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Home Affairs Committee: Written evidence Counter-terrorism This volume contains the written evidence accepted by the Home Affairs Committee for the Counter-terrorism inquiry. Web CT Author Page INQ0001 01 CST 1 INQ0002 02 Metropolitan Police 6 INQ0003 02a Supplementary 9 INQ0004 03 Foreign and Commonwealth Office 15 INQ0005 04 Home Office 16 INQ0006 04a Supplementary 17 INQ0007 04b Main submission 18 INQ0008 04c Further supplementary 26 INQ0009 04d Further supplementary 32 INQ0010 04e Further supplementary 33 INQ0011 05 Professor Clive Walker 36 INQ0012 06 Professor Sir David Omand 47 INQ0013 07 Chairman Peter T King 54 CTE0014 08 Tom Keatinge 57 CTE0015 09 Henry Jackson Society 65 CTE0016 10 Financial Conduct Authority 72 CTE0017 11 David Anderson Q.C. 76 CTE0018 11a Supplementary 83 CTE0019 12 Charity Finance Group 97 CTE0020 13 Privacy International 104 CTE0021 14 Google, Facebook, Yahoo!, Twitter and Microsoft 108 CTE0022 15 Charity Commission 110 CTE0023 16 Roger Bennett 118 CTE0024 17 Guardian Media Group 121 CTE0025 18 Birnberg Peirce & Partners 132 CTE0026 19 ARTICLE 19 164 CTE0027 20 Quilliam 170 CTE0028 21 Sir Anthony May, Interception of Communications Commissioner 174 CTE0029 22 Ministry of Defence 177 CTE0030 23 Sir Mark Waller, Intelligence Services Commissioner 179 CTE0031 24 Metropolitan Police supplementary 180 CTE0032 25 Guardian Media Group supplementary 185 CTE0033 26 Claystone Associates 189 CTE0034 27 Gilles de Kerchove, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator 193 CTE0035 28 Paul Laborde, UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate 199 CTE0036 29 Sir Mark Waller, Intelligence Services Commissioner 201 CTE0037 30 Sir Mark Waller, Intelligence Services Commissioner 202 CTE0038 31 Private Secretary, Intelligence Services Commissioner 203 CTE0039 32 Uthman Lateef 204 CTE0040 33 Tom Keatinge supplementary 207 CTE0041 34 Home Office supplementary 213 CTE0042 35 Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP, Intelligence and Security Committee 215 As at 8 April 2014 Written evidence submitted by CST [CT 01] Letter from Richard Benson, Chief Executive, CST, to the Chair of the Committee, 14 June 2013 In response to your request for information concerning extremist speakers at UK universities for the Home Affairs Committee’s inquiry into international terrorism and crime, please find attached CST’s submission. As you will see, we are aware of several incidences of extremist speakers and antisemitic incidents at UK universities that affect the well being of both Jewish students and the wider student community. Richard Benson, Chief Executive CST June 2013 BACKGROUND TRENDS British campuses are generally places where Jewish students feel safe to study and do not suffer antisemitism on a daily basis. However, there are occasions at some Universities and Students’ Unions when Jewish students have been exposed to hate preachers, extremist groups, radicalised individuals, disruption of Jewish Society events and even direct incidents of antisemitism. Extremist activity can leave students from a range of minorities feeling vulnerable and reluctant to express their identity openly. Antisemitism, when it occurs, often takes place in a context that includes other forms of bigotry and as such targets all minority students, and therefore the student body as a whole. This academic year (2012-13) has seen an increase in far right activity on campus. Some of this increase is part of a cycle of extremism between far right and Islamist extremists 1. PROBLEMATIC SPEAKERS ISLAMIST SPEAKERS: • Haitham Al-Haddad spoke at Edinburgh Napier University in November 2011 and Roehampton University in May 20121. Al-Haddad was also meant to address students at LSE in February 2012, but his participation in the event was subsequently cancelled.2 Haitham al-Haddad used facilities at Nottingham campus to host a family retreat weekend in April 2013, the first of a three part course.3 Al-Haddad is the chairman of London’s Muslim Research and Development Foundation, a group that gives Sharia advice on financial matters.4 Al-Haddad has been embroiled in controversy surrounding comments allegedly made in 2001 where it is alleged that he claimed Jews “are the enemies of God and descendants of apes and pigs”.567 He has persistently denied making those comments. An English-language article by Al-Haddad opposes the actions of Al Qaeda but explains that regardless of what Osama bin Laden did, or did not do, “it is an established part of our Islamic 1 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5b0V49VusY 2 http://www2.