38899 2171

SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF FRIDAY, 28th APRIL, 1950 $ttt)Ugi)tt 6?

Registered as a newspaper

TUESDAY, 2 MAY, 1950 OPERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE LANDINGS IN THE GULF OF ON 9iH SEPTEMBER, 1943. Admiralty foreword: — on the Operations in connection with the land- The Naval forces taking part in Operation ings in the Gulf of Salerno on 9th September, " Avalanche " were under the general control 1943*. of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. 2. Owing to the unavoidable delay in for- The Naval Task Force for the operation was warding the report of the Naval Commander under the immediate command of Vice- Western Task Force due to more urgent de- Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U.S.N., who was known mands on the time and facilities of his staff, as the Commander Western Naval Task Force. it is not my intention to do more than com- This Force was charged with the escort to and ment on the salient features of this operation, the landing of the Fifth Army at Salerno and the more so since many of the lessons learnt with the subsequent support of this Army until have been incorporated in other operations it was firmly established on shore. which have been carried out subsequently in The Western Naval Task Force included the this and other theatres. Except insofar as is Northern Attack Force (Force " N ") composed stated in the succeeding paragraphs, I fully of British and American Ships and Craft and concur with the suggestions and recommenda- under the command of Commodore G. N. tions of the Force Commander, whose report Oliver, R.N., and the Southern Attack Force is very full and covers every aspect of the (Force " S ") composed of U.S. Ships and Craft operation. and under the command of Rear-Admiral John L. Hall, Jr., U.S.N. Planning. The Naval Covering Force (Force " H ") was 3. My detailed remarks on the planning of under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Operation "Avalanche" are contained in Algernon Willis, while the Naval Air Support Appendix I. Force (Force " V ") was under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian. 4. Having decided that the mainland of The report of the Commander Western was to be invaded on the West coast, it was Naval Task Force on this operation will be clear that the seizure and development of the published by the U.S. Navy Department in port of was of paramount importance, due course. since no other port in Western Italy could The following Despatch was submitted to the maintain the Military forces which it was in- Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on tended to deploy. the %th March, 1945, by Admiral of the Fleet 5. The choice for the actual point of attack Sir ANDREW B. CUNNINGHAM, K.T., lay between the Gulf of Gaeta and the Gulf of G.C.B., D.S.O. Salerno. The former had the advantage of Office of the Commander-in Chief, having an open plain as its immediate hinter- Mediterranean Station, land and it was clear that a successful landing Allied Force Headquarters. in this area might lead to the early capture m March, 1945. of Naples. On the other hand, its beaches I have the honour to forward the report of Admiralty footnote: the Naval Commander Western Task Force * See Admiralty foreword. 2172 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 2 MAY, 1950 were, at the best, indifferent and were beyond loading without proper authority of some the reach of adequate single seater fighter cover smoke containers into an L.C-T. already con- based on . The first of these disadvan- taining ammunition. Spontaneous combustion tages might have been overcome, the second of the smoke led to the explosion of the was insurmountable. Therefore, despite the ammunition which put out of action four fact that on 27th July information was received L.C.T.S which could ill be spared. This that H.M.S. UNICORN, acting in the capacity incident serves to stress the necessity for of a light Fleet Carrier, and four Escort Car- careful supervision of the loading of assault riers could be .made available from outside my convoys. Command, it was decided that the landings must take place in the Gulf of Salerno. Here Italian Armistice. the beaches were superior to those of the Gulf of Gaeta but the area immediately inland 10. The fact that an Armistice had been could be covered by artillery fire from the signed between the Allies and the Italians was adjacent hillSj. Further, the roads to Naples broadcast by the B.B.C. on the evening of led through narrow defiles, which could be D -1. It had been fully realised that this easily defended. These disadvantages had, announcement might well engender an however, to be accepted. unjustified sense of security in the minds of those taking part in the assault. Accordingly, 6. Once again, as in Operation "Husky"* the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean and the choice of D-Day was largely governed by the Task Force Commanders sent signals the period of moon required for the employ- warning all ships taking part in the operation ment of paratroops. The date finally selected that strong opposition from German forces for this operation was thus not entirely favour- must still be expected. There can, nevertheless, able from the Naval point of view, and the be no doubt that many took no heed of these assault forces had to accept a disadvantageous warnings and viewed the proceedings with a light for the approach. In the event, airborne sense of complacency which was not sub- troops were not employed for the assault. stantiated in the event. Preparation, Training and Mounting. Intelligence. 