Middle Power Poland in the Emergent Multi-Polar World Order

CEU eTD Collection The Quest for Leadership in post-1989 Central Eastern Europe: In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Poland’s RisetotheMiddle Poland’s Department of Political Science Political of Department Central European University European Central Supervisor: AndrásSupervisor: Bozóki Budapest, Hungary Wyatt Nagorski Submitted to Submitted 2007 By i CEU eTD Collection a significantsource influenceof in system international well the into thefuture. behavior also garnered itmembership in NATO and the EU where Poland will continue beto relations with its neighbors and present itself as a middle power. Poland’s middle power inforge Poland beneficial states ableto other behaviorCEE, was towards diplomatic itsinandmanager facilitator, acatalyst, By as acting power. a as great self-perception position andits turn positionthis advantage. to Thisdepart required from its to Poland past that Poland was able Union. toEuropean the into admission overcome what duringEastern Europe the period between itsin late independence 1989andgaining its was historicallybefore. This thesis than ever today system influence international the seeksto and potential capacity much a greater disadvantageous to outline the emergence have duringmaintaining a timesinternational ofchange. order Middlepowers stability and of Poland geostrategic as exert leaderscapacity influence their or inand willingness to hegemonic of shaping a middle power in Central and decreased the states between interdependence theincreasing system given international It is of great importance to analyze alternative sources of leadership within the Utilizingmiddle abehavioral approach thesis poweranalysis, this to demonstrates ABSTRACT ii CEU eTD Collection BIBLIOGRAPHY 55 ...... CONCLUSIONS 8: CHAPTER OSTPOLITIK: LEGACY OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN 38 COMMONWEALTH...... 7: CHAPTER USA AAIGTEES-ETBLNE...... 33 RUSSIA: MANAGING THE ...... EAST-WEST BALANCE 6: CHAPTER 28 THE VISEGRÁD TRIANGLE...... 5: CHAPTER 22 GERMANY: AN ANCHOR ...... TO THE WEST 4: CHAPTER NATIONAL INTEREST 14 AND FOREIGN POLICY...... 3: CHAPTER TOWARDS A THEORY 5 OF MIDDLE POWER...... 2: CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION...... 1: CHAPTER 7.3: 7.2: 7.1: 6.1: 3.2: 3.1: 2.3: 2.2: 2.1: U B L AO...... 34 ...... NATO P P A A P RE OST OSITIONAL ITHUANIA ELARUS PPLYING KRAINE B -1989: EHAVIORAL -1989: ...... 55 ...... 38 ...... 33 ...... 28 ...... 22 ...... 14 ...... 5 ...... 1 ...... 47 ...... 43 ...... M R ...... 40 ...... , ...... 60 ...... A EALIST VS EALIST IDDLE G H EOGRAPHIC A ISTORIC PPROACH P OWER TABLE OFCONTENTS . I DEALIST DEBATE DEALIST O , PPORTUNITY AND ...... 10 ...... T HEORY N ORMATIVE APPROACHES ...... 12 ...... 18 ...... iii ...... 14 ...... 6 ...... CEU eTD Collection increasing multi-lateral cooperation between states. The concept of middle power is middle power certainly Theof concept betweenstates. multi-lateral cooperation increasing Wood also affirms that middle powers are the states which are mostlikely to benefit from the influence in international the system isthan commonly 1990, recognized” (Wood p.71-72). potential and capability “much have greater middle powers Consequently, world order. play and diminishedmajor hegemonic in leadersto the willingness of roleshapinga the system international the of interdependence increasing the to due powers middle to available providers of stability withinand order international the system. as ofleadership sources other tothese be must paid attention More its influence. exert maintenance withinleader noapparenthegemonic of thewhen order system ispresentto detracts from other sources of focus attention This (ies). by authority hegemonic the promulgated international the order of leadership within inherentlythe subjugates the role system.of other states within the system to becoming mere adherents of It also fails leadership focus on hegemonic The system. international the of theoverall stability tomaintain account for the system as a whole. international is that extenditscapable enough beyondborders toshape influence to its own the system international the of top the at state one the of presence the for need the emphasizing down by leader.world have approach Hegemonic consequently theorists stability taken a top results in states two spotone oroccupying the top within the system acting as hegemonic the naturally paradigm hierarchical of This criteria. based set onsome particular order particular international implies Worldsystem. order states that within thissystem are arranged ina World order very simply refers to the relationship between states withinbetween states relationship tothe simplythe World very order refers Bernard Wood (1990)Bernard appropriately Wood manythat asserts haveopportunities become shape and isto necessary state an powerful all that maintains lineof reasoning This INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1: CHAPTER 1 CEU eTD Collection given its considerable size and significant Establishing population. Poland asamiddle power crumbling Soviet Union. Poland is also prominentin relation to other states within the region and then the between Europe Western significance position geostrategic of extreme the other CEE states as a probable candidate toemerge as a middle power. Poland occupied a been analytically applied to andneverhas middle theory self-identified thethe powers for havebeen evaluation states chosen CEE region. It can be argued the “middlepowermanship” analyses of most In there. were achieved that positive outcomes that Poland stood apart from isit duringexplore period,leadership this sources essential the thatcontributedof tothe to emergence of a middle power within the region during this time. the for ideal were conditions the Union Soviet the of dependency the under formerly for states the leadership hegemonic of absence sudden WWII.With the after the of Europe rest for the been had asthere theregion for aid Plan type Marshall be no wasto There order. many twentieth the brought century with the future regional andworlduncertainties regard to essentially two different world orders. The rapid decline of the Soviet Union nearwas what line between dividing theliteral and figurative end the became region CEE The influence. of spheresof two these between contention became central area of the continent The European framework of the diametrically opposed ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union. system international inthe play fall of communism provides agoodillustration importantthe roleof middle powershave to the after (CEE) Europe Eastern in Central situation The system. international the in stability consideration middle influencethe that powershave in creating world and order maintaining into take to need the demonstrate system international the of realities the However, as classifyis anditsuch inproblematic to manner. indeeddifficulta state anyprecise Due to the significance of the CEE region in the overall stability and order of Due tothesignificance of of in stability CEEregion Europe the and order overall the werebound WarThe Cold in within epoch offered a system limited which states the 2 CEU eTD Collection relationshipwould that affordpursue Poland confidence the to rest there itsof diplomatic toforge an inorder affablehistorical toresolvewith disputes and worked Germany diplomaticbehavior states. towards other Chapter four will showhow Polandinitiative took andmanagers intheir coordinators, actascatalysts, thatmiddle powers which broadly states middle theory power basedto itsapproach onthebehavioral neighbors toward policy actions incarnations. its previous from was amajor divergence interest willsystem. be It shown foreign Poland’s that post-1989 conceptpolicy of andnational international in the changes to according time over changed and developed have interests these national how and consider interests national interms of perspective from a historical membership inthe investigate willnextEuropean Union. Chaptertwo Polish foreign policy policy duringfollowing the period the collapse of communism in 1989until its roughly middlepowermanship. The behavioral approach will be used toanalyze Polish foreign a assessinggeography, behavioral normative to and qualities of approach position, on based measures from evolved has power middle of theory the how demonstrate will This exercise literature. existing in the years has the taken over the theory variations Chapter one Whatare oflasting the of affects thisfor