IRAQ GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY (IGPA/TAKAMUL) PROJECT
QUARTERLY REPORT: APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018
JULY 2018
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by DAI.
IRAQ GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY (IGPA/TAKAMUL) PROJECT QUARTERLY REPORT: APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018
Program Title: Iraq Governance and Performance Accountability (IGPA/Takamul) Project
Sponsoring USAID Office: USAID Iraq
Contract Number: AID-267-H-17-00001
Contractor: DAI Global LLC
Date of Publication: July 30, 2018
Author: IGPA/Takamul Project Team
The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
CONTENTS ACRONYMS ...... III PROJECT SNAPSHOT ...... 1 SUMMARY TABLE OF RESULTS ...... 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 3 CHAPTER I: PROJECT CONTEXT ...... 5 Political Dynamics ...... 6 Governance Dynamics ...... 8 Economic Dynamics ...... 10 Legal Development ...... 11 POLITICAL ECONOMY CONTEXT AND PROJECT IMPACT ...... 12 Challenges ...... 12 Implementation Strategy ...... 13 CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ...... 15 Conflict Sensitivity and IGPA/Takamul Programming ...... 15 Major Conflict Dynamics and Drivers ...... 17 CHAPTER II: PROJECT PROGRESS ...... 20 OBJECTIVE ONE: ENHANCE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITY ...... 20 Result One: Improve Service Delivery Outcomes in Sectors with High Impact/Visibility21 Result Two: Strengthen Strategic Approach of Line Ministries and PCS to Better Align Service Delivery Outcomes with Local Government and Citizen Priorities ...... 26 Result Three: Enhance Regulatory and Procedural Predictability to Attract Private Sector Investment ...... 27 Result Four: Enhance Targeting of Capital Investment Spending in Service Delivery Sectors that Serve Vulnerable and Disadvantaged Populations ...... 27 OBJECTIVE TWO: IMPROVE GOVERNORATE AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ...... 29 Result One: Strengthen capacities of Administrative and Financial Affairs Directorates (AFAD) ...... 30 Result Two: Support Development of Oversight Mechanisms (National and Provincial Level) ...... 33 Result Three: Enhance Provincial Revenue Generation, Collection and Management from Outside Oil Sector ...... 33 Result Four: 4: Enhance Budget Cycle Planning, Development and Execution (Central and Provincial Level) ...... 34 OBJECTIVE THREE: STRENGTHEN MONITORING AND OVERSIGHT OF SERVICE DELIVERY AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ...... 36 Result One: Strengthen the Capacity of Selected Provincial Institutions to Establish Effective Citizen Participation and Outreach Mechanisms ...... 37 Result Two: Enhance Public Capability and Willingness to Participate in Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating Public Services ...... 40 OBJECTIVE FOUR: SUPPORT IRAQI CHANGE AGENTS ...... 44 Result 1: Enhance Capacity of Women and Vulnerable Populations to Represent their Needs Within Government Decision-Making Processes ...... 45
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 i
Task Order One ...... 45 REGIONAL ...... 50 Baghdad ...... 50 Basrah ...... 50 Erbil ...... 51 Ninewa ...... 52 CROSS-CUTTING ...... 52 IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES ...... 52 CHAPTER III: MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING ...... 55 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS ...... 55 COMPLEXITY AWARENESS ...... 58 Sentinel Indicators ...... 58 Stakeholder Feedback, Process Monitoring of Impact, and Outcome Harvesting ...... 60 CHAPTER IV: LESSONS LEARNED ...... 62 CHAPTER V: QUARTERLY FINANCIAL INFORMATION ...... 64 ANNEXES ...... 1 ANNEX 1: CROSS CUTTING THEMES IN THE ELECTIONS OF 2018 ...... 2 ANNEX 2: PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS ELECTED AS COR MPS WITH PARTY AFFILIATION ...... 7 ANNEX 3: QUARTERLY ACTIVITY TABLE ...... 8 ANNEX 4: SUCCESS STORIES ...... 17 ANNEX 5: CONTRACT DELIVERABLES ...... 24 ANNEX 6: POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS AND REPORTS ...... 25 ANNEX 7: SUBCONTRACTORS OVERVIEW ...... 26 Al JIDARA ...... 26 GENDER RESOURCES, INC. (GRI) ...... 26 OVERSEAS STRATEGIC CONSULTING (OSC)...... 26 SOUKTEL ...... 27 ERNST & YOUNG ...... 27 IRFAD ...... 27 GAFFNEY, CLINE & ASSOCIATES (GCA) ...... 28 GARDAWORLD ...... 28
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 ii
ACRONYMS AFAD Administrative and Financial Affairs Directorate AMEP Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan CCN Cooperating Country National COMSEC Council of Ministers Secretariat COP Chief of Party CSO Civil Society Organization DAI DAI Global LLC DCOP Deputy Chief of Party EY Ernst & Young GCA Gaffney, Cline & Associates GO Governor’s Office GOI Government of Iraq GRI Gender Resources, Inc. HCCP Higher Commission of Coordinating among Provinces HCCPSec Higher Commission of Coordinating among Provinces Secretariat IHEC Independent High Electoral Commission IRFAD Iraqi Research Foundation for Analysis and Development ISF Iraqi Security Forces KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party KRG Kurdistan Regional Government LOP Life of Project M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MEL Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning MoF Ministry of Finance MoO Ministry of Oil MoP Ministry of Planning NGO Nongovernmental Organization OJT On-the-Job Training OSC Overseas Strategic Consulting PC Provincial Council PCC Provincial Council Chair PEA Political Economy Analysis
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 iii
PFM Public Financial Management PG Provincial Government PMF Popular Mobilization Force PMO Prime Minister’s Office PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan SWM Solid Waste Management TA Technical Assistance USAID United States Agency for International Development USG United States Government
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 iv
PROJECT SNAPSHOT
SUMMARY TABLE OF RESULTS
Read Output this Reporting Period (# of) Output LOP (# of) Ref more Description 2 # W/shop1 Training Participants W/shop Training Participants Other Other3 days days Male Female days days Male Female
1 Enhance Government of Iraq Service Delivery Capacity Improve Service Delivery Outcomes in Sectors with 1.1 18 - 62 7 - Pg. 21 5 - 90 24 2 High Impact/Visibility Strengthen Strategic Approach and Capacity of Line Ministries and Provincial Directorates to Better Align 1.2 2 - 39 1 - Pg. 26 - 3 20 1 - Service Delivery Outcomes with Priorities of Provincial Governments and Local Populations
Enhance Regulatory and Procedural Certainty to Attract 1.3 - - - - - Pg. 27 - - - - - Private Sector Investment Enhance the Targeting of Capital Investment Spending in 1.4 Service Delivery Sectors that Serve Vulnerable and 6 - 18 29 - Pg. 27 1 - 3 20 - Disadvantaged Populations 2 Improve Provincial and National Government Public Financial Management Strengthen Capacities of Administrative and Financial 2.1 2 8 80 20 - Pg. 30 - 11 27 9 - Affairs Directorates (AFAD) 2.2 Support Development of Federal Oversight Mechanisms - - - - - Pg. 33 - - - - - Enhance Provincial Revenue Generation, Collection, and Pg. 33 2.3 ------Management from Outside the Oil Sector 2.4 Enhance Budget-Cycle Planning - - - - - Pg. 34 1 - 3 2 -
1 Includes focus group discussions and conferences 2 Calculated based on participants attending an event (no ‘double count’) 3 Includes: 1) Documents developed by/with support of IGPA/Takamul for the direct beneficiary of an activity, such as guidelines, charts, standard operating procedures, and manuals, and 2) Mechanisms developed with the support of IGPA/Takamul
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 1
Read Output this Reporting Period (# of) Output LOP (# of) Ref more Description 2 # W/shop1 Training Participants W/shop Training Participants Other Other3 days days Male Female days days Male Female
3 Strengthen Monitoring and Oversight of Service Delivery and Public Expenditure Enhance Capacity of Selected Provincial Institutions to Pg. 3.1 Establish Effective Citizen Participation and Outreach 12 12 201 54 - 3 - 37 26 - 3736 Mechanisms Enhance Public Capability and Willingness to Participate 3.2 11 14 218 152 - Pg. 40 3 - 36 8 - in Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluating Public Services 4 Support Iraqi Change Agents Enhance capacity of women and vulnerable populations 4.1 to present their needs within government decision - - - - - Pg. 44 6 - 31 28 - making processes CLIN 5 Task Order 1 - - - - - Pg. 45 - - - - -
Task Order 2 - - - - - 2 - 16 4 - TOTAL OUTPUT 51 34 618 263 21 14 150 122 2
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Iraq held nationwide Parliamentary Elections on May 12. Much of the news in this reporting period is dominated by the elections and the political uncertainty over its results.4 As of this writing, Iraq remains very much in the grip of the aftermath of those elections and without a clear path to the formation of a new government. While the issues of service delivery provided a major theme in the elections, the ensuing political paralysis has meant that these issues have remained largely unresolved. The result has been political discontent which has resulted in large scale demonstrations in much of Iraq. Beyond the immediate political questions, the fate of decentralization is also at stake here. While IGPA/Takamul is not a decentralization program per se, it relies heavily on decentralization as an important tool for pushing down decisions on the provision of services to a more local level. The underlying theory is that local decision makers are better placed to understand local needs so that decisions about services are better informed about local needs and resourcing them reflect a broad political consensus. While no one expects decentralization to disappear completely as a government policy (it is still enshrined in Iraqi law and in the Constitution), it remains unproven as a theory for improving services in Iraq, a rentier state which has long relied upon a heavily centralized form of government which has historically sought to monopolize decision-making. Without sustained support from the center, it is unclear to what extent the program will be able to utilize decentralization as a continued tool for improving services. Compounding further the still unresolved question of who will rule Iraq at the national level is the issue of provincial elections, which were originally intended to be held concomitantly with parliamentary elections. These are now scheduled to be held in December 2018, although, as with the runup to the parliamentary elections, there is much uncertainty as to the actual date they will be held. For IGPA/Takamul, which is intended to work at the provincial level to help the Iraqi government deliver better services, the political uncertainty has required an adjustment in strategy which is detailed in the pages below. Given the likely turnover in senior personnel starting with the governors in most provinces, IGPA/Takamul has intensified its efforts to work with institutions which are likely to be able to withstand any change in government, including the Administrative and Financial Affairs Directorates (AFADs) which were instituted with USAID help and remain one of the main resources available to make provincial governments continue to function, at least in terms of decentralized ministries. In addition, the program has intensified efforts its work with civil society organizations. Taking advantage of the tradition of civil society or voluntary organizations in Iraq, IGPA/Takamul is working closely with them to maintain a focus on oversight and accountability, improved service delivery, and providing a bridge between the government and its constituents. Despite these challenges, IGPA/Takamul has been able to record some significant successes in its first ten months of operation. It has worked to improve communications within the Iraqi government and has regularly and successfully brought together disparate parts of the government which previously had rarely if ever communicated with each other. For example,
4 IGPA/Takamul provided significant support to the holding of the elections, which is detailed in the Iraq 2018 Elections Report and other elections reports which have been provided separately to USAID.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 3
IGPA/Takamul helped to create a joint committee between the Baghdad Amanat (Mayoralty) and Baghdad provincial government, two government entities with overlapping responsibilities but separate administration reporting chains and budgets. The result has been unprecedented cooperation leading to communities being hooked up to the water network and unhealthy landfills being moved out of populated areas. The work with AFADs has already been mentioned above. IGPA/Takamul has worked to anticipate its expanded role in preparing and executing budgets which reflect local needs thereby putting into practice the theoretical mandate of localized decision making leading to better service delivery outcomes. In addition, the program has worked broadly to reform the government’s procurement process by updating and simplifying the process, making it more effective and transparent. In doing so, the program has created new opportunities for smaller companies which were historically unable to cope with the heavy administrative requirements of the previous procurement procedures. It has also helped to remove one of the most frequently cited bottlenecks to improved service delivery which was lengthy (and often corrupted) procurement processes. Even with the current uncertainties, IGPA/Takamul views the future with some optimism. However flawed the electoral process may have been, Iraq is on the brink of another peaceful transition of political power; a process that would have been unthinkable prior to 2003. While sectarianism and ethnic identities remain strong in Iraq, the focus on services provides a trans- ethnic basis for creating a political process focused on the broad needs of the population. In addition, the program will work with provincial governments to implement the Local Revenue Generation Law which could provide a significant source of new revenue for expanding services. It will also continue its work on expanding opportunities for women and for vulnerable populations, largely through the design and establishment of new gender units at the provincial level and by using civil society organizations to ensure an equitable distribution of services. The results of these latter efforts are already clear in Basrah, where a courageous young Chaldean priest has led a group of Muslim and Christian CSO members to successfully demand better services from the local government. As always, the entire IGPA/Takamul team would like to express its appreciation to our USAID colleagues for their support and hard work in providing the program with much needed resources and guidance.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 4
CHAPTER I: PROJECT CONTEXT The controversial National Elections of May 2018 continue to dominate Iraq’s political economy. Their effects are felt in the continuing political, economic, and security crises besetting the country and in the ever more parlous state of Iraq’s ability to deliver services. IGPA/Takamul’s political economy analysis focuses on ongoing political and conflict sensitivities within the pre- and post-election context. Specifically, this chapter presents an overview of the issues that emerged during the reporting period as a result of the flawed elections process and subsequent complications. The political uncertainty that continues to dominate Iraq since the beginning of the year overshadows not only the long-term policy making, socioeconomic projects, and governance decisions, but also short-term daily actions that used to maintain service delivery at a minimum level. At the end of this reporting period on June 30, Iraq was facing a severe electricity and water shortage, which has spurred widespread citizen discontent spilling over into sometimes violent demonstrations over the perceived lack of government response. Iraqis had high expectations for the outcome of the National Elections and hoped for a non- sectarian government that would launch economic and development programs in post-Da’esh Iraq. However, political fragmentation continues to deepen the daily life challenges of ordinary Iraqis, sowing disappointment and distrust in the ability of the current political establishment to provide practical solutions. In addition to the political fragmentation, rivalries among legislative, executive, and judiciary institutions have politicized interpretations of the foundational legal framework, such as the constitutional articles and elections laws. This has further alienated the public from the ruling parties and government institutions and decreased domestic legitimacy. This has left Iraq vulnerable to stronger and more visible regional interventions and challenges to Iraq’s sovereignty. By the end of June, the situation facing Iraqis was critical. Official election results are still pending and, as such, a new parliament has not been sworn in. This leaves Iraqis with a caretaker government who has proven itself unable to manage the country’s ongoing electricity, water, and job scarcity crises. Frustrated by perceived inaction, citizens took to the streets in Karbala, Najaf, Babil, Diyala, Wasit, and Basrah to protest the deterioration of services concurrent with the holy month of Ramadan and the students’ national exams. The following three sections present: the main political, governance, and economic dynamics dominating the Iraqi context; the main legislations related to service delivery, decentralization, and elections; and a brief overview of the impact of these dynamics on IGPA/Takamul project implementation and how the project accounted for such a fluid political context in its design, plan, and implementation.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 5
Political Dynamics
Severe Intra-Group Rivalry Political rivalries among and within Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish political parties were the main source of Iraq’s political impasse during this reporting period. This fragmentation has made creating viable alliances able to deal with Iraq’s manifold crises ever more difficult and has prompted politicians to resort to sectarian and ethnically based politics that have dominated Iraq since 2003. Looking forward, few Iraqis see cause for optimism as the electoral impasse continues and the formation of a new government remains elusive. Perhaps even more importantly Iraqis do not see solutions for the severe problems of services, upon which politicians campaigned in the run up to the election, anywhere on the horizon. Each of the rival parties, especially within the ruling Shia lists, controls two or more of the federal and provincial governments’ institutions, and therefore can move, direct, and exploit these institutions based on their political calculations. Analysts agree that the current political stalemate is a manifestation of such severe intra-group conflict within the Shia bloc, 5 as the major Shia lists, e.g., Hakim’s Hikma, Amiri’s PMFs/Hashed Fatih, and Sadr’s Sayroon lists, are consolidating their efforts to deny the Dawa party the premiership position.6 Dawa uses its control of the various parts of the Government of Iraq’s (GOI) institutions to delay or expedite the process of government formation based on narrow political calculations centered primarily around improving the chances of PM Abadi returning to power for a second term. PM Abadi, for instance, appeared in mid-June to back down from demands to investigate alleged electoral fraud made just a month earlier. Most analysts considered Abadi’s support of the Council of Representatives’ (COR) third amendment on June 6 to hold a full manual recount as an effort to hinder government formation at a time when the government formation process did not seem to favor his candidacy for a second term. 7 While PM Abadi allowed the Supreme Judiciary Council (SJC) to move forward with the implementation of the COR’s proposed legislations, he also delayed the Federal Court’s decision to ratify the legislation. This allowed him to agree later to have the Court issue a verdict supporting a partial manual recount. In brief, the complicated outcomes of the National Elections in May 2018 have added to the political uncertainty; strengthened the intra-political rivalry; deepened parties’ control of state institutions; and distorted the legal foundation of the Iraqi political system. These dynamics have kept the provincial governments and councils paralyzed in the current political impasse and have contributed to the deterioration of service delivery in diverse areas, including electricity,
5https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/shia-factions-iraqi-election-divided-and-disarray-20461 6Ammar al-Hakim’s Hikma List: Ammar al-Hakim split from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) a few months prior to the elections and established the Hikma (Wisdom in Arabic) list, in an attempt to attract young Shias who are started to disapprove of the Shia Islamic parties. Hadi al-Amiri’s PMFs/Hashed Fatih List: represents a group of militias, mainly Badr organization and Asa’ib Ahl al- Haq (AAH-headed by Qais al-Khazali). Hadi al-Amiri the Secretary General of Badr Organization heads the list. Sadr’s S’yroon List: represents a coalition of Sadr movement, civil and liberal parties and activists. Dawa Party ran this election with two lists; PM Abadi’s Nasr and Maliki’s State of Law. Despite the rift between Abadi and Maliki, and despite the fact that they ran outside the party’s establishment, political analysts point to a near agreement between the two lists to re-join effort, so they can keep the prime-minister position. 7 http://www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=40567&y=2018&articl
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 6
water, and health. Additionally, critically needed service delivery projects and critical other decisions have been put off pending a resolution of the political situation. Electoral Fraud National elections were held on May 12, 2018 in all Iraqi provinces, including the newly liberated areas and the Kurdistan Region. The May 2018 Elections were highlighted by the following challenges and new trends that surfaced pre- and post-elections and have continued to affect Iraq’s politics, security, and service delivery:8 • The Independent High Electoral Commission’s (IHEC) decision to use new technology to expediate the announcement of the results without proper preparation, training, and voter education. • Confusing and unorganized registration and voting processes for internally displaced persons (IDP) and religious minorities. • Voter abstention. • The political transformation of militias, who used intimidation and forced busing to the polling centres in IDP camps and religious minorities areas, especially Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Diyala.9 • Concentrated attacks against women candidates. Social media platforms were heavily exploited to attack women candidates on secular and moderate lists for failing to cover their hair or for “immodest” dress. New in these elections was the non-consensual leaking of supposed sex tapes of women candidates. • The withdrawal of the Shia’s jurisprudence support (Marjya)10to the political establishment. • The exploitation of service delivery projects and temporal fixes during the election campaign. The issue of service delivery dominated the election campaigns of various parties, with those in control of certain municipalities and ministries implementing projects like road pavement or solid waste management (SWM) campaigns in the most underserviced areas to consolidate political loyalties. For example, PM Abadi’s visits to Qadisiya and Basrah were accompanied by the hasty inauguration of projects that stopped soon after his visit, such as the electricity plant in Basrah’s district of Fao, which was launched concurrent with PM Abadi’s arrival to the plant and stopped once he left, and created another problem of water shortage.11 Another example occurred in Najaf where al-Hikma’s prominent candidate and Minister of Youth and Sports, Abdul Hussain Abtan, hastily inaugurated Najaf Stadium with rivals at Najaf provincial government quickly announcing that the project was opened before it was finished.
8 See Annex One: Cross Cutting Themes in the Elections of 2018 9 For full and detailed reporting on these issues and other aspects of the elections please refer to IGPA/Takamul’s weekly reports, and the special reports produced pre- and post-elections. 10 The Shia Jurisprudence (Marjya) represents the Shia religious authority. There are two main Marjyas for Shias in the world. The Iraqi Shia Marjya is represented in Najaf’s seminary commonly termed as (al-hawza al-‘ilmiyya)- the enclosure of learning in Arabic. Several senior Grand Ayatollahs constitute the Hawza, and Sistani is the Grand Ayatollah who heads the seminary and present the Marjya’ s religious instructions and positions towards political and governance issues. The Iraqi Marjya is the biggest Marjya with followers from across the world. The second Shia Marjya is (Qumm) located in Iran with followers mainly from India, Lebanon, Pakistan. https://www- tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/00263200701568220?needAccess=true 11 Abadi’s visit to Basrah-projects inaugurated but stopped soon after.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 7
• Significant election campaign funding allowed for big funding machines that marginalized small parties and independent candidates. Most funding originated as regional contributions from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Iran. • In addition to the inter-party fragmentation and politicization of state governance institutions, the general mismanagement of the national elections created a chaotic transitional period with three main political camps. The first camp supports the electoral results and aims to move forward with the government formation process. This camp, which includes Sadr’s Sayroon, Hakim’s Hikma, parts of the Kurdish parties - particularly the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and parts of the Sunnis, especially Jamal al-Karboli’s al- Hal lists, still has not been able to propose a viable government. Rather each member of the lists has a different agenda and vision for the new government. The second camp supports the manual recount, whether partial or full, and advocates the delay of negotiations to form a government pending the results. The main proponent of this camp is Maliki’s State of Law, parts of the Wataniyha list, (particularly Speaker Salim al-Jobouiri’s bloc at the list), the Turkoman Front, and the five Kurdish12 opposition parties. The third camp can be described as the fluctuating camp since it has changed positions since the elections based on political calculation. The main lists here are PM Abadi’s Nasr list, the Kurdish party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Alawi’s bloc in the Wataniyha list. Similar to the situation of the first and second camp, the lists under the third camp have not grouped themselves into a coalition to form the largest parliamentary bloc in order to win the right to form the new government. The emergence of these camps has led instead to further fragmentation and an even more complex set of political calculations which together have stalled any meaningful negotiations about government formation. Currently, most of the lists prefer to wait until the final results of the partial manual recount are announced and ratified by the Federal Court, before moving with any serious negotiations. Predictions are, given the timeline required to finish the recount and Court ratification, government formation will pick up by mid-August. It is worth mentioning that, legally, the Federal Court is not bound by any timeline to ratify the results. So, if the political situation will not lean towards Abadi’s ruling Dawa party, the party will still have the option to delay the government formation process by delaying Court ratification.
