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The Debate Widens - Introduction The University of Notre Dame Australia ResearchOnline@ND Business Book Chapters School of Business 2003 The Debate Widens - Introduction Robert Leeson University of Notre Dame Australia, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/bus_chapters Recommended Citation Leeson, R. (2003). The debate widens - Introduction. In R. Leeson (Ed), Keynes, Chicago and Friedman, Vol 1 (2). London, United Kingdom: Pickering and Chatto. This Book Chapter is brought to you by the School of Business at ResearchOnline@ND. It has been accepted for inclusion in Business Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of ResearchOnline@ND. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Keynes, Chicago and Friedman Chapter 13: The Debate Widens Robert Leeson 3 June 2002 Shortly after Don Patinkin’s initial assault on Milton Friedman, Thomas Humphrey (chapter 14 [1971], 12) highlighted the importance of the contributions (“overlooked by both Patinkin and Friedman”) made to the quantity theory between 1930-50 by four non- Chicagoan economists: Carl Synder, i Lionel Edie, ii Lauchlin Currie and Clark Warburton. There are similarities between Friedman’s version of the Chicago monetary tradition and Currie’s Supply and Control of Money in the United States (1934). Also, Currie’s (1962 [1934]) essay on ‘The Failure of Monetary Policy to Prevent the Depression of 1929-32’ interpreted the Great Depression as a Great Contraction in a manner which foreshadowed the later work by Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963). Humphrey commented that “oddly enough, however, [Lloyd] Mints and Friedman do not seem to be aware of the extent to which their criticisms were anticipated by Currie, for they cite him infrequently”. In the exchange that followed two further names were added to the list of overlooked quantity theorists: Arthur Marget iii and James Angell (Patinkin chapter 16 [1974], 28; Humphrey chapter 17 [1973], 462). iv Both Patinkin and Humphrey expressed curiosity about these omissions. Currie (chapter 15 [1972]) provides an additional perspective on Humphrey’s contribution in a note that is published here for the first time. It seems unlikely that Friedman was unaware of Currie’s April 1934 Journal of Political Economy (JPE ) essay since it was reprinted, at Harry Johnson’s insistence, in 1962 as one of the JPE Landmarks in Political Economy ; the selection criteria of which included “impact upon professional economists”. v The editor of that volume noted that the load “borne by … Milton Friedman” in the production of that volume had been “disproportionately heavy” (Hamilton 1962, ix-x). There are several references to Warburton’s “important papers” in the Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 301, n2, 359, n71) Monetary History , but Currie’s name is not listed in their bibliography. Indeed, Currie (correspondence 29 November 1972) informed Patinkin that he had been informed by Harry Johnson that Friedman had “nothing to do with the selection of my paper in the Landmarks of Political Economy ”. vi This introductory chapter contrasts Friedman’s endorsement of Warburton as a pioneer monetarist and his initial reluctance to mention Currie and Angell in this context. It also examines some previously unpublished archival evidence highlighting the intensity of some of the passions engendered by this debate. 15.1 Warburton Without specifically referring to his own work, Warburton (1963, 77) noted that the conclusions derived by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) “should come as no surprise to anyone who has surveyed the history of business-fluctuation theory”. The “most continuous” component of the existing literature was to attribute “a dominant causal” role to “misbehavior of the monetary and banking system”. Warburton (1952, 292-3) reported that “the most remarkable theory feature of contemporary business-fluctuation theory is the unanimity with which economists have ignored the timing and amplitude of changes in the quantity of money in the United States relative to changes in population, output, consumer spending, prices and employment”. The first three ‘villains’ in Warburton’s list were John Maynard Keynes, Alvin Hansen and Frank Knight. Mints and Henry Simons apparently approved of Warburton’s work. Mints recalled that (presumably in the 1930s) “I remember distinctly (I think!) that after a talk by Warburton at the University [of Chicago] both Simons and I were greatly pleased by what Warburton had said. I even gained the impression that Warburton was grateful for our approval” (cited by Patinkin chapter 46 [1981/1979], 284-5). Warburton was a monetarist while Friedman was still a wartime Keynesian. vii Friedman and Warburton contributed to the same wartime debate on the Inflationary Gap in the American Economic Review ( AER ). Friedman criticized Walter Salant’s (1941) essay on ‘The Inflationary Gap: Meaning and Significance for Policy Making’. But when his AER critique was reprinted, Friedman (1953, 253, n2, 251, n) was obliged to add a footnote: “The next seven paragraphs and the subsequent