influence Poland and restEurope the and world? the this thesis on topic?the Whatimpactdid Polandhave oncreating stability withinand order region? the will analyze as literature by of outlined existing characteristics the the power a middle Poland demonstrate the theoryemerge between asamiddle power 1989 andits membership inthe Union.European Did of middle power and traceorder. the many Union with makePoland positioned to contributions continued toEuropean stability and enlargedEuropean are now apartof the of CEE and rest asit the consequence is continued of Chapter four, five, six, andseven will be individual case studies of foreign Poland’s to able isanswer was Poland whether seeksto thesis this question the Therefore, 3 CEU eTD Collection its current in position European the Union. andperiod has consequently positioned itself tohave acontinued influence in through Europe will be shown Polandthat emergewas asamiddleable to time powerduring the post-1989 of itRepublics. Basedonthefindings Soviet former the this and analysis of democratization independence the encouraging time same the at while Russia with relations good maintaining policy. These chapters will reveal how Poland was able to overcome eastern its the difficultin conducting faced task of Poland that challenges many the explore will seven and six Chapter Europe. to itsreturning of goal achieve andsuccessfully of vestiges communism the illustrates how this cooperation with other Central and Group inEuropean Visegrád the five Poland’s participation examines Chapter objectives. states enabled Poland to cast of 4 CEU eTD Collection been considered a distinct category of actors in the international relations literature. in relations international category the actors of adistinct been considered inrooted their relationships vis-à-vis the powers,great and only haverecently middle powers been consistently has powers in middle interest The time. their of environment international and coetaneous the of authors the perspectives particular the hasvariedwith definition middlehistory. sporadically Theof subject. concept Its powerhasreappeared throughout made to middle powers, but there has not been a continuous body of work dedicated to the number of different methods. definebeen to basedtheories have different thatattempt developed powers ona middle small powers. Manyleave assmall. be identified notand ablack This reasonably world andwhite does great of states fall somewhere thatcan powers and numerous powers great identifiable easily worldin has thatthe evident in thereadily is power middle of idea middlethe However, problematic.” is… relations, international of this power continuum. in contemporary as a actor of distinctive middle category of power, “Theidea that, Many al. etrecognize (1993) Cooper 1984, p.2). small”nor is (Holbraad great neitherthat power overcome the serious difficulties of providing an entirely satisfactory definition of the type of has middle“Nobody remainsillusiveFurthermore, aprecisedefinition quite as power of status, international behaviorforeign and policy role, (Neack 1995,p.224). theirstates” of policy behavior.Rather, “middle powertheory developedwas bystatesmen describeto the foreign type linkstate which can to a methodological nor approach framework theoretical powers nor small powers.be great to considered not are system that theinternational within states of policy foreign Somethe go so far as to state that middle power theory is neither a Carsten Holbraad thatthroughout (1984)observes history many references have been analyze to attempt arbitrary andaseemingly very iselusive a theory Middle power TOWARDS A THEORY OF MIDDLE POWER CHAPTER 2: CHAPTER 5 CEU eTD Collection friendly disposition towards its neighbors.” Furthermore, he believes a middle power must a make of and “reliable it that qualities” and strategic “geographical, political specific posses must middle power a that ascertains Clausewitz middle powers. of identification in setting the the pertinence of furthergeopolitical heintroduced astep when power system. international middle greater in potential a the role of the power elaborate middle that arelimited powers but in notdoes bytheirmiddle powerstatus actions their recognize does Botero be measured. might howthis strength or tothis strength, contribute factors indication what of gives no but middle for powers, strength” for “sufficient needthe security 1956,p.8).”Botero’s (Botero sixteenth century reference tomiddle highlights power and and,exceedingbecomemediocrity, great, boundsleave of behind the those of also longevity middle power’s bemay ifleaders jeopardized “are content not butwish toexpand thata when hecontends beinga middle of power recognize limitations the leadership to ability a state’s the Boteroof introduced of alsotheimportance 1956,p.8).” (Botero them, and even if feelings are aroused to anger they are easily quieted and tranquility restored restrains neighbors Fear of their states. in than larger and lessprovocation license support and their wealth and powerbeing passions moderate, are less violent, ambition finds less they that are “exposedviolence neither to by weaknessnor their to envy by their greatness, need of help the without from own its on stand to authority and others.”strength sufficient has dominion middle-sized “a Botero believes that middle-sized observes that Botero international order. within the states of in position the factors deciding states are most lasting given in 1589. In hisin 1589.In approaches Normative and 2.1: Positional,Geographic, In Karl brings1831 German theoristvon Clausewitz concept political middle the of One of the first known references to middle power was presented by Giovanni Botero Ragion diStato, Botero articulates that power and size are the determining the andsizeare power that articulates Botero 6 CEU eTD Collection system in the next century. next inthe system of international the more become characteristic even would century they in nineteenth the influential were relations geopolitical If state. that of behavior policy foreign the explaining in implications does have power serious middle a potential location geopolitical the that greatpower.the Though this definition middleof is power limited inits scope, wewill see toafforditpower protection in fair termswith event of hostility great toward the the enough wouldpower bethe immediate neighbor of a greatpowerin situation this beand would on middle a itself. Presumably, middle power thanfor the rather its neighbors with relationship in more so a state’s but middle power, of definition in Clausewitz’s characteristic an essential status andpower geographic astate’s position thewithin international is system. Power still century. the decade of twentieth lastthe until (Clausewitz 1992,p.370) of onthealter balancepower” of the “sacrificed aspirations limitations(Clausewitz geopolitical 1992,p.381).The of location Polish would leave nation with which Poland wouldhave a more enduring conflict ofinterests than Germany” people toward whom theGermany, Clausewitz Polish actually opposed independence observingis that there “no Poles have displayedbeen had decidedlyrebellion of the interests external againstthis quelled.repression In more contempt than Warsaw’s recent powers. between aforementioned the fourth decade of partition inits the Germans” and “no these great powers towards another. However, during Clausewitz’s era, the Polish nation was Russia; implyingPoland that would serve as a ‘bufferagainst state’ aggression from any of due its Austria,powers geographical power between to situation greatPrussia, and the defend itself” inthe eventof outside hostility 1984, p.23). (Holbraad be militarily capable enough to “afford some protection” itsto neighbor, and must “be able to Clausewitz’s definition of middle power implies a direct relationship between middle between relationship direct a implies power middle of definition Clausewitz’s In Poland sovereign amiddle havebeen 1831 ahypothetically might considered 7 CEU eTD Collection solely on military might or economic superiority, but because they enjoy a “certain status” a “certain enjoy they but because economic superiority, mightor military solely on power? great from a power amiddle what differentiates So system. international the within players be responsible to ability their demonstrated also have They others. influence to them enable the United Nations. Middle powers,like great powers, undoubtedly possess certain traits that as such institutions international nascent within notably most powers, great to granted