Governance Dynamics
Elections and Governance Political uncertainly carried over from the previous reporting period and continues to dominate the Iraqi context. The second quarter began with political uncertainty about whether to hold or postpone the elections. In the third quarter, the political uncertainty was about a stalled government formation process and more uncertainty as to when the now delayed provincial elections (they were scheduled to be held at the same time as the national elections but
12 IGPA/Takamul uses the term “the five opposition parties” to refer to the opposition parties in the KRG for an easy reference throughout the report. The opposition in the KRG consists of five parties: Gorran (Change movement), Yagrdu (Islamic Union), Komel (Islamic Group), Coalition for Democracy and Justice (CDJ-Headed by Barhim Salih), and Nawe Nwie (New Generation movement headed by the young businessman Shaswar AbdulWaihd)
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 8
postponed until December 2018) would be held. Both issues directly affect provincial level governments and hinder tangible progress in governance issues in a state-weak institutions country like Iraq. The National Elections in May 2018 witnessed an increasing number of Governors and Members of Provincial Council Candidates running for the Iraqi COR, and given their status as incumbent officials, the majority of them won the elections. Having Members of Parliament (MP) with strong provincial experience is a positive development in channelling the provincial demands more effectively to the national level. However, the protracted government formation process means that these provincial officials are caught in a transitional status, which paralyzes government performance on both national and provincial levels.13 Uncertainty about the provincial elections stems from two factors. First, the lack of clarity about the coalition that will form the new government, which will play a vital role in deciding the nature of the coalitions and candidates for provincial elections. Second, the uncertainty about the ability of the Iraqi parties to meet the constitutional timeline and form the government before October 2018. The fluctuation about these dates adds to the uncertainty about whether the provincial elections will be held on time. Such complicated political calculations amidst deep party fragmentations hinder proactive implementation of government projects to develop various services, especially electricity and water, because any move can cost the political party or candidate national positions or provincial loss. Politicized Anti-Corruption Campaign The anti-corruption campaign announced at the beginning of PM Abadi’s term was strongly supported by the public and Shia Marjya, represented by Ayatollah Sistani.14 Iraqis consider corruption and misuse of public finance as the main reason for the country’s faltering development process and economic hardship. Except for the Da’esh threat, Iraqis view corruption as the gravest threat facing their country, including the Kurdistan region. PM Abadi spent most of his term promoting and promising effective anti-corruption measures. Despite PM Abadi’s heavy emphasis on the anti-corruption campaign, no tangible results from the campaign materialized such as significant legal or financial repercussions against corrupt officials or institutions. The anti-corruption campaign also failed because the GOI took superficial action against secondary and less-powerful politicians and bureaucrats, usually from PM Abadi’s rival parties, in an attempt to be seen as cracking down on corruption. Similar to Maliki, PM Abadi is viewed as using corruption dossiers against his political rivals as in the example of the Governor of Ninewa. While originally a big proponent of impeaching the Governor, PM Abadi changed his position, allowing the Governor to stay in power. PM Abadi’s changing position further weakened his corruption campaign, since his support of the Ninewa Governor was in exchange for maintaining an upper hand in the federal government in the reconstruction projects and politics of Ninewa. Corrupt campaign funding is another issue that angered Iraqis. The elections campaigns of 2018 inflated the “Election Market” with huge financial expenditures on campaigns. Sources attribute the increase in spending to corrupted government contracts and foreign intervention,
13 See: Annex Two: Table of the provincial officials transferred to MP at the COR with their party affiliations: 14 Shia Marjya is the Arabic term to refer to the Shia jurisprudence, and represented in Ayatollah Sistani’s position and statements about political issues.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 9
particularly by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and Iran. The amount of cash that flooded the market raised the cost of entry for smaller parties.15 Larger parties – in terms of finances and capability - and prominent candidates held lavish election activities and bought expensive TV ads. For example, al-Mosilyah TV, a Ninewa local TV station with high viewers, sold three minutes of airtime for $400,000. Some parties, such as al-Hal party, which heads the Ninewa Hawiatuna (Ninewa is Our Identity) list paid local TV more than $1 million to gain the biggest share of TV coverage. Corruption expanded to the purchase of voter biometric and electronic cards, especially in the IDP camps. Corruption has generated widespread skepticism among Iraqis towards the political establishment and the government’s ability to tackle such entrenched networks of corruption and was clearly a factor in the high rate of voter absenteeism which the Government estimated to be about 45% but which unofficial sources place as high as 70 percent. 16 Regional vs. Federal Government Relations The election campaign and political interaction towards government formation helped to stabilize relations between the KRG and the GOI during this reporting period. This was a by- product of the GOI and KRG parties’ recognition of the need for coalition alliances as part of the government formation process. As an example of stabilized interactions between the GOI and the KRG, the GOI re-commenced sending salaries to KRG public employees. They had previously stopped sending these salaries after the Kurdish referendum in September 2017. Simultaneously, the KRG’s political rhetoric against the GOI’s policies decreased during this period.
Economic Dynamics
Government Formation and Service Delivery Projects Election outcomes continued to affect business cycles.17 Hence, the Iraqi political business cycle is heavily affected by the uncertainty surrounding the elections’ laws and dates. As such, the economy has slowed, government expenditures on service delivery projects have stalled, and unemployment is growing at an alarming rate. These issues are further exacerbated by the fact that Iraq is a rentier state, with more than 90 percent of its GDP generated through oil export, making it heavily depending on government contracts. This dependence depletes Iraq’s provinces of its local revenues, creating greater financial disparity between provinces and weakening the private sector. Thus, a prolonged government formation process, coupled with austerity measures, have caused financial hardship and greatly slowed down the Iraqi markets, especially on provincial level. The provincial governments (PG) in Babil, Basrah, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Qadisiya faced especially challenging situations to maintain an adequate level of service delivery in terms of projects related to water, sewerage, and electricity.
15 Interview with Sumyah Ghanim candidate on al-Wataniyha list in Ninewa- the interview was conducted for the six short PEA produced for the Election Assistance Task -Order. 16 PM Abadi’s press conference on July 17, 2018. 17 “Economic fluctuations that are induced by politically motivated manipulation of economic policies are known as the political business cycle.” https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/docview/1695749480?accountid=14434&rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 10
Regional Relations and Economy Iraq’s regional relations have always been fractious with intermittent periods of tenuous peace, especially with Turkey and Iran. The National Elections of May 2018 and the transition to a new government were another avenue for both Turkey and Iran to assert influence. They ended up doing so by leveraging their control of vital water and power resources as tools to cripple the Iraqi economy. Turkey started to fill the Iliso Dam, which drastically affected the water level in Tigris, leading to a dire agriculture season for the Iraq’s southern provinces. Iran, in turn, locked streams to the Zab and Sirwan rivers that also feed Tigris and dried the Garoon river that affects the salinity in Basrah’s Shatt-al-Arab river. Iran, aggressively pursuing stronger influence in the new Iraqi government, cut the export of 1,200 megawatts of electricity to Iraq’s southern provinces, which in turn has affected business and factories, creating a challenging situation for the southern population.18 Generating Local Revenue and Political Instability PGs continue to face enormous challenges to maintain basic service delivery amidst a slowed- business cycle, a lack of adequate budget allocation and an unstable political context. Thus, the process of imposing new taxes, adding service fees, or collecting facilities’ revenue was halted during this reporting period. Election season, including the possible provincial elections, also deterred PGs from imposing new taxes or collecting service fees, as most of the incumbent Governors and PC members were candidates and did not want to affect their political support by imposing taxes during an election season. Adding to the challenges of generating local revenues, the PGs, especially the maritime port city of Basrah, failed to convince PM Abadi to allow them to keep the revenues from the border-crossings at the related provinces. Instead PM Abadi maintained that managing and collecting revenues from the border-crossings fall under the Federal Government’s exclusive authorities granted by the Iraqi constitution. Legal Development
COR legislated the following laws and amendments during the reporting period: • The Third Amendment to the National Election Law 45/2013 on June 5, 2018. Main articles were to hold nationwide manual recount of the results of the National elections of May 2018.
The Federal Supreme Court (FSC) issued the following verdicts related to the decentralization process during the reporting period:
• The FSC ratified the article that cancelled the sub-districts councils, which was legislated by the COR as part of the third amendment to Law 21/2008 in January 2018. Legal claims have been filed, stating that cancelling these councils is against the federal nature of the Iraqi state as it is established in the Iraqi Constitution. However, the FSC rejected these claims and ratified the article, stating that it does not contradict the constitution.19
18 For full and detailed account of the impact of the Turkish and Iranian measures on the Iraq’s economy and service delivery, please refer to IGPA/Takamul’s weekly reports in June 2018. 19 Federal Court Letter no.82/June 11 2018
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 11
• The FSC issued a decision that the related Minister, not the PG, has the authority to promote or appointment senior public employees at the provincial level. The FSC also ruled that decisions about employment in general should be in line with the Council of Minister’s (COM) policies. The FSC decision came while reviewing a claim filed by the Governor of Maysan in which questioned the constitutionality of Article 4, Item 2, Point 1 of the Third Amendment to Law No. 21/2008, which deprive the PG the authority to appoint or promote senior government employees at their provinces.
POLITICAL ECONOMY CONTEXT AND PROJECT IMPACT
Challenges
IGPA/Takamul’s Unstable and Fluid Operational Context Iraq has faced a rocky path since the liberation of its major cities from Da’esh occupation. The GOI missed the opportunity to capitalize on the public enthusiasm after defeating Da’esh and Iraqis’ newfound trust in their politicians to steer the country away from sectarian policies towards the implementation of the anti-corruption campaign, economic development, and service delivery focused programs. The political uncertainty and fragmentation, polarization, unstable legal framework and politicization of the judiciary and governance institutions have contributed to unstable national policies and stalled PGs. The southern provinces are divided among key power bases,20 while the Sunni newly liberated areas are still in shambles, and the KRG is moving in a different direction; trying to shield the KRG’s progress attained thus far from the impact of the deterioration in the rest of the country. This context has created disparity in Iraq’s political, economic security, and development sector and blurred the line between politics and governance. Hence, decisions to use power, advance governance policies, or achieve consensus have been based on political calculations rather than real efforts to reach solutions to Iraqis’ demands for better service delivery and governance policies. This has created an extremely unstable operational context for IGPA/Takamul. The seesaw of the Iraqi politics affects government officials, bureaucrats, and institutions. The rapid changes in institutions’ policies and personnel, and sudden changes in provincial institutions, deprives IGPA/Takamul from long-term strategic planning for programming. Furthermore, the stakeholders and partners, with whom IGPA/Takamul has invested considerable time and effort to cultivate relations and build an understanding of the program, are often replaced. The fluctuations in legal interpretations of fundamental constitutional articles, laws, and regulations that provide the framework for the decentralization process based on the status and power of the adversarial also pose another challenge affecting the operational framework for IGPA/Takamul. Uncertainties around the new government formation process and the unknown nature of the coalition that will form the new government will continue to affect IGPA/Takamul’s operational context throughout much of 2018.
20 For example, while Dawa and Hikma are strong in Basrah, Sadr rules Maysan.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 12
Implementation Strategy Political complications, extreme deterioration in service delivery, and subsequent public demonstrations stemming from underperforming government entities, support IGPA/Takamul’s logic underlying its activities and strengthen their importance and impact. Underpinning IGPA/Takamul program logic is the following USAID development hypothesis: IF Iraqi Government service delivery capacities are enhanced, PFM is improved, monitoring and oversight of service delivery and public expenditures are strengthened, and key champions for change in Iraq are supported, THEN the government’s response to its citizens’ needs will be improved at the local and national levels.21 In addition to IGPA/Takamul’s hypothesis and foundational assumptions, the project’s implementation strategy utilizes the problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA) approach to enhance the project’s capability of coping with Iraq’s fluid and unstable political climate. IGPA/Takamul does this by implementing activities with long term technical impact and short- term improvements to PG capacity. This approach is rooted in IGPA/Takamul’s understanding that to make an impact in a fragile state like Iraq, IGPA/Takamul must rapidly improve citizen access to critical services while simultaneously building government capacity over a longer period in order to re-establish the social contract between citizens and government. For example, Objective Three Activity 3.1.1, government partners develop, implement, and monitor communication and outreach strategies that inform the public on service delivery functions, IGPA/Takamul formed technical working groups (TWG) for four provinces; Basrah, Babil, Anbar, Baghdad, and Baghdad Amanat, including different entities such as the Water Directorate, Municipality, Municipalities, PC, GO, and CSOs. Prior to the activity the CSOs had antagonistic relations with the PG, as the latter considered the former an instigator of trouble with the citizens. The CSOs had been identifying problems and addressing deficiencies in government performance without constructive input towards solutions. Therefore, IGPA/Takamul focused on developing healthy relations between the PGs and vital segments of the society: the CSOs. This in turn will produce effective oversight and accountability and better government performance with effective government-citizens communication strategy. In addition to the activity’s long-term technical impact institutionalizing oversight and accountability at the PGs, the activity also has an immediate impact on improving government outreach. The activity improves PG responsiveness to citizens’ complaints which is especially critical during the tenuous time of service deterioration and severe shortages in basic services. To that end, two TWGs implemented the communication and public outreach plan. The TWGs in Basrah and Babil each launched awareness campaigns on issues like revenue generation for water services as well as conducting citizen satisfaction surveys. The activity has succeeded in creating an immediate impact by changing the relationship dynamics between the PGs and CSOs. At the same time, the activity has established a sustainable and long-term administration development through the institutionalization of the CSOs oversight, accountability, and inputs towards PGs service delivery performance.
21 DAI’s technical proposal p. 5.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 13
Objective One Activity 1.1.1, initiation of coordination and cooperation between the Baghdad PG and the Baghdad Amanat, especially in the delivery of water supply and waste management services, includes both long term technical-structural improvement on Baghdad’s local authorities as well as short term tangible impact on citizens’ daily life. While the activity resulted in creating a joint committee between Baghdad PG and Baghdad Amanat to clarify jurisdiction and mandate for each bureaucracy, establishing structural coordination between the two government institutions has also resulted in rapid action to address the problem of SWM in vulnerable communities in Baghdad. Previously, Baghdad Amanat used the residential areas in the suburbs of Baghdad, which are under the jurisdiction of the Baghdad PG, as landfill areas for the solid waste collected from the center of Baghdad. The community of Nehrwan was particularly affected by this procedure, resulting in hazardous health and pollution issues for the community. The joint committee established by Activity 1.1.1 reached an agreement between Baghdad PG and Amanat to relocate the landfill area from Nehrwan to Niba’aie area, about 65 km north of Baghdad. The new location is environmentally safe for use for 10 to 15 years and has already opened areas that allow for better landfill operations and increased capacity to accommodate all solid waste collected from the capital. As of the writing of this report, 3,000 tons of solid waste have been Baghdad workers at the new Niba’aie landfill location transferred to the new location. Amidst Iraq’s complexity and challenging operational context, IGPA/Takamul has strong entry points upon which to capitalize and advance activities. Given the public pressure mounting on the GOI and PGs for a better service delivery, government officials and institutions should be more receptive to cooperate and coordinate with IGPA/Takamul’s programming requirements. This will in turn facilitate better and more agile implementation. In addition, analyzing citizens’ demands, IGPA/Takamul’s four objectives correspond to the most emerging demands. The program is focused on improved service delivery capacity for water supply and SWM, public finance management, oversight and accountability through civil society organizations (CSO), and empowered change agents, all of which encompass the core issues Iraqis are currently pressing their government to address.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 14
CONFLICT SENSITIVITY This section consists of the following two sub-sections: 1) IGPA/Takamul’s measures to incorporate Conflict Sensitivity Analysis (CSA) into its activity design and implementation; and 2) a brief overview of the nature and developments of the conflict context in Iraqi during the reporting period.
Conflict Sensitivity and IGPA/Takamul Programming
IGPA/Takamul’s CSA and Implementation Strategy was approved on January 23, 2018. Since then, the project has continued to streamline the notion of acting with a conflict-sensitive lens, i.e. mainstreaming conflict sensitivity throughout project interventions. Briefly, the CSA is “an understanding of the two-way interaction between activities and context and acting to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of intervention on conflict, within program’s mandate.”22 The CSA also entails efforts to understand the implicit and explicit conflict dynamics, the relationship between causes of conflict and implemented programs, how these factors interact with each other, and how to maximize positive impacts on mitigating conflicts while also “doing no harm” in the target area.23 IGPA/Takamul is not a conflict management project, but it does operate in a fluid conflict context. IGPA/Takamul adopted an agile implementing strategy mainstreaming the principle of “Do No Harm” throughout activity design, plan, and implementation. Thus, while IGPA/Takamul’s core activities are related to technical expertise and capacity building of the PGs, the project continues to operationalize the notion of maximizing the positive impact of its activities. IGPA/Takamul does this by expanding activities whenever possible beyond its six target provinces to Iraq’s various provinces and regions that are still suffering from protracted conflicts and disparities. For example, Iraq still faces the impact of Da’esh sleeper cells possessing the capability to wage terrorist attacks; rapid conflict escalation, targeting various communities; the shallow nature of GOI’s national reconciliation efforts; and conflicts’ variability in nature, intensity, history, and possible future solutions from one province to another. To transform these abstract notions into practical implementation, the program developed a framework to track and respond to conflict sensitivity indicators. This begins with the project’s unified format for activity scopes of work (SOW) through which IGPA/Takamul’s technical teams build in practical measures to include CSA considerations in IGPA/Takamul’s programming. The CSA considerations have been developed to cover the rest of activity phases through an in-house integration process among the following three related units: Political Economy Analysis (PEA), Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E), and Communications. The triangle of PEA/M&E/Communications provides comprehensive and collaborative inputs throughout activity planning and implementation, in addition to inputs on activity design. PEA analyzes the nature of
22 https://www.sida.se/globalassets/sida/eng/partners/peace-and-conflict-tool- box/s209461_tool_defining_key_concepts_c2-3.pdf 23 David Keen, “When ‘Do No Harm’ Hurts,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/opinion/when- fear-impedes-aid.html (November 6, 2013).
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 15
the activity by developing specific measures that address certain conflict sensitive aspects. M&E tracks activity implementation to ensure all conflict sensitivity measures are effectively streamlined. Communications follows activity results to develop success stories, highlighting its impact using various social media platforms. Programming Example Objective Three Activity 3.2.1, development of oversight mechanisms for key service delivery targets by Social Accountability Groups (SAG) including youth (YAG), women (WAG), and vulnerable populations (VP) provides a clear example of an operationalized CSA strategy throughout activity phases, including the activity design and implementation. In addition to direct capacity building output of forming SAGs in two pilot provinces, Babil and Basrah, which together comprise up to 30 members, the SAG activity also consists of forming three additional groups: WAG, YAG, and VP. In Basrah, the activity succeeded in giving voice to Christians demands for better service delivery in PCs and PGs decision making and execution of service delivery projects. The intervention included the selection and training of SAGs members to oversee, monitor, and advocate for better water and solid waste management service delivery. In Basrah, the activity focused on the Christian minority, all 350 remaining Christian families.24 Prior to the SAG activity, the Christian families were marginalized politically, economically, and socially, with the ongoing targeting of Christians in particular, and the other religious minorities in general. This hostile context created a passive community prevented from developing safe venues to advocate for their political, social, and governance rights. Essentially, IGPA/Takamul’s SAG activity has engaged the Christian leaders (eg. Priest Aram Pano of al-Samiri al-Salih Church) to lead service delivery monitoring campaigns and advocate for better service delivery. This engagement was successful in terms of securing PGs response to their demands, and finally they were able to have a sustainable mechanism to advance their issues to their local government. This, in turn, resulted in empowering the Christians in Basrah and now the activity has become a raw model for other minorities to follow, using the Christians’ example. Accordingly, the Christian leaders were approached by the Mandaean religious leaders, who were skeptical at the activity’s beginning of the feasibility of advancing their demands with the PGs, to activate a similar SAG group. IGPA/Takamul plans to establish similar SAG communication mechanisms with Basrah PG for the Mandaeans and other minorities. Now that the Christian SAG has succeeded, other minorities want to replicate the same success for their communities. The SAG activity also showcases IGPA/Takamul’s inter-objective integration approach combining Objectives One, Three, and the cross-cutting component of Equality and Inclusion. Objective One Activity 1.1.1. provides another clear example of an operationalized CSA strategy throughout activity phases, including the activity design and implementation. In addition to its direct capacity building output of forming a joint committee between the Baghdad Amanat and PG, the implementation of Activity 1.1.1 yielded an important conflict mitigation impact in the suburbs of Baghdad.
24 The population of the Christian minority was about 15 thousand families only 30 years ago. Source: activity preliminary assessment.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 16
IGPA/Takamul’s Baghdad PG and Amanat joint committee facilitated negotiations between the two bureaucracies to implement a water supply project for seven villages located in the suburbs of Baghdad, otherwise known as the Baghdad Belt. The area used to create security concerns and threaten the stability of Baghdad, due to its heavy exploitation by the Sunni insurgency, al- Qaeda, Da’esh, and later the PMFs/Hashed militias, especially Ase’b Ahl-Haq. Given the continuous military operations and clashes, villagers were deprived of drinking water access. IGPA/Takamul’s Baghdad PG and Amanat joint committee decided to have the Baghdad PG build a network of pipeline to link to Baghdad’s Amanat water supply system in the nearby area, and the Baghdad Amanat agreed to turn on its water pumps. The project benefited about 2,000 people in seven villages25 across the Baghdad Belt. The impact of this technical activity that focuses on facilitating structural coordination and jurisdiction has expanded to affect the daily lives of the villagers (a Sunni majority). This further stabilized the area and mitigated citizen feelings of neglect and marginalization by the Shia PG.
Major Conflict Dynamics and Drivers
Iraq still suffers from the same conflict dynamics that jeopardized its political process, governance policies, and social development throughout much of 2018. As a fragile state, Iraq’s main challenges are Da’esh sleeper cells, political fragmentation, electoral fraud, protracted conflicts’ impact on service delivery, and tribal conflicts. Da’esh Sleeper Cells Da’esh remains capable of implementing ad-hoc terrorist attacks, mainly in the difficult terrain between Kirkuk, Diyala, and Salah al-Din. A key example is Da’esh’s terrorist campaign of kidnapping and killing civilians taken hostage while traveling between Baghdad and Kirkuk. This was followed by intentional attacks on electrical lines between Kirkuk and Hawija, further exacerbating the electricity shortage. The terrorist campaign revived the notion that the liberation is not complete and Da’esh is still capable of executing atrocities against Iraqi civilians. The Da’esh also provided an opportunity for the KRG, PMFs/Hashed, and GOI to advocate for more troops and military forces in the area. This is likely to instigate further conflicts with the increased chance of friction between these different military groups. The KRG asserts that the recent security deterioration in Kirkuk is due to the absence of the Peshmerga and Asayesh (the Kurdish intelligence apparatus). Hence, the Ministry of Peshmerga announced that it reached an agreement with the International Coalition to review the security plans for Kirkuk. The GOI, in turn, claims a need for sending more Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and announced a wide military operation in the problematic areas of Kirkuk, Diyala, and Salah al-Din. Political Fragmentation, Electoral Fraud, and Violence A mismanaged election process, deep political fragmentation and highly polarized political constituencies have instigated conflicts that risk jeopardizing Iraq’s security and political stability. Throughout the reporting period, several large-scale fires occurred at IHEC’s warehouses where ballot boxes, papers, and biometric devices were stored. One of the biggest incidents
25 The seven villages that benefited were: Albu Daraj, KaserBohi, Atraf Sha’ora, Um Jedar, Ammar ben Yaser, AlMara, and AlMa’amel.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 17
was in Resafa, where 40 percent of Baghdad electoral vote was stored. Official reports maintained that the fire only affected the biometric devices and not the ballot papers. A similar incident occurred in Kirkuk as well. In addition to attacks against IHEC’s warehouses, the reporting period also witnessed attacks and explosions in militias’ weapon warehouse. This included a series of explosions hitting major weapon warehouses of Sadr’s militias Saraya al-Salam in Baghdad, PMFs/Hashed militias in Najaf, and Peshmerga in the KRG’s three provinces of Sulaimaniya, Dahuk, and Erbil. Protracted Conflicts and Service Delivery Politically, Iraq suffers from structural and institutional weaknesses, corruption, unstable political arrangements, and deeply fragmented political parties. Socially, Iraq is like the rest of the Middle East with high proportions of youth under the age of 24 (61.7 percent of the total population),26 which runs concurrent to high unemployment and women’s marginalization, creating high youth dependency rates.27 Economically, the decades-long uninterrupted cycles of conflicts have affected state resilience. Volatile oil prices and staggering demographic problems have contributed to enormous fiscal pressures, deficits, spending demands, and loss of revenue.28 The political dynamic of mismanaged national elections also consolidated the political transformation of militias. Through deficient elections law and subsequent regulations of party and list registration, the militias’ parties have been legalized and entered the political context as parties, transferring the militias to an entity with two proxies, militant and political/legislature. These militias are actively operating throughout Iraq and succeeded in winning a considerable number of seats during the National Elections of May 2018. Regional instability, such as the ongoing Syrian crisis, spilled into Iraq, creating further domestic insecurity. The trans-border religious allegiance of some of the PMFs/Hashed and Iranian backed factions within the PMFs adds to this regional instability. These Iranian backed factions announced their religious allegiance to the Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei instead of the Shia jurisprudence in Iraq Ayatollah Sistani. These complex and protracted conflicts, regional proxy wars, and transnational allegiances are further compounded by Iraq’s ineffective governance and fiscal policies to address its dire need to increase job opportunities and better services. These conflict drivers and grievances have widely increased among Iraqis, culminating in a broken social contract between the government and its citizenry.
26 Jack A. Goldstone., Eric P. Kaufmann, and Monica Duffy Toft, Political Demography: How population changes are reshaping international security and national politics (Oxford University Press, 2012), 27. Graham E. Fuller, "The youth crisis in Middle Eastern society," Institute of Social Policy and Understanding, http://www.youthmetro.org/uploads/4/7/6/5/47654969/youth_crisis_in_middle_east.pdf, (2004). UNDP, “Iraq Profile,” http://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/countryinfo.html 27 Gavin W. Jones, "Where are all the jobs? Capturing the demographic dividend in Islamic countries," in Population Dynamics in Muslim Countries (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012), http://elibrary.worldbank.org.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-1-4648-1016-9 , 36. 28 The World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects, January 2017: Weak investment in uncertain times,” (2017), 131- 137.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 18
Tribal Conflicts Tribal conflicts continued to be the main source of destabilization in Iraq’s southern29 and central30 provinces this quarter. The main type of tribal conflict was the conflict between tribes and the government over power and resources especially in the areas near the oil fields in Basrah. The second type was intra-tribal conflicts over control of irrigation sources, land, and smuggling/trade routes in Najaf, Basrah, Maysan, and Wasit. The recent severe water shortage caused by the Turkish decision to fill the Iliso dam on the Tigris river, and the Iranian decision to decrease water supply to Tigris and Shatt al-Arab revived tribal and social conflicts in the southern provinces, especially between Najaf and Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Qadisiya. The latter three provinces accuse Najaf of pressuring the GOI to increase irrigation shares to rice farms at the expense of southern provinces. Further, they claim that these southern rice farms have no economic benefit except to elite families who are viewed as remnants of the feudal system. Najaf, on the other hand, accuses the other three provinces of wasting water by filling the basins of the Marshes at the expense of the more profitable agriculture lands. Among other factors in the tribal conflict are the pro-Iranian militias, who imitate Hezbollah’s model of self-sustained financial resources. These militias have facilitated the smuggling of Iranian-made drugs including Krystal (the local name for methamphetamine) in the south. This, in turn, feeds into the tribal conflicts by creating competition and competing loyalties to the militias responsible for the lucrative trade.
