Sino japanese war pdf

Continue The 19th-century war between the Tsing Dynasty of China and the Japanese Empire of the First Sino-Japanese WarFirst Sino-Japanese Wars, major battles and troop movements25 July 1894 - April 17, 1895 (8 months, 2 weeks and 2 days) LocationCoria, Manchuria, Taiwan, yellow maritimeresulte Japanese victory Significant loss of prestige for the Tsing Dynasty (Korea) removed from the Chinese suzerenti of the Korean Peninsula, transferred to the Japanese sphere of influence of the Treaty of ShimonosekiTerritori China cedes Taiwan , Penghu, and the Liaodong Peninsula in Japan.Liudong China JapanTeand and leaders of Guangxu EmperorEmpress Dowager CixiLiu HongzhangLiu KunyiSong Tsingdin Ruchan †Liu Buchan †Ya Jichao Suo Bao Baogi † Mei EmperorIto HirobumiKodama GentaroYamagata Aritomozu Michicuraoyama Ivaoita SuukkiStrengt 630,000 people 240 616 peopleKasuaratia and loss of 35,000 killed and injured3 1,132 dead3 758 wounded285 died of wounds11 894 died from the disease of the First Chinese甲午戰爭a Japanese war Jiavu - referring to 1894 as part of the traditional sexogenic systemTraditional Chinese甲午戰爭os Chinese甲午戰爭 甲午战争TransscriptPrime MandarinHanyu PinyinJiǎwǔ ShenchjangJapan-Tsin VarKanji⽇清戦争Ukjitai⽇清戰爭TransscriptionNishin Sensein-Japan Warhangul청일전쟁 Gangja淸⽇戰爭 First China-Japanese war (July 25, 1894-April 17, 1895) was a conflict between the Chinese Tsing Dynasty and the Japanese Empire, mainly because of influence in Korea. After more than six months of continuous success by the Japanese land and navy and the loss of the port of Weihaiwei, the Tsing government sued the world in February 1895. The war demonstrated the failure of the Tsing Dynasty's attempts to modernize its armed forces and fend off threats to its sovereignty, especially compared to the successful meiji restoration in Japan. For the first time, regional domination in East Asia shifted from China to Japan; The prestige of the Tsing Dynasty, along with the classical tradition in China, has suffered greatly. The humiliating loss of Korea as an influx state has caused an unprecedented public outcry. In China, the defeat was the catalyst for a series of political upheavals led by Sun Yat-sen and Kang Yuwei, culminating in the Xinhai Revolution of 1911. The war is widely known in China as the Jiawu War (Chinese: 甲午戰爭; pinyin: Jiǎwǔ zh'nzh'ng), referring to the year (1894) as named within the traditional sexgenic system of the years. In Japan, it is called the War of Japan and the Tsing (Japanese: ⽇清戦争, Hepburn: Nisin Sensea). In Korea, where much of the war took place, it is called the Tsing-Japan War (Korean: 청일전쟁; Hanya: 淸⽇戰爭). The background after two centuries, the Japanese policy of seclusion under the shoguns of the Edo period came to an end when the country was open for trade Kanagawa in 1854. In the years following the Meiji restoration in 1868 and the fall of the shogunate, the newly formed Meiji government embarked on reforms to centralize and modernize Japan. The Japanese sent delegations and students around the world to study and assimilate Western arts and sciences, with the intention of making Japan equal to Western powers. These reforms have transformed Japan from a feudal society into a modern industrial state. The Tsing Dynasty also began to undergo reform in both military and political doctrine, but was far from successful. Korean politician In January 1864, Cholzhong of Joseon died without a male heir, and according to Korean succession protocols Gongong from Korea ascended the throne at the age of 12. However, because King Godjon was too young to rule, the father of the new king, Yi Ha-ŭng, became Henson Devongun, or lord of the great courtier, and ruled Korea in the name of his son as regent. The term Daewongun originally referred to any man who was not actually a king but whose son took the throne. With his ascent to power Daewongun initiated a set of reforms designed to strengthen the monarchy at the expense of the Yangban class. He also pursued an isolationist policy and was determined to cleanse the kingdom of any foreign ideas that had infiltrated the country. In Korean history, the king's laws used great power, so Devongun recognized that any future daughter-in-law could threaten his authority. So he tried to prevent any possible threat to his rule by choosing as the new queen for his son orphaned girls from the clan Yŏhŭng Min, who had no strong political connections. With Empress Meonson as his daughter-in-law and royal wife, Devongun felt safe in his power. However, after she became queen, Ming hired all her relatives and appointed them to influential positions in the name of the king. The queen also allied itself with Devongun's political enemies, so by the end of 1873 she had mobilized enough influence to remove him from power. In October 1873, when the Confucian scholar Choi Ik-hyun presented a memorial to King Goongong, urging him to rule on his own, the queen Ming took the opportunity to force her father-in-law to resign as regent. Devongun's departure led to Korea's rejection of isolationist policies. The discovery of a caricature of the Korean language about the dispute between China, Japan and Russia over Korea, published in the first edition of Chiba in 1887 on February 26, 1876, after clashes between the Japanese and Koreans, the Ganghwa Treaty was signed, opening Korea to Japanese trade. In 1880, the king sent a mission to Japan led by Kim Hong Chip, an enthusiastic observer of the reforms being carried out there. While in Japan, the Chinese Huang Tsunxian presented him with a study called Chaoxian Celue (Strategy for Korea). She warned of the threat to Korea from the Russians and recommended that Korea maintain friendly relations with Japan, which at the time was too economically weak to be an immediate threat, work closely with China and seek an alliance with the United States as a counterweight to Russia. Back in Korea, Kim presented the document to King Goongong, who was so impressed with the document that copies were made and distributed to his officials. After Chinese-brokered talks in Tianjin on May 22, 1882, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Trade and Shipping between the United States and Korea was officially signed in Incheon. However, the treaty raised two important issues: the first concerned Korea's status as an independent state. During negotiations with the Americans, the Chinese insisted that the treaty contained an article stating that Korea was China's dependence and argued that the country had long been an inflow state of China. But the Americans strongly opposed such an article, arguing that the treaty with Korea should be based on the Gangwa Treaty, which stipulated that Korea was an independent state. A compromise was finally reached, and Schufeldt and Lee agreed that the King of Korea would notify the U.S. president in a letter that Korea has a special status as a state of China's tributary. The treaty between the Korean Government and the United States has become a model for all treaties between it and other Western countries. Korea later signed similar trade and trade treaties with Britain and Germany in 1883, with Italy and Russia in 1884 and with France in 1886. Subsequently, commercial agreements were concluded with other European countries. Korean reforms After 1879, China's relations with Korea came under the rule of Li Hongzhang, who became one of the most influential figures in China after he played an important role during the Taiping Uprising, and was also a supporter of the self-reinforcing movement. In 1879, Li was appointed Governor-General of Jili Province and Imperial Commissioner of The Northern Ports. He was in charge of China's Korean policy and called on Korean officials to adopt China's own self-reinforcing program to strengthen its country in response to foreign threats that King Godgeon was susceptible to. The Korean Government, immediately after the country's opening to the outside world, pursued a policy of enlightenment aimed at achieving national prosperity and military power through the Tongdo doctrine of sŏgi (Eastern Ways and Western Machines). To modernize your country, The Koreans tried to selectively embrace and master Western technologies, while preserving the cultural values and heritage of their country. In January 1881, the government initiated administrative reforms and established Amon T'ongni kimu (Office for Emergency State Affairs), which was modeled after Chinese administrative structures. Twelve sa or agencies have been established within this comprehensive organization. In 1881, a technical mission was sent to Japan to survey upgraded facilities. Officials traveled throughout Japan, inspecting administrative, military, educational and industrial facilities. In October, another small group went to Tianjin to study modern weapons manufacturing, and Chinese technicians were invited to manufacture weapons in Seoul. In addition, as part of their modernization plan, the Koreans invited Japanese military attache Lt. Horimoto Reiso as an adviser to the modern army. A new military formation called the Pyŏlgigun (Special Skills Force) was established, in which from eighty to a hundred young men of the aristocracy were to receive Japanese military training. The following year, in January 1882, the government also reorganized the existing five-ward garrison structure into Muwiyŏng (Palace Guards Garrison) and Changŏyŏng (Capital Guards Garrison). Japanese uncertainty in Korea in the 1880s, discussions in Japan about national security were focused on the issue of Korean reform. The political discourse on the two issues is intertwined, as German military adviser Major Jakob Mekel said, Korea is a dagger pointing to the heart of Japan. Korea's strategic problem was not only its proximity to Japan, but also its inability to defend itself from outsiders. If Korea were truly independent, it would not pose any strategic problem to Japan's national security, but if the country remained backward and uncivilized, it would remain weak and therefore attractive prey for foreign domination. The political consensus in Japan was that Korea's independence lay, as for Meiji Japan, through the import of civilization from the West. Korea needed a self-affirming program, as well as post-recovery reforms that had been adopted in Japan. Japan's interest in Korean reform was not purely altruistic. These reforms will not only enable Korea to withstand a foreign invasion that is in Japan's immediate interest, but will also be a conduit for change, and they will also be able to play a broader role on the peninsula. For Meiji leaders, the question was not whether Korea should be reformed, but how those reforms could be implemented. There is a choice in favour of adopting a passive role that requires cultivation elements in Korean society and to assist them whenever possible, or or more aggressive policy by actively interfering in Korean politics to ensure that the reform took place. Many Japanese supporters of Korean reform have swung between the two positions. Japan in the early 1880s was weak, as a result of internal peasant uprisings and samurai uprisings during the previous decade. The country is also struggling financially with inflation as a result of these internal factors. The Meiji government subsequently adopted a passive policy, encouraging the Korean court to follow the Japanese model, but offering little concrete assistance except sending a small military mission led by Lt. Horimoto Reiso to train Pyŏlgigun. The Japanese were worried about the Chinese, who loosened control over Korea in 1876, when the Japanese managed to create a legal basis for Korean independence, ending its status as an influx. China's actions appear to be hampering the forces of reform in Korea and reassessing their influence on the country. 