EAI Commentary No. 15

A Complex Strategy to Overcome the Yeonpyeong Incident EAI Commentary No. 15 December 31, 2010

The Need for a Complex Strategy The Korean Peninsula went through the Ko- Young-Sun Ha toward North Korea rean War in 1950 and following of the cease-

fire, both Koreas were stuck between ‘hot war’

Since North Korea’s deadly artillery barrage and ‘cold war.’ Since the collapse of the Soviet on Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea has been Union, the world has passed the stage of ‘cold stepping up efforts in its defense posture and peace’ and moved towards a ‘hot peace.’ In international cooperation. In preparing spite of this global shift, North Korea has been against any further provocation from the frequently using combinations of ‘cold war,’ North, Seoul has been reinforcing forces on ‘hot war,’ ‘cold peace,’ and ‘hot peace’ on the the island, strengthening defense and deter- international strategic chessboard. For exam- rence capabilities, and drastically increasing ple, during the Cold War period North Korea its defense budget. Somewhat belatedly, it has provoked the South in a number of cases: also been taking up actions to reexamine the Rangoon bombing (1983), bombing of Korean strategies of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, Air Flight 858 (1987), attempted Blue House demanding cooperation from China and Rus- raid (1968), North Korean infiltration in the sia while maintaining the traditional trilateral Uljin and Samcheok areas (1968). Even in the cooperation with the United States and Japan. post-Cold War period, nuclear tests, naval Of course, analyzing the causes of the weak battles in the Yellow Sea, the sinking of Cheo- response to the shelling and preparing to pre- nan naval ship and the shelling on Yeon- vent further provocations are undoubtedly pyeong Island ensued. At the same time, important. However, reading the bigger pic- Pyongyang has been aggressively demanding EAI Commentary seeks ture and formulating key strategies for the for a peace agreement to this day. to play a leading role in providing profound future is a far more critical task. The Kim The possibility for limited warfare on the perspectives and timely suggestions toward cur- Jong-il/Kim Jong-un leadership in November Korean Peninsula came dangerously close rent issues. 2010 conducted two consecutive moves— with the recent Yeonpyeong shelling, more so

revealing its uranium enrichment facilities than the last North Korean provocation, the The East Asia Institute 909 Sampoong B/D and launching an artillery strike on Yeon- sinking of the Cheonan. As the pendulum of 310-68 Euljiro 4-ga Jung-gu Seoul 100-786 pyeong Island. Understanding the situation of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula swung Republic of Korea the whole East Asian region, while at the same from the ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ greater chaos © EAI 2010 time anticipating Pyongyang’s strategies and arise. It is expected that the Kim Jong-il/Kim taking preemptive actions will be the main Jong-un regime will try to maximize the use challenges ahead for Seoul. of this pendulum of peace and war in order to Firstly, it is important to understand the strengthen Kim Jong-un’s weak power base. range of North Korea’s strategic options from In spite of the dangers, merely worrying aggressive diplomacy to peaceful diplomacy. about the possibility of war is not going to www.eai.or.kr