29 The southern provinces affected were: Wasit, Basrah, Maysan, and Qadisiya. 30 The central provinces affected were: Diyala and Anbar.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 19
CHAPTER II: PROJECT PROGRESS By of the end of Q3, the project completed three work plan activities and had 31 activities underway, in addition to crosscutting work to strengthen project relationships with stakeholders and implementing partners. The following sections detail specific project progress under IGPA/Takamul’s four objectives, as well as cross-cutting efforts. The activities are categorized under the work plan’s intended Results per Objective.
OBJECTIVE ONE: ENHANCE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITY
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 20
Objective One’s Service Delivery Year One and Year 2 Workplan consists of 24 activities. Of these, two have been completed, 12 are in progress, and three will commence implementation in the next quarter. Result One: Improve Service Delivery Outcomes in Sectors with High Impact/Visibility
1.1.1 Initiation of coordination and cooperation between the Baghdad PG and the Baghdad Amanat, especially in the delivery of water supply and waste management services A strong administrative disconnect has always existed between the Baghdad Amanat (Mayoralty) and the Baghdad PG, which has negatively impacted effective service delivery to Baghdad citizens. This disconnect came because of the two entities having separate budgets and different reporting structures. To improve service delivery, IGPA/Takamul improved and in some cases created areas of cooperation and coordination between the two on joint planning and sector integration delivery, particularly in areas where service delivery overlaps. The impact of this activity will ensure that funding and efforts are not wasted but rather coordinated towards more robust service delivery in Baghdad. During this quarter, the Baghdad Amanat and PG joint committee and its secretariat, both formed as a result of ongoing IGPA/Takamul support, continued to identify and solve various service delivery issues. Most notably, the Committee successfully connected seven villages without access to water in Baghdad PG’s jurisdiction to the Amanat main water pipeline. The Committee also relocated a Baghdad Amanat landfill in al-Nahrawan residential area of Baghdad province that was causing health and environmental problems. The landfill was moved to a safer and more environmentally sound area in al-Nebaie (Baghdad province). The landfill is now receiving trash from the al-Resafa area and has the capacity to take all trash generated from Baghdad province. All of these improvements involve movements of services across administrative boundaries and have never occurred before. The Committee is working on other service delivery improvements, which will be reported in the next quarter. 1.1.3 Establishment of provincial Performance Evaluation Department (PED) Under Iraq’s previous centralized system, the GO did not have any oversight authority over service delivery as everything was managed by relevant ministries in Baghdad. After decentralization, the PM approved a new GO organization structure, which included the establishment of the PED. IGPA/Takamul is working to operationalize the PED, so that it can serve as the GO’s oversight HCCPSec PED TWG orientation session (May 29) mechanism. The PED will gauge the
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 21
provision and quality of decentralized services and will report and follow-up on any performance issues to the GO. Doing so will ensure that action is taken by the GO, thereby significantly improving service delivery at the provincial level. During the last quarter, IGPA/Takamul hired three STTAs in the fields of service delivery, legal and organizational development to start working with five pilot provinces to develop the PED structure. The five pilot provinces are as follows: Najaf, Wasit, Baghdad, Basrah, and Babil. These provinces were chosen in coordination with HCCPSec based on factors such as high levels of political stability (at the time of selection), political will, and political influence. The STTAs began working with the pilot provinces to develop functional descriptions, staffing patterns, and job descriptions for PED staff. The STTAs were oriented on the Organization Analysis and Design (OAD) method, which was used to develop the PED structure. Once developed, the PED model will be shared with remaining provinces in Iraq. 1.1.6 Review and improvement of provincial procurement system especially aspects related to water supply and solid waste management This reporting period, IGPA/Takamul began implementation of Activity 1.1.6 to develop PG capacity to manage and deliver decentralized services. An antiquated procurement regime has been identified as one of the most important causes of poor service delivery as government contracts take too long to tender and are subject to corruption. In addition, because of the complexity of the system, typically only very large companies had the ability to bid in accordance with the regulations. This intervention has the potential to significantly reform the MoP’s procurement process. Working with the MoP, IGPA/Takamul developed standard bidding documents (SBD) for small and medium projects as well as new procurement processes for the central and provincial levels. This intervention will make it easier for small and medium sized businesses to participate in the bidding process and help to reinvigorate the Iraqi economy. PG and private sector staff were also trained on how to use these bidding documents in a manner consistent with federal guidelines and improve communications between federal and provincial procurement officials through Assessment of procurement system with DGGC staff (April 23- 24) joint workshops and other meetings. IGPA/Takamul worked to increase the capacity of provincial procurement staff and the MoP Directorate General of Government Contracts (DGGC) to successfully implement the procurement system. The project then obtained approval from the MoP’s Director General (DG) of the DGGC to implement the activity. To begin, IGPA/Takamul formed teams of DGGC and IGPA/Takamul staff, who conducted comprehensive assessments of the current procurement system. This included reviewing procurement related rules and regulations as well as identifying weaknesses of the existing procurement procedures in Baghdad, Anbar, Babil, and Basrah. Following their review, the teams developed action plans for each province whose implementation will enable the provinces to better manage and implement the new
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 22
procurement processes. This in turn allows the PG to better implement contracts and provide better services to its citizens. IGPA/Takamul will hold workshops in Baghdad, Basrah and Babil for the provincial procurement staff in early Q4 and will focus on improving the acquisition of services offered to citizens. The team will conduct a thorough review of the SBD with the PG staff. The workshop in Basrah will specifically tackle the procurement of trash collection services. Also, this quarter IGPA/Takamul supported the MoP’s DGGC in reviewing the specialized SBDs used to procure specific items or services for different government entities such as the purchase of education materials or medical supplies. The DGGC formed six teams of DGGC and IGPA/Takamul staff to improve the current documents which, in their current format, do not reflect the actual needs of DGGC. This quarter also covered the team’s review and modification of all twenty general conditions (instructions) for the SBD. Furthermore, the project obtained approval to open a procurement team office at the MoP to assist DGGC staff to achieve better results in assessing and improving the procurement systems and SBD procedures especially by reducing processing times. The IGPA/Takamul procurement office will open at the MoP in Q4. IGPA/Takamul also provided on-the-job support to the MoP’s procurement help desk, which addresses requests received from citizens, private entities, and non- governmental institutions. As a result, the DGGC became more efficient and productive. This on-the-job support will continue to strengthen the capacity of the MoP procurement help desk on the job training continues MoP to respond to both official and citizens’ (May) requests. 1.1.7 Service delivery process improvement / reengineering for water supply and solid waste management In Q1, IGPA/Takamul initially began its service delivery improvement interventions by assessing and streamlining services (referred to as business process re-engineering, or BPR) offered to citizens in the provinces of Baghdad, Wasit, and Qadisiya. In the past quarter, the project has narrowed its support to the target services of water supply and SWM. Within these services, IGPA/Takamul is focusing on water subscription services related to water supplies and the trash collection (phase 1) of waste management services. To maintain sustained implementation of these streamlined processes, IGPA/Takamul will work to mobilize citizens as monitors. The following is a short description of the project’s interventions in each target province. • Erbil: The project secured necessary approvals for replicating the BPR process from the Erbil Governor and DG of Water and Sewage in the Ministry of Municipalities and Tourism. Work will commence to streamline the selected processes early next quarter.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 23
• Basrah: In Zubeir, IGPA/Takamul again created a BPR team to re-configure the process of trash collection. Throughout the reporting period, the project worked closely with the BPR team by providing technical support. The BPR team is in the final stages of designing their streamlined proposal. Once finalized, the new process will be officially submitted to Zubeir Municipality as an application, approved, and then implemented. In Q4, IGPA/Takamul will follow up with the BPR team to ensure that the approved processes are implemented.
• Anbar: On April 18, 2018, IGPA/Takamul hosted focus group sessions for the Anbar water and municipality directorates, forming BPR teams for each directorate. The BPR teams then developed streamlined processes. The water directorate BPR team submitted a proposal for a water subscription service to Ramadi. The approved system now allows applicants to submit their applications remotely, reducing the processing time from three days to one hour. Increased application approval speeds correlates to a decrease in associate government costs, which also makes for more satisfied Anbar citizens. The municipality directorate BPR team, which is responsible for SWM, concluded that Ramadi needs 45 additional trash compressors31 to implement their proposed streamlined service.
• Babil: IGPA/Takamul shared the BPR model with the Babil Technical Deputy Governor, who in turn created a committee. IGPA/Takamul introduced the committee to the BPR concept on May 24, 2018, and the committee began working on their own proposals. This resulted in the creation of a three-week action plan to develop, submit, and obtain approval for their proposed streamlined processes.
Also during this quarter, the project followed up on its previous efforts in streamlining services in Baghdad, Wasit, and Qadisiya. The results from these follow-up interventions are detailed below. • Baghdad: In addition to the estimated 5,892 new Baghdad beneficiaries of trash collection services reported on in the al-Mansiyai success story, 14 neighborhoods are now receiving trash collection services as a result of streamlined processes. Similarly, al-Hurriya village in al-Madi’en District witnessed an improvement in the water subscription service with 20,000 new citizens gaining access to water. • Wasit: Streamlining processes at two of Wasit’s directorates - Directorate of Youth and Sports (DoYS) and Directorate of Agriculture (DoA) - resulted in increased revenues, which enabled the directorates to provide better services to its citizens. IGPA/Takamul improved the investment enabling environment in Wasit through its work with the DoYS to reduce the time and cost of the rental process for multi-purpose spaces typically used for sports or community events. By streamlining the process, IGPA/Takamul decreased rental processing time from 66 to 20 days, reducing the processing cost for investors by 66 percent. Wasit now has improved capacity for local investment and witnessed an increase in
31 Ramadi currently only has 35 trash compressors. The municipality will include the additional required trash compressors in the 2019 budget.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 24
average monthly submitted applications from seven to 25 after implementation of the improved process. The increase in revenue enabled the DoYS to rehabilitate the directorate, buy essential equipment, and streamline other processes such as gym licenses for sports centers. Similarly, IGPA/Takamul improved the business environment for Wasit farmers. The project reduced the time and cost for renting agricultural land through the DoA by decentralizing the simplified application procedure, enabling applicants to apply at the district and sub-district levels. This reduced the application timeline from 66 to 15 days and cut associated costs in half. As a result, the DoA witnessed a 70 percent increase in revenue generation from service fees and rental costs, with a monthly average of 60 applications, compared to 20 applications before IGPA/Takamul’s intervention. • Qadisiya: IGPA/Takamul improved Wasit farmers applying for use of farmlands through the new municipal trash collection processes by streamlined process (June) streamlining the process of obtaining equipment purchase approvals from the Ministry of Industry. The new streamlined trash collection decreased the time and effort needed to proceed with equipment purchases. The Municipality was therefore able to purchase and distribute 630 new trash containers in Q3. Through IGPA/Takamul efforts, the reengineered trash collection process reduced the steps needed from nine to five steps, thus upgrading the waste management service currently offered to Qadisiya’s 100,000 citizens. Following this success, the Qadisiya Governor decided to replicate the streamlined trash collection service in all its neighborhoods to ensure that all Qadisiya Municipality distributing new trash containers throughout cities receive the improved service. the province
Implementation of round two of this activity to cover additional functions in SWM and water supply will commence during the next quarter. IGPA/Takamul will provide a list of the functions
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 25
to be streamlined and improved at the onset of the next quarter for the project approval and implementation. 1.1.8 Revitalization of the Provincial Planning and Development Councils (PPDC) In Q3, IGPA/Takamul started to identify candidates for implementing Activity 1.1.8, which aims to revive the role of PPDCs as advisory entities for local governments (both the executive and legislative branches). The activity will build PPDCs’ capacity in the areas of governance, planning, and decision making so that they can assume the roles assigned to them efficiently and improve the service delivery with high impact and visibility. This includes, among other things, establishing a secretary that provides administrative and logistical support to the council as needed. IGPA/Takamul will select one or more provinces to perform an analysis of PPDCs. The selection will be based on criteria that considers whether the province can be meaningfully used as a model for other provinces, using lessons learned in the pilot province for the activity roll- out phase to other provinces. The pilot province(s) will also be selected based on political will to cooperate and implement recommendations to reform its council. Result Two: Strengthen Strategic Approach of Line Ministries and PCS to Better Align Service Delivery Outcomes with Local Government and Citizen Priorities
1.2.1 Development of organizational design for PED unit under the Higher Commission for Coordinating among Provinces Secretariat (HCCPSec) HCCPSec requested IGPA/Takamul operationalize its newly formed PED by developing a needs-based organizational structure with a clear staffing plan and job descriptions. During the last quarter, the project hired qualified STTAs for this purpose. The STTAs worked with HCCPSec to form a TWG, oriented the TWG members on the OAD method, and worked with the group to define the mission statement and organizational key outputs. The guiding documents were later approved by the HCCPSec Chairman. In Q4, IGPA/Takamul will develop the organizational functions chart by identifying activities that relate to each key output. 1.2.3 Development of governorate operation manual Under Activity 1.2.3, IGPA/Takamul will review and update the provincial operation manual, which provides detailed descriptions of service- delivery operations implemented by the provinces. During this quarter, IGPA/Takamul team met with the HCCPSec Chairman to present the outline of the governorate operation manual. The manual will serve as a reference to familiarize senior local government officials with governorates’ operations. The HCCPSec Chairman approved the outline of the IGPA/Takamul staff present the operation manual outline operation manual and proposed next steps. to HCCPSec Chairman
1.2.5 Development of a unified PC organizational structure
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 26
The current PC organizational structure is poorly defined, with no uniform structure across provinces and added confusion resulting from Law 21’s Third Amendment reduction of PC members and, accordingly, downsizing of PC committees. HCCPSec requested IGPA/Takamul assist in developing unified structures for the PC to ensure consistency in structure, increase PC’s functional efficiency, and facilitate funding of PC activities from the Ministry of Finance (MoF). During the last quarter, IGPA/Takamul hired two STTAs specialized in administrative law and finance. The selected provinces of Qadisiya, Najaf, Diyala, Basrah, Baghdad, and Babil served as pilot provinces where unified PC structures will be developed and later shared with remaining provinces. TWGs were established in each of the pilot provinces and oriented on the OAD method. IGPA/Takamul worked with the TWGs to develop the PC mission statement and organization key outputs, which were submitted to and approved by HCCPSec. All six pilot provinces publicized IGPA/Takamul’s assistance in this regard on the social media outlets.32 Result Three: Enhance Regulatory and Procedural Predictability to Attract Private Sector Investment
In Q3, IGPA/Takamul began preparation for implementation of Activity 1.3.1, conduct a national and regional conferences PPP laws, regulations, and potential projects, and Activity 1.3.2, preparation of a case study of a PPP project. These activities aim to increase awareness among provinces and the private sector in Iraq about the use of PPP as an alternative vehicle for financing and service delivery implementation. These activities also seek to identify specific projects that can utilize this mechanism and attract private sector investments to participate in financing projects through different PPP mechanisms. IGPA/Takamul will assess the status of PPP regulatory framework in Iraq and will present the findings and recommendations to relevant stakeholders on the reforms needed to better utilize PPPs to improve service delivery. Result Four: Enhance Targeting of Capital Investment Spending in Service Delivery Sectors that Serve Vulnerable and Disadvantaged Populations
1.4.1 Improvement of GOI's ability to identify and report on the needs of women and girls for water and sanitation services In Q3, the Equality and Inclusion (E&I) team conducted a rapid assessment of existing data sources and identified additional data collection needs with relation to gender. The team found that the MoP data collection efforts include a reasonable level of disaggregation by gender, but the ability of PG gender units to collect data to inform programming is poor. The capacity assessment of the Provincial Women’s Empowerment Departments (PWED) discussed below in Activity 1.4.3 revealed that the PWED’s reporting capacity is limited to activity reports. Further, very few units have the staffing capacity to collect reliable or accurate data. It is anticipated that the PWED’s ability to gather and collect data will require the addition of qualified staff and additional training. The organizational restructure recommendations for the PWEDs (see Activity 1.4.3) will include recommendations for staffing to support this data
32 https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1720313688060616&id=489390377819626 https://www.facebook.com/ayadmay
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 27
collection function. The E&I team will work with the pilot governates beginning next quarter to adopt these recommendations and begin providing more robust training for PWED staff. The E&I team postponed the development of work planning with the PWEDs and selection of programmatic indicators until the approval of the new PWED structure and the Iraq National Action Plan (INAP) indicators to avoid duplication. 1.4.2 Support to GOI's ability to develop annual INAP report Also in Q3, the E&I team launched a new activity to support the development of the next iteration of the INAP for UNSC Resolution 1325 for 2019-2022. At the request of the Iraqi Cross Sector Task Force for INAP, and in close collaboration with UN Women and Canadian Implementing Partner Aktis Strategy, the E&I team is organizing national and provincial workshops for women in government and civil society to come together and discuss the needs of women in their governate. These workshops will take place starting in Q4. The outcomes of the meetings will be compiled into a report that will inform the development of the next iteration of INAP for Gender. In June, IGPA/Takamul hired a team of technical advisor and four facilitators who will conduct the workshops, which will begin in July and will include women from all 18 provinces and at least one IDP camp. 1.4.3 Development of diversity and inclusion toolkits to guide gender mainstreaming across all activities In Q3, the E&I team completed the capacity assessment of provincial women’s departments and staff in Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basrah, Karbala, Kirkuk, Maysan, Muthanna, and Qadisiya. Staff capabilities was rated on a scale ranging from 0 to 4. The scale scores were: 4 = Outstanding; 3= Good; 2= Acceptable; 1= Needs Improvement; and 0= Unqualified. Total scores for provincial PWED staff capabilities and qualifications were significantly low, indicating “needs improvement” or “unqualified.” Out of a possible total of 20 points, PWED scores ranged between 0 and 5. None of the PWEDs scored higher than 2 (Acceptable) on one or two staff capability areas and the majority of PWEDs scored 1 (Needs Improvement) or 0 (Unqualified) for most areas. These results are currently being discussed with HCCPSec and the Women’s Empowerment Department (WED), and will inform upcoming capacity development programming for the PWEDs. In June, a senior gender STTA began to develop recommendations for an organizational restructure of the PWEDs. This involves facilitating a fully collaborative design process that includes the HCCP, COMSEC, WED, and the PWEDs to ensure buy-in from key decision- makers. Recommendations will be presented to the GOI in July and will include a suggested mission statement, organization chart, job descriptions, department scope of work, responsibilities, guidelines for collaboration; and reporting requirements. The E&I team anticipates working with the HCCP and governors to rapidly roll-out the new structure in select pilot provinces beginning in the next quarter. The units will provide important assistance across local government to ensure that services are designed for, and reach, women and girls. Following meetings with the KRG PM and the Governor of Erbil in May 2018, the Governor of Erbil agreed to issue a formal order to establish a PWED, which will be issued early Q4. This is the first provincial gender unit in the Kurdish Regional Government. IGPA/Takamul is working with the Governor of Sulaimaniya to help establish a PWED in his province. He is expected to issue a similar order in the next quarter. The E&I team will coordinate with both Governors in
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 28
the coming quarter to build structures in line with the E&I team’s recommendations and provide capacity building assistance to the new established units
OBJECTIVE TWO: IMPROVE GOVERNORATE AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Objective Two’s Public Financial Management (PFM) Year One and Year 2 Workplan consists of 38 activities. Of these, one has been completed, 12 are in progress, and seven will commence implementation in the next quarter.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 29
Result One: Strengthen capacities of Administrative and Financial Affairs Directorates (AFAD)
2.1.2 Roll-out of AFAD training on decentralized financial management system using Excel IGPA/Takamul continued training AFADs and newly decentralized directorates, building their capacity in order for them to meet MoF reporting and financing requirements. The project team designed formal and on-the-job training programs. IGPA/Takamul trained 58 participants from the project’s six target provinces as well as from other provinces, including Karbala, Najaf, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Muthanna, Qadisiya, Wasit, Salah al-Din, and Maysan. The team engaged MoF in most of the formal trainings through several Najaf AFAD training (June 3) methods. First, IGPA/Takamul is in continuous contact with MoF to obtain their feedback on the training programs and technical assistance (TA) priorities for provinces based on the feedback they receive from provinces and the quality of the monthly financial reports. Secondly, the team asked MoF to send subject matter experts in the training topics who serve as co-trainers and enrich the training content and interaction. . Some of these training programs were highlighted in local radio, TV stations, and social media.33 AFAD trainees work on provincial financial management practices The assessment focused on identifying training needs for employees responsible for budgeting, accounting, and financial management functions within AFADs and decentralized directorates. The assessment team met with MoF to discuss the preliminary results and to obtain MoF perspective on training needs for provinces based on the ministry’s experience with AFADs monthly reports and shortfalls. Training needs include operational and investment budget preparation, internal audit,
33 https://web.facebook.com/salahiattheqar/posts/220483118684423
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 30
accounting system and Excel. The project is developing 12-month capacity building training plans for all AFADs in Iraq, with specific training plans the project’s target provinces of Baghdad, Babil, Basrah, and Anbar.34 The training plan for Ninewa will be developed following the appointment of the new AFAD Director. The training plan for Baghdad was launched on June 28.
2.1.3 Review of the legal basis for the creation of AFAD This quarter, IGPA/Takamul met with AFAD directors, lawyers and GoI officials to better understand the legal obstacles preventing the MoF from fully recognizing the AFAD as the primary institution responsible for provincial finances. As part of this process, IGPA/Takamul sought to first understand the relevant laws. To do so, the project hired legal advisors to undertake a legal review and make recommendations for restructuring the AFADs into fully functional financial management institutions. The aim of the legal review is to ensure that AFADs have the legal backing to fulfill their responsibilities such as managing local revenues and internal audits. IGPA/Takamul also reviewed the draft financial management law, which was drafted by the Canadian Institute on Governance (IOG) and submitted to Parliament. 2.1.5 AFAD organizational analysis and re-design In Q3, the IGPA/Takamul held numerous meetings and discussions with AFADs, HCCPSec, and MoF on AFAD organizational structure analysis and re-design. The AFAD re-design will ensure that AFAD will have a clear mandate from MoF and HCCPSec to take full responsibility for financial tasks such as revenue generation, budgeting, financial reporting, internal audit and cash management. Based on the legal review in Activity 2.1.4, IGPA/Takamul will create a new organizational structure for AFAD that will include all the added functions such as internal audit, fixed assets management, and legal services; a clear job description; and Standard Operating Procedures. In Q3, several AFADs expressed concern that the current structure does not satisfy the needs for their provinces and does not keep up with the increasing responsibilities and delegation of fiscal authority from MoF. IGPA/Takamul is in the process of hiring an organizational Assessment team verifying the initial results with MoF and development advisor to start the organizational obtaining feedback on AFAD training needs based on their experience with the quality and issues with financial reports. analysis and re-design work. 2.1.9 Establishment of coordination mechanism between national and provincial revenue collection and budget authorities
34 The remaining IGPA/Takamul target province, Erbil, does not have an AFAD. The KRG does not have the same type of decentralized financial system like the rest of Iraq and thus does not have AFADs within the KRG.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 31
During Q2, IGPA/Takamul began coordination with MoF and the provinces to create a permanent coordination mechanism on local revenues and budgeting between local and national authorities. Ongoing assessments revealed a large communication and coordination gap between federal and provincial financial administration, especially on issues such as decentralization, transfer of authority, and local revenue. IGPA/Takamul organized several meetings with MoF and engaged in a constructive discussion with different departments on the importance of establishing a communication and coordination mechanism. From this coordination, MoF created a unit reporting directly to the Minister of Finance on coordination with provinces. The IGPA/Takamul with AFAD directors during the consultative workshop on coordination mechanisms in Babil (May 16) Deputy Minister and other senior management team at MoF supported the unit establishment. For the first time since the creation of AFADs in the provinces, IGPA/Takamul succeeded in bringing together all AFAD directors. This inaugural meeting of all AFAD directors discussed the current challenges with MoF and MoP and best ways forward in managing this complex relation between local governments and the federal government, especially concerning local revenue generation and budgeting. At the same time, IGPA/Takamul gathered key decision makers from the federal government to agree on importance of organizing and managing relationship between the two authorities on local revenues and budgets. Most notably, on June 8, IGPA/Takamul hosted a roundtable35 in Erbil for central government stakeholder to discuss coordination on local revenue and budgets between Baghdad and the provinces. Participants included key officials from the HCCPSec, MoF, MoP, and Federal Board of Supreme Audit (FBSA). The Governor of Wasit and Deputy Governor of Baghdad represented the governorates’ perspective. The roundtable discussed challenges faced by the Federal Government and local authorities related to coordinating local revenue and budgets. IGPA/Takamul presented a framework that will enable both sides to coordinate more effectively and ensure a transfer of technical knowledge from MoF/MoP to the provinces. This will result in a more transparent and effective local revenue and budget process. The roundtable came after consultation with AFAD in all provinces and key central government officials.