1882 Crisis Home article: Imo Incident Woodblock print depicting the flight of the Japanese legislature in 1882 In 1882, the Korean Peninsula experienced a severe drought that led to food shortages, causing many difficulties and disagreements among the population. Korea was on the verge of bankruptcy, even lagging behind for months on military wages, causing deep resentment among soldiers. There was also outrage over the Pyŏlgigun by regular Korean army soldiers, as the formation was better equipped and processed. In addition, more than 1,000 soldiers were dismissed in the process of overhauling the army, most of them either old or disabled, and the rest were not paid in rice for thirteen months. In June of the same year, King Godjon, having been informed of the situation, ordered that soldiers be given a monthly rice allowance. He instructed Min Goom-ho, the public finance warden and nephew of the queen Ming, to deal with the matter. Ming, in turn, handed the case over to his steward, who sold the good rice he was given and used the money to buy millet, which he mixed with sand and bran. As a result, rice became rotten and unimainable. The distribution of the alleged rice infuriated the soldiers. On 23 July, a military insurgency and unrest erupted in Seoul. The furious soldiers went to the residence of Min Goom-ho, whom they suspected of having deceived them out of rice. Ming, hearing the words about the uprising, ordered the police to arrest some of the ringleaders and announced that they would be executed the next morning. He suggested that this would serve as a warning to other agitators. However, upon learning of the incident, the rebels broke into Mina's house to take revenge; as he was not in his residence the rebels vented their frustrations, destroying his and other things. The rioters then moved to the weapons depot from which they stole weapons and ammunition and then went to prison. Overpowering the guards, they released not only those who were arrested that day Min Goom-ho, but also many political prisoners. Ming then summoned the army to quell the uprising, but it was too late to quell the rebellion. The initial body of the rebels was swollen poor and dissatisfied citizens of the city, as a result of the uprising took on a large scale. Now the rebels turned their attention to the Japanese. One group went to Lieutenant Horimoto's cabin and killed him. Another group, about 3,000 strong headed for the Japanese summer, where Hanabusa Yoshitada the minister in Korea and twenty-seven members of the legislature resided. The crowd surrounded the flying, shouting their intention to kill all the Japanese inside. Hanabusa ordered the doping to be burned, and important documents were set on fire. As the flames quickly spread, the lemanation members fled through the rear gate, where they fled to the harbor and boarded a boat that took them down the Han River to Chemulpo. After sheltering with incheon's commandant, they were again forced to flee after word came about the events in Seoul, and the attitude of their hosts changed. They fled to the harbour during heavy rains and were chased by Korean soldiers. Six Japanese were killed and five others were seriously injured. The survivors, carrying the wounded, then boarded a small boat and headed for the high seas, where three days later they were rescued by a British inspecting the ship HMS Flying Fish, which took them to Nagasaki. The day after the attack on Japanese heritage, the rebels made their way to the royal palace, where they found and killed Min Goom-ho, as well as a dozen other high-ranking officers. They were also looking for the queen of Ming. The queen barely escaped, however, dressed as a normal court lady and was held on the back by a loyal security guard who claimed she was his sister. Daewongun used the incident to confirm his power. The Chinese then sent some 4,500 troops to Korea under the leadership of General Wu Changqing, who effectively regained control and suppressed the uprising. In response, the Japanese also sent four warships and a battalion of troops to Seoul to protect Japanese interests and demand reparations. However, tensions subsided after the signing of the Treaty of Chemulpo on the evening of August 30, 1882. The agreement stated that the Korean conspirators would be punished and 50,000 pounds would be paid to the families of the murdered Japanese. The Japanese government will also receive a 500,000 pound official apology and permission to do so at their diplomatic event in Seoul. After the uprising was charged with inciting sedition and violence, and was arrested by the Chinese and taken to Tianjin. He was later taken to a town about sixty miles southwest of Beijing, where he was confined to a room for three years and kept under strict surveillance. Re-affirmation of Chinese influence After the Imo incident, early reform efforts in Korea suffered serious setbacks. After the incident, the Chinese reiterated their influence on the peninsula, where they began to directly interfere in the internal affairs of Korea. Since the deployment of troops to strategic locations in the capital Seoul, the Chinese have taken a number of initiatives to gain significant influence over the Korean government. Two special foreign advisers representing Chinese interests were sent to Korea: German Paul Georg von Mullendorf, a close confidant of Li Hongzhang, and Chinese diplomat Ma Jianzhong. A Chinese officer also took over army training, providing the Koreans with 1,000 rifles, two guns and 10,000 rounds of ammunition. In addition, Chingunyeong (Metropolitan Guard Command), a new Korean military formation, was created and trained on the Chinese line Yuan Shikai. In October, the two countries signed a treaty stipulating that Korea was dependent on China and gave Chinese merchants the right to conduct maritime and maritime business freely within their borders. It also gave the Chinese significant advantages over the Japanese and Westerners, as well as the unilateral privileges of extraterritoriality in civil and criminal cases. According to the treaty, the number of Chinese merchants and traders increased significantly, which will be inspired by Korean merchants. Although it allowed the Koreans to mutually trade in Beijing the agreement was not a treaty but in fact was issued as an adjustment for vassal. In addition, the Chinese over the next year led the establishment of the Korean Maritime Customs Service, headed by von Mullendorf. Korea has been reduced to a semi-colonial state of China's tributary with King Gojong unable to appoint diplomats without Chinese approval, and with troops stationed in the country to defend Chinese interests. (nb 1) Factional rivalries and the domination of the Ming clan In the 1880s, two rival factions appeared in Korea. One of them was a small group of reformers who concentrated around Gaehwadang (Enlightenment Party), which was disillusioned with the limited scope and arbitrary pace of reform. The members who made up the Enlightenment Party were young, well-educated Koreans, and most of them were from the Janban class. It included Kim Ok-gyun, Park Yong-hyo, Hong Yong-sik, So Kwan Bom and So Jaipil. The group was also Young; Park Yong-hyo came from a prestigious line associated with the royal family, was 23 years old, Honu - 29, So Kwan Bom - 25, So Jaipil - 20; with Kim Ok-gyun is the oldest at 33. All of them spent some time in Japan, Park Yong-hyo was part of a mission sent to Japan to apologize for the Imo incident in 1882. He was accompanied by So Kwan-boom and Kim Ok-gyun, who later came under the influence of Japanese modernizers such as Fukuzawa Yuki. Kim Ok-gyun, while studying in Japan, also cultivated friendships with influential Japanese figures and became the actual leader of the group. They were also strongly nationalistic and wanted to make their country truly independent, putting an end to Chinese interference in The Internal Affairs of Korea. Sadadedan was a group of conservatives that included not only Min Yong Ik of the Ming family, but also other prominent Korean politicians who wanted to maintain power with the help of China. Although Sadadedan members supported the education policy, they advocated gradual changes based on the Chinese model. After the Imo incident, the Ming clan pursued a policy. It was also partly a matter of opportunism, as Chinese intervention led to the subsequent expulsion of rival Daewongun in Tianjin and the expansion of Chinese influence in Korea, but it also reflects an ideological position also shared by many Koreans towards more comfortable and traditional relations as China's influx. Consequently, the Ming clan became a proponent of the philosophy of dongdo seogi (Adopting Western knowledge while preserving Eastern values), it arose from the ideas of moderate Chinese reformers, who stressed the need to preserve perceived excellent cultural values and heritage of the Sino-oriented world, while recognizing the importance of acquiring and adopting Western technologies, in particular military technologies. in order to maintain autonomy. Thus, instead of major institutional reforms, such as the adaptation of new values such as legal equality or the introduction of modern education, as in Meiji Japan, the proponents of this school of thought sought a one-off adoption of institutions that would strengthen the State while maintaining the basic social, political and cultural order. Through the domination of the Ming queen to the throne, the Ming clan was also able to use the newly created institutions of government as the basis for political power, subsequently with their growing monopoly on key positions, they thwarted the ambitions of the Enlightenment Party. The main article gapsin Coup: Gapsin Coup For two years, continuing the incident with Imo, members of Gaehwadang failed to achieve appointment to vital positions in the government and failed to implement their reform plans. As a result, they ready to seize power by all means necessary. In 1884, there was an opportunity to seize power, staging a coup d'etat against Sadaderang. In August, when hostilities between France and China erupted over Annam, half of the Chinese troops stationed in Korea were withdrawn. On December 4, 1884, with the help of Japanese Minister Takezoe Sinithiro, who promised to mobilize Japanese guards to assist, the reformers staged their coup under the guise of a banquet organized by Hong Yong Sik, Director of the General Postal Administration. The banquet was to celebrate the opening of the new national post office. King Godjon is expected to attend with several foreign diplomats and high-ranking officials, most of whom were members of the pro-Thai Sadadedan faction. Kim Ok-gyun and his comrades approached King Gongong, falsely claiming that Chinese troops had created a disturbance, and escorted him to the small Gyeonggu Palace, where they placed him in the custody of Japanese guards. They then killed and wounded several high-ranking officials of the Sadaedan group. After the coup, Gaehwadang members formed a new government and developed a reform agenda. The radical 14-day reform proposal says that the following conditions will be met: the end of The Flow of Korea's Relations with China; abolition of the privileges of the ruling class and the establishment of equal rights for all; reorganization of the government as a practically constitutional monarchy; Review of land tax laws; abolition of the cereal credit system; the unification of all domestic budgetary administrations under the jurisdiction of Ho-jo; the suppression of privileged traders and the development of free trade and trade, the creation of a modern police system, including police patrols and the Royal Guard; and the severe punishment of corrupt officials. However, the new government lasted no more than a few days. In particular, because the reformers were supported by no more than 140 Japanese soldiers who clashed with at least 1,500 Chinese garrisons in Seoul, under the command of General Yan Shikai. As reform measures pose a threat to the power of her clans, the queen of Ming secretly requested military intervention from the Chinese. Consequently, in the three days before the reform measures were unveiled, the coup was suppressed by Chinese troops, who attacked and defeated Japanese forces and restored power to the pro-China Sadaedan factions. During the ensuing melee, Hong Yong-sik was killed, the Japanese building was burned down and forty Japanese were killed. Surviving leaders of the Korean coup, including Kim Ok-gyun, fled to the port of Chemulpo under the escort of Japanese Minister Takezoe. From there they boarded a Japanese ship to be exiled to Japan. In January 1885, The Japanese sent two battalions and seven warships to Korea, resulting in the signing of the 1885 Treaty of Japan on 9 January 1885. The treaty restored diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea. The Koreans also agreed to pay the Japanese 100,000 pounds for the damage done to their legalization and to provide space for the construction of the new building. Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi, in order to overcome Japan's unfavorable position in Korea after the failed coup, visited China to discuss the issue with his Chinese counterpart Li Hongzhang. On 31 May 1885, both sides secured the conclusion of the Tianjin Convention. They also pledged to withdraw their troops from Korea within four months, first notifying each other whether troops would be sent to Korea in the future. After the two countries withdrew their troops, they left behind an unsustainable balance of power on the Korean peninsula between the two countries. Meanwhile, Yuan Shikai stayed in Seoul, was appointed a Chinese resident and continued to interfere in Korea's domestic politics. The coup's failure also marked a sharp decline in Japanese influence over Korea. Incident in Nagasaki Home article: The Nagasaki Incident This section does not refer to any sources. Please help improve this section by adding links to reliable sources. Non-sources of materials can be challenged and removed. (September 2012) (Learn how and when to delete this template message) The Nagasaki incident was a riot that occurred in the Japanese port city of Nagasaki in 1886. Four warships of the navy of the Tsing Empire, the Navy Of Iyan, stopped in Nagasaki, apparently for repair work. Some Chinese sailors rioted in the city and started a riot. Several Japanese policemen who clashed with the rioters were killed. The Tsing government did not apologize after the incident, which led to a wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan. Bin Controversy Bad Harvest in 1889 led the governor of The Province of Hamgong Korea to ban the export of soybeans to Japan. Japan requested and received compensation in 1893 for its importers. The incident underscored Japan's growing reliance on Korean food imports. The prelude to the war Kim Ok-gyun case Kim Ok-gyun photographed in Nagasaki in 1882. His assassination in China would have contributed to tensions leading to the First Sino-Japanese War. On March 28, 1894, pro-Japanese revolutionary Kim Ok-gyun was assassinated in Shanghai. Kim fled to Japan after taking part in the 1884 coup, and the Japanese rejected Korea's demands for his extradition. Many Japanese activists saw it as a potential for a future role in Korean modernization, but Meiji government leaders were more cautious; after some reservations, they referred him to the island of Bonin (Ogasawara). Eventually, he was lured to Shanghai, where he was Korean Hong Jong-woo in his room in a Japanese hotel in an international settlement. After some hesitation, the British authorities in Shanghai concluded that the extradition rules did not apply to the corpse and handed his body over to the Chinese authorities. His body was then flown aboard a Chinese warship and sent back to Korea, where it was cut, encured and displayed in all Korean provinces as a warning to other alleged rebels and traitors. In Tokyo, the Japanese government took this as an outrageous insult. The brutal murder of Kim Ok-gyun was depicted by Li Hongzhang as a betrayal and a blow to Japan's authority and dignity. The Chinese authorities not only refused to press charges against the killer, but also allowed Kim's mutilated body back to Korea, where he was showered with awards and honors. Kim's killing also cast doubt on Japan's commitment to its Korean backers. In the same year, Tokyo police thwarted a previous attempt to assassinate Park Yong-hyo, one of the other Korean leaders of the 1884 uprising. When two suspected Korean assassins were granted asylum by the Korean president, it also caused diplomatic outrage. Although the Japanese government could immediately use Kim's assassination to its advantage, it concluded that after Kim's death on Chinese soil, the treatment of the corpse was beyond his authority. But the shocking killing of the Korean inflamed Japanese opinion, with many in the country believing that the Chinese supported actions also directed against Japan. The Japanese also showed their disrespect for international law when they release the suspected killer, who was arrested by the British authorities in Shanghai and then, under treaty obligations, handed over to the Chinese for trial. Nationalist groups immediately began calling for war with China. The main article of Donghak Rebellion: Tensions in the peasant revolution in Donghak between China and Japan was high, but the war was not yet inevitable, and the furore in Japan over the assassination of Kim began to dissipate. At the end of April, however, a Donghak uprising broke out in Korea. Korean peasants rebelled in an open revolt against the repressive taxation and incompetent financial management of the Joseon government, it was the largest peasant uprising in Korean history. However, on 1 June, when rumours broke that the Chinese and Japanese were on the verge of sending troops, the rebels agreed to a cease-fire to remove any grounds for foreign interference. On June 2, the Japanese cabinet decided to send troops to Korea, if China did. In May, the Chinese took steps to prepare for the mobilization of their forces in the provinces of Jili, Shandong and Manchuria, resulting in tense situation on the Korean peninsula. But these actions were planned more as an armed demonstration to strengthen their positions in Korea, rather than as preparations for war with Japan. On 3 June, King Goongong, on the recommendation of the Ming clan and at the urging of the Yuan Shikai, sought the Chinese government's assistance in quelling the Donghak uprising. Although the uprising was not as serious as it seemed initially, and therefore Chinese forces were not needed. It was decided to send 2,500 men under the command of General E Jichao to Asan Harbour, about 70 km from Seoul. Troops destined for Korea sailed aboard three British steamships chartered by the Chinese government, arriving in Asan on June 9. An other 400 troops arrived on 25 June. Thus, by the end of June there were about 2,800-2900 soldiers in Asana. Closely watching developments on the peninsula, the Japanese government quickly became convinced that the Dunhak uprising would lead to Chinese intervention in Korea. As a result, shortly after the Korean Government learned of the request for assistance from the Chinese army, all Japanese warships in close proximity were immediately ordered by Busan and Chemulpo. By June 9, Japanese warships were consistently called in Chemulpo and Busan. 420 sailors, selected from the crews of warships, were immediately sent to Seoul, anchored in Hemppolo. There they served as a temporary counterweight to chinese troops stationed in Asana. At the same time, by 27 June, a reinforced brigade of some 8,000 troops (Oshima Composite Brigade) under the command of General Osim Yoshimasa had been sent to Chemulpo. According to the Japanese, the Chinese government violated the Tingin Convention by failing to inform the Japanese government of its decision to send troops, but the Chinese claimed that Japan had approved it. The Japanese objected by sending an expeditionary force to Korea. The first 400 troops arrived on June 9 en route to Seoul, and on June 12, 3,000 landed in Incheon. However, Japanese officials denied any intention to intervene. As a result, Vice-King Li Hongzhang was lured into believing that Japan would not wage war, but the Japanese were fully prepared to act. (Attribution is necessary) The Tsing government rejected the proposal of Japan and China to cooperate in reforming the Korean government. When Korea demanded that Japan withdraw its troops from Korea, the Japanese refused. In early June 1894, 8,000 Japanese troops captured King Goongong of Korea, occupied Koenbokgun in Seoul, and by June 25 replaced the existing Korean government with members of the pro-Japanese group. Despite the fact that the forces of the Tsing have already left Korea after being undescribed The new, pro-Korean government granted Japan the right to send troops to the Tsing, while Japan sent more troops to Korea. The Tsing Empire has dismissed the new Korean government as illegal. The status of combatants Japanese Japanese reforms under the Meiji government have given significant priority to the creation of an effective modern national army and navy, especially naval construction. Japan has sent numerous military officials abroad to train and evaluate the relative strengths and tactics of Western armies and navies. The Imperial Japanese Navy It'Sukeyuki, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet French-built Matsushima, the flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Sino-Japanese conflict Imperial Japanese navy was modeled after the British Royal Navy, s53 at the time of the main naval force. British advisers were sent to Japan to train the naval establishment, while Japanese students were sent to the UK to train and observe the Royal Navy. Thanks to drilling and training of Royal Navy instructors, Japan has developed naval officers experts in the art of artillery and navigation. At the beginning of the war, the Imperial Japanese Navy consisted of 12 modern warships (the protected cruiser Izumi was added during the war), eight corvettes, one warship, 26 torpedo boats, as well as numerous auxiliary/armed merchant cruisers and converted liners. In peacetime, the Imperial Japanese Navy warships were divided between the three main naval bases in Yokosuka, Kura and Sasebo, and after mobilization the fleet consisted of five divisions of naval warships and three flotillas of torpedo boats, the fourth of which was formed at the beginning of hostilities. The Japanese also had a relatively large merchant fleet, which in early 1894 consisted of 288 ships. Of these, 66 belonged to the shipping company Nippon Yusenisha Kaisha, which received national subsidies from the Japanese government for the maintenance of ships for use by the navy during the war. As a result, the navy can summon a sufficient number of auxiliary and vehicles. Japan does not yet have the resources to acquire battleships and therefore plans to use the Jeune cole doctrine, which favors small, fast warships, especially cruisers and torpedo boats, with an offensive ability to destroy larger ships. The Japanese naval leadership, on the eve of hostilities, was generally cautious and even apprehensive, as the navy had not yet received the warships ordered in February 1893, in particular the battleships of Fuji Yasima and the protected cruiser Akashi. Thus, the beginning of hostilities at that time was not ideal, and the navy was much less confident than the army, in the outcome of the war with China. Many of the main Japanese warships were built at British and French shipyards (eight British, three French and two two it is known that 16 torpedo boats were built in France and assembled in Japan. The Imperial Japanese Army Government Meiji first washed away their army after the French army. French advisers were sent to Japan with two military missions (in 1872-1880 and 1884), in addition to one mission under the shogunate. In 1873, a national conscription service was introduced and a Western conscript army was established; military schools and arsenals were also built. In 1886, Japan turned to the German-Prussian model as the basis for its army, adopting German doctrines and the German military system and organization. In 1885, Thel man Meckel, a German adviser, implemented new measures, such as the reorganization of the command structure in the division and the regiments; strengthening of army logistics, transport and structures (thus increasing mobility); and the creation of artillery and engineering regiments as independent commands. It was also an army that was equal to the European armed forces in all respects. Japanese troops during the Sino-Japanese War On the eve of the war with China, all men between the ages of 17 and 40 were eligible for conscription, but only those in their 20s were required to be drafted into the army, while those over the age of 17 could volunteer. All men between the ages of 17 and 40, even those who had not received military training or were physically unfit, were considered part of the territorial militia or national guard (cokumin). After a period of active military service (gen-eki), which lasted for three years, the soldiers became part of the first reserve (y'bi) and then the second reserve (kebi). The third reserve was all young and able-bodied men who had not received basic military training because of exceptions, and those conscripts who did not fully meet the physical requirements of military service. During the war, the first reserve (Ibi) was to be called first, and they had to join the regular army units. Next were called the kebi reserve, which was to be either used to further fill the ranks of linear units, or to form in new ones. Members of the Khoja Reserve were to