The Role of International Alliances in Civil War Onset Paul Todd Fletcher

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COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PUBLIC POLICY

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL

ALLIANCES IN CIVIL WAR ONSET

PAUL TODD FLETCHER

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2015

Paul Todd Fletcher defended his dissertation on 9 February 2015. The members of the supervisory committee were:

Mark A. Souva Professor Directing Dissertation

Johnathan Grant University Representative

Dale L. Smith Committee Member

Sean D. Ehrlich Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements.

This dissertation is lovingly dedicated to my mother, Cathy Ozbun Fletcher. As her endless encouragement has supported me through this dissertation, her constant love has sustained me throughout my life.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not be possible without the guidance of my committee members, the encouragement of friends, and the support of family.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Mark Souva, my committee chairman for his hours of discussion, reflection, and encouragement throughout the entire process. When I was most plagued with doubts about the dissertation, it was his positive perspective and support that provided me with much needed reassurance. I also wish to thank Dr. Dale Smith and Dr. Sean

Ehrlich. From the knowledge and wisdom they imparted in my first classes in graduate school, through the several research and teaching opportunities offered during my time in the program, to their sage counsel regarding my dissertation, I offer my sincere thanks to my committee members who were more than generous with their time and expertise. Special thanks go to Dr. Grant who was willing to participate in my final defense committee at the last moment.

I would also like to thank my father, Jim Fletcher, who never doubted that I’d finish my dissertation. I wish to thank my brother, Jace Fletcher, his wife, Laura Fletcher, and my nephew

Aiden Todd Fletcher, their support, encouragement, and friendship was so greatly needed and very appreciated. Finally, I want to say a heartfelt thank you to my mother, Cathy Fletcher. She read through countless drafts of my dissertation, always asking the thought-provoking questions, and providing constructive criticism whenever needed. She pushed me when I needed pushing. She distracted me when I needed distraction. Outside of my committee members, she’s the only person

I can confidently say has read every page of this dissertation, and that means the world to me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ...... vi

Abstract ...... vii

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER 1: EXPLANATIONS OF CIVIL WAR ONSET ...... 3

CHAPTER 2: DOMESTICALLY MOTIVATED ALLIANCE FORMATION ...... 15

CHAPTER 3: CIVIL WAR ONSET ...... 26

CHAPTER 4: IRREGULAR REMOVAL OF LEADERS ...... 48

CHAPTER 5: FUTURE RESEARCH ...... 67

APPENDIX A: MODEL WITH LAGGED POLITY ...... 78

APPENDIX B: COUPS IN ANOCRACIES ...... 79

References ...... 81

Biographical Sketch ...... 93

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Civil War Onset among All States (1945-1991) ...... 32

Table 2. Alternative Logistic Regressions on Civil War Onset among All States (1945-1991) ...... 33

Table 3. Logit Comparisons of Civil War Onset Over Time ...... 35

Table 4. List of Civil Wars and Allies of Anocratic Countries at Onset (1945-1991) ...... 36

Table 5. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Civil War Onset among Anocracies (1945-1991) ...... 39

Table 6. Alternative Logistic Regressions on Civil War Onset among Anocracies (1945-1991) ...... 41

Table 7. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Removal of Leaders among All States (1945-1991) ...... 56

Table 8. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Removal of Leaders among Anocracies (1945-1991) ...... 59

Table 9. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Succesful Coups among All States (1950-1991) ...... 63

Table 10. Regressions on Civil War Onset among Anocracies (1945-1991) with Lagged Polity...... 78

Table 11. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Succesful Coups among Anocracies (1950-1991) ...... 79

ABSTRACT

While significant scholarly attention has been given to the literatures on civil war and on alliances, there has not been any exploration of the important role international alliances play in civil war onset. This dissertation posits that international alliances can greatly decrease the onset of civil war. Leaders wish to remain in power, and alliances can serve as a means to that end. Allies need foreign leaders who will ensure that their states can fulfill their alliance obligations. Civil wars undermine the ability of leaders to meet alliance obligations. Through the formation of alliances, leaders may be seeking international solutions to domestic problems. This dissertation proposes that alliances go beyond their written obligations by also providing foreign states with security from domestic threats. The empirical results of this dissertation demonstrate that powerful states can substantially reduce civil war onset in their allies. However, further research indicates that this benefit may come at a cost. By heavily relying on help from a powerful ally, states may be more vulnerable to irregular removals of leaders, especially in the form of coups. More broadly, this dissertation also seeks to provide a possible policy prescription for stability and security in the world.

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INTRODUCTION

At the close of the Napoleonic Wars, the small sovereign German states looked for security.

Ravaged by over a decade of war, these states found protection in the German Confederation established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Surrounded by powerful neighbors, the Germanic states were encouraged to form an alliance where the “States of the Confederation engage to defend not only the whole of Germany, but each individual State of the Union, in case it should be attacked.” As the treaty made a war against any Germanic state a war against all Germanic states, the clear intent of the treaty was to protect against external threats. Yet, when the second phase of the treaty was signed by 39 independent Germanic states in 1820, the treaty expanded in scope to include all threats, both foreign and domestic. Article 26 of the Final Act of the Viennese

Ministerial Conferences stated that:

When domestic peace in a Confederal state is directly threatened by insubordination of subjects against the authorities, and a dissemination of rebellious movements is to be feared, or a real rebellion has broken out, and the government itself, after exhausting constitutional and legal means, calls for the support of the Confederation, then it is incumbent upon the Confederal Assembly to arrange immediate assistance for the restoration of peace.1

With relative stability and peace returning to the international order, these leaders logically turned their attention to other threats to their power – their subjects. While the primary goal of the

German Confederation was to provide security from outside threats, participating states realized that this alliance could also provide internal stability and security against domestic threats.

It is worth noting that the idea of an alliance helping against domestic threats and rebellions was not only a consideration for these leaders, but written into one of the most important treaties of its time. Yet, while modern studies of alliances have extended their data back to 1815, no scholarly

1 German Historical Institute. “Final Act of the Viennese Ministerial Conferences (May 15, 1820).” German History in Documents and Images. German Historical Institute, Washington DC. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/pdf/eng/1_C_NS4_Vienna%20Final%20Act.pdf Sourced from: Karl Binding, Deutsche Staatsgrundgesetze [German Federal Laws], Number III. Translated by: Jeremiah Riemerp. 37 ff. (accessed 15 November 2014). 1

attention has been given to the idea that leaders may be signing international treaties in order to also deal with domestic enemies. Likewise, in the extensive literature examining civil war onset, scholars have overlooked the role of international alliances. As the 20th century shifted from an era of world wars into an era of civil wars, the role of international alliances in domestic threats pleads for attention. This dissertation serves as the first examination of how international alliances affect civil war onset.

CHAPTER 1

EXPLANATIONS OF CIVIL WAR ONSET

While outbreaks of interstate war have dropped dramatically since the end of World War II, instances of civil war onset have risen considerably (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). During this period, over 20 million have died in civil wars (Sambanis 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2003). In the 21st century, new civil wars have started in places like Syria, Libya, Iraq, Central African Republic,

Ukraine, and South Sudan. In 2010 alone, civil wars created 11 million refugees and asylum seekers, with another 27 million internally displaced persons.2 All states must contend with internal enemies.

Yet, while some states have experienced decades of stability and relative peace within their borders, others have struggled through decades of turmoil and civil war. If we seek a more stable and peaceful world, we first need to fully understand a fundamental question: Why do some states experience civil wars and some do not?

This dissertation posits that international alliances provide weaker states with stability against domestic threats, especially in the reduction of civil war onset. Though international alliances are signed with a focus on international security, they also have an important effect on domestic security that has yet to be analyzed. While significant scholarly attention has been given to the literatures on civil war and on alliances, there has not been any exploration of the important role of international alliances on civil wars.

Leaders are first and foremost concerned with the retention of their office. As leaders anticipate forcible removal from office in the form of revolution, rebellion, or civil war, they look for solutions internationally. Chiozza and Goemans (2011) suggest that some leaders look to interstate war as a possible answer to domestic instability. Facing forcible removal, leaders with little to lose may engage in international conflict where there is much to gain – resources, credibility, etc

2 Forced Migration Online. http://www.forcedmigration.org/about/whatisfm 3

(Chiozza and Goemans 2011). I suggest that alliances with other states offer leaders an alternative path when looking for international solutions to domestic threats. Alliances can provide leaders with additional aid, capabilities, training, expertise, intelligence, and deterrence against threats from domestic rebels. This dissertation argues that leaders of weak states should sign alliance treaties in order to increase their chances of survival against domestic threats.

Historical examples have shown leaders intentionally creating alliances for protection from internal threats. In 1820, Austria, Prussia, and thirty-seven other states formed an alliance to defend against both external and internal threats.3 This early Germanic Confederation lasted for twenty- eight years, providing for common defense and military support in the case of domestic opposition or external hostility. In 1849, Germany, Saxony, and Hanover established an alliance specifically to deal with internal threats and maintenance of order. Under this alliance, allies were expected to aid each other in emergencies against internal threats and unrest through military intervention. While few states sign treaties that allow for another state to intervene militarily in their domestic affairs, many establish treaties where neighboring allies can support against domestic threats through aid, intelligence, and denial of safe havens. For example, in 1998, Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo agreed to prevent their territories from being used as a base of rebellion or safe haven for each other’s domestic rivals. Alliances between states are by their very definition international, but that doesn’t mean the concerns they address are always international. Through the formation of alliances, leaders may be seeking international solutions to domestic problems.

3 Details of alliance treaties are provided by the ATOP database created by Brett Ashley Leeds, et al. Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long. 2002. Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944. International Interactions 28: 237-260. The ATOP dataset only lists ten of the larger states that were party to this treaty. 4

Explanations of Civil War Onset

Civil war scholarship has primarily focused on the roles of two actors: the leader of a state and the rebel opposition. This dissertation builds off of prior literature on political leaders, which holds that the primary objective of any politician is to win, and then retain, their office (Downs

1957; Riker 1962; Mayhew 1974). Selectorate theory, as developed by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith,

Siverson, and Morrow (2003), builds on this premise and suggests that leaders need to maintain the support of a winning coalition in order to stay in office. In order to maintain their office, selectorate theory suggests that leaders must determine levels of taxation and allocation of public or private goods to their winning coalition, the broader selectorate, or all the residents of the state. Selectorate theory suggests that the size of the selectorate and the winning coalition affect the distribution decisions made by leaders, as leaders with smaller winning coalitions will emphasize private goods, while larger winning coalitions will emphasize public goods (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003). When looking at the effect of leaders, measures of state factors can proxy for the actions of a leader. Previous studies focus on state factors such as: poverty and slow economic growth (Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Reynal-Querol, and Sambanis, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004;

2001; de Soysa, 2002, Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Hegre et al., 2001 and Sambanis, 2004; and Collier and Sambanis 2002) regime type and political instability (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 2000;

Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Reynal–Querrol 2002); and large population size (Fearon and Laitin

2003). As leaders look to address the factors that cause civil war onset, scholars are exploring whether leaders can preempt rebellion by buying off the population (Arena and Hardt 2014; Fjelde

2009; Fjelde and De Soysa 2009; Le Billon 2003; Taydas and Peksen 2012).

Like any actor, rebels have their own interests. Rebels may resort to civil war to change government policy, claim autonomy over a particular region in a state, or attempt to overthrow the state itself (Fearon 2007). Rational choice theorists suggest that the decision to rebel is based on a

“calculus of risk, cost, and incentive” (Tarrow 1998). As civil war studies often look toward the leaders of the state, recent work has also focused on decision-making of the rebel elite: the grievances that motivate them (Gurr 1970); the complexity of these grievances (Keen 2012); their access to natural resources to finance rebellion (Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2001); opportunities for collective action (Tilly 1978); their motivations of greed (Collier and Hoeffler

2002); the geographic advantages that aid them (Fearon and Laitin 2003); and how they recruit and deter defection (Gates 2002). Arena and Hardt (2014) suggests that rebel leaders find conflict “more attractive when the government is relatively ill-equipped to put down a rebellion or when the rebel elites can expect to secure the support of the broader populace at a relatively low cost.”

Early scholars suggested that the gap between expectations and achievement fostered rebellion (Gurr 1970; Davies 1962). Subsequent scholars contended this theory was lacking, noting several examples of intrastate conflict arising in very poor and underdeveloped states (Horowitz

1985) as well as examples of states with high economic deprivation where civil war did not occur

(e.g. the United States during the Great Depression). Later theories focused on the economics of rent-seeking behavior (Sandler 2000, 723-729), information asymmetries and credible commitment issues (Fearon 1995; Lake and Rothschild 1996), and the potential “labor market” of rebels (Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003). While these theories of civil wars have spurred considerable discussion, many have focused on the theoretical arguments of greed versus grievance.

Indeed, much of the literature on civil war onset in the last decade focuses on sociological arguments of grievance versus economic arguments of greed.

Grievance-driven arguments suggest that civil wars are the result of discontent and aggravated individuals who find that the current government isn’t meeting their needs (Collier and

Hoeffler 1998). Early grievance-driven arguments put forth a “relative deprivation” theory in which domestic conflict was a result of an individual’s frustration and resentment over the difference

between expectations and reality (Gurr 1970; Davies 1962). According to this theory, perceived deficiency at meeting social or economical needs increases the willingness of people to rebel.

Similarly, other research argues that civil wars were driven by grievances focused on economic inequalities (Midlarsky 1988; Muller and Seligson 1987; Nagel 1974; Weede 1981), repression and discrimination (Mueller 1985), and other systematic inequalities – such as discrimination against ethnic minorities, women, or religious groups (Caprioli 2005; Gurr 1993; Gurr and Moore 1997).

While arguments of relative deprivation stress an individual’s perception of what they expect relative to what they receive, arguments of systematic inequalities stress an individual’s perception of what they receive compared to what others already have. In arguing for systematic inequality, some scholars are suggesting that the frustration and grievances that lead to rebellion are driven not by a government failing to meet an individual’s expectations but by not addressing economic and social injustices within the society at large. While these theories have different causal mechanisms, they all posit that grievances are the basic motivation of rebels and the root cause of civil wars.

Though the logic of grievances as a leading cause of civil war is compelling, some scholars cited particular shortcomings with the theory. Examples of extreme grievances in states that don’t succumb to civil war, and states with minimal grievances experiencing civil war onset, both challenged the theory of grievances as the motivation behind civil war. Scholars challenging the grievance narrative argued that grievances were present in every state and thus not a sufficient explanation for the outbreak of civil war (Sobek and Payne 2010). Greed-driven arguments provide a rational choice explanation that civil wars are the result of selfish actors who seek to profit in terms of wealth or power (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Focusing on the “calculus of risk, cost and incentive,” Tarrow (1998) posits an economic argument in which an individual’s decision to participate in rebellion is a rational choice based on a cost-benefit analysis. Grossman (1991) treats rebellion “and its deterrence or suppression as economic activities that compete with production for

scarce resources.” In Grossman’s model, rebellions are a form of profit generation for those partaking in the rebellion, both directly from looting during the rebellion and indirectly through possible future gains from the change in distribution of resources, should the rebellion succeed against the state. Supporting this line of reasoning, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) note that the financing provided by looting and extortion can make “rebellion feasible and perhaps even attractive.” Thus, unlike grievance arguments which emphasize an antipathy towards the government as the driving cause of civil war onset, greed arguments suggest that the decision to rebel derives from individual self-interest where the benefits that can be acquired through rebellion outweigh the possible risks and costs.

Due to the constraints of the term greed, Collier and Hoeffler replaced this with the broader concept of “opportunity.” While including the original motivations of rebels as suggested by the term greed, opportunity also incorporates the likelihood of success and the ability of rebels to mobilize. As a response to the early grievance-driven theories, Tilly (1978) argued that mobilization was the key to understanding political unrest and civil war. Like arguments of greed, Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1994) suggest that grievances are always present in every state, but not a sufficient condition to spur collective action in the form of civil war. Mobilization theories posit that the difference between states is not the level of grievance in society, but the constraints on the ability of rebel mobilization. The collective action problem inherent in mobilization is the issue of free-riders.

To overcome the issue of free-riders, rebel groups looking to mobilize the populace will need selective benefits or side-payments to encourage participation (Tilly 1978; DeNardo 1985; Tarrow

1994; Lichbach 1990; 1994; Olson 1971). Mobilization and greed theories both discount grievances as the key to understanding civil wars. As both emphasize a mutual focus on how to encourage individuals to participate, they fit together under the broader term of opportunity. Opportunities provided by rebellion, whether political in terms of leadership and power, or economic in terms of

loot and money, suggest that civil war onset is not a collective emotional response to a grievance, but an individual response to rational incentives to participate.

In an effort to support their theoretical positions, scholars have provided substantial evidence supporting both opportunity and grievance explanations of civil war. To provide empirical support, civil war scholars select key independent variables that proxy for opportunity or grievance, and then demonstrate how one set of variables perform better than the other. The difficulty for scholars comes in determining what variables are indicative of opportunity and what are indicative of grievance. Despite the strongly different assumptions underlying theories of opportunity and grievance, the division of variables along this dichotomy has been less than obvious and hotly debated. The norm in civil war literature treats economic development variables as measures of opportunity and variables of regime type as factors of grievance (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Taydas,

Enia, and James 2011). For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) consider both per capita income and male secondary schooling as proxies for opportunity. Yet, Walter (2006) treats per capita income as a measure of grievance; and Keen (2005) notes that fighters have cited lack of education as key grievance and reason for war in countries like Sierra Leone. The difficulties associated with proper assignment of these measures have been points of contention in several articles (Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Regan and Norton 2005; and Walter 2006).

