Jordan and the Arab Spring: Challenges and Opportunities Nuri YEŞİLYURT* Abstract Introduction This article aims to make a comprehensive Unlike many Arab republics, Arab analysis of the impacts of the Arab Spring monarchies have not experienced any on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In regime changes since the revolutionary particular, it tackles with the question of how currents started to sweep through the the Hashemite regime could survive the Arab 1 Spring. Furthermore, it aims to contribute Arab world in 2011. This situation drove to the ongoing scholarly debate about the scholars to write extensively about the resilience of Arab monarchies by trying to find main factors that make Arab monarchies out if the survival of the Hashemite monarchy resilient.2 While some explanations during the Arab Spring has more to do with factors endogenous to the regime or exogenous underscore factors that are endogenous to it. After analysing the main challenges and to the regimes, like legitimacy and opportunities that the Arab Spring created institutional advantages enjoyed by for Jordan, this article argues that challenges 3 that the Hashemite regime faced during this monarchies; others emphasize factors period either disappeared or are outbalanced that are more exogenous to the regimes, by the opportunities it enjoyed, and these like the oil rents and allies (both foreign opportunities originated from both exogenous and domestic) that help monarchical and endogenous factors. regimes to survive.4 Key Words Among Arab monarchies, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is surely Jordan, Arab Spring, King Abdullah II, one of the most vulnerable because of Hashemites, Arab monarchies. its small size, poor economy, fragmented society and uneasy neighbourhood. Yet, in spite of all these vulnerabilities, Jordan so far has succeeded to remain an island of security and stability in a sea of revolution, * Dr., Ankara University, Faculty of Political turbulence and war. Since independence, Science, Department of International the Hashemite regime survived two inter- Relations, Cemal Gürsel Cad. Cebeci, 06590, Ankara, Turkey. state wars against Israel in 1948 and 1967, E-mail: [email protected] a number of coup attempts in the 1950s, 169 PERCEPTIONS, Winter 2014, Volume XIX, Number 4, pp. 169-194. Nuri Yeşilyurt a civil war between 1970 and 1971, and and on some occasions, calling for the civil unrest in 1989. Under King Abdullah downfall of the regime. Furthermore, II,5 the Hashemite regime still hangs on, political, economic and social costs in spite of the destabilizing effects of the of the ongoing conflicts in Jordan’s recent revolts in the region. Accordingly, neighbourhood put an extra burden on considering its immense vulnerabilities, the shoulders of the regime. Although taking a closer look at the performance these developments do not equate with of the Hashemite regime during the Arab the mass anti-regime demonstrations Spring has surely much to contribute to in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Libya, they the ongoing scholarly debate about the were severe enough to destabilize the tiny resilience of Arab monarchies. kingdom. That said, this article argues that the Arab Spring created very important Between 2011 and 2013, opportunities for the Hashemite regime Jordan witnessed periodic as well, which eventually outbalanced the demonstrations protesting above-mentioned challenges. Moreover, the government, demanding it contends that these opportunities political and socio-economic are products of both exogenous and endogenous factors. reforms, and on some occasions, calling for the downfall of the In the following sections, firstly, the regime. main trajectory of popular protests and the regime’s reform efforts in Jordan since 2011 are outlined. Secondly, a detailed This paper aims to make a comprehensive analysis of the destabilizing effects of the analysis of the impacts of the Arab Spring Arab Spring on the Kingdom is made. In on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. this respect, the study focuses on the rise of In particular, it deals with the survival Islamism (both in its moderate and radical of the Hashemite regime in the course forms) in the region and its implications of the Arab Spring by focusing on the for Jordan; the Kingdom’s deepening main sources of stability and instability economic crisis; and soaring unrest for the regime during this period. It can among the East Banker population. In be argued that the Arab Spring posed the the third section, the article concentrates most serious threat that King Abdullah II on the advantages that the Hashemite has faced since he ascended the throne in regime enjoyed thanks to the Arab Spring. 