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/events/2012/02/20120207t1830vCLM502.aspx 3 http://www.familyretreat.co.uk/speakers/shaykh-dr-haitham-al-haddad/ 4 http://www.mrdf.co.uk/ 5 http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/cleric-did-say-"jews-are-descendants-apes-and-pigs" 6 http://www.alminbar.net/alkhutab/khutbaa.asp?mediaURL=4359 7 http://hurryupharry.org/2012/02/04/more-wisdom-of-haitham-al-haddad/ 1 creed that every Muslim, unlike the disbelievers, will eventually enter paradise”. The article also shows various perspectives on what constitutes a “martyr” in combat between Muslims and non- Muslims.8 Speaking in English, Al-Haddad may be seen on youtube, discussing “why marriages fail”. This includes his saying that no outsider should ask a husband why he is beating his wife, because such matters should be sorted between the couple.9 • Azzam Tamimi has repeatedly appeared on university campuses. Tamimi is spokesperson for the Muslim Association of Britain, director of the Institute of Islamic Political Thought10. His Guardian profile states that he has “advised Hamas on media strategy”.11 In February 2010, Tamimi was a speaker at the Federation of Student Islamic Society (FOSIS) Palestine Conference12 held at Manchester University, an Islamic Society event at Cambridge13 and a Palestinian Society event at SOAS.14 During his address to SOAS students, Tamimi called for the destruction of Israel and stated, “Today Hamas is considered a terrorist organisation because that’s what the Americans and Israelis and cowardly politicians of Europe want, but what is so terrorist about it? “You shouldn’t be afraid of being labelled extreme, radical or terrorist. If fighting for your home land is terrorism, I take pride in being a terrorist. The Koran tells me if I die for my homeland, I’m a martyr and I long to be a martyr.”15. In November 2004, Tamimi told the BBC’s Hardtalk: “If I can go to Palestine and sacrifice myself I would do it. Why not?...sacrificing myself for Palestine is a noble cause. It is the straight way to pleasing my God and I would do it if I had the opportunity”16 • Following the threat of protests by Reading University’s Islam Awareness week in February 2013 saw the cancellation of a talk by Uthman Lateef, , due to fear of protests and disruption.17 Uthman Lateef is a preacher from the Hittin Institute.18 Lateef is alleged to have said, “we don’t accept homosexuality...we hate it because Allan hates it”.19 In January and June 2009, Lateef was an advertised speaker at events where Anwar Al-Awlaki (a senior Al-Qaeda figure, later killed by a US drone strike) gave presentations via video link.2021 FAR RIGHT ACTIVITY ON CAMPUS • Nick Griffin, leader of the British National Party, has been invited to university campuses several times in recent years. In February 2012, the Philosophical Society at University College Cork invited Griffin to debate with students; the society withdrew their invitation only days in advance of the 8 http://www.islam21c.com/politics/2644-advice-to-muslims-on-the-death-of-osama-bin-ladin 9 See from 9:00 minutes for relevant comments http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=z37H-NuyY1c, 10 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jan/07/iraq.comment 11 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/nov/21/israel-palestine-gaza 12 https://www.facebook.com/events/280300288948/ 13 http://www.tcs.cam.ac.uk/issue/news/university-islamic-society-accused-of-hypocrisy/ 14 https://www.facebook.com/events/271049642285/ 15 http://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/27106/calls-destruction-israel-soas-lecture 16 Hardtalk, BBC News 24, 2/11/04, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/3985403.stm 17 http://www.reading.ac.uk/news-and-events/releases/PR490014.aspx 18 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kHEaL6Fs7RA 19 http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100077810/east-london-mosque-keeps-on-lying/ 20 http://theendoftime.eventbrite.com/ 21 http://www.hurryupharry.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/wasatiyyah.jpeg 2 event22. In October 2011, Griffin was invited to address students at Trinity University before again having his invitation rescinded.23 In October 2012, Griffin was handed a platform at Leeds University after the student newspaper the Leeds Student published an interview between themselves and Griffin.24 • In February 2013, the Cambridge Union invited Marine Le Pen of the French Front National. Around 200 students protested against her presence, but the event proceeded.25 • Jack Buckby, a student at Liverpool University, founded The National Culturalists society in 2012, renamed as Culturalist Hub in April 201326. Buckby spoke at the 2012 Alliance of European National Movements meeting, explaining how nationalism could be better presented to students, fore xample by its slogan “love culture, hate racism”. He was introduced by Nick Griffin, but has declared himself unaffiliated with the BNP27. • During a 'Pimps and Hoes' themed bar crawl by Manchester’s Varsity Leisure Group, a number of students were spotting donning racist graffiti and messages of support for the BNP on their official bar crawl t-shirts28. 2. DISRUPTION OF EVENTS Although the disruption of Israel-related events may not be antisemitic per se, it contributes to an environment of tension, hostility and discomfort for Jewish students; often resulting in Jewish students feeling intimidated and unable to express their views or identities on their own campus.
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