The arguments for and against opportunity and grievance have been extensive (e.g. Keen

2012; Taydas; Peksen and James 2010; Thyne 2006; Vinci 2006; Regan and Norton 2005; Fearon and Latin 2003; Jackson 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 1998; Saxton and Benson 2008; Lichbach

1990; Heath et al. 2000; Hirshleifer 1995; 2001; Grossman 1991; 1999; Berdal and Malone 2000;

Walter 2006; Jackson 2002; Rule 1988; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978; Gurr 1970; 1993). While some scholars have solidly staked their positions, Taydas, Enia, and James (2011) suggest that “conceiving of opportunity and grievance as two mutually exclusive and competing explanations can lead to

reductionism and, in turn, limit our understanding of civil conflicts.” With the debate over whether variables more accurately proxy grievances or opportunities, they argue that key factors may play more than one role, generating a grievance at one stage and an opportunity at the next (Taydas,

Enia, and James 2011). Regan and Norton (2005) make a similar argument when suggesting that grievances are necessary to begin a civil conflict, but that greed (or opportunity) becomes “salient” when attempting to mobilize and motivate soldiers. In other studies, scholars have chosen to simply move beyond the debate by adopting a particular theory, taking opportunity or grievance as an assumption (e.g. Greig and Regan 2008 begins with “we start from the premise that civil wars start over grievances”).

Sambanis (2002) referred to civil conflict as “the most poorly understood system failure in domestic political processes.” Through a constructive debate over opportunity and grievance, scholars have a much clearer understanding of factors affect civil war. Whether as proxies of grievances or opportunity, scholars found a number of key factors believed to important to the study of civil war onset. The primary suspects are economic conditions – poverty, inequality, weak economic growth, and availability of natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Murdoch and

Sandler 2002; Caprioli 2005; Besancon 2005; Boix 2008), political structures – regime type, democratization, and “state strength,” (Fearon 2004; Vreeland 2008; Sobek 2010) and geographic issues – rebel-friendly terrain, natural disasters, neighborhood effects, ethnic diversity, and diasporas

(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Nel and Righarts 2008; Ostby, Nordas, and Rod 2009). Building upon prior civil war literature, this dissertation argues that alliances affect many of the key independent variables associated with civil war onset.

Rebels and the Involvement of the International Community

When initiating a civil war, rebels may look for signals from the international community.

For instance, rebels seeking secession and independence may look to the United Nations, or major

powers, for recognition as an independent state. In March 1992, the United States and the

European Community both agreed to recognize an independent state of Bosnia (Kuperman 2008).

The mere offering of verbal support may drastically alter the calculations of rebels. In several interviews with Bosnian leaders, Kuperman found a repetitive theme best illustrated by Alija

Izetbegovic, who noted that they “expected the international community would recognize our independence and then defend the state it recognized… politically and militarily” (Kuperman 2008).

Beyond signals of approval from international actors, rebels may seek more tangible support.

When organizing and hiding from state forces, rebels may seek external bases and safe havens in neighboring states (Salehyan 2008). Rebels needing rest and reprieve from fighting, cross into bordering states that either support rebel actions or turn a blind eye to their presence. In the ongoing Syrian civil war, rebels of the Free Syrian Army use Lebanese border towns, like Masharih al-Qaa, as safe havens from fighting.4 Financially, rebels may look internationally for funding.

Previous research suggests that rebellions are often aided by diasporas which funnel money to the rebels (Fearon and Laitin 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2001). Alternatively, funding can come from outside states. In 2012, France announced they would back Syrian rebels in their efforts to remove

Assad’s government.5 In some cases, the international community has placed sanctions upon states and covertly aided rebels with supplies and weapons (Kuperman 2008). In 2011, Libyan rebels were aided by sanctions from the European Union, the United States and the United Nations.6 Since

4 Blanford, Johnathan. 2012. “Syrian rebels fight to keep route to safe havens in Lebanon.” The Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/1011/Syrian-rebels-fight-to-keep-route-to-safe-havens- in-Lebanon (published 11 October 2012; accessed 12 November 2013). 5 Chulov, Martin. 2012. “France funding Syrian rebels in new push to oust Assad.” The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/07/france-funding-syrian-rebels (published on 7 December 2012; accessed 12 November 2013). 6 Cooper, Helene and Mark Lander. 2011. “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Libya in Wake of Crackdown.” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/middleeast/26diplomacy.html?pagewanted=all (Published online on 25 February 2011; accessed 12 November 2013). CNN wire staff. 2011. “UN Security Council slaps Libya with sanctions” Cable News Network online http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/26/libya.un/ (Published online on 26 February 2011; accessed 12 November 2013). 11

2012, the United States and European Union have escalated a series of sanctions against Syria.7

Beyond sanctions, the European Union and the United States have supplied both non-lethal and lethal aid to rebels in Libya and Syria. In support of rebels in Ukraine, Russia has supplied aid and weaponry.8 Militarily, rebels may seek armed intervention and assistance from the international community. While interventions often support the government of a state, instances of NATO intervention in Libya and Bosnia demonstrate that the international community can intervene on behalf of rebels as well.

Recent civil war studies have looked at the role of the international community when: conducting military intervention (Kuperman 2008; Regan 2000; 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000); attempting to mediate a peace settlement (Maoz and Terris 2006; Regan and Stam 2000; Greig and

Regan 2008; Kydd 2003; 2006); and studying the effect of ethnic diasporas support for rebellion

(Fearon and Laitin 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Woodwell 2004). Additionally, some avenues of research have focused on the internationalization of civil wars as they spill over state boundaries in the form of conflict (Gleditsch 2007), refugees (Gleditsch and Salehyan 2006), and external bases and safe havens (Salehyan 2008).

From a growing body of research, we have a general understanding of the influence of the international community on civil war duration, severity, and settlement (e.g. Walter 1997; Balch-

Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Elbadawi and Sambinas 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001).

When studying the mediation by third parties into a civil war, research suggests that substantial resources from third parties’ also lead to more successful mediations (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006;

Richmond 1998). Beyond the material benefits provided by a third party, Kydd (2003, 2006) finds

7 Norman, Laurence. 2014. “EU Adds New Targets for Syria Sanctions.” The Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/articles/eu-adds-new-syria-sanctions-targets-1406033066 (Published online on 22 July 2014; accessed 21 September 2014). 8 MacFarquhar, Neil and Michael R. Gordon. “Ukraine Leader Says ‘Huge Loads of Arms’ Pour in From Russia.” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/world/europe/ukraine-conflict.html (Published online on 28 August 2014; accessed 21 September 2014). 12

that states are more likely to implement stable peace agreements when the third party has a preference in the outcome. While allies would be an obvious third party candidate with resources and a preference for outcome, no study has attempted to comprehensively understand the role of allies in intrastate conflicts. In an initial effort, Greig and Regan’s (2008) article on mediation suggests that allies are incentivized to offer mediation in civil disputes, as such disputes are damaging to the effectiveness and continuation of an alliance. When a state is embroiled in civil conflict, it behooves the state and its ally to find a quick and permanent resolution. While Greig and Regan

(2008) provide this justification specifically to allied mediation during a civil war, their same logic can also serve as justification for the involvement of allies in all phases of civil war, especially onset.

This dissertation suggests that some members of the international community should be more motivated to involve themselves in another state’s civil war: the ally.

Decades of scholarly works have focused on the role of alliances in interstate conflict. Early scholarship asserts that alliances deter interstate threats through the balancing of power

(Morgenthau 1960; Waltz 1979) and by signaling a rival state that the dangers of conflict have increased (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Recent literature has focused on several aspects of alliances including: the reduction of militarized interstate disputes (Leeds 2003); the reliability of alliances partners to meet their obligations (Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000); the desire of states to attain major power status or acquire major power alliance partners (Fordham 2011); the reputation of alliance partners and their structural design (Mattes 2012); and the effectiveness of an ally’s ability to deter conflict (Leeds 2003; Palmer and Morgan 2006; Senese and Vasquez 2008; Johnson and

Leeds 2011; Benson 2011). While the role of alliances has always been important to the study of international relations and interstate war, few have considered if alliances have a role in civil war.

Looking Ahead

In Chapter 2, I present a new theory of domestically-motivated alliance formation. This dissertation argues that alliances act as an international solution to a uniquely domestic problem: civil war onset. In Chapter 3, I empirically analyze the core contributions of this new theory, examining the following claims regarding civil war onset and alliance formation:

 States with alliance partners are less likely to experience civil war onset than states with no alliances.  States with major or superpower partners will experience further reductions in the likelihood of civil war onset.

Chapter 4 examines this theory from the perspective of a leader looking to maintain their office.

In particular, the chapter examines the relationship between leadership tenure and alliance formation and addresses the following claims:

 States allied with major powers should be less likely to experience irregular removal of leaders than states allied with the United States, minor powers, or states with no alliances.  States allied with the Soviet Union should be less likely to experience irregular removal of leaders than states allied with the United States, major powers, minor powers, or states with no alliances.  States allied with the United States should be more likely to experience irregular removal of leaders than states allied with the USSR, major powers, minor powers, or states with no alliances.

Chapter 5 concludes with future research directions to be explored when studying the role of international alliances in civil war onset.

CHAPTER 2

DOMESTICALLY MOTIVATED ALLIANCE FORMATION

Traditional international relations theories suggest that states acting in the anarchic setting of the international arena should find it difficult, both to form alliances and maintain them. Early empirical findings bolstered this position as Sabrosky (1980) finds that states only came to the aid of their allies in 25 percent of international conflicts. With such low levels of allied support, the debate in subsequent decades attempted to explain why leaders would ever sign alliances if their partners could not be relied upon to come to their defense. Scholars offered several plausible theories: that leaders sign treaties only when they believe there is at least a strong possibility that the alliance will be successful (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Fearon 1998); or that leaders signed alliances to deter enemies and signal their resolve (Smith 1995; Morrow 1994); or that Sabrosky’s results were caused by a selection effect as reliable alliances are more likely to deter conflict and thus are never tested (Smith 1996; Gartner and Siverson 1996).

In 2000, Leeds, Long, and Mitchell reexamined alliance treaties and the empirical findings of

Sabrosky. In the Alliance Treaties Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset, they look not only at whether two states had an alliance or treaty in effect, but at the specific obligations and provisions detailed in each treaty. Previous studies assumed every alliance meant that states were committed to defend an ally in any conflict. Leeds, Long, and Mitchell (2000) found that alliance treaties were often very precise in their language about what conditions triggered the treaty to take effect and what allies were obligated to do. By reanalyzing treaties with greater detail, they found that allies fulfill their obligations nearly 75% of the time. If states rarely ever met their obligations, looking at further implications and effects of treaties would seem a pointless endeavor. With research suggesting states largely meeting their obligations, this dissertation explores the additional effects that alliances might possess.

Regardless of the motivations for joining a treaty (whether for mutual security, strategic placement of military bases, attaining or maintaining preferential treatment in trade, or to reinforce a close relationship), allies can only meet their obligations if they are internally stable. The outbreak of rebellion, revolution, or civil war compromises a state’s stability and jeopardizes its ability to meet its alliance obligations. If embroiled in a civil war at home, an ally will be less able to meet its obligations. Wanting to ensure that an ally can fulfill their obligations, states should be motivated to promote stability in their allies. In particular, this should be most evident when looking at the outbreak of domestic conflicts in their ally’s territory. Unless the cost of supporting the ally is greater than the benefits gained, states should have an interest in aiding allies against domestic threats. Understanding this basic motivation of allies is vital to understanding their role in civil war onset.

As states want reliable alliance partners, they should be seeking policies that promote stability in their allies. Some of these actions are easily observable in a state’s use of foreign aid or trade agreements. However, not all capabilities afforded by alliances are easily quantified or measured. I argue that alliances can provide two additional benefits to an ally: 1) the very formation of an alliance may deter the threat of a domestic opposition; and 2) allies are more likely to share vital intelligence on potential threats from a domestic opposition. Alliance literature has demonstrated the success of immediate extended deterrence after threats have been made against allies (Siverson and Tennefoss 1984; Leeds 2003). Additionally, scholars have shown that general extended deterrence decreases the likelihood of threats between allies and their interstate rivals and subsequently also reduces the onset of war (Johnson and Leeds 2011). This dissertation argues that the deterrent effect of an alliance is not limited solely to foreign opposition, but should also alter the calculus of domestic groups considering rebellion, revolution, or civil war. I argue that alliances

provide a level of extended domestic deterrence, where the benefits of deterrence apply to domestic audiences.9

Additionally, an alliance may incentivize states to share intelligence that pertains to their ally’s stability and security from a domestic threat. States and their intelligence agencies are secretive by nature and thus are not always forthcoming if they have knowledge of an impending attack against another government. However, when states become allies, there is an incentive to provide intelligence that will aid allies against their domestic rivals. Indeed, Fearon and Laitin (2003) note that rebels are weak relative to the governments they fight (at least at the beginning) and that if the government could locate rebels, “they would be fairly easily destroyed or captured.” Intelligence from an ally can help thwart rebellion, especially in its infancy. For example, Congo and the

Democratic Republic of Congo had an alliance that included an effort to aid one another against their respective domestic rebels through the exchange of intelligence on rebels’ plans and actions. In

February 2013, the United States began providing their ally France with satellite intelligence and intercepted enemy communications in their conflict with al-Qaeda rebels in Mali.10 This intelligence could prove vital to the success of French forces in routing the rebels.11 By providing a level of extended domestic deterrence and valuable intelligence to allies, I argue that alliances should reduce the likelihood of civil war onset.

Not all allies are equal. Below I examine two types of alliances where at least one state has additional motivations and capabilities: major powers and superpowers. Major powers are states

9 As this dissertation looks at the onset of civil war, the ability to distinguish between credible threats which signify that general deterrence failed and a minor opposition group simply airing their grievances becomes difficult to distinguish. Only when immediate deterrence fails and civil war begins is it clear that general deterrence has also failed. Where threats in international wars come from another state, a leader may face a dozen domestic opposition groups whose threats and capabilities to actually initiate civil war may differ greatly. 10 Lawrence, Chris. 2013. “US Looks to Support France’s Mali Offensive.” Cable News Network Security: http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/14/u-s-looks-to-support-frances-mali-offensive/ (published 14 January 2013; accessed 13 June 2014). 11 If we’re willing to provide intelligence to the French to aid a country we don’t support (Mali), it makes logical sense that we’d be even more helpful at helping the French (and other allies) against threats on their own soil. 17

that have both the capability and desire to act aggressively in international affairs (Levy 1983).

Significant works have demonstrated the difference between average states and major powers in international relations (e.g. Small and Singer 1982; Levy 1983; Benson 2011; Fordham 2011). The difference in the motivations and capabilities of major powers requires that they be analyzed separately from standard alliances. Traditionally, studies find nine major powers in world history since 1816 – Austria-Hungary, England, France, Prussia (Germany), Russia (the Soviet Union), Italy,

Japan, China, and the United States (Small and Singer 1982; Levy 1983). While all states should be motivated to preserve their allies, logic and historical precedent suggests that these major powers not only have a greater ability to help their allies, but extra motivations to do so. Though Morrow

(1991) notes “a motivation to gain security is always present,” he suggests that major powers are more often interested in other possible gains from an alliance than security itself. He posits that major powers aggressively pursue greater autonomy – defined as “the degree to which it pursues desired changes in the status quo.” This change in the status quo can be sought in their ally’s foreign or domestic policies, favorable trade policies, or the placement of military bases on the minor power’s land (Morrow 1991).

However, allying with minor powers could potentially embroil major powers in wars they do not want to fight. Several scholars argue that by allying with minor powers, major powers encourage their weaker counterparts to take more aggressive stances on foreign policy disputes (Snyder 1984;

Smith 1995). Following this logic, major powers are more secure by not forming alliances with minor powers and thus avoiding foreign entanglements. Indeed, obvious historical anecdotes provide support for this argument. Fearing US involvement in European wars, the first US

President George Washington noted in his farewell address:

Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent

alliances with any portion of the foreign world...12

Despite the warning of Washington and the entangling alliances that led to two world wars, the post-World War II era still finds major powers allied with dozens of weaker states. Given the obvious drawbacks and dangers associated with alliances, why then do we still see major powers allying with minor powers?

Recent research suggests that states have the ability to “restrain” their allies, as they can credibly threaten to withdraw their support if their ally refuses to listen (Johnson and Leeds 2011;

Fang, Johnson, and Leeds (forthcoming)). This power to restrain should be particularly notable among major powers. As alliances are designed for protection, a minor power has more to lose if an alliance between themselves and a major power were to dissolve. In short, asymmetric capabilities provide major powers with leverage over their weaker allies (Cha 2009). If a major power contributes 90% of the military power in an alliance, they only lose a marginal amount of power in the termination of an alliance. Conversely, a minor power is faced with an overwhelming loss that may leave them incredibly vulnerable. This power disparity makes the maintenance of the alliance more crucial for the minor power. With the ability to threaten withdrawal from an alliance, major powers gain leverage over their allies. Previous literature (Schroder 1976; Cha 2009; Fang, Johnson, and Leeds forthcoming) demonstrates that alliances can restrain an ally’s foreign policy ambitions.

Pressman (2008) advances this theory further by asserting that powerful states intentionally create alliances with weaker states because they are motivated to gain control over another state’s foreign policy. He suggests that this “restraint motive” is just as important in understanding alliances as the motive of mutual protection. In an explanation of why the United States established bilateral alliances in Asia, but opted to have multilateral alliances in Europe, Cha (2009) offers a “powerplay explanation.” Similar to Pressman’s “restraint motive,” Cha’s powerplay suggests that the United

12 Washington, George. 1796. “Farewell Address.” Yale Law School, Lillian Goodman Law Library: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp 19

States establishes treaties when interested in exerting greater influence and control over a state’s foreign policy. Cha (2009) argues that the United States’ alliances with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan) are designed specifically to constrain “rogue allies” from engaging in adventurist foreign policies. These arguments suggest that major powers seek to restrain or influence the foreign policy decisions of their allies.

