L/UIIIIV11L VIA The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized
Report No. 3523 Public Disclosure Authorized
PRUJECT PEi'RFI1LWKE AUDIT REPURT
MALI: MOPTI RICE PROJECT (CREDIT 277- MI) Public Disclosure Authorized
Junp 29- 1981 Public Disclosure Authorized Operations Evaluation Department
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of heir nafel chdiast.n It- cntments wwaye nt oterwise ur ulCuSv withut IAurl D autshorization. 0T1DDVMV VnTUTWAT ETC
1971 (at Appraisal) US$1.00 = CFAF 555 fr1rA 0 1 (VIOC TTC1IQOn
Ur~I ft.U V- - An I -
1973-79 (Estimatedi Average U0±.uuVV - AI of Disbursements) CFAF 1,000 = US$2.13
1978 (at Completion) US$1.00 = CFAF 451 CFAFr 1,0010 =
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
1 kilometer (km) 0.62 miles I hectare (ha) 2.47 acres 1 kilogram (kg) 2.2 pounds 1 metric ton (ton) 2,204 pounds
ABBREVIATLUNS
FAC Fonds d-Aide et de Cooperation IDA International Development Association IER Institut d-Economie Rurale OACV Operation Arachides et Cultures Vivrieres ODEM Operation Developpement de 1'Elevage Mopti ORM Operation Riz Mopti SCAER Societe de Credit Agricole et d'Equipement Rural r!-1% f^vvi9q AT i Ter r%11 at rwitLIFLL U%E, V1%&IL0I
RKUJECT PFRKMANE AUULX- KEPUK
MALL: MUTi KIC RKUJET (CREDIT 277-MLI)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
Preface ...... Project Performance Audit Basic Data Sheet ...... ii Highlights ...... iv
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM
I. SUMMARY ...... 1
II. MAIN ISSUES ...... 3
A. Project Design ...... 3 B. Agricultural Credit ...... 6 C. Farmer Institutions ...... 7 D. Technical Package and Agricultural Extension ...... 8 E. Monitoring and Evaluation ...... 10 F. Project Impact at Farm Level ...... 12
Annex I
Table 1 Participants by Farmers and non Farmers ...... 14 Table 2 Distribution of Holdings per Family ...... 14
ATTACHMENT: PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I. BACKGROUND ...... 15
II. PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL ...... 16
III. IMPLEMENTATION ...... 18
IV. AGRICULTURAL IMPACT ...... % .... 22
V. ECONOMIC IMPACT ...... 26
VI. PERFORMANCE ...... 28
VII. SPECIAL ISSUES - LESSON LEARNED ...... 30
Annexes 1 - 3 31-38
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World bank authorization.
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
MALI: MOPTI RICE PROJECT (CREDIT 277-MLI)
PREFACE
This is a performance audit of the Mopti Rice Project in Mali for which Credit 277 was approved in December 1971 in the sum of US$6.9 million which was increased to US$9.5 million and closed fully disbursed in September 1980.
The audit report consists of an audit memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated December 1980. The PCR was prepared by the West Africa Regional Office on the basis of an execution report prepared by the project authority in June 1978.
An OED mission visited Mali in August 1980. Discussions were held with officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and the project authority. The information obtained during the mission were used to test the validity of the conclusions of the PCR.
The audit memorandum is based on the mission's discussions, on interviews with Bank staff, and on a review of the Appraisal Report No. PA-107a dated November 9, 1971, the President's Report No. P-999 of Decem- ber 9, 1971, the Credit Agreement dated January 6, 1972, the PCR and corre- spondence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issues contained in relevant Bank files.
A copy of the draft report was sent to the Borrower for comments on April 29, 1981; none were received.
The audit finds that the PCR covers adequately most of the project's salient features and the PPAM generally agrees with the main conclusions. However, in addition to summarizing the objectives and results of the project, the PPAM expands upon some issues which are not, or only briefly, mentioned in the PCR: deficiencies in technical design, farmer institutions, and monitor- ing and evaluation, because of their importance to this as well as other agricultural projects in the same region.
The valuable assistance provided by the Government of Mali and the nroiect staff met durine the prenaration of this report is gratefully acknowledged.
- ii -
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET
MALI: MOPTI RICE PROJECT (CREDIT 277-MLI)
KEY PROJECT DATA
Appraisal Actual or Ttem Exnctation C,irrant- at-4mnaa
Total Proiect Cost (US9 million) 9.4 13.1 Overrun (%) 39 Credit Amount (TTq millinn) A9 o ,/a Disbursed 9.5 Date Mninr Phycirnl rnmnnnantc rnmnitaA OA/75 09/7 Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 100 95 Pronortion of Time Overrun (7) - 17 Economic Rate of Return (%) 14 17
Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements /TTC4 '80 VWqU4vaen#-*
FY73 FY74 FY75 vY76 FY77 Fv70 v70 Fon
Esiae 900n 11, 7nn 9; Qf0f Q,71.A 01 1 Kt* n, 1.OIn n nfO IJO~~tL ~.JWI.O '.J-. A 'JJ 'JV'JW S .U 7, -tU 7.JV P U - Actual 1,280 4,250 6,900 8,300 8,700 9,100 9,300 9,500
Estimated % 106.6 114.8 116.9 95.0 95.0 96.5 97.9 100
Actual or Item Original Revisions Est. Actual
V4 rst M1-4d-- In Fi1es or Tm et-abl1e ^1-1,nIre .V.L L 11ICLLuiL -LLLE.±±cb U LL aU. U ' / .11 /I Government s Application 06/27/70 LTego LaUJ - //.L -LV/ 40/i 0/I/7 Board Approval 12/21/71 - 01/06/72 Creuit Agreement vate Ui/Uo// - 01/U6/72 Effectiveness Date 04/17/72 07/01/72 06/26/72 %,-Losing Date va /~-. /I0 1.3 /~ /0 9/3/8 Borrower Republic of Mali Executing Agency Operation Riz Mopti Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31 Folow-on Project Name Second Mopti Rice Project Credit Number 753-MLI Amount (US$ million) 15.0 Credit Agreement Date 12/08/77
/a Including Supplementary Credit of US$2.6 million.
- iii -
MISSION DATA
Sent Month/ No. of No. of Man- Date of item D Year Weeks Persons weekaLa Report
Identification KMWA 05/69 2.2 3 6.6 06/28/69 10/24/69 Preparation I RMWA/HQ 10/69 1.2 2 2.4 11/06/69 Preparation II RMWA 01-02/70 2.4 1 2.4 03/16/70 Preparation Ill RMWA U-lU//U 1.0 2 2.0 10/19/70 Appraisal HQ/RMWA 04-05/71 4.6 4 22.4L.b 05/20/71
Total 11.4 35.8
Supervision I HQ 05/72 0.8 2 1.6 06/09/72 Supervision II HQ 10/72 1.6 1 1.6 10/27/72 Supervision III HQ 06/73 1.5 2 3.0 07/31/73 Supervision IV HQ/RMWA 05/74 1.6 3 4.8 06/28/74 Supervision V HQ 11/74 2.0 2 4.0 12/24/74 Supervision VI HQ 04-05/75 2.0 2 4.0 06/02/75 Supervision VII HO 11/75 0.2 1 0.2 12/05/75 Supervision VIII HQ 01/76 1.6 3 4.8 03/03/76 Supervision IX HO 11/76 3.4 4 13.6 12/22/76 Supervision X HQ 05/77 2.6 2 5.2 06/22/77 Supervision XI HO 11-12/77 1.0 2 2.0 04/28/78 Supervision XII HQ 02/78 0.6 1 0.6 02/28/78 SunerviRion XTTT HO 11/78 1.2 9 9.4 19/04/78
Total 20-1 47.8
NaMt! U1 UULLeCecy ALULrevLaL.Lu) Mali Frane (Mr) Year: Appraisal Year average (71.) Exchange Rate: US$1 MF555.42 Intervening Years Average US$1 = MF469.60 Completion Year Average (1978) US$1 = MF431.L1
/a Total manweeks may overestimate the actual number of manweeks spent on the project since some supervision missions also covered other projects in Mali.
/b Includes two weeks each by two additional mission members who were not present for the entire duration of the mission.
- .1v -
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
MALI: MOPTI RICE PROJECT
HIGHLIGHTS
The project which was the bank Group s first operation in Mall s agricultural sector aimed at raising paddy production by 35,000 tons through the construction of three polders and the rehabilitation of five polders in the Niger flood plain, deep plowing, equipment and staffing of the project authority, establishment of a seed farm and technical assistance to project management.
Most of the project works were completed on schedule with the exception of three polders and construction of buildings which were completed about three years behind schedule. Because of adverse topographic and pedo- logic conditions discovered only during project implementation, the total project area was reduced from 31,000 ha to about 26,000 ha.
The project's objectives were not fully achieved mainly for climatic reasons, shortcomings in the technical design, wild rice infestation and lack of adequate agricultural credit. Yields have reached only 50% to 70% of the appraisal forecast. However, despite the decrease in area and production compared with projections, the project's ERR is now reestimated at 17%, compared to 14% calculated at appraisal, because the economic price of rice increased by more than 300% over appraisal projections.
The following points may be of special interest:
- In spite of its limitations, the controlled flood irrigation system offers benefits to a large number of farmers at low cost per ha and does not require drastic changes of existing farming systems (PPAM para. 13);
- deficiencies in technical design exacerbated the limitations of the controlled flood system (PPAM paras. 12 and 14, PCR paras. 3.07-3.09);
- the lack of an agricultural credit component had adverse effects on the project (PPAM paras. 18-20);
- the project failed to promote farmer organizations to deal with credit, marketing, extension, land distribution and cost recovery (PPAM paras. 21-22); - farmers' attitudes vis-a-vis the technical package were dictated more by technical constraints and the prevailing socio-economic environment than by ignorance and irrationality (PPAM paras. 23-25);
- monitoring and evaluation had little impact on managements decision-making process (PPAM paras. 30-31); and
- the cost recovery rate was good despite low yields and heavier taxation than initially foreseen; inconsistencies are evident in required cost recoveries in Bank assisted irrigation projects (PPAM paras. 33-34). PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM
MALI: MOPTI RICE PROJECT (PVDTT ?77-MTTI)
I. SUMMARY
Background
1Lh. Niger-LUW±Hg RiVE LLUUU jid.Ltb UW L-C L LL6ULLauLdiea : West Africa. Mali had traditionally been an exporter of rice until the 1960s when stagnating prouuction anU increaUig population causeu L LU Ut LUUrm LL importing country. To reverse this trend, Mali embarked on a program to construct polders and introauce improved rice cu_LivaLiUn over an area U approximately 120,000 ha, about 55,000 ha of which were located in the Mopti area. Government submitted a request for DA' s assistance to help in the development of this area.
2. The project, which was the Bank Group's first operation in Mali's agricultural sector, was identified by the Bank s Resident Mission in West Africa (RMWA) in May 1969. The project was prepared by the Government with the assistance of consultants financed by UNDP and French Aide (FAC). Tne feasibility study was issued in January 1971 and appraisal took place in April/May 1971. Negotiations were held on October 1971. Board presentation took place on December 21, 1971 and the Credit Agreement was signed on January 6, 1972.