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help. Rather, we have to understand precisely nor ‘reform with denuclearization’ is included why the North has raised the bar of aggression in the range of North Korea’s strategic options. from acts of terrorism to that of a direct artil- On the other hand, South Korea has the lery attack on South Korean territory. It is problem with its narrow range of options. likely that the North would pursue a ‘cold Compared to North Korea’s pendulum widely peace’ offensive to utilize the amplitude of the swinging from ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ South pendulum. A complex picture emerges when Korea’s pendulum swings narrowly between looking back on the recent comments made the Sunshine Policy and sanctions. For Seoul, by top officials from North Korea, the United a more comprehensive strategy must be uti- States, and China. Seoul and Washington have lized against Pyongyang including measures called for Pyongyang to engage in measures for military, diplomacy, and unification. Most for active denuclearization and reengagement importantly, in order to stop the North in- in inter-Korean relations as preconditions for creasing its use of belligerence to bring the resuming the Six-Party Talks. North Korea on Korean Peninsula to brink of full-scale war, the other hand has taken precisely the oppo- South Korea needs to work more closely with “The worn out efforts site measures. To read what the North Korean the United States to devise military capabili- for the Sunshine Policy regime has in mind we have to think of the ties for deterrence, ‘defensive defense,’ and or sanctions must be situation not as a motionless snapshot but as a ‘offensive defense.’ Altogether such measures put aside and a more moving footage. Furthermore, South Korea will strip North Korea’s options to use orga- effective policy must must do more than just respond to North Ko- nized provocations. replace them.” rea’s actions. Instead it should focus on mak- The issue here is whether or not Kim ing strategically preemptive moves. For this, it Jong-un will inherit his father’s will— songun is necessary to examine why the North Korean or the military-first politics—to run the next regime expanded the pendulum’s amplitude regime. After Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, the and find measures to make the leadership consequences of Kim Jong-il’s choice of mili- pursue a survival strategy that does not in- tary-first politics, was to go through an “Ar- clude huddling around nuclear weapons. duous March.” If Kim Jong-un chooses to in- As was demonstrated in the Yeonpyeong herit and continue with the military-first poli- Incident, Kim Jong-il is passing down exactly tics, a worst fate will befall him. What then what he has learned from his father, Kim Il- can be done to dissuade Kim Jong-un from sung, to his son, Kim Jong-un. Following the inheriting the legacy of his father and repeat- pattern of brinkmanship, Kim Jong-il showed ing the path of failure? The answer is complex a strong determination for ‘nuclearization’ strategies. First, South Korea needs to make instead of ‘denuclearization,’ ‘deterioration’ of the North realize that the military-first poli- relations, not ‘improvement.’ Obviously, the tics focused on nuclear development will only next step will be a ‘clinch’ strategy to buy time, result in total collapse of the regime. The such as allowing IAEA inspections or resum- worn out efforts for the Sunshine Policy or ing the Six-Party Talks thus the pendulum will sanctions must be put aside and a more effec- swing towards peace. But these are ‘salami tive policy must replace them. In short, a si- tactics’ to successfully establish the Kim Jong- multaneous approach should be taken: it must un regime. As of now, neither ‘full-scale war’ prepare for a method to incapacitate North

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Korea’s belligerence while framing a compre- lesser of two evils, maintaining the North Ko- hensive peace system to better response rean regime over provoking its possible col- against the North’s peace offensive. The Sun- lapse which would result in a disaster for shine Policy can increase limited exchanges, Northeast China. Therefore, cooperation with but it cannot bring about fundamental China is as important as trilateral cooperation changes in the military-first politics. Taking with the U.S. and Japan for resolving the off the coat is not enough. We need a change North Korean problem. in the DNA sequence. Sensing the relative decline of the United North Korea’s denuclearization is possible States, China with its own rise is taking ad- if and only if the succeeding regime abandons vantage and has recently made strong com- the old system and pursues a new nuclear-free ments against the U.S. policies. This stands in strategy. This will require political figures to contrast to the 1990s when China candidly demote military-first politics as the central acknowledged the power gap between them priority while at the same time it will need and rather focused on its own economy while comprehensive efforts from South Korea, the delicately making moves in international poli- “The question is United States, and Japan to provide security tics. It is interesting that China maintains the whether it is assurances. For this, a very comprehensive principles of Taoguang Yanghui (Bide our time, appropriate for China security system is needed to assure North Ko- build our capacities) and Yousuo Zuowei to raise its voice against rea of its future. Furthermore, on top of the (Doing some things to make our voice heard the United States efforts to find a way to denuclearize the North, in the world) yet has increasingly been taking at this time.” regional and global financial support systems a more assertive position toward the United should be established. In a long-run, the States. This is in part related to the fact that North and related states should pursue a strat- China’s confidence grew after the global fi- egy of coevolution for the 21st century devel- nancial crisis, but what deserves attention at opment of North Korea. the same time is the influence of domestic politics on its foreign policy. With a leadership succession due in 2012, China is in the midst Pursuing a Complex Diplomacy with China of a political competition to clarify its global position through its foreign policy. During the The most important yet the most difficult task power shift, those who clearly express China’s in a comprehensive strategy towards North confidence on the world stage will have a Korea is the policies regarding China. Chinese more advantageous position in domestic po- influence on North Korea is critical. As is well litical power competition. This clarification of known, China has been unhappy with North its global position can be best shown in its Korea in recent years over the lack of basic strategies against the United States. Hence, communication as the North Korean regime domestic politics are invoking China to make pursues its extreme military-first policies critical comments against the U.S. policies. without consultations with its sole ally. In The question is whether it is appropriate spite of this, Beijing has always chosen to back for China to raise its voice against the United Pyongyang to some extent. Putting its econo- States at this time. In 2008, on the 30th anni- my as the first priority, China is choosing the versary of ‘Reforms and Openness’, Hu Jintao