rights the them hadearned stability continued law,and their international for their respect war, the powers. They greatrecognition afforded felt to theirthat support of willing alliesduringthe Canadians,like felt manyothers, they,that by of reason influence their sizeand deservedthe theirinfluence and their stability are close to being great powers (Mackay 1969, p.138).” The of their size, their materialDepartment of External Affairs assumed that, “The middle powers are those which, by reason resources, their willingness and vocal. most the were naturally ability to accept responsibility,power. In the Western sphere of influence, the states that might be considered middle powers the Western world and leader of hegemonic asthe took reigns the States influence theUnited sphere of Sovietthe a great deal of debate Outside in heart continent. the the a states of andstable of Europe created satellite reach into took shapeits extended overUnion Soviet the as lived be short what would independence this however some For it meant to be a great independentforeignstates brought of theater international an agendatothe relations. policy Each across newlyThe result Europe. states was a of independent new of blossoming these muchforhistory. ofits devastating that thecontinent hadplagued recent nationalist conflicts the to solution lasting a seeking world, the of rest the and Europeans, the left These conflicts The early decades of the twentieth century brought two brutal World Wars to Europe. to Wars World brutal two brought century twentieth the of decades early The Holbraad (1984) clarifies that great powers are unique in their greatness based areuniquepowers in not greatness their great Holbraad clarifies that (1984) In anaddress United tothe NationsR.G. Riddell onJune 22,1948, Canadianthe of 8 CEU eTD Collection quantitative approach to assessing middle powers is the objectivity issuch approaches theobjectivity of middleassessing powers quantitative approach to middlecreatinglistof apreliminary ismajor powers useful. of The advantage such a ranking based he concludes power on thatsuchan GNP alone therefore and approach to closelylists (1990)pointsmatch out,these composites power of 1973). AsBernardWood Jacobson,and 1950,1958,1960(Cox years and prestige inthe capability, nuclear per capita, One such list compiled byCox and Jacobsen (1973) created a composite index of GNP, GNP within states other beensystem by had previously international the researchers. created other list. initial United Kingdom 1984,p.90).Polandfalls(Holbraad solidly in themiddle of Holbraad’s included West These “secondary France, Japan, Germany, the powers and powers.” China, of eighteen middle powers.and drawsalineoff in(1975), mostreasonable atthe Heends cut eachregion. upwith a list Of these, he refersmiddle power Holbraad dividesto the worldthe into regions, ranks topeach nation based fiveon GNP as In defining “otherp.78). (Holbraadleadership” 1984, organization location,and area, resources, great powers” “population, including of ormostreflectpower characteristic of GNP tendsto capabilities the isbelief that It nations. his quantify of particular power in indicator to the attempting good “military,moral” Holbraadbe components. GNP appears and economic, concludesthat to a including factors many of amalgamation isan state a of influence and power overall the that Holbraad must consider powers believesone “total force”the and of (1984) suggests a state small and middle between differentiate To powers. smaller the from them distinguished history have and thathaveensuredthroughout interests” theircommon recognition “sustained the and solidarity” “collective the haveexpressed powers great that elicits further He 1984, p.75). society” (Holbraad in international a“specialclass belongand to Similarattemptlists rank that statesaccordingtopower and to position to relative 9 CEU eTD Collection system system and changedin the foreign middlepolicy environment which powerswere tooperate. dynamics the altered formerly Bloc markedly Soviet international states the of within the the international system resultin changes in a middle power’s behavior within thein system. changes Significant functions. state the which in system international the of nature very diplomacy. It is also importantbehavioral approach is the foundation of tomost contemporarykeep analyses of middlein power mind thatbe Sucha in considered amiddlepower. must like to state power a middle behave order state behavior is most a In words other play 1996,p.244).” it of an (Cox disposition not to adequate predictor a affected by the itis but play role; of to this ability is condition a necessary economic) or (military capability thisabout therole point middle of he powerswhen “Possessingthat states middle-range influencemiddle power in international1990,the system (Wood p.77).RobertCox reiterates into a wielding influence thereby this power actually converts state determine that whether based on their capabilities,power. It is very possibleit inmake notfalls ranking does of a quantitativesomewhere middle it power the woulda middle that require though a numbera just Therefore, astate detailed p.3-4).” because Jacobsen logically1973, is(Cox and necessary not of states analysis mightthis influence, greatest the may exercise also power greatest the possess qualify who those Although of thatas extent. full its to middle or all at either state’sconverted so necessarily not is it but powersinfluence, into converted behavior to may be an actor…Power to available are that resources political of aggregate is the it means capability; of another…Power behaviorbythat actor’s modification one of means the Approach 2.2: ABehavioral differentiation important between overlook power andinfluence. the power basic of rankings also that Wood recognizedthe However, 1990,p.74). (Wood The fall of The fall of BerlinWall,Union, of collapse the of andtheindependence Soviet the maintainCox and “influence who (1990)quotes that, BernardJacobsen Wood (1973) 10 CEU eTD Collection acceptable principles and standards. Middle powers build confidence and create an build create and powers confidence andstandards. Middle acceptable principles initiating the formation of organizations, institutions, and associations. Middle powers create the common goals enables similar topresenta stronger interests demonstrate voice powers middle in achieving of the group. states that with other This collaboration associations. and form coalitions to minded” states Lastly,states middle to followpowersforeignparticular Middlebreakpolicy objectives. new groundpowers andencourageother theirplay lead.theas act powers Middle forms. distinct in three themselves manifest role Middle of powers also act asconsidered middle powers. are they not or whether determines that environment relations international contemporary Their theory favors a “behavioral” etal.middlebe p.17-18) (Cooper theright” be” considered1993, “earning to powers. or Normative map; or the on a state GNP; Geography, or suchas measures area, population, quantifiable traditional methodssystem”makes that study the middleof powerso important (Cooperetal. p.16). 1993, of ofleadership“the changingnature inand followership international contemporary the definingpay needmuch to attention sources leadershipto other etof al.p.12),” andit (Cooper 1993, is middle is hegemony a “Underof waning there conditions followersorder. within international the power essential of the role to al. etparticular attention pay (1993) inleader Cooper question, world in such Withis Cold of War era byamulti-polara world replaced order. presence the nowbeing ways of the as: order replacedthebipolar that uni-polarthe order that under assumption the powers Position,Within the context of this new world order, Cooper et al. (1993) attempt to “relocate’” middle the use of Cooper et al. (1993) acknowledge that the characteristics of middle power behavior characteristicsthe middle power of etal. acknowledge that Cooper (1993) In taking in forward astep Cooper analysismiddlethe of etal powers, eschew (1993) approaches thatbase “deserving assumptions onstates to approach itapproach is asserts which “do” what states 11 facilitators the physical location of location physical the by seeking out “like-by seeking out catalysts managers by initiating by in the by CEU eTD Collection powers mustpowers focus theirforeign policy towardefforts initiatives deemed most beneficially to ability influenceto spectrum a broad of issues in policy international the Middlesystem. system. within state is located of