Both Cha’s “powerplay explanation” and Pressman’s “restraint motive” provide useful explanations of how a major power leverages their position to increase their ability to affect the status quo – what Morrow refers to as “autonomy.” While this dissertation agrees with the logic of

Morrow (1991), Cha (2009), and Pressman (2008), the terminologies of “autonomy,” “powerplay,” and “restraint” can be counter-intuitive and restrictive. Morrow’s major powers gaining of

“autonomy” necessarily comes by taking away autonomy from weaker states in the alliance.

Likewise, when analyzing the motivations of major powers to influence a minor powers’ domestic policy, Pressman’s terminology of “restraint” does not translate well. As motivation in a domestic context may not be about restraint per se, I instead suggest a broader, less restrictive motivation – the desire to control. Major powers can be motivated to join alliances by the desire to control another state’s policies, both foreign and domestic. When observing American foreign relations, one can easily see this type of control over another state’s policies in our use of “puppet leaders.” When speaking of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza Garcia, US President Franklin Delano

Roosevelt quipped that “he may be a son-of-a-bitch, but he’s our son-of-a-bitch” (Schmitz 1999).

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the United States has often supported leaders in weak states that in turn provided the US with extensive control over their policy decisions, both foreign and domestic. This dissertation suggests that the desire to control a state’s domestic policies may be every bit as important as the desire to control or “restrain” their foreign policies.

Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) posit that the interest of a third party intervener during a civil war is not altered by the intervener’s own domestic agenda. While selectorate theory argues that democratic and autocratic rulers have different domestic goals, they share an interest in controlling the policies of the states in which they intervene. While the foreign policy goals of autocratic and democratic interveners may be different, they have a shared interest

“in avoiding the creation of democratic institutions in target states” (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs

2006). Indeed, the desire to control another’s foreign policy is evident both in the formation and selection of alliances, as well as in the decision and manner in which a third party may intervene in a civil war.

Scholars assert that the potential to control another state’s international policy is a key motivation for forming an alliance with a weaker state (Schroeder 1976; Snyder 1997; Gelpi 1999;

Weitsman 2004; Pressman 2008; Cha 2009). Yet, they overlook the obvious motivations to also control domestic policy. States may be interested in affecting the domestic policy of their allies for many reasons: markets for exports, access to raw materials, strategic location for military bases, or simple denial of an ally (or trading partner) to a rival power. I argue that alliances provide an opportunity for major powers to control another state’s domestic affairs. Tempted by this opportunity to shape another state’s domestic policy, major powers engage in alliances that provide them leverage and control over an ally.

With the rise of the two superpowers, the world had states whose military capabilities gave them not only a presence worldwide, but a nuclear arsenal large enough to end all life on earth.

With such unprecedented reach and power, both the United States and the Soviet Union were hyper-aggressive in pursuing their foreign policy agenda, in establishing alliances, and in finding trading partners. Traditional realist arguments suggest that even superpowers should crave the security found by gaining weaker allies. Again, “all nations are both secure and insecure; a

motivation to gain security is always present” (Morrow 1991). This way of thinking is exemplified by the domino theory. Worried about the spread of communism, US President Eisenhower pointed to “broader considerations that might follow what you would call the ‘falling dominos’ principle.

You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.”13 As the United States feared that one state after another would fall like dominos to communism, they sought alliances with anyone that resisted communist influences. By establishing a network of alliances worldwide, the United

States followed George Kennan’s policy of containment of the communist threat. Domino theory pushed the notion of a creeping threat that needed to be fought everywhere for the very survival of the United States. The contest between the United States and the Soviet Union was treated as a zero sum game in which any gain for one state was seen as a loss for the other. Eisenhower exemplified this mentality when he noted that:

Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses… But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking really about millions and millions and millions of people.14 Gains for communism and the Soviet Union were viewed as loses by the United States.

Conversely, Soviet Premier Yuir Andropov offered similar fears of the United States as he remarked that “All this is forcing the USSR to fortify the nation's defences… We are compelled to see to our country's essential security and also to that of our friends and allies. That is exactly what is being done. And we want everybody to remember that no adventure-seekers will ever succeed in

13 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1954. Eisenhower Press Conference, April 7, 1954 – provided by Mount Holyoke College: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/ps11.htm 14 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1954. Eisenhower Press Conference, April 7, 1954 – provided by Mount Holyoke College: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/ps11.htm 22

catching us unawares, that no potential aggressor has the slightest chance of escaping a devastating retaliatory strike” (Shaposhnikov 1984). The superpowers feared both the loss of allies and the acquisition of allies by the other. I argue that this superpower zero-sum mentality incentivized both states to act even more aggressively to protect their allies, especially from domestic threats (often perceived as subversive actions of the other superpower). I hypothesize that this hyper-aggression should be visible in the ability of the superpowers to deter civil war onset in their allies.

Major and superpowers also have reputational concerns that should incentivize their support of minor allies. In international conflict, strong powers are heavily incentivized to defend their allies because they suffer reputation costs if they do not. Gibler (2008) and Crescenzi, Kathman,

Kleinberg, and Wood (2012) show that reputations for reliability affect the ability of a state to attract new allies. While most alliance treaties would not explicitly state that a strong power had to intervene against an ally’s domestic opponents, failure to help a fledgling ally could result reputation costs in the international community, regardless of whether it was from foreign attack or domestic rebellion. Johnson and Leeds (2011) demonstrate that major powers are more effective at providing effective extended deterrence in interstate conflicts. I suggest that the same effect should be found in the form of extended domestic deterrence. Protecting allies from domestic threats should improve the reputation of a powerful state and allow it to attract new allies who also feel threatened by domestic rebels.

Not all alliances have the same ability to reduce civil war onset. With differing capabilities and motivations, I posit that major powers and superpowers will possess the greatest ability to reduce onset. While I hypothesize that standard alliances should benefit states over those with no

alliance, I suggest that their effectiveness will be considerably lower than alliances with more powerful states.15

Hypotheses of Civil War Onset

In testing the theory of domestically motivated alliance formation, I examine the support for the hypotheses made about the effectiveness of alliances with minor powers, major powers, and the two superpowers. As major powers possess greater capabilities than minor powers, I expect that major powers will further reduce the likelihood of civil war onset. As superpowers possess greater capabilities and motivations than major powers, I expect that alliances with superpowers will even further reduce the likelihood of civil war onset. Thus, I offer the following hypotheses about the effect alliances have on civil war onset:

Hypothesis 1 (Number of Alliances): States with greater numbers of alliance partners should be less likely to experience civil war onset than states which have few or none.

I expect the effect of weaker alliances to have a very marginal benefit at best. Though weaker states can provide intelligence, minor financial support, military training or even military support, their support would be minimal compared to what could be provided by a major power or superpower.

While weak states may want their allies to be stable and secure from domestic threats, they may simply not have the financial resources to really provide any level of adequate support. Though unlikely to produce any measureable effect, as states do want their allies to survive, it is worth testing to evaluate whether this benefit can even be generated by having alliances with weaker states.

Hypothesis 2 (Major Powers): States allied with major powers should be less likely to experience civil war onset than states allied with minor powers, or states with no alliances.

15 An alternative idea for measurement would to look at the capabilities of alliance partners to show that more capabilities resulted in less civil war onset. 24

Major powers are states with great global reach and the ability to usually invest both military forces and aid into their allies. The expectation is that allies of major powers will benefit by seeing a reduced amount of civil war onset.

Hypothesis 3 (Soviet Union Superpower): States allied with the Soviet Union should be less likely to experience civil war onset than states allied with major powers, minor powers, or states with no alliances.

Like major powers, the Soviet Union has a global reach and the ability to invest both military forces and aid into their allies. The expectation is that allies of the Soviet Union will benefit by seeing a reduced amount of civil war onset. As the Soviet Union ultimately lost the Cold War, one might guess that their allies also suffered more than those not targeted by US action.

Hypothesis 4 (US Superpower): States allied with United States should be less likely to experience civil war onset than states allied with the USSR, major powers, minor powers, or states with no alliances.

The eventual triumph of the US over the USSR in the Cold War may also be visible in the survival rates of their allies. Thus, I expect American allies to fare far better than Soviet counterparts. As such, I suggest that US allies should be more successful than the allies of all other states. However, the effectiveness might be tempered slightly by Soviet covert action against US allies.

CHAPTER 3

CIVIL WAR ONSET

Theoretically, I suggest that alliance formation may likely be the result of a weak state, specifically its leaders, trying to gain resources necessary to defend itself against threats – both foreign and domestic. In order to model this theoretical concept, the dependent variable is the likelihood with which a state experiences civil war onset. As several prominent scholars provide different standards for what constitutes a civil war and its onset, I ultimately decided to test the effectiveness of alliances across several measures of civil war onset. The Correlates of War (COW)

Intra-State dataset v3.0 observes all states from 1816-1997 (Sarkees 2000). This dataset includes 213 intra-state wars. COW war typology states that civil wars must have: 1) “military action internal to the metropole of the state system member;” 2) active participation of the national government; 3) effective resistance by both sides; and 4) result in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related fatalities in each twelve month period (Sarkees 2000).16

Collier and Hoeffler (2001) provide a similar set of conditions for civil war onset. They define a civil war with the following criteria: 1) the war is an internal conflict; and 2) 1000 battle related deaths (civilian and military) every year. Collier and Hoeffler “primarily updates” COW data but doesn’t provide exact specifications on the changes made. According to Fearon and Laitin

(2003), Collier and Hoeffler build off of COW data, by “breaking a number of COW civil wars into multiple wars according to unspecified criteria and including some colonial wars… but not others.”

Looking only at civil wars since 1944, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) offer a modified definition of COW’s onset measure. These conditions of civil war include: 1) causes more than 1,000 deaths overall and in at least a single year; 2) the sovereignty of an “internationally recognized state” is

16 Any cease fire lasting at least six months would cause any subsequent fighting to be recorded as a new civil war onset. 26

challenged; 3) war must occur within the state’s borders; 4) the state is the principal combatant; 5) rebels must be able to mount organized armed opposition to the state; and 6) parties are dealing with the concept of “living together in the same political unit after the end of the war” (Doyle and

Sambanis 2000).

Fearon and Laitin (2003) measures civil war onset with a different set of conditions.

Looking only at civil wars since 1945, their primary criteria for measuring onsets include: “(1) They involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels). The last condition is intended to rule out massacres where there is no organized or effective opposition.” The formation of Fearon and Laitin’s list of onsets developed “because of doubts about particular inclusions and exclusions in each [previous] list” (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

When looking at the Cold War period from 1945-1991, six measures of civil war onset were employed in this dissertation. Between 1945 and 1991, Fearon and Laitin (2003) identify 86 onsets,

Correlates of War (v3) identify 88 onsets, and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) identify 105 onsets.

Collier and Hoeffler (2001) only code from 1960 and thus identify 65 instances of onset. Even in the measures with the most overlap, Collier and Hoeffler (2001) and Correlates of War, they both identify 51 of the same instances of civil war while disagreeing on 51 other instances. At the most extreme, Collier and Hoeffler and Fearon and Laitin agree on 32 instances of civil war while disagreeing on 67 other instances (33 indentified only by Collier and Hoeffler and 34 indentified only by Fearon and Laitin). Previous civil war scholarship has employed various measures for onset that provide a comprehensive view of civil war onset. This dissertation adds two additional measures of civil war onset based off of the prior literature. First, I begin with a broad view of civil

war, considering any observation of a civil war onset by even a single author sufficient for inclusion in a measure on civil war onsets. As previous scholarship provides differing classifications this measure serves as a broader catch-all of civil war onsets. This broader measure of civil war onset yields 160 onsets between 1945 and 1991. Second, I take a very narrow view of civil war, only accepting those instances of onset when all prior literature (except Collier and Hoeffler) agree that an onset has occurred, yielding only 47 onsets.17

While previous authors may have different opinions of what constitutes civil war onset, the importance of this measure is that it represents domestic conflict and instability so that we may test the domestic effect of international alliances. Despite their varying justifications for coding decisions, the broadest measure of onset is most appropriate for this study as we want to capture all cases where the state was threatened by internal conflict despite the presence of an ally. While this

“On Any” variable will serve as the baseline measure of onset, all models will be examined for robustness.18

Alliance Measures

The primary independent variables of study are the various types of alliance formation.

Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long (2002) offer a dataset known as Alliance Treaty Obligations and

Provisions (ATOP). Temporally, the ATOP dataset covers the years 1815-2003. The ATOP dataset defines an alliance as “a formal agreement among independent states to cooperate militarily in the face of potential or realized military conflict.” Alliances must be written agreements. These alliances must also promise cooperation in addressing military threats. The alliance must include commitment in the event of conflict. This measure includes all defensive and offensive alliances as

17 This restrictive measure excludes the onset cases of Collier & Hoeffler as their data only starts in 1960. When including Collier and Hoeffler in the data, only 12 country-year onsets are agreed upon by all authors from 1960- 1991. 18 While the same argument could be made for the most restrictive measure, that if they all agree then we know conflict is occurring, it provides an exceedingly small number of onsets that makes finding any statistical significance difficult. 28

the basic logic of this paper suggests that allies should be motivated to aid their allies against domestic threats.19 Whether their obligations are offensive or defensive in nature, a civil war inhibits a state’s ability to meet their alliance obligations.

The ATOP definition of alliances excludes informal alliances, such as that between the

United States and Israel over the last two decades.20 This stricter definition of alliance may ignore relevant informal alliances; however, this should only work against the likelihood of finding significant results. Despite the support of the US, Israel is coded zero for an alliance with a superpower, and also zero for civil war onset, thus weakening any findings (as I suggest that states without superpower allies should be more likely to experience onset). When looking among all states, we have 5,842 country-year observations. The United States is an ally in 2,056 observations, or 35 percent of all country-years. The Soviet Union is an ally in 634 observations, or roughly 11 percent of all cases. The major powers are allied in 488 observations (8.5 percent). In 1,720 (29 percent) of cases, the state has no allies at all. When looking at the key independent variables of alliances only among anocracies, we find that the US serves as an ally in 507 of the 1108 observations (45 percent), whereas the Soviet Union serves as an ally in only 25 observations (2.2 percent). Major allies account for 108 observations (10 percent). In 321 observations (29 percent), states had no alliances.

Major power and superpowers will be tested independently. As previously noted in the section on major alliances, COW has designations for major power status from 1816-2007 that includes nine states.21 States will be coded 1 during the years that they are major powers and zero in all other years. The capabilities of the two world superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union,

19 Non-aggression pacts are excluded. 20 The formal alliance between the United States and Israel lasted ten years from 1981 to 1991. 21 Alternative measurements of major-state status can be found in Small and Singer (1982) and Tessman and Chan (2004) which exclude states that only serve as major economic powers (e.g. Germany since 1990 and Japan since 1990) for reliable comparison. 29

dwarf that of any previous “major” power. As such, they should be independently tested from other major powers. However, as the tension between the two states became a worldwide standoff known as the Cold War, it may be prudent to test them individually. As the United States ultimately triumphed in the Cold War, there may be a stronger effect for US allies than for those allied with the

USSR. Temporally, most historians consider the rise of both powers to coincide with the end of

World War II in 1945. Thus, in 1945, both the United States and the USSR switch from the classification of major power to superpower. The United States remains a superpower to the present, while the Soviet Union collapsed between 1989 and 1991.22 The trichotomous classification of minor, major, and superpower mirrors those used in Morrow’s (1991) analysis of asymmetric alliances. From 1945 to 1991, we consider three states major powers: United Kingdom, France, and

China. However, China does not appear in the variable for major powers as China posses on average less than two alliances per year, zero with anocracies, and all states allied with China are also already aligned with either the US or USSR.

Alliances are coded into four separate variables. The first three variables are dichotomous measures. First, states are coded as 1 for US Ally in a year if they possess an alliance with the US and 0 if they do not. Second, states are coded 1 for USSR Ally if they possess an alliance with the

USSR (between 1945 and 1989), and 0 if they do not. Third, states are coded 1 for Major Power in a year if they possess an alliance with any major power, 0 if they do not. Fourth, states are coded by the number of Alliances they possess in a given year. If a state has no alliances, they are coded at 0 for a given year. The modal category in the data is 0 alliances as 40 percent of all country-years lack alliances. All alliance variables should be negatively correlated with civil war onset. The strongest effect on civil war onset should be found among the allies of the United States. Next, I expect that

22 Some historians mark the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, when Eastern Europe broke away and the Berlin Wall came down. Others mark the end of the Soviet Union (and the Warsaw Pact) with its official dissolution in 1991. As we are concerned with the treatment of their allies, a strong case may be made for 1989 as the end of Soviet support. The data was tested considering both dates to make sure that this period did not significantly alter the results. 30

the allies of the Soviet Union will gain a similar (albeit weaker) benefit from their alliances with the

USSR. Major powers should also affect their allies to a degree lesser than the superpowers, but to a far greater degree than states allied with only minor powers. Finally, I expect a small effect from states that possess any allies at all when compared with states with no alliances.

The other variables listed – per capita income, polity score, ethnic fractionalization, oil exporter, mountainous terrain, large population, prior war, Muslim population, new states, and political instability – are variables theorized in previous literature (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003) to affect civil war onset.

Large populations, mountainous terrains, and oil exporters are positively correlated with onset in

Fearon and Laitin 2003. Both high levels of ethnic fractionalization and Muslim populations were theorized to have an effect in Fearon and Laitin 2003, but were generally found to be insignificant.

Newly founded states and those with high levels of political instability are shown to be positively correlated with onset. Other literature has shown that high-levels of per capita income, military expenditures, prior war, imports, exports, and military personnel are negatively correlated with civil war onset.