be called only in exceptional circumstances, and the territorial militia or national guard would be called only in the event of a direct attack by the enemy or invasion of Japan. The country was divided into six military districts (Tokyo headquarters, Osaka, Nagoya, Sendai, Hiroshima and Kumamoto), each of which was a recruiting area for a square infantry division consisting of two brigades of two regiments. Each of these divisions contained about 18,600 troops and 36 artillery pieces during mobilization. There was also a division of the Imperial Guard, which was recruited at the national level from all over Japan. This separation also consisted of two but instead had two battalions rather than three battalions, regiments, hence its number after mobilization amounted to 12,500 troops and 24 artillery pieces. In addition, each area had a fortress army of some six battalions, a colonial corps of some 4,000 troops stationed in Hokkaido and the Ryukyu Islands, and a military police battalion. In peacetime, there were fewer than 70,000 regular army members, while their numbers increased to more than 220,000 after mobilization. Moreover, the army still had a prepared reserve, which after the mobilization of the first-line divisions could be formed into reserve brigades. These reserve brigades consisted of four battalions, a cavalry unit, a company of engineers, an artillery battery and rear units. They were to serve as recruiting bases for their prific divisions, as well as to carry out secondary combat operations, and if necessary, they could be expanded to full divisions with a total of 24 territorial force regiments. However, the formation of these units was hampered by the lack of sufficient equipment, especially uniforms. Japanese troops were equipped with an 8mm one-ourselves Murata Type 18 rifle. Improved five-cell types 22 were only being introduced, and therefore, in 1894, on the eve of the war, only the Imperial Guard and the 4th Division were equipped with these rifles. The artillery division consisted of 75 mm field guns and mountain guns manufactured in Osaka. The artillery was based on Krupp's projects, which were adapted by the Italians in the early 1880s; although it could hardly be called modern in 1894, it still met the modern requirements of the battlefield. By the 1890s, Japan had a modern, professionally trained Western-style army that was relatively well equipped and supplied. Its employees studied in Europe and are well educated in the latest strategy and tactics. By the beginning of the war, the Imperial Japanese Army could have put a total of 120,000 men in two armies and five divisions. China's prevailing view in many Western circles was that the modernized Chinese military would crush the Japanese. Observers praised Chinese units such as the Huai Army and weiyang's navy. (nb 2) The German General Staff predicted The defeat of Japan, and William Lang, who was a British adviser to the Chinese military, praised Chinese training, ships, weapons and fortifications, saying that at the end of the day, there is no doubt that Japan should be completely defeated. The main article of the Imperial Chinese Army: The Imperial Chinese Army of the Tsing Dynasty does not have a single national army, but consists of three main components, with the so-called Eight Banners forming the elite. eight banners were divided along ethnic lines into separate separate Han Chinese, Mongolian, Hui (Muslim) and other ethnic entities. The Flagmen, who made up the Eight Banners, received a higher salary than the rest of the army, while Manchuria received additional privileges. A total of 250,000 soldiers were on eight banners, with more than 60 per cent in garrisons in Beijing and the remaining 40 per cent serving as garrison troops in other major Chinese cities. The Green Standard Army was a 600,000-strong gendarmerie that was recruited from the majority of the Han Chinese population. His soldiers received no basic military training in peacetime, but had to fight in any conflict. The third component was an irregular force called the Braves, which were used as a kind of back-up force for the regular army and which were usually recruited from more remote or remote provinces in China. They were formed into very poorly organized units from the same province. The brave were sometimes described as mercenaries, and their volunteers received as much military training as their commanders saw fit. With no fixed unit organization, it is impossible to know how many combat-ready Braves there actually were in 1894. There were other, smaller number of military formations, one of which was the Huai Army, which was under the personal leadership of the politician, general and diplomat Li Hongzhang and was created initially to suppress the Taiping Uprising (1850-1864). The Huai Army received limited training from Western military advisers; With almost 45,000 troops, it was considered The Best Armed Military Unit in China. Although the Chinese had created arsenals for the production of firearms, and a large number of them had been imported from abroad, 40 per cent of Chinese troops had not been issued with rifles or even muskets at the beginning of the war. Instead, they were armed with various swords, spears, pikes, halberds, bows and arrows. Against well-trained, well-armed and disciplined Japanese troops, they would have little chance. Those units that have firearms have been equipped with heterogeneity weapons, from various modern rifles to old-fashioned muskets; this lack of standardization has led to a serious problem with the proper supply of ammunition. The Imperial Chinese Army in 1894 was a heterogeneous mixture of modernized, partially modernized and almost medieval units that no commander could successfully lead, leading to poor leadership among Chinese officers. Chinese officers did not know how to handle their troops, and senior, high-ranking officers still believed they could fight the way they did during the Taiping Uprising of 1850-1864. It was also a result of the fact that the armed forces were divided into largely independent regional commands. The soldiers were taken from different provinces, which had no affinity with each of every Chinese troops also suffered from poor morale, mainly because many troops were not paid for a long time. The low prestige of soldiers in Chinese society also hampered morale, and the use of opium and other drugs was prevalent throughout the army. Low morale and poor leadership have seriously reduced the effectiveness of Chinese troops and contributed to defeats such as the rejection of the very well-fortified and justified Weihaiwei. In addition, there was no military logistical support, as the construction of railways in Manchuria was discouraged. Huai Army troops, although they were a small minority in the overall Imperial Chinese Army, had to take part in most of the fighting during the war. The main article of the Beiyang fleet: Empress of the fleet Beiyang dowager Cixi built the Chinese navy in 1888. The Beiyang Fleet was one of four modernized Chinese naval forces in the late Tsing Dynasty. The Navy was heavily sponsored by Li Hongzhang, Viceroy Jili, who also created the Huai Army. The Xiang Fleet was the dominant fleet in East Asia until the First Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese themselves were afraid to face the Chinese fleet, especially the two battleships built in Germany - Digyuan and Chenyuan, with which the Japanese had no comparable counterparts. However, China's advantages were more obvious than real, as most Chinese warships were older and outdated; Ships were also not properly maintained, and indiscipline was widespread among their crews. The large armor of the main Chinese warships and the greater weight of the wide side they could shoot were more than offset by the number of fast- shooting guns on most Japanese first-line warships, which gave the Japanese an advantage in any sustained exchange of volleys. The worst feature of both Chinese battleships was their main weaponry; each of them was armed with short-barrelled cannons in two barbets mounted in an echelon that could only shoot in limited arcs. China's short barrels of basic weapons meant that the projectiles had low muzzle speed and poor penetration, and their accuracy was also low over long distances. Tactically, Chinese naval vessels entered the war with only the roughest set of instructions - ships that were assigned to designated pairs had to stick together, and all ships had to fight at the end as far away from the beam as possible, a tactic dictated by the aging arrangement of guns aboard Chinese warships. The only vague resemblance to the navy's tactics was that all ships had to follow the visible movements of the flagship, which was necessary because the signal book used was written in English, a language with which few of the Syang Navy officers had any acquaintance. When it was first developed by the Dowager Empress in 1888, Bijang's fleet was Navy in East Asia. Before her adopted son, Emperor Guangsu, took the throne in 1889, she wrote clear orders that the fleet should continue to evolve and expand gradually. However, after he retired, all naval and military developments abruptly stopped. Japan's victories over China are often falsely said to be the fault of Cixi. Many believed that Cixi was the cause of the Navy's defeat because it appropriated navy funds to build the Summer Palace in Beijing. However, extensive research by Chinese historians has shown that Cixi was not the cause of the decline of the Chinese fleet. In fact, China's defeat was due to Emperor Guangsu's lack of interest in the development and maintenance of the armed forces. His close adviser, the great mentor of Weng Tonge, advised Guangsu to cut all funding for the navy and army because he did not see Japan as a true threat, and there were several natural disasters in the early 1890s that the emperor considered more urgent to spend. Dinyuan, the flagship of the beiyang fleet of zhenyuan Beiyang Fleet Basic combatants Ironclad battleships Dingyuan (flagship), Chenyuan armored cruiser King Yuen, Laiyuan Protected Cruisers Chih Yuen, Ching Yuen Cruisers Torpedo Cruisers - Chi Yuen, Kuang Ping / Kwang Ping, Chaoyong, Yanwei coastal warships numerous gunboats and chartered merchant ships modern wars, fought by the Tsing Empire While the Tsing Empire fought the First Sino-Japanese War, it also simultaneously involved the rebels in the north-west of China. Generals Dong Fuxiang, Ma Anlian and Ma Haiyan were initially summoned by the Tsing government to take Hui troops under their command to participate in the First Sino-Japanese War, but in the end they were sent to suppress the Dungan Uprising. Early stages June 1, 1894: The Dunhak Rebel Army moves toward Seoul. The Korean government is asking for help from the Tsing government to quell the uprising. June 6, 1894: About 2,465 Chinese soldiers are transported to Korea to quell the Donghak uprising. Japan maintains that it has not been notified and therefore China has violated the Thientxin Convention, which requires China and Japan to notify each other before interfering in Korea's affairs. China claims that Japan has been notified and approved of Chinese interference. June 8, 1894: The first of about 4,000 Japanese soldiers and 500 Marines disembarked in Jemulpo, Incheon. June 11, 1894: End of the Donhack Rebellion. June 13, 1894: The Japanese government telegraphs the commander of Japanese troops in Korea, Othori Keisuke, to stay in Korea as soon as possible, despite the end of the uprising. June 16, 1894: Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu meets Wang Ambassador Tsing to Japan to discuss the future status of Korea. Wang says that the government intends to withdraw from Korea after the suppression of the uprising, and expects Japan to do the same. However, China retains residents to take care of the Chinese championship in Korea. June 22, 1894: Additional Japanese troops arrive in Korea. Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi tells Matsukata Masayoshi that since the Tsing Empire appears to be preparing for military preparations, there is probably no policy but to go to war. Mutsu tells Otori to push the Korean government on Japanese requirements. June 26, 1894: Otori presents King Godjoon of Korea with a series of reform proposals. The Goongjon Government rejects these proposals and instead insists on the withdrawal of troops. July 7, 1894: Failure of mediation between China and Japan, organized by the British Ambassador to China. July 19, 1894: Creation of the Japanese Joint Fleet, consisting of almost all ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Mutsu Cables zori take all necessary measures to force the Korean government to implement a reform program. July 23, 1894: Japanese troops occupy Seoul, capture Godjon and create a new pro-Japanese government that terminates all Sino-Korean treaties and grants the Imperial Japanese Army the right to expel the Tsing Empire's Jieyang Army from Korea. July 25, 1894: The first battle of the war: The Battle of Pundo / Hoto-oki Kaisen Events during the War Opening moves by July 1894, Chinese troops in Korea were saturated 3000-3500 and were in the minority of Japanese troops. They can only be delivered by sea through Asan Bay. The Japanese goal was to first block the Chinese in Asan and then surround them with their ground troops. Japan's initial strategy is to gain command of the sea, which is crucial for its operations in Korea. The command of the sea would allow Japan to transport troops to the mainland. The Fifth Division of the Army landed in Chemulpo on the west coast of Korea to engage and push Chinese troops northwest of the peninsula and draw the Biyang fleet into the Yellow Sea, where it will participate in the decisive battle. Depending on the outcome of this commitment, Japan will make one of three options; If the United Fleet wins decisively, most of the Japanese army will conduct immediate landings on the coast between Shan Hai Kuan and Tientsin in order to defeat the Chinese army and bring the war to a rapid conclusion. If it were a draw and neither side gained control of the sea, the army would focus on the occupation of Korea. Finally, if the United Fleet is defeated and therefore lost command of the sea, the bulk of the army will remain in Japan and prepare to repel the Chinese invasion, then as the Fifth Division in Korea will be ordered to hang on and fight the actions of the rearguard. rearguard. Main article: Battle of Pungdo Image of the wreck of the Kov-shing and the rescue of part of its crew by the French gunboat Le Lion, from the French periodical Le Petit Journal (1894) on July 25, 1894, the cruiser Yoshino, Naniwa and Akitsu Japanese Flying Squadron, which patrolled near asan Bay, collided with the Chinese cruiser Tsy Yuan and the gunman Kwang These vessels left Asan to meet with the transport koov-shing, accompanied by the Chinese gunboat Tsao-kiang. After an hour-long engagement, Chi-yuan escaped while Kwan-I grounded on the rocks, where his powder log exploded. Kow-shing is a 2,134-ton British merchant ship owned by the London-based Indo- Chinese Steam Navigation Company under the command of Captain T.R. Galsworthy and comprising 64 men. The ship was chartered by the Tsing government to ferry troops to Korea, and was on its way to strengthening Asan with 1,100 troops plus supplies and equipment. A German artillery officer, Major von Hanneken, an adviser to the Chinese, was also on board. The ship was due to arrive on July 25. The Japanese cruiser Naniva, led by Captain Togo Heihachiro, intercepted the kov-shing and captured his escort. The Japanese then ordered Coe-shin to follow Naniva and ordered the Europeans to be transferred to Naniwa. However, 1,100 Chinese desperate to return to Tou threatened to kill English captain Galsworthy and his team. After four hours of negotiations, Captain Togo ordered the ship to be shot. The torpedo missed, but the subsequent blow hit Coe Shin, who began to sink. Confused, some of the Europeans ran overboard, only to be shot by the Chinese. The Japanese rescued three British crew members (captain, first officer and quartet) and 50 Chinese and took them to Japan. The sinking of the Coe-Shin almost caused a diplomatic incident between Japan and Great Britain, but the action was taken in accordance with international law regarding the treatment of rebels (Chinese troops). Many observers believed that the troops lost aboard Kow-shing were the best Chinese. The German gunboat Iltis rescued 150 Chinese, the French gunboat Le Lion rescued 43, and the British cruiser HMS Porpoise rescued an unknown number. Conflict in Korea Main articles: Battle of Songhwan and Battle of Pyongyang (1894) Korean soldiers and Chinese prisoners commissioned by the new pro-Japanese Korean government for the forced expulsion of Chinese troops, On July 25, Maj. Gen. Oshima Yoshima Yoshima led a mixed brigade of about 4,000 men, which quickly headed from Seoul south toward Asan Bay to confront Chinese troops garrisoned at Songgwan station east of Asan and Konju. Chinese forces stationed near Songhwan under the command of General E Jichao killed about 3,880 people. They expected the japanese's impending arrival by strengthening their position with trenches, earthworks, including six redoubts protected by abatitis, and flooding surrounding rice fields. But chinese reinforcements were expected to be lost aboard British transport Kowshing. China's main forces were deployed east and northeast of Asan, near the main road leading to Seoul, the key positions held by the Chinese were the cities of Songwan and Cheonan. Approximately 3,000 troops were stationed in Songhwan, and 1,000 were stationed in Cheonan, together with General E Jichao's headquarters. The rest of the Chinese troops were stationed in Asana itself. The Chinese were preparing for a tick-borne movement against the Korean capital, an array of troops in Pyongyang in the north and Asana in the south. On the morning of July 27-28, 1894, the two forces met near Asan in an engagement that lasted until 7:30 a.m., the next morning. The battle began with a sabotage attack by Japanese troops, followed by a major offensive that quickly outsmarted The Chinese defense. Chinese troops, witnessing that they were outflanked, left their defensive positions and fled in the direction of Asan. The Chinese gradually gave way to superior Japanese numbers, and finally broke and fled towards Pyongyang, giving up weapons, ammunition and all their artillery. The Japanese took the city of Asan on July 29, tearing up Seoul's Chinese encirclement. The Chinese suffered 500 dead and wounded, while the Japanese suffered 88 casualties. The comparative perspective of the Japanese and Chinese emperors on August 1 was officially declared a war between China and Japan. The justification given by the rulers of both countries could best be assessed by comparing the declarations issued from each of them; the language and tone are markedly different. In the case of Japan: We, by the grace of Heaven, the Emperor of Japan, sitting on a throne occupied by the same dynasty since time immemorial, make an appeal to all our faithful and brave subjects, as follows: We declare war on China, and we command all our competent authorities, in accordance with our desire and in order to achieve the national goal of fighting by sea and land against China with all the means at their disposal, consistently with the Law of Nations. During the last three decades of our rule, our constant goal has been to further the peaceful development of the country into civilization; and, being prudent to evil, inseparable from complications with foreign states, we are always happy to instruct our Minister of State to work to strengthen friendly relations with our treaty powers. We are pleased to learn that our Empire's relations with these powers have increased every year in good faith and in In these circumstances, we were not prepared for such blatant mumm and integrity, as China demonstrated in its conduct towards that country in relation to the Korean case. Korea is an independent state. It was first introduced into the family of nations on the advice and leadership of Japan. However, China has a habit of labeling Korea its dependence, as well as openly and covertly interfering in its internal affairs. During the recent Korean uprising, China sent troops there, claiming that its purpose was to afford the support of its dependent state. As a result of the treaty concluded with Korea in 1882, which was aimed at possible emergencies, military forces were sent to the country as a result. In an effort to ensure that Korea is free from the scourge of perpetual unrest and thereby preserve peace in the East as a whole, Japan has invited China to cooperate in achieving this area. But China, promoting various pretexts, rejected Japan's offer. Japan has since advised Korea to reform its administration so that order and tranquillity can be maintained at home and that the country can fulfil the responsibilities and responsibilities of an independent state abroad. Korea has already agreed to this task. But China secretly and insidiously tried to circumvent and thwart Japan's goal. She also hesitated and tried to make bellicose preparations both on land and at sea. When these preparations were completed, she not only sent large reinforcements to Korea because of her ambitious designs, but even carried out her arbitrariness and audacity to the extent that she opened fire on our ships in Korean waters. China's simple objective is to make it uncertain where the responsibility is to preserve peace and order in Korea, and not only to weaken that State's position in the family of nations - a position that was gained for Korea through Japan's efforts - but also to conceal the importance of treaties by recognizing and reaffirming that position. Such behaviour on the part of China is not only a direct detriment of the rights and interests of this empire, but also a threat to the permanent peace and tranquillity of the East. Judging by its actions, it should be concluded that China was inclined from the outset to sacrifice the world to achieve its sinister object. In this situation, fervent as we want to promote the prestige of the country abroad purely peacefully, we find it impossible to avoid the official declaration of war against China. We sincerely wish that the faithful and the prowess of our faithful subjects would soon be restored and the glory of the Empire strengthened and completed. Given this first day of the eighth month of the 27th year Japanese Emperor Meiji, released on behalf of Emperor Meiji, the tenor of the Japanese declaration of war, appeared to have at least one eye aimed at the wider international community; use of phrases such as the family of nations, the Law of Nations and additional references to international treaties. This was in stark contrast to the Chinese approach to international relations (historically noted for refusing to treat other peoples on a diplomatic basis, and instead insisted that such foreign powers pay tribute to the Chinese emperor as vassals - see the system of China's influx). In accordance with the traditional Chinese approach to its neighbors, Emperor Guangsu thus proclaimed: Korea has been our tributary for the last two hundred odd years. All this time it pays tribute to us, which is an issue known to the world. Over the past decade, Korea has been troubled by repeated uprisings, and we, sympathizing with our small influx, have just as repeatedly sent aid to it, eventually placing a resident in its capital to protect the interests of Korea. On the fourth moon (May) of this year in Korea began another uprising, and the king repeatedly asked us for help to put the uprising. We then ordered Li Hong Chan (Li Hongzhang) to send troops to Korea; and they barely made it to Yashan, the rebels immediately dissipated. But Wojen, for no reason, suddenly sent his troops to Korea, and entered Seoul, the capital of Korea, strengthening them constantly until they exceeded ten thousand people. Meanwhile, the Japanese forced the Korean king to change his system of government, demonstrating a tendency to mock the Koreans in every way. A difficult case was found to reason with Wojen. Although we are used to helping our tributaries, we have never interfered with their internal government. Japan's treaty with Korea is one country with another; there is no law to send large armies to intimidate the country in this way and force it to change its system of government. The various powers are united in condemning the behavior of the Japanese, and cannot give a reasonable name to the army it now has in Korea. Nor can Japan reason and will not heed the call to withdraw its troops and amicably devoting the question of what should be done in Korea. On the contrary, Japan has shown itself to be belligerent without regard to visibility, and is increasing its forces there. Her behavior alarmed the people of Korea as well as our merchants there, and so we sent more troops to protect them. The judge of our surprise, then, when, halfway