theinternational hierarchy where that the merely than system rather international the influence to actually does state that on based what middle power assess it isto a potential best behavior, middle power into translate necessarily meansthey by no not predict suchan Since powercapability middle outcome. does for potential may be geography position the prerequisite astate indicate amiddleto or power etal.evenisby that evidentmiddle It Cooper (1993). of though theories powerbasedon (Clausewitz), andnormative qualities (Riddell) adynamic to behavioral approach presented andHolbraad), geography (Botero of position basedon characteristics approaches 2.3: Applying Middle Power Theory mostbeneficial state(Cooper the 1997,p.6).to are that achieve results to andability skills the have they inwhich in areas the their efforts concentrate and alternatives policy between choose they whereby diplomacy” “niche practice powers. be Middlesogreat “cannot “doeverything” everywhere”must they and powers the from them distinguish that outcomes policy multiple influential to ability limited power’s determinesin what they international do is Furthermore, ittheir given environment. amiddle is alsowhat it from and small them powers, separate that middle powers of expertise 1993, p.24-25). (Cooper etal. betweenstates so often occur misunderstandings” that and “misperceptions also meansthe and the efforts settle These bywhich create path. disputes resolve to environment andlegitimacy of trust otherstofollow thatencourages them reputablethe down As Andrew Cooper (1997)As Andrew points Cooper middle out, powersareinherently limited by their The middle theoryevolution hasof power from progressed thus limitedthe (1997)suggests itis Andrewthat ability Cooper the entrepreneurial and practical 12 CEU eTD Collection middle behavior. power in changes and interests in national in changes result system in the Changes system. that within place their as well as system international the within behavior their given reassessed international system (Cooper, p.8).” Therefore, middle the of powersstate mustchanging be the continuallyof context the in continually rethought be to has that “something middle a theory be cannot considered power isof a“fixeduniversal.”theory power Middle during a given period does notforever make that state amiddle power. Robert Cox states that power. middle a considered being a state of indicative be will interests national own its on based system international andorderly a stable of creation influence the capability to power middle exercising its a state of middle powerbehavior observed system. The international gain will inclusive power to exhibitmultilateral an in of approach confidence the others The middle states. other andtowards in amanagerforeign policy its facilitator, a catalyst, a as acting it find will that behavior exhibit will power middle The favor. its in system in work it areas whereitbe in will the international most successful considerers influencing within the international will system. limitationsrecognize the It its capabilities of own and its position will middle recognize A power middle of power. a potential interests national andbinding all to (Cox 1996, p.524-525). is predictable both that order creatingmaintaining aworld and towards andwork states other toidentifyinrequires interest national middlepowers their theirrelationships of terms to initiativethe andrestraintby suchmiddlewhich must powers operate.Such a position Middlepowermanship defines rolea state’s in world.the Beingin middle the both provides “middlepowermanship.”Cox (1996)calls underlyingRobert condition whatof likelythem mostachieve where they and Thissituation are to provides success. the It must middlebehaviorIt exhibitionby of beemphasized that also the power a state Therefore, an analysis middleof power behavior must begin with an assessment of the 13 CEU eTD Collection War. independence abrief After period of Poland during inter-war the again was World First until the lasted after century duringlate eighteenth powers the great the between Partition drawn. be should state Polish the of boundaries the exactly where and be Polish to whatmeantit left as lingering to debates and Polishthe citizenry variations inthemakeupof map, have shifted from east to west. These shifts were accompanied by a number of different more or whenborders of appropriately, it the non-existence.has appeared The Polishthe state, on existence, modern their of much for state a without Poles the left has situation of this geopolitics The attain” 1967,p.1). (Bromke to haveit expected could resources material and human its of virtue by which power, middle a of position the taking from nation Polish the hasprevented “Geography deed, In state. aGerman of variations different the Russiapowers, and perennial great of between flatEurope’s territory two situated expanse of great a been has Poland Geographically, continent. European the of center the at position debate Realistvs.Idealist 3.1: Pre-1989: other point in the history of the state. international system which allowed Poland topursue a foreign policy notafforded toit atany in the extentinfluencedchanges a great bysignificant after 1989wasto interests national allowed inpursuing its national interests inthe The past. change in theperception of Polish besuch limited it its a pathmust viewed inlightof historical options and the experiences was have asunderstanding injustices. perceived A better past notpursue of why Polandchoose to itmight for by seekingwhat redemption irredentist haveforcibly an posture easily assumed foreign policy facedchallenges Republic. Thirdmight by Post-Cold Polish the WarPoland The manifest obstacles of history can not be ignored when analyzing the complex the analyzing when be ignored not can history of obstacles manifest The Poland’s pre-1989 history is dominated by the burdens of its unfortunate geographic its unfortunate is burdens of by dominated Poland’s the history pre-1989 NATIONAL INTEREST ANDFOREIGNPOLICY INTEREST NATIONAL CHAPTER 3: CHAPTER 14 CEU eTD Collection of the century found an outlet in the National Democratic movement, led by Roman by led movement, Democratic National the in outlet an found century the of increasing demand for political aspirations as well. Anincrease in political desires at the turn counterproductive. As thenation strengthened economically and socially was there an Bromke actually strategy this outwas points that (Bromke (1967) 1967,p.12). action political from away a turn and nation Polish the of well-being social and economic, moral, the more onstrengthening focus wastherefore Polishnation. The the weaken viewed foreign asinevitablerule and felt independencestrides towards would only further even realists political Early objective. nation primary as the asa Poland of preservation the see and unchangeable as situation geographic the view They system. international the thetwo. examplebetween contrast the of provide agood war period inter- the and War World First the to up leading years the history, Polish throughout prevalent are thought of lines both Though reasoning. own their with line in policy foreign Polish sway to attempting idealists political and realist political between split traditional the to actually is as compared to those who see things in terms of where it ought tobe. This has led it where of in system terms in international the place whoviewPoland’s those between arises The conflict 1967,p.2). (Bromke independence secure andmaintain Poland’s as howbestto elite Polish in the split intellectual an to led historically has system international in the place PolishFurthermore, theusual politics. discrepancy between Poland’sactual and potential mere survival Polishof independence atthe top the listof of national interests. precariousness of Poland’s position between two powerful and threatening neighbors, has left virtuallyindependence no inown external their history,policy. and the This disappointing butregained fell statehood domainunder the Union of Soviet the which afforded Poles the War. World neighbors war,Poland during Second Afterthe the byitssacrificed greatpower Poland’s political realists have taken a more pragmatic approach to Poland’s place in place Poland’s to approach pragmatic a more have taken realists political Poland’s This hassituation ledroutinely foreign to becoming policy thefundamental issue of 15 CEU eTD Collection further added to this misperception (Neumann 1992, p.123). This 1992,p.123). viewof romanticized misperception addedtothis further (Neumann combined both with