Empirical Results of Civil War Onset

While six models were tested and their results provided below, the final model looking at the most restricted definition of civil war onset did not have a likelihood ratio chi2 probability of less than .05. The failure of the sixth model is due to the limited number of agreed upon civil war cases

(28). While providing all the models, the analysis below will focus on the five working models. In

Table 1, the Soviet Union only finds statistical significance in the broadest measure of civil war onset, whereas the US is significant across three measures of onset. In the one model showing statistical significance, the marginal effect of an alliance with the Soviet Union was a reduction in civil war onset of 1 percent, on par with that of the US and other major powers. Holding other variables at their mean or median, the predicted probability of civil war onset in allies of the USSR is

1.2 percent. This represents a 66 percent reduction in predicted onset. Unlike the Soviet Union, the

United States and major powers both find statistical significance in multiple models. Statistically significant in all five models, the predicted probability of civil war onset in allies of the US is .78 percent to 1.4 percent. As the predicted probability for states not allied with the US ranged from 1.5 to .84, allies of the United States faced between 34 and 49 lower predicted probabilities of civil war onsets. Similarly, significant in four of the five models, allies of major powers had predicted probabilities between 47 and 53 percent less civil war onsets than their non-allied counterparts.

Table 1. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Civil War Onset among All States (1945-1991) On Any (151) F&L C&H D&S COW On 3 (28) US Ally -0.461* -0.116 -0.799* -0.582* -0.274 -0.115 (0.262) (0.348) (0.418) (0.325) (0.342) (0.460) USSR Ally -0.822* -0.652 -1.015 -0.602 -0.491 -0.870 (0.485) (0.677) (0.742) (0.580) (0.621) (0.947) Major Power -0.764* -0.574 -2.061** -0.485 -1.579** -1.013 (0.393) (0.498) (1.027) (0.427) (0.742) (0.762) Alliances 0.069 0.001 0.152 0.029 0.109 0.043 (0.079) (0.110) (0.110) (0.097) (0.102) (0.144) Per capita income -0.263*** -0.401*** -0.285*** -0.309*** -0.333*** -0.457*** (0.062) (0.097) (0.093) (0.080) (0.093) (0.139) Polity IV 0.025* 0.040** 0.026 0.033* 0.016 0.017 (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) Ethnic Fractionalization 0.322 -0.121 0.237 0.199 0.291 -0.429 (0.340) (0.438) (0.515) (0.413) (0.468) (0.581) Oil Exporter 0.586** 0.698** 0.728* 0.739** 1.060*** 1.162*** (0.260) (0.340) (0.378) (0.313) (0.324) (0.417) Log(% Mountain) 0.263*** 0.198** 0.461*** 0.284*** 0.433*** 0.306** (0.073) (0.095) (0.112) (0.087) (0.106) (0.130) Log(Population) 0.311*** 0.323*** 0.262** 0.197** 0.161 0.180 (0.072) (0.098) (0.116) (0.087) (0.101) (0.134) Prior War -0.633* -0.960** -2.055*** -0.996*** -0.783* -0.969* (0.332) (0.388) (0.735) (0.384) (0.444) (0.506) New State 1.440*** 1.204*** 1.771*** 1.211*** 1.194*** 1.202** (0.312) (0.406) (0.448) (0.365) (0.445) (0.536) Muslim (%) 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) Political Instability 0.453** 0.236 0.430 0.547** 0.514* 0.359 (0.217) (0.292) (0.353) (0.262) (0.286) (0.381) Constant -6.607*** -6.662*** -7.195*** -5.742*** -6.361*** -6.109*** (0.695) (0.911) (1.092) (0.807) (0.950) (1.213) Observations (N) 5,026 5,026 3,998 5,026 5,026 5,026 Note: The dependent variable is coded "1" for country years in which a civil war began and "0" in all others. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 13. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01

The control variables for per capita income, new state, prior war, oil exporters, and mountainous terrain were all statistically significant in all six models. Population is significant in four of the six models, while political instability is significant in three of the six models. The significance of these variables is logically consistent with prior literature.

Below, when a variety of control variables are employed, the US, USSR, and major powers reduce civil war onset in four of the five models. When looking among all states, both the USSR and major powers are just slightly more effective at reducing civil war onset than the United States.

Table 2. Alternative Logistic Regressions on Civil War Onset among All States (1945-1991) All Models Run “On Any” Base On Any F&L2003 All Variables Alternate Onsets Model Model Model Model Model US Ally -0.630*** -0.461* -0.432* -0.204 -0.613** (0.206) (0.262) (0.237) (0.283) (0.245) USSR Ally -0.811* -0.822* -0.996** -0.832 -0.789* (0.422) (0.485) (0.439) (0.513) (0.457) Major Power -0.782** -0.764* -0.649* -0.478 -0.641* (0.381) (0.393) (0.390) (0.403) (0.389) Alliances 0.008 0.069 0.064 0.013 0.034 (0.065) (0.079) (0.070) (0.084) (0.073) Per capita income -0.263*** -0.247*** -0.427*** -0.377*** (0.062) (0.058) (0.093) (0.086) Polity IV 0.025* 0.033** 0.030** (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) Ethnic Fractionalization 0.322 0.413 (0.340) (0.382) Oil Exporter 0.586** 0.547** 0.427 0.541** (0.260) (0.241) (0.286) (0.263) Log(% Mountain) 0.263*** 0.238*** 0.310*** 0.304*** (0.073) (0.072) (0.082) (0.077) Log(Population) 0.311*** 0.373*** 0.193 0.245* (0.072) (0.066) (0.148) (0.138) Prior War -0.633* -0.951*** -0.693** (0.332) (0.353) (0.331) New State 1.440*** 1.590*** 1.391*** (0.312) (0.292) (0.421) Muslim (%) 0.001 0.002 (0.003) (0.003) Political Instability 0.453** 0.399* 0.309 0.439** (0.217) (0.212) (0.233) (0.216) Log(Military Expenditures) 0.590*** (0.131) Log(Military Personnel) -0.418*** -0.097 (0.131) (0.095) Log(Imports) -0.216

Table 2. Continued All Models Run “On Any” Base On Any F&L2003 All Variables Alternate Onsets Model Model Model Model Model (0.158) Log(Exports) 0.044 0.148* (0.131) (0.083) Constant -3.290*** -6.607*** -7.053*** -9.450*** -6.016*** (0.114) (0.695) (0.672) (1.301) (0.956) Observations (N) 5,607 5,026 5,058 4,573 4,774 Note: The DV is coded "1" for country years in which a civil war began and "0" in all others. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 13 *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01

It is worth noting that the decision to model the Cold War era was in part decided by the previous authors’ works. As most of their data on civil war onsets covered the Cold War era, comparing between the various measures was only possible in this limited time period. Many variables used for controls have only been measured across all states since 1945. Of those that have been studied before 1945, few went back further than the beginning of the 20th century. Thus, in order to have a fully specified model with a full set of controls and multiple measures of onset, I followed the lead of previous scholars and began with 1945.

However, as both the ATOP dataset on alliances and the COW measure of civil war onsets are available back to 1816, this dissertation can take a glimpse look at role of alliances in civil war onset in the 128 years before 1945. Beyond the dependent variable and the key independent variable, some other useful variables, such as polity and a few found in the Correlates of War project, stretch back to 1816. These variables include polity, population, military expenditures, military personnel, imports, and exports. Though running the model without controls isn’t as informative, it is useful to view the results before 1945 and the results over the entire time period of 1816-1999. The results produced in the model before 1945 (from 1816-1945) and the model over all years (from 1816-1999) are nearly identical in the strength and direction of all variables. Moreover, they match with the general direction and results provided in the models above.

Table 3. Logit Comparisons of Civil War Onset Over Time 1816-1944 1816-1999 Major or Superpower Ally -1.207** -0.429** (0.487) (0.204) Polity -0.089*** -0.046*** (0.032) (0.015) Log(Military Expenditures) -0.093 0.100 (0.148) (0.071) Log(Military Personnel) 0.302 0.043 (0.197) (0.098) Log(Imports) 0.111 -0.323** (0.374) (0.131) Log(Exports) -0.445 -0.117 (0.342) (0.116) Log(Population) 0.370 0.303** (0.266) (0.123) Constant -5.238*** -4.895*** (1.115) (0.559) Observations 2,075 8,774 Note: The dependent variable is coded "1" for country years in which a civil war began and "0" in all others. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 13. *p <.1; **p<.05; ***p <.01

These results give us confidence that the theory of this dissertation is applicable in all time periods.

Powerful allies, from 1816 to 1999 show a consist ability to reduce the likelihood of civil war onset in their allies.

Onset In Anocracies

As some states have extremely low risks of civil war onset (e.g. the United States after World

War II), testing will look specifically at the effectiveness of alliances among states that are most plausibly at risk for civil war onset – anocracies. Anocracies are those states in transition between democracy and autocracy, typified by elite groups competing for control of the state (Marshall and

Cole 2011). By focusing only on this group of weak states, we gain a better grasp on the directional argument: alliances reduce civil war onset. By looking at all states, the correlation between alliances and civil war onset could be a product of states choosing alliances with states not in jeopardy of civil war onset. However, if the same correlation holds among states typically more vulnerable to civil war onset, the reverse cannot as easily be claimed.

States between -5 and 5 on Polity IV scale are widely considered to be anocracies.23 As the aid of powerful allies should have little bearing on stable democracies and autocracies, their inclusion in the model only serves to inflate the effectiveness of alliance partners as they are less prone to civil war. By testing only among anocracies, we limit ourselves to those states which should be vulnerable to civil war onset and in most need of support from their allies. While anocracies represent only 21 percent of all states from 1945-1991, they account for 43.7 percent of all civil war onsets. On average, 6 percent of anocracies suffer a civil war onset in a given year, over triple the

1.8 percent rate of onsets among non-anocracies. In total, we have 65 civil war onsets among anocracies from 1945-1991, provided in the table below:

Table 4. List of Civil Wars and Allies of Anocratic Countries at Onset (1945-1991) War Onset Year Country US Ally USSR Ally Major Allies # of Alliances

1 1946 PHILIPPINES No No No 0 2 1946 CHINA No Yes No 1 3 1947 PARAGUAY Yes No No 2 4 1948 COLOMBIA Yes No No 2 5 1949 KOREA, S. No No No 0 6 1949 COLOMBIA Yes No No 2 7 1950 PHILIPPINES No No No 0 8 1950 KOREA, S. No No No 0 9 1950 INDONESIA No No No 0 10 1952 BOLIVIA Yes No No 3 11 1953 INDONESIA No No No 0 12 1956 INDONESIA No No No 0 13 1958 LEBANON No No No 2 14 1958 INDONESIA No No No 0 15 1959 IRAQ No No Yes 5 16 1960 DEM. REP. CONGO No No No 0 17 1960 VIETNAM, S. No No No 0 18 1960 LAOS No No No 0 19 1961 IRAQ No No No 3 20 1962 YEMEN ARAB REP. No No No 5 21 1962 RWANDA No No No 0 22 1963 LAOS No No No 0 23 1963 CYPRUS No No Yes 2 24 1963 RWANDA No No No 1 25 1965 DOMINICAN REP. Yes No No 2 26 1965 BURUNDI No No No 0

23 Additional robustness checks varied the range of what is considered an anocracy as wide as -6 to 6 and as narrow as -4 to 4. The results were typically similar in both significance and direction of all key independent variables. 36

Table 4. Continued War Onset Year Country US Ally USSR Ally Major Allies # of Alliances

27 1965 INDONESIA No No No 0 28 1966 UGANDA No No No 0 29 1966 GUATEMALA Yes No No 3 30 1968 GUATEMALA Yes No No 3 31 1968 PHILIPPINES Yes No No 2 32 1970 GUATEMALA Yes No No 2 33 1971 PAKISTAN Yes No No 3 34 1972 ZIMBABWE No No No 0 35 1974 ETHIOPIA No No No 1 36 1974 GUATEMALA Yes No No 2 37 1975 LEBANON No No No 2 38 1976 SOUTH AFRICA No No No 0 39 1978 AFGHANISTAN No Yes No 2 40 1978 GUATEMALA Yes No No 2 41 1979 IRAN Yes No No 2 42 1979 EL SALVADOR Yes No No 2 43 1980 CHAD No No No 1 44 1980 UGANDA No No No 0 45 1981 IRAN No No No 0 46 1981 UGANDA No No No 0 47 1981 NICARAGUA Yes No No 2 48 1982 LEBANON No No No 2 49 1982 NICARAGUA Yes No No 2 50 1983 ZIMBABWE No No No 0 51 1983 SRI LANKA No No No 0 52 1983 SOUTH AFRICA No No No 0 53 1984 ZIMBABWE No No No 0 54 1987 SRI LANKA No No No 0 55 1989 ROMANIA No Yes No 7 56 1989 SENEGAL No No Yes 4 57 1990 YEMEN No No No 2 58 1990 YUGOSLAVIA No No No 0 59 1991 AZERBAIJAN No No No 0 60 1991 SOMALIA No No No 2 61 1991 ALGERIA No No No 3 62 1991 KENYA No No No 1 63 1991 GEORGIA No No No 0 64 1991 YUGOSLAVIA No No No 0 65 1991 RUSSIA No No No 22

The 65 onsets provided in Table 4 are generated from the broadest definition of onset, thus encompassing all previous authors’ measures of civil war onset among anocracies. Narrowing our focus to the hardest test cases of anocracies only leaves a sample of 12 agreed upon civil wars onsets out of 1,110 country-years.

Empirical Results of Civil War Onset among Anocracies

Table 5 shows the results of a logit analysis using onset as the dependent variable and a fairly full specification of independent variables discussed above. All models in Table 5 use the variables suggested to have the greatest significance on civil war onset in Fearon and Laitin 2003. While six models were tested and their results provided below, the final model looking at the most restricted definition of civil war onset did not have a likelihood ratio chi2 probability of less than .05. The failure of the sixth model is due to the limited number of agreed upon civil war cases in anocracies

(12). While providing all the models, the analysis below will focus on the five working models.

Confirming the hypothesis that allies of the US face reduced civil war onset, the US as an ally was found to be statistically significant in all five models. Accepting all previous scholars’ definitions of onset in a broader encompassing definition, the model also finds statistical significance for the US as an ally. To understand the effect of a US alliance, one can look at the predicted probability of civil war onset between states that are allied with the US and those that are not.

Looking across all 5 models, the predicted probability of civil war among states not allied with the

United States is 4.4 to 8.8 percent, holding everything else at their mean or median. Comparatively, states allied with the United States have a predicted probability of civil war onset between 1.5 and 3 percent of country years. When looking at the average marginal effects of the US as an ally, the effect ranged, from model to model, from 2.6 to 6.1 percent. These results strongly suggest that, holding all else constant, having the US as an ally will reduce the likelihood of civil war onset in an anocracy. The substantive effects of these findings are incredibly significant. When looking at events that only occur in 4 to 9 percent of all country years, decreases of 2.6 to 6.1 percent are considerable. Across all models of civil war onset, an alliance with the United States reduced the likelihood of a civil war onset in an ally anywhere from 55 to 75 percent. Such a substantial drop in

civil war onset serves as an obvious motivation for any leader looking for help against domestic threats. The full results can be seen below in Table 5:

Table 5. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Civil War Onset among Anocracies (1945-1991) On Any (66) F&L C&H D&S COW On 3 (2) US Ally -1.179*** -0.826* -1.035* -1.478*** -1.086*** -1.003* (0.350) (0.481) (0.552) (0.457) (0.421) (0.600) USSR Ally 0.734 0.683 1.431 1.009 1.261* 0.486 (0.667) (0.926) (0.946) (0.787) (0.703) (1.202) Major Power -1.248** -1.184 Omitted -1.350* -1.817* -1.624 (0.632) (0.783) (0.766) (1.048) (1.084) Alliances 0.084 0.050 0.093 0.030 0.132** 0.085 (0.056) (0.105) (0.091) (0.086) (0.066) (0.119) Per capita income -0.218** -0.384** -0.266 -0.247* -0.326** -0.356* (0.109) (0.168) (0.180) (0.134) (0.156) (0.210) Polity IV -0.076* -0.030 -0.026 -0.053 -0.066 -0.040 (0.043) (0.055) (0.076) (0.052) (0.055) (0.071) Ethnic Fractionalization 0.676 0.313 1.518 0.495 0.596 0.080 (0.518) (0.657) (0.943) (0.640) (0.652) (0.849) Oil Exporter 0.368 0.244 0.394 0.335 0.382 0.171 (0.422) (0.525) (0.728) (0.518) (0.539) (0.661) Log(% Mountain) 0.317*** 0.146 0.554*** 0.297** 0.374** 0.179 (0.115) (0.141) (0.187) (0.133) (0.152) (0.178) Log(Population) 0.169 0.212 -0.155 0.062 0.126 0.031 (0.112) (0.144) (0.212) (0.136) (0.140) (0.187) Prior War -0.814* -1.399** Omitted -1.743*** -0.742 -1.493* (0.472) (0.636) (0.628) (0.536) (0.778) New State 1.168*** 0.723 1.358** 0.643 0.590 0.111 (0.423) (0.553) (0.637) (0.508) (0.595) (0.800) Muslim (%) -0.003 0.002 0.009 -0.002 -0.002 0.005 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) Political Instability 0.279 -0.177 0.675 0.375 0.268 0.063 (0.317) (0.448) (0.486) (0.385) (0.389) (0.542) Constant -4.838*** -4.827*** -3.833** -3.782*** -5.002*** -3.756** (1.086) (1.369) (1.765) (1.261) (1.366) (1.706) Observations (N) 1,108 1,108 580 1,108 1,108 1,108 Note: The dependent variable is coded "1" for country years in which a civil war began and "0" in all others. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 13. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01

Interestingly, an alliance with the Soviet Union was found to be statistically insignificant across four of the five models. Additionally, while only significant in one model, the direction of the effect suggests that having the USSR as an ally may only serve to increase the likelihood of civil war onset (among anocracies). However, the effect among anocracies may be more indicative of the

choice of alliance partners by the Soviet Union, rather than the effectiveness of their alliances.