Project Design
3. The total project area was planned to cover 31,000 ha of the Mopti region. The project's objective was to raise paddy production by 35,000 tons in 1982 through the introduction of a controlled flood system, improved seeds, improved and timely plowing and seeding, and application of fertil- izers. A total of 7,800 farmers (4.25 ha/farm) were expected to be reached by the project which originally consisted of (i) the construction of 3 polders covering 13,300 ha and the rehabilitation of 5 polders with an area of 13,ZUU ha, (ii) deep plowing on 10,300 ha, (iii) housing, building, vehicles, farm machinery, staffing and operating cost of the project authority (O.R.M.).', (iv) an applied agricultural research program, (v) the establishment of a seed farm and (vi) technical assistance, to project management and for prepar- ing the feasibility study of the Second Mopti Rice Project. At government request, technical assistance to the agricultural credit institution was eliminated from the project description.
1/ Operation Riz Mopti. - 2 -
4. Total proiect cost was estimated at US$9.4 million: IDA's contribu- tion was US$6.9 million while FAC financed technical assistance (US$0.7 million). A supplementary IDA Credit of US$2.6 million and an increase in FAC's contribution amounting to US$0.5 million were made in 1975 to cover the effects of the dollar devaluation. minor changes in Droiect design and cost increases.
Project Implementation
5. The Project became effective in June 1972. In spite of inital rtlnva in tendering nnd Awnrdinp contracts most nf thp irriontinn works wre completed by mid-1976 as foreseen with the exception of three polders which were completed 32 months hohind chedulo For nnstruction fn buildings delays in completion were even longer partly due to cement shortages. Cer- taiproblems were encoun tered du-- -g imleenato resutin in modfi--- tions of the works. Because of adverse topographic and pedologic characteris- tics discovered only duiringcxcuin the total project area wsreduced from 31,000 ha to about 26,000 ha. In 1974, technical insufficiencies of the hydr a.ulic.. s tructures aresu.Ol.ted.~L in unotrle.. ~t f.L~.t'.looding affctn t-U±1 po'ders.UC. 6 and the loss of 800 ha of already cultivated land. The long delays experi- eceAI.C in JJ.J 1, 15A-n cos.J t rucUt i b,ad a neaau .va ctiveipato L.Ie opertion L.Lo tiL e Project Authority.
6. Project cost estimates were revised in June 1973, May 1974 and were mainly due to cost escalation of civil works, management and extension rVce. GVeLLLenCL LUnLLUULL0O LU dLUJ=k_L LULD WeLC LUdUE CVdLdU.U 111 time and kept pace with the progress of works.
Project Impact
7. The project's objectives were not fully achieved mainly for climatic reasons. rullowing the Li,/iJ an( i droughts, when only 1/3 and 1/2 or the developed areas could be inundated, the net cultivable area of each polder had to be redefined and was reduced Dy 16%. Yielas were lower than estimated and do not show a sustained increase as anticipated; this was due to limited adoption of improved cultivation techniques and to wild rice infestation. However, when compared with the "without the project" situation, yields are on average 1.5 times higher but have reached only 50%/ to I of the appraisal forecast. Because of inadequate incentives due to low official paddy prices, farmers try to sell as much as possible in the parallel market. The gross value of production per farm reaches between 50% and 65% of appraisal esti- mates while actual family net incomes amount to 647 - 12% of appraisal projec- tions.
8. The agricultural credit component aiming at expanding ox-drawn cul- tivation fell short of expectations because of (i) increases in the price of bullocks, (ii) inefficiency of the government agency responsible for supplying - 3-
eq JpmentL, t,4,*% *U~ -A (- +-, 4 oxen an. 4
ties of farmers in repaying loans after the bad harvests during drought.
I.Credi was also used uy UR' UML urching.LI tractors, threshersL anu. tlersL L o provide services to farmers; ploughing and sowing were, however, limited due to few requests from1 farmersL ad ULRb equipweiI- ___1euaie UI~UL~~U
9. Despite certain imprUvements i1troduceu in 1L7/7It, performance of the seed farm has remained unsatisfactory. Faulty methodology and lack of competent supervision prevented complete acnievement of initial objectives of the agricultural research component. Conclusive results, however, have been obtained as regards cultivating techniques which are being used in the Mopti II project.
10. In accordance with the Credit Agreement, levies were to be charged to farmers to cover annual operation and maintenance costs and to recover all direct investments over a 35-year period. Levies were imposed from 1974 on at a much faster rate than anticipated, although ORM adopted a policy of exempt- ing farmers most affected by cropping hazards from these levies. The present level of the levies is adequate to compensate for recurrent costs, but recov- ery of investment costs proved not feasible because it would place too heavy a burden on farmers' low net incomes.
11. Despite the decrease in area and production compared with appraisal projections, the project's ERR is now estimated at 17%, as opposed to 14% calculated at appraisal, because the economic price of rice increased by more than 300% over appraisal projections.
II. MAIN ISSUES
A. The Project Design
12. The PCR considers the limited efficiency of the "controlled flood" irrigation system as the main issue and stresses that despite investments in structures (dikes, inlet and outlet structures), sufficient rainfall and its timely distribution has a decisive influence on the cropping cycle and yield (para. 7.01). The extent of risk attributable to insufficient rainfall has only come into focus in recent years and was not considered at appraisal. Although the audit shares this view, it also finds that intrinsic limitations of the "controlled flood" system were exacerbated by shortcomings of the technical design: canals and drains had insufficient capacity to properly flood and drain the rice fields; some of the intakes suffered from weak structures as well as erosion problems, and the quality of the hydraulic structures was not fully satisfactory. Most of these problems were eliminated during project implementation, but ORM had still not received adequate racks for intake structures and drainage problems were not eliminated for the -4-
Soufouroulaye polder at the time of the mission. In this polder, farmers also complanedabou inAn, fic'n ce-r Ano_l/
13. The PCR concludes that because of its 14mita-f-4- the controlled flood system might be inappropriate for the Mopti region. In the audit's vi4w +-- co+-ole- flood system should, however, becmae wIth ps sible alternative irrigation systems which have been reviewed by the rural flood was the only feasible economic solution for the Mopti area. Exorbi- LanL UL LUtal water Liall \over TTvO-s)uWulua" LL cUsts contrlU in Hy,LLW~I WO./1JI G , forceLtIe-Uc 'ov'ern=%UVLY ment to limit construction of such schemes to heavily populated areas where UGUUl LLUpptluCb b fL-dlledbii UL tLU rUe WOIr aALeLLaVCs aLe fasULC (Kayes, Timbouctou and Legou). Under prevailing conditions in the Mopti area, the controlled flood system permitted improving living conditions of thousands of families at a low cost per ha and without drastic changes of the existing farming system. Iu ne 1opti region, the alternative is not a more sopnis- ticated irrigation scheme but only the "no project" solution.2/ The 1972, 1973 ana i77 cropping seasons snowea tnat "no project means no crops while the polders remained the only productive areas in the Mopti region. This explains continuous farmers' interest for polders despite the limitations of the controlled flood system and subsequent disappointing yields by outside standards.
14. In addition to the rehabilitation of old poiders and construction of new polders, land preparation (deep ploughing) was an important physical component to reduce wild rice infestation. A provision of deep ploughing on 10,300 ha was allowed at appraisal after chemical treatment considered at the feasibility stage had been eliminated on economic grounds. Wild rice intesta- tion is still a serious problem and the PCR tries to explain this unsatisfac- tory situation by the lack of farmerso collaboration (para. 4.04). The audit does not support this view and thinks that wild rice infestation should be mainly attributed to insufticient deep ploughing. Deep poughing has been carried out only on 8,900 ha because "the contractor for the rural works,
1/ Soufouroulaye polder should have been mentioned in para. 3.06 of the PCR which lists polders where considerable completion delays occurred.
2/ The Region argues that between controlled flood as it has been prac- ticed and the fully controlled irrigation there is a wide range of development possibilities, like partial levelling, contour levees and ditches, improvement of water conveyance networks and partial pumping, which could be used according to the physical characteristics of each individual polder and which have not yet been envisaged either for Mopti I or Mopti II Projects. These actions would partially offset the shortcomings of the controlled flood system that, in spite of its merits, is highly dependent on rainfall and river floods. Before decid- ing on a simple controlled flood system or any improvements to it, an agroclimatologic study needs to be carried out. -5-
who had also carried out the deep ploughing, abandoned the residual works in 19ia, preferring to pay the statutory penalty. in uibauenLC, "Ll C uaL.V7 contractor could be induced to undertake the deep ploughing.' It is not surprising then to observe the worst situation in OLa polders aiu moLe specif- ically on the Mopti-Sud polder where no deep ploughing was ever undertaken. The lesson is that under prevailing conditions deep ploughing has Lo De considered as a prerequisite prior to land allocation to farmers. This was done under the Mopti H1 Project which planned systematic deep ploughing of new poldeys and on 10,200 ha of the Mopti I polders and two other existing polders.±-'
15. In the audit's view, the deficiencies in technical design and insufficient deep ploughing are the main reasons for which "the success of the harvest is still dependent on climate and the incremental benefit is compara- tively low.".J The audit does not support the PCR's assessment that "the project could not offer the water control necessary to induce farmers to fully participate with the project. As a result, smaller lots per family were cropped and cultivation standards have remained low." It was found that only in the Dia Tenenkou polders farmer participation was contingent on efficient water control. Areas cultivated in these polders are marginal and irrigation works do not significantly improve water control over natural conditions which it should be noted, are exceptionally good. As a result, yields of the Dia Tenenkou polders were generally lower than yields outside during project implementation. This was not the case in most other polders where effects of the rainfall deficit were less pronounced during the dry years (1972/73, 1973/74, 1977/78). In those polders farmers' attitude vis-a-vis the project was more influenced by socio-economic considerations than by water avail- ability. The case of the Sarantomo Syn polder is a good illustration: after two consecutive years during which there was no harvest at all, allocation of land and the number of beneficiaries remained at the same level, which demon- strates continuous farmers' interest in the project despite its poor technical performance.
16. Allocation of smaller lots per family was not brought about by any lack of farmers' interest but, on the contrary, as a deliberate policy to satisfy all or more requests and in addition had to take into account the
1/ Mopti II Project Appraisal Report, para. 13.
2/ The Region notes that deep ploughing is necessary when infestation reaches such proportions that no other solution is possible; it is not a prerequisite of rice cultivation but the only remedy after years of bad cultivation practices.
3/ PCR. nara. 7.01. equipment available to farmers.1/ The project's 1973/74 annual report shows that only 792 of farmers who ronue-stpd ho1dingg were in fact allocated a lot. The 1978 report of the "Evaluation Unit" indicates (para. 11.13) that 66.67% of sa=ple farms hvmanaedthieir siz- 9-5-6-47 (mnst of them under two hectares) have increased their holdings and the remaining 7.9%, with decreases -in thbeir ac.reage, wer the largea fa-rms (abovey 6; ha)-
17. CSpecal mention should be made of the attention given fo rpQnlvp nyv likely problems with livestock in the design of the project's polders. Unlike other irrigation schemes in the sahelian Zon.2/ th xtnie,sko h project area by cattle herds during the dry season was anticipated and provi- SiOnS were mad~e for a"_ut access to gras4-n-if-Mn tion of a livestock component in the Mopti II project design was less success- ful anG las led tLseLious arguments etween -frmes and hradamen out the Bougoula polders project where dikes now render access to traditional grazing areas impoSSIDLe. An attempt LU Leblve tL±L PaUV ew was maUc nd ODEM. projects.