German and weakeningthe of as power Russian a result war the of Poland’s formerwithin rulingfeel elite the to on par with formertheir and aggressors regain aneed to prestige.its independence The afterlarge theachieve thatNeumann outcome finds 1967,p.3). (Bromke thatwhenPoland(1992) regained First Worldterritorial War there seemsmeans asacceptable and only to goal and viewmilitary action insurrection acceptable to have the as politics beensizeinternational in place rightful a her of psychological restoration the and Poland of andindependence populationneed full idealist Furthermore, see p.121). withinsystem (Neumann 1992, the European of inter-wara great power andPoland the partitions of the eighteenth itswhen independence after actually war. centurythe Poland regained robbed the state would course furtherofan viewof prevail future Poland’s to chances.However, these opposing its due place way best wasthe power a greater with an alliance that recognized Healso independence. for realistic. He realized that Poland was notin a position to improve its position beyond striving best changeindependencefuture for Dmowski’s (Bromke 1967,p.15-17). was reasoning state, centered in the Western an unified ethnically He feltthat multinational union. a pre-partition support theideaof not provinces, did Dmowski Russia. specifically powers, allied occupying the of one with alliance an be would with Russia against Germanyadvance cause Poland’s to bestway the He feltthat future. in the occurring independence was Poland’s However,see regainPolishwhile anindependent Dmowski’s state. to striving not still did nation the of lot economic and social the strengthen further to important most was it felt He World WarOne. of outbreak the to prior politics Polish on impact significant a have to began which Dmowski Political idealism in Polish political thought is rooted in the idea that Poland was once was Poland that idea in the is rooted thought political Polish in idealism Political idealism. political and realism political both of mixture a was philosophy Dmowski’s 16 CEU eTD Collection population with Ukrainians representing 13.9%, Jews 8.7%, Belarusians 3.1%, and Jews Belarusians Germans 3.1%, population Ukrainians13.9%, representing8.7%, with the made of only two-third was its uproughly ethnic Poles heterogeneity. ethnic 1931 In Russia, littleground wasmade in Further Poland’sthis addingregard. inter-war to difficulty the states of Central Eastern Europe (Neumann achieve Though Pilsudski soughtto 1992, p.127-129). of some between union sort which also endured constantGermany threat from Germany asand theLithuania Polish over the city ofCorridor Vilnius, with Czechoslovakia cutp37-38). Such delusions of howevergrandeur not reflect did the reality Poland’s of situation. East over the PrussiaTeschen region,depends on the policies of Poland no less than on those of otherand great powers” (Bromke 1967,offwith from fate ofcontemporary Europe in Europe…The Central Eastern of cornerstone order political the rest of andisPoland “the concluded and that Polish of redeemer” state Pilsudskithe asthe “creator German territoryis(“Poland (Neumann aGreatPower”) In 1992, p.123). pamphletthis Lukasiewicz praises entitled a pamphlet wrote Lukasiewicz, Juliusz andMoscow Paris, to as1939,theformerup As eve ambassador World Polish to the War. right late of Second the Thisview lasted power. viewed and asagreat Poland of Poland themselves astheliberators expounded a romanticizednot only The Pilsudski p.39). regime 1967, in (Bromke entire the cultural east” power version of Polish history,history, but ofso thattheir the greatplace Polish within Poland back “to turn of clock for the ultimate was goal Pilsudski’s the that stated 1920, Republic it. They would seen emerge as the directstrongest military conflict with Russia at the end of World War One. While at war with militaryRussia in as well as independenceregain and soughtto pre-partition lands tothe east.ThisPoland brought into leadership, then dictatorship, of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski. Poland’s place in the international system would prevail during the inter-war period under the The re-establishment of Poland after World War One left it in border disputes disputes itleftinWorld Onewith border War The after of Poland re-establishment Unlike Dmowski, the Pilsudskiites saw Russia as the principle threat to Polish 17 Polsk jest Mocarstwem jest Polsk CEU eTD Collection the patent determination to establish substantial associations with former enemies, long former establish patent determination with enemies, the substantial time to associations buttress Poland’s ascendance middleto power. The conscious effort to overcome history and served a to that approach forward-looking in1989demonstrated democratic revolution Opportunity Historic A Post-1989: 3.2: Eastern Europe in 1989. in Central regimes communist of collapse the with came change necessary This allow. national interest by which to guide future foreign policy when internationalthe system would era andcommunist independence arational during developed still sought the intellectuals Polish reality Despite this unmistakable self-perceptionp.187). power (Sanford 2003, great of historical tradition there and surrender situation political reality their of accept the the war, also had an enduring affectduring inter-war the periodprevious due to partition between differentthree powers. on Polish foreign also waslackingperiod that an servedtomodernize Poland and infrastructure develop unified policy. The Soviet the Rapidindustrialization during p.190). (Sanford 2003, ethnically homogeneous Poles were forced became 97percent and nation-state the front western a defendable of interms favorable to fortuitous benefits. Poland becameborders compact were territorially more and it now policy ofPolandin fate some unthinkable. Paradoxically result after the wardid the Organization Council and for the Mutual foreign Assistanceindependent madeEconomic Soviet hegemony. Membership in the Easternas first Germany and then invaded,Russia and Polandlost once more its independence. Bloc groupings such powers. between twogreater In late 1939Poland was again from wiped mapof the Europe as the Warsaw Treaty Poland itlocation howeverdanger to 2.3% (Davieswasstill Thegravest 2005, p.299). The foreign policy actions of the Polish leadership immediately following Poland’s following immediately leadership Polish the of actions policy foreign The domination after Soviet during, and Nazi occupation of experience the Furthermore, of influence the fully under War World Second the after state as a Poland reemerged 18 CEU eTD Collection course that had been set by Mieroszewski and by Mieroszewski been hadset that course 1970). The maintain MSZ categorically would under the leadershipof Skubiszewski this 1990;Tyrmand, domination (Kostrzewa, free of breakSoviet would eventually predicted rightly and whichMieroszewski Ukraine), Union theBelarus, republics(Lithuania, Soviet of western with the relations and developing andHungary), (Czechoslovakia states European rapprochement with former enemies (Germany and Russia), cooperation with other Central Mieroszewski, whose prescription for sovereign Poland’s foreign policy included September 1989 to November MSZ to the September of brought a formidable 1989to 1993. Skubiszewski philosophy Krzysztof of led the Skubiszewski whoPolish ministry from foreign mid- achieved its independence. grandforth by strategy were put of most prominent one the ofthis tenants Thefundamental p.225). strategy international (Snyder 2003, grand relations philosophies of the era of erajournal the communism of in Paris-based Soviet the derivative much of politicalthe thoughtproduced earlierby intellectuals Polish exiled during Though pioneering inpractice, much foreign of Skubiszewski’s policy was philosophy butopposition bejeopardize not allowedtoday could to the potential rewards of future. the future course of Polish foreign policy. Temporary pain was to be expected in the short-term, hadpolitics.” words, Skubiszewski chart In theother once-in-a-lifetime opportunity the to “extraordinary of inaperiod shock therapy, Poland was Poland’sto economy introduced interm coined by finance early who Ministerthe LeszekBalcerowicz, 1990s Polishthen Spraw Zagranicznych the of thought political enlightened the highlight states newborn and neighbors, Much of totheMuch of progressive policy MSZ’sforeign the success canbeattributed The liberal influence of andtheThe liberalforward-thinking influence of editorship Jerzy