to Korea, a number of Wojen ships suddenly appeared, and, taking advantage of our unpreparedness, opened fire on our transport on the spot on the sea coast near Yashan, and damaged them, thereby forcing us from their treacherous behavior, which cannot be predicted by us. Since Japan has violated treaties and failed to comply with international laws, and is now raging with its false and insidious actions, starting hostilities itself, and laying itself open to condemnation by various powers in general, we therefore want the world to know that we have always followed the path of philanthropy and perfect justice throughout the complication, while Wojen, on the other hand therefore we have ordered Li Hong Chan (Li Hongzhang) to give a strict order to our various armies to rush to eradicate Vozhen from their lairs. He must send successive armies of valiant men to Korea to save the Koreans from the dust of slavery. We also command the Manchurians, viceroys and governors of the maritime provinces, as well as the commanders-in-chief of various armies, prepare for war and make every effort to shoot at the ships of Wojen if they come to our ports, and completely destroy them. We call on our generals to refrain from the least weakness in obeying our orders in order to avoid severe punishment on the part of our hands. Let everyone know this decree, as if addressed to themselves individually. Respect this! - The proclamation of the Chinese Emperor Guansu, in the last statement of the Chinese emperor, a palpable disdain for the Japanese can be assumed from the reuse of the term Wojen, (which translates as the deliberately offensive term 'dwarf'). Such use of a derogatory state to describe a foreign state was not unusual for Chinese official documents of the time; so much so that the main bone of contention between imperial China and the powers of that time was the usual use of the Chinese character 夷 ('Yi'... that literally meant barbarian), to refer to those that were otherwise referred to as foreign devils (usually those powers that occupy the ports of the Treaty). The use of the term Yi (夷) by Chinese imperial officials was in fact considered so provocative by treaty powers that the collective package of agreements known as the TientsIan Treaty (agreed in 1858 to end the Second Opium War) explicitly prohibited the Chinese imperial court from using the term Yi - to refer to officials, subjects or citizens of the four warring powers , (namely, the Russian Empire, France, the United Kingdom) signatories seem to consider it necessary to extract this specific demand from representatives of Emperor Xianfeng. However, in the thirty-five years since the treaty was signed by Thientsin, the language of the Chinese emperors seems to have changed little in relation to its neighbor, Japan. Japanese First Sino-Japanese War, The War, 1895 After the Declaration by August 4, the remaining Chinese troops in Korea retreated to the northern city of Pyongyang, where they were met by troops sent from China. 13,000 to 15,000 defenders made a defensive overhaul of the city, hoping to test the progress of the Japanese. On September 15, the Imperial Japanese Army converged in Pyongyang from several directions. The Japanese attacked the city and eventually defeated the Chinese with an attack from the rear; Defenders gave up. Taking advantage of heavy rainfall overnight, the remaining Chinese troops fled Pyongyang and headed northeast toward the coastal city of Uijju. The losses amounted to 2,000 dead and about 4,000 wounded for the Chinese, while the Japanese casualties amounted to 102 people killed, 433 wounded and 33 missing. In the early morning of September 16, the entire Japanese army entered Pyongyang. The Muslim general, Tso Baogi, from Shandong Province, was killed in action in Pyongyang by Japanese artillery in 1894 while securing the city. A monument was built for him. Defeat fleet Beiyang Main article: Battle of the Yalu River (1894) Battle on the Yalu River In early September, Li Hongzhang decided to strengthen Chinese forces in Pyongyang, using the Beiyang fleet to escort traffic at the mouth of the Taedong River. Some 4,500 additional troops stationed in Jili were to be redeployed. On 12 September, half of the soldiers went to Daga in five specially chartered carriages and headed to Dalian, where two days later, on 14 September, they were joined by another 2,000 soldiers. Initially, Admiral Dean wanted to send light escorts with only a few ships, while the main forces of the Biyang Fleet could find and operate directly against the United Fleet to prevent the Japanese from intercepting the convoy. But the appearance of Japanese cruisers Yoshino and Naniwa on a reconnaissance flight near Weihaiwei thwarted these plans. The Chinese mistook them for the main Japanese fleet. Thus, on September 12, the entire Biyan fleet flew from Dalian to Weihaiwei, arriving the next day near the Shandong Peninsula. Chinese warships spent the whole day plying the area, waiting for the Japanese. However, since the Japanese fleet was not seen, Admiral Dean decided to return to Dalian, reaching the port on the morning of September 15. When Japanese troops moved north to attack Pyongyang, Admiral Ito correctly guessed that the Chinese would try to strengthen their army in Korea by sea. On September 14, the United Fleet soaked north to search the Korean and Chinese coasts in order to bring the Biyang fleet into battle. Japan's victory in Pyongyang allowed Chinese troops to be tested north to the Yalu River, in the process of eliminating all effective military presence on the Korean peninsula. Shortly before the convoy left, Admiral Ding received a message about the battle of Pyongyang informing him of the defeat. Subsequently, this made it unnecessary to redeploy troops at the mouth of the Taedong River. Admiral Dean then correctly assumed that the next Chinese line of defense would be established on the Yalu River, and decided to redeploy his soldiers there. On September 16, a convoy of five transport ships departed from dalian Bay under escort from the Beiyang Fleet, which included two battleships, the Dinyuan and the Chenyuan. Having reached the mouth of the Yalu River, the transports were dropped off by the troops, and the disembarkation operation continued until the next morning. On September 17, 1894, the Japanese combined fleet collided with the Chinese Xiaong fleet at the mouth of the Yalu River. The naval battle, which lasted from late morning to sunset, led to a Japanese victory. Although the Chinese were able to land 4,500 troops by sunset, Beyang's fleet was close to the time of the total collapse, most of the fleet escaped or was sunk, and the two largest ships, the Dinyuan and the Chenyuan, were almost munitions-free. The Imperial Japanese Navy destroyed eight of the ten Chinese warships, assuring Japan's command in the yellow sea. The main factor of the Japanese victory was superiority in speed and firepower. The victory destroyed the morale of the Chinese navy. The Battle of the Yalu River was the largest naval operation in the war and a major propaganda victory for Japan. The invasion of Manchuria this section needs to be expanded. You can help by adding to it. (December 2012) Main article: Battle of Juliancheng Since the defeat in Pyongyang, the Chinese left North Korea and took up defensive positions in fortifications along their banks of the Yalu River near Jiulancheng. Having received reinforcements by October 10, the Japanese quickly moved north towards Manchuria. Illustration of Utagawa Kokunimas Japanese soldiers beheading 38 Chinese prisoners of war as a warning to others On the night of October 24, 1894, the Japanese successfully crossed the Yalu River, undetected, erecting a pontoon bridge. The next day, at 5 p.m., they attacked the Husan outpost east of Julyancheng. At 20:30 the defenders left their positions, and the next day they completely retreated from Julyancheng. With the capture of Jiulanchen, the 1st Army Corps of General Yamagata occupied the nearby town of Dandong, and in the north elements of the retreating Biyan Army set fire to the town of Fancheng. The Japanese established a solid foothold on Chinese territory, killing only four people and injuring 140. (quote needed) Japanese 1st The corps was then divided into two groups: General Nozu Michitsura's 5th Provincial Division advancing towards the city of Mukden (modern Shenyang) and the 3rd Provincial Division of Lieutenant General Katsura Taro, chasing fleeing Chinese troops west towards the Liaodong Peninsula. By December, the 3rd Provincial Division had captured the cities of Tatunkau, Takushan, Xiang, Tomucheng, Heicheng and Kanwasa. The 5th Provincial Division marched during the harsh Manchu winter towards Mukden. The Japanese 2nd Army Corps, led by Syam Ivao, landed on the southern coast of the Liaodong Peninsula on October 24 and quickly moved to capture Jinzhou and Dalian Bay on November 6-7. The Japanese besieged the strategic port of Leshunk (Port Arthur). The fall of Leshunkov's Main Articles: The Battle of Lushunkou and the massacre in Port Arthur,China, by November 21, 1894, the Japanese had taken the city of Leshunk (Port Arthur) with minimal resistance and minimal losses. Describing their motives as the disfigured remains of Japanese soldiers invading the city, Japanese forces began to take on the rampant killing of civilians during the Port Arthur massacre with unconfirmed estimates of thousands. An event that at the time was widely viewed with scepticism as the world as a whole was still in disbelief that the Japanese were capable of such deeds, which seemed more likely to have been exaggerated by the Chinese government's propaganda fabrications to discredit Japanese hegemony. In fact, the Chinese government itself was uncertain how to react and initially denied the appearance of Port Arthur's loss to the Japanese altogether. Entering the city of Port Arthur, we saw the head of a Japanese soldier, depicted on a wooden stake. This filled us with fury and a desire to crush any Chinese soldier. Everyone we saw in town, we killed. The streets were filled with corpses, so much they blocked our path. We killed people in their homes; by and large, there was not a single house without three to six dead. The blood was flowing, and the smell was terrible. We sent out search teams. We shot at some, we shot at others. Chinese troops just dropped their weapons and fled. Shooting and cuts, it was boundless joy. At this time, our artillery troops were in the rear, giving three greetings (banzai) for the emperor.- Makio Okabe, diary 98 K 10 December 1894 Kaipeng (modern Gaizhou) fell into the Japanese 1st Army Corps. The fall of the Weihaiwei Revisionist image of the Chinese delegation, led by Admiral Ding Ruchang and their foreign advisers, landed a Japanese ship to negotiate surrender with Admiral Ito Sukeyuki after the Battle of Weihaiwei. In fact, Dean committed suicide after the defeat and never gave up. Main articles: Battle of Weihaiwei and Battle of Ingkou Chinese Navy subsequently for the fortifications of Weihaiwei. However, they were then surprised by the Japanese ground forces, who bypassed the harbour defenses in coordination with the navy. The Battle of Weihaiwei was a 23-day siege with major land and naval components, which took place between January 20 and February 12, 1895. Historian Jonathan Spence notes that the Chinese admiral resigned because of the protective curtain of contact mines and no longer took part in the fighting. The Japanese commander passed his troops over the Shandong Peninsula and reached the ground side of Weihaiwei, where the siege was eventually successful for the Japanese. After the fall of Weihaiwei on February 12, 1895 and the easing of harsh winter conditions, Japanese troops entered further into southern Manchuria and northern China. By March 1895, the Japanese had strengthened the posts that commanded maritime approaches to Beijing. Although this would be the last major battle fought; numerous skirmishes will follow. The Battle of Inkou was fought outside the port city of Ingkou, Manchuria, on March 5, 1895. Occupation of the Pescadores Islands Main article: Pescadores campaign (1895) Even before peace talks were due to begin in Shimonoseki, the Japanese began preparations for the capture of Taiwan. However, the first operation will not be directed against the island itself, but against the Pescadores Islands, which, because of their strategic position off the west coast, will be a stepping stone to further operations against the island. On 