B. Agricultural Credit
18. Agricultural credit which was considered an important component at appraisal was eliminated at Government s request CUL.LLIg negotiti.ons. I. retrospect, this decision had adverse effects on the project since SCAER/ aDility to supply farmers wLi farm equipment was limIteU. At appFateam, va had little control and limited influence on credit organization as well as on credit allocation and delivery. This problem was recUonized and pointed out in the appraisal report: "Although the operations now administer agricul- tural credit, the burden of financing farm inputs sold on credit still rests with SCAER. SCAER has never had sufficient working capital of its own to fi- nance its activities and has always relied on direct government assIsa 1
1/ The Region doubts that the actual farm size being smaller than antici- pated at appraisal results from a deliberate policy of ORM. The linlited equipment of farmers and their consequent inability to effectively cope with larger units might have been a much stronger reason.
2/ See PPAR Senegal Polders OED Report No. 2777, dated December 1979.
3/ Operation Developpement de l'Elevage Mopti.
4/ Societe de Credit Agricole et d'Equipement (the agricultural credit agency).
5/ CPS notes that the costs of administering credit can be so high, and the default rates excessive due to poor crops that one might argue that, economically speaking, a straight grant package would be cheaper, espe- cially since inputs are already heavily subsidized. - 7 -
(Appraisal Report, Annex 4, p.2). As a result, credit terms were unfavor- able (20% cash and repayment in two 40% annuities) and, to a large extent, credit availability was restricted. This was noted by the November/December 1977 supervision mission which noted that "this aspect of project should be accorded priority in the coming months in order to seek a more satisfactory solution well in advance of the next cropping season" (para. 12).
19. Lack of credit for bullocks turned out to be one of the main con- straints. The cost of a pair of bullocks was about 150,000 MF in 1977 and increased to about 200,000 MF by 1980. The shortage of draft animals also explains the slow progress of putting to more effective use the farmers' equipment and the relative decrease of plowing. As a consequence of the Government/Bank agreed institutional arrangements. ORM never felt resnonsible for credit problems and never referred to the unsatisfactory credit situation either in its Proiect Execution Renort or in its 1977/78 and 1978/79 annual reports. Rates of credit recoveries were not considered key indicators either by the extension service or by the evaluation unit and hencp it iq not surprising to find little information on this matter in Bank documents.
20. The credit system's failure to function adequately is a major shortonming of this nrniet and the lak of nrovision fora crdI o mnonent within the project is a serious omission of the Mopti I project. As shown in the chapter on agricultural1 extension (praras. 23 - 24A) , tehIa rogess-- was, and still is, highly dependent on the availability and proper use of farm 1 aqipmnmrt. T -n. Out -d .i -,,t ari--u #,u1.-- credi4t ,F xtesion actvte nr, -F4.444 have only a limited impact on production in the Mopti polders. There should beo a cl-e 1 4.-, .- A cooperation betweenn agri cul4tural -r-A4+- -- 4--,.,ettk-.. ing, input supply, and extension at project level. A good example of a suc e SfUl 4 ntegart-n is 44-e Mq14 C-A qn,4a4-TIt 1 --- ^-- e - . 1 .~ by the Mopti II project which includes a credit component to be managed by
AUM0. uuwcyck LHC AG.L ACMGRD LUOL LLuUweL LveUrLCIeLD LUL UU LU.A-s VC nUL been solved and are still not recognized when it is concluded that "generally, oxen aLe pLULcure Uy fLLrm ULcly LLUm Lhe LLUae b Lhis appedLb LU work satisfactorily, no change is envisaged in this procedure and oxen are, in consCquence, nU coveted uy Lue creuit programme." fl. 1lrmL -AILu-I.ons
I-A* Un.L&e mULe LecentC GLL1 A11t.U C L.iU.LULdL UL ctL, iHbL.LUL.LOLU building was not considered as an issue. The need for farmer institutions was, nowever, recogunieu uy Lue Decemuer 1910 Supervision mission wnicn reported that: "marketing tasks will become even more of a burden as marketed production increases. No ready soluLIon is In signt DUt It is hoped that more emphasis on farmer's groups, functional literacy programs, etc.,...will allow
1/ Mopti II Appraisal Report, Annex 5, Appendix III, para. 3. -8- a gradual allocation of marketing tasks to farmers' representatives."!1 The same issue was raised again in a project report prepared by ORM, which recon- mended the establishment of farmer village groups to manage agricultural credit through the reorganization of the Malian cooperative system. The implementation of this cooperative program is expected to create "professional institutions of rice farmers able to self-manage irrigation schemes and their equipment." 2 /
22. Promotion of farmer associations was not considered under the follow-on project in spite of including an adult literacy component. The absence of any efforts to establish farmer organizations was also commented on in previous OED reports of two other Bank financed irrigation proiects: Cameroon SEMRY Rice and Senegal River Polders.31 It was found that in most irrigation Droiects. proiect authorities aDpear reluctant to nromot farmer organizations which in their view could strengthen the farmers' bargaining power and. as a side effect. reduce the authorities' leverage. On the one hand, farmers contribute, through the payments of levies, to the reimburse- ment of Droiects investments- which imnlies at least that thev should have some rights in decision making.-- On the other hand, to insure optimum use of irrigated land. nroiert authoriton intend to ratnin ho victh- t- evict farmers who do not properly till allocated lands. In the case of this proj- ect- ORM waq uinqble to establish a nPrPzry dinloriie with farmar. The f4.1A staff's power in deciding on land distribution is in no way balanced or countered by farmer organizations and recent exnprienre hqr Qhnwn thnf thic situation could lead to abuses.- Project management is well aware of this nrohlpm and shares the n,dit' s vier n the need for promoting farmer organiza- tions to deal with credit supply and recovery, marketing, extension, levies onllprfinn AnA lanfi r1i.trihiutionn_
D)_ Technical Packrage ndA Agricuiltural Extension 91 Analysis of the farmers' response to th tehla limited to a general comment by the PCR on their refusal to adopt crop inten- contributesCXO*to cost recver,thiso i a tificati
OJUP%-LVL.LJLVL I-,ZPULL, LJC:_LLJL)CL L71V, LULLM!A~ JU, PZLLa. 1.
~)I ~ (\fl1A~ -J 11T~ 1 C170 - 11' VKWJEdI L. ACULUI 1)j~.JL _JIIL710,p i.
-I OD Report bilos. 42054 anu 2777, dated March 191 and December 1979.
/ CPS staff points to the fact that although farmers pay a levy which contributes to cost recovery, this does not constitute a justification for their participation in project decision-making. Such a participa- tion, however, might be desirable from a production point of view.
5/ Reallocation of field staff by new project director revealed that some field workers abused their power in arbitrary land allocation. attitude can be attributed mainly to "plagues and unsatisfactory flooding of poiders" ,- and partly to ORM s work organizaLiOn of eXtensiUn WoE. However, there are also additional more specific reasons explaining the farmers attitudes towards different package components. For some components, farmers' responses have been positive and this was recognized during the Mopti It appraisal.-, Sativa varieties are now totally accepted within the project area and are also widely used outside.
24. The Mopti II Appraisal also gives an explanation for the delays in adopting line sowing: ...introduction of line sowing, the prerequisite for effective weeding and for making good use of fertilizer was retarded by the lack of a seeder adapted to local conditions. Following the identification and acquisition of a suitable type, line sowing has begun on a modest scale and has reached about 6% of the cultivated area in 197/7/.o Line sowing was undertaken only on 17% of the planted areas in 1978/79. Main reasons for the slow adoption of line sowing were both the small number of seeders (128 in 1977) and their low productivity (21 ha per seeder instead of 40 ha). The average area annually sown by seeders is more dependent on rainfall patterns than on the farmers' good intentions. The use of bullocks for sowing in the polders is contingent on sufficient intervals between rainfalls and, there- fore, extension staff have sometimes recommended hand sowing when waiting for the seeders. The lack of ox-mechanized weeding was not due to farmers' unwillingness but to lack of adequate equipment; the modified ARIANA hoe was not then supplied to farmers by SCAER. Substantial price increases and lack of adequate medium-term credit explain the shortage of plows and oxen (only 41% of farmers were adequately equipped).3/
25. Because of these technical and financial constraints the impact of extension staff remained minimal.k/ The project proved again the old exper- ience that the farmers' attitude vis-a-vis a technical package is more dic- tated by technical constraints and the socio-economic environment than by
1/ PCR, para. 4.04.
2/ "The substitution of sativa rice varieties for the traditional glaberima rice was unexpectedly rapid and is now complete, far ahead of appraisal estimates." Mopti II Appraisal Report, Annex 4, para. 18.
3/ CPS staff notes that (i) no research has apparently been done, or at- tempts made at mobilizing the farmers' own resources and that credit was not necessarily the best alternative means of stimulating purchase of equipment, and (ii) the fact that more than a quarter of land owners in the polders are absentees suggests that the situation is more complex.
4/ This was also noticed in another project (see OED Report No. 2054, Cameroon SEMRY Project, dated March 1978). - Ij~n ignorance and irrationality. Recognizing the constraints, the project should have paid Less attention to extension and more to the institutional aspects or the credit and supply systems.
E. Monitoring and Evaluation
26. The audit thinks that special mention needs to be made of the work achieved by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (MEU) officially established in January 1977. The creation of MEU was not explicitly foreseen at appraisal but the Credit Agreement made provision for socio-economic surveys to be carried out by consultants under the Mopti II feasibility studies. The consultants first visited Mali in July 1974 and February 1975. The objective of the socio-economic analysis was to establish a farm classification based on the following criteria:
- Ethnic group
- Age of household head
- Main professional activity
- Farm area
- Farm equipment
- Number of resident active males in household
This study reveals some interesting findings. A breakdown or participants by farmers and absentee land owners shows the importance of the absentee element on polders close to the Mopti Sevare agglomeration. Acreage of holdings per family shows that in some polders the percentage of holdings with more than 6 ha is relatively large (19% in Soufouroulaye, 18% in Tenenkou), while on average, small holdings under 4 ha account for 80% of farms but only for 60% of total area. Details are given in Annex 1, Tables 1 and 2. These findings seem to indicate that appropriate covenants need to be considered in future agreements to avoid allocation of Bank funds to population segments which cannot be considered as members of the "target groups."