Giedroyc’s Kultura’s (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs / MSZ) during this period. Touse a writers played a substantial role in shaping post-Cold War Poland’s inshaping post-Cold played asubstantial role writers 19 Kultura Kultura. decades before Poland actually Kultura’s contributors, Juliusz contributors, Ministerstwo CEU eTD Collection Organization (NATO) and the European Organization Union (EU). The andtheEuropean second(NATO) outcome isPoland’s Treaty Atlantic North the specifically institutions, western within place their and establish Europe” to “return to commitment explicit is Poland’s First policy. foreign Polish of facets Poland’s Warforeignpost-Cold policy. thisthroughout Evident analysis aretwodistinct as Europe a whole.” (Skubiszewski 1990, p.1) foritself andfor anasset country into the beturned andshould could importance geostrategic disadvantage,” Skubiszewskian objective went on to sayAtlantic inlate Assembly November 1990.After acknowledging“Poland’s that positionis that fact he hoped which that “Poland’sroleimportant heenvisioned for Polandin during the changed Europe anaddresstothe North in contemporarygeopolitical of regional links herneighbors with (Sanford 2003, p.182). Skubiszewski commented on the and historyPoland’s membershipsovereignty, achieving in European organizations, andthe development has maintaining of in terms defined was interest national The put successors. eventual his all by and her more oftenSkubiszewski would set acourse thatwould be maintained byhim four governmentsthrough than not,interests of and state the its position in the international system 2003,p.178).(Sanford at a determiningmiddle powerPoland’s position future in developingthe European order. which shared pasts. ThesePoland clearly be troubled linkages pivotal to proved in animosities they Skubiszewskibrought, was able toestablish critical links neighbors with Through tosubduehis and efforts nationalisthistorical sentiments the corresponding incheck. emotions nationalistwhile attheforefront interests keeping based onplacingstate playwas to in changingEuropean the andenvironment developed aPolish 2004, p.42) .He therole significantreputation alegal Poland recognized academicas (Spero includingresumein a internationally International LawHarvard Ph.D. an and recognized The following chapters explore the difficulties and triumphs of middle power onthenational elite by Poland consensus characterized a united was Post-1989 20 raison d’etat CEU eTD Collection promoting democratic ideals and independence in newly the sovereign states to its East. and Moscow with diplomacy between balancing in manager and Triangle, Visegrád the of afacilitator Germany, as neighbor power Poland Theseconfirm as in its (1993). chapters that a catalyst acted great negotiations with demonstrated behavior as a middle power based on the theoretical framework of Cooper et al. in its associations with the Central European states 21 CEU eTD Collection early foreign policy became obtaining official German recognition of the present borders. MSZ’s the of points focal main the of one Consequently, line. the to regard with mean would disputed by West duringthe the ColdWar anditwas uncertain what German reunification states. The border was however a source of apprehension for Poland as the divide had been two the between divide official the became Line The Oder-Neisse Germany. of expense territory ( in the Potsdampowers by were great the ultimately decided borders post-war War. Poland’s WorldSecond Agreementpact of 1939 which essentially betweensplit Polish lands Germany and Russiaduring the of 1945. Molotov-Ribbentrop the by sacrificed been had Poland recently Most centuries. two past the The Poles lostfraught with difficultiessubstantial given the bitter history shared betweenportions the Poles and(eastern policy). Germans over of theirinchoate yet theMSZ’s successfully pursue to which foundationson necessary the eastern would Rapprochementwith portend. Germany Poland Westwould the anchor to andcreate and an importance keen of with awareness profound the relationship amicable Germany with establish relations objectives exhibitingaclearsetof quickly Germany harmonious to moved Poland challenge. policy foreign significant first its with inPoland democracy Berlinthe Wall signaled imminentthe unification of Germany thereby presenting the nascent coalition government in the Soviet Blocfreein elections August June 1989. In of of 1989, Poland first fashioned the non-communist in over 40 years. On 9 November 1989, theSolidarnosc fall of The historic Roundtable Talks between communistthe of government Polandand Poland’s task of its neighborPoland’s with was western diplomacy establishing of productive task Kresy , the Polish trade union turned icon of democratic freedom, lead to the partially lead the to freedom, iconofdemocratic union turned Polish trade , the GERMANY: AN ANCHOR TO THE WEST ANANCHORTO GERMANY: ) while being compensated with an extension of their western boundary at the at boundary western their of extension an with compensated being while ) CHAPTER 4: CHAPTER 22 Ostpolitik CEU eTD Collection Germany and evaded the Oder-Neisse border issue in order not to hinder issueinborder Germany notto and his evaded theOder-Neisse order reelection astheMSZhaddesired.Oder-Neisse border (Spero 2004,p.111)However, thisvisitfailedproduce any to official recognition the of states. respective other’s in each living minorities protect to agreement as well as Germany and Poland between cooperation andeconomic for political calling agreement a joint Germany totheensuingtend to Poland situation.fewhe Onhisreturn to a signed days later, return to forced to was Kohl breached. been had Wall Berlin he the learned November 1989 could nothave inauspicious,been more since on the evening ofKohl’s arrival in Poland on9 visit Kohl’s of timing The November. in early Warsaw visit would Kohl Helmut Chancellor to reclaim its any of pre-war 2004,part territory p.111). (Spero previousGermany his no desire that Poland.Gensher statements For harbored part reiterated including states, multiple from leaders of involvement the required unification German of states, andfeltborders of two longsaid heit conditions withinthe the present the as occurred GermanPoland as supported unification declared that Septemberinlate 1989.Skubiszewski Gensher, of meetings addressedthe affairs United Polish-German state during Nations atthe Hans-Dietrich of Federal Minister, and Foreign Skubiszewski the Republic Germany’s present borders (Spero 2004,p.104).of Europe maintain the itwas necessary to order” European “thepeaceful contemporary maintain followed law,”international Senate the suit1989, declaring30 August and on in to that order of principles “fundamental the of violation a as agreement the condemned Parliament Polish the Pact Ribbentrop Molotov- the of anniversary fiftieth the On Sejm. Polish the of acts Poland begantodelineate this policy 23Augustofficially on 1989in one of firstthe Over theKohl ensuing year hisunderstandably developmentsturned attentions in to after Soon attheUnited statements these German announced Nations itwas that meaningfulas reconciliation toward headed rapidly Polandwere and Germany 23 CEU eTD Collection reunification and regional security reunification issues. and regional security German on by position taking as a quickly catalyst act to seized the opportunity Poland significantly Most sovereignty. Polish sacrifice again might that accord German-Russian p.117). Poland feared2004, another a new system” undoubtedly security (Spero European Skubiszewski stated, “we must bethinkingnew today…about European structures and about itdesired. with pursuealliances whomever leftopen to Germany a neutral than entire region aGermanythat bound by was by security European structures farfor safer Poland andthe observedearly in (1999) Sanford 1990. Poland was acting interest. self certainly enlightened members began NATO key before even made was and to USSR, the of that discussto contrast stark in was position the subject of unifiedPoland tocall thefirst became state formembership unified Germany’s in NATO. This Germany’s admissioncould into not the simultaneously allianceGermany Skubiszewski knew that 2004, p114). military (Spero organizations” and different in be a member alliances of different members arepart the where federations, mention not to confederations, of NATO and the still extant Warsaw2004, p.114). Pact. Thusfor German recognitionarticulating Kohl’s quandaryby explaining the complexity legalthe of