7. Due to the short time available between the final conquest of Sicily and mounting of 11. In general, the intelligence proved Operation " Avalanche ", there was little time reliable and it is satisfactory to note that both available for rehearsal. In fact, as is stressed beach intelligence and intelligence on fixed by the Naval Commander Western Task Force, Coastal Defence installations were found to be it was necessary to overhaul the landing craft accurate; the only additional defences at first priority. Every possible repair facility encountered over and above those estimated in North Africa was pressed into service and being of the mobile type. That the security of the fact that more craft than had at first the operation was not all to be desired was seemed likely were overhauled in tune to take due to a variety of reasons, the chief of which part in the operation enabled a faster build-up were: — to be achieved than had been expected, and (a) The logical selection of the beaches reflects great credit on the repair staffs con- (from the enemy's point of view) for the cerned. reasons given in paragraph 5. 8. In this connection, however, I cannot (b) The Armistice. concur entirely with the remarks of the Naval Commander Western Task Force in Part IV, It is interesting to note, however, that Section I, paragraph 18 of his report, in which although the assaulting forces were sighted by he states that " Naval Planning for Operation air reconnaissance on the 7th September, it was * Avalanche' was affected by the late receipt not until 0230 on 9th September that Alarm of orders from higher authority and changes in Number 3 ("Landing imminent or in pro- the composition of the Naval Task Forces gress ") was instituted by the Germans. brought about by unforeseen releases of Land- ing Craft from Operations 'Husky' and Assault. ' Bay town 'f." The increases in the numbers of Landing Craft assigned were largely due to 12. The assaults, with a few minor excep- the great efforts of the maintenance personnel. tions, went according to plan. The forces Further changes in the numbers and types of arrived at the correct lowering points at the Landing Craft available were caused by the times laid down in the orders. The distances of omission of the Naval Commander Western. these lowering points for the deep draught Task Force to provide six L.S.T.s, as required L.S.I.(L)s—9 and 10 miles from the shore— by my Operation Orders, to lift Air Force was forced upon the Task Force Commanders stores from Milazzo in Northern Sicily to the by an expected minefield along the 100 fathom assault area. To take the place of these line. This expectation was fulfilled. L.S.T.s a number of L.C.T.s were diverted 13. One Brigade of 56 Infantry was from the Messina/Reggio ferry service at con- landed to the South of its allotted beach and siderable expense to the Eighth Army build-up. became mixed with the other Brigade which This is referred to more fully in paragraph 21 had spread North of its sector, thereby causing of this report. considerable confusion for some hours. 9. During the loading stages an unfortunate The Scout Boat marking UNCLE GREEN incident took place at Tripoli, due to the beach was too far to the South, thus causing a gap in the 46th Division landing, which left an ' Admiralty footnotes: * Operation " Husky "—the landing in Sicily. enemy strongpoint unneutralised. This strong- t Operation " Baytown " — the assault across the point subsequently caused considerable trouble Straits of Messina, 3rd September, 1943. to the Division. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 2 MAY, 1950 2173

14. The landing of the Rangers* at Maiori it was under constant artillery fire from the was without opposition, but the neighbouring hills. It was, therefore, neces- landing on Vietri was opposed by the gunfire sary to construct an air strip near of the shore batteries. Both these landings, nearer to the coast, and for Force " V" to however, were able to make considerable pro- operate at sea for 3^ days after which it was gress and to secure the left flank with the X withdrawn to Palermo. Before doing so 26 landing. aircraft were flown ashore to operate at Paestum. 15. The organisation for clearing Landing Craft and Boats of Military stores on arrival 21. Had the Military progress proceeded at the beaches left much to be desired. In a according to plan considerable embarrassment large number of cases boats' crews had to clear would have been caused by the late arrival their boats themselves, with consequent delay of Air Force material for the preparation of in returning for further loads. Further, in the Monte Corvino airfield. This was caused by stress of events in the early stages after the the non-arrival at Milazzo of six L.S.T.s assault, arrangements for the transfer of destined to ferry these stores to the assault stores from the beaches to disposal areas further area. inland were inadequate. Consequently there was much congestion on the foreshore: but, Enemy Air Activity. by D+2 and onwards, 3,000 tons per day were 22. Enemy air activity was not on a heavy being discharged over the British