27. Monitoring and evaluation should have required more attention and guidance by the Bank to make findings of the unit more meaningful. Analysis of the budget of 66 farms during the 1978/79 campaign concludes that ox-drawn farm equipment may not be profitable on small holdings (under 3 ha). However, this analysis may not be fully conclusive because use of oxen and equipment on fields outside the polders (natural flooding of fields used for rice cultiva- tion and rainfed cereal fields) has not been taken into account. Malian project staff are convinced that the most significant criteria for farm classification are: (i) paddy areas cultivated outside polders and (ii) areas of dry land crops. Unfortunately, these additional lands were not yet consid- ered by the Evaluation Unit. - 11 -
9AR A sincl nold r chii1d hp t-kpn aq th hqic unit for qnV qnrin- economic analysis. The variables selected by the MEU would then become repre- sentatve for the farm r1.qQifirtion of Pach noldr where hqnir naramPtr. (hydraulic and climatic conditions as well as the farming system) are the same. ome of the Anluicn reached need to be more carefully evaluat,d Good performance achieved in the Sofara polder can be explained by the fact that there a-re few other opportunitieS for r4ce -utvtoUtSide. thn polder in the Sofara area. By contrast, lack of farmers' response in the Dia
outside the polders and the marginal water control improvement offered by ir- rigation works. C_-.polders where ra infed crops ar\motn Soufouroulaye)$ slow progress of hoe weeding on project fields can be explained by the compe-
LiLU UCLWeeH Ly anALL igated lande.. Farmers giVe priUity LU hand wCeuing of dry lands when weeds, as they see it, are more serious competitors for the soils resiUdul mibIwre.
Z. lThe "fingllA system" approachl, i.e., loo'.L[ L ± Ld_LUIdLVLe irrigation as well as dry farming, was totally lacking during project imple- mentation. MEu is now well aware of the importance of taking into account all farm activities inside and outside polders, irrigated and rainfed crops, agriculture and livestock production. Tne findings of such comprehensive analysis will be useful for agricultural extension and should give a sound basis for better coordination between different agencle-z' which work in the area, and in the past have tried to influence the same farmers sometimes with what must have appeared to them as conflicting information.
30. Institutional aspect of monitoring and evaluation also deserves some comment. In this respect, it is interesting to compare the Integrated Rural Development (UACV)t' and the Mopti Projects. In ORM, the evaluation unit is integrated in the project structure and part of the agro-socio-economic divi- sion, with very few links to IER.--' On the other hand, OACV's Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was directly under IER's control and had little influence on project management. Different institutional structure of MEU had, however, little impact on project management. The methodology applied by both units (sample surveys of farms) focused more on evaluation than on monitoring and had little impact on management's decision-making process. In the audit's view, the reason for the MEU's limited impact was that monitoring and evalua- tion objectives were formulated too vaguely.
1/ Mopti Rice Project, Mil Mopti, CMDT, ODEM.
2/ See OED Report No. 3274, Mali Integrated Rural Development, dated Decem- ber 1980.
3/ Institut d'Economie Rurale (a department of the Ministry of Rural Dev- elopment). - 12 -
31. Mopti project staff and, more specifically, extension staff have not yet discovered how to make use of the wealth of information collected by MEU. The audit found, however, a growing awareness among project management and staff of the need for more precise assessment of what kind of information is needed at different levels of project management for extension, for re- search, for credit and for marketing. Closer cooperation has now been estah- lished between the project MEU and the IER Evaluation Unit. This should facilitate better coordination between monitoring, evaluation and annlied agricultural research.
F. Project Impact at Farm Level
32. Farm budgets presented in the PCR (Annex 3, Table 4) refer only to one farm tvnpe: the one qtah1ished in P-i-tinc nolderz Tn the without project situation, however, the appraisal report dealt with two farm types: thnse in Arictina nolders and fArms outside pnldere Actually, there are 5,600 farms that fall under the second category. For these families, the prnoe- Js even -or i pn-atnt be-usec pady p,roduciion OU+-.4A- __IoA virtually nil in years of poor flooding (as it actually happened in 1972, 1973, 1977 IQ7Q)~ A. note-- *--A.l inoter bank f4nanced ..... L & 6 CLL.AULL projects,- the Mopti project also benefitted from the "drought effect;" inroeae -- _-i fonln dueA1 to wate - r contrl even 4f not sufceto some polders, was greatly appreciated by farmers during the years when polder crops were the only crops avai. le. An additional benefit that Sh-ouldAlob taken into account is that in average years of good flooding, there are sub-
a..c.tLLLS...CO ~ ' - I 6-tJ II 'U - -%Z VWJU.LO LLUC LUV LLM W.LUK:b9LICU 5 use of project introduced Sativa varieties.
33. On the other hand, farmer incomes are reduced by the levies col- uperation lcec e tocverLtL aLLLa.LannualltU U L VV.UkJL~L UII anuOLI maitencanceUI.iLLtIaLIt cvst.L b . LIbA-tgtt L.LIgi .LY UUI1PLIUblZeUmuaie by the PCR (para. 4.15), the recovery rate was good in spite of generally poor yields anu heavier taxatun Luan initially foreseen (liu Kgina instead or Du kg/ha in 1977). The Appraisal Report of Mopti II apparently did not share analysisdts unu p.upoueu that "to ensure Luat rarmers in the project area make an equitable contribution towards project costs, the development levy will be raised above the level envisaged under the first MoptI Rice Project. Assurances were obtained at negotiation that the current policy of periodi- cally raising the development levy would De continued until a levy of 24U kg/ha is reached in 1982."2/ The audit, however, strongly supports the PCR conclusions that it would be unrealistic at prevailing official prices to try to recover investment costs and that the farmers' contributions to project cost recovery have to be sought through farm-price increases and not through increase of paddy quantities.
1/ See PPAR of Cameroon SEMRY Rice and Senegal Polder. OED Report Nos. 2054 and 2777, dated March 1978 and December 1978.
2/ Mopti II Project Appraisal Report, para. 6.11. 34. In this context, it is interesting to compare Mopti with other irrigation projects in West Africa. Under the Cameroon Sr-AcY prOject, the farmers' share in cost recovery was limited to cover the field operation and maintenance costs of the irrigation network. Direct investments are to be recovered through surpluses generated by the SEMRY marketing operations. At completion time, "part of the costs of the services provided Dy SE was not charged directly to farmers but covered by SEMRY s operating budget;"1/ this was considered equitable because of sizeable income differences bet- ween the north and the rest of Cameroon." In the case of Senegal Polders, the appraisal objectives were similar to those of the Mopti project. Farmer levies were supposed to recover all "project operation and maintenance costs and all direct investments including taxes chargeable to the project. !L "At completion, water charges actually paid by farmers were adequate to finance operating and maintenance costs of the perimeter'T and credit recovery is similar to Mopti-s (87% in 1977). In the audit's view, there are inconsistencies in approaching cost recoveries in irrigation projects which need to be eliminated. 4/
35. Farm gate prices have been a main issue in Bank relations with Malian Government3/ and the PCR (para. 7.02) reminds that "the Association has occasionally been able to obtain significant increases in producer prices but, due to Government's over-concern with processing cheap cereals for influential urban customers, these successes have always been temporary and soon eroded by inflation." In this context, a lesson can be learned from project experience. Prices on the parallel market are sensitive to annual production levels and it is a fact that during drought years these prices were far above official levels. There is, however, a remarkable exception: in 1975/76 at harvest time, market prices were below official prices but ORM was unable to buy all paddy brought in by farmers because of a shortage of market- ing funds and storage facilities. This supports a finding of the Mali Integ- rated Rural Development audit that marketing is not only a price but also an organizational problem. Shortages of marketing funds and bags have been a chronic problem plaguing most development projects in Mali.
1/ OED Report No. 3051, Cameroon SEMRY, dated March 1978, paras. 7.5 - 7.6.
2/ Senegal Polders Appraisal Report, para. 6.10.
3/ OED Report No. 2777, Senegal Polders, dated December 1978, para. 4.02.
4/ The Region-s point of view reflects the Bank guidelines in this matter (OMS 2.25 and CPM 2.10) i.e., the recovery criteria should be a trade-off between the need to get paid for the water delivered, the country's policy in this matter, and the capacity of farmers to pay. This means that each case has to be examined on its own merits and constraints, and although uniformity might be desirable at regional or national level, that uniformity should not be taken as a must.
5/ SPP nED Renort No. 3274, Mali Integrated Rural Development (OACV), dated December 1980. - 1. -
Tab~le ±
Participants Area Attributed
Farmers Other Profes- Farmers Others Polder %_ sions % % %
Mopti Sud 56 44 65 35 Ibetemi 28 72 35 65 Soufouroulaye 92 8 96 4 Mopti Nord 67 33 68 32 Karbaye 83 17 86 14 Diambacourou 85 15 87 13 Sofara 62 38 74 26 Syn 89 11 89 11 Tenenkou 71 29 93 7 Dia 6ý 37 63 37
Total 73 27 81 19
Table 2
Distribution of Holdings Per Family
ha. ha. ha. ha. ha. ha. Polder 0 to 2 2 to 4 4 to 6 6 to 8 8 to 10 above 10
Mopti Sud 26 48 22 4 Ibetemi 61 28 5.5 5.5 Soufouroulave 26 36 19 9 3.5 6.5 Mopti Nord 45 47 6.3 1.3 0.3 Karbe 52 35 9 4 Diambacourou 25 65 10 Sofarn 60 31 9 Syn 34 53 9 3 1 Tenenkou 27 37 18 7 7 4 Dia 28 68 4
Average % 36 44 12 4 2 2 - 15 -
MAL I ATTACHMENT
MOPTI RICE PROJECT (Credit 277-MLI)
COMPLETION REPORT I
I. BACKGROUND
an1 & ------T Tune 1070 tl= 1a"r -- ma---.. 4: phe Dcpi T± of- M",1- mshm4tted a request for IDA assistance to help finance a project to promote rice produc-
t LO b-YSmL IO I.? d =.LZ- in -LheI0J t.L 44. a IL t"I ceI LMr Li.Ve fL.U OU PLdIla in - December 21, 1971 the Association approved a Credit of US$6.9 million for the project, which was the Bank Group's first operation in Mali's agricultural sector and followed two Credits made in 1966 and 1970 for transportation.
1.02 . The Niger River flood plains are an important rice growing area in West Africa. Mali had traditionally been an exporter of rice until the 1960s when stagnating production and increasing urban consumption caused it to become a net importing country. To reverse this trend, Mali embarked on a program to construct polders and introduce improved cultivation over an area of approximately 120,000 ha, about 55,000 ha of which were located in the Mopti area. The Mopti Rice Proiect (Operation Riz Mopti) and the parallel EDF financed Segou Rice Project (Operation Riz Segou) were the lirst stae of this nroram.
tion through the construction and rehabilitation of polders along the Bani
introduction of successive packages of improved inputs, implements and practices. Over the 9ix-year project implementation perio (1972-197), the project was expected to cover 31,100 ha and to reach 7,300 farm families.
1.04 Total project cost, including taxes, was estimated at US$9.4 million; the IDA contribution was US$6.9 million while French Aid (FAC) financed technical assistance (US$0.7 million) provided by consultants. At the request of Government (July 17, 1974) and after favorable recommendation of the Statutory Committee, a supplementary IDA Credit of US$2.6 million was made in 1975 to cover the effects of the dollar devaluation, minor changes in project design and cost increases. FAC also increased its contribution by US$0.5 million. The project was executed by Operation Riz Mopti, an "Operation de Developpement." which has its headquarters in Sevare near Mopti. Project implementation started on June 1, 1972, and physical works were vIrtual Iv r-omnl eed by the mfidle of 1976. At rovernment'q rnipqt the closing date was extended to September 30, 1979 to complete some minor works.