While the Soviet Union allied with 10 percent of all states between 1945 and 1991, they only allied with 2 percent of anocracies. This small sample may not be indicative of their general ability to reduce civil war onset in an ally. In the only model where an alliance with the Soviet Union was statistically significant, the marginal effect of a Soviet alliance was an increase in civil war onset by

4.2 percent.

Statistical significance was found in four of the five models for major power alliances during this period. The broadest model found statistical significance, and that states allied with major powers have a six percent less chance of experiencing civil war onset. One model omitted the major powers from the logistic regression model due to the variable perfectly predicting civil war onset. In the four models where major powers were found to be statistically significant at the .01 level, the effect of such an alliance was a reduction in the likelihood of civil war onset for allies of major powers ranging from 4.1 to 6.2 percent.24 The control variables that consistently showed significance were per capita income, new state, prior war and mountainous terrain. Per capita income was statistically significant in four of the five models; new state was statistically significant in two of the five models; prior war was significant in three of the four models; and mountainous terrain was statistically significant in four of the five models. These results were in the predicted direction and consistent with the prior findings of Fearon and Laitin 2003.

To check the robustness of these findings, Table 6 shows the results of a logit analysis using any onset or “On Any” as the dependent variable and a fairly full specification of independent variables beyond the original model in Table 5. In Table 6, the base model highlights the key independent variables of interests without any controls. The “On Any” Model is repeated for

24 For the logisitic model where the value of major allies was omitted, an OLS estimate with robust standard errors was used. The results in OLS provide nearly identical findings (in terms of statistical significance and marginal effects) for nearly all variables. In the case of major powers, OLS found a 6% reduction in civil war onset for allies. 40

comparison from Table 5. The F&L2003 Model includes all variables found to be statistically significant for civil war onset from Fearon and Laitin’s 2003 paper. Both the All Variables Model and Alternate Model compare the findings against an extensive list of control variables.

Table 6. Alternative Logistic Regressions on Civil War Onset among Anocracies (1945-1991) All Models Run “On Any” Base On Any F&L2003 All Variables Alternate Onsets Model Model Model Model Model US Ally -1.161*** -1.179*** -1.126*** -1.040** -1.431*** (0.307) (0.350) (0.325) (0.410) (0.336) USSR Ally 0.714 0.734 0.573 0.417 0.719 (0.607) (0.667) (0.639) (0.759) (0.690) Major Power -1.289** -1.248** -1.174* -0.937 -1.474** (0.613) (0.632) (0.624) (0.656) (0.632) Alliances 0.041 0.084 0.078 0.077 0.101 (0.052) (0.056) (0.057) (0.060) (0.062) Per capita income -0.218** -0.217** -0.567*** -0.478*** (0.109) (0.107) (0.205) (0.169) Polity IV -0.076* -0.100** -0.094** (0.043) (0.048) (0.044) Ethnic Fractionalization 0.676 0.658 (0.518) (0.602) Oil Exporter 0.368 0.433 0.377 0.251 (0.422) (0.376) (0.509) (0.422) Log(% Mountain) 0.317*** 0.312*** 0.440*** 0.428*** (0.115) (0.117) (0.146) (0.127) Log(Population) 0.169 0.206* 0.018 0.174 (0.112) (0.105) (0.246) (0.220) Prior War -0.814* -1.233** -0.910* (0.472) (0.517) (0.470) New State 1.168*** 1.204*** 0.814 (0.423) (0.418) (0.639) Muslim (%) -0.003 -0.006 (0.004) (0.005) Political Instability 0.279 0.078 0.146 0.177 (0.317) (0.305) (0.337) (0.314) Log(Military Expenditures) 0.782*** (0.213) Log(Military Personnel) -0.503** -0.232 (0.217) (0.163) Log(Imports) -0.516* (0.301) Log(Exports) 0.291 0.284** (0.230) (0.125) Constant -2.373*** -4.838*** -4.953*** -8.590*** -5.124*** (0.165) (1.086) (1.083) (2.173) (1.577) Observations (N) 1,128 1,108 1,108 1,026 1,057 Note: The DV is coded "1" for country years in which a civil war began and "0" in all others. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 13 *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01

Across all models, the effect of US alliances is statistically significant. In these models, the marginal effect of an alliance with the US results in a reduction of civil war onset from 5 percent to

7.5 percent. Having an alliance with a major power was statistically significant in 4 of 5 models and reduced the likelihood of civil war onset from 4.5 percent to 7.7 percent. Again, the substantive meaning of these marginal effects findings is very significant. In the first model of Table 6, onset among non-US allies is 8.2 percent in any country year, while among US allies onset is only 2.7 percent. This 5.5 percent decrease in onset translates to a 67 percent reduction in civil war onset for states allied with the United States. Across all 5 models, the US reduced the likelihood of civil war onset between 63 percent and 75 percent. Major powers reduced the likelihood of onset in their allies by 60 to 76 percent.

The control variables that consistently showed significance were per capita income, new state, prior war, mountainous terrain, and polity IV. The significance of polity IV in this table suggest that even among anocracies, an increase in democracy should reduce civil war onset. While statistically insignificant, the models suggest that the Soviet Union increases civil war onset in allies from 2 percent to 3.9 percent.

While the effect of alliances on anocracies is important to understanding how powerful states might aid their weaker counterparts, the above results only highlight the success of the United

States among such weak states. During the Cold War, the US allied more with anocracies (45 percent) than they did with all states in general (35 percent). The inability to find similar results for the Soviet Union may have to do with their lack of alliance formations with anocracies. While the

Soviet Union is allied with 11 percent of states between 1945 and 1991, they only choose to ally with

2 percent of all anocracies during this time. Broadening the sample size provides almost five times the number of country-year observations and doubles the number of civil wars considered during this time period. To address possible concerns of endogeneity, the analysis of civil wars among

anocracies was also run with a lagged measure of polity to account for changes in polity score that might result from civil war. The results are similar to those found above in Table 5 and can be found in Appendix A.

Discussion

This dissertation addresses a fundamental question: Why do some states experience political violence in the form of civil wars and some do not? The evidence above suggests that international alliances do affect the likelihood with which a state experiences civil war onset. While I hypothesized that weak states could garner some power even from the formation of alliances (or a number of alliances with other weak states), little statistical support was found for such a trend.

Only when looking among anocracies that had three or more weak alliances was it possible to find weak alliances statistically significant. In that very rare and specific case (27 out of 1,128 observations in the period), the effect of having more than three alliances wasn’t a reduction in civil war onset, but an 11 percent increase in the likelihood of onset. This effect loses all statistical significance when looking at all states (not just anocracies). The ineffectiveness of weak alliances isn’t surprising, nor is it unexpected that a state with a greater number of weak alliances merely increases their likelihood of onset. As leaders and their states seek solutions to their domestic threats from the international community, weak states might be compensating for their inability to gain a major power ally by establishing several weaker allies. As weaker allies do not possess the necessary capabilities to aid one another in times of domestic unrest, it is not surprising that no statistical difference can be discerned between states with no allies and states with weak allies.

Returning to the question of why some states succumb to civil war onset and some do not, I hypothesized that the more powerful an ally a weak state gained, the more likely they were to avoid said onset. The results above strongly suggest that super powers and major powers can reduce civil war onset in their weaker counterparts. A 2.6 to 6.2 percent decrease in civil war onset is incredibly

significant when only 4 to 10 percent of all country years experience civil war onset to begin with.

This drastic effect of powerful alliances rivals the other best indicators of civil war onset. Looking at the most basic “on any” onset model (the first model from Table 5), the marginal effect of having the US as an ally is a 4.7 percent decrease in civil war onsets. This marginal effect equals a 67 percent lower chance of civil war onset when comparing US allies to non-allies. Comparatively, the variable most likely to increase the likelihood of civil war onset is whether the country is a new state or not. In the “on any” model from Table 5, an older state has a 66 percent fewer civil war onset than newer states. Thus, states looking for practical solutions to reduce the likelihood of onset can find success in the formation of alliances with more powerful nations.

Where it may become problematic for some states to gain this stability is in the acquisition of a major power or superpower ally. This is especially true for states with real or perceived communist leanings. Western powers (United States, France, and the United Kingdom) were four times more likely to ally with states than the communist powers (USSR and China). For the 21 percent of states that were anocracies during the Cold War, only 2 percent found allies with the communist powers while 55 percent found alliances with the Western powers. Given the weakness of anocratic states, it is to be expected that they would seek out powerful allies to improve their own condition. The trend to overwhelming ally with the West isn’t particular to anocracies. 61 percent of democracies were allied with the Western powers (54 percent allied directly with the United

States) compared to 9 percent with the communist powers. However, it is notable that the Western states were also more likely to ally with autocracies (27 percent) than the communist states were allied with autocracies (18 percent). The difference in alliances may be attributable to several factors.

First, the Soviets and the Chinese were both rebuilding at the end of World War II, with a need to first rebuild at home and, in the case of the Chinese, win a civil war of their own. By the time the Chinese civil war ended in 1949, the US had already formed alliances with 20 Latin

American countries under the Rio Pact and another 10 European states under NATO.25 Within 5 years, the US would add another 12 allies through SEATO, additions to NATO, and multiple bilateral alliances. In 1946, the US had 20 allies, compared to the USSR’s 3. By 1955, less than 10 years into the Cold War, the US had 42 allies compared to only 9 allies for the Soviet Union.

Second, in comparison to the resources of the United States, the financial constraints on the Soviet

Union may have led to a risk adverse alliance strategy by the Soviets. Seeing anocracies as riskier investments would explain why the USSR allied with 10 percent of all states during the Cold War, but only 2 percent of anocracies.

Third, the choice not to ally with either superpower may have been a calculation of leaders hoping to elicit more out of both superpowers in terms of aid and trade by not committing to one side. Throughout the Cold War, the largest beneficiaries of US aid were two states (Israel and

Egypt) that didn’t have formal alliances with the United States, but received over $59 billion each in economic assistance since 1946.26 By the standards of ATOP and this dissertation, these states don’t count as allies. Conversely, two long-term allies (Australia and New Zealand) covered by the United

States through ANZUS and SEATO defensive pacts have received a paltry $71 million and $42 million respectively.27

In particular, I hypothesized that weaker states would be those most likely to benefit from international alliances as they are the those most in need of outside support. Moreover, it would be dubious to suggest that stable states with little domestic threat would form alliances for the purposes of domestic stability. Indeed, stable states may be forming alliances for their explicit written purposes – protection against other states. This is why it was vitally important to look at the

25 According to the ATOP Codesheets. 26 The US and Israel did have an alliance for a brief ten year period from 1981 to 1991. US- Israel Treaty: ATOP alliance code 3925. Available online at: http://atop.rice.edu/download/search/ATOP3925.pdf (accessed on 10 March 2014). 27 In constant 2012 US$. USAID. 2012. US Overseas Loans & Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 – September 30, 2012. U.S. Agency for International Development. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaec300.pdf (accessed 23 March 2014). 45

domestic effects of alliances particularly among weak states as they are the states most likely to be seeking alliances for domestic reasons. This chapter strongly supports the theory that weak states form alliances with major powers to strengthen their position over rivaling domestic forces. Weak states allying with either major powers or the United States see a real and substantial benefit to their safety.

This dissertation hypothesized that there would be differing levels of effectiveness among weak powers, major power, and superpowers. While a clear difference has been established between weak powers and major/superpowers, little difference exists between the effectiveness of major powers and superpowers. If we compare the effectiveness of US alliances against the major powers of the UK and France, only a minimal amount of difference exists statistically or substantively. This lack of difference could be attributed to two possible factors.

First, the data is faced with a temporal issue that cannot be ignored. As nearly all the data on superpowers exists during a period when the two superpowers of the world were directly competing, there’s the additional element of covert action and direct attempts to destabilize the other superpower’s allies. As such, the relative parity between the US and the major powers may exist only because the superpowers reduced the effectiveness of each other’s alliances, while those made by the major powers were free to support without outside interference.

Second, the ability of a major or superpower to reduce the likelihood of onset in an ally may have limits, where after any additional aid may have little or no increasing effectiveness towards the stability of the weaker allied state. If the support provided by major powers meets this limit, then difference between the effectiveness of major and superpowers may be minimal or non-existent.

Whether the similar statistical results of major and superpowers is a factor of the temporal limitations of the Cold War or a limit in the absolute amount of support a powerful state can provide to its ally should be visible in the data when more time has passed since the Cold War’s end.

With the United States supporting allies in the post-Cold War, it will be enlightening to see if they begin to outperform their major power counterparts.

This chapter sought to test whether alliances played a role in reducing civil war onset. While the results suggest that an average state does not have the power to reduce civil war onset in their allies, there is ample evidence to support the theory that powerful states may be able to reduce civil war onset. Previously, the treatment of “puppet” states has only been spoken of in generalities (e.g. state X propped up the government of state y). This chapter provides the first quantitative evidence that powerful states can affect the domestic survival of the states with which they choose to ally.

CHAPTER 4

IRREGULAR REMOVAL OF LEADERS

While Chapter 3 addresses the core theory of this dissertation, the logic of powerful states using their capabilities to support allies domestically can be broadened to the study of state leaders.

Chapter 3 demonstrated that international alliances have domestic ramifications. Through alliance formation, the United States and major powers reduce civil war onset. This dissertation argues that leaders of weak states form alliances in order to improve their survival against domestic threats. Yet, the motivations of weak state leaders discussed in Chapter 1 are not limited to deterring civil war onset alone. Leaders wish to remain in office and safeguard against all threats. While the empirical findings on civil war onset suggest that alliances benefit weak states, does the same logic apply when looking at the survival of leaders?

Causal Logic of Leadership Survival

Do leaders of weaker states want alliances with powerful states? Consistent with the logic presented in this dissertation, leaders of weaker states, especially anocracies, should be seeking strong alliance partners if they believe that those alliances will increase their likelihood of staying in office. As leaders desire to maintain their office, their desire to avoid civil war should be viewed as a part of the leader’s larger interest in maintaining power. Presumably, a leader might believe that the same weapons and support from a powerful ally that reduce the likelihood of civil war might also reduce the likelihood of a coup, rebellion, or assassination. A weak leader might logically view such aid and support from a powerful ally as an investment by the ally in their own survival as a leader. If leaders believe that their survival is equally important to the ally, I suggest that the motivations of the weak state leaders should remain the same. They desire the security and support coming from a powerful ally. For weak leaders, the motivations to avoid civil war onset are the same as the motivations to avoid removal from office.

However, do powerful larger states still possess the same motivations for the survival of a weak allied leader that they had for the reduction of civil war onset in an allied state? As previously discussed, the motivations of a powerful state can include stability in a foreign market, strategic military bases and access, and influence over domestic decisions of the weaker state. Ostensibly, leaders of weak states are signing alliances that also appeal to the desires and motivations of powerful states. As they seek the tangible benefits of a powerful ally, they should likely be compromising on issues important to their powerful ally. Thus, one might suspect that leaders with powerful allies survive in office longer than leaders without powerful allies.

The Causal Logic of Powerful States

The ability of a powerful state to protect a leader should be the same as the power to protect a state against civil war. Powerful states not only provide resources to allow a weak state to defend itself but, through the use of coordinated military exercises, the placement of military bases, and the deployment of soldiers, can also serve as a deterrent to threats against the state. The aid and support provided by powerful states could also extend to the protection of the weak state’s leader as well.

However, history has shown that this is not always the case. While powerful states have a vested interest in protecting an allied state, the same logic does not always apply to leaders.

Only if a powerful state is satisfied with the actions and decisions of a weak ally, should the logic of protecting the ally’s weak leader from removal be the same as the logic of protecting the weak state itself. While a weak leader can offer benefits to a powerful ally, nothing stops a similar agreement between an opposition leader and the powerful allied state. Indeed, none of the incentives offered by weaker states are intrinsically tied to the current leader of a state. While the powerful state does not want instability in the form of civil war (as this threatens trade, military bases and deployment, and an ally’s ability to meet their commitments), the removal of a leader through a coup or assassination may not only be acceptable, but possibly preferable. If the leader of

a weak state only acquiesces to some of the powerful states interests, the powerful state may gain from the changing of that leader.

States may often not agree on the direction of their policies on trade, the terms of their acceptance of the powerful state’s troops and bases, or the decisions a state makes with its foreign or domestic policy. Tensions between powerful states and their weaker allies may be especially pronounced when one state changes leaders. In 1970, Chile elected socialist Salvador Allende as president. As the United States strongly opposed the rise of a socialist leader in their ally, the CIA attempted to facilitate a coup between the September 4th election and the affirmation of his presidency on October 24th.28 While the coup attempt failed, it reveals three important points. First, it provides a useful illustration of how a powerful state might both be allied with a weaker state and still have a motivation to remove their leadership. Fearing a socialist Chile, the United States opposed their ally’s shifting domestic policies enough to support an overthrow of its democratically elected leader. Second, it suggests why an alliance might benefit a state but not the state’s leader.

The alliance between the United States and Chile was established in 1945, over two decades before

Allende’s rise to power. Thus, the formation of the alliance itself may often not have been signed or even supported by the leader in office. Third, while powerful allies might use their powers to protect an allied leader’s government, US actions demonstrate that those same resources can be mobilized to remove an allied leader from power.

The qualitative literature on coups suggests that the two superpowers of the world employed drastically different strategies when dealing with their weak allied leaders. When seeking to protect their allies, the Soviet Union’s “approach to coups include[d] the presence of Soviet personnel.

Several thousand Soviet advisers and/or troops… [were] based in Afghanistan, Algeria, Ethiopia,

Libya, Syria, Southern Yemen, Madagascar, and Mongolia. Their presence establishes a de facto

28 CIA Library. “CIA Activities in Chile.” Central Intelligence Agency. Available online at https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/#5 (accessed 21 July 2014). 50

counter-coup force that must be considered by any potential coup-makers” (David 1986). David

(1986) further notes that “the USSR… [was] very successful in protecting friendly regimes from coups. Since their reverses in the mid-1960s, the Kremlin… lost only two friendly regimes to coups d'etat.” While failing to protect a few allied leaders from coups in the 1960s, the general strategy of the USSR trends toward the protection and safeguarding of allied leaders.