6 March, the Japanese Expeditionary Force, consisting of a reinforced infantry regiment with 2,800 troops and an artillery battery, set off in five carriages and sailed from Ujin to Sasebo, arriving there three days later. On 15 March, five transports were accompanied by seven cruisers and five torpedo boats of the 4th Flotilla, which were heading south. The Japanese navy arrived in Pescadores on the night of March 20, but faced stormy weather. Due to bad weather, landings were postponed to March 23 when the weather cleared up. On the morning of March 23, Japanese warships began bombing Chinese positions around the port of Lishanjiao. The fort guarding the harbor was quickly drowned out. Around noon, Japanese troops began landing. Unexpectedly, when the landing operation began, the fort's guns again opened fire, causing some confusion among Japanese troops. But they soon fell silent again after being shot at by Japanese cruisers. By 2 p.m., Lishanjiao was under Japanese control. After strengthening the captured positions the next morning, Japanese troops headed towards the main city of Magong. The Chinese offered symbolic resistance and after a short skirmish left their positions, retreating to the neighboring island of Xiyu. 11:30 The Japanese entered Madong, but as soon as they took the coastal forts in the city, they were shelled by a Chinese coastal battery on the island of Xiyo. The barrier continued until dark, as the Chinese destroyed all the weapons in Madong before they retreated, and Japanese warships were afraid to enter the strait between Penghu and Xiyu islands because of the potential threat posed by mines. However, there were no serious casualties among the Japanese forces. During that night, a small naval artillery crew of 30 men managed to make one of the tools of the Mageong coastal battery workable. At dawn, the gun began firing on Chinese positions in Xiyy, but Chinese cannons did not respond. Subsequently, the Japanese crossed the narrow strait, reaching Xiyi, discovering that Chinese troops had left their positions at night and fled aboard local vessels. Japanese warships entered the strait the next day and, finding that there were no minefields, entered Magong Harbour. By 26 March, all the islands of the archipelago were under Japanese control, and Rear Admiral Tanaka Tsunatsune was appointed Governor. During the campaign, the Japanese lost 28 dead and wounded, while the Chinese casualties were almost 350 killed or wounded and almost 1,000 were taken prisoner. This operation effectively prevented the strengthening of Chinese forces in Taiwan and allowed the Japanese to put forward their demand for Taiwan's withdrawal from the peace talks. The end of the military treaty of Shimnosek of the Shimnosek of the Shimnosek treaty of the Shimnosek, April 17, 1895, was signed by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. China recognized the full independence of Korea and indefinitely resisted Japan's Islands of Liaodong, Taiwan and Penghu. The disputed islands, known as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, were not named in the treaty, but Japan annexed these uninhabited islands in Okinawa Prefecture in 1895. Japan maintains that the move was made independently of the treaty to end the war, and China claims they were meant as part of The end of Taiwan. In addition, China had to pay Japan 200 million tael (8,000,000 kg/17,600,000 pounds) of silver as military reparations. The Tsing government has also signed a commercial agreement allowing Japanese vessels to operate on the Yangtze River, operate production plants in contract ports and open four more ports for foreign trade. However, Russia, Germany and France made a triple intervention in a few days and forced Japan to abandon the Liaodong Peninsula in exchange for another 30 million tons of silver (equivalent to about 450 million yen). After the war, the Tsing government paid 200 million Tael Buying, or 311,072,865 yen, making the war a net profit for Japan, as their military fund was only 250,000,000 yen. Japanese Invasion of Taiwan Home Article: Japanese Invasion (1895) The withdrawal of the island to Japan was perceived by the Chinese people with such disignment that it required a large military force to carry out its occupation. In the nearly two years since, Japanese troops have been offered fierce guerrilla resistance, and large forces - more than 100,000 - were required to quell it, as was claimed at the time. This was not achieved without much cruelty on the part of the conquerors, who in their march on the island committed all the most terrible excesses of war. They undoubtedly had significant provocations. They were constantly ambushed by enemies, and their losses from battle and disease far exceeded the entire loss of the entire Japanese army throughout the Manchurian campaign. But their revenge was often taken by the innocent villagers. Men, women and children were mercilessly killed or subjected to rampant lust and raping. The result was the expulsion from their homes of thousands of hard-working and peaceful peasants who, long after the main resistance was completely suppressed, continued to wage war on vendettas, and to generate a sense of hatred that would not have completely eradicated the subsequent years of reconciliation and good government. - Cambridge Modern History, Volume 12 105 Several officials of the Tsing in the determination to oppose the section of Taiwan to Japan under the Treaty , and on May 23 declared the island an independent Republic of Formosa. On 29 May, Japanese forces led by Admiral Motonori Kabayama landed in northern Taiwan and, as part of a five-month campaign, defeated the republican forces and occupied the island's main cities. The campaign effectively ended on October 21, 1895, with the defection of Liu Yong-fu, the second Republican president, and the surrender of the republican capital of Tainan. After a satirical drawing in Punch magazine (September 29, 1894), showing the victory of little Japan over big China, Japanese success during the war was the result of modernization and industrialization, which began two decades ago. The war demonstrated the superiority of Japanese tactics and training from the adoption of Western-style armed forces. The Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy were able to inflict a series of defeats on the Chinese through foresight, endurance, strategy and organization strength. Japan's prestige has grown in the eyes of the world, and the victory reflects the success of the Meiji Restoration. Japan only suffered a small loss of lives and treasures in exchange for the dominance of Taiwan, Pescadores and the Liaotung Peninsula in China. Their decisions to abandon the policy of isolation and to study western policy have also set a good example for other Asian countries. As a result of this war, Japan has become equal in status with and victory established Japan as the dominant power in Asia. This also reinforced their ambitions of aggression and military expansion in Asia. As Japan benefited greatly from the Treaty, it encouraged Japanese ambitions to continue invading China. This has made the Chinese national crisis unprecedentedly serious. The degree of semi-colonization has deepened considerably. After Japan's victory, other imperialist powers thought they could also benefit from China. These imperialist powers then began to divide China over the next few years. For China, the war revealed the high level of corruption present in the government and policy of the Tsing administration. Traditionally, China has viewed Japan as a subordinate part of the Chinese cultural sphere. Although China was defeated by European powers in the 19th century, the defeat at the hands of the Asian power was a bitter psychological blow. Anti-foreign sentiment and agitation grew, which would later end in the form of a boxing uprising five years later. The population of Manchuria was devastated by the fighting during the First Sino-Japanese War and the boxing uprising, with huge losses suffered during the wars, and then were brought to extreme suffering and deprivation in Beijing and northeast China. The Convention on Retrocession of the Liaodong Peninsula, 8 November 1895, although Japan achieved what it intended to achieve and ended Its Chinese influence on Korea, Japan was forced to abandon the Liaodong Peninsula (Port Arthur) in exchange for increased financial compensation. The European powers (especially Russia) did not object to other provisions of the treaty, but believed that Japan should not get Port Arthur because they had their own ambitions in this part of the world. Russia persuaded Germany and France to join the diplomatic pressure on Japan, which led to triple intervention on April 23, 1895. Although Japan has managed to eliminate Chinese influence on Korea, it is Russia that is reaping the benefits. Korea declared itself the Korean Empire and declared its independence from the Tsing Empire. The Japanese-sponsored Gabo (Cabo Reforms) of 1894-1896 transformed Korea: legal slavery was abolished in all forms; The Janban class has lost all special privileges; The outgods were abolished; Equality of law; equality of opportunity in a social background; marriage was abolished, Hangul was to be used in government documents; Korean history was introduced in schools; The Chinese calendar has been replaced by the Gregorian calendar; education has been expanded and new textbooks written. In 1895, a pro-Russian official tried to dislocate the King of Korea into the Russian embassy and failed, but the second attempt was successful. Thus, during the year the king reigned from the Russian legislature in Seoul. Assignment The Seoul-Incheon Railway, granted to Japan in 1894, was recalled and granted to Russia. Russian guards guarded the king in his palace even after he left the Russian Embassy. China's defeat accelerated the country's railway construction as foreign powers demanded that China make rail concessions. The Western powers, trying to share their interests and influence in China after the First Sino-Japanese War in 1898, signed a 25-year lease on the Liaodong Peninsula and proceeded to the naval station base in Port Arthur. Although this angered the Japanese, they were more concerned about Russia's invasion of Korea than in Manchuria. Other powers, such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, took advantage of the situation in China and received land, port and trade concessions at the expense of the decaying Tsing Dynasty. Tsingtao was acquired by Germany, Guangzhoun - France, Weihaiwei and New Territories - Great Britain. Tensions between Russia and Japan will increase in the years after the First Sino-Japanese War. During the boxing uprising, eight members of the international force were sent to suppress and suppress the uprising; Russia sent troops to Manchuria as part of these forces. After the suppression of the boxers, the Russian government agreed to liberate the area. By 1903, however, it had actually increased its strength in Manchuria. Negotiations between the two countries (1901-1904) on establishing mutual recognition of the respective spheres of influence (Russia over Manchuria and Japan over Korea) have repeatedly and deliberately stalled the Russians. They felt that they were strong enough and confident enough not to compromise, and believed that Japan would not go to war against the European power. Russia also intended to use Manchuria as a springboard to further expand its interests in the Far East. In 1903, Russian soldiers began building a fort in Nnammo, but stopped after protests in Japan. In 1902, Japan made an alliance with Great Britain, the terms of which said that if Japan fought in the Far East and that a third power came to the fight against Japan, then Britain would come to the aid of the Japanese. It was a test to prevent Germany or France from interfering in any future war with Russia. Japan sought to prevent a repeat of the Triple Intervention, which deprived it of Port Arthur. The British reasons for joining the alliance were to stop the spread of Russian expansion in the Pacific, to increase Britain's attention to other areas, and to gain a powerful naval ally in the Pacific. The rising tensions between Japan and Russia were the result of Russia's reluctance to compromise and the prospect of Korea falling under Russian domination, leading it to enter into conflict with Japan and In the end, Japan was forced to take action. This would be the decisive factor and catalyst that would lead to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. See