1/ The Completion Report, dated December 1980, was prepared by the West Africa ReRional Office on the baRis of an exection r prneared byk O.R In. June 1978. - 16 -
1 k*REPAXK.AILUN ABU APPKAlAL
Chronology
2.01 The project was identified by the Bank's Permanent Mission in West Africa (PMWA) in May 1969. At that time the greater part of the total 200.000 ha under rice cultivation was unimproved rice land: about 60,000 ha of improved rice polders, financed by FAC, EDF, and UNDP/FAO, were under t-ultivation. TTNflDP with FAO as executine azencv. had begun a oroiect in the Niger delta area around Mopti in 1965 and had made a survey of all the polders in the area* The May 199e-nn1914I~9 tIIAAA~ I-har 2 feasible rice project could be implemented in the Niger delta, provided that an, approprit extesio wa-saL~U ------9-- paddy were revised. French Aid (FAC) was willing to finance the feasibility study, to be carried out by French consultants, and the engineering S-udy for the Mopti-North polder. In October 1969 a PMWA mission visited Bamako to discuss with the FAC mission the terms of reference for the feasibility study.
2.02 The project was prepared by Government with the assistance of consultants financed by UNDP and FAC. A PMTJA preparation mission visited Bamako in January/February 1970. Following the preparation mission it was decided to limit the Bank project to the Hopti region, while EDF would concentrate on the Segou region. The feasibility study was issued in January 1971.
2.03 Appraisal took place in April/May 1971. The mission was com- r------paod of an ------engineer An economisr I------An aoritutiralisr a onnanitant crAdit specialist, an environmental health consultant, and the PMWA staff member 4 4 4..ivolved 1.9a project prear 1.- nn- e, M . - 4- --- "e..n4n,--A 4. noe.,.. dence shortly after appraisal were: (i) major problems with the agricul- tural credit aspect of te project, (II e rule uf tne Soete de Credit Agricole et d'Equipement Rural (SCAER) in the procurement of agricultural inputs; (iii) Government4s contribution to project financing; and (iv) notification of the proposed project to the states party to the Interna- tional Niger Water Agreement.
2.04 Negotiations were held on October 27, 1971. At Government's request during negotiations, technical assistance to the agricultural credit institution was eliminated. Board presentation took place on December 21, 1971. and the Credit Agreement was signed on January 6, 1972.
.. %J'J ... e p.------v- the trend of increasing rice imports which was registered in the late 1960s.
Operation iz, create .Ln 190,9 to deve.lop C-Utii-Y-C-StiOn 10YCW-6L1I% flooding in the Niger River flood plains, was split into Operation Riz Segou, financed by the EDF, and Operation Riz Mopri (On) for which rinan- cial assistance was provided by IDA and technical assistance by FAC. The project's objective was to raise paddy production by 35,000 tons by 1982. The total project area was planned to be 31,000 ha. Yields were to increase - 17 -
from 0.70 t/ha (traditional outside polders) and 0.88-t/ha (traditional within polders) to 1.86 t/ha. These increases were to be achieved through the introduction of a controlled flooding system* of improved seeds, improved and timely plowing and seeding initially, and through line-sowing, intensive weeding and the application of fertilizer in the later stages. A total of 7,300 farm families were expected to be reached by the project (4.25 ha/farm). 40% of the farmers were expected to adopt the complete package; a further 20%, the package without fertilizer; while 20% of the farmers would only use improved seeds and annly prescribed plowing and harrowing techniques. The remaining 20% would continue to apply traditional
4.0O The project originally consisted of:
- the construction of three polders with an area of 13,JUU ha;
- the rehabilitation of five polders with an area of 13,200 ha;
- land preparation (deep plowing) on part of the new and the rehabilitated polders as well as on one further existing polder, altogether on 10,300 ha;
- construction of offices, houses, workshops, stores, and sheds;
- acquisition of vehicles and farm machinery (tractors, trailers,
threshers, and seeders);
- an applied agricultural research program;
- establishment and operation of a seed farm;
- technical assistance for project management;
- staff and operating cost of the project authority.
The project also included the feasibility study for the second Hopti Rice Project.
* The controlled flooding system consists of enclosing the area to be developed with a dike provided with inlet/outlet structures which are camahlat% rirnnina avaa waern to or Alei4na ~ fi-rnm the river-by gravity. Water flows are improved by deepening existing natural channels. Soil preparation and Sowing are done after the firSt rains.. At the time of irrigation when the river water level allows, theC loWer finge6 of theC PUoLd"r (forK floatingL rIce) iZ rapidlJy fLooded;- the higher fringe is flooded at a pace equivalent to the rate of growth of the rice plants. When the river is low and the crop is ready, fields are drained by the same channels as those used for irrigation. The system is highly dependent on timing and magnitude of floods and on rainfall for soil preparation and for seeding. - 18 -
III - IMPLEMENTATION
Effectiveness
3.01 The originally envisaged date of effectiveness was April 17, t-- - t -34. A - - 197/L* Three conditions of effectivens were required uJY t-nC %,LMLuA6 Z%16-=- ment. (a) The opening by the Borrower of a special account for ORM's personnel expenditures, (b) recruitmenc of engineering consultants to assist in the supervision of the works and (c) the establishment of ORM. Govern- ment was not able to fulfill the two first conditions in time and the Credit did not become effective until June 26, 1972. However, this delay of about two months did not affect the implementation schedule.
Procurement
3.02 Procurement of major civil works and supply of equipment were made thrnu-h TCR and contracts wera awarded in accordance with Bank iuidelines. Construction of buildings was procured through local bidding procedures. F^ilirg aurenc4ot of the cnt-eract for maior civil works (nara 6.05). ORM executed certain minor works by force account.
3.03 Fertilizers and ox-drawn farm implements were obtained annually by SCAM" and supplied to VR.W. fo dsr±V±o o ame
.1.04 Consucants ror supervision or works, stuais, and technicsa1 assistance were chosen after international consultation and negotiations on contract conditions.
Starting-Up of Works
3.05 Due to late tendering and the need for adjusting the beginning of works to the dry season, civil works did not start until March 1978, one year later than envisaged at appraisal. For the construction of buildings, delays were even longer (1.5 years). Recruitment of consultants, in particular those providing technical assistance to ORM management, progressed much more natisfactorily and this team started to work very close to the effective date.
Progress of Works
3.06 The actual implementation schedule of works as compared to the appraisal forecast is Illutratd in M-..ex 1 IML Ac -, ' tion dates of construction of irrigation infrastructure and buildings and of deep ploughing are given below: - 19 -
Appraisal Actual Delay kmonths)
Infrastructure and Annexes
- Dia Tenenkou Rehabilitation July 1973 July 1974 12 Ploughing June 1973 July 1974 13
- Soufouroulaye Construction July 1973 Not completed Ploughing May 1974 June 1974 1
- Mopti Nord Pasc rTtila T w1r 1 074 Ter1Trr TOTA Ploughing May 1975 June 1975 1
- Seed Farm and Research St.(Constr.) July 1974 July 1974 0
- Sofara (Construction) July 1973 July 1973 0
- Sarantomo (Ploughing) May 1974 March 1974 2
- Karbaye (Rehabilitation) July 1972 March 1975 32
- Mopti Sud (Rehabilitation) July 1972 March 1975 32
-- Ibetemi (Rehabilitation) July 1972 March 1975 32
&I V A,.7 I A. * . I -r,..
Seo"stgeVf .- 17 1 JL71 j.Y1r
In spite of the initial delays in tendering and awarding, most of the irrigation works were completed by mid 1974 as foreseen. Considerable delays occurred, however, in the Dia Tenenkou polder and in the rehabi- litation of the Karbaye, Mopti-Sud and Ibetemi polders. As for the con- struction of buldings, delays in completion were still longer (about two and a half years) due, in part, to cement scarcity (1972 - 1974).
Irrigation Works
3.07 Modifications in the works were introduced during execution. Tn viw of better water control and in order to decrease maintenance charges, gates were placed in every structure, and dikes and new access r aAdSw -ow.Stru c~-o te e. W 1 A T 41 1 4t-e%n The nIin ina n" etzan ploughing was also modified due to pedalogic constraints. When large cost teuleaCredt wksof n e (pr4 e,y ere p.Atil rsumd the Supplementary Credit was granted (para 1.04) they were partially resumied. - 20 -
and drains had insufficient capacity to properly fill and drain the rice fLds-L.; WJome of. t1he inL4ake strucL%uLes suffred=% fro,m Stabrility) a&nd erosionWL problems, and because of topographic and pedalogic features discovered only during execution, the total area was reduced from 31,090 ha to 26,100 ha. (para 4.02)
3.09 The quality of construction of canals and dikes was satisfac- tory. However, due to technical insufficiencies, the same does not apply to the hydraulic structures. In 1974, this meant uncontrolled flooding in two polders with the loss of 800 ha of already cultivated land.
Buildings
3.10 Some modifications and additions were introduced in this part of the projae-. These ha aonnated to abonu PM 107.5 millin. The aoM delays experienced in the construction of the buildings were mainly due to the local contractor and the shortage of cement in Mali. These delays resulted iu serious nUconveniences for the auzlal operation of ua since office buildings and lodging for local staff and expatriates were not available for a long time. in general, the quality is not satisfactory.
Costs
3.11 The appraisal report estimated net of tax project costs at US$9.42 million, equivalent to MF 5,238 million at the prevailing rate of MF 556 per US dollar. The cost estimate included physical contingencies of 15% for embankments, canals and intake regulators, 10% for buildings, studies and engineering supervision, and 5% for equipment of the agricultural research; it also included price continzencies of 8% per year for civil works, studies and engineering supervision, 10% per year for heavy equipment, 6% per year for clAriAq- AT nPr var for oneratina costs and It nr vaar for farm equipment. IDA was to finance US$6.9 million (MF 3,836 million), or 73% of -ue costs. rAP TTCCf 7 m44114 -- tMW 101 -4114^-N ,^v- V ^- #4h- cosete and Government US$1.8 million (MF 1,010 million), or 19% of project costs. The
LUAJA C~ueu.Lt was reinforce W.L L -W1J-JlJ-o by Agreemen dated~ rp~..L. 1975 (para 1.04). FAC and Government increased their contribution propor- tionally.
3.12 Appraisal estimates and actual costs are indicated in Annex 3, Table 1. Project cost estimates were revised in June 1973, May 1974, and November 1974, and the results can be summarized as follows:
Appraisal June 1973 May 1974 November 1974 Actual
HF million 5,238 5,666 5,898 6,132 6,020 r 100 10 1146 117 115
~1,- 4a --Oft 4-cwea ic I5r, 'Y W Q~ eDd llnw -Ra~~rT'f %M t1 n a &"-~~ ------ho eve percentage becomes 39% when the cost is expressed in dollars. (The average rate -JLujc Tr Ck, -M- XT ..CO m L I 1 LTT & - T1 CCKC 'l rate during tne projct was L U'J. 1-1 -+-do agaist L U Qg - KKI -Ja aWC6C&1a.pa.LQCL.;* - 21 -
3.13 The table indicates that:
(1) Three of the prolect components cost less than estimated with savings on the order of MF 529 million. This was due to the slow oace of implementation of agricultural research, the failure to expand farmers' ox-drawn cultivation and
%A;Thes saving ofr thoe r lrgel excede by he cos
increase in civil works and, principally, in management and extension services. The former resulted from adjustments and additional works; the latter was mainly due to the increase in operating costs that resulted directly from the oil crisis of 1974.
3.14 In short, in spite of the high inflationary period during which the project was implemented, the 15% global cost overrun is very moderate compared to that experienced by most other projects of this period in Mali and elsewhere. The devaluation of the dollar led to financial difficulties which were solved by a reinforcement of the Credit and of the local contri- bution.
Disbursments
3*15 The IDA Credit was to be disbursed against:
- 100% of foreign expenditures for the purchase of equipment ana venicles;
- 80% of total expenditures of civil works;
- 100% of total expenditures for services of engineering consultants:
- 45% of total expenditures for operating expenses of ORM including salaries, and
- 95% of total expenditures of operating expenses of the agricul- tural research station, including salaries and consultant services for the carrying out of a feasibility study for a second agricultural project in the Mopti region.
The chart of Annex 2 compares appraisal estimated and actual disbursements ^f tha TTA r7-a4r
18 months but the devaluation of the dollar, additional works and the price escalation due to the oil crisis of 1973/74 led to an increasing pace of disbursement in relation to appraisal estimates. In August 1975 a Supple- mentary Credit of US$2.6 million was granted and until mid 1978 actual disbursements were about US$0.5 million below the revised estimates. But toward the extended completion date of Sept. 30, 1979 this difference narrowed to about US$86,000. This balance has now been fully disbursed. - 22 -
3.17 Payments for irrization works and buildings were made on the basis of monthly statements of expenses prepared by the contractors and certified by'
0P' an/orGP.Mospa-ents wre made und-e the dir-tparce
.3*0 JV umen LI.LuJuuu Lu project costs were always made avallaule in time and kept pace with the progress of works.
IV - AGRICULTURAL IMPACT
Objectives
4.01 The objectives of the project were to increase rice production through the construction and rehabilitation of polders along the Bani and Niger Rivers, and to improve rice cultivation techniques through the introduction of successive packages of improved inputs, implements and naretiop_. At Annraial the nrnioet wan IYrtd to emvpr i1-1nn ha And tn reach 7,300 families. As developed hereafter, the objectives of the project were not fiilTv Ai-hi2vimd_ mqinlY fnr i -ntrnl1lAh riAno (relim;atl)
4O2 ase( on tue experieuce from tne drough years of t7iti aus 1973/74, when only 1/3 and 1/2 of the developed areas were inundated, and because of the inaccuracies of topographic maps, the net cultivable area of each polder was redefined. Both the upper and the lower fringes of polders were eliminated, and the probability of inundation was increased from 90% to 95%. The total cultivable area became 26,100 ha instead of the 31,100 ha estimated at appraisal (a reduction of 16%). Annex 3, Table 2 indicates the progress of the area put under cultivation and compares estimates before and after revision. The drops in 1973/74, 1978/79, and 1979/80 are due not only to the intrinsic inaccuracy of the estimates but also to the farmers' fear of cultivating after the failures and disappoint- ments of dry years. as well as to the lack of seeds which resulted frcm oo harvests of preceding years.
4.03 Table 2 of Annex 3 also gives estimated and actual yields for the understanding of the actual achievements. The actual yields differ substan- tially depending on whether they are related to the -sown area- or the "harvested area." The former in the recorded period varies from 33% to 86% of the latter. The average is 920 kg/ha against 1,260 kg/ha. Again it is the period 1972/74 and the 1977/78 campaign which show the lowest ratios. This because of the unfavourable climatic conditions of those years. Total annual rainfall was well below average and its distribution in time uneven. Therefore, losses occurred as a result of interrupted germination and growth at the beginning of the crop cycle and the late arrival of floods in the case of rice planted on the higher fringes. - 23 -
4.04 In spite of the corrective factor introduced by using harvested areas, yields were lower than estimated and do not show a sustained increase as anticipated. The average of the period was 926 kg/ha against 1,280 kg/ha at appraisal. This was due to a stagnation in cultivation techniques, contrary to anticipated improvements, mainly with respect to weeding and line-sowing. The lack of farmers collaboration led to wild rice infesta- tion which can only be corrected by deep ploughing as is presently being denp udear rhp qpconi Monti Prniaet. Hnwpvpr- this nroblem was not ganara- lized all over the area. Certain polders showed better response than others. marginal, farmers participation in the project was better. Plagues and unsatisfactoryflodn o..UJ.L the po~JLu.Lers wer UrZeCtl resOn-1J.L- C_. I.- and uneven yields, and were also an important factor in farmers' refusal to adopt crop intensive cultivation methods as foreseen at appraisal. However, when compared with the "without the project" situation, yields are an average 1.5 times higher. Although below estimates, production was satisfactory in the period 1974/77.
4.05 Table 3 also indicates the tonnage marketed by ORM and its per- centage of the production. The relatively low figure is explained by the lack of incentive offered by the official paddy-price; farmers try as much as possible to sell in the parallel market, limiting their sales to ORM to repayment in kind of services and water charges, and a compulsory deli- very quota for the marketing agency OPAM.
Agricultural Equipment
4.06 The Credit provided for the purchase of agricultural equipment, threshing, transportation). Even though farmers were receptive to the use of ox-drawn implements, its normal development was hampered by (i) the price of bullocks (dramatically increased due to the scarcity of cattle in years of drought, competition from the cattle export market, and demand on the part of richer cotton farmers); (ii) the inefficiency of SCAER (official organism in charge of supplying agricultural inputs); (iii) the rise in equipment prices; and (iv) the difficulties of farmers in repaying-credit after the bad harvests of dry years.
4.07 As far as equipment for ORM is concerned, 32 tractors, 46 threshers and 34 trailers were purchased in addition to other minor equip- ment. This gave ORM the opportunity to provide services to farmers in nloehi,nc thrPshing_ and transportation. Ploughin2 was aimed orincipally at eliminating wild rice infestation. Deep ploughing had to be undertaken in a systmatic fashion under the follo-1- prjc Nfoptf± TT_ The tyne o%f equipment purchased was not well suited to moving heavy soil, the tractors paddy and inputs. Threshing operations were satisfactory and most of the equipment found adequate. Farmers use of threshing services provided by OR was positive. Transportation equipment was used mainly during the threshing period moving threshers and carrying the paddy from the farms and to the rice-mill. Maintenance of this equipment has been assured by the ORM workshop. - 24 -
4.08 In general, the equipment pool of ORMU was underutilized and in- adequately maintained. Ploughing and sowing was very limited due to few requests from farmers and, despite farmers' participation, available thresh- ing capacity far exceeded its use.
Seed Farm and A2ricultural Research
4Q Teia finein nf fhp qppd farm uJa to nrndnie anna Mn1litv qPOA to replace the traditional farm seeds. The already existing farm in the not considered adequate and the Credit provided for the construction of a new one in tne Zopti-L'Nor area. It started UperatiUnS L12 7/tQ.
4.10 Results on the whole were disappointing. Bad management and insufficient supervision by ORM led to wild rice infestation, improper water control and low yields. Despite certain improvements introduced in 1977/78 the performance of the seed farm has remained unsatisfactory.
4.11 Agricultural research focused on yield responses to various cultivation techniques (seed spacing, timing of ploughing, intensity of weeding), on methods of eradicating wild rice and on labor requirements of a 4-ha type model farm with varying use of equipment. Faulty methodology and a lack of comnetent sunervision prevented complete achievement of initial objectives. However, conclusive results have been obtained, in particular s re-ards cultivrating tech.,inques which a _ra 1haie i in the M,ansi TT project.
Farmer's Income
4.12 The project appraisal estimated that some 7,300 farmers would grow paddy, increasing their paddy acreage from 2.6 ha to 4.0 ha per tarm. At the same time yields would increase, and net family cash income was estimated to reach KI 132,795 at full development (1982). In the "without the project" situation, the family net cash income was FM1 104,480. There- fore the increase due to the project would be, in L971 terms, FM 28,315. This cash income would be equal to the gross value of production, minus family consumption and production costs.
4.13 Annex 3, Table 4 gives farm budgets as estimated at appraisal and. a comnarison with the actual situation in 1977/78. Two actual scenarios are indicated: (1) "average years of good flooding" and (2) "average years
o_ p-_f1 _ r n,,lod I" -ra fF-,, r %^h t 1- h "wil tj In" a.nd "vr - t ,u t ner Jec- " a 4 r.qI n -4 ^" 2 are shown. The following conclusions can be drawn from this table.
a) The size of actual farm units is one half the appraisal estimate and is close to that existing before the project. This reflects limited equipment of farmers and their conse- quent inability to effectively cope with larger holdings. - 25 -
b) Actual yields are 50% to 70% of the forecast. This is due mainly to adverse natural conditions (irregular flooding and untimely and insufficient rainfall even in years of good flooding) which affected the normal progress of the cropping i-rl anti lari rn tha Ina nF an~rm m-r=na,
^.N Tbegrss~ value~ o., prdcto jper fJarm is between 56. and. 655% of4 the appraisal estimate. This obviously results from the smaller cultivated area and from the lower yields mentioned above. The gross value of production per ha increased by 12% to 29% due to the price of paddy.
d) Production costs per ha decreased as compared to appraisal by about 15% because of the less intensive type of cultivation practiced by farmers.
e) The actual family net revenue is 64% - 72% of the appraisal expectations because of the smaller farm size, but the net revenue per man-day is 46%-60% higher because a) less time was spent in the field than projected and b) the orice of oaddy increased. The.change in net annual income per capita follows thar of nor revenue0
fN T" a, -- It thea.. a lo be ee "e ac *tuations
"with" and "without project" is much better (1.4 - 2.4) than
Cost Recovery, Levies
4.14 Following appraisal recommendations and in accordance with section 3.08 of the Credit Agreement, levies should be charged to farmers to cover annual operation and maintenance costs and to recover, over 35 years, all direct investment. The schedule and amount of levies, the corresponding pro- ject revenues and project expenditures as estimated at appraisal are:
Project Revenues FM/ha
Years 1 to 5 60 kg/ha/year at FM 30/kg 9,000 Years 6 to 10 120 kg/ha/year at FM 28/kq 16tw0 Years 11 to 35 180 kg/ha/year at FM 28.5/kg 128,250
154,050
Project Expenditures
Direct Investment FM 2,998 million 103,024 0 & M (35 years) FM 630 million 21,649
124,673 - 26 -
4.15 Levies have been imnosed on farmerg from 1974 onward at a much faster pace than anticipated. The following table indicates levies, revenues,
kg/ha FM/kg FM/ha for (1000) (7.)