beaches. scale and on the average only ten red alerts per day were experienced. Indeed, so light Naval Forces other than Assault Forces. was the scale of attack that the fighters of 16. The existence of the main cover force, Force. " V" had few combat opportunities. Force "H", was rendered unnecessary by the This operation was notable, however, as being Italian Armistice, and two Divisions of the the first occasion on which several new types Battle Squadron were employed to cover the of missiles were used by the German Air Force. passage to of such units of the Italian These new bombs caused considerable losses Fleet as succeeded in making good their escape and damage. (Operation " Gibbon"). In addition, four Cruisers were diverted to Bizerta on D-2 to Events Subsequent to the Assault. load elements of the First British Airborne 23. On the whole, the Fifth Army was un- Division for discharge at (Operation able to establish itself ashore as quickly as " Slapstick "), a course of action rendered pos- had been planned. This was due in part to sible by the Italian Armistice. the fact that it had been anticipated that the 17. The chief object of Force " H ", there- coast defences would be manned by Italians, fore, became to provide fighter cover over the whereas in fact the Germans had taken over Escort Carrier force (Force " V "). these defences a few days prior to the assault. 24. The port of Salerno was opened early on Air Activities. D+2 but by 1900 the following day the port 18. Fighter cover over the beaches was pro- was again under enemy gunfire and at 1500 vided by Naval fighters from Force " V ", and on D+4 it was necessary to withdraw the by land based fighter aircraft of the 12th Air port party for the time being. Support Command. Fighter cover over Force 25. Thus, despite the initial successes which "V" was provided by the Fleet Carriers of attended the landings, by D+4 the Military Force " H ". situation had become unfavourable. The 19. The high accident rate suffered by the German Command had rallied quickly from Escort Carriers, which was at the time the disorganisation caused by the liquidation attributed almost entirely to the lack of of their erstwhile brothers-in-arms and had natural wind, must, in the light of more recent concentrated sufficient armoured forces with experience in Operation " Dragoon "f, be con- supporting infantry to drive a wedge into the sidered largely due to insufficient deck landing Fifth Army defences and at one point had practice immediately prior to the operation. almost penetrated to the beaches, Wind speeds experienced during Operation " Dragoon " were very similar to those prevail- 26. By the following day, the situation had ing throughout Operation "Avalanche", but further deteriorated, all unloading ceased, and in spite of the fact that during the former the Naval Commander Western Task Force operation the Carrier forces operated for six requested me to provide heavier Naval support days and the fatigue of the pilots thereby in- fire. Accordingly, H.M.S. VALIANT and creased considerably in the later stages, the H.M.S. WARSPITE were ordered to proceed number of deck accidents was relatively to the "Avalanche" area, so as to arrive as smaller. soon as possible after first light on D+6. In addition, three cruisers from Force "V", 20. The plan assumed that Monte Corvino EURYALUS, SCYLLA and CHARYBDIS, airfield would be captured on D-Day and put were ordered to proceed at their utmost speed into operation for shore based fighters on to Tripoli to embark further Military reinforce- D + l. The Escort Carriers were, therefore, ments. Throughout D+7 Naval gunfire of only intended to operate for two days. There all calibres shelled enemy formations and was, however, considerable delay in capturing strongpoints and by 1400 on D +8 the situation Monte Corvino airfield and even after capture was restored. It was while returning from Admiralty footnotes: these gun support duties that H.M.S. * Rangers—the American counterpart of British Com- WARSPITE received two direct hits and one mandos. near miss from radio-controlled glider bombs. f Operation "Dragoon"—the landing on the South H.M.S. WARSPITE subsequently reached coast of France in August, 1944. Malta in tow without further damage. A 2 2174 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 2 MAY, 1950

27. There can be little doubt that the APPENDIX I, psychological effect upon our troops of seeing these heavy ships bombarding close inshore PLANNING. played a large part in relieving a situation which at one time showed every indication of On completion of the Sicilian Campaign becoming extremely grave. there were many and changing factors involved in the decision as to the location of the main The End of the Operation. assault on the Italian coast. Not until August 28. The Military situation, stabilised on 19th was it decided that the planning and D + 6, 15th September, gradually improved; mounting of Operation "Avalanche" should indications of a general German withdrawal be given first priority. Plans involving landings were seen on D+7. On 19th September, in the Gulf of Gioija* (Operation " Buttress "), Eboli and, on 20th, Campagna and several in the and on the Italian coast other towns in the vicinity were captured. North of (Operations " Musket" and Five days later the port of Salerno was re- "Goblet"), were all examined and progressed