35 This event was prominently covered by media outlets and social media posts. Ex: Link 1, Link 2, Link 3, Link 4, Link 5, Link 6, Link 7, Link 8
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 32
In Q4, IGPA/Takamul will draft the coordination mechanisms in local revenues and budgeting between the central and provincial authorities. IGPA/Takamul will then obtain official MoF approval, and train provinces and the MoF/MoP on these procedures. Result Two: Support Development of Oversight Mechanisms (National and Provincial Level)
2.2.1 Support for planning or implementation of the planned integrated financial management information system (IFMIS) Step by step, the MoF transfers fiscal authority for a new directorate to AFAD. Accordingly, AFADs’ roles and responsibilities increase. Now, AFADs are not only required to prepare budgets and financial reports on budget execution for the GO, but also for more than ten service delivery directorates. This requires AFAD to have information systems in place that enable them to capture, process, and report vast amounts of data to MoF and other federal agencies. Most of AFAD and decentralized directorates operations are done manually or using internally developed simple Excel spreadsheets. The World Bank is working with OJT for Basrah Agriculture Directorate Accounting MoF to implement an integrated Financial Manager on using developed Excel financial reports Management Information System (IFMIS). The module (April 4) system will be piloted at MoF and two other ministries and two provinces. It remains unclear when this system will be installed and operational. As an interim solution, MoF and provinces requested IGPA/Takamul for IT solutions that will improve the timeliness, accuracy, and quality of financial reports. IGPA/Takamul in collaboration with MoF developed reporting templates using Excel to help AFADs and new decentralized directorates compile and send their monthly financial reports to MoF. The reporting templates include monthly expenditures and revenue reports, cash balances and bank reconciliation, and monthly ending balances. IGPA/Takamul trains staff from provinces across Iraq on using these financial modules and reporting templates. At the end of Q3, the team was working with MoF to track the monthly report submission. IGPA/Takamul organized and conducted several formal and OJT programs for AFAD and decentralized directorates on the use of the monthly reporting templates. In total, the project trained 58 participants on the use of these templates from Basrah, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiya, and Wasit. Result Three: Enhance Provincial Revenue Generation, Collection and Management from Outside Oil Sector
2.3.1 Support to the enactment and implementation of the Provincial Revenue Fund Law
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 33
IGPA/Takamul’s daily interaction with the provinces revealed how critical generating local revenue is for provinces. During this quarter, the team continued its efforts and discussions with AFADs, GOs, and PC members on the importance of passing legislation for local revenue generation. Local advisors on revenue generation were being identified as of the end of Q3. They will be hired during the next quarter to start work on several local revenue initiatives. Result Four: 4: Enhance Budget Cycle Planning, Development and Execution (Central and Provincial Level)
2.4.1 Support to the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to better track budget execution Due to limited human and technical capacity at MoF, provinces never received clear budget execution templates to use for their monthly reports. The World Bank is currently working with MoF and MoP to develop and implement an IFMIS. One of IFMIS’s main functions will be to track invoice payment and therefore arrears and commitments. Until MoF and the WB complete the work on IFMIS, IGPA/Takamul developed the monthly reporting templates using Excel, which are widely available and used by most AFADs and directorates. The monthly financial reporting templates were developed based on MoF requirements and best practices and after consultation with MoF. Using one template by all provinces for their monthly reports will reduce the amount of time required by provinces to compile the reports and for the MoF to review and approve the payments. When these templates were developed, IGPA/Takamul requested the MoF to identify the most common errors and mistakes in the monthly financial reports submitted by provinces. Based on MoF feedback, IGPA/Takamul developed simple financial reporting templates that are easy to understand and complete. At the same time, they automated the process of consolidating financial data from several workbooks into one master report and also the computation of opening and closing balances. The team is currently working with MoF to build a tracking system that can show progress made in budget execution. The two images on the right show samples of Basrah monthly reports to MoF before and after using IGPA/ Takamul developed reporting templates. 2.4.3 Assistance to MoP in maintaining an invoice tracking system and commitment control Until the IFMIS system is up and running, IGPA/Takamul will build an interim invoice tracking tools utilizing the current systems used by both ministries. In the case of MoP, the project will build on the Iraq Development Management System (IDMS) that is used to prepare, execute,
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 34
and monitor the investment budget, provide training and technical assistance for provinces and line ministries on using the invoice tracking functionality under IDMS. IGPA/Takamul provided technical assistance to the MoP on the system specifications and functions needed for IDMS in order for the MoP to track invoices and to have a system for commitment control. IGPA/Takamul met with the MoP team responsible for the development and management of IDMS. Together, they analyzed the system and determined additional functions and fields needed in order for the MoP to track invoice payments, arrears, and commitments. MoP included these specifications and functions in the terms of reference (TOR) for the IDMS system provider, Synergy.
IGPA/Takamul met with MoP IDMS team to assess system needs KRG IGPA/Takamul met with key stakeholders in KRG including Erbil governor, KRG Minister of Planning and his deputies, KRG PM, KRG PM advisors, KRG Deputy Prime Minister (DPM), and KRG DPM advisors. The different discussions gave the team insight on KRG-specific PFM needs and priorities. The work plan was drafted taking into consideration these priorities and discussions. As part of developing 12-months training plan, the team started the training needs assessment for Erbil governorate, MoP and MoF. Implementation will start next quarter. IGPA/Takamul plans to engage other KRG provinces in the trainings.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 35
OBJECTIVE THREE: STRENGTHEN MONITORING AND OVERSIGHT OF SERVICE DELIVERY AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
Objective Three’s Oversight and Accountability Year One and Year 2 Workplan consists of 18 activities. Six are in progress, and two will commence implementation in the next quarter.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 36
Result One: Strengthen the Capacity of Selected Provincial Institutions to Establish Effective Citizen Participation and Outreach Mechanisms
3.1.1 Development of provincial communication and public outreach strategies With the transfer of certain powers to the provinces under decentralization, PGs have an accompanying responsibility to their citizens both to manage service delivery and to offer information on government services in a transparent and accountable manner. PGs have little experience or organizational capacity to carry out consistent and clear communication with their constituents. This activity therefore assists each target PG in formulating and documenting a communication and public outreach strategy. The activity builds the capacity of concerned PG agencies and officials to implement, monitor and evaluate, and update their communication and public outreach strategy. This will enable citizens to better access information from their local government and more easily engage government entities. During Q3, the Oversight and Accountability (O&A) team completed communications and public outreach action plans in four provinces: Basrah, Baghdad, Babil, and Anbar. Also in Q3, IGPA/Takamul conducted trainings, focus group discussions, and workshops, working with PG TWGs to develop and implement these communication and public outreach action plans in five governorates: Babil, Baghdad, Basrah, Anbar, and Erbil. TWGs in Babil and Basrah began implementing these communication action plans they concluded with IGPA/Takamul’s technical support provided during this quarter. This included one plan for water supply and one plan for solid waste management for each province. In Q3, the project began implementing the action plans created in Basrah and Babil. The project will work with the PGs in Baghdad and Anbar to begin implementing the remaining action plans in Q4. The following provides an overview of the communication and public outreach action plan implementation in Basrah and Babil: Basrah: IGPA/Takamul and Basrah PG commenced its action plan for water with media campaigns to increase local revenue generation for the Water Directorate. The action plan also involved PG repair of damaged pipelines in several areas in Basrah, publicizing the work to show improved government responsiveness to citizen service delivery concerns. The action plan for Basrah Municipality and Municipalities directorates was implemented through media campaigns and responding to citizens’ complaints. According to Basrah PG, the number of monthly citizen complaints increased from 25 complaints before the media campaign in April to around 95 per month after the campaign launched in May. The low level of citizen complaints reflected citizens’ distrust in their government to address their concerns. The media campaigns provided Basrah citizens with information on how to file complaints and increased visibility of their responsiveness to these complaints. This is a critical step toward improving government transparency and responsiveness to citizens’ demands.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 37
As part of communication action plan, Basrah Municipality posts its response to citizen-reported accumulated waste in al- Hussein area: before, during, and after Babil: Two awareness campaigns will be conducted in early Q4. The first one will to focus on citizen satisfaction on water services in Babil. The other campaign will focus on increasing local revenue for water service delivery through awareness campaigns around paying services fees. 3.1.3 Utilization of social media as governance tool to support water supply and solid waste management service delivery PGs have not utilized the power of social media and instead still rely heavily on paper-based communication within and outside government. This activity supports local governments to utilize social media as a platform to report to citizens on the state of and improvements in service delivery, gather citizens inputs, and mobilize citizen support in achieving and sustaining improvements. This activity builds PGs and CSOs capacity to effectively utilize social media for increased transparency and accountability, including assistance in message development and communication strategies. The increased accountability ultimately will improve responsive service Social media workshop for Baghdad government officials (April 5 and 8) delivery, especially in the water supply and SWM sectors, to citizens. IGPA/ Takamul conducted several trainings on utilizing social media platforms as a governance tool. These trainings had a special focus on Facebook pages for water supply and SWM service delivery for social media staff from Baghdad, Basrah, and Ninewa GOs, water directorates, directorates of municipalities, and national CSOs based in those three governorates. PG representatives from water and municipalities directorates learned outreach skills such as: promoting campaigns, publicizing achievements, effective customer service over social media, content management, social media strategy and policy, and cross-posting between different service delivery entities’ Facebook pages. Below is the finding of the pre-post assessment conducted for the participants:
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 38
IGPA/Takamul is working closely with CSOs and PGs to enhance communication through social media. CSOs and PG in Ninewa and Basrah are following hashtags to promote for better water and SWM, sharing information on important citizen complaint hotlines within the posts. In Basrah, the complaints increased by 40 percent from May to June after the PG began publishing information on these hotlines. In Q4, IGPA/Takamul will hold a national event combining all target provinces and CSOs in one social media event to launch a national campaign on Facebook on service delivery. 3.1.6 Development of decentralization communication plan for HCCPSec Though Iraq has devolved some level of authority to the provinces, HCCPSec still faces many challenges in fully transferring functions and authority largely because of a lack of awareness and understanding of administrative decentralization concepts. This activity is working to develop a communication plan for HCCPSec that enables it to effectively engage with PGs and civil society organizations throughout the ongoing decentralization process to strengthen awareness of decentralization’s impact and functions. This awareness is critical for activating local governments and citizens’ newfound roles in the decentralized decision-making process, ensuring the accountability and improved governance that sparked decentralization process in the first place.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 39
After the successful establishment of the TWGs in Q2, IGPA/Takamul provided trainings and technical assistance workshops for Baghdad, Babil, and Basrah TWG team members, comprised of government officials from the respective provinces. This resulted in the development province-specific plans. As part of these plans, provincial TWG members started uploading decentralization related documents and preparing it for the decentralization website, which will be established as part of this activity to increase awareness of decentralization. This website will also house relevant information on decentralized functions and services, enabling citizens to more easily understand and access decentralized services. Meanwhile, preparation continued for development of a decentralization communication plan at the nation level. During this period, IGPA/Takamul coordinated with the TWGs in Baghdad, Babil, and Basrah as well as the HCCPSec to implement decentralization communication plans on the provincial level on one hand, and develop the decentralization communication plan on the national level with the HCCPSec on the other. In Q3, IGPA/Takamul established a collaboration mechanism between decentralized PG and federal government institutions and active civil society groups. This established an oversight system between Baghdad municipalities directorate and CSOs on SWM service delivery. This collaborative system allows for future sustainable joint campaign between both parties to enhance service delivery. Result Two: Enhance Public Capability and Willingness to Participate in Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating Public Services
3.2.1 Development of oversight mechanisms for key public services through Social Accountability Groups (SAG) With poor service delivery and citizen disaffection as major issues, many Iraqis are leading community initiatives and advocating for rights and improved public service delivery. IGPA/Takamul is implementing several social accountability interventions through supporting civic initiatives demanding social accountability by supporting SAGs for youth, women, and vulnerable populations, among others. IGPA/Takamul works with SAGs to build their capacity to monitor, evaluate, and report on service delivery and public expenditure performance. SAGs use this information to hold their local governments accountable for addressing issues identified by these assessments to improve service delivery. During the last quarter, the project trained SAG members in Basrah and Babil on how to conduct door to door surveys. SAG members recorded and reported numerous incidents of service delivery deficiencies to the PGs of Basrah and Babil. PGs overall responded positively to SAG reports. In Q3, the project moved to the stage of creating formalized communication and
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 40
coordination mechanisms between SAG and PG. The project developed trackers for SAG reports, which the SAGs now use to report service delivery issues and follow up on government responses. During the last quarter, the Basrah Water Directorate response was 100 percent. IGPA/Takamul built the capacity of Basrah and Babil SAG members during Basrah SAG designs service delivery surveys (May 5-6) this quarter to undertake social accountability interventions in their respective governorates. Babil and Basrah SAG were trained on survey design and conducting door-to-door service delivery surveys that aim to gauge citizens satisfaction on water and SWM service delivery. As a result, Basrah and Babil SAGs designed surveys on water supply and SWM which will be launched in July 2018. IGPA/Takamul additionally supported SAGs technically and administratively to track, monitor, and submit water and SWM service delivery cases to the Babil and Basrah PGs. These monitoring reports highlighted the service delivery problems and suggested solutions, sharing these identified issues directly with the relevant PG directorates. On the same topic, PG officials (e.g. governor assistants for municipal affairs, water and municipal general directors) were keen to coordinate with SAGs in both governorates to set a common tone for civil society service delivery monitoring and response. Hence, the PG response to SAG reports significantly improved during the past two months. Furthermore, by the support of IGPA/Takamul, Babil and Basrah SAGs coordinated with the TWGs whom work in a parallel line to develop service delivery communication strategies on the provincial level. After joint meetings between both Basrah SAG and TWG, communication improved with SAG members able to submit the reports directly through social media platforms (e.g. Facebook and WhatsApp). Four out of seven cases have been solved as a result to this coordination in Basrah. In Babil, IGPA/Takamul is planning to hold a social accountability conference, which is welcomed by the PG to launch the social accountability principle among CSOs and PG. Babil PG also agreed to implementing
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 41
reporting and response mechanisms to service delivery in Babil, as well as officially accepting social accountability interventions on the provincial level from SAGs created by IGPA/Takamul. 3.2.2 Enhancement of organizational capacity of selected CSOs to perform oversight effectively Iraqi CSOs largely still lack advanced organizational capacity or strategies. IGPA/Takamul works with selected CSOs to develop and increase their ability to engage in informed political participation, such as engaging government agencies and officials in policy dialogue and in sector specific advocacy activities to improve service provision. This activity improves selected CSOs’ institutional capacity to advocate for more transparent and accountable governmental practices, which will lead to more responsive and improved government service provision. While IGPA/Takamul worked to foster internal governance in targeted PG institutions, IGPA/Takamul also trained over 200 CSO members from six provinces (Baghdad, Babil, Ninewa, Erbil, Basrah, and Anbar) in workshops to improve CSOs organization and performance. Eight CSOs from each province attended these workshops, falling within the following categories: communication, financial management, decentralization, and oversight and monitoring. These CSOs will further build their capacity by conducting an assessment on water and SWM service delivery through a door-to-door surveys in the six provinces, supported by IGPA/Takamul. The assessment will commence as soon as feedback is received from Baghdad water directorate and Baghdad Directorate of Municipalities on the assessment forms. 3.2.6: Empowerment of CSOs to provide oversight of decentralized services CSOs have an important role in supporting the decentralization process through communicating the changes to citizens. This critical role requires intensive education of the CSOs about decentralization. IGPA/Takamul conducted workshops in Baghdad and Najaf and prepared for workshops for Babil, Wasit and Basrah (to be held early Q4), to empower these CSOs to perform oversight on decentralized services. The workshops focused on building the capacity of CSOs with the decentralization law and especially with Articles 44 and 45 in the Iraqi Constitution. The workshops highlighted the Governors’ authorities according to Law 21 and the latest authorities that were awarded to the provinces under Article 45, while also explaining the role of HCCPSec. These workshops focused as well on the practical skills of project implementation of decentralization. The workshops clarified administrative decentralization in general, in accordance with the Iraqi constitution-levels of decentralization (administrative, delegation, transfer of powers), law Provincial Power Act No. 21 of 2008 as amended by a statement of the roles and responsibilities of the governorate councils (legislative oversight) and the Governors (chief executive). This included explaining section 44 of the Governorate Act, the financial resources of the governorates, and Article 45 of the provincial law which indicates high level of
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 42
coordination between the governorates and their functions, the transfer of services and posts from eight ministries to the governorates. Vulnerable Groups Inclusion
Stakeholders of the project come from diverse backgrounds such as CSOs, PCs, GOs, HCCPSec, and voluntary groups. Despite these differences, the project largely focused equality and inclusion, whether during capacity building activities, workshops, focus groups, or social accountability interventions, hence, all projects activities reflected women participation in all activities, where women participation were no less than 25 percent of the total participants in each activity. IGPA/Takamul works closely with vulnerable populations, engaging them in civil society oversight and accountability interventions. Such interventions were noticeable in certain activities, e.g. development of oversight mechanisms for key service delivery targets by SAG including: youth (YAG), women (WAG), and vulnerable populations (VP), and enhancement of organizational capacity of selected CSOs to perform oversight effectively. The SAGs, for instance, gained local governments and citizen attention, whether PGs in Basrah and Babil, vulnerable populations started to monitor service delivery in areas of the majority to advocate for the rights of the majority. On the other hand, as IGPA/Takamul focused on equality and inclusion, two out of three solved service delivery cases have been filed and reported by women-led organizations. This gives credibility to the project’s goal in sustaining gender equality and achieve women empowerment throughout social accountability and community outreach.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 43
IGPA/Takamul has also worked to bring communities together through their joint interest in improved service delivery. Hence, IGPA/Takamul’s inclusion of Christian participation in social accountability is particularly relevant. Such initiatives include service delivery monitoring by Chaldean Priest Aram Pano in Basrah on SWM issues in SAG member Priest Aram Pano demands better service delivery for underserved Muslim communities. vulnerable Muslim populations In June, the E&I team jointly with Objective Three planned a community trash cleaning campaign as a collaborative effort with vulnerable groups in Basrah. This campaign will be implemented through a local NGO that should works with volunteer groups to ensure community participation and enhancement of social accountability of citizens towards their city. The effort marks the first time that IGPA/Takamul supports local partners and volunteer groups in services delivery. In this reporting period, the RFP has been advertised to the most effective local NGOs who will get into fair competition to be selected. The campaign will include a promotional campaign to ensure the sustainability of the campaign. The activity is designed to be a “quick win” and is anticipated to be completed by the end of August. OBJECTIVE FOUR: SUPPORT IRAQI CHANGE AGENTS Objective Four aims to support Iraqi change agents, seizing “windows of opportunity” within Iraq’s ever-changing political landscape to further the priorities of Objectives 1-3. During Q3, the project team continued to assist in the implementation of crosscutting activities that support the project’s service delivery, PFM, and oversight and accountability objectives. Objective Four works with the other project objectives to identify change agents who will catalyze and sustain improvements in service delivery, PFM, and oversight and accountability. During Q3, the project worked to develop a “Conceptual Design” for the change agents’ (CA) model at IGPA/Takamul, including the methodology of work and the support that will be extended through it to the other components of the project. The project designed a “Capacity Building” program for the CA team that is being formed, and conducted an initial training of Change Agents brainstorming session (May 24)
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 44
trainers “ToT” program for the CA team. During this quarter, the first draft of the Change Agents Conceptual Design has been developed taking into consideration integrating change agents in all of IGPA/Takamul efforts. The plan was developed after conducting several brainstorming sessions with external potential change agents and with the participation of different officials from water and municipality directorates, HCCPSec, and different NGOs. These meetings also allowed clarifying the concept of the Change Agent and its added value for the government entities and the CSOs. During the next quarter, change agents will be selected from both the public sector and CSOs. The CA Team Lead with the support of M&E has launched the CA selection process by widely sharing the online Self-Assessment Survey for potential candidates (in Google Forms). During the beginning of the next quarter, the project will finalize the conceptual design report and will propose the final capacity building program for the CA. Additionally, the training material/presentations for the ToT will be updated and submitted. Result 1: Enhance Capacity of Women and Vulnerable Populations to Represent their Needs Within Government Decision-Making Processes Task Order One IGPA/Takamul began work on its first task order on August 31, 2017 to provide public financial management technical assistance to GOI, as well as support to the Ministry of Oil (MoO) in meeting Prior Actions under the World Bank’s Development Policy Financing program. During Q3, work continued under sub-tasks one and four. Sub-task three deliverables were completed in early Q3. The project was finalizing the hiring of the sub-task two consultant as of the end of Q3. Sub-Task One Sub-task one aims to provide technical assistance to the MoF to implement an interim commitment control system until the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) is in place. The sub-task one lead will also design an improved cash management system, based on the IMF’s Technical Assistance Report in April 2017, and work with the MoF to operationalize the system. In Q3, the sub-task lead worked on the main three sub-task objectives, as follows: Objective 1: Strengthening Commitment Control The sub-task one lead advised the Accounting Department on forming a team to manage and follow up on implementing commitments controls and reporting with the Spending Units (SU). This specifically focused on updating the MoF’s guidance for collecting data on arrears, integrating this into the adjusted trial balance. MoF and the FBSA decided to launch large-scale training workshops for all SUs around Iraq to strengthen compliance with commitments and arrears, control, and reporting. MoF and FBSA have already issued a procedures letter stipulating that SUs perform an arrears survey by September 30, 2018. The workshops will include detailed training on data collections and accounting recording for both arrears and commitments.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 45
The sub-task lead participated in planning sessions for the upcoming workshops and will continue to participate in Q4 by preparing the conceptual framework of the commitments and arrears training material. Furthermore, the sub-task lead will deliver the lectures on commitments and arrears at the training workshops. The training workshops are planned to be held over eight weeks starting from July 1, 2018. The sub-task lead, with MoF’s commitment team, will work on producing the tools by which data will be collected from SUs and guide the commitment team to build the reports and integrate the data into financial statements and budget execution operations. Those tools will introduce the mobilization of commitment control reforms envisioned under this objective. Objective 2: Strengthening Cash Forecasting MoF established a Cash Forecasting Division (CFD) at the Accounting Department, as well as a Cash Management Committee (CMC) headed by the Deputy Minister of Finance. While the MoF has not yet activated the CMC, the sub-task one lead built the capacity of the CFD toward the goal of producing a three-months cash forecasting report. This report will include advice on budget execution within the expected cash constraints, and provide alternatives of dealing with excess or lack of cash liquidity. Data availability has been a limitation for achieving this goal. However, the sub-task lead worked with the CFD team to produce a draft cash plan for the year 2018 as soon the 2018 budget was approved. The MoF and GOI adopted the 2018 forecast as the official cash plan. This cash plan guides MoF in releasing budget appropriations and financing decisions. Additionally, the sub-task lead worked to produce the daily cash position of the MoF, incorporating treasury accounts at the Central Bank of Iraq. The daily cash position reports lead to cash tables of monthly forecasting on cash position and budget execution with advice to MoF management.
MoF used the monthly cash tables (forecasts) as cash plans for releasing appropriations to SUs based on recommendations associated with each month’s forecast. This allowed the MoF to reduce the frequency and volume of monthly cash releases to SUs off its appropriated budgets. CFD began producing the monthly forecasts in late March 2018. So far, CFD has produced forecasts for the months of April, May, June, and July 2018. The CFD monthly forecasts resulted in an increase in monthly budget spending from the second to third quarter, with April through June 2018 as follows: 5.8, 7.6, 8.6 trillion IQD, compared to monthly budget spending of 4.3, 4.5, and 4.3 trillion IQD in the second quarter. The MoF used to study each funding request for the SUs, down to expenditure type. Now, MoF portions total monthly budgeted appropriations of SUs, up to 100 percent for many SUs, based on MoF’s trust and acceptance of the monthly forecasts. A major outcome of the CFD work occurred in May, when the MoF decided to decline the planned 1.4 trillion IQD of bonds to pay for contractors’ arrears during the year 2018. Instead, MoF decided to settle those debts in cash, avoiding three-year bonds and five percent interest rates, in the amount of 210 billion IQD. Additionally, MoF declined to issue treasury bills to finance the unfunded budget deficit of 2.1 trillion IQD, as monthly forecasts and cash position updates by the CFD showed that it would be unnecessary borrowing for GOI, thus saving around 100 billion IQD in interest.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 46
Data collection remains a challenge for the CFD. The sub-task lead helped MoF identify data quality and coverage requirements from the Oil Marketing Company (SOMO). SOMO is a state-owned company responsible for state oil production, necessitating inclusion of their data to better inform cash forecasts. SOMO started providing a cash flow of its revenues broken down to weekly expected collections, covering the months of June, July, and part of August, separately. Work will continue with SOMO on extending the period’s coverage up to three months as needed by the CFD.