Conversely, there are the actions of the United States. Officially, the CIA has only confirmed their role in seven successful coups. In one such instance, in 1963, the Kennedy administration was aware of an impending coup against the leadership of a US ally in South

Vietnam. Unhappy with President Ngo Dinh Diem’s treatment of Buddhists protestors, the United

States told those plotting the coup that they had the backing of the United States. Instead of warning Diem, the CIA provided funding to coup plotters and US officials assisted in distracting

Diem as the coup unfolded.29

Beyond the seven confirmed coups, the CIA and other US agencies are suspected in dozens of other coups. However, given the clandestine and illegal nature of such covert action, the United

States is predictably not forthcoming about such activities. Indeed, the CIA’s role in the 1953 coup of Iran was only finally confirmed by officials in 2013.30 Yet, the seven confirmed coups reveal something interesting about where the US focused their covert action. Five of the seven successful coups with confirmed CIA involvement were carried out against states which possessed alliances with the United States.31

29 Pentagon Papers. 1971. The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963. The Pentagon Papers. Boston: Beacon Press, Volume 2: 201-276. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htm (accessed 23 June 2014).

30 Byrne, Malcolm. 2013. “CIA Admits It Was Behind Iran’s Coup.” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/18/cia_admits_it_was_behind_irans_coup (Published online on 19 August 2013; accessed 23 June 2014). 31 Stuster, J. Dana. 2013. “Mapped: The 7 Governments the US has Overthrown.” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/19/map_7_confirmed_cia_backed_coups (Published online on 20 August 2013; accessed 23 June 2014). 51

While this section strives at great lengths to focus on the treatment of allies by powerful states, it is worth noting that both the USSR and the US targeted Third World states that were neutral or sought non-alignment with either superpower. In 1977, the Soviet Union backed a coup in Ethopia by Colonel Mengistu. In secret meetings, the Soviets promised financial and military support to Mengistu after he secured power. In the year following the coup, the Soviet Union delivered with aid, weapons, and an official treaty adding Ethopia as an ally (Henze 1983; David

1986). Simliarly, the United States CIA orchestrated a 1953 coup against Iranian Prime Minister

Mohammad Mosaddegh. By replacing the democratically elected leader with the Shah Mohammad-

Rezā Shāh Pahlavi, the United States gained a friend and by 1959 an ally in the state of Iran.32

Through the use of coups and assassinations, the superpowers turned neutral states into “friends” and allies by installing new leaders sympathetic to their ideology.

Hypotheses of Coups and Irregular Removal during the Cold War

Building upon prior theory and historical cases, I suggest the following series of hypotheses for the irregular removal of leaders:

Hypothesis 5 (Weak Alliances): States with weak alliances should be more likely to experience irregular removal of leaders than states allied with the USSR, major powers, and states with no alliances, but less likely than those allied with the United States.

Similar to Hypothesis 1 in the prior chapter, this measure excludes alliances with major and superpowers. Overall, I expect the effect of weaker alliances to have a very marginal benefit at best.

While weak alliances were insignificant in nearly every model for civil war onset, the general directional effect was always positive. Indeed, only when looking at anocracies with at least three weak alliances or more did we find any significant effect. Moreover, in those particular cases, the result of more alliances only served to increase the likelihood of civil war onset. As this directional

32 Risen, James. 2000. “Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran.” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html (accessed 23 June 2014). 52

effect may be an indication of incredibly weak states seeking, and failing to get, the outside support they need from a major or superpower, I argue that the same trend likely still exists for leaders trying to avoid their own removal from office. While there’s a strong likelihood of statistical insignificance for this variable, any significance should be in the direction of increasing irregular removal of leaders.

Hypothesis 6 (Major Powers): States allied with major powers should be less likely to experience irregular removal of leaders than states allied with the United States, minor powers, or states with no alliances.

Two important and related observations account for this hypothesis. First, major powers performed almost as well in deterring civil war onset as the United States. While this might suggest they will again perform on par with the United States, the active use of coups by the US (or at least support for domestically motivated coups) against its own allies is unlikely to be echoed in the policies of major powers. Historical precedence suggests that the more limited major powers were more interested in using their resources to stabilize allies rather than replace them. Second, I posit that major powers were far less motivated by the Cold War struggle than the two superpowers vying for world dominance. The Cold War found the US and USSR focused on undermining each other’s allies and constantly guarding against ideological shifts among their own allies. As a consequence, the superpowers may have been less concerned with the weaker allies of the major powers. On the other hand, it is possible that in a similar fashion to the treatment of their own allies, the US or

USSR may have been interested in or even attempted to remove leaders allied with the major powers. However, the major power’s support of a weak allied leader may have been enough to discourage or reduce the likelihood of any such attempted irregular removal.

Hypothesis 7 (Soviet Union Superpower): States allied with the Soviet Union should be less likely to experience irregular removal of leaders than states allied with the United States, major powers, minor powers, or states with no alliances.

Historical observation suggests that the general Soviet policy was focused almost exclusively on the defense of their allies against any coup attempts. As the policy of the Soviet Union was primarily of protection of allied leaders, I suggest that their greater capabilities should be more effective than those provided by major powers. Though I hypothesize that the Soviet Union will be more effective, the United States was still actively seeking to destabilize and remove Soviet-friendly leaders. There is a distinct chance that leaders allied with the Soviet Union suffered more irregular removals than those of the major powers due to US covert action.

Hypothesis 8 (US Superpower): States allied with the United States should be more likely to experience irregular removal of leaders than states allied with the USSR, major powers, minor powers, or states with no alliances.

As the results of Chapter 2 suggest that the US can protect allies from civil war onset, it follows that the US would likely also reduce the instances of irregular removal of leaders among their allies.

However, substantial historical evidence suggests that US interests in deterring civil war onset and promoting stability may not extend to protection of allied leaders. Indeed, the extensive use of covert action against allies suggests the very opposite – that an alliance with the US increases the likelihood of irregular removal among its allied leaders. As the United States may protect some allied leaders that meet its needs or demands, it also demonstrates the willingness to remove those allied leaders who fail to do so. This mixed strategy of the United States may result in statistically insignificant results. However, I hypothesize that the effect of an alliance with the United States will match historical evidence, suggesting that such an alliance might actually increase the likelihood of an irregular removal.

Measuring Irregular Removal

While Onset provides a clear indicator of when a leader is challenged for control in a state by armed rebels, it fails to capture assassinations, coups, revolutions, or rebellions that occur without

major armed conflicts (particularly those with less than 1,000 battle deaths). For example, the 1964

Brazilian coup d’etat replaced the democratically elected Goulart with the chief of staff of the

Brazilian army, Humberto Castello Branco. Over three days, minor revolts and military actions only resulted in the deaths of seven people in Brazil. In 2010, a Tunisian street vendor set himself on fire in protest of police harassment and government brutality. Within a month mass protests across

Tunisia result in the deaths of 338 individuals and force the removal of President Zine El Abidine from power after 23 years in office. When looking at the domestic effects of international alliances, simply observing the onset of civil war does not provide a full picture. After understanding the effect of international alliances on allied states, the next question falls to how these alliances effect allied leaders.

Measures of civil war onset only look at the initiation of war against a government, but not necessarily a change in government. While this helps us understand how allies might deter civil conflicts, it does not give us a full picture of how they may protect a friendly government against all threats. As leaders may survive through civil wars and remain in control of the state, another way to measure the effect of an alliance is to look at their ability to safeguard allied leaders. This chapter utilizes two sources of data on leadership removal: Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza’s Archigos dataset and Powell and Thyne’s Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010 dataset.

To test whether alliances have an effect on the survival of leaders requires data on instances of how leaders are removed from office. Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza’s (2009) Archigos dataset developed a measure denoting whether a leader was removed through regular constitutional means or through irregular means such as a coup, assassination, rebellion, civil war, or foreign intervention. As the variable differentiates between types of removal we can create a measure for all domestically initiated irregular removals. Irregular removals occurred in 4.4 percent of country-year

observations among all states. Looking all states from 1945 to 1991, there are 248 instances of irregular removal. The full results can be seen below in Table 7:

Table 7. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Removal of Leaders among All States (1945-1991) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 US Ally 0.969*** 0.541** 0.594*** 0.986*** 0.824*** (0.198) (0.259) (0.177) (0.215) (0.173) USSR Ally -0.902** -0.401 -0.860** -0.760* -0.949** (0.411) (0.426) (0.388) (0.429) (0.399) Major Power -0.220 -0.249 -0.302 -0.172 -0.251 (0.285) (0.295) (0.285) (0.291) (0.285) Alliances 0.047 0.095 0.078 0.060 0.115 (0.065) (0.081) (0.059) (0.070) (0.060) Per capita income -0.307*** -0.243*** -0.357*** -0.178*** -0.166*** (0.054) (0.069) (0.062) (0.066) (0.061) Polity IV -0.035*** -0.034** -0.033** -0.037*** (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) Ethnic Fractionalization 0.060 -0.092 0.209 (0.259) (0.313) (0.281) Oil Exporter 0.424* 0.341 0.548** 0.529** 0.547** (0.222) (0.247) (0.224) (0.245) (0.233) Log(% Mountain) -0.030 0.018 -0.014 -0.010 -0.037 (0.055) (0.060) (0.056) (0.059) (0.057) Log(Population) -0.048 0.029 -0.007 0.254** 0.283*** (0.059) (0.107) (0.088) (0.114) (0.109) Prior War 0.590*** 0.393* 0.448* 0.649*** (0.211) (0.230) (0.229) (0.213) New State -1.158 -1.373 -1.180 -1.483 (0.723) (1.018) (0.727) (1.021) Muslim (%) 0.003 0.005* 0.003 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) Political Instability 0.370** 0.387** 0.381** 0.354** 0.407** (0.164) (0.171) (0.165) (0.172) (0.166) Log(Military Expenditures) -0.023 -0.032 0.165 (0.081) (0.064) (0.101) Log(Military Personnel) -0.058 -0.292*** -0.191*** (0.108) (0.099) (0.072) Latin America 0.601* (0.328) Sub-Saharan Africa 0.434 (0.352) Asia 0.373 (0.337) Eastern Europe -1.244* (0.692) Log(Imports) -0.054 (0.116) Log(Exports) -0.234*** -0.191*** (0.088) (0.059) Constant -2.566*** -3.207*** -2.108*** -4.791*** -3.994*** (0.513) (0.838) (0.523) (0.944) (0.734) Observations (N) 5,026 4,605 4,735 4,573 4,774 Note: The DV is coded "1" for country years in which irregular removal occurred and "0" in all others. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 13. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01

The insignificant effect of weak alliances confirms Hypothesis 5. Weak alliances are statistically insignificant in their effect on the irregular removal of leaders across all five models.

Additionally, Table 7 finds that leaders allied with the United States still experience highly significant levels of irregular removal. In all five models, having the United States as an ally increases the probability of irregular leadership removal. The marginal effect of the US as an ally is tempered when including the more stable non-anocratic states – ranging from a 2.4 to a 4.2 percent increase in irregular removal of leaders. Yet, despite the lower number of irregular removals, the effect of having the US as an ally increases the number of irregular removals they suffer between 71 and 165 percent.

The results from Table 7 confirm the hypothesis on the effect of an alliance with the United

States. Having an alliance with the United States greatly increases the likelihood of a coup. The effect of an alliance with major powers on leaders is statistically insignificant. Given that the historical record indicated a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to “coup-proof” their allies, the results above may be a better accounting of the effect of their alliances.

The USSR significantly reduces the likelihood of irregular removal in four of the five models. In the four models with significance, the marginal effect on allied leaders is a reduction in irregular removal ranging from 3.4 to 4.2 percent. Depending upon the model, this substantial reduction in irregular removals equates to a 55 to 60 percent reduction in irregular removals among

Soviet allies.

Among the control variables, per capita income, exports, military personnel, and polity IV reduced the likelihood of a state suffering an irregular removal of a leader. Prior war and instability were significant in all models and increased the likelihood of an irregular removal. Oil exporting countries and large populations were also generally significant and increased the likelihood of an irregular removal. While the regional controls were insignificant when looking at anocracies, the two

regions suspected to demonstrate significance do so when looking at all states. Latin America increases a state’s likelihood of experiencing an irregular removal while Eastern Europe decreases a state’s likelihood. Both results are consistent with any historical understanding of US and Soviet actions in these particular regions.

Irregular Removal Among Anocracies

In order to compare the results with the civil war data, I also looked at anocracies during the time period of 1945-1991. Compared to the 66 civil wars during this period, there are 111 instances of leadership removal. Using the same sample of anocracies and years from the study of civil war onset, this dataset also has 1,110 country-year observations. The data are recoded to a dichotomous measure that indicates whether an irregular removal happened in a given year. With 111 irregular removals observed among anocracies, 10 percent of all country-years experience an irregular removal. This figure nearly doubles the number of civil wars observed among anocracies in Chapter

Below, I present several models identical to those in the study of civil war onset, only changing the dependent variable to irregular removal. The five models demonstrate consistent results for the key independent variables of US and major powers. Only the alliance measures that fluctuated in terms of statistical significance were alliances with the Soviet Union and weak alliances.

Looking at anocracies across the five models, the marginal effect of an alliance with the US is an increase in the likelihood of irregular removal between 5 and 9 percent. As irregular removals are rare events, an increase of 5 to 9 percent suggests that an alliance with the US increased a state’s likelihood of experiencing an irregular removal from 65 to 231 percent. Similarly, when significant, the Soviet Union increases the irregular removal of allied leaders of anocracies from 207 to 583 percent compared to states not allied with the Soviet Union. While these results would seem to refute the hypothesis that the Soviet Union reduces irregular removal in their allies, it is worth

noting again that between 1945 and 1991, the Soviet Union is only an ally to anocracies in 2 percent of all country-years. Yet, when observing all states during the same period, the Soviet Union is an ally in 10 percent of all countries-years.

Major powers have the opposite effect of the US and Soviet Union. Among anocracies, an alliance with a major power reduces the likelihood of an irregular removal between 66 and 73 percent when compared to states not allied with major powers. Much like the results found in

Chapter 3 on civil war onset, the variable for number of alliances was largely insignificant. These results fully confirm two of the four hypotheses and partially confirmed one other. Unsurprisingly, the effect of the number of alliances was only significant in two of the five models. The directional effect of the number of weak alliances partially confirms Hypothesis 5. The strength and significance of the major powers variable strongly confirms Hypothesis 6. While having the USSR as an ally was significant in three of the five models, the directional effect was the opposite of what was predicted. Instead of reducing the likelihood of an allied leader being removed, those leaders allied with the Soviet Union saw an average increase of nearly 11 percent. While it was predicted that the USSR would be less effective than major powers at reducing the removal of allied leaders, anecdotal evidence and historical observation suggested a strong interest on the part of the Soviet

Union in protecting allied leaders. Below are the full results:

Table 8. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Removal of Leaders among Anocracies (1945-1991) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 US Ally 1.228*** 1.223** 0.649** 1.312*** 0.547** (0.342) (0.487) (0.288) (0.380) (0.274) USSR Ally 1.291* 2.204** 0.769 1.494* 0.875 (0.702) (0.863) (0.684) (0.768) (0.684) Major Power -1.337** -1.375** -1.134* -1.177* -1.143* (0.617) (0.643) (0.602) (0.622) (0.599) Alliances 0.132 0.152 0.169* 0.101 0.213** (0.108) (0.146) (0.097) (0.114) (0.098) Per capita income -0.239** -0.290** -0.433*** -0.184 -0.259** (0.097) (0.137) (0.126) (0.146) (0.127) Polity IV -0.127*** -0.138*** -0.128*** -0.132*** (0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) Ethnic Fractionalization 0.666* 0.758 0.794* (0.403) (0.523) (0.451)

Table 8. Continued Oil Exporter -0.184 -0.258 0.448 -0.295 0.000 (0.342) (0.431) (0.370) (0.438) (0.390) Log(% Mountain) -0.181* -0.132 -0.139 -0.158 -0.116 (0.093) (0.113) (0.098) (0.105) (0.096) Log(Population) -0.125 0.016 -0.165 0.041 0.181 (0.099) (0.205) (0.153) (0.195) (0.181) Prior War 0.727** 0.351 0.406 0.733** (0.287) (0.325) (0.318) (0.287) New State -1.533 -1.159 (1.044) (1.043) Muslim (%) 0.011*** 0.008 0.012*** (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) Political Instability -0.604** -0.595** -0.541** -0.686** -0.508* (0.262) (0.280) (0.265) (0.281) (0.262) Log(Military Expenditures) 0.208 0.115 0.442** (0.150) (0.110) (0.183) Log(Military Personnel) -0.306 -0.380** -0.169 (0.190) (0.168) (0.119) Latin America -0.391 (0.629) Sub-Saharan Africa -0.155 (0.731) Asia -0.442 (0.600) Eastern Europe -2.278 (1.559) Log(Imports) -0.356 (0.225) Log(Exports) 0.022 -0.015 (0.169) (0.094) Constant -1.552* -3.786** -1.302 -4.769*** -3.052** (0.890) (1.502) (0.930) (1.649) (1.253) Observations (N) 1,090 986 991 979 1,039 Note: The DV is coded "1" for country years in which irregular removal occurred and "0" in all others. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 13. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01

The results for anocracies do not support Hypothesis 7 on the directional effect of the

Soviet Union as an ally. However, the difference in direction between the tables for the Soviet

Union, while interesting, is not surprising or substantively important. By looking at Soviet action among all states, we see that their results among anocracies is a likely aberration of the data and not reflective of the USSR’s overall effect on states. Hypothesis 8 was again confirmed by the models in

Table 8. Here, historical evidence was correct when asserting that the United States might have often removed allied leaders from power. Statistically significant in all five models, no variable

performed more strongly across every model than that of an alliance with the US. Similar to the

USSR, having an alliance with the US greatly increased the likelihood of irregular removal.