1999. Between 2011 and 2013, Jordan These opportunities can be classified as witnessed periodic demonstrations increased foreign assistance; dissuading protesting the government, demanding effects of regional turmoil on Jordanian political and socio-economic reforms, public, and empowerment of the King’s 170 Jordan and the Arab Spring: Challenges and Opportunities image as a pro-reform figure fighting political and economic reforms in the against the forces of the status quo within Kingdom.8 Their inclusion increased the regime. Lastly, in conclusion, an both the number of protestors and the overall assessment of the main challenges pressure on the government. and opportunities that the Arab Spring Political reform demands shared created for Jordan is made, and the reason by all segments of the opposition opportunities seem to be more dominant included establishment of a truly as of 2014 is explained. parliamentary political system in which the government is drawn from the Protests and Reforms elected parliamentarians rather than appointed by the King, and in which On 14 January 2011, the same day that the parliament actually legislates rather the Tunisian President Zine al Abidine ben than simply implementing the initiatives Ali fled the country, protests criticizing of the government and the King. In poverty, unemployment and corruption addition, they wanted a more democratic were launched in major Jordanian Election Law, which would not include cities including Amman, Karak, Irbid, the current single non transferrable vote Salt and Maan.6 In fact, the political (SNTV)9 system. Furthermore, they also atmosphere in the country had already called for more freedom of expression, been tense due to debates surrounding fewer roles for the General Intelligence the November 2010 elections, which Directorate (GID) in public life, a more had been boycotted by the Jordanian independent judiciary, and an end to Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) due to widespread corruption.10 its objections to the Election Law, and which produced a largely loyalist The first critical move of parliament.7 In the January protests the new government was to the major demand of the protestors was the resignation of Prime Minister appoint a 52-member National Samir Rıfai. This was Jordan’s first “Day Dialogue Committee (NDC) in of Rage” and it was organized by “The March 2011 in order to open a Jordan Campaign for Change” (Jayeen), dialogue with representatives an alternative reform coalition formed of various political parties, by urban pro-reform activists in early professional associations and January 2011. Traditional opposition civil society organisations about movements like the JMB, the Baathists political reform matters in the and leftist parties joined the protests in Kingdom. the following weeks and called for both 171 Nuri Yeşilyurt The government’s first response to the the protestors by regime supporters, protests was the introduction of some aid which resulted in one dead and over 100 packages and salary increases, yet it was injured, dissuaded the protests over the not successful in easing the unrest.11 On following weeks.14 1 February 2011, the King finally bowed Nearly one month after these to the major demand of the protestors deadly clashes, the King ordered the and sacked the government of Samir establishment of the Royal Committee Rifai. In his place, he appointed Marouf to Review the Constitution (RCRC) on Bakhit, an ex-general and former prime 26 April 2011 in order to appease the minister, and charged him with forming opposition with the promise of genuine a national dialogue for genuine political reforms. The RCRC’s task was to revisit and economic reforms. the entire Constitution while taking into The first critical move of the new consideration the recommendations that government was to appoint a 52-member would be submitted by the NDC in June National Dialogue Committee (NDC) in 2011.15 On 14 August 2011, the RCRC March 2011 in order to open a dialogue submitted its recommendations for with representatives of various political constitutional changes on 42 articles. The parties, professional associations and following month, nearly all amendments civil society organisations about political were approved by the Parliament and reform matters in the Kingdom.12 the Senate with minor alterations and The JMB refrained from joining the subsequently signed by the King on 30 Committee because of its “limited September 2011. remit, which excluded constitutional The major amendments to the reforms.”13 The establishment of the Constitution included, above all, creation NDC, however, did not appease the of a Constitutional Court with “oversight protestors. On 24 March 2011, a pro- on the constitutionality of the applicable reform sit-in was organized in Amman’s laws and regulations” (Art. 58) and an Dakhiliyya Square by the “Youth of independent commission “to supervise March 24”, a newly formed opposition the parliamentary electoral process and movement consisting of mainly urban to administer it in all of its stages” (Art. youth activists. The major demands of 67). The new provisions also limited the the protestors were essential political and government’s ability to issue temporary economic reforms for a truly free and laws in the absence of the parliament social democracy. On the second day, the (Art. 94) and obliged it to resign in case sit-in grew stronger with support from of the Parliament is dissolved (Art.