Objective 3: Payment Management through Rationalizing Payments
Rationalizing payments depends solely on IFMIS and core banking systems. While neither will be operationalized in the near future, the sub-task lead continued to work with MoF to establish a weekly-based Treasury Single Account (TSA) to form the future basis for active TSA with the capability to enhance payment management. The state-owned banks al-Rasheed and al-Rafideen started providing partial data for TSA. It is expected that the banks will soon provide more complete data to enable establishing a weekly TSA. Sub-Task Two Per USAID instructions, the project recruited and selected a candidate for this position. However, work has not yet commenced as of the end of the reporting period. Sub-Task Three Sub-task three aims to assist the GOI to design, draft, and prepare to implement a Supplementary Natural Gas Processing Contract template and attendant regulations on Natural Gas Marketing and Natural Gas Transport in accordance with its commitments under the World Bank Development Policy Financing (DPF) II operations. In FY17 Q4, DAI selected the firm Gaffney, Cline & Associates (GCA) to undertake sub-task three work. In FY18 Q3, GCA submitted all deliverables which IGPA/Takamul sent to USAID on May 4, 2018 in its final report: New Natural Gas Market Framework and Five-Year Plan. This report provided an account of all the meetings, analysis, and thought processes that led to the New Natural Gas Market Framework and the Five-Year Gas to Power Plan. Deliverables included: 1. Guidelines and indicative provisions to develop a Supplementary Natural Gas Processing contract model. a. Note: Included in final report. 2. Guidelines and indicative provisions to develop a Natural Gas Marketing regulation. a. Note: Included in final report. 3. Guidelines and indicative provisions to develop a Natural Gas Transport regulation. a. Note: Included in final report. 4. A finalized 5-Year Gas-to- Power Coordination and Implementation Roadmap (2018-2022). a. Note: Included in final report.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 47
5. Workshop with Ministry of Oil leadership and designated staff to present the rationale, underlying assumptions, modeling results and operationalization requirements of the proposed SNGP contract and regulations guidelines and the capacity, skills and staffing needs to implement them and to create and gradually consolidate requisite contractual and regulatory administration expertise. a. Note: GCA participated in a series of fact-finding and engagement-building meetings with the Ministry of Oil between September 22-24, 2017. The actual workshop was held on October 29-31, 2017 at the Prime Minister’s guest house in Baghdad. Multiple representatives of the Ministry of Oil attended, including the deputy minister with responsibility for gas and most of the state-owned entities responsible for the pipeline system, liquid petroleum gas handling, and gas processing. Approximately 30 government officials attended over the three days. 6. Draft and finalized deliverables will be submitted for peer review by World Bank staff to ensure alignment and consistency with the World Bank’s technical assistance program on Reimbursable Advisory Service for Structuring of the Gas Value Chain and Gas Marketing in Iraq (RAS) recommendations on natural gas sector development in Iraq. a. Note: GCA’s deliverables were peer reviewed by Carlos Alberto Lopez of the World Bank in a series of conference calls and emails between the October workshop and the submission of the draft legislation in November/December, and subsequently, the delivery of the five-year gas-to-power plan in March. Some of the conference calls also involved Elaine Grigsby of USAID, maintained close contact with Carlos Alberto Lopez on the framing of the deliverables. Sub-Task Four Sub-task four provides support to the Prime Minister’s Office’s (PMO) nascent Economic Reform Unit (ERU). A financial sector specialist works as the sub-task four lead to support the ERU in coordinating with senior GOI officials in the MoF, MoP, and Ministry of Electricity (MoE), as well as the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), to aid in priority economic reforms. Specific tasks include engaging with high-level GOI officials in Iraqi financial institutions to ensure they are on track to meet commitments, helping the GOI develop and implement systems for the efficient management of financial instruments such as sovereign guarantees, helping the GOI implement the financing of investments and related sovereign guarantees to ensure investments are financed, assessing the current state of the financial sector in Iraq and recommending interventions, and building the capacity of ERU staff. In Q3, the sub-task four lead completed the following tasks: Followed up on external public debt payments related to the Iraqi Bonds and International Debtors: The consultant collected and analyzed data provided by the Public Debt Department at the MoF to create a list of all Paris Club Debtors (a group of countries that have agreed to reschedule Iraqi national debt payments incurred under previous governments prior to 2003) and bond payment dues for 2018. This list will be adopted by the MoF and enables the MoF to utilize a more efficient method of monitoring the various amounts and their respective due dates. In upcoming quarters, the consultant will continue to follow up with the Public Debt Department and then with the Accounting Department in the MoF to ensure payments are made on time through their account at the Central Bank of Iraq.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 48
Strengthened Export Credit Agencies (ECA) financing for government projects: ECAs from various countries have offered limits for Iraqi government projects. The ECA financing agreements are important to Iraq because they provide a relatively cheap financing cost associated with certain infrastructure projects. Since these projects usually generate large amounts of business with the exporting nation, those countries will offer Iraq lower interest rates and longer repayment terms in order to promote their local industries, giving Iraq the added value of cheaper long- term financing costs. The UK Government announced that it was ready to support financing up to GBP 10 billion ($13 billion USD) over the next ten years in projects that are completed by UK-based companies. Another added advantage is that Iraq will benefit from the oversight of the UK ECA and international banks that will have to monitor the progress of the project. In Q3, various ECA projects were included in Iraq’s 2018 National Budget. The consultant engaged with the German, Italian, Swedish, and British ECAs to provide financing for several projects being discussed with various ministries. The ERU will have additional support from the ECA in addition to MoF reports relating to project progress, and the ERU ensure that the required approvals from the MoF are submitted according the agreed schedules and act as a point of reference in case any delays arise. Once the commercial contracts are finalized between the relevant ministries and multinational companies in upcoming quarters, the ERU will begin to support creation of the documentation required from the MoF and the international banks. Once the documentation is ready, the ERU will work with the Deputy Minister of Finance’s Office to present the projects for approval by the Council of Ministers. Then the ERU can begin drafting documentation for issuance of a Sovereign Guarantee. During Q3, the sub-task four lead also continued to analyze and assess the current state of the financial sector in Iraq, recommend interventions appropriate to the context, and keep USAID informed of major developments. The consultant presented reports to the Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister on the proposals for electronic banking products being presented by the state- owned banks (Rafidain and Rasheed Banks). The banks aim to introduce new electronic systems to improve efficiency and transparency. The consultant will advise the key decision makers as they review the various solutions being presented from both government institutions and private vendors. This will help decision makers form a holistic view of modernizing Iraqi state banks with key required decisions identified and presented to the Council of Ministers and Central Bank of Iraq (CBI). Much work remains to successfully modernize the state-owned banks, which the consultant will focus on in upcoming quarters. Progress remains slow due to strong resistance from existing high-level CBI management to adopt new technologies, and a new committee is due to be formed at the CBI. Built the capacity of ERU staff to analytically determine necessary financial sector reforms, and assist them in developing and rolling out said reforms: The consultant gave several presentations at the ERU regarding various financing models and proposals being studied by the ERU and at the PMO. These included short presentations on the basics of financing mechanisms like pre-export oil financing, supplier credit financing, and deferred payment model for commodity imports. In the upcoming quarter, these presentations will continue to be prepared based on the relevant projects being tasked for review by the ERU.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 49
REGIONAL
Baghdad
IGPA/Takamul met with Aktis and IOG this quarter to exchange ideas and ensure there are no duplicated efforts as all three projects work in the area of governance. All three programs presented their workplan activities. IGPA/Takamul presented an update on the status of decentralization, including the transfer of functions, staff, financial allocations, and property. A similar meeting will take place in Q4. Through the Baghdad joint committee activities, IGPA/Takamul encouraged the Baghdad joint committee to consult with international donors to fund potential water projects, related to infrastructure needs outside of IGPA/Takamul’s scope. Baghdad PG has reached out to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which is currently working with Baghdad PG to fund the implementation of identified water projects in the boundaries of Baghdad PG. During this reporting period, IGPA/Takamul provided briefings to the Baghdad PC chair on IGPA activities and implementation. The Baghdad PC chair remains supportive of IGPA/Takamul activities and directed his staff and advisers to provide all the support needed to ensure IGPA/Takamul’s activities are implemented smoothly.
Basrah
During Q3, IGPA/Takamul continued to hold coordination meetings with international donors to ensure that project activities are not duplicated by other international donor-funded programs. IGPA/Takamul’s Basrah team met with representatives from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at their main office in Basrah. Representatives of both programs presented project activities to ensure that there are no duplicated efforts, as well as exchanged ideas on the element of sustainability in program activities. The Basrah team also met with Aktis several times over the last quarter. IGPA/Takamul and Aktis discussed in detail possible areas of overlap, since Aktis is in the process of restructuring the decentralization department at the GO and trying to inventory transferred functions as part of decentralization. During the last quarter, a delegation from USAID and the US consulate in Basrah visited IGPA/Takamul’s Basrah office, where the Basrah office team presented the status of activity implementation by objective. The visiting delegation also met with several SAG members who presented an overview of their engagement with IGPA/Takamul in Basrah. The IGPA/Takamul team also met with Basrah Governor al-Idani to present the program objectives, obtain the governor’s support on some pending issues, and ascertain the Basrah GO’s needs to improve essential service delivery. The governor is a strong supporter of IGPA/Takamul programming, particularly in the areas of improving GO oversight over essential service delivery (to be performed through the performance evaluation department), assistance with development of the standard bidding document, business process re-engineering, improving provincial financial management, increasing local revenues, and improving cooperation between civil society and the government to identify service delivery issues.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 50
IGPA/Takamul received a request from the legal department at Basrah provincial council for training in the legislative process. IGPA/Takamul responded positively to the request and identified resources to provide the requested training course this quarter.
Erbil
After officially opening the Erbil office in March, time project team onboarded additional technical and operational staff this quarter. The office also managed to build an excellent working relationship with stakeholders in Erbil.
Despite challenges in the KRG, and the differences in needs and priorities in comparison to other Iraqi provinces, the project enjoys strong support from both the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister to improve service delivery for KRI citizens. Similar, political parties show enthusiasm for decentralization rather than devolution of power, identified as an opportunity for IGPA/Takamul to intervene and improve both government performance and service delivery. Major highlights from Erbil during Q3 include: In Q3, the Erbil governor agreed to sign36 an administrative order to establish a gender unit in the Governor’s Office and appoint a woman in his office to lead this unit. The new unit aims at tackling issues of workplace harassment, victim confidentially, and violence against women through the codification of a code of ethics. After the unit is officially established, IGPA/Takamul will assist the governor in structuring the unit in a professional manner through a series of technical assistance and trainings. IGPA/Takamul also supported the KRG Reform and Modernization Program (Xizmat), working closely with DPM and his office to ease citizen access to information and simplify processes for service delivery. IGPA/Takamul launched an awareness campaign for the website created by the DPM which provides comprehensive information on over 400 public services. Other IGPA/Takamul support activities to Xizmat will include: 1. Crafting and implementing a branding strategy 2. Assisting in the establishment of a help desk 3. Customer relations training for receptionists and related service personnel 4. Re-engineering/improving service delivery processes 5. Engaging CSOs in the oversight of service delivery 6. Conducting a feasibility study of fee structures IGPA/Takamul commenced work with Erbil Municipality leadership to establish a call center/ hotline – a collect call phone number for citizens to report and follow up on public services complaints. The hotline will enable the municipality to forward reports and complaints to related service providers for follow up actions. IGPA/Takamul also worked to address the water crises in separate regional conferences. Recommendations from each region will be discussed in one national conference, where all
36 This administrative order was signed on July 2, 2018 in Q4
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 51
experts and decision makers across Iraq will meet to come up with a plan to manage the water crises and their implications. Finally, IGPA/Takamul assisted the KRG in improving local revenue generation. The KRG is experiencing difficulties collecting fees for water and electricity services from the community. Due to an inability to pay public servants on time and in full, in addition to not having a suitable mechanism for fee collection, the government is currently unable to manage fee collection. IGPA/Takamul is working with the water department as a pilot project to re-engineer the process and set up a mechanism to charge and collect fees in a timely manner.
Ninewa
IGPA/Takamul launched activities in Ninewa through coordination with both the KRG Joint Commission Command Center (JCCC) and Ninewa Operation Center (OPC). Baseline assessments for the minority populated areas, conducted by interviewing minority leaders and the KRG DGs of Christian Affairs and Yazidis Affairs, indicate greater needs for infrastructure repair than technical assistance. The project is in the process of embedding provincial coordinators in Ninewa governorate office to facilitate closer coordination. IGPA/Takamul’s Erbil office is currently serving as a hub for supporting activities in other provinces, including Ninewa.
CROSS-CUTTING IGPA/Takamul strives to utilize the information obtained from its conflict sensitivity analysis, gender analysis, and political economy analysis to mitigate potential negative impacts on conflict and gender dynamics, encourage positive outcomes, and monitor for these outcomes. For a governance project to be successful, it must include and pay attention to the extent to which the project is responsive to the needs and priorities of women and men, vulnerable groups and society as a whole. IGPA/Takamul strives to ensure all activities communicate the message that an effective government is one that represents the needs of all, and that all activities include members of disadvantaged groups. All team leads have been integral to IGPA/Takamul’s goal of ensuring that programming benefit men and women equitably. This quarter, of the 881 individuals who participated in IGPA/Takamul trainings, 263 were women.
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES The results of the recent national elections and prolonged government formation process have proved frustrating to many local government officials. Some of these officials appear uncertain as to whether a new government will continue the process of decentralizing services. Additional uncertainty centers on officials’ concerns over maintaining their positions in a new administration. This has at times made activity implementation difficult or slow. Additionally, the prolonged government formation process makes certain capacity building efforts challenging. IGPA/Takamul trains various national and provincial officials to improve service delivery, PFM, and accountability. It is unclear how the transition to a new government
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 52
will impact these positions - retaining institutional memory will be a challenge. For this reason, IGPA/Takamul tries to ensure the sustainability of its work by improving the structure of the government (for example, by trying to unify the structure of provincial councils) and by providing clear documentation on operations and best practices. During its needs assessments and interactions with stakeholders, IGPA/Takamul encountered a wide range of requests that do not fit within IGPA/Takamul’s scope. There is a great need for procurement-related assistance, such as water pumps. Additionally, in places like Ninewa, which had around 80 percent of its infrastructure destroyed, it is difficult to build capacity for government entities without actual infrastructure. IGPA/Takamul works to manage expectations and identify ways to build capacity in high impact and sustainable ways. A specific challenge for the BPR activity is maintaining government buy-in to implement streamlined processes. After assessing and developing a streamlined model for a selected service, the recommended approach is then presented to the directorate in charge of the service. While the BPR process engages directorate staff during the assessment and streamlined model development, IGPA/Takamul has faced occasional impediments to implementation of the streamlined model. This has resulted from a variety of factors, such as the directorate’s lack of commitment to implement the recommended changes for fear of increased efficiency/ lowered costs decreasing their overall directorate budget allocation. Other impediments were due to difficulty in finding adequate resources to finance the proposed improvements. This was the case in Ramadi city in Anbar, where the lack of trash compressors hindered the implementation of the streamlined model. The trash collection service in Anbar will be improved once the local government provides the remaining machinery needed to enhance the new streamlined trash collection function. IGPA/Takamul also faced challenges when securing the buy-in and support of the MoP on IGPA/Takamul’s approach to improve the procurement process, and to develop a new bidding tool (SBDs) for small contracts that should ease government contracting and expand opportunities for small and medium businesses. The process requires a large amount of time due to the inconsistency of the reviewed regulations and the bureaucracy associated with obtaining approvals to commence work, or gain access to different documents. Similarly, building the capacity of MoP staff proved to be challenging due to the difference in their capabilities, which may impact the sustainability of the training provided to the team. Working in the KRG has also presented a special set of challenges. IGPA/Takamul continues to plan for work in Erbil in a way that best meets the project objectives to strengthen governance. However, the KRG still runs on an ad-hoc, emergency budgeting model, exacerbated after the GOI stopped sending salaries to KRG public employees in the aftermath of the Kurdish referendum.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 53
CHAPTER III: MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS According to the project’s Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (AMEP), approved by USAID on February 27, 2018, the following Performance Indicators (PI) will be reported on:
PI Performance Indicator PI Level Result No. IGPA/Takamul Goal: Improve GOI response to citizens’ needs 4 Points company is contracted to conduct the first public opinion survey as a baseline for this Percentage of citizens reporting indicator. The survey will be conducted in August 1 improvements to service delivery Impact 2018 in all six provinces. Further details platforms. regarding survey methodology and finding will be shared next quarter. Objective 1: Enhance GOI Service Delivery Capacity Number of functional Provincial 1.1 Improve service delivery outcomes in Activity SoW is approved. STTA SoW is Planning and Development Councils 2 Outcome sectors with potential for high impact approved and now in the STTA hiring process. (PPDC) in IGPA- supported and visibility. Activity to start in Q4. provinces For PED on provincial level: After determining the selection criteria for the TWG in 5 provinces (Basrah, Babil, Najaf, Wasit, and Baghdad), the 1.2 Strengthen the strategic approach and TWG was formed. This TWG will be oriented capacity of line ministries and on the OAD method, develop the PED mission Score on Performance Evaluation provincial directorates, to better align statements, key outputs, functional chart, 3 Departments index Outcome service delivery outcomes with the organizational structure, and staffing pattern.
priorities of provincial governments For the PED on HCCPSec level: the PED mission and local populations. statement and key output have been approved by the HCCPSec Chairman Dr. Torhan al-Mufti. TWG is now working to develop the functional chart and the organizational structure.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 55
PI Performance Indicator PI Level Result No. Percentage of participants who report improved knowledge and 1.3 Enhance regulatory and procedural Activities related to building the capacity on the 4 capacity in public procurement as a Output certainty to attract private sector public procurement will start in quarter 4. result of IGPA/Takamul capacity investment. building activities 1.4 Enhance the targeting of capital Conducted institutional and staff assessments for Number of IGPA-supported functional investment spending in service the WEDs in 11 provinces, this assessment will 5 Output Provincial Gender Departments delivery sectors that serve vulnerable be the baseline to develop the organizational and disadvantaged populations structure for the WEDs. Objective 2: Improve Provincial and National Government Public Financial Management Number of standard operating procedures (SOP) that are 2.1 Strengthen capacities of provincial PFM provided formal and on the job trainings on implemented by central, federal and AFAD and support their conversion decentralized accounting system. This manual 6 Outcome provincial governments to manage into fully operational financial was developed by MoF as it is considered as a Public Finance Management (PFM) management offices. SOP. functions Number of mechanisms for external 2.2 Support development of federal oversight of public resource use oversight mechanisms, such as Activities related to this indicator will start in 7 supported by USG assistance. Outcome financial audit procedures, of Year 2. (Standard Foreign Assistance Indicator DR.2.4-2) provincial finances. Percentage increase in the rate of 2.3 Enhance provincial revenue collection of fees imposed by generation, collection and Working with the local and provincial councils to 8 Provincial Governments on services Outcome enact local revenue laws. Further activities management from outside the oil delivered in IGPA-supported service related to this indicator will start in Year 2. delivery platforms. sector. Designed the reporting template according to 2.4 Enhance budget-cycle planning, the MoF regulations and trained AFAD on the Number of provincial in-year budget development and execution against reporting template to be used in producing 9 reports published in accordance with Outcome decentralized expenditure budget reports. PFM developed reporting law/best practice assignments templates are being used now by Basrah, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Najaf. Objective 3: Strengthen Monitoring and Oversight of Service Delivery and Public
Expenditure Number of mechanisms developed or Five mechanisms are developed for Baghdad, 3.1 Strengthen capacity of selected 10 improved, and implemented, to Outcome Basrah, Anbar, Babil, and Erbil, two of them are provincial institutions to establish establish effective citizen implemented in Babil and Basrah, IGPA/Takamul
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 56
PI Performance Indicator PI Level Result No. participation, outreach and effective citizen participation and will receive the supporting documentation letters communication. outreach mechanisms. for mechanisms implementations in Q4. An online application form was released during Q3. CSOs registered and the selection process is completed. IGPA/Takamul started a series of Number of Civil Society 3.2 Enhance public capability and capacity building trainings for CSOs including Organizations (CSO) receiving USG willingness to participate in planning, communication and outreach, social media, 11 assistance engaged in advocacy Outcome monitoring and evaluating public decentralization, organizational assessment, and interventions. (Standard Foreign survey design for SAGs. CSO trainings will Assistance Indicator DR.4.2-2) services continue during Q4. IGPA/Takamul will track advocacy campaigns resulting from project assistance.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 57
COMPLEXITY AWARENESS IGPA/Takamul implementation utilizes the PDIA-based approach which incorporates adaptive management into program implementation. At its heart is a complexity-aware planning cycle, which includes and draws from the PEA, CSA, and Complexity Awareness-Monitoring plan (CAM). These combined approaches provide a nuanced political and technical understanding of governance issues and system process thinking to facilitate adaptive activity implementation in a conflict environment such as Iraq. As explained in Chapter One, the operational context of the IGPA/Takamul in terms of the Political Economy and CSA is highlighted by fluctuating dynamics and political uncertainty that will continue influencing Iraqi governance and policy decisions, security and stability, and the economic environment throughout 2018. But while these dynamics will change according to the necessities of political calculation, public demands for better services, job opportunities, and effective anti-corruption measures will not. It is therefore highly probably that public anger at the political establishment and its perceived incompetence will continue. These factors combine to create a complex environment in which to operate. By complexity, we mean simply that these factors can operate independently of each yet combine to create an outcome which cannot be predicted from the outset. This is true even if each factor by itself could be considered, in accordance with complexity theory, either simple or complicated. For the program, this implies that results and outcomes may well be different from those initially intended. Accordingly, IGPA/Takamul’s CAM deploys the following approaches: • Sentinel Indicators • Stakeholder Feedback • Process Monitoring of Impact • Outcome Harvesting The following sub-sections offer brief explanations and measures taken about each of these four approaches during the reporting period.
Sentinel Indicators
Iraq is a fragile state that has been unable to develop good governance practices or institutionalize economic development. Decisions about the distribution of services and revenues, and even when to intervene against non-state actors such as the militias or to tackle endemic corruption, are made on the basis of narrow political calculations. In addition, political goals, tactical decisions, and political forces shape the GOI’s management of the economy; devising fiscal policies and developing economic institutions. These economic motivations permeate policy and the service delivery environment, encouraging systemic corruption schemes, and resulting in public unrest and protests for better services and accountable government institutions. Working in this context, IGPA/Takamul thus uses sentinel proxy indicators as a flagging mechanism to inform project implementation ahead of time about the implications of certain
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 58
political or governance decisions, security developments, and social trends. IGPA/Takamul mainly focuses on those indicators with operational, process, and system impact on national and provincial levels, which altogether provides a complex-aware monitoring of project implementation. The sentinel indicators may have concurrent impact; they influence projects during the implementation within the reporting period, or long-term impact; their early impact can be anticipated during the implementation reporting period, but their influence will extend over several reporting periods. The following are the main tracked sentinel indications, divided into concurrent and long-term impact indicators. Concurrent Sentinel Indicators: Stalled Elections and Government Formation: The national elections of May 2018 resulted in a political stalemate, rather than the formation of a new government that could lead the country through the post-Da’esh challenges and advance constructive policies. While Iraqis looked for new policies that could address service delivery deterioration with sustainable solutions removed from political calculations and divisive partisan agendas, the political establishment continued its use of narrow political calculations in its negotiations for forming the new government. This traditional process has completely overlooked solutions that impact upon the daily lives of Iraqis. Currently, Iraq has a caretaker government that in many aspects is one of the main reasons for the poor performance of provincial governments: unanticipated austerity measures, sudden changes in decisions to implement projects, and the overall lack of sound policy all are the results of the absence of good governance from the center. This context has created a governing system unable to manage the country’s ongoing electricity, water, and job scarcity crises. Frustrated by perceived inaction, citizens took to the streets in Karbala, Najaf, Babil, Diyala, Wasit, and Basrah to protest the deterioration of services. In addition, and as explained in the Political Economy Analysis (Chapter One), the National Elections in May 2018 witnessed an increasing number of Governors and Members of Provincial Council Candidates to the Iraqi COR, and given their status as incumbent officials, the majority of them won the elections. Having MPs with strong provincial experience is a positive development in channeling provincial demands more effectively to the national level. However, the protracted government formation process has meant that these provincial officials are caught in a transitional status, which paralyzes government performance on both national and provincial levels, shifting the focus and efforts from governance to politics. Furthermore, the provincial governments are scheduled for provincial elections in December 22, 2018. Despite the uncertainty about holding/postponing these elections, the possibility of a second election within six months means that the highly politicizes context of election campaigns will continue through the provincial elections on December 22, 2018. These dynamics have kept the provincial governments and councils consumed by the current political impasse, leading to widely underperforming institutions and negligence of service delivery. Long-Term Sentinel Indicators: Pre-mature announcing of victory over Da’esh (Da’esh Sleeper Cells): PM Abadi proclaimed December 7, 2017 the Iraqi Victory Day, marking the end of the Da’esh occupation and
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 59
launching the post-Da’esh stage in Iraq. However, Da’esh sleeper cells remain active in various parts of Iraq, especially in Kirkuk, Ninewa, and some parts of Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Anbar. The announcement itself incentivized Da’esh to wage organized attacks in the southwest of Kirkuk, west of Ninewa, and on the Syrian border. The Victory Day has become a Da’esh target to undermine GOI and the sense of a new era, jeopardizing GOI’s effort politically and militarily. Therefore, Da’esh conducted deadly attacks that conveyed strong messages of insecurity and instability, and hence, negatively impacted Iraqis’ trust in GOI capability to tackle Da’esh and avow security. This trust deficit has continued GOI’s protracted problem of negative domestic legitimacy. IGPA/Takamul has identified this indicator as a long-term dynamic that will dominant the security situation in Iraq throughout the rest of 2018. In general, to uproot Da’esh or terrorism in its broader sense, Iraq needs governance reform, an inclusive political process, and new regional security arrangements; issues that are yet to be addressed effectively. Failed Anti-corruption campaign: GOI announced legal and government measures to target the misuse of public financial resources and tackle the networks exploiting government contracts. However, these measures lacked substantive action, which in turn has created public mistrust. Concurrent with the national elections of May 2018, the anti-corruption campaign has faced backlash in certain cases, with Iraqis viewing PM Abadi’s campaign as an election campaign rather than a real effort to tackle the epidemic of corruption. In addition, the politicization of the anti-corruption campaign has contributed to the entrenchment of a bureaucratic culture that hedges its activities against rival political parties; resulting in slow service delivery and jeopardizing local revenue collection. IGPA/Takamul identified this indicator to continue to have an impact throughout 2018, as the politicization of the anti-corruption campaign will further challenge provincial governments’ performance, given the current public protests, and the scheduled provincial elections in December 22, 2018.
