with you. 13. As the officer responsible to you for the supervision and conduct of the activities of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, I, of course, have full responsibility for the serious lapses that occurred and the deficiencies in co-ordination and communication exposed glaringly by the Jadotville experience. There is no explanation beyond the simple statement that I had not anticipated in the slightest degree that normal military practices would fall far short of United Nations Headquarters needs. It having been convincingly demonstrated that this is the case, some radical changes and improvements are imperative. "Lk. Finally, in the light of the foregoing, I recommend that a two or three man mission from Headquarters be sent by you to the Congo at an early date with terms of reference to study thoroughly the existing machinery of OWUC for communication and co-ordination internally and with United Nations Headquarters, with a view to making recommendations to you for substantial improvements and strengthening in these areas designed to avoid in the future any breakdowns and lapses of the nature recently experienced. Respectfully submitted, 10 January 1963 Ralph J. BUNCEE Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs