A Complex Strategy to Overcome the Yeonpyeong Incident EAI Commentary No
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EAI Commentary No. 15 A Complex Strategy to Overcome the Yeonpyeong Incident EAI Commentary No. 15 December 31, 2010 The Need for a Complex Strategy The Korean Peninsula went through the Ko- Young-Sun Ha toward North Korea rean War in 1950 and following of the cease- fire, both Koreas were stuck between ‘hot war’ Since North Korea’s deadly artillery barrage and ‘cold war.’ Since the collapse of the Soviet on Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea has been Union, the world has passed the stage of ‘cold stepping up efforts in its defense posture and peace’ and moved towards a ‘hot peace.’ In international cooperation. In preparing spite of this global shift, North Korea has been against any further provocation from the frequently using combinations of ‘cold war,’ North, Seoul has been reinforcing forces on ‘hot war,’ ‘cold peace,’ and ‘hot peace’ on the the island, strengthening defense and deter- international strategic chessboard. For exam- rence capabilities, and drastically increasing ple, during the Cold War period North Korea its defense budget. Somewhat belatedly, it has provoked the South in a number of cases: also been taking up actions to reexamine the Rangoon bombing (1983), bombing of Korean strategies of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, Air Flight 858 (1987), attempted Blue House demanding cooperation from China and Rus- raid (1968), North Korean infiltration in the sia while maintaining the traditional trilateral Uljin and Samcheok areas (1968). Even in the cooperation with the United States and Japan. post-Cold War period, nuclear tests, naval Of course, analyzing the causes of the weak battles in the Yellow Sea, the sinking of Cheo- response to the shelling and preparing to pre- nan naval ship and the shelling on Yeon- vent further provocations are undoubtedly pyeong Island ensued. At the same time, important. However, reading the bigger pic- Pyongyang has been aggressively demanding EAI Commentary seeks ture and formulating key strategies for the for a peace agreement to this day. to play a leading role in providing profound future is a far more critical task. The Kim The possibility for limited warfare on the perspectives and timely suggestions toward cur- Jong-il/Kim Jong-un leadership in November Korean Peninsula came dangerously close rent issues. 2010 conducted two consecutive moves— with the recent Yeonpyeong shelling, more so revealing its uranium enrichment facilities than the last North Korean provocation, the The East Asia Institute 909 Sampoong B/D and launching an artillery strike on Yeon- sinking of the Cheonan. As the pendulum of 310-68 Euljiro 4-ga Jung-gu Seoul 100-786 pyeong Island. Understanding the situation of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula swung Republic of Korea the whole East Asian region, while at the same from the ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ greater chaos © EAI 2010 time anticipating Pyongyang’s strategies and arise. It is expected that the Kim Jong-il/Kim taking preemptive actions will be the main Jong-un regime will try to maximize the use challenges ahead for Seoul. of this pendulum of peace and war in order to Firstly, it is important to understand the strengthen Kim Jong-un’s weak power base. range of North Korea’s strategic options from In spite of the dangers, merely worrying aggressive diplomacy to peaceful diplomacy. about the possibility of war is not going to www.eai.or.kr 1 help. Rather, we have to understand precisely nor ‘reform with denuclearization’ is included why the North has raised the bar of aggression in the range of North Korea’s strategic options. from acts of terrorism to that of a direct artil- On the other hand, South Korea has the lery attack on South Korean territory. It is problem with its narrow range of options. likely that the North would pursue a ‘cold Compared to North Korea’s pendulum widely peace’ offensive to utilize the amplitude of the swinging from ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ South pendulum. A complex picture emerges when Korea’s pendulum swings narrowly between looking back on the recent comments made the Sunshine Policy and sanctions. For Seoul, by top officials from North Korea, the United a more comprehensive strategy must be uti- States, and China. Seoul and Washington have lized against Pyongyang including measures called for Pyongyang to engage in measures for military, diplomacy, and unification. Most for active denuclearization and reengagement importantly, in order to stop the North in- in inter-Korean relations as preconditions for creasing its use of belligerence to bring the resuming the Six-Party Talks. North Korea on Korean Peninsula to brink of full-scale war, the other hand has taken precisely the oppo- South Korea needs to work more closely with “The worn out efforts site measures. To read what the North Korean the United States to devise military capabili- for the Sunshine Policy regime has in mind we have to think of the ties for deterrence, ‘defensive defense,’ and or sanctions must be situation not as a motionless snapshot but as a ‘offensive defense.’ Altogether such measures put aside and a more moving footage. Furthermore, South Korea will strip North Korea’s options to use orga- effective policy must must do more than just respond to North Ko- nized provocations. replace them.” rea’s actions. Instead it should focus on mak- The issue here is whether or not Kim ing strategically preemptive moves. For this, it Jong-un will inherit his father’s will— songun is necessary to examine why the North Korean or the military-first politics—to run the next regime expanded the pendulum’s amplitude regime. After Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, the and find measures to make the leadership consequences of Kim Jong-il’s choice of mili- pursue a survival strategy that does not in- tary-first politics, was to go through an “Ar- clude huddling around nuclear weapons. duous March.” If Kim Jong-un chooses to in- As was demonstrated in the Yeonpyeong herit and continue with the military-first poli- Incident, Kim Jong-il is passing down exactly tics, a worst fate will befall him. What then what he has learned from his father, Kim Il- can be done to dissuade Kim Jong-un from sung, to his son, Kim Jong-un. Following the inheriting the legacy of his father and repeat- pattern of brinkmanship, Kim Jong-il showed ing the path of failure? The answer is complex a strong determination for ‘nuclearization’ strategies. First, South Korea needs to make instead of ‘denuclearization,’ ‘deterioration’ of the North realize that the military-first poli- relations, not ‘improvement.’ Obviously, the tics focused on nuclear development will only next step will be a ‘clinch’ strategy to buy time, result in total collapse of the regime. The such as allowing IAEA inspections or resum- worn out efforts for the Sunshine Policy or ing the Six-Party Talks thus the pendulum will sanctions must be put aside and a more effec- swing towards peace. But these are ‘salami tive policy must replace them. In short, a si- tactics’ to successfully establish the Kim Jong- multaneous approach should be taken: it must un regime. As of now, neither ‘full-scale war’ prepare for a method to incapacitate North 2 Korea’s belligerence while framing a compre- lesser of two evils, maintaining the North Ko- hensive peace system to better response rean regime over provoking its possible col- against the North’s peace offensive. The Sun- lapse which would result in a disaster for shine Policy can increase limited exchanges, Northeast China. Therefore, cooperation with but it cannot bring about fundamental China is as important as trilateral cooperation changes in the military-first politics. Taking with the U.S. and Japan for resolving the off the coat is not enough. We need a change North Korean problem. in the DNA sequence. Sensing the relative decline of the United North Korea’s denuclearization is possible States, China with its own rise is taking ad- if and only if the succeeding regime abandons vantage and has recently made strong com- the old system and pursues a new nuclear-free ments against the U.S. policies. This stands in strategy. This will require political figures to contrast to the 1990s when China candidly demote military-first politics as the central acknowledged the power gap between them priority while at the same time it will need and rather focused on its own economy while comprehensive efforts from South Korea, the delicately making moves in international poli- “The question is United States, and Japan to provide security tics. It is interesting that China maintains the whether it is assurances. For this, a very comprehensive principles of Taoguang Yanghui (Bide our time, appropriate for China security system is needed to assure North Ko- build our capacities) and Yousuo Zuowei to raise its voice against rea of its future. Furthermore, on top of the (Doing some things to make our voice heard the United States efforts to find a way to denuclearize the North, in the world) yet has increasingly been taking at this time.” regional and global financial support systems a more assertive position toward the United should be established. In a long-run, the States. This is in part related to the fact that North and related states should pursue a strat- China’s confidence grew after the global fi- egy of coevolution for the 21st century devel- nancial crisis, but what deserves attention at opment of North Korea. the same time is the influence of domestic politics on its foreign policy. With a leadership succession due in 2012, China is in the midst Pursuing a Complex Diplomacy with China of a political competition to clarify its global position through its foreign policy.