Stakeholder Feedback, Process Monitoring of Impact, and Outcome
Harvesting
Stakeholder feedback, process monitoring, and outcome harvesting (SFPMOH) are post-activity qualitative indicators that IGPA/Takamul will utilize for several of its implemented activities. The implementation of SFPMOH in will be conducted in a form of focus group (FG) discussions facilitated by M&E specialist and attended by PEA and E&I. PEA will collect data about the political impact or any conflict sensitive issues that might have occurred during the activity implementation, whereas E&I will collect data about gender and vulnerable population inclusion. The data collected from the FG discussions will be compiled in a unified M&E report about SFPMOH indicators for the related activities. IGPA/Takamul has selected specific activities for the SFPMOH indicators based on the nature of the activity that focus on system process impacts. The timeline to conduct these SFPMOH FG is within six months after activity implementation is finished and M&E has finished collecting the data on performance indicators.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 60
The time frame of six months post-intervention to conduct the FG depends on the nature of the activity. For example, if IGPA/Takamul establishes a new unit within the Governor’s Office that unit will not be fully functional within three months, so it would be more effective to conduct the FG after six months when the stakeholder – unit personnel and director and the Governor- will be able to evaluate the benefit and its integrated impact on the system and performance of the related PG. Participants at these FGs will vary from one activity to another, depending on the type of intervention, provided technical expertise, and institution or agency. The table below explains those activities, as per below table: Obj. Activity Implementation FG Date (3 or 6 FG participants Date months after implementation) 1 1.1.7 Service delivery January 16-17, July 2018 Participants from process improvement/ 2018 Baghdad, Qadisiya re-engineering for water and Wasit. This supply and solid waste activity will be management, including replicated in other at least one process provinces like each focusing on women Anbar. Newly and vulnerable included provinces population. will also be targeted. 2 2.1.1 AFAD November 26-29, July 2018 AFAD finance and introductory training on 2017 accounting staff decentralized financial from Basrah, Babil, management system. Baghdad, and Anbar. 3 3.1.6 Development of March 18, 2018 August 2018 Participants from decentralization the PG, water and communication plan for municipality HCCPSec directorates in Baghdad, Basrah, Babil.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 61
CHAPTER IV: LESSONS LEARNED It will be essential to continue building and maintaining stakeholder relationships, such as those listed above, as local buy-in lies at the core of project success. IGPA/Takamul’s stakeholders, including the government and CSOs, have continued to approach IGPA/Takamul to request support. IGPA/Takamul works to remain responsive to their requests while also managing expectations of what kind of support the project can provide. The IGPA/Takamul team developed 13 quick win activities that fit within the project scope to improve service delivery in Iraq. This came as a result of reports from the field and requests from project stakeholders like government entities and CSOs. IGPA/Takamul continues to enhance coordination with other donors that fund similar projects and activities, like GIZ, IOG, Aktis, World Bank, and UN agencies. This coordination is integral to avoiding duplicate efforts and maximizing impact. Through IGPA/Takamul’s activities aiming to connect CSOs with the government to enhance service delivery, it became clear that the government often resists working with CSOs because of a lack of trust. IGPA/Takamul worked to improve communication, collaboration, and trust between the government and CSOs through trainings and by facilitating collaboration within the TWGs under Objective 3. Iraq’s political uncertainty and security challenges threaten to affect the project’s implementation timeline. In its activity planning and implementation phases, IGPA/Takamul mitigates this impact by directly addressing these challenges in activity design, through constant coordination with relevant stakeholders. It is essential to ensure stakeholders’ buy-in prior to activity implementation. For instance, the review and improvement of the provincial procurement system activity, a project which holds enormous potential for significantly reforming procurement processes in one of IGPA/Takamul’s key partner ministries (the MoP), has proven successful due to the full support of the MoP’s DG of the State Contracts Directorate. Having an IGPA/Takamul office at the MoP has accelerated work through enhanced communication between the project and MoP teams. The physical presence of the team at the MoP has provided the opportunity for close cooperation and coordination, which builds trust and yields improved and faster results. Likewise, the service delivery improvement/reengineering activity must first ensure the full support and commitment of related governors/directorates before commencing work. Otherwise, results will not be achieved if the proposed approaches to selected functions in both the water and waste management services are not adopted and implemented by relevant parties. As a result of the different political structure in the KRG, IGPA/Takamul created a specific KRG workplan. This decision resulted from meetings with several KRG government officials,
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 62
including the KRG PM, KRG DPM, Minister of Planning and his deputies, Erbil Governor, and other Erbil governorate officials.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 63
ANNEXES Annex 1: Cross Cutting Themes in the Elections of 2018 Annex 2: Provincial Officials Elected as COR MPs with Party Affiliation Annex 3: Quarterly Activity Table Annex 4: Success Stories Annex 5: Contract Deliverables Annex 6: Political Economy Analysis and Reports Annex 7: Subcontractors Overview
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 1
ANNEX 1: CROSS CUTTING THEMES IN THE ELECTIONS OF 2018 Electorates Political Maturity Societal political maturity represents a transference of social thought into the state and government by affecting parties’ ideologies, platforms, and election campaign. The Iraqi political electorate has exhibited advanced political maturity compared to the previous elections. The phenomenon of a mature political discussion that has deviated from inter-group sectarian and ethnic political platforms to intra-group heated discussions about political and governance concepts such as service delivery, corruption, rule of law, citizenship and civilian government, is a sign of progressed democracy in Iraq, given the country’s history. In some respect democracy is a “government by discussion”, the political discussion during the election season, hence, reflects a new social/political thought in Iraq, which acts in and through parties, groups and CSOs, media, and all the other societal organs for the ventilation and comparison of different election campaigns. The electorates directed their anger and objection to generalized election campaigns pressuring candidates to provide some sort of service to their areas before allowing them to run their campaign in their areas. Another aspect of political maturity that ran throughout Iraqi provinces is anti-party establishment and resistance to incumbent politicians in the political process; an issue that was unheard of until the last elections of 2014. Iraqis daring to deeply criticize all politicians, including big religious leaders and heads of militia has overshadowed all the election campaigns. For example, in Basrah the al-Tamimi tribe organized demonstrations to defend their candidate, Muzahim al-Timimi’s right to run for the election, despite being accused to be a former Ba’athest, and disqualified by the Accountability and Justice Committee; an important indicator of the public’s mature understanding of the use of the aforementioned Committee as a political tool. Defending a former Ba’athist in an overwhelming Shia majority province would have been unthinkable in previous elections. Voter Abstention The elections of 2018 recorded the lowest voter turnout. The numbers show 25-30 percent turnout, with the lowest in the southern part of the country. While IHEC published official numbers that reach 35 percent, almost all Iraqi media channels and political talk-shows reported a staggeringly low voter turnout. According to numbers widely circulated in those media reports and by analysts appearing in various programs covering the elections, Basrah has recorded the lowest turnout, followed by Najaf and Karbala. While voter abstention has contributed to a rocky post-election stage where parties and people alike have become skeptical of the results and the process itself, the abstention has resulted in getting rid of several leaders within the establishment that they were running on their extreme views and strong positions within their parties. For example, the COR/MP Henan Al-Fatlawi, an extremist voice within Mailki’s camp, did not win, and her newly established party could secure only three seats at the COR. In addition, Amer Al-Khuzaie number one at Abadi’s Nasr list in
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 2
Basrah also did not make it to the COR. The failure of those two figures in securing enough votes to stay in power shows Iraqis strong shift against sectarian rhetoric or overtly partisan candidates. In general, low voters’ turnout usually helps parties with primordial loyalties and religious affiliations. For example, in the Kurdish community, the constituencies of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) had a strong turnout in Dahuk and Erbil -some numbers state more than 50 percent turnout in both provinces- easily giving the KDP 28-30 seats, not including the number of seats the party might gain in Ninewa’s disputed areas. KDP’s constituencies are loyalists for the Barzani tribe and family, and strongly believe that the Late Mustafa Barzani is the godfather of the Kurdish movement. These considerations in tribal and ethnic-based communities count more than political or economic interests or achievements. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) also depended on such embryonic loyalties when its charismatic leader was still alive but lost that with him passing away last year. The Sunnis do not have such loyalties. While tribalism is still a major source of political support and votes; the tribal leaders change their support and political affiliations based on financial interests and the number of government positions they can secure for the members of their tribes. Therefore, no Sunni leader can claim sustainable tribal support without securing adequate political gains and interests for the tribes. Al-Sadr in the Shia community has a strong and robust segment of the Shia society that supports and spiritual (ﻣرﺟﻌﯾﺔ اﻟﺻدر him and considers him their religious jurisprudence (Marjya’t AlSadr leader. Hence, even though he could not deliver on many of his promises of reform and anti- corruption measures, his constituencies have not shifted or changed loyalties. As a result, while the rest of the Shia society decided to punish its leaders through significant parts of Shia segments abstaining from voting, the Sadrist acted on their religious loyalties and filled the vacuum. This granted Sadr more seats at the expense of Abadi’s Nasr, Amiri’s Fatih, Maliki’s State of Law, and Hakim’s Hikma. In addition to the aforementioned dynamics related to the social milieu of each of the Iraqi mosaic and their voting tendencies, the following are the main issues that further contributed to voters’ abstention. 1. Distrust of the political process and its ability to fix or provide meaningful reforms. 2. The failed anti-corruption campaign did not deliver serious measures, feeding peoples’ perception that it is a politicized process rather than a serious matter to remove corrupt politicians 3. Sistani’s statement during the pre-election period in which for the first time he (representing the Shia Marjya) did not equate voting with religious responsibilities, and redefining voting as civic-citizens right rather than religious duty. 4. Lack of leadership, one of the most important variables, influenced Iraqis political orientation and disincentivized them. None of the current heads of parties or top Iraqi officials were able to provide a substantive vision convincing Iraqis of his/her ability to change the current dysfunctional system. For example, even Abadi, who ran on his victory over Da’esh and later his realignment operation in Kirkuk pushing back KRG to its borders before 2014, still failed to appeal to Iraqis as a leader or statesman with enough political strengthen to provide solutions. His decisions were hesitant and his anti-corruption measures were seen as shallow and politically motivated. His election-campaigns visiting provinces actually further angered people
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 3
and alienated new parts of society. For example, in Basrah he made poor and retired people wait hours to try to meet with him. Due to disorganized schedule, he was ultimately unable to meet them or allocate time to their complains. Similarly, when visiting Ninewa, Abadi’s disorganized venue obliged three deans and number of prominent local figures to wait hours and then leave the event protesting the disrespectful conduct. The lack of real understanding of the depth of Iraqis’ anger and dissatisfaction with the political establishment has created weak election campaigns and shallow voter outreach. 5. Security concerns. Da’esh announcements that it would attack polling centers and stations, and PMFs/Hashed militias’ activities, especially in the newly liberated areas, pushed people to stay at home instead of taking the risk while knowing (or strongly convinced) that their votes would not change the current situation. 6. Rumors and intensive social media campaigns that the election was already sold and shares at government positions and ministries were already distributed based on the same arrangements. This entrenched the idea among Iraqis that their votes would not change the situation. 7. Lack of adequate voters’ outreach and voters’ education due to IHEC’s time and resource constraints. Questioning the Funding of Election Campaigns
Questioning of funding sources is also a new trend in the Iraqi elections of 2018. The debate about funding, resources, excessive spending in elections campaign is twofold. First, the public is acutely aware of the candidates’ budget and follows reporting on spending and distribution of gifts to potential supporters closely. Second, this led to talk about funding sources and expenditures as a political tool to demoralize rival political parties, lists, or candidates. This phenomenon completely contradicts previous elections, whereby Iraqi looked favorably upon those who had large campaign budgets, equating that with the candidate’s strength. In the elections of 2018, especially in the devastated newly liberated areas such as Ninewa and Anbar, spending millions of IQD on posters and election campaigns has been widely criticized. For example, COR’s Speaker Salim al-Jobouri filed a claim against a rival candidate Ibrahim al-Sumadie, who ran in Diyala under Diyala the Challenge list and accused the Speaker of spending $27 million on his TV ads.37 This type of court cases has not been filed at the Iraqi court before. In Basrah, people took down posters to protest the expense of political campaigns and repurposed them such as for roofs over fruit stands to show instead the importance of creating jobs over campaign spending. Furthermore, the elections of 2018 were also highlighted by the large amount of money spent in the election campaigns. The cash that flooded the market has, as explained by one of the candidates in Anbar, “raised the election prices for us; the smaller parties.”38 Parties with large financial resources and prominent candidates held lavish election activities and gatherings and bought expensive TV ads with costs that are totally new to the Iraqi media or election market. For example, al-Mosilyah TV, a Ninewa local TV station with high viewers, sold three minutes for a very simple ad for $400,000. Some parties, such as al-Hal party which heads the Ninewa
37 Video: Ibrahim AlSumadie’s interview talking about funding and expenditure by COR’s Speaker https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Y_DdDhUoY4) 38 Interview with Sumyah Ghanim candidate on al-Wataniyha list in Ninewa.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 4
Hawiatuna list (Ninewa is Our Identity) has paid this local TV more than $1 million to gain the biggest share of TV coverage. Another concerning funding issue that emerged in this election is the amount paid to buy voters’ cards, with some parties in Ninewa, Anbar, and Diyala paying $100-300 per card, and buying thousands of cards, in addition to expensive gifts and rewards for key tribal leaders. Big rallies busing people and paying pocket money for the huge number of participants was also another venue that big money shows up leaving the small party devoid from any meaningful competition. The issue of the unlimited amount of money being spent surfaced continued to be one of the main issues widely debated in addition to service delivery. Funding and lavish election related expenditures are linked with corruption and are considered a natural extension to what has become systematic corruption in the Iraq whether in the bureaucracies or political parties. Women and Minorities: Roles and Participation Women’s participation in political life is guaranteed by the constitutional article to have 25 percent women in all political lists. However, the quota has not materialized in true representation with the parties bringing on board uneducated or unqualified women to make sure they do not deviate from the party line. The current political trend to devalue religious campaign themes and the momentum of the civic movement have created new space for actual representation. Despite the more progressive elements mentioned above, incidents of women candidates on secular and moderate lists being attacked in the media for failing to cover their hair or “immodest” dress have been reported in almost all the Iraqi provinces. This phenomenon is also one of the new cross-cutting themes across Iraq that only first appeared in the last elections of 2014, with an increasing number of incidents in more conservative provinces, e.g. Basrah and Diyala. Reports about intimate pictures circulated without consent on social media and reported on TV for a female candidate. Some of these attacks were in terms of leaking sex-tapes. One of these videos led the PM’s list to suspend a candidate’s nomination. Similarly, in KRG, reports about private videos/photos of a member of KDP list have been widely viewed on the internet, but the KDP did not suspend her candidacy. This new trend is considered as an orchestrated effort to intimidate women from entering the political arena, and meant to undermine the surge of the liberal, progressive, and civic movements. While Law 45 of 2018 reserves nine seats for minority representatives, some minorities feel that the quota falls short in securing a fair representation, a sentiment which may have contributed to low minority voter participation in the last electoral events. Currently, minorities, especially in Ninewa Plain, suffer from fake representation with PMFs/Hashed constructing Christian or Yazidi lists that are on the Hashed pay-roll. Similar actions were taken by the Peshmerga in the disputed area. One of the other issues emerging in this election is the issue of attempting to exploit churches’ names and support and promote candidates as church’s preferred candidate. For example, recent clashes occurred among Chaldean candidates, with each claiming the support of the church. The Chaldean Church issued a strong statement stating its neutrality. Quick Service Delivery Projects and Election Campaign The issue of service delivery dominated the national election campaigns of 2018. There was not as much talk about political marginalization or sectarian grievances as the grave needs for better services. The issue evolved throughout the pre-election period, and Iraqis were desperate to pressure big parties to provide some quick projects that address some of their daily challenges.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 5
Main services identified as “quick wins” for the Iraqi Government were paving roads, linking villages and sub-districts to provinces’ city centers and main transportation routes; and building small irrigation projects. For example, in Buhrez (a sub-district in Diyala) the community banned candidates from Wataniya list from campaigning in their town until the main street that links the town with east Baquoba was paved. Similarly, according to the head of Basrah Political Council in Basrah “services such as cleaning neighborhood, paving roads, implementing small irrigation projects are widespread nowadays in Basrah’s villages”39 In addition to having the parties implement quick and short-term service projects, Iraqis have utilized social media platforms, bashing the political establishment for having nothing to show for their constituencies. Activists published posters/infographics about unfinished, fake, or deserted projects next to parties’ names whose minister was responsible. Those pictures are heavily circulated on various platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp groups, creating strong backlash against the establishment. Foreign Intervention and Elections: Military and Political Proxies Foreign interventions in the Iraqi elections are widely known and recognized by Iraqi voters. Nevertheless, such interventions were not denounced by the voters as aggressively and publicly as they were in the national elections of 2018. Furthermore, the politicians and militias who represent the manifestation of such interventions, especially by regional countries like Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, were more vocal about their loyalties and support to these countries. For example, most of the militias running under Fatih list are termed in Iraqi politics as Loyalties Militias such as Hezbollah-Iraq, Asa’eb Ahl al-Haq (AHH) announced in .(ا�حﺸﺪ اﻟﻮﻻئﻲ) Hashed many cases that they follow Khamenei as their religious jurisprudence instead of Sistani. Also, the Turkoman were more vocal about the Turkish role in Kirkuk and positively promote that in their election campaigns. This blunt political and military proxies have instigated public backlash and pressured the Marjya to put it as one of the main points Sistani tackled in his statement, banning any type of intervention whether in terms of funding party lists or weaponizing the militias. Less Major Security Concerns Contrary to previous elections, analysts widely considered this election to be relatively secure without major concerns about terrorist attacks. However, concerns about militia intimidation are valid. For example, the PMFs/Hashed trying to control or lock certain areas supporting one of their candidates in Fateh list and other incidents of intimidation were reported especially in Diyala, Ninewa, Basrah, and Anbar. These actions and activities were still less in number, intensity, and type of aggression than in previous elections. However, while public intimidation has lessened, political reports have also documented intra-militia rivalries as militias tried to reposition themselves as political parties. This includes attempts by the Badr organization, one of the main members of the militia-dominated Fatah List, to block candidates from other militias from running in Diyala. Similar incidents were documented in Salah al-Din, whereby the Sa’aroon list, protected by the Sarayha al-Salam militia, blocked candidates from the Badr organization. Similar rivalry and militant blocking have been documented in Basrah between Sa’aroon list and Badr organization. The Badr organization was widely reported to block rival Shia parties, especially ISCI and Hikma from running election campaigns in the district of Tal Afar in Ninewa province.