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proclaimed that the country will achieve a ber, 2010.1 The speech as basically detailed high level of Xiaokang Shehui (a moderately America’s comprehensive policies in the Asia- prosperous society) by 2021, which will mark Pacific region. Of course the U.S. engagement the 100th anniversary of Chinese Communist strategy includes military measures, but it is Party. As of now, GDP per capita is 4,000 dol- far more complex. That is, it will not take on lars and by 2021, it is likely to break the 10,000 the zero-sum perspective like it did during the dollars mark. However, Hu Jintao has proc- Cold War. Rather the United States will pro- laimed that 2049 as the year that China will mote friendly relations with newly rising truly aim for. That year represents not merely states such as China, India, and ASEAN states, an economic goal but a more fundamental while also maintaining strengthened ties with and broader one: showing the world China as five allied states, such as South Korea and Ja- a new standard of civilization. pan in East Asia. The speech also implies Against this backdrop, both Beijing and Washington’s willingness to engage interna- Washington are trying to forecast the out- tional organizations in the region. By broa- come of the U.S.-China summit which will dening the scope of engagement, Secretary of “By contrast, China be held in January, 2011. The talks are un- State Clinton is framing the U.S. smart power has yet to break away likely to break down in the middle of the which appropriately combines soft power and from the old habit of summit but it is expected that sealing a hard power in the areas of 3D (diplomacy, seeing things from deal will be tough. Although the United development, and defense). a dichotomous view.” States is in relative decline since 2008 with By contrast, China has yet to break away China on the rise, the process of this trend from the old habit of seeing things from a di- will be slower than expected. When a ma- chotomous view. It is looking at the world jor historical current flows in a particular through a narrow window of power struggle direction, self-management can make the and balance of power for national interests, decisive difference about the status of the which is the core principle in the modern in- states. The United States belatedly realized ternational order. With this narrow view, Chi- the danger of decline and now has been na cannot catch up with the United States. In pursuing its own comprehensive strategy in the Cold War era, the world was divided into order to adapt to the changing environ- two by the United States and Soviet Union. ment. But the new order of 21st century is much The future East Asian order will be more complicated. It will be harder for China more complex than China expects, and no to muster more powers than the United States clear blueprint has been suggested by poli- with this dichotomous world view. cy makers in Beijing. This was well reflect- For instance, Chinese politicians, media, ed in the recent competition between the and scholars look at the former South Korean United States and China for framework administration as pro-China and the current building of the East Asian order for the 21st century. 1 U.S. Department of State, "America's Engage- The U.S. Secretary of State Hilary ment in the Asia-Pacific," October 28, 2010, Clinton gave a speech titled “America’s En- http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/1501 gagement in the Asia-Pacific” in late Octo- 41.htm# (Accessed December 30, 2010).