1973 - - - - - 1974 60 40 2,400 32,968 83 1975 100 40 4,000 49,312 83 1976 120 40 4,800 72,315 91 1977 140 45 6,300 74,917 90
It should be stressed that in spite of the generally poor harvests and the heavier taxation than initially foreseen, farmers have been rather respon- sive to paying. which is shown by the high collection rate. However, OR has always adopted the policy of exempting from levies the farmers most affpnted hv nrnnninv hazards. On the whnle the cnrrPqnondinq area hag been about 23% of the attributed areas, but it is not contained in the total from whic^r.rr3e a oleto r drvd
and maintenance costs. Adding the repayment of service charges (ploughing, liue-sowiug and thrensing) Uts percentage increases by about o%. Tne difference is being offset by the margin on paddy/rice sales. This means that the present level of development levies is adequate to compensate recurrent costs, but the recovery of investment costs by surcharging farmers is not feasible in a short term because it would be too heavy a burden and their already low net revenue (between US$210 and $260 per fauily) could be drastically reduced. With the new cultivated areas under the Mopti II pro- ject and with an adequate cereals price policy a balanced budget, inclL.ing amortization, would be possible.
V - 7COOMTC TMPArT
5.01 The appraisal report estimated the ERR of this project at 14%. Ina its assumptions, 50% of investmen and oPeratig oss veLteL6ya operating period of the agricultural research station were deducted, since benefits would also accrue to farmers outside the project area. The esti- mated cost of the second stage studies were also deducted. The sensitivity analysis indicated that the rate of return would drop to 10.8% if the paddy farmgate prices were be 15% lower and would go up to 16.7 should yields be 2.2 t/ha instead of 1.86 t/ha.
5.02 Annex 3, Table 5 indicates the data for the actual calculation of the economic rate of return. 1/ The following assumptions have been made:
/ filedrond the es are cotaino tin Ctewr.npa of i-na filed in the West Africa Information Center. - 27 -
a) Areas and Yields. For the "with the project" situation, actual areas haVC UCCU ta&Cn LLUE 172/ LHEDUgt 178./* ru Chen to 19u a linear progression to the maximum attainable cultivable acreage. After 1990 and until the end of the period, a constant area equal to that maximum. It is assumed that in discount terms climatic vagaries which might change cultivable areas do not substantially affect the calculations. The same criterion has been applied to yields. In the "without project" situation cultivated area projections of the Appraisal Report (Annex 14) have been taken with some adjustments: (1) for 1972, 1973, 1977, and 1978: 50% of estimates due to unfavorable climatic conditions. (2) for other years: 0.84 of estimates, this coefficient meaning the reduction of cultivable land due to tonoaranhic adinstments (nra L.n9). VipldQ ha" Noon t->." as 0.6 of actual results or present estimates for the "in the T%^ AaraI 11 a tion Fr the ",t A'4 -- A-- -It - tionthe coefficient has been 0.4. *
b) Economic Prices. Substitution prices for paddy have been esti- mated following a procedure similar to chat used in appraising Mbpti II (Annex 10, Table 4b) and by applying World Bank Price Forecasts (January 1980). For the period 1972-1979, actual current dollars were used; from 1979 onward the calculation is based on forecasts using 1979 constant dollars.
c) "Investment and ReDlacement" are the actual amounts. Local costs were multiplied by the standard conversion factor 0.88, the same as that used for the Mopti II appraisal.
d) "Operating Costs and Staff" are actual amounts multiplied by the sam~e Rtand;trd ,_qQv rF0.8Mf nqr, e) "InrementlFa.mL1bor is based on an estimated to-"a'-or
input of 80 man-day/ha and 57 man-day/ha for the situation "in" and e . . IJ.%L.L C .6. LLL .6 CL J WLLI -Ucly ( LICI LIA been valued at FM 310/man-day or FM 272 using the same standard cowversion factor.
f) "Production costs without the project" were estimated following the same criteria as appraisal (Annex 14, Table 1) but with the actual cultivated areas.
5.03 The increase by three points of the ERR as compared with appraisal is not surprising in spite of the decrease in actual areas and production compared to appraisal estimates. The main reason for the increase is that the economic price of rice is more than three fold the apraisal exnectations. A sensitivity analysis shows that even if the cultivated area would not increase from the present level- the FRR would be about InT.
* Average criterion taken at appraisal. - 28 -
Consultants
6.01 Consultant's input in this project has been related to (1) supervision of works, (2) preparation of studies for the second phase of the Mopti irrigation development, and (3) technical assistance to ORM.
6.02 Supervision of works was the responsibility of the Rural En2ineering Department assisted by a foreign consulting firm which supplied two techni- rian for a tntal of 34 man-monthq Th nPerformannn of thict rninnting firm was considered unsatisfactory due to its lack of previous experience of hydro- of some works, faulty calculations leading to the collapse of an outlet structure anu Lack o JUJtiati-V= auu u4u6L u y LU u=4.Lug With cuULLcLUrsE.
6.03 The carrying out of the studies for second phase irrigation development was the responsibility of the Study Bureau of the Rural Engi- neering Department which, however, sub-contracted some topographic mapping and pedalogic surveys to private ccnsultants. These consultants performed satisfactorily both in time and in quality of work.
6.04 The Credit provided financing for technical assistance to ORM management to a maximum of five expatriates; this number would gradually decrease toward the end of project implementation. All were recruited from the same consulting firm and their performance was satisfactory.
Contractors single contractor, after international competitive bidding. Due to the
Q4y LU L - y. L ~L ., LVL CL .3WAJ&.t_L6 %JJ CLkA.. %.LL= "CL6..A.ULC &=aA --. 6 CL"UL to the unsatisfactory quality of some works (hydraulic structures) the contract was suspended and completion of works awarded to four other con- tractors. This was done when most of the works were completed. In fact, the firm left for another job and preferred to pay penalties. Financial arrange- ments of the initial contract were satisfactorily settled. ORM itself also executed some works by force account. Most of the contractors performed satisfactorily with the exception of the firm in charge of supplying and installing the gates for the hydraulic structures. Due to unacceptable delays this contract was terminated in August 1978 and another firm resumed the works after approval of the Association. These works are completed.
6.06 For the construction of buildings, after a long delay in eva- lintfa f-ae a d hfninina TTA qmnraI. th- offer of thp lowst biddar elapsed. In September 1979, the contract was finally awarded based on consu"'ttion among b4LAArs -d aproe bir TnA* Cn. 4v^Iat-m cmnll1 buildings for which contractors would have been difficult to find were executed oy uR unuer rce account. - 29 -
Suppliers
6.07 Procurement of equipment was monitored by IDA and no significant delays or ornblms P-nPriAnred.
6.8 hepefomaceofSAER asa QupplUer of fertilizers and" farm implements was not satisfactory. Lack of organization, liquidity and mnagmenut led to defice suppLies and, despLe of GovernmenL subsidies, very high prices. Direct purchase without passing through SCAER has been strongly advocated by URM to eliminate these inconveniences.
Borrower
6.09 After some delays in the starting phase of the project, implemen- tation took on momentum and ORM, under the strong management of its Director General, improved its performance substantially. Part of the poor results in production and farmers' participation can be attributed to 0:RM's weak organization of extension work which overemphasized classroom training with inadequate field work, and to its inability to establish a dialogue with farmers.
6.10 ORM reported the project's progress regularly. Financial state-
6e1s Th auralreepoaent Engineering np1unmibse wa for the supervi- sion of works and preparation of the second phase studies. Its staff could not offset the deficiencies in the technical assistance provided by the consultant (referred to in para 602) which led to the failures in the supervision of works. However, Its performance in preparing the second phase studies was satisfactory both in terms of quality of work and time.
Bank
6.12 After an identification mission in May 1961, the Bank sent three preparation missions (one in 1969 and two in 1970). Appraisal took place in April 1971. Identification and preparation were primarily the responsi- bility of RWA. The total number of man-weeks in the field spent in iden- tification, preparation, and appraisal was 35.8.
6.11 Th Bank sArt 11 sunervfsion mi_sqiR twn npr vear from 1977 to 1978 with the exception of 1973 when there was only one mission. The total numbr F man-weeks sent the r A7aRA Via of the m4ic2n< had the participation of an engineer. The continuity was average with the
~'..k'JJ.. & - / A. . 1 U .1. ~ k 644~~ in the initial period of project implementation.
6.14 Given the occurrence of uncontrollable events (droughts and the oil crisis of 1974) during the implementation period, it can be concluded that the project's main objectives as defined at appraisal were achieved. Supervision missions and follow-up letters often urged Government to take measures which could have improved overall project performance, i.e. an - 30 - increase of the farmgate price of paddy and improvement of the extension services. However, the response was not always encouraging, particularly with respect to the producers' price issue. Better technical preparation with adequate mapping would have permitted an adequate estimate of the cultivable area, and a more realistic judgment of the management services cnuld have nrPvPnrAd rhe onst overrun nf rhic rnmnananro
VII - SPECIAL ISSUES - LESSON LEARNED
7.01 The main issue of this project, which was never fully seized at the time of definition of the follow-up project (Mopti II), is the matter of "controlled flooding' irrigation. The recurrent droughts ex- perienced in the early 1970s showed the need to redefine the areas in order to guarantee a higher probability of inundation. But experience with Mopti 1I has indicated that this is not enough. The amount and the timely distri- bution of rainfall (which do not necessarily relate directly with the flood) have a decisive influence on the normal progress of the cropping cycle, crop survival and yields. Despite investment in structures (pro- tective dikes, inlet and outlet structures) the success of the harvest is still dependent on the climate, and the incremental benefit is com- naratiuvV inW Th arnt nf the rick rf iTiifFioianr ?-infnll has only come into focus in recent years; there has possibly been a permanent de- 4 O~-- ~ 111 nlm - to arliere A-nA- s in -- -1 - - 1950s and the 1960s. To clarify these aspects an agro-climatologic study
LL%* LJWML ordered. L 1. Lb LV .LUt_-L.L.L~ LLM .LiiLU of past recent years and the probability of adequate rainfall in time to meet initial cropping needs.
7.02 Because of the bad climatic conditions, the project could not offer the water control necessary to induce farmers to fully participate with the project. As a result, smaller lots per family were cropped and cultivation standards have remained low. In spite of the efforts of the extension ser- vices of ORM were not able to offset farmers- fears. Unattractive producer prices, a general problem in Mali, is a further contributing factor. The Association has occasionally been able to obtain significant increases in aroducer orices but due to Government's over concern with nrocessing chean cereals for influential urban customers, these successes have always been temporary and "soon eroded by inf lation. - 31 -
1R1=
i971 1972 97! i97 .-ratu ":r ar "*xuz
-. .. .••-• * *iaP a? r- a: -. in-. -.
4ora1u:::a I"" z amt~timn••• --- a.... .=fr.=ZF. ahIltT o - h. --1-1--. •• -c -^ - -- • .AaeSe Sea3 h - *clf.. eha.rs atla-r~ .43,-3ita paa -L...... - "1t n -a.-:ooa '.z..-ta.e - Awr-- t1 "mera Sid Opna -- . .m. 1•.4...
. *-.arfi•--- - Constreet a - - .. - .• == =--l. "cor y-- "• - -- .-- 1. -- 1 -• - 32 - MAL ANNE= 2 MOPTI RICE PROJECT (Credit 277-KLI)
COMPLETION REPORT
DISBURSEMENTS muHilion
10.