opened, followed quickly by the capture of to a certain extent. Operation " Buttress " was Castellammare on 28th and of Torre in fact fully planned and- detailed orders were Annunziata the next day. Naples was issued to the ships concerned. This uncertainty' entered on 1st October and with its capture, led to an immense amount of work for my Operation " Avalanche " drew to a close. The planning staff and for the British Naval Com- port of Naples had been carefully and manders involved, all of whom had two or methodically wrecked by the withdrawing more problems to examine. enemy, but even so, two days later five Liberty ship berths, six coaster berths and 2. It was the intention that the " Buttress " eight holding berths were cleared. By the 6th Force would become the Northern Assault October discharge over the Salerno beaches Force for " Avalanche " and that an American was almost completed, the port of Naples was force would provide the " Avalanche " Southern functioning slowly, and on that day Operation Assault Force. By this means it was hoped "Avalanche" was officially deemed to have that it would be practicable to switch been completed. from Operation " Buttress" to Operation "Avalanche" without upsetting the detailed Lessons Learnt. planning to any marked extent. For a variety 29. Owing to the considerable period which of reasons this combination proved not to be has elapsed since Operation " Avalanche " was so simple as had been imagined, the chief carried out and the fact that the experience difficulty being that " Buttress" involved the gained therein has been embodied in other use of only one port, namely Vibo Valencia, operations, it is redundant to remark at length whereas in "Avalanche" the plan had to upon the lessons learnt. Owing to the short allow for the eventual capture and development period which had elapsed between Operations of Salerno, Castellammare, Torre Annunziata "Husky" and "Avalanche", but few of the and Naples. difficulties brought to light in the first operation were remedied in time for the second. My 3. As a result of the several plans under remarks on Operation "Husky" still hold consideration, planning for Operation good, but to some extent these mistakes have " Avalanche" was conducted almost simul- now been rectified and it is not intended taneously on the levels of the Commander-in- to elaborate upon them further. Chief, Mediterranean, the Western Task Force Commander, who had no other operation to Conclusions. plan, and the subordinate Task Force Com- 30. Operation " Avalanche" was the most manders, one of whom, Commodore G. N. ambitious amphibious operation so far Oliver, R.N. (the Northern Assault Force Com- launched. That it succeeded after many mander), was planning in detail for both vicissitudes reflects great credit on Vice- " Buttress " and " Avalanche " concurrently. Admiral Hewitt, U.S.N., his subordinate Commanders, and all those who served 4. Naval planning memoranda were issued under them. That there were extremely as for previous operations in this theatre to anxious moments cannot be denied. The enemy disseminate the building of the plan to the employed new types of weapons and defended subordinate Commanders. It is no exaggera- his positions with a ferocity which we have tion -to say that without this system these now come to regard as normal, but at the time subordinate Commanders could never have pro- it provided a severe test to our Military Com- duced their own orders in time for the opera- manders. I am proud to say that throughout tion, as planning was taking place on all levels the operation, the Navies never faltered and simultaneously, as stated in the preceding carried out their tasks in accordance with the paragraph. highest traditions of their Services. Whilst full acknowledgment must be made of the devastat- 5. Further difficulty was experienced through ing though necessarily intermittent bombing the frequent changes of plan introduced by the by the Allied Air Forces, it was Naval gun- Fifth Army, many of which took place at a fire, incessant in effect, that held the ring when very late date. The Commander Western Naval there was danger of the enemy breaking through Task Force comments strongly on this point to the beaches and when the overall position in his report. looked so gloomy. More cannot be said. 6. The sailing and routeing of the assault (Signed) ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, convoys called for careful timing and accurate Admiral of the Fleet, Admiralty footnote: Late Commander-in-Chief, * Gulf of Gioija—on the North-West coast of Mediterranean. . SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 2 MAY, 1950 2175 navigation, as many of the convoy tracks had 7. The decision by Commanding General perforce to cross each other, due to the fact Fifth Army to advance H-Hour by 30 minutes that the troops embarked in convoys sailing was not taken until 24th August and was one from Oran were required for the Southern which involved a considerable number of altera- Sector of the assault beaches. A special channel tions to the convoy sailing and routeing pro- was swept through the minefields between grammes, all of which had to be signalled, as Sicily and Tunisia to allow the assault forces by that time the Operation Orders were in to pass West of Sicily. course of distribution.

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