As the United States was particularly active in coups in Latin America, Model 2 incorporated a battery of regional controls: Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. In

Model 2, regional controls were insignificant. Polity IV, and instability were all significant in all models in which they were tested. Per capita income was significant in four of the five models.

Both Muslim population and mountainous terrain were significant in two out of three models tested.

Measuring Coup d'etat

While any irregular removal is a threat to the leadership of a state, particular types of irregular removal are of greater concern. Similar to Powell (2012), the data are recoded to a dichotomous measure that indicates whether a coup happened in a given year. According to the

Archigos dataset, from 1945 to 1991, twelve country-years experienced the assassination of a leader by unsupported individuals. Fifteen country-years experienced an irregular removal through domestic popular protest. Twenty country-years experienced an irregular removal of a leader due to rebel forces. Twenty-three country-years experienced an irregular removal due to a political “coup” by domestic government actors. One-hundred and sixty-three country-years experienced an irregular removal due to a military coup.33 Though leaders must fear and guard against assassination attempts or mass protests and rebellions, no threat is more frequent than that of a coup d’etat.

For comparison, Powell and Thyne (2011) introduce a new dataset on global instances of both attempted and successful coups from 1950-2010. Building off of the data on 14 previous studies of coups, they provide four basic criteria for determining whether a coup was attempted: 1) the goal of the coup is to replace the target with someone else; 2) the target of the coup must be the primary leader of the state; 3) the perpetrators of the coup must be carried out by “any elite who is part

33 Statistics derived from Archigos dataset from 1945-1991. 61

of the state apparatus” (emphasis in original); and 4) the tactics used to overthrow the state’s leader must be illegal. From 1950 to 1991, they find 182 country-years with successful coups (3.3 percent) out of 326 country-years that experienced attempts (5.6 percent).34 Their recent work is the most thorough analysis of data on coups to date and serves as the best possible choice for this paper. In addition to Powell and Thyne’s data, the Archigos dataset is also analyzed across the same models of varying controls to see if these results are not just unique to Powell and Thyne’s measure.

In Table 9, the same three sets of models with varying controls are run across two different datasets: Powell & Thyne (P&T) and Archigos (ARCH). As with previous analyses, the effects of alliances are first explored among the states considered most vulnerable, anocracies. As coups are a subset of irregular removals, all the hypotheses for coups are the same as those offered for irregular removals. Confirming Hypothesis 8, the effect of an alliance with the United States on successful coups is both significant and positive in two of the three P&T models and in all three Archigos models. Looking at the predicted probability of the first P&T model, US allies have a 6.4 percent chance of a success coup, while states not allied with the United States have only a 3 percent chance.

Thus, states allied with the US have a 110 percent increased chance of a successful coup than states not allied with the United States. Across all models, the marginal effect of an alliance with the

United States ranges from 3.8 to 5.8 percent increase in successful coups among anocracies. The effect of an alliance with US is an increase of 109 to 162 percent in successful coups among anocracies. In Table 9, the effect of an alliance with the United States is even more pronounced and significant across all six models. The marginal effect of an alliance with the United States ranges from 2.0 to 3.2 percent increase in successful coups among all states. Compared to states not allied with the United States, those states allied with the US experience an increase of 78 to 150 percent more successful coups.

34 Including both military and political coups, Archigos provides 172 country-years with successful coups from 1950-1991. 62

Table 9. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Succesful Coups among All States (1950-1991) P&T 1 P&T 2 P&T 3 ARCH 1 ARCH 2 ARCH 3 US Ally 0.933*** 0.623** 0.940*** 0.886*** 0.598** 0.856*** (0.234) (0.297) (0.252) (0.237) (0.294) (0.252) USSR Ally -1.503*** -1.120* -1.492** -1.136** -0.877 -1.064** (0.564) (0.583) (0.585) (0.522) (0.541) (0.536) Major Power -0.256 -0.187 -0.312 -0.247 -0.274 -0.317 (0.325) (0.337) (0.331) (0.336) (0.347) (0.341) Alliances 0.122 0.073 0.137* 0.079 0.074 0.091 (0.078) (0.092) (0.082) (0.079) (0.092) (0.082) Per capita income -0.377*** -0.338*** -0.212** -0.375*** -0.298*** -0.225** (0.074) (0.093) (0.087) (0.076) (0.093) (0.090) Polity IV -0.056*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.055*** -0.050*** -0.049*** (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) Ethnic Fractionalization 0.305 0.214 0.364 0.216 0.024 0.227 (0.303) (0.362) (0.326) (0.310) (0.364) (0.333) Oil Exporter 0.158 0.106 0.286 0.271 0.367 0.469 (0.289) (0.309) (0.313) (0.284) (0.299) (0.302) Log(% Mountain) -0.055 -0.039 -0.052 -0.037 -0.024 -0.050 (0.064) (0.070) (0.067) (0.065) (0.071) (0.069) Log(Population) -0.027 0.043 0.239* -0.009 0.009 0.177 (0.071) (0.126) (0.133) (0.072) (0.127) (0.135) Prior War 0.138 0.177 0.131 0.202 0.274 0.249 (0.275) (0.284) (0.285) (0.270) (0.280) (0.281) New State -1.417 -0.660 -0.867 -0.923 (1.015) (0.728) (1.024) (1.030) Muslim (%) 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Political Instability 0.486** 0.491** 0.468** 0.564*** 0.543*** 0.541*** (0.191) (0.193) (0.194) (0.193) (0.195) (0.196) Log(Military Expenditures) -0.065 0.169 -0.159* 0.030 (0.095) (0.117) (0.095) (0.116) Log(Military Personnel) 0.003 -0.232** 0.122 -0.083 (0.129) (0.116) (0.128) (0.116) Latin America 0.610 0.601 (0.381) (0.388) Sub-Saharan Africa 0.141 0.391 (0.402) (0.402) Asia -0.092 0.184 (0.392) (0.390) Log(Imports) -0.183 -0.150 (0.136) (0.139) Log(Exports) -0.188* -0.130 (0.102) (0.107) Constant -3.024*** -3.048*** -4.615*** -3.229*** -2.360** -3.490*** (0.624) (0.978) (1.104) (0.636) (0.960) (1.097) Observations (N) 4,751 4,339 4,313 4,751 4,401 4,372 Note: The DV is coded "1" for country years in which a successful coup occurred and "0" in all others. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 13. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01

The Soviet Union is significant in five out of six models. The marginal effect of an alliance with the Soviet Union ranges from 2.9 to 5.6 percent decrease in successful coups among all states.

Compared to states not allied with the Soviet Union, those states allied with the USSR experience a decrease of 57 to 78 percent less successful coups. While the Soviet Union gains significance when looking at all states, major powers lose all statistical significance. Once again, weak alliances are only significant in one model, suggesting that weak alliances may have a marginal increase in the likelihood of a successful coup. Beyond the effect of alliances with the US and the USSR, three control variables dominate the results among all states: per capita income, polity IV, and political instability. All three variables are very significant across all six models. Tables 8 and 9 confirm hypotheses 5 through 8, in the same general strength and direction found when looking at all irregular removals. Appendix B looks at coups among anocracies. Looking at the smaller sample, the US retains its significance and direction, the USSR loses significance, and major powers gain significance. The full results and discussion of coups in anocracies can be found in Appendix B.

Discussion

This chapter explores a useful adaptation of the dissertation’s core theory which explores the effect of international alliances on civil war onset. While Chapter 3 largely confirmed the basic hypotheses of the relationship between powerful states and their weaker alliance partners, Chapter 4 expanded upon this theory by analyzing the alliance relationship with a focus on the leader. By looking at the protection of leaders as opposed to the protection of states, this chapter provides useful insights into the motivations of powerful states. While powerful states have clear vested interests in preventing civil war onset in an allied state, they appear to often lack the same motivations for protecting the leader of an ally.

Numerous studies have suggested that when leaders feel threatened and vulnerable, they attempt to “coup-proof” their regimes to maintain power (Powell 2012; Koga 2010; N’diaye 2002;

Quinlivan 1999; Frazer 1994; and Johnson, Slater, and McGown 1984). Belkin and Schofer (2003) empirically demonstrated the successful efforts of such leaders in reducing the likelihood of a coup.

Table 4.5 provides empirical evidence that an alliance with the Soviet Union decreased the likelihood of a coup among their allies. Powell’s (2012) recent study argues that leaders can protect against coups by altering the disposition and the ability of the military to attempt a coup. To alter the disposition of the military, leaders appease the military by providing them with greater spoils.

Previous studies have suggested that the Soviet Union provided such material support to states as a vital part of their coup-proofing strategy (David 1986). To alter the ability of the military to attempt a coup, leaders may also institute structural reforms to protect against a coup (Powell 2012). Powell

(2012) and Belkin and Schofer (2003) suggest that counter-balancing forces like a strong paramilitary forces or overlapping military branches and commands also help to coup-proof a leader, albeit at the expense of military effectiveness (Pilster and Bohmelt 2011). Beyond material support, the Soviet

Union supplied thousands of advisers and troops to specifically train their allies in the creation of both paramilitary forces and extensive spy networks. This training may further explain the success of Soviet allies in discouraging coups or irregular removals.

The United States provides ample military resources and spoils to their allies and has a history of training paramilitary forces for their allies. Like the deployment of Soviet advisers, the

United States has used military personnel throughout the world. Since 1950, the United States has averaged over 535,000 troops deployed across at least 40 countries in any given year (Kane 2004).

While both superpowers often deployed their military forces to stabilize and defend their allies, the

United States has had the opposite effect of the Soviet Union. The allies of the United States have a much greater likelihood of experiencing irregular removals – in particular coups.

The strength and robustness of the effect of having an alliance with the United States upon irregular removal is remarkable. As Chapter 3 demonstrated that the United States possesses the ability to reduce civil war onset among its allies (a common method of irregular removal), the removal of allied leaders by other means becomes all the more intriguing. The United States has a

clear interest in the stability of an allied state for trade, placement of military bases and soldiers, and control over a state’s domestic affairs and ideology. Thus, if the US is not pleased with a leader, they need alternatives to civil war if they wish to alter an allied state’s policy. For example, if the ally has a newly elected leftist government which could threaten trade, basing rights, or US businesses in the country, the US could utilize a strategy of coups to obtain leadership which better aligns with US interests. Thus, the same logic that motivates powerful states to protect their weaker allied states in some instances may also be the motivation that encourages powerful countries to carry out coups.

While the Soviets were able to reduce civil war onset across some models, they also made a clear effort to reduce onset among their allies at large with only a few exceptions.

CHAPTER 5

FUTURE RESEARCH

This dissertation serves as the first exploration of the effects of international alliances on civil war onset. Previous literature extensively analyzed alliances for their intended international effects. Early researchers claimed that alliances are designed to provide security and prevent war in the anarchical atmosphere of international relations (Morgenthau 1960; Waltz 1979). Later researchers contended that alliances only incite and expand war (Christensen and Snyder 1990;

Siverson and Starr 1991; Vasquez 1993). An ally’s effectiveness at deterring international conflict has been a point of serious debate in the alliance literature (Leeds 2003; Palmer and Morgan 2006;

Senese and Vasquez 2008; Johnson and Leeds 2011; and Benson 2011). Similarly, another significant argument in the literature focused on the debate over whether states even meet their alliance obligations. Sabrosky (1980) found that states only come to the aid of their allies in 25 percent of international conflicts. After several scholars attempted to explain the oddity of this finding (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Fearon 1998; Morrow 1994; Smith 1995; 1996; Gartner and Siverson 1996), Leeds, Long, and Mitchell (2000) reexamined the detailed obligations and commitments found in every treaty. Their research demonstrated that allies, in fact, meet their commitments nearly 75 percent of the time.

In civil war literature, the most contentious debate regarding civil war onset focuses on the underlying causes of grievances and opportunity.35 In addition, scholars studied a host of other contributing factors including: poverty and slow economic growth (Collier and Sambanis 2002;

Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003) regime type and political instability (Fearon and

35 A sample of the articles debating grievances and opportunity include: Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 1998; Midlarsky 1988; Muller and Seligson 1987; Nagel 1974; Weede 1981; Caprioli 2005; Gurr 1993; Gurr and Moore 1997; Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994; Keen 2012; Taydas; Peksen and James 2010; Thyne 2006; Vinci 2006; Regan and Norton 2005; Fearon and Latin 2003; Jackson 2002; Saxton and Benson 2008; Lichbach 1990; Heath et al. 2000; Hirshleifer 1995; 2001; Grossman 1991; 1999; Berdal and Malone 2000; Walter 2006; Jackson 2002; Rule 1988. 67

Laitin 2003; Gurr 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Reynal–Querrol 2002); and large population size (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Recently, scholars began exploring the actions leaders can take to deter and diminish the likelihood of a civil war. Arena and Hardt (2014) study how leaders can preempt rebellion by buying off the population. Chiozza and Goemans (2011) argue that leaders eliminate domestic threats through international conflict. This dissertation posits that leaders can also reduce civil war onset through international alliances.

As shown in Chapter 3, having a weak ally does not demonstrate any measurable effect on the ability of a state to deter civil war. However, an alliance with a powerful state does decrease the likelihood a state experiences civil war onset. In Chapter 3, the effect of powerful allies is constant and robust across several measures of civil war onset, and against a battery of control variables. In order to control for the possibility that powerful states only choose to ally with stable democracies or autocracies, I focused on the effect of powerful allies on weak anocracies. This dissertation successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of powerful allies at reducing civil war onset, even among the most vulnerable states.

While the empirical findings demonstrated that powerful allies reduce civil war onset in their weaker allies, it does not mean that weaker leaders should necessarily engage in alliances with without some reservation. Powerful allies have a vested interest in the stability of an allied state, but will only support the current leader of that state if it furthers their interests. Depending on the motivations of a powerful ally, the positive gains a weak state leader might receive against domestic threats may not be worth the increased likelihood of his or her removal from office. In Chapter 4, I examined the effect of international alliances on a state’s likelihood of experiencing the irregular removal of a leader. Compared to states with no allies, leaders allied with the United States experienced higher levels of irregular removal. Conversely, compared to states with no allies, Soviet

allies had lower levels of irregular removal. As noted in Chapter 4, the empirical findings are consistent with historical observations of American and Soviet interactions with their allies.

Two Directions for Future Research

This dissertation confronts a difficult temporal limitation. As civil wars are rare events, there have not been enough cases of civil war onset since the end of the Cold War to analyze the role alliances might play. Problematically, most civil war measures only cover a decade after the

Cold War. Likewise, the key alliance variables from ATOP only exist through 2003. As these datasets are updated over the next few decades, future research could reexamine the core arguments of this dissertation. Beyond expansion into the post-Cold War period, researchers could also attempt to analyze the role of alliances before 1945 with a fuller array of control variables. Cursory examination of civil wars before 1945 suggests that the effect of powerful allies extends beyond the temporal limitations of the Cold War. However, the lack of most basic controls before 1945 makes detailed analysis difficult. By expanding the current work temporally, future research could contribute to the literatures on civil wars and alliances in multitude of ways. Below I discuss two possible directions for future inquiry: subsets of civil war and alliances; and the effects of alliances over time.

Subsets of Civil Wars and Alliances

With the passage of time, additional cases of civil war onset would allow for the study of alliances within more refined subsets of civil wars. While this dissertation focused on the effect of alliances across several different measures of civil war, future studies could explore the effectiveness of alliances on different types of civil wars. Instead of treating all civil wars the same, Sobek and

Payne (2010) divide civil wars into two subsets: “wars of legitimacy” and “wars of replacement.”

They argue that these are different types of civil wars “and should be treated as such—both theoretically and empirically.” Wars of replacement seek only to replace the current leaders with

new leaders, whereas wars of legitimacy desire to alter the relationship between the state and the society (Sobek and Payne 2010). They posit that the fundamentally different motivations will lead to different calculations by rebels of when to initiate civil war, the expected cost, and the duration of war. If there is a substantive difference between the two types of civil war, it raises interesting questions. Are alliances better at deterring wars of replacement or wars of legitimacy? Are powerful allies more attentive to threats of legitimacy than threats of replacement? As wars of legitimacy seek to alter the state’s arrangement with their citizens, it probably increases the likelihood that they would also seek to change the state’s arrangement in the international order. A war of replacement may be a change of leadership but not alter the relationship between a state and the international order. Does this imply that alliance agreements are more threatened by wars of legitimacy than wars of replacement? If so, are states more attentive and quicker to aid their ally against such threats?

Where Sobek and Payne’s (2010) dichotomy looked at different threats to the state, others have suggested that differences in civil wars exist based on the goals of rebels. Ross (2004) looks at the difference between separatist versus non-separatist “subsets” of civil war. While some civil wars are attempts by rebels to overthrow the government of the entire state, other civil wars are only attempts to take part of the state’s territory and create a separate independent state. Buhaug and

Rod (2006) argue that this difference between territorial and governmental conflicts is so essential

“that governmental and territorial conflicts should be studied separately.” Whether treated as subsets of civil war, or studied as two fundamentally different types of conflict, the theory of alliances presented in this dissertation might suggest that powerful states behave differently based on the type of threat their ally faces. Indeed, rebels threatening a civil war that would overthrow the entire government are potentially more threatening to a powerful ally’s interests than a civil war where a separatist movement is yearning for independence and a small territory of their own. While governmental conflicts threaten the existence of an ally altogether, separatist movements may not

threaten any essential interests of an ally. Thus, it begs the question: Are allies more likely to aid states against non-separatist governmental threats over separatist territorial threats?

Whether it is separatist versus non-separatist or legitimacy versus replacement, future analysis could study if allies are better at reducing onset in one type of civil war over another. Does a difference in the type of civil conflict suggest a lower threshold for initiating one type of civil war, and if so, does that mean alliances may be better at reducing onset in one type than another? Or does it suggest that allies are more concerned about one type of civil war and thus invest more resources in deterring a particular type of threat? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions can only be clarified with additional civil war data.