material inclosed in brackets are additions to the article as originally published. As I trust the new material makes clear, the omission from that version of monetary effects is a serious error which is not excused but may perhaps be explained by the prevailing temper of the times”. This was “a serious error of omission”. Warburton continued the debate with ‘Measuring the Inflationary Gap’ (1943) and ‘Monetary Expansion and the Inflationary Gap’ (1944). Warburton (1944, 303, 318, 323, 325-6) argued that the first ‘gap’ that required filling was “the gap between those economists who approach the problem of price inflation from analysis of the use of income and those who approach it from monetary theory and the analysis of monetary statistics … Monetary theory has also long had an answer to the next question in the exploration of the causes of price fluctuations: How much pressure on prices is exerted by monetary expansion or monetary contraction? … This commonsense view is an application to money of the general economic principle known as the law of supply and demand. The refinement of this view which has long been made by monetary theory is often spoken of as the quantity theory of money”. Warburton believed that his statistical analysis demonstrated that “These facts are in perfect accord with the quantity theory of money, defined as the belief that changes in the price level are primarily due to changes in the volume of money relative to the need for money … Modern economists who observe the facts around them have no … reason to disavow this old-fashioned theory”. For Warburton the “cause of the great depression of the early 1930s was monetary deficiency” and “the greater part of the amplitude of business fluctuations could be eliminated by … monetary policy”. Although Warburton was not a full member of the Chicago School, several of his articles appeared in Chicago journals. viii The JPE published Warburton’s ‘The Trend of Savings’ (1935), ‘The Volume of Money and the Price Level Between the World Wars’ (1945), ‘Quantity and Frequency of Use of Money in the United States, 1919-45’ (1946), ‘Volume of Savings, Quantity of Money and Business Instability’ (1947) and ‘Money and Business Fluctuations in the Schumpeterian System’ (1953). Also, the Journal of Business of the University of Chicago published Warburton’s ‘Monetary Policy and Business Forecasting’ (1949) and his ‘Misplaced Emphasis in Contemporary Business- Fluctuation Theory’ (1952 [1946]). This later essay – “his best known and most important contribution” - was reprinted in the AEA Readings in Monetary Theory co- edited by Mints (Lutz and Mints 1952). According to Michael Bordo and Anna Schwartz (1987 [1979], 236-7) this essay provided evidence that Warburton “anticipated the Keynesian-monetarist debate of the 1960s by a decade or more”. Warburton’s (1952 [1946], 284, 317) purpose was to point out that “a far more potent force of economic instability in recent years, namely, erratic variations in the quantity of money, has been ignored” in Keynesian analysis. There would be no progress in business cycle theory without the “elimination of its misplaced emphasis on savings-investment relationships and a re-examination of the significance of changes in the money supply”. Warburton (6 January 1968) wrote to Friedman to congratulate him on his AEA Presidential Address: “it was a very well-developed exposition of the view both of us [emphasis added] have reached from our studies of the factual record and the reasoning and hypotheses of our predecessors. I still find it amazing that the factual data available and the views of earlier economists on the role of money were so largely ignored during the ‘Keynesian revolution’ … your eloquent statement of our case [emphasis added] before today’s professional audience, young and old, will bear fruits I am sure”. ix Friedman (20 January 1966) informed Charles Golembe of the American Bankers Association that Warburton “is now, we are all glad to say, no longer so lonely in his intellectual companionship”. x From 1934 until his retirement in 1965, Warburton (1981, 293) was employed at the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC) which was not, he recalled, an “academic center” (it was established in 1933 to prevent another collapse of the banking system). xi In July 1951, Friedman wrote to Warburton urging him to write a “substantial monograph” so as to maximise the impact of his work. Warburton thought it was unwise for him to do so. Warburton (6 January 1968) recalled to Friedman that in 1955 John Black, the AEA president had invited him to participate in an AEA panel discussion on ‘The Monetary Role in Balanced Economic Growth’. Since 1953, Warburton had “been prohibited by FDIC from publishing articles or participating in public discussions on monetary problems or policies”. His employers led him to believe that his “job would be at stake” if he accepted Black’s invitation: “With real regret, I declined, deciding to play by the rules of the ‘game’ in which I was involved, but hoping to extract myself or that a new breeze would blow soon in Washington.
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