6
.4
- Appralsal Røvision After Cradit Suppl=nc - Actual
1973 1974 1975w ' 1976 l7/9 4.157 FY74 TY75 FT76 FY77 FY7FY79 - 33 -
MOPTI RICE PROJECT Table 1 (Credit 277-MLI)
COMPLETION REPORT
DISBURSEMT TABLE (US$'000 Equivalent)
Appraised 1/ Actual Ouarter Ending Appraisal Revised Estimate
09/30/1972 i2/31/217 3001l 10 2 03/31/1973 700 06/30/1973 1,200 1,283 09/30/1973 1,700 12/31/1973 2,450 2,583 03/31/1974 3,050 - 06/30/1974 3,700 4,250 09/30/1974 4,300 - 12/31/1974 5,050 5,918 03/31/1975 5,450 6,869 06/30/1975 5,900 6,900 09/30/1975 6.100 8.000 7.740 12/31/1975 6,350 8,120 8,091 03/31/1976 6,45n 8,430 8,180 06/30/1976 6,600 8,740 8,272 nQil1Q76 6,600 8,910 8,351 12/31/1976 6,650 9,090 8,543 e3 / / l977 6 ,70 0l 1 ^e,51 V-if i./ J- ii up,iv 7 ,L. U , gi. 06/30/1977 6,750 9,160 8,708 09/30/1977 6,800 9,220 8,824 12/31/1977 6,850 9,290 8,824 03/31/1978 6,900 9,360 8,895 06/30/1978 - 9,430 9,080 09/30/1978 - 9,470 9,275 12/31/1978 - 9,500 9,282 03/31/1979 - - 9,292 06/30/1979 - - 9,308 09/30/1979 - - 9,309 12/31/1979 9,424 03/31/1980 9,424
1/ With additional US$2.6 million of the Amendment to the Credit Agreement dated April 1.1, 1975J MALI - 34 - ANNEX 3 MOPTI RICE PROJECT Table 1 (Credit 277-MLI)
ESTIMATES AND ACTUAL COSTS (in FM million)
Appraisal Actual (May 1971) (March 1977)
CIVIL WORKS - Embankments and canals 1.114 1,839 - Intake regulators 261 453 - Deep ploughing 411 249 - Buildings 363 505 - On-farm works - 76 Sub-total 2,149 3,127
ENGINEERING SUPERVISION 124
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH - Transportation and Research Equipment 35 10 - Office and Laboratory Equipment 18 6 - Personnel Expenditures 143 32 - Operating Costs 52 28 Sub-total 248 76
FARM MACHINERY - Ox-drawn equipment 292 1 - ORM Equipment 223 427 Sub-total 515 428
MANAGEMENT AND EXTENSION SERVICE - Transportation Equipment 59 110 - Office, lodging and other equipment 48 134 - Salaries Expatriate Personnel 353 651 - Salaries Local Personnel 297 519 - Operating Costs 202 651 Sub-total 959 2,065
SECOND STAGE STUDIES - Equipment 22 - Topography and Soil Surveys 190 - Feasibility Study 154 Sub-total 366 324 CONTINGENCIES 877 - TOTAL 6.020
US$ Equivalent million 9.4 13.1
US$1 = FM 556 US$1 - 458 1/ 1/ Average rate during the disbursement period NOTE: Proiect cost estimates were revised in June 1973 (FM 5,666 million), in May 1974 (FM 5,898 million) and in November 1974 (FM 6,132 million) MALI MPTI B E PROJECT (Credit 277-MLI)
COKPLETION JRREPOT
AGRICLTURAL IMPACT
(Cultivated z]reaB, yields and production)
19723 4 197L4/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/0 81 g81/82 1982/8 1. CULTIVATED AREA (HA) 1.1 Appraisal Estimate 5,970 11,470 17,230 20,010 22,630 25,25) 27,830 å8,390 1.2 Revised Estimate 29,960 30,520 31,090 /5.010 9,630 14,470 16,8oo 19,000 21,200 23,360 23,830 25,150 25,620 1.3 - Actual 5,474 7,493 26,100 4 13,862 16,o?8 17,224 18,805 17,778 16,192 - - - 1. - % tc appraisal 92 65 80 80 76 74 64 57 - - - 1.5 % to revised estimate 109 78 96 96 91 89 76 68 - - - 2. YILDS (Ko/HA) 2.1 Appraisal 880 1,010 1,200 1,290 1,410 1,530 1,650 1,770 1,830 2.2 Actual 2/ 265 5O 1,860 1,860 1,397 1,147 1,392 884 873 - - - - 2.3 Percentage 30 50 116 89 99 58 53 - - - - 3. FRODUCTION (T) 3.1 - Appraisal Estinate 5,250 11,580 20,680 25,810 31,910 38,630 44,27o 48,480 51,170 53,050 54,110 3.2 - Revised Estimate 1/ 4,430 9,760 17,410 21,830 26,870 32,53 37,280 40,820 43,090 44,670 45,560 3.3 - Actual 1,450 3,750 19,360 18,440 25,40o 16,620 15,230 - - - - 3.4 - Percentage 33 38 111 84 95 51 41 - - - -
1/ Reduced in the same proportion on total area to be developed, i.e. 26,100 ha: 31,090 0.839 Per ha sown MALI
MPTI RICE PROJECT (Credit 277-MLI)
COMPLETION REPORT
AGRICULTURAL IMPACT
ACTUAL RESULTS
1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80
1. Attributed Area (ha) 6,960 9,300 16,276 21,158 21,330 21,212 19,530 18,920 2. Number of Farms N.A. 3,304 6,495 8,790 8,975 9,095 8,880 7,855 3. Area per Farm (ha) 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.4 4. Sown Area (ha) 5,474 7,493 13,862 16,078 17,224 18,805 17,778 16,192 5. 4/1 in % 79 81 85 76 81 89 91 86 6. Harvested area (ha) 1,808 3,954 11,968 12,703 14,890 13,367 14,332 - 7. 6/4 in % 33 53 86 79 82 71 131 - 8. Yields per sown area kg/ha 265 500 1,397 1,147 1,392 884 873 - 9. Yields per harvested area kg/ha 800 948 1,618 1,451 1,705 1,243 - 1,083 - 10.Production (t) 1,450 3,750 19,360 18,440 25,400 16,620 15,530 - 11.Marketed (t) - - 3,490 6,731 8,886 3,277 2,901 - 12.11/10 in % - 18 37 35 20 19 -
kliS - 37 -
ALTANN. 3 m= ncz ?ROJECT q.. (Crd.t 277-MLI)
YuL1 Develop- A rerst:ou 3t ood Iaccc=i i .erage imars 2 r n nt Project WLch Preject Vichouc Prajac with Projact Withouc ?roject
Averade Farm jaIlc h a 4 2 Yttid (kg/ha f sovn area) 1,860 1,150 1,300 800 900 400 Average Far unit ?roducclon (kg) 7,440 4,600 2,600 1,600 1,300 800 Paddy Pricas (74/kg) a) official 30 30 45 45 45 45 b) marke - - 60 60 75 75 Sold chrough official chanels (kg) 7,440 4,600 800 - 350 - Sold e...e,a m.r,et - - Lso• 1.600 1.450 800 Groa valum of production 223,200 138,000 144,000 96,000 124,500 60,000 Producion comts 85,725 1/ 28,900 36,354 2/ 20,084 2/ 37,194 2/ 23,084 2/ Nac revaau' . 117,475 110KIn 1i7,a 7n5,916 7 ,at 36,916 Som. conaumpcion 4,680 3/ 4,60 12,000 4/ 12,000 / LS,000 4/ L,000 / Na£ cash Incom 132,795 10 95,646 63,916 82,306 2.1916 Nect rvnua/man-day 2/£02 -2 7 /672 19 7/ 373 2/ Sec amnual revenut per capita 22,913 f/ 18,183 f/ 17,941 T/ 12,653 5/ 14,551 5/ 6,153 5/ (Us$ equi.) (41) (43) (37) (26) (30) (13)
/ An= 16. Table 1 of Appraisal Report 2/ Complacion Roart working papers in WA Filas 3/ Anx 16, Table 1 of the Appraisal Repart Z/ 200 kg of paddy oer family at the market price 5/ Aa an aver :. ;:rsz"/Umily COMPLETION REPRT
RATE OF RETURN CALCULATION
Year Incremental Economic Value of Investment Operating Staff 2/ Incremental Prod. Costa Benefits Minus Paddy Prod.1/ Price 2/ Incremen- and Replace- Costs 3/ Farm Labour 2/ Without Costs tal Prod. ment 3/ Prject V (ton) G MF m. MF m.MF m. F m. m. m. M.
1972 - - 38 20 87 55 19 - 181 73 980 63 62 1,224 37 122 64 30 -1, 355 74 2, 400 128 307 1, 471 60 227 76 69 -1, 458 75 10,870 92 1,000 723 120 205 98 77 - 69 76 10, 670 56 598 96 152 236 103 84 95 77 15,250 63 961 93 190 223 234 54 275 78 12, 470 89 1.,110 35 190 223 204 57 515 79 10,950 66 723 535 190 223 80 84 - 221 1980 8,530 87 742 67 190 223 57 88 293 81 9,000 89 801 393 190 223 72 98 21 82 10,5G0 91 961 63 190 223 87 100 498' 83 12,2,40 94 1,151 - 190 223 103 101 736 84 14,110 96 1,355 35 190 223 103 101 905 85 16,210 98 1,589 353 190 223 103 101 821 86 18,590 100 1,859 - 190 223 103 101 1,444 87 20,990 102 2,141 416 190 223 103 101 1,310 ® 88 23,5-' 104 2,447 130 190 223 103 101 1,902 89 26,230 106 2,780 159 190 223 103 101 2,206 1990 29,230 108 3,157 35 190 223 103 101 2,707 91 29,410 108 3,175 353 190 223 103 101 2, 407 92 29,410 1c8 3,175 - 190 223 103 101 2,760 93 29,410 108 3,175 234 190 223 103 101 2,526 94 29,410 108 3,175 63 190 223 103 101 2,1697 95 29,410 108 3,175 182 190 223 103 101 2,578 96 29,410 108 3,175 102 190 223 103 101 2,1658 97 29,410 1o8 3,175 512 190 223 103 101 2,248 98 29,410 108 3,175 - 190 223 103 101 2,760 99 29,41o 108 5,175 234 190 223 103 101 2,526 2000 29,410 1o8 3,175 63 190 223 103 101 2,697 1 29,410 108 3,175 - 190 223 103 101 2,760 2 29,410 108 3,175 35 190 223 103 101 2,725 11 3 29,410 108 3,175 '535 190 223 103 101 2, 225 4 4 29,410 1o8 3,175 67 190 223 103 101 2,693 m 5 29,410 108 3,175 393 190 223 103 101 2,367 L 6 29,410 1o8 3,175 63 190 223 103 101 2,697
La;ged 6 months in relation to inputs 2/ 45- consr.umed at Bamako and 55% at Mopti / Local ccsts affected by a SCF = 0.88 ER 17%