39 Interview: Ma’aeen AlHasani head of Basrah Political Council and Deputy Governor
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 6
ANNEX 2: PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS ELECTED AS COR MPS WITH PARTY AFFILIATION
Province Member Name Position Party Basrah Zahra al-Bchary The head of development Al-Hekma & housing committee Basrah Safa al-Bander The head of the education Dawlit Al-Qanoon committee Basrah Assaid Aledanee Governor Alnasser Anbar Mohamed al-Halbosi Governor Al-Anbar Hawyatona Anbar Ali Farhan Vice Governor Al-Anbar Hawyatona Najaf Khalid al-Jash’ami The head of security Al-Hekma Committee Najaf Sana’a al-Mousawi The head of Endorsement Islamic Supreme and religious affairs Council committee Babil Sadiq Madloil Governor Dawlit Al-Qanoon Babil Hassin AlJanabee Vice PC head Al-Hekma Babil Falaih Alkhafagee The head of the security Alnasser committee Babil Maha al-Janabee Pc member Alnasser Babil Hassin Shakier The head of energy Alfateh committee
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 7
ANNEX 3: QUARTERLY ACTIVITY TABLE
Date Activity Title Provinces Ministry Related Type WP Result
1-Apr Meeting Series of meetings with Ninewa’s PG stakeholders (Water, Trash collection Ninewa PG 3.1 directorates) to discuss the social media as a tool to support service delivery 1-Apr Meeting On the job training on monthly cash balance and bank reconciliation Basrah Basrah AFAD 2.1 2-Apr Meeting 3.1.6 Baghdad - Series of meetings with HCCPSec, PGs, Water and Trash Collection Baghdad HCCPSec 3.1 Directorates in involved provinces, and other stakeholders. 2-Apr Meeting Follow up with MoF on coordination mechanism development Baghdad MoF 2.1 2-Apr Meeting Introductory Meeting with Erbil Governorate Erbil PG 2.1 3-4 Training On-The-Job (OTJ) training for AFAD Basrah on consolidating monthly financial reports Basrah PG 2.1 Apr from decentralized directorates 3-Apr Meeting Meeting with HCCPSec about the Governorate Operating Manual Baghdad HCCPSec 1.2 4-Apr Meeting Meeting with Baghdad PC chairman to update him on IGPA activities particularly Baghdad PG 1.1 focusing on the development of the PC unified organization structure 4-Apr Meeting DPM Advisor Visit to IGPA Erbil Office Erbil Office of Deputy 3.2 Prime Minister 5-Apr Training Social Media Training - CSOs and Baghdad PG Baghdad PG 3.1 6-7 Training Coalition and Network Building Workshop for SAG group in Babil Babil not applicable 3.2 Apr 8-Apr Training Social Media Training - Baghdad Amanat Baghdad PG 3.1 8-Apr Meeting Mosul women’s CSOs needs assessment Erbil Not Applicable 1.4 8-Apr Meeting Introductory Meeting with Youth Activity Org. Erbil not applicable 1.4 8-Apr Meeting Meeting with decentralization manager at Basrah GO to Discuss Organizational Basrah PG 1.2 structure 9-Apr Meeting Meeting with Dhi Qar AFAD’s Director to discuss local revenue law and legislation Dhi Qar PG 2.1 9-Apr Meeting Zubair Municipality Meeting to Re-engineer service delivery processes Basrah MOCHPW 1.1 10-Apr Meeting Meeting series to assess and develop Erbil PG's provincial communication and public Erbil PG 3.1 outreach strategies 10-Apr Meeting Maysan AFAD needs assessment Maysan PG 2.1 10-Apr Meeting Collaboration meeting with the DG of Human Resources at the MOP Erbil MOP 1.1; 1.2 10-Apr Meeting Basrah conference on private sector development Basrah PG 1.3
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 8
Date Activity Title Provinces Ministry Related Type WP Result
12-Apr Meeting Meeting with Head of oversight, Integrity and Complaints Committee at the Erbil PC Erbil Erbil PC 1.2 15-Apr Meeting Roundtable series on Babil Social Accountability Groups (SAG) Babil not applicable 3.2 15-16 Training Coalition and network building training for Social Accountability Group (SAG) in Basrah Basrah not applicable 3.2 Apr 15-16 Training National TWG Training for Development of Decentralization Communication Plan for Babil, Baghdad, Basrah PG 3.1 Apr HCCPSec 15-Apr Meeting Basrah AFAD financial report collaboration Basrah AFAD 2.1 17-Apr Focus Focus Group on Development of Provincial Communication and Public Outreach Ninewa PG 3.1 Group Strategies for Mosul 17-Apr Meeting Meeting with Accounting Department at Water Directorate in Basrah Basrah PG 2.1 17-Apr Meeting Meeting with the KRG DPM Advisor on proposed "Services" request Erbil KRG Council of 1.1; 1.2; 1.3; Ministries - DPM 3.1; 3.2 Office 17-Apr Meeting Meeting to discuss the ICT assessment for the electronic procurement portal Baghdad MoP 1.1 18-Apr Focus BPR approach introduction to Anbar Water Supply and Municipality (Solid Waste Anbar PG 1.1 Group management) directorates 18-19 Training Communication and Public Outreach Training for Erbil PG Erbil PG 3.1 Apr 18-Apr Meeting Review and improvement of provincial procurement system activity launched Baghdad MoP 1.1 19-Apr Meeting Baghdad Amanat and Baghdad local government Joint Committee's first meeting Baghdad PG 1.1 23-Apr Meeting Follow up with MoP regarding budget cycle Baghdad MoP 2.4 23-Apr Meeting Training needs identification and Trainees selection Muthanna AFAD 2.1 24-Apr Meeting Training needs identification and Trainees selection Maysan AFAD 2.1 26-Apr Meeting Training needs and identification and trainees selection Dhi Qar PG 2.1 29-Apr Meeting The Baghdad Amanat and PG joint committee Secretary receives first orientation Baghdad PG 1.1 29-Apr Meeting Coordination Mechanisms in BGD province. Baghdad PG 2.1 29-30 Training Communication and Outreach Plan Training in Basrah Basrah PG 3.1 Apr 29- Training AFAD Training on Decentralized Financial System using Excel for Dhi Qar, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Maysan, PG 2.1 30Apr Muthanna Muthanna 29-Apr Meeting Coordination Mechanisms between BGD province and MoF. Baghdad PG 2.1 30-Apr Meeting Basrah ongoing collaboration with HCCPSEC, PG, Water and Solid Waste Management Basrah HCCPSEC, PG 3.1 Directorates, and other stakeholders on decentralization communication plan for
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 9
Date Activity Title Provinces Ministry Related Type WP Result
HCCPSEC (3.1.6) 30-Apr Meeting Media and public relations government stakeholders ongoing collaboration to advance Baghdad PG 3.1 activity 3.1.3 in Baghdad 30-Apr Meeting Media and public relations government stakeholders ongoing collaboration to advance Basrah PG 3.1 activity 3.1.3 in Basrah 30-Apr Meeting Ongoing assessment and development of Mosul PG's provincial communication and Ninewa PG 3.1 public outreach strategies 30-Apr Meeting BPR concept replication in Babil -Water Supply and Municipality (SWM) Babil PG 1.1 30-Apr Meeting Meeting with Joint committee's secretariat in Baghdad Embedded Office Baghdad PG 1.1 30-Apr Meeting Local revenue and budgeting Coordination Mechanism Kick off meeting Baghdad HCCPSEC 2.1 30-Apr Meeting Obtain support from PM Advisor on PFM coordination mechanisms activity Baghdad COMSEC 2.1 2-May Meeting Obtain support from MoF Finance and Administration DG on PFM coordination Baghdad MoF 2.1 mechanisms activity 2-May Meeting Get support from Ms. Taif Sami on PFM coordination mechanisms activity Baghdad MoF 2.1 3-May Workshop Coordination workshop for the development of Decentralization Communication Plan Babil, Baghdad, Basrah PG 3.1 for HCCPSec 3-May Workshop Enhancement of Organizational Capacity of Selected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Baghdad not applicable 3.2 in Baghdad to Perform Oversight Effectively 3-May Meeting Meeting with the KRG Prime Minister to Introduce the Project’s Aims and Objectives Erbil KRG’s Council not at KRG’s Council of Ministries of Ministries applicable 3-May Meeting Meeting with the KRG Minister of Planning to Discuss the project implementation and Erbil KRG MoP not strategies for the workplan within KRG context and outline collaboration applicable 5-6 Training Basrah SAG Training on Survey Development for Service Delivery Basrah not applicable 3.2 May 6-May Workshop Enhancement of Organizational Capacity of Selected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Babil not applicable 3.2 in Babil to Perform Oversight Effectively 6-8 Focus Assess the procurement system in the provinces procurement departments - Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, PG 1.1 May Group Assessment Basrah 6-9 Training AFAD Training on Decentralized Financial System using Excel for Karbala, Najaf, Karbala, Najaf, PG 2.1 May Qadisiya, Wasit Qadisiya, Wasit 7-May Workshop Babil TWG Introductory Meeting Babil PG 3.1 7-May Meeting Baghdad joint committee Secretariat procedural review Baghdad PG 1.1 7-May Meeting Development of coordination mechanism framework Baghdad MoF 2.1 7-May Meeting Meeting with Baghdad PC member and the head of the PC admin department to review Baghdad PG 1.2
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 10
Date Activity Title Provinces Ministry Related Type WP Result
PC needs to serve as input for the unified organizational structure. 8-May Workshop Basrah TWG Workshop for the Development of Decentralization Communication Plan Babil, Baghdad, Basrah PG 3.1 8-May Focus BPR approach introduction to Zubair Municipality, Basrah (solid waste management) Basrah PG 1.1 Group 9-May Workshop Enhancement of Organizational Capacity of Selected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Erbil not applicable 3.2 in Erbil to Perform Oversight Effectively 9-May Meeting Presenting IGPA /Takamul methodology for creating effective change agents team in Baghdad not applicable 4.1 Baghdad province 9-May Meeting Understand main challenges facing MoF with AFADs Baghdad MoF 2.1 14- Meeting Discuss the development of coordination mechanism framework Baghdad MoP 2.1 May 14- Meeting Meeting with HCCPSec chairman to form the team working group Baghdad HCCPSec 1.2 May 15- Meeting A graduation ceremony for al--Yarmouk school students with special needs Baghdad NGO 4.1 May 15- Meeting Meeting with Baghdad Amanat to discuss the development of communication and public Baghdad Baghdad Amanat 3.1 May outreach plan 15-16 Training Babil SAG Training on Survey Development for Service Delivery Babil not applicable 3.2 May 16- Workshop Babil TWG Workshop for the Development of Decentralization Communication Plan Babil PG 3.1 May 16- Workshop Workshop for coordination mechanism on local revenue generation, budgeting, and Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, PG 2.1 May financial reporting Basrah, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Karbala, Kirkuk, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Ninewa, Qadisiya, Salah al-Din, Wasit 16- Meeting Baghdad Regional IGPA team meeting with the technical Assistant of Baghdad Governor Baghdad Baghdad PC 1.1 May and the head of municipality affairs Department separately 17- Meeting assessment of existing data sources to design gender database Baghdad MoP May 20- Training Social Media Training - Basrah PG and CSOs Basrah PG 3.1 May 20- Meeting Series of meeting to assess and develop Anbar PG's provincial communication and Anbar PG 3.1 May public outreach strategies
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 11
Date Activity Title Provinces Ministry Related Type WP Result
20- Meeting Discuss MoF Quality control Department's report on AFAD Training program in Baghdad MoF 2.1 May Karbala on May 6-9 and the recommendation 21- Meeting Present the quick assessment results to Basrah officials Basrah PG 3.1 May 21- Meeting Present the quick assessment results to Basrah officials Basrah PG 3.1 May 22- Workshop Basrah TWG formation Basrah PG 3.1 May 22- Meeting Coordination meeting with National Team secretariat of UNSC Resolution 1325 Baghdad Prime Minister’s 1.4 May Office 22- Meeting KRG High Council of Women Affairs Capacity Assessment Erbil KRG High 1.4 May Council of Women Affairs 22- Meeting MoF feedback on AFAD training needs assessment Baghdad MoF 2.1 May 22- Meeting Define roles and responsibilities of the Provinces Affairs Dep. At MoF regarding Baghdad MoF 2.1 May coordination mechanisms 24- Training Social Media Training - Ninewa PG and CSOs Ninewa PG 3.1 May 24- Focus BPR approach introduction to Babil Water and Municipality (solid waste management) Babil PG 1.1 May Group directorates 24- Meeting Present Quick Assessment Report for Baghdad Amanat Baghdad Baghdad Amanat 3.1 May 24- Meeting Meeting for selected representatives (NGOs& GOI) with the international STTA Baghdad PG 4.1 May 26- Workshop Enhancement of Organizational Capacity of Selected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Babil not applicable 3.2 May to Perform Oversight Effectively 27- Meeting Donor Coordination Meeting with HCCPSec Baghdad HCCPSec 1.1 May 28- Workshop Enhancement of Organizational Capacity of Selected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Basrah not applicable 3.2 May to Perform Oversight Effectively 28- Workshop Enhancement of Organizational Capacity of Selected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Baghdad not applicable 3.2 May to Perform Oversight Effectively for Baghdad CSOs 28- Focus Orientation session for HCCPSec PED TWG Baghdad HCCPSec 1.2 May Group 28- Meeting Meeting with Women Empowerment Directorate WED/COMSEC Baghdad WED/ COMSEC 1.4 May
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 12
Date Activity Title Provinces Ministry Related Type WP Result
28 Focus Following up on assessment completed in the 4 provinces (Baghdad, Anbar, Babil and Anbar, Babill, Baghdad, PG 1.1 May-7 Group Basrah), the MoP procurement team will work with these provinces to discuss the Basrah Jun result of procurement department assessment as well as to developing action plan to develop the procurement documents for small and medium projects. 29- Meeting Baghdad Amanat PG Joint Committee meeting to review and approve procedures and Baghdad Baghdad Amanat, 1.1 May discuss key service delivery for some areas PG 29- Meeting BPR for Water Service Subscription Erbil KRG- Ministry of 1.1 May Municipalities and Tourism 29- Meeting Monthly Joint Committee Meeting between Baghdad Amanat and Baghdad PG Baghdad Baghdad Amanat 1.1 May & Baghdad PG 30- Meeting Coordination meeting with MoP- Central Statistical Organization Follow up the gender Baghdad MOP 1.4 May Database Designing 31- Workshop Organizational Capacity Assessment of CSOs from Erbil and Ninewa Erbil, Ninewa not applicable 3.2 May 31- Workshop Enhancement of Organizational Capacity of Selected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Erbil, Ninewa not applicable 3.2 May from Erbil & Ninawa to Perform Oversight Effectively 31- Focus Enhancement of Organizational Capacity of Selected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Babil PG 3.2 May Group to Perform Oversight Effectively 2-Jun Meeting Budget preparations and execution training Baghdad MoP 2.4 3-Jun Workshop Social media strategy workshop for Baghdad Amanat Baghdad PG 3.1 4-Jun Focus Focus group discussion with Babil PG on provincial communication assessment and Babil PG 3.1 Group recommendations 4-Jun Meeting Meeting between Baghdad Amanat water and PG water departments to resolve water Baghdad PG 1.1 issues 5-Jun Workshop Baghdad TWG workshop to develop decentralization communication plan Baghdad PG 3.1 5-Jun Workshop Enhancement of organizational capacity of Anbar CSOs to perform oversight effectively Anbar not applicable 3.2 5-Jun Meeting Organizational analysis presentation to Babil PC and TWG formation Babil PG 1.2 7-Jun Workshop Launch of 12-months PFM training plan for AFAD and decentralized directorates in Babil PG 2.1 Babil 7-Jun Focus Focus group discussion with Baghdad PG on provincial communication assessment and Baghdad PG 3.1 Group recommendations 7-Jun Meeting Launch of 12-month PFM training plan for AFAD and decentralized directorates in Babil Babil PG 2.1 8-Jun Workshop Key stakeholders workshop on coordination mechanisms on local revenue generation, MoF, MoP, HCCPSec, PG 2.1 budgeting, and financial reporting COMSec, FBSA, PG
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 13
Date Activity Title Provinces Ministry Related Type WP Result
10-Jun Meeting Meeting with Qadisiya PC to discuss incumbent org chart. Qadisiya PG 1.2 11-Jun Workshop Follow up workshop with HCCPSec TWG on the Development of Decentralization Baghdad not applicable 3.1 Communication Plan 11-Jun Meeting Meeting with Babil provincial council to discuss current org chart in preparation for the Babil PG 1.2 upcoming workshop. 11-Jun Meeting Meeting with Najaf PC to discuss org chart Najaf PG 1.2 11-Jun Meeting Meeting with Water Resources Ministry’s Advisor to get clear information about the Baghdad Ministry of ministry solution and what they need to pass water’s crisis Water Resource 12-Jun Meeting Meeting with the Diyala PC to discuss current PC org chart. Diyala PG 1.2 12-Jun Meeting Meeting with Basrah SAG and Basrah deputy governor to discuss the complaint tracker Basrah PG 3.2 method 12-Jun Meeting Meeting with the DG of Yazidi's Affairs at the KRG Ministry of Endowment and Erbil; Ninewa Ministry of crosscutting Religious Affairs Endowment and Religious Affairs 12-Jun Meeting Meeting with DG of Christian Affairs To assess the needs of minority communications Erbil; Ninewa Ministry of crosscutting for future activities Endowment and Religious Affairs 12-Jun Meeting Meeting with International Oil Company (IOC) Chevron to coordinate on water Erbil not applicable 1.1 project- service delivery 13-Jun Workshop Follow up workshop with Babil TWG Babil PG 3.1 13-Jun Training Enhancement of Organizational Capacity of Selected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Baghdad not applicable 3.2 to Perform Oversight Effectively 13-Jun Meeting Launch of 12-month PFM training plan for AFAD and decentralized directorates in Basrah AFAD 2.1 Basrah 18 Jun Training Round 2 BPR approach to Supply water and Municipality (Solid Waste management) Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, PG 1.1 -18 directorates Basrah, Qadisiya, Sep Wasit 20-Jun Meeting Follow up with Erbil governorate office regarding establishing the gender unit Erbil PG 1.4 20-21 Training Training for Baghdad, Anbar, and Babil technical working groups (TWG) on Baghdad, Anbar, Babil PG 3.1 Jun communication strategy development 21-Jun Meeting Meeting with UNHCR To Present IGPA/Takamul objectives Basrah not applicable not applicable 21-Jun Meeting Meeting with IOM To Present IGPA/Takamul objectives Basrah not applicable not applicable 24-Jun Meeting Kick off meeting for PWED Review Baghdad PG 4.1
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 14
Date Activity Title Provinces Ministry Related Type WP Result
25-Jun Focus Focus group discussion with key Water and Solid Waste Management Directorates Baghdad PG 1.4 Group stakeholders to discuss gender mainstreaming in service delivery 25-Jun Focus Focus group discussion with key Provincial Communication Unit and relevant Baghdad PG 1.4 Group committees in the Provincial Council stakeholders to discuss gender mainstreaming in service delivery 25-Jun Focus Focus group discussion with Baghdad SCOs to discuss gender mainstreaming in service Baghdad PG 1.4 Group delivery 25-Jun Meeting Meeting with technical working group to identify the HCCPSec PED key outputs Baghdad HCCPSec 1.2 25-Jun Meeting Conducting focus group for PWED review Baghdad PG 4.1 26-Jun Focus Developing decentralization communication action plan for the field awareness team in Babil PG 3.1 Group Babil 26-Jun Assessment Enhancement of Organizational Capacity of Selected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Anbar not applicable 3.2 to Perform Oversight Effectively 26-27 Workshop Developing unified provincial council organizational structures Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, PG 1.2 Jun Basrah, Diyala, Najaf, Qadisiya, Wasit 26-27 Workshop Unified PC organization structure workshop Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, PG 1.2 Jun Basrah, Diyala, Najaf, Qadisiya, Wasit 27-Jun Workshop Conduct a Workshop with Najaf CSOs Province for Empowerment of CSOs to Najaf PG 3.2 provide oversight of decentralized services 27-Jun Meeting Meeting with Basrah Governor To Discuss the progress of IGPA/Takamul project Basrah PG 1.1 27-Jun Meeting Meeting with the Erbil Municipality presidency Erbil PG 3.1 28-Jun Assessment Enhancement of Organizational Capacity of Selected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Basrah not applicable 3.2 to Perform Oversight Effectively 28-Jun Workshop Enhancement of Organizational Capacity of Selected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Najaf not applicable 3.2 to Perform Oversight Effectively 28-Jun Workshop Conduct a Workshop with Baghdad CSOs Province for Empowerment of CSOs to Baghdad PG 3.2 provide oversight of decentralized services 28-Jun Focus Focus group discussion with key Water and Solid Waste Management Directorates Basrah PG 1.4 Group stakeholders to discuss gender mainstreaming in service delivery 28-Jun Focus Focus group discussion with key Provincial Communication Unit and relevant Basrah PG 1.4 Group committees in the Provincial Council stakeholders to discuss gender mainstreaming in service delivery 28-Jun Focus Focus group discussion with Basrah SCOs to discuss gender mainstreaming in service Basrah PG 1.4 Group delivery
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 15
Date Activity Title Provinces Ministry Related Type WP Result
28-Jun Meeting Launch of 12-month PFM training plan for AFAD and decentralized directorates in Baghdad AFAD 2.1 Baghdad 28-30 Training Door-to-door survey TOT training for Basrah SAG Basrah not applicable 3.2 Jun
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 16
ANNEX 4: SUCCESS STORIES This page intentionally left blank.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 17
2,000 Baghdad citizens receive access to water from joint committee collaboration A strong administrative disconnect has always existed between the Baghdad Amanat (Mayoralty) and the Baghdad Provincial Government (PG), which has negatively impacted effective service delivery to Baghdad citizens. This disconnect came because of the two entities having separate budgets and different reporting structures, leading to wasted resources and duplicated efforts. Baghdad Amanat is responsible for providing services to the capital city while Baghdad PG provides services to the rest of Baghdad province. As a solution, IGPA/Takamul created a joint committee for the Baghdad Amanat and PG to address strategic short- and long-term service delivery issues facing both entities. Specifically, the joint committee coordinates and collaborates on the delivery of water supply and solid waste management.
One of the most critical issues impacting not just Baghdad but all of Iraq, is the ongoing water shortage. As part of its mandate, the joint committee identified the areas most affected by, and the issues contributing to, water services. For example, the committee identified seven villages under the Baghdad PG jurisdiction that did not have access to drinking water. These villages are located in an area known as the Baghdad Belt. This area used to create security concerns and threaten the stability of Baghdad, due to its heavy exploitation by the Sunni insurgency, al-Qaeda, Da’esh, and later the PMFs/Hashed militias, especially Ase’b Ahl-Haq. Given the continuous military operations and Baghdad PG workers install water pipelines connecting to Baghdad Amanat’s clashes, villagers were deprived of water supply drinking water access.
The Baghdad PG had been unsuccessfully attempting to locate funds for a water project to permanently connect these villages to a water supply. As such, they turned to the joint committee for a stopgap solution until they can obtain the necessary funds. The joint committee worked quickly to develop a solution whereby the Baghdad PG would connect these villages to the Baghdad Amanat’s water supply. Since these villages fall under the Baghdad PG jurisdiction, the PG agreed to fund the connection.
On June 12, after unprecedented collaboration between the Baghdad Amanat and PG, the seven villages and their 2,000 citizens were successfully connected to Baghdad Amanat’s water supply. Baghdad PC member and joint committee member Nazar al-Sultani remarked that “the work of the joint committee was fast important, tangible and was able to serve about 2000 inhabitants of villages with pure clean water. Takamul contributed significantly to achieving that goal through the project’s support to the committee.” Dr. Riyad Naser al-Adad, Baghdad PC chair reinforced the significance by stating “Takamul was able to focus on one of the most important elements to
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 18
improve service delivery for the people of Baghdad. The establishment of the joint committee between Baghdad Amanat and Baghdad local government was able to serve about 2000 inhabitants by providing clean water from the Amanat main pipeline.”