Beyond analysis of the subsets of civil war, future research could also look at additional subsets of alliances. In this dissertation, alliances were divided into three subsets: superpowers, major powers, and weak powers. Future research could further distinguish between these alliances by looking at those in collective defense alliances versuses those in bilateral alliances. As both bilateral and collective defense alliances include states ranging from the weak powers to superpowers, it would not be prudent to measure the difference between the two, but instead look at the differences between bilateral and collective defense alliances at each level of power. The question then becomes: Would collective defense alliances be better at reducing civil war onset than their bilateral counterparts?

In bilateral alliances where there is a power disparity, prior research suggests that powerful states are motivated by the desire to control another state’s foreign or domestic policies. Cha (2009) analyzes why the United States differed in its use of treaties between Western Europe, the South

Pacific, and Southeast Asia compared with East Asia. In Western Europe, the United States established a collective defense alliance – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the

South Pacific, the US established the collective Australia-New Zealand-United States treaty alliance

(ANZUS). In the Western hemisphere, the US established the Organization of American States

(OAS) to provide for collective defense against outside threats. Yet, in East Asia, the United States aggressively pursued bilateral treaties with Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and the

Republic of China (Taiwan). Cha (2009) argues that the difference in treaty type was due to the desire by the United States to exert greater control over these East Asian “rogue allies.” By establishing direct bilateral treaties, the defenses of these East Asian states were wholly dependent on the United States. Bilateral alliances may provide more motivation for powerful states than collective defense alliances. Collective defense may not provide powerful states with the leverage necessary to control other states. Major and superpowers upset with the actions of a minor power may not simply withdraw from such an alliance without also punishing all other states involved in the treaty. Thus, their ability to leverage this threat in exchange for greater control over another state’s actions may be severely limited.

With a powerful states preference for bilateral alliances, an argument can be made that collective defense alliances should offer less protection against domestic threats than their bilateral counterparts. There may be a pronounced difference between the effects of major or superpower states included in a collective defense alliance when compared to the effects of major or superpower states in a bilateral alliance. The distribution of aid, training, and military bases from a powerful state might be uneven in a collective defense alliance. Within NATO, the disproportionate bulk of

US military presence is found in Germany. Does this provide less domestic deterrence to other coalition members? Do states with bilateral alliances like Japan and South Korea get more aid, training, and intelligence from the United States than the smaller states of NATO? Due to the limitations in data, the ability to definitively answer these questions currently remains elusive.

The Effect of Alliances over Time

The previous chapters measured the effect of alliances on weak anocratic states. When more data is available, future research might attempt to look at autocratic and democratic states and measure the effectiveness of powerful allies on these states over time. These studies could provide new insights into arguments of grievances versus opportunity. Among former American allies, we can quickly note several instances of anti-American grievances playing a role in civil wars and revolutions, from Castro’s Cuban revolution in the 1950s, to the Iranian revolution of 1979, to the

Egyptian revolution of 2011.36 The history of these civil wars and revolutions suggest that an alliance with a strong ally, such as the United States, may itself become an additional grievance that fuels the domestic opposition. Indeed, when airing their grievances, rebels and revolutionaries have often blamed their problems on foreign interference.

While an alliance with the United States was not enough to prevent the eventual onset of civil war and revolution in the above three cases, this is not to say the alliances were completely unsuccessful. Indeed, the support gained from the United States likely kept the governments of these states in power decades longer than they would have survived on their own. What we may observe from these examples is that despite being allied with the United States for decades, (which limited opportunities for civil war onset in the short term), these alliances did not reduce (and may well have increased) the grievances which culminated in civil war onset in the long term. While

Chapter 3 demonstrated the ability of powerful states to reduce civil war onset, future research may find that the benefits from alliances with powerful states wane over time.

Fortunately, alliances can also have the long term effect of reducing grievances. For example, the United States has also had alliances with Japan since 1951 and South Korea since 1953.

36 The United States had formal alliances with both Cuba and Iran before their revolutions. While US leaders openly referred to Egypt as an ally, and regularly provided aid in excess of $1.5 billion a year, it did not have a formal alliance with Egypt after WWII. 73

Neither Japan nor South Korea have fallen into civil war or revolution since the formation of their alliances with the United States, and perhaps more notably, neither have significant levels of anti-

American sentiment. Recent Pew Polls illustrate this difference. In 2009, citizens of several states were asked if they thought of the United States as “more of a partner” or “more of an enemy.” 63 percent of South Korean respondents viewed the US as partners, while 8 percent said enemies. 66 percent of Japanese respondents viewed the US as partners, with just 3 percent saying enemies.

Both the Japanese and Korean people viewed the US as more of a partner than did the citizens of

Germany or France. When asked the same question, only 18 percent of Egyptians thought of the

United States as a partner in 2009, with 27 percent considering the United States an enemy.

Additional questions on favorability were asked in 2010 and 2011. When asked whether they had a favorable or unfavorable view of the United States, in 2010, 79 percent of South Korean respondents viewed the US favorably.37 In 2011, the Japanese respondents had a higher favorability of the US than any other people, including American respondents, with 85 percent.38

Comparatively, only 20 percent of Egyptian respondents viewed the US favorably. What accounts for this difference in attitudes? Why does American support result in high-levels of anti-American attitudes and civil war in one state but not in another? As policymakers of any strong state look to establish long-term working alliances, it is vital to understand why some alliances improve relations with other states and some only serve to strain them.

Future research could investigate whether there is an interactive effect between an alliance with powerful allies and the regime type of weaker alliance partners. I would suggest that powerful allies might reduce grievances in the long-term when the weak ally has a democratic government.

Selectorate theory suggests that democratic leaders possess larger winning coalitions which make

37 South Korea was not surveyed in 2011. More on the Pew Polling data can be found at: pewglobal.org. http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=1&survey=13&response=Favorable&mode=chart 38 Americans actually came in 3rd with only 79% of Americans viewing the US favorably (Kenya was 2nd). 74

spending on welfare and public goods more useful for survival in office (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith,

Siverson, and Morrow 2003). Lake and Baum (2001) find that democratic leaders do spend significantly more on public goods, like welfare, than their autocratic counterparts. Taydas and

Peksen (2012) demonstrate that welfare spending reduces grievances and civil war onset.

Conversely, selectorate theory suggests that leaders with smaller winning coalitions, exemplified by dictators, do not focus on providing greater levels public goods, but instead focus on providing greater levels of private goods to their smaller winning coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

As strong alliances allow for the reallocation of defense spending, both democrats and autocrats in weaker states should use the opportunity to appease their winning coalitions.

Through reallocation, leaders of democracies (possessing larger winning coalitions) should divert defense resources to welfare spending. This should have the long term effect of reducing grievances and thus reducing civil war onset in the long term. As autocracies will focus more on private goods, their reallocation should not help to reduce long term grievances and civil war onset.

Indeed, the opposite may be true. As autocracies focus on private goods but maintain power through the support of an ally, the end result may be an increase in grievances. Thus, while strong allies should have the same initial effect on all states in reducing the opportunities of the domestic opposition, the long-term effect of alliances in the reduction of civil war onset should be far greater among democracies. We can view this by comparing the difference in civil war onset over time between democracies and autocracies with powerful allies.

While some policies are designed to deal with short term problems (e.g. alliances against immediate foreign threats), many are designed with an eye towards their long term potential. The theory of this dissertation may suggest that the resources spent by a strong state may be more effective when spent on an alliance with a weak democracy over a weak autocracy. As resources are limited this may encourage policymakers to favor the support of weak democracies. Alternatively,

this may also suggest that strong allies should place particular conditions on their alliance partners to deal with long term grievances. Research would suggest this is occurring as states increasingly use linkage to tie military support to political or economic policies.

Implications for Policymakers

Civil wars affect nearly every facet of international relations. For policymakers, particularly policymakers of powerful states like the United States, civil wars in foreign territories can demand time, attention, and resources. Looking at the widespread impact of even one current civil war can be illustrative. As a result of the Syrian Civil War, forced migration, human trafficking, and child slave labor have become prominent problems in neighboring Lebanon. The Syrian Civil War has resulted in the over three million refugees into neighboring countries. With a population of less than five million, the addition of over one million Syrian refugees has resulted in rising unemployment and rapidly depreciating wages in Lebanon. Additionally, Lebanese farmers have lsot foreign markets in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan when trade routes across Syria closed.39 Given the twenty percent rise in Lebanon’s population in just the last three years, do policymakers from powerful states need to rethink aid packages to Lebanon? What about aid to Jordan with over 600,000 refugees or Turkey with over 1.6 million refugees? Additionally, how do the 220,000 refugees who fled to Iraq affect our relations with the Iraqi government and our actions within Iraq? Beyond the flow of refugees fleeing Syria, the Syrian Civil War has played a pivotal role in the growth of ISIS (or

ISIL), whose rebel fighters now occupy and carry out operations in both Syria and Iraq. All of this is to demonstrate how just one civil war can greatly affect our relationship with numerous countries.

The effects of civil wars are felt in international economy, trade, human rights, terrorism, immigration, national defense, and more. For policymakers who wish to encourage stability

39 Gilbert, Ben. 2014. “Syrian refugee children forced to work to support families in Lebanon.” Aljazeera America. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/22/syrian-refugee- childrenforcedtoworktosupportfamiliesinlebanon.html (published 22 February 2014; accessed 9 September 2014). 76

worldwide, they need a fuller understanding of all the contributing factors of civil war onset and the policy options at their disposal. In this regard, the potential usefulness of international alliances warrants further study.

Policymakers must have practical ways they can affect change. Policy decisions should be informed and driven by research, data, and analysis. This dissertation provides policymakers with another tool for powerful states. When pursuing ways to increase global security and provide stability, this dissertation offers alliance formation as an option when looking to stabilize weaker anocratic friends. It suggests that alliances can serve as a stabilizing factor that can reduce civil war onset in weaker friendly states. Through the placement of military bases, shared intelligence, and aid, powerful states may provide stability and deter challenges from rebels. This perspective includes the assumption that policymakers have a vested interest in stability and security internationally.

Conversely, for policymakers seeking the means to destabilize countries perhaps perceived as threats, this dissertation also implies that powerful states could destabilize countries or even regions through the withholding or even removal of an alliance. By withholding the stabilizing influence that an alliance might provide, powerful states may be signaling their reluctance to intervene to rebels. While there was insufficient data to test the stability of states before and after the loss of an alliance with a powerful ally, the logic of this dissertation supports the idea that the revoking of an alliance could undermine the domestic stability of a weak state.

APPENDIX A

MODEL WITH LAGGED POLITY

In order to address concerns that the polity score for a given year was driven by the civil war that occurred within that same year, the polity score that determined if a state qualified as an anocracy is lagged from the previous year. The results are similar to those presented without the lagged above.

Table 10. Regressions on Civil War Onset among Anocracies (1945-1991) with Lagged Polity On Any (66) F&L C&H D&S COW On All 3 US Ally -1.183*** -0.842* -0.944* -1.537*** -1.061** -0.968 (0.354) (0.484) (0.559) (0.467) (0.430) (0.606) USSR Ally 0.421 0.091 1.423 1.161 0.988 0.631 (0.720) (1.153) (0.945) (0.807) (0.754) (1.220) Major Power -1.166* -1.204 Omitted -1.273* -1.728* -1.546 (0.630) (0.784) (0.766) (1.049) (1.090) Alliances 0.084 0.067 0.088 0.017 0.135** 0.096 (0.056) (0.101) (0.091) (0.091) (0.067) (0.127) Per capita income -0.224** -0.386** -0.240 -0.270** -0.323** -0.408* (0.111) (0.170) (0.180) (0.137) (0.158) (0.223) Polity IV -0.022 -0.004 -0.023 0.008 -0.015 0.009 (0.038) (0.047) (0.064) (0.045) (0.047) (0.061) Ethnic Fractionalization 0.467 0.378 1.263 0.113 0.408 0.016 (0.519) (0.666) (0.937) (0.638) (0.662) (0.832) Oil Exporter 0.521 0.301 0.458 0.491 0.549 0.333 (0.415) (0.517) (0.704) (0.515) (0.528) (0.646) Log(% Mountain) 0.321*** 0.133 0.561*** 0.313** 0.377** 0.199 (0.117) (0.142) (0.191) (0.137) (0.158) (0.181) Log(Population) 0.153 0.160 -0.158 0.101 0.089 -0.018 (0.115) (0.149) (0.215) (0.139) (0.147) (0.184) Prior War -0.734 -1.296** Omitted -2.176*** -0.612 -1.616 (0.471) (0.635) (0.750) (0.535) (1.059) New State 1.244*** 0.750 1.487** 0.676 0.685 0.093 (0.427) (0.556) (0.646) (0.514) (0.601) (0.802) Muslim (%) -0.003 0.003 0.009 -0.003 -0.002 0.006 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) Political Instability 0.284 -0.171 0.784 0.385 0.285 -0.037 (0.318) (0.450) (0.503) (0.389) (0.395) (0.539) Constant -4.608*** -4.373*** -3.899** -3.910*** -4.664*** -3.366* (1.099) (1.382) (1.798) (1.292) (1.409) (1.747) Observations (N) 1,103 1,103 579 1,103 1,103 1,103 Note: The dependent variable is coded "1" for country years in which a civil war began and "0" in all others. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 13. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01

APPENDIX B

COUPS IN ANOCRACIES

Across all six models, the significance of the USSR among its anocratic allies is insignificant.

As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the lack of results for the Soviet Union among anocracies is the result of an incredibly small sample size for the USSR. The effect of an alliance with major powers is highly significant across all six models. In all six models, the effect of an alliance with a major power is a reduction in successful coups from approximately 5 percent (in all non-allied states), to less than 0.5 percent. These findings demonstrate that major powers were able to decrease between 90 and 93 of successful coups, compared to those not allied with major powers.

Alliances appear significant in only one model and show an increase in the likelihood of coups of 1.3 percent per additional weak alliance.

Even among anocracies, polity IV is highly significant across all six models. Per capita income is significant in four of the six models. Some variation between the two dependent variables does result in different controls showing significance. In Powell & Thyne’s data, ethnic fractionalization and political instability are significant across all three models, but neither is significant in any of the Archigos models. Alternatively, in the Archigos data, high Muslim populations are significant in all three models, while not significant in the models of Powell &

Thyne. The full results are below:

Table 11. Multiple Logistic Regressions on Succesful Coups among Anocracies (1950-1991) P&T 1 P&T 2 P&T 3 ARCH 1 ARCH 2 ARCH 3 US Ally 0.778* 0.838 0.782* 0.855** 1.024* 0.864* (0.400) (0.532) (0.441) (0.402) (0.527) (0.446) USSR Ally 0.917 1.107 0.749 1.089 1.495 1.009 (0.841) (0.938) (0.888) (0.837) (0.932) (0.876) Major Power -2.591** -2.487** -2.560** -2.555** -2.403** -2.572** (1.085) (1.101) (1.096) (1.080) (1.094) (1.098) Alliances 0.228* 0.147 0.206 0.193 0.077 0.162 (0.127) (0.152) (0.131) (0.125) (0.150) (0.130) Per capita income -0.397*** -0.500** -0.303 -0.343*** -0.395** -0.176 (0.138) (0.196) (0.204) (0.132) (0.182) (0.193) Polity IV -0.187*** -0.179*** -0.187*** -0.174*** -0.156*** -0.163***

(0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) Ethnic Fractionalization 1.320*** 1.367** 1.252** 0.732 0.780 0.524 (0.493) (0.609) (0.548) (0.489) (0.615) (0.545) Table 11. Continued Oil Exporter -0.544 -0.666 -0.878 -0.592 -0.485 -0.732 (0.485) (0.574) (0.612) (0.483) (0.540) (0.588) Log(% Mountain) -0.101 -0.120 -0.151 -0.128 -0.194 -0.218* (0.115) (0.136) (0.127) (0.115) (0.136) (0.126) Log(Population) -0.136 -0.227 -0.193 -0.107 -0.149 -0.123 (0.127) (0.252) (0.253) (0.124) (0.248) (0.246) Prior War -0.080 -0.131 -0.212 -0.084 -0.072 -0.202 (0.390) (0.409) (0.411) (0.390) (0.408) (0.413) New State -1.105 -1.079 (1.058) (1.063) Muslim (%) 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.010** 0.010* 0.011** (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) Political Instability -0.626* -0.605* -0.675** -0.394 -0.360 -0.426 (0.327) (0.335) (0.337) (0.315) (0.321) (0.324) Log(Military Expenditures) 0.136 0.454** -0.011 0.381* (0.177) (0.222) (0.173) (0.222) Log(Military Personnel) -0.014 -0.071 0.070 -0.005 (0.227) (0.215) (0.226) (0.213) Latin America -0.008 -0.198 (0.758) (0.740) Sub-Saharan Africa -0.254 -0.458 (0.876) (0.880) Asia -0.469 -0.751 (0.729) (0.708) Log(Imports) -0.684** -0.784*** (0.294) (0.291) Log(Exports) 0.197 0.213 (0.202) (0.202) Constant -1.745 -1.897 -2.865 -1.906* -0.970 -2.269 (1.138) (1.784) (2.047) (1.131) (1.736) (2.054) Observations (N) 981 908 903 981 908 903 Note: The DV is coded "1" for country years in which a successful coup occurred and "0" in all others. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 13. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Paul Todd Fletcher was born in Kansas City, Missouri. He graduated from Lee’s Summit

North High School in 2002. At the University of Missouri, he earned his Bachelor of Arts in both history and political science in 2005. In 2009, he joined the doctoral program in political science at

Florida State University. While pursuing his degree, he has served as a research assistant and instructor at Florida State University. Dr. Fletcher’s disseratation, The Effect of International Alliances in

Civil War Onset, was supervised by Dr. Mark Souva.