requirements needed of the border and called 1989 in of December Sejm the to aspeech delivered Skubiszewski border, Oder-Neisse for patience on responsethe part of Polandto Kohl’s (Sperostill “Ten pressed Point for Plan” recognition law,this understood andrealized official of recognition borderthe would take time, buthe on German of unification,the officially Skubiszewski,recognize theborder. being anaccomplishedborder student of international before which the he wasboundby law constitutional and thatonly avowed unificationa unified GermanParliamentcould failed to mention of thecampaign in the run up toGermantwo elections in the fall theof 1990. Kohl regularly Germanys.reiterated that In In this same speech Skubiszewski declared that “history not knowcasesof “history does In thissamespeech that declared Skubiszewski 24 CEU eTD Collection marked the successful completion of the first major foreign policy challenge faced by the faced challenge major foreign policy first the of completion successful marked the 1990 the “Treaty on the Confirmation of the Polish-German Border” was signed. This treaty was signed inMoscow. Germany officially on unified 2 October 1990,and on 14 November p.121). in between situated stabilizing2004, factor themselvesa rich and Europe… Russia” (Spero “the Polish state, having of advantage torecognize the ought Germans the that stated Minister negotiations, the a strong, richIn a following finalizingGerman documents statement“2+ the unification. the 4” one with a democraticyearhad inincludedof exalted expounded the heover pastfinal was the text asthe doctrine system, unification as their position 2004, previous held p119).Skubiszewski (Spero further was functioning before unification than rather of outset border atthe allowing the German recognition of well, being compromise explaining by MSZ’s to willingness the French, andBritish counterparts a his States, United to sentby letters Skubiszewski by inpartaccomplished invitation was Poland’s invitation to take integration. Western of partintentions in the “2 + in Europe openly government their anon-CommunistEastern 4”era that Central declared negotiationsWar II time post-World was thefirst as it inthe statement of thesignificance observes this on German unification.inand French,” shaping thefuture of European p.104)unification. (Spero, Spero (2004) The “commensurate German would be with that achievedbetween rapprochement Germans the Polish-the that further articulated He Germany. with “genuine reconciliation” required believing this world,” andthe to Europe Poland open “We to desire that September 1989 Sejm 12 on the before declared Mazowiecki Tadeusz Minister Prime when even earlier Poland’s willingness to act as an ostensible catalyst in the region was demonstrated On 12 September 1990 the “Treaty On 12 September Germany” 1990the “Treaty with on Final the Settlement Respect to A major for triumph Skubiszewski and the MSZteam inJuly came 1990 with 25 CEU eTD Collection participation of Poland. However, no matter the significance of Poland’s contribution to the to contribution Poland’s of significance the matter no However, Poland. of participation et(Cooper al. p.24) 1993, aparticular cause around togather followers leadininitiatives efforts andtakethe trigger energy to intellectual political and the provide often Middle powers efforts. diplomatic inits act asacatalyst ability Poland’s to demonstrated rapprochement Polish-German the effectively moved Western Europe farther east. In terms of Poland’s middle power behavior, butmarkedly states Western nottwo together brought asit importance of of order an equal genuineit Polish-Germanmayis bethat the unification, European and argued rapprochement for conditions the creating in vital been have Both earlier. years many rapprochement p.129). Germany stating in that German be couldpolicy the East 2004, builtPolandthrough (Spero vis-à-vis aparallelfor Poland role advocated time, HannaSuchocka, atthat PrimeMinister The Polishsteps onthepathtoEurope.” important has already taken andsolidarity…Poland traveledPoland to and affirmed“on that way the to Europe, Poland canbuild supportour on integration.European In newly German foreign1992, the minister,KlausKinkel,appointed allyin Germanywas become greatest bidfor inits andto Poland’s Central stability Europe.” Second WorldWar 2002, (Pond p.126). Eagle” Chancellorto Helmut Kohl,the first German receiveto this honor since the end of the of by in White the “Order the awarding this symbolic reconciliation offereda great gesture Poles The divides. Polish-German historical overcome and issues minority ameliorate to efforts Neighborliness,17 June Cooperation” Friendship, on and1991, codifying “Good- on treaty the brought year next the over coalescence Polish-German MSZ. It is most certain that German unification would have gone on with or without the Franco-German the with par on put been has rapprochement Polish-German The Elizabeth (2002)definesPond friendship Polish-German the as bedrockof “the peace 26 CEU eTD Collection able to quicklyfocusable to to shift pressingother in concerns region. the was MSZ foundation Berlin the with its Western OnceWarsaw established Central Europe. in interests rapidly developing other expenseof the cameat preoccupation priority. This foreign its Poland highest madeobjectives. with Germany reconciliation undeniably policy surely achievingof theMSZasignificantboost gave confidence towards its furtherpolicy also It system. in participantinternational the asanimportant presence Poland’s vindicated undoubtedly powers great irrefutably the Meeting with andGermany. Soviets, France, the Participation in the process brought Poland to the same table with the United States, Britain, effortby Skubiszewski, secured the Polish presence at the 2+4 talks on German unification. unified must Germany be of a part NATO. By taking such along with aproactivepositions, that fact declarethe openly to first the Poland was Furthermore, Poland. acceptable to Germanquickly supported itunification bewith stipulation the that doneunder terms Poland did. actually Poland what is analysis power middle in this important is what process, The importance of Poland’s presence at these talks cannot be underestimated. cannot talks atthese presence of Poland’s importance The 27 CEU eTD Collection mutual interests in the realm of foreign policy. foreign of realm inthe interests mutual dual astoundingis found economictogether. and not political transitions It states these of face challenges the also Theywould domination. this freeof breaking of elation collective the experienced and communism of Soviet realities in depressing the Czechoslovakia shared Over offour Hungary, Poland, course and the region” decades 1998, p.23-25). (Prizel “unique has past” that foreign impacton developmentthe anda in of exercise policy the the with “fascination and defensiveness,” “cultural injustice,” social and “political of feelings and political ressentiment complex theory of national identity in which thesecooperation. states share a common sensecommon regional and international a concerns fostered that unique basisfor their of cultural the furnished them with states of these historical experiences shared The domination. security institutions, as well as disentangling themselves from vestigesthe of Soviet and economic Western into integration obtain to efforts their in states European Central This toEurope.” wouldof “thethese seetheHavel closecollaboration return pursuit coined Czechoslovakia and Hungary the mutual aspiration of what Czechoslovak President Vaclav inregion the fall Poland1989. From of outsetthe shared with buddingdemocraciesthe in Poland’s Central late incoups government communistof the 1940s. region the noncommunistthe since Europeanleader became in Communism Mazowiecki thefirst 1989when of a August Tadeusz neighbors soon followed suit as revolution swept across the Ilya Prizel (1998) posits that the states of Central and Eastern Europe are united by areunited a Europe and of Eastern Central states thatthe posits Ilya Prizel (1998) yoke in tocastoff of Soviet Europe the state firstCentral became the Poland THE VISEGRÁD TRIANGLE VISEGRÁD THE directed toward a former oppressor. This ressentiment produces Thisressentiment oppressor. aformer toward directed CHAPTER 5: CHAPTER 28 CEU eTD Collection towards Moscow. The result was each state handing the Russians identical lists of lists of demands. identical handing theRussians was each Theresult Moscow. state towards in of state’s policy andcoordination 1992, saw the full Visegrád