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administration as pro-U.S., when in reality On the other hand, China’s network is rela- there is much more diversity of views in South tively too simple. Korean government. In fact, Seoul is trying to Expanding ties with China while streng- improve its relation with China without loo- thening the alliance with the United States is sening its important relationship with the the way South Korea must go. It is woefully United States and Japan. If China misunders- difficult for a weaker state to maneuver a tands these efforts not as Lian Mei Lian Zhong stronger state for the former’s benefit, if not (Being connected to United States and China impossible. As the famous 18th century Ko- at the same time) but as Lian Mei Kang Zhong rean scholar, Ji Won Park pointed out in his (Being connected to United States to counter work Heo Sang Jeon, “Bok Bul” (an expedition China), it is missing the bigger picture of this to conquer the north which means China) has era. China should no longer apply its dicho- its limits. Rather he emphasized network dip- tomous view in evaluating South Korea and lomacy by using marriage, commerce, and must try to recognize Seoul’s pro-U.S./China education to the greatest extent. South Korea policy. should follow the advice of Ji Won Park in the st “The most pressing For South Korea, the need for U.S.-China 21 century. Through the three steps of ‘ex- issue for South Korea cooperation is vital. If the United States and pansion,’ ‘intensification’ and ‘trust building,’ in carrying out China turn their backs on each other, South South Korea should make China formulate a comprehensive policies Korea will be forced to make a difficult deci- more comprehensive diplomacy which reflects towards North Korea is sion. While the Cold War still exists on the the interest not only of its own but also of how to overcome the split in public opinion.” Korean Peninsula, the global order, even U.S.- South Korea, the Korean Peninsula, East Asia China relations are not like that of the Cold and the world. War period. Although there are several con- flicting elements, mutual cooperation between the two states is inescapable as has been clear- Overcoming the Split ly shown through their economic relations. in South Korean Public Opinion South Korea and China are also too mutually dependent to break away from each other. In The most pressing issue for South Korea in terms of economy and investment, China has carrying out comprehensive policies towards become the largest partner for South Korea. North Korea is how to overcome the split in Therefore, Seoul has to hold friendly relations public opinion. From the Cheonan incident to with both Beijing and Washington. For this, the Yeonpyeong Island attack, strong conflicts U.S.-China relations should be enhanced. If prevail among South Koreans both in cyber- Chinese leaders pressure South Korea to make space and in reality. It is difficult to push for a choice between the traditional alliance with an effective and refined complex strategy in United States and the new partnership with the midst of this tense atmosphere. What is China, it will not do much to help China to needed at this moment is a future-oriented expand its influence in the world. Currently, policy that can draw out a popular agreement the United States is making great efforts to regardless of party affiliation. include everyone in its network except a few For this, South Korea needs to be outlier states such as North Korea and Iran. equipped with bigger pendulum amplitude

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than that of the North, and take preemptive understanding of where public opinion is actions in an effective way. The current ad- going in this internet era, Seoul needs to sug- ministration’s “Grand Bargain” policy falls gest a persuasive discourse and carry out open short in its persuasiveness amidst popular discussion concerning its policy towards discord. When South Korea recovers from the North Korea both on the internet and in reali- wound of the attack on Yeonpyeong Island ty.■ and when the North reinitiates its peace offen- sive strategy, popular opinion in South Korea is likely to be bipolarized once again. There- ――― Professor Young-Sun Ha received fore, South Korea should not only strengthen Ph.D. in international politics from University its readiness for ‘cold war’ and ‘hot war,’ but of Washington. He is currently a professor in also prepare measures for ‘cold peace’ and ‘hot the Department of Political Science and Inter- peace.’ In other words, South Korea is re- national Relations at Seoul National Universi- quired to take a leading role in stopping North ty and a chairman of Global Net 21 at East Korea from its aggressive diplomacy as well as Asia Institute. building a constructive diplomacy for peace- ful reunification. Meanwhile, with the precise

Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. The East Asia institute, an Asia Security Initiative core institution, ac- knowledges the MacArthur Foundation for its generous grant and continued support. This commentary has been translated from the original on De- cember 20, 2010. This commentary is produced with help of Eun Hae Choi, Jina Kim, Yang Gyu Kim, Stephen Ranger, and Hyun Young Yoon. 6