The impact of this technical activity that focuses on facilitating structural coordination and jurisdiction has expanded to affect the daily lives of the villagers (a Sunni majority). This further stabilized the area and mitigated citizen feelings of neglect and marginalization by the Shia PG. Hassb Allah Fasal al-Jolan, a community member of al-Mamel area, remarked that “this is a great initiative and we thank the Governor, IGPA/Takamul, and Baghdad Amanat.” It should be noted that the ongoing water crisis impacts the regularity of water access to all Baghdad citizens, with Mr. Jolan noting that “we want water pumping to be continuous.” IGPA/Takamul will Hassb Allah Fasal al-Jolan, a community member of al-Mamel area. continue its work to improve water supply service delivery capacity.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 19
2000 ﻣواطن ﻣن ﺑﻐداد ﯾﺣﺻﻠون ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺎء ﻣن ﺧﻼل ﺗﻌﺎون اﻟﻠﺟﻧﺔ اﻟﻣﺷﺗرﻛﺔ ﺛﻣﺔ ﻋدم ﺗﻧﺳﯾﻖ ادراي ﻓﻲ ﺟﺎﻧب اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت ﺑﯾن أﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐداد وﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﻐداد اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ، ﻣﻣﺎ أﺛر ﺳﻠﺑﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻘدﯾم اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت اﻟﻔﻌﺎﻟﺔ إﻟﻰ ﻣواطﻧﻲ ﺑﻐداد. وﺟﺎء ﻋدم اﻟﺗﻧﺳﯾﻖ ھذا ﺑﺳﺑب ان ﻛﻼ اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺗﯾن ﻟﮭﻣﺎ ﻣﯾزاﻧﯾﺎت ﻣﻧﻔﺻﻠﺔ وھﯾﺎﻛل ﺗﻧظﯾﻣﯾﺔ ﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔﺔ، ﻣﻣﺎ أدى إﻟﻰ ﻣوارد ﻣﮭدورة وﺟﮭود ﻣﺗﻛررة. ان اﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐداد ﻣﺳؤوﻟﺔ ﻋن ﺗوﻓﯾر اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت ﻟﻠﻌﺎﺻﻣﺔ ﺑﯾﻧﻣﺎ ﺗﻘدم ﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﻐداد اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت ﻟﺑﻘﯾﺔ ﻣﺣﺎﻓظﺔ ﺑﻐداد. وﺣﻼ ﻟﮭذه اﻟﻣﺷﻛﻠﺔ، ﺷﻛل ﻣﺷروع ﺗﻛﺎﻣل ﻟﺟﻧﺔ ﻣﺷﺗرﻛﺔ ﻷﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐداد و ﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﻐداد اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ ﻟﻣﻌﺎﻟﺟﺔ ﻗﺿﺎﯾﺎ ﺗﻘدﯾم اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت اﻟطوﯾﻠﺔ واﻟﻘﺻﯾرة اﻻﺟل اﻻﺳﺗراﺗﯾﺟﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗواﺟﮭﮭﺎ ﻛﻼ اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺗﺎن. ﺣﯾث ﺗﻘوم اﻟﻠﺟﻧﺔ اﻟﻣﺷﺗرﻛﺔ ﺑﺷﻛل ﺧﺎص ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻧﻧﺳﯾﻖ واﻟﺗﻌﺎون ﻓﻲ ﺗﻘدﯾم ﺧدﻣﺎت اﻟﻣﯾﺎه وإدارة اﻟﻧﻔﺎﯾﺎت اﻟﺻﻠﺑﺔ. ان اﺣد أھم اﻟﻘﺿﺎﯾﺎ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗؤﺛر ﻟﯾس ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻐداد ﻓﻘط ﺑل ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻌراق ﺑرﻣﺗﮫ ھﻲ ﻣﺳﺄﻟﺔ ﺷﺣﺔ اﻟﻣﯾﺎه اﻟﻣﺳﺗﻣرة. وﻛﺟزء ﻣن اﻟﺗزاﻣﺎﺗﮭﺎ ، ﺣددت اﻟﻠﺟﻧﺔ اﻟﻣﺷﺗرﻛﺔ اﻟﻣﻧﺎطﻖ اﻷﻛﺛر ﺗﺄﺛرا واﻟﻣﺳﺎﺋل اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺳﮭم ﻓﻲ ﺧدﻣﺎت اﻟﻣﯾﺎه. ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﺑﯾل اﻟﻣﺛﺎل ﺣددت اﻟﻠﺟﻧﺔ ﺳﺑﻊ ﻗرى ﺗﺣت ﺻﻼﺣﯾﺎت ﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﻐداد اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻐداد واﻟﺗﻲ ﻟم ﯾﻛن ﺑﺈﻣﻛﺎﻧﮭﺎ اﻟﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﯾﺎه اﻟﺷرب. ﺗﻘﻊ ھذه اﻟﻘرى ﻓﻲ ﻣﻧطﻘﺔ ﺗﻌرف ﺑﺎﺳم ﺣزام ﺑﻐداد. ﻛﺎﻧت ھذه اﻟﻣﻧطﻘﺔ ﺗﺳﺑب ﻣﺧﺎوف أﻣﻧﯾﺔ وﺗﮭدد اﻻﺳﺗﻘرار ﻓﻲ ﺑﻐداد ﺑﺳﺑب اﺳﺗﻐﻼﻟﮭﺎ اﻟﻛﺑﯾر ﻣن ﻗﺑل اﻟﺗﻣرد اﻟﺳﻧﻲ واﻟﻘﺎﻋدة وﻋﺻﺎﺑﺎت داﻋش ، وﻻﺣﻘﺎ اﺳﺗﻐﻠت ھذا اﻟﻘرى ﻣن ﺑﻌض ﻣﺳﻠﺣﻲ اﻟﺣﺷد اﻟﺷﻌﺑﻲ، وﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻋﺻﺎﺋب أھل اﻟﺣﻖ. وﻧظرا ﻟﻠﻌﻣﻠﯾﺎت اﻟﻌﺳﻛرﯾﺔ ﻋﻣﺎل ﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﻐداد اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ ﯾﻧﺻﺑون ﺧطوط اﻧﺎﻧﺑﯾب اﻟﻣﯾﺎه ﻟﯾرﺑطوھﺎ ﺑﺎﻧﺎﺑﯾب ﻣﯾﺎه اﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐداد اﻟﻣﺳﺗﻣرة واﻻﺷﺗﺑﺎﻛﺎت ﺣرم ﺳﻛﺎن ﺗﻠك اﻟﻘرى ﻣن اﻟﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﯾﺎه اﻟﺷرب. ﻟﻘد ﺣﺎوﻟت ﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﻐداد اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ ﻣﺣﺎوﻻت ﻏﯾر ﻧﺎﺟﺣﺔ ﻟﻠﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﻰ أﻣوال ﻟﻣﺷروع اﻟﻣﺎء ﻣن اﺟل رﺑط ھذه اﻟﻘرى ﺑﺷﻛل داﺋم ﺑﺎﻧﺎﺑﯾب اﻟﻣﯾﺎه. ﻋﻠﻰ ھذا اﻟﻧﺣو ، ﻟﺟﺄوا إﻟﻰ اﻟﻠﺟﻧﺔ اﻟﻣﺷﺗرﻛﺔ ﻟﻠﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣل ﻣؤﻗت ﺣﺗﻰ ﯾﺗﻣﻛﻧوا ﻣن اﻟﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻣوال اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ. وﻋﻣﻠت اﻟﻠﺟﻧﺔ اﻟﻣﺷﺗرﻛﺔ ﺑﺳرﻋﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗطوﯾر ﺣل ﯾﻣﻛن ﻣن ﺧﻼﻟﮫ أن ﺗﻘوم ﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﻐداد ﺑرﺑط ھذه اﻟﻘرى ﺑﺎﻧﺎﺑﯾب ﻣﯾﺎه أﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐداد. وﺑﻣﺎ أن ھذه اﻟﻘرى ﺗﻘﻊ ﺿﻣن ﺻﻼﺣﯾﺎت ﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﻐداد اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ، ﻓﻘد واﻓﻘت ﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﻐداد اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻣوﯾل رﺑط اﻻﻧﺎﺑﯾب. ﻓﻲ 12 ﺣزﯾران ﺑﻌد ﺗﻌﺎون ﻏﯾر ﻣﺳﺑوق ﺑﯾن أﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐداد و ﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﻐداد، ﻧﺟﺣت اﻟﻘرى اﻟﺳﺑﻊ وﺳﻛﺎﻧﮭﺎ اﻟﺑﺎﻟﻎ ﻋددھم 2000 ﺷﺧص ﻓﻲ اﻟﺣﺻول اﻟﻣﯾﺎه ﻋن طرﯾﻖ رﺑط اﻧﺎﺑﯾب ﻣﯾﺎه ھذه اﻟﻘرى ﺑﺎﻧﺎﺑﯾب ﻣﯾﺎه أﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐداد. وﻋﻠﻖ ﻋﺿو ﻣﺟﻠس ﻣﺣﺎﻓظﺔ ﺑﻐداد وﻋﺿو اﻟﻠﺟﻧﺔ اﻟﻣﺷﺗرﻛﺔ ﻧزار اﻟﺳﻠطﺎﻧﻲ ﺑﺄن "ﻋﻣل اﻟﻠﺟﻧﺔ اﻟﻣﺷﺗرﻛﺔ ﻛﺎن ﺳرﯾﻌﺎً وﻣﻠﻣوﺳﺎً وﻛﺎن ﻗﺎدراً ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧدﻣﺔ ﺣواﻟﻲ 2000 ﺷﺧص ﻣن ﺳﻛﺎن اﻟﻘرى ﺑﺎﻟﻣﯾﺎه اﻟﻧظﯾﻔﺔ". وﻗد ﺳﺎھم "ﻣﺷروع ﺗﻛﺎﻣل" ﺑﺷﻛل ﻛﺑﯾر ﻓﻲ ﺗﺣﻘﯾﻖ ھذا اﻟﮭدف ﻣن ﺧﻼل دﻋﻣﮫ ﻟﻠﺟﻧﺔ. وﻋزز رﺋﯾس ﻣﺟﻠس ﻣﺣﺎﻓظﺔ ﺑﻐداد اﻟدﻛﺗور رﯾﺎض ﻧﺎﺻر اﻟﻌﺿﺎض أھﻣﯾﺔ ذﻟك ﺑﻘوﻟﮫ " ﺗﻣﻛن ﻣﺷروع ﺗﻛﺎﻣل ﻣن اﻟﺗرﻛﯾز ﻋﻠﻰ واﺣدة ﻣن أھم ﻋﻧﺎﺻر ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺗﻘدﯾم اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت ﻟﻣواطﻧﻲ ﺑﻐداد. اذ ان ﺗﺷﻛﯾل اﻟﻠﺟﻧﺔ اﻟﻣﺷﺗرﻛﺔ ﺑﯾن أﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐداد وﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﻐداد
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 20
اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ ﻛﺎﻧت ﻗﺎدرة ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧدﻣﺔ ﺣواﻟﻲ 2000 ﺷﺧص ﻣن ﺧﻼل ﺗوﻓﯾر اﻟﻣﯾﺎه اﻟﻧظﯾﻔﺔ ﻣن ﺧط اﻷﻧﺎﺑﯾب اﻟرﺋﯾﺳﻲ اﻟﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻻﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐداد. وﻗد ﺗوﺳﻊ ﺗﺄﺛﯾر ھذا اﻟﻧﺷﺎط اﻟﻔﻧﻲ اﻟذي ﯾرﻛز ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺳﮭﯾل اﻟﺗﻧﺳﯾﻖ واﻻﺧﺗﺻﺎص اﻟﮭﯾﻛﻠﻲ ﻟﯾؤﺛر ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺣﯾﺎة اﻟﯾوﻣﯾﺔ ﻟﺳﻛﺎن اﻟﻘرى (ذو أﻻﻏﻠﺑﯾﺔ اﻟﺳﻧﯾﺔ). وﻗد أدى ھذا إﻟﻰ ﻣزﯾد ﻣن اﻻﺳﺗﻘرار ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﻧطﻘﺔ وﺗﺧﻔﯾف ﻣﺷﺎﻋر اﻟﻣواطﻧﯾن ﻣن اﻟﺷﻌور ﺑﺎﻹھﻣﺎل واﻟﺗﮭﻣﯾش ﻣن ﻗﺑل ﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺑﻐداد اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ اﻟﺷﯾﻌﺔ. ﻗﺎل ﺣﺳب ﷲ ﻓﺿل اﻟﺟوﻻن ، أﺣد أﻓراد اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻧطﻘﺔ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﻣل ، "ھذه ﻣﺑﺎدرة ﻋظﯾﻣﺔ وﻧﺷﻛر اﻟﻣﺣﺎﻓظ وﻣﺷروع ﺗﻛﺎﻣل واﻣﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻐداد". وﺗﺟدر اﻹﺷﺎرة إﻟﻰ أن أزﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﯾﺎه اﻟﺣﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﺗؤﺛر ﻋﻠﻰ اﻧﺗظﺎم وﺻول اﻟﻣﯾﺎه ﻟﺟﻣﯾﻊ ﻣواطﻧﻲ ﺑﻐداد ، ﺣﯾث أﺷﺎر اﻟﺳﯾد ﺟوﻻن إﻟﻰ "أﻧﻧﺎ ﻧرﯾد أن ﯾﻛون ﺿﺦ اﻟﻣﯾﺎه ﻣﺗواﺻﻼً". ﺳﯾواﺻل ﺣﺳب ﷲ ﻓﺿل اﻟﺟوﻻن, اﺣد اﻓراد اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻧطﻘﺔ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﺷروع ﺗﻛﺎﻣل ﻋﻣﻠﮫ ﻟﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﻗدرة اﯾﺻﺎل ﺧدﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﯾﺎه.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 21
IGPA/Takamul increases local revenue in Wasit
The Wasit Directorate of Youth and Sport (DoYS) generates most of its revenue needed to sustain its operations through the rental of its multi-purpose spaces, typically used for sports and/or community events. DoYS “investors” lease long-term (average rentals are six years) and develop multi-purpose event spaces like sports fields, gyms, and shops, that the Wasit community can then rent and use. This practice benefits the local government, which collects rental fees; the investor, who is able to earn revenue from the developed land; and the Wasit community, which is able to make use of these multi-purpose spaces.
Wasit investors developed multi-use rental spaces into a football field, gym, and game hall for the community to rent or pay membership fees
Despite this mutually beneficial system, the DoYS struggled to attract investors due to its cumbersome and inefficient rental application process, which required investors to complete 16 review steps and four approvals. The application process required an enormous amount of time on the part of the investor and the DoYS staff, resulting in high travel costs for the investor, who had to guide their application through the average 66-day process.
IGPA/Takamul worked with the DoYS to streamline the rental application process, reducing the processing days by 70 percent, from 66 to 20 days. This decrease reduced the associated application cost to investors by 66 percent, from 3 million IQD ($2,500 USD) to just 1 million IQD ($800 USD). As a result, DoYS’ average rental applications for a single rental property have increased from seven to 25 bids following improvements to the process.
DoYS has used the increased revenue to implement much needed rehabilitation of the directorate, buy essential equipment, and streamlined other inefficient processes such as gym licenses for sports centers.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 22
ﻣﺷروع ﺗﻛﺎﻣل ﯾزﯾد اﻻﯾرادات اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺣﺎﻓظﺔ واﺳط ﻋﻣﻠت ﻣدﯾرﯾﺔ اﻟﺷﺑﺎب واﻟرﯾﺎﺿﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺣﺎﻓظﺔ واﺳط ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗوﻓﯾر ﻣﻌظم اﯾراداﺗﮭﺎ اﻟﺗﻲ ھﻲ ﺑﺣﺎﺟﺔ اﻟﯾﮭﺎ ﻟﻠﺣﻔﺎظ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻣﻠﮭﺎ ﻣن ﺧﻼل ﺗﺄﺟﯾر اﻟﻣﺳﺎﺣﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﻌددة اﻻﺳﺗﺧدام واﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﻣﻛن ان ﺗﺳﺗﺧدم ﻟﻼﻋﻣﺎل اﻟرﯾﺎﺿﯾﺔ واﻻﻧﺷطﺔ اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻌﯾﺔ. ﺣﯾث ﯾﺳﺗﺄﺟر ﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣروا ﻣدﯾرﯾﺔ اﻟﺷﺑﺎب واﻟرﯾﺎﺿﺔ ﻣﺳﺎﺣﺎت ﻣﺗﻌددة اﻻﺳﺗﺧدام ﻟﻔﺗرات طوﯾﻠﺔ ﺑﻣﻌدل ﺳت ﺳﻧوات ﻣﺛل اﻟﻣﻼﻋب اﻟرﯾﺎﺿﯾﺔ وﺻﺎﻻت اﻟرﯾﺎﺿﺔ واﻟﻣﺣﻼت اﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﻣﻛن ﻟﻠﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ اﻟواﺳطﻲ اﺳﺗﺧداﻣﮭﺎ وﺗﺄﺟﯾرھﺎ ﻣن اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣرﯾن. ﺣﯾث ان ھذه اﻟﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺔ ﺗﺟدي ﺑﺎﻟﻧﻔﻊ ﻟﻠﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﻣن ﺷﺄﻧﮭﺎ ﺟﻣﻊ اﻣوال اﻻﯾﺟﺎر وﻟﻠﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣر اﻟذي ﯾﺟﻧﻲ رﺑﺣﺎ ﻣن اﻻراﺿﻲ اﻟﺗﻲ طورھﺎ وﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ واﺳط اﻟذي ﯾﺳﺗﻔﯾد ﻣن ﺗﻠك اﻻراﺿﻲ اﻟﻣﺗﻌددة اﻻﺳﺗﺧدام.
ﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣورا واﺳط ﯾطورون ﻣﺳﺎﺣﺎت اﯾﺟﺎر ﻣﺗﻌددة اﻻﺳﺗﺧدام ﻟﻣﻼﻋب ﻛرة ﻗدم وﻗﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﻌﺎب ﻟﻠﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﻣن اﺟل اﯾﺟﺎرھﺎ او دﻓﻊ اﺟور اﻟﻌﺿوﯾﺔ
رﻏم ﻧظﺎم اﻟﻣﻧﻔﻌﺔ اﻟﻣﺗﺑﺎدﻟﺔ ھذا, ﻋﻣﻠت ﻣدﯾرﯾﺔ اﻟﺷﺑﺎب واﻟرﯾﺎﺿﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺟذب اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣرﯾن ﺑﺷﻛل ﻓﻌﺎل ﺑﺳﺑب ﻋﻣﻠﯾﺔ اﻻﯾﺟﺎر اﻟﻣرھﻘﺔ وﻏﯾر اﻟﻔﻌﺎﻟﺔ واﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺗطﻠب ﻣن اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣرﯾن اﻛﻣﺎل 16 ﺧطوة ﺗﺗﺿﻣن ارﺑﻊ ﻣواﻓﻘﺎت. اذ ان ﻋﻣﻠﯾﺔ ﺗﻘدﯾم اﻟطﻠﺑﺎت ﺗﺗطﻠب وﻗﺗﺎ طوﯾﻼ ﻣن ﺟﺎﻧب اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣر وﻣن ﺟﺎﻧب ﻣوظﻔﻲ ﻣدﯾرﯾﺔ اﻟﺷﺑﺎب واﻟرﯾﺎﺿﺔ وھذا ﻣن ﺷﺄﻧﮫ ان ﯾﺗﺳﺑب ﺑﺗﻛﺎﻟﯾف ﻧﻘل ﻋﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣر اﻟذي ﯾﺟب ﻋﻠﯾﮫ ﻣﺗﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻋﻣﻠﯾﺔ ﺗﻘدﯾم اﻟطﻠب اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺳﺗﻣر ﺣواﻟﻲ 66 ﯾوﻣﺎ. ﻋﻣل ﻣﺷروع ﺗﻛﺎﻣل ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻌﺎون ﻣﻊ ﻣدﯾرﯾﺔ اﻟﺷﺑﺎب واﻟرﯾﺎﺿﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺳﮭﯾل اﺟراءات اﻻﺳﺗﺋﺟﺎر واﻟﺗﻲ ﻧﺗﺟت ﻋن ﺗﻘﻠﯾل ﻣدة ﻋﻣﻠﯾﺔ ﺗﻘدﯾم اﻟطﻠب ﺑﻧﺳﺑﺔ 70 ﺑﺎﻟﻣﺎﺋﺔ اي ﻗﻠﻠت اﻟﻣدة ﻣن 66 ﯾوﻣﺎ اﻟﻰ 20 ﯾوﻣﺎ. وھذا اﻻﻧﺧﻔﺎض ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣدة ادى اﻟﻰ ﺗﻘﻠﯾل اﻟﺗﻛﺎﻟﯾف اﻟﻣﺻﺎﺣﺑﺔ ﻟﻌﻣﻠﯾﺔ ﺗﻘدﯾم اﻟطﻠب ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣر ﺑﻧﺳﺔ 66 ﺑﺎﻟﻣﺎﺋﺔ اي ﺑﻣﻌﻧﻰ ﺗﻘﻠﯾل اﻟﻛﻔﻠﺔ ﻣن 3 ﻣﻼﯾﯾن دﯾﻧﺎر ($2500) اﻟﻰ ﻣﻠﯾون دﯾﻧﺎر ($800). وﻧﺗﯾﺟﺔ ﻟذﻟك ازداد ﻣﻌدل ﺗﻘدﯾم طﻠﺑﺎت اﻻﯾﺟﺎر ﻟﻠﻌﻘﺎر اﻟواﺣد ﻣن 7 اﻟﻰ 25 ﻋرﺿﺎ ﺑﻌد اﻟﺗﺣﺳن اﻟذي طرأ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻣﻠﯾﺔ ﺗﻘدﯾم اﻟطﻠﺑﺎت. واﺳﺗﺧدﻣت ﻣدﯾرﯾﺔ اﻟﺷﺑﺎب واﻟرﯾﺎﺿﺔ اﻻﯾرادات اﻟﻣﺗزاﯾدة ﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ ﺑﻌض اﻻﺣﺗﯾﺎﺟﺎت ﻣﺛل اﻋﺎدة ﺗﺄھﯾل اﻟﻣدﯾرﯾﺔ وﺷراء ﺑﻌض اﻟﻣﻌدات اﻻﺳﺎﺳﯾﺔ وﺗﺳﮭﯾل ﺑﻌض اﻻﺟراءات اﻟﻣﻌﻘدة ﻣﺛل ﺗراﺧﯾص ﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﻻﻟﻌﺎب واﻟﻣراﻛز اﻟرﯾﺎﺿﯾﺔ.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 23
ANNEX 5: CONTRACT DELIVERABLES
Deliverable Title Submission Status Date Election Biweekly 1-Apr Final/Sent to USAID for Review Weekly Report 5-Apr Final/USAID Approval Not Needed Weekly Report 12-Apr Final/USAID Approval Not Needed Election Biweekly 15-Apr Final/Sent to USAID for Review Weekly Report 19-Apr Final/USAID Approval Not Needed Weekly Report 26-Apr Final/USAID Approval Not Needed Election Biweekly 29-Apr Final/Sent to USAID for Review Weekly Report 3-May Final/USAID Approval Not Needed Weekly Report 10-May Final/USAID Approval Not Needed 6 Flash Reports- Special Voting Day 12-May Final/Sent to USAID for Review Reports 6 Flash Reports - Election Day 12-May Final/Sent to USAID for Review Post-Election Update report 17-May Final/USAID Approval Not Needed Weekly Report 17-May Final/USAID Approval Not Needed Weekly Report 24-May Final/USAID Approval Not Needed IGPA Voter Registration Assessment 31-May Final/USAID Approval Not Needed -Final Report Weekly Report 31-May Final/USAID Approval Not Needed Weekly Report 7-Jun Final/USAID Approval Not Needed Weekly Report 14-Jun Final/USAID Approval Not Needed Iraq 2018 Elections Report 17-Jun Final/Sent to USAID for Review Weekly Report 28-Jun Final/USAID Approval Not Needed
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 24
ANNEX 6: POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS AND REPORTS
Report Title Submission Date 12 A Week in Politics Reports – Annex to Weekly Report April1 – June 30, 2018 Decentralization in KRG May 27, 2018 One Week Post the Election Report May 20, 2018 Six Ad hoc Political Reports-Election Support May 11-14, 2018 Pre-Election Wrap up Report May 11, 2018 (6) Pre-Election PEAs: Anbar, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Diyala, May 10, 2018 Basrah, and KRG- Election Support Election Weekly Report May 8, 2018 Analysis of Sistani Fatwa on the Elections May 4, 2018 Bi-Weekly Election Assistant Report May 1, 2018 Political Analysis: Kirkuk Pre-Election Brief April 25, 2018 Political Analysis: Minister of Education Suspends April 23, 2018 Function/Activity Transfer
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 25
ANNEX 7: SUBCONTRACTORS OVERVIEW
Al JIDARA CONTRACT VALUE:
ROLE ON IGPA/Takamul: Al Jidara’s primary responsibilities include providing technical assistance in support of IGPA/Takamul’s Objective One, “Enhance GOI Service Delivery Capacity,” which provides technical assistance to government institutions and regulators to improve service delivery outcomes in sectors with potential for high impact and visibility at the national, provincial, and local levels. This includes the provision of a Service Delivery Advisor and three Service Delivery Coordinators. Al Jidara’s activities include technical assistance for government institutions and regulators to improve service delivery, the creation of regulatory and procedural certainty to attract private sector investment, and support for organizational restructuring and strengthening with regards to provincial government execution of service delivery.
GENDER RESOURCES, INC. (GRI) CONTRACT VALUE:
ROLE ON IGPA/Takamul: GRI provides cross-cutting support to IGPA/Takamul through activities related to gender, vulnerable populations, and youth, and by working to support activities that ensure a gender-sensitive approach to IGPA/Takamul programming while promoting a reduction in gender disparities within the provincial government. GRI uses their experience to ensure that IGPA/Takamul takes diversity-sensitive approaches to citizen outreach, planning, and service delivery across the board. GRI contributes to both of IGPA/Takamul’s concurrent work streams, one to produce “quick win” demonstrable improvements in service delivery with high- visibility, high-priority, projects; and the other to help correct systemic capacity deficiencies in Iraqi governance.
OVERSEAS STRATEGIC CONSULTING (OSC) CONTRACT VALUE:
ROLE ON IGPA/Takamul: OSC provides support to IGPA/Takamul under Objective Three, “Strengthen Monitoring and Oversight of Service Delivery and Public Expenditure,” by working to make provincial government staff more receptive to citizen feedback and promoting citizen engagement with local government. They work to achieve these goals by providing trainings to provincial government staff on effective citizen participation and public outreach mechanisms; designing public awareness programs for citizens and civil society organizations to increase participation in provincial budget development, service delivery outcomes, and investment priorities; and designing public awareness programs using innovative technology to enhance citizen consultation and engagement.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 26
SOUKTEL CONTRACT VALUE:
ROLE ON IGPA/Takamul: Souktel provides cross-cutting support to IGPA/Takamul under all project objectives. Souktel’s main tasks will be to develop citizen feedback “hotline” tools that allow citizens to make suggestions/complaints and share feedback with regard to public services, develop a public access online accountability and transparency hub that consolidates quantitative and qualitative data, develop digital solutions to problems identified by the IGPA/Takamul project team, and perform other tasks identified by either IGPA/Takamul’s Strategic Communications Manager or Senior M&E Advisor. Souktel will provide short-term technical assistance to support IGPA/Takamul in conducting brief audits of selected governorates focusing on their ability to plan and execute effective outreach and basic communication strategies, with a goal of defining outreach Assistance Packages to be delivered for provincial management units and others involved in service delivery. Souktel has also conducted an initial scoping mission to get an understanding of the current ICT context in Iraq.
ERNST & YOUNG CONTRACT VALUE:
ROLE ON IGPA/Takamul: Ernst & Young’s primary responsibility is to provide cross-cutting support to IGPA/Takamul under Objective Two, “Improve Governorate and National Government Public Financial Management,” Objective Three, “Strengthen Monitoring and Oversight of Service Delivery and Public Expenditure,” and Objective Four, “Support Iraqi Change Agents.” They achieve this by supporting the development of internal procedures to implement and comply with Ministry of Finance standards; providing analysis and making recommendations to increase locally derived revenue streams; assisting with the development and implementation of standard operating procedures to manage expenditure assignments; and developing regulations on decentralized finance, financial reporting, and oversight of expenditures. Ernst & Young deploys technical advisors to support the project in these and other areas.
IRFAD CONTRACT VALUE:
ROLE ON IGPA/Takamul: IRFAD coordinated with senior IGPA/Takamul staff to conduct research and administer a survey to assess service delivery capacity across Iraq. IRFAD first conducted a desk analysis of existing laws and policies, studies of service delivery, political economy analyses, and media reports to understand the current service delivery environment. They then conducted key informant/stakeholder interviews and developed a survey questionnaire to administer in the capital and across all provinces. Interviews and surveys were conducted at the national and provincial levels through one-on-one meetings and focus groups. IGPA/Takamul staff utilize this data for various reports.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 27
GAFFNEY, CLINE & ASSOCIATES (GCA) CONTRACT VALUE:
ROLE ON IGPA/Takamul: Gaffney, Cline & Associates provided technical assistance under IGPA/Takamul’s Objective Four, “Support Iraqi Change Agents.” This falls under the IDIQ portion of DAI’s prime contract, specifically Task Order One, effective August 31, 2017. GCA’s activities supported the Iraqi Ministry of Oil to draft guidelines that will form the basis of a model contract for investments in the country’s natural gas sector. Technical activities supported the World Bank in preparation for their Development Policy Financing III’s (DPF III) project. GCA’s deliverables included a model Supplementary Natural Gas Processing Agreement, a Natural Gas Marketing Regulation, a Natural Gas Transport Regulation, a Coordination and Implementation Roadmap for a flaring-reduction-gas-to-power program, and a workshop with Ministry of Oil leadership.
GARDAWORLD CONTRACT VALUE:
ROLE ON IGPA/Takamul: GardaWorld provides professional risk management services to IGPA/Takamul, especially focusing on providing mobile security for movements in Baghdad and across Iraq. Road movement is risk and information-led, and conducted using armored vehicles. GardaWorld provides services in IGPA/Takamul’s initial operational areas, including Baghdad, Basrah, and Erbil, as well as surrounding provinces, but may be called upon to provide mobile security services elsewhere when required. GardaWorld also provides threat assessments and manage physical movements under the monitoring and oversight of the DAI Country Security Manager. To keep staff abreast of security concerns, GardaWorld provides daily, weekly, and individual incident reports as designated by the DAI Country Security Manager.
IGPA/TAKAMUL – QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1 – JUNE 30, 2018 28