also the Chinese portal Japan portal History of Japan History of Japan History of Korea History of Taiwan Military History of China Military History of Japan Sino-Japanese Relations References Notes - The Korean historian said that the Chinese government began to turn its former tributary state into a semi-cul, and its policy towards Korea has significantly changed to a new imperialist state, where the Suzerin state demanded certain privileges in its vassal state. On the eve of the Sino-Japanese war, China appeared, indistinguishable observers, possessing respectable military and naval forces. Praise of the Army of Angwei Li Hong Chan and other Chinese troops was not uncommon, and peyang's Navy provoked significant positive comments. When the war between China and Japan proved likely, most Westerners believed that China had an advantage. Her army was huge, and her navy both outnumbered and outweight Japan. The German General Staff considered Japan's victory unlikely. In an interview with Reuters, William Lang predicted Japan's defeat. Lang thought the Chinese fleet was well drilled, the ships were in uniform, the artillery was at least adequate, and the coastal forts were strong. Weihaiwei, he said, was impregnable. Although Lang stressed that it all depended on how the Chinese forces were in charge, he believed that in the end, there was no doubt that Japan should be completely crushed. A new balance of power has emerged. China's millennial regional domination suddenly ceased. Japan has become an outstanding power in Asia, a position it will maintain throughout the twentieth century. Payne, Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895: Perception, power and primacy. Citations - Payne 2003, page 303. Kim 2012, page 304. Jowett 2013, page 37. ^ ... Japan has been at the forefront of hegemonic wars in a bid to extend Japanese hegemony over Korea to the entire Asia-Pacific region - the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 to gain korean supremacy by the Two Koreas and Great Powers, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 2. Payne 2003, page 3. Jansen 2002, page 343. Jansen 2002, page 335. a b Kim 2012, page 279. Kim 2012, page 281. Kim 2012, page 284. b c d e Kim 2012, page 285. a b Seth 2011, page 234. Seth 2011, page 234-235. a b c Seth 2011, page 235. a b c Kim 2012, page 287. a b Kim 2012, page 288. b c d e f g Kim 2012, page 289. a b Kim 2012, page 290. a b Keen 2002, page 372. Kim 2012, page 289; Keen 2002, page 373. b c d e f g h i j k l Keene 2002, p. 373. a b c Duus 1998, page 49. a b Duus 1998, page 51. a b Duus 1998, page 52. a b Duus 1998, page 50. Kim 2012, page 282. b c Keen 2002, page 374. Seth 2011, page 236. Kin page 376. 376. Keen 2002, page 377. a b c d e f g h Seth 2011, p. 237. Kim 2012, page 293; Seth 2011, page 237. b c d e Kim 2012, page 293. a b c Duus 1998, page 54. Kim 2002, page 293. sfn error: no goal: CITEREFKim2002 (help) - b c d e f Seth 2011, page 238. b c d e f g h Kim 2012, p. 294. Kim 2012, page 294; Payne 2003, page 59. b c d e Kim 2012, page 295. Payne 2003, page 59. Seth, page 445 and b c d Jansen 2002, page 431. a b c d Elleman 2001, page 96. a b Payne 2003, page 113. a b c d Olender 2014, page 42. James S. Gao, Historical Dictionary of Modern China (1800-1949), 120 - Olender 2014, page 42-43. Olender 2014, page 43. Olender 2014, page 44. James McClain, Japan Modern History, 297 and b with Seth, Michael J (2010). The history of Korea: from antiquity to the present. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. page 225. ISBN 978-0-7425-6716-0. Kwan Ching 1978, page 105. Evans and Pitty 1997, page 12. Evans and Pitty 1997, page 36. a b Olender 2014, page 39. a b c d e Evans and Pitty 1997, page 38. Shenking 2005, page 81. b c d e f h Olender 2014, page 30. b c d e Olender 2014, page 31. Kwan Ching 1978, page 268-269. Kwan Ching 1978, page 269. Jowett 2013, page 21. a b c d Jowett 2013, page 24. Jowett 2013, page 19. a b Jowett 2013, page 27. Elleman 2001, page 99. Jowett 2013, 24-25. a b c Jowett 2013, page 38. Jowett 2013, page 25. Sondhaus 2001, page 169-170. a b c Evans and Pitty 1997, page 39. a b c Chang 2013, page 182-184. Chang 2013, page 160-161. 董福祥与⻄北⻢家军阀的的故事 - 360Doc个⼈图书馆. Archive from the original 2018-12-14. Received 2014-10-30. Evans and Pitty 1997, page 40. a b Evans and Pitty 1997, page 41. a b Payne 2003, page 133. The sequence of events, as well as the number of rescued and dead, taken from several articles from the London Times of August 2, 1894 - October 24, 1894 - b Payne 2003, p. 158. Payne 2003, page 158-159. Olender 2014, page 56. Payne 2003, page 159. - Olender 2014, page 56; Payne 2003; Jowett 2013, page 30. - Olender 2014, page 56; Jowett 2013, page 30. p.240-242, China Readings 1: Imperial China, Ed. Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, (London: Penguin Books, 1967) Pp.240-242, China Readings 1: Imperial China, Ed. Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, (London: Penguin Books, 1967) - British Treaty (1858), Art. LI harvp error: no goal: CITEREFBritish_treaty1858 (help). Alia Ma Lynn (2007). Muslims in China. Volume 3 Asian Studies. University press. page 44. ISBN 978-0-88093-861-7. b c d e f g Olender 2014, page 60. Evans and Pitty 1997, page 42. Elleman 2001, page 101. Evan and Pitti 1997, page 42. mistake sfn: no goal: CITEREFEvanPeattie1997 (help) - Evan and Pitty 1997, page 44. error sfn: no goal: CITEREFEvanPeattie1997 (help) - Evan and Pitty 1997, page 48. error sfn: no goal: (help) - Payne 2003, page 82. Payne 2003, page 182-183. Perry, John Curtis (1964). Battle of Taiang, September 17, 1894. Sailor's mirror. 50 (4): 243–259. doi:10.1080/00253359.1964.10657787. Lonely 1994, page 155. Evans and Pitty 1997, page 46. a b Spence, Jonathan (2013). Search for modern China. New York: W. W. Norton and company. 2012. ISBN 9780393934519. a b Olender 2014, page 163. a b c d Olender 2014, page 164. Payne 2003, page 266. Payne, Sarah. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 - perception, power and primacy. Cambridge University Press, 2002, page 269-70. Sir Adolf William Ward; George Walter Protero; Sir Stanley Mordaunt Lites; Ernest Alfred Benians (1910). The modern history of Cambridge. Mcmillan. page 573. www.ocu.mit.edu. Archive from the original for 2008-06-05. Received 2008-07-11. Jansen 2002, page 432; Shenking 2005, page 78. Hopper, Helen. Fukuzawa Yuki. Payne 2003, page 293. Edward J. Rhoades (2011). Manchus and Han: Ethnic relations and political power in the late Tsin and early republican China, 1861- 1928. University of Washington Press. page 80. ISBN 978-0-295-80412-5. Clarence B. Davis; Wilburn, Kenneth E., Jr.; Ronald E. Robinson (1991). Imperialism of the railway in China, 1895-1939. Imperialism of the railway. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. page 159. ISBN 978-0-313-25966-1. Received on August 10, 2015 - through questia. Rousseau, Joan-Francois (June 2014). The failure of the Imperial Railway: Indochina Railway, 1898-1941. In the Journal of Transport History. 35 (1). Received on August 10, 2015 - through questia. Jansen 2002, page 438. Jansen 2002. Seth 2011, page 252. Jansen 2002, page 439; Evans and Pitty, page 65 sfnm error: no goal: CITEREFEvansPeattie (help); Sfnm error 1997: no goal: CITEREF1997 (help). Evans and Pitty 1997, page 65. Chang bibliography, Jun (2013). The head of the head, which launched modern China: the dowager Empress Sixi. New York: Books of Anka. ISBN 9780307456700.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Duus, Peter (1998). Abacus and the Sword: Japan's infiltration of Korea. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-92090-3.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Elleman, Bruce A. (2001). Modern Chinese War, 1795-1989. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-21474-2.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Shenking, D. Charles (2005). Creating waves: Politics, propaganda, and the appearance of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868-1922. Stanford University press. ISBN 978-0-8047-4977-0.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Keane, Donald (2002). Emperor of Japan: Meiji and his world, 1852-1912. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-12341-9.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Kim, Jinvung (2012). The history of Korea: from the Earth of morning calm to the states, in conflict. New York: Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-00024-8.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Evans, David C; Mark R Pitty Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press Office. ISBN 978-0-87021-192-8.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Jansen, Marius B. (2002). Manufacturing modern Japan. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-00334-7.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Jansen, Marius B. (1995). Meiji Japan's appearance. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-48405-3.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Jowett, Philip (2013). China Wars: Rousking the Dragon 1894-1949. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-47280-673-4.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Kwan-Ching, Liu (1978). John King Fairbank (Cambridge History of China. Volume 11, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 Part 2( Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-22029-3.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Lonely, Stewart (1994). The first modern war in Japan: the army and society in conflict with China, 1894-1895. New York: St. Martin's Press.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Olender, Peter (2014). The Sino-Japanese Naval War of 1894-1895. MMPBooks. ISBN 978-83-63678-30-2.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Payne, S. C. M. (2017). The Japanese Empire: A Great Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War. ISBN 1-107-01195-7.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Payne, S.C.M (2003). The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: perception, power and primacy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-81714-1.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Palace, James B. (1975). Politics and politics in traditional Korea. Harvard University Asian Center. ISBN 978-0-674-68770-7.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Seth, Michael J. (2011). History of Korea: from antiquity to the present. Rowman and Littlefield. ISBN 978-0-742- 56715-3.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Sondhaus, Lawrence (2001). Naval War, 1815-1914. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-21477-3.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Willmott, H. The Last Century of The Sea Power: from Port Arthur to Chanaka, 1894-1922, Volume 1. Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-25300-356-0.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) sackmann, Urs Matthias (2009). China and Japan in the late Meiji Period: China's policy and Japanese discourse on national identity, 1895-1904. Routledge. ISBN 978-0415481915.CS1 maint: ref'harv (link) Further reading by Kim, Chong Ik Eugene, and Han Kyo Kim. Korea and the politics of imperialism, 1876-1910 (Univ of California Press, 1967). Mutsu, Munemitsu. (1982). Tokyo: Tokyo University of Press. ISBN 978-0-86008-306-1; OCLC 2520848446 Morse, Osia Ballou. (1918). International Relations of the Chinese Empire vol 2 1861-1893 Shan, Patrick Fuliang (2018). Yuan Shikai: Revaluation, University of British Columbia Press. ISBN 9780774837781. Morse, Hosea Ballou. International relations of the Chinese Empire vol 3 1894-1916 Wikimedia External Links has media related to The Sino-Japanese war. 程映虹.. 從版畫事件到《國向⻄⾏進》There Purdue 濮德培和國當代⺠族主義 (in Chinese) Detailed report on the naval battle on the Yalu River by Philo Norton McGiffen under the dragon flag - My experience in the Chino-Japanese War James Allan Print Exhibition at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sinking Coushing - A report by Captain Galsworthy SinoJapaneseWar.com a detailed account of the Sino-Japanese War of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: as seen from engravings and archives (British Library/Japanese Center for Asian Historical Records) extracted from sino japanese war 2. sino japanese war movies. sino japanese war first. sino japanese war map. sino japanese war in tamil. sino japanese war causes. sino japanese war timeline. sino japanese war documentary

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