May the Prague, CSFR inp.238). SubsequentKrakow, Polandin 1991, initiatives 2004, summits October (Spero group’s the himself of asthe figurehead established quickly agenda andSkubiszewski group obtainedthe had of its name)Poland framework foreign Visegrád’s setthe the policy policy for the triangleprogram 2004, p.237). (Spero upaconcrete draw to summits andsecond first the between interim the during diligently work would who Mazowieki Minister Prime Polish be would it but cooperative, regional elected2004, p.236).This officials (Spero laid for meeting the groundwork thebasic replacedwere soon by communist regimes thatdemocratically of representatives defunct were in attendance many those Furthermore, of prepare. to states other for the time little leaving set an summitagenda, to days before the last until aswaited the Prague proposals policy tangible of in way little very produced meeting This Havel. Vaclav government initiative head of Czechoslovak inthe the under April Slovakia Bratislava, 1990 1970, p.273) grouping whichwould strengthen (Tyrmand partnersvis-à-vis cooperating the Moscow.” a Polish-Hungarian-Czechoslovakian weshould create future “Inthe wrote, Mieroszewski in earlier years hadbeen prescribed agenda. Such a collaboration foreign achieve policy acommon to together working andbegan Triangle Visegrád so-called coalesced become p.54). This common states intothe policy official as theseagenda three into institutions political, Western 1992, economic, the and security European (Michta of mutual establishwould andsecurity hasten a agenda that political,their economic, acceptance Extraordinary changes in the regional order made Extraordinary to it in regional forchanges essential the order group this By the time the group met again in Visegrád, Hungary in February 1991 (from metinFebruary inwhere Hungary 1991(from Visegrád, By thetime thegroup again The leadership of Poland, Hungary, andheld Czechoslovakia theirfirst summitin 29 Kultura when CEU eTD Collection from Skubiszewski who was annoyed with Walesa for suggesting such for suggesting such a counterproductive Walesa whowasannoyedfrom with Skubiszewski rebuke and in region littlethe support very met with alliance Seasecurity Baltic-to-Black to regional threats security. werenoperceivable andMoscow,there Warsawin between Berlin anxiety over dealings quarrel from Therefore, asidewith lingering Germans” the (Tyrmand 1970,p.258). some a has which Poland, with up itself tie to wants Hungary nor “Czechoslovakia neither as Triangle Visegrád was actually the process to prerequisite Polish-German the rapprochement Mieroszewski, to According theregion. throughout of security aura anoverall and created Polish-German reconciliation went along way in allaying Polish fears of German revanchism external tonationalthreats issecurity played byforeign policy” (Ziebas 1993,p.69).The immigrants.inundation refugees of Hemaintainedor “leading thatthe role…of preventing possiblethe inmight destabilization neighboring that states in conceivably an result is Poland to threat conceivable only the and opponents” or enemies no has officially, “Poland, he said when Zieba byRysard articulated was time the of Thereality structures. security foreign policy objectives. theirstates took sovereignty seriously andwerewillingwork together toachieve to common European Central thatthe Moscow to proved Triangle Visegrád of the actions collective withdrawals with forcestroop from leavingCentral last Europe, 1992. Poland inlate the The Soviet negotiated alsosuccessfully These states 1992,p.130). WarsawPact(Michta the of structures military the of WarsawPact,and1July the with 1991 official the dissolution of achieve policy outcomes on their own terms than if any one of these states were acting alone. putThis collaboration pressure far Visegrádto the Moscow to enabled on states greater These conditions explain why Polish President Lech Walesa’s idea of creating a creating of idea Walesa’s Lech President Polish why explain conditions These With the Warsaw Pact in the history books, Poland was left outside of any tangible The proceeds of the Visegrád’s cooperation came on 31 March 1991 with the removal 30 CEU eTD Collection the scope of this study.beyond is EU the and NATO for requirements meetentry to underwent states these processes However, it is crucialUnion on 1 May 2004 thuscompleting to Europe. their Afull return analysis complex the of to note that the cooperativewith their admissions function ofinto the NATO in March of the EU. to for early acceptance compete 1999 and their accession beganto countries as theVisegrád theVisegrád process toward exhibitsmug attitude to a into the Europeanon wouldbe referred toas the Visegrád Group, but the Czech Prime Minister would continue from Ultimately,p.85).which then coalition the joined meansall necessary Slovakia (Spero, by Visegrádprocess preserve the hemust moveif wasinevitable but sucha Czechoslovakia, split notto Vaclav Klaus, Minister, Prime Czech region. Skubiszewski urged the European in Central the new state asa of Slovakia emergence the with Triangle Visegrád of the thecohesion in threatened Czechoslovakia Divorce” the“Velvet January 1993 as identical of those (Prizel to west” the Thisstability 1998,p.150). putin 1 on was question are values theirand cultural political evidencethat and“can provide and coordinate…” compromise, cooperate, to have capacity the case; they since areaspecial nations communist post- “these particular that Europe to demonstrating coalition cooperative stable and 2004,p.258). objectivethe (Spero of creating astable and secureCentral Europe to be the beginnings of a regional security alliance, but rather as a “loose coalition” Triangle Visegrád the neverbased considered necessity.Skubiszewski security as amilitary or not on viewed a move NATOmembership as todeepenintegration,political designed Western their clearly Triangle Visegrád The membership. NATO of pursuit their justify to states these Poland and other potential members into a regional security bloc making it more difficult for concept. Thoughnever would an official proposal, such a security lockedstructure have The definingmoments of integration VisegrádGroup’s the Western strategy came a create wasto Triangle Visegrád intentthe of the that proposed Rachwald Arthur 31 CEU eTD Collection distance themselves from process. the from themselves distance to trying Czech the seen and mix the into Slovakia lagging a brought which Czechoslovakia in Poland Central Europe. alsoremainedto committed process the even breakthe with up andorder stability of creating and aninstrument platform as an agenda-setting foreign policy instrumental(Cottey However, 1999, p.87). the Visegrádin was theearly of phases Polish of and Warsawthe bringing Pact NATO the political the issuesof and the EUto agenda of Visegrádthe diminished process it its key after achieved objectives, namely dissolutionthe in isleadership.it theparticipation process of middle demonstrative Theimportance power Poland’s equal on itswas dependentthe all of active process members, participation Visegrád Though the al.p.24) et issue-specific 1993, on their problems (Cooper power leveraging of means a as coalitions utilize to seek that activities collaborative of facilitator simultaneous admissions to both NATO and the EU. dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the removal of Russian troops from the region, and later their the netted that cooperation itwas their general toEurope, return to race inthe themselves p.297). Thoughoften wrangled (Spero 2004, thesestates times forposition amongst powers between inWest East bridging and countries to and institutions nonprovocatively” enabledprocess capitalize Poland to onits bilateral linkages great, middle, to and smaller (2004) summarizes into VisegrádTriangle “the As institutions. these accession Spero mandates to important were it stability created of atmosphere andtheentailing Visegrád As Cooper et al. (1993) point out, it is characteristic of a middle power to act as a 32 CEU eTD Collection 1970, p.261). In this context Poland embarked on what Spero (2004) describes asPoland’s Spero Poland embarkedonwhat context In this 1970, p.261). Mierzewski believed thatPoland had a vital part toplay in ‘Europeanizing’ Russia (Tyrmand andbecoming afrontier outpost of Westthe against East”(Prizel the 1995, p.xii). and mean Western (and)…will abridgebeing between Europe difference Russia between the willWar not“the excludewhetherorder Russia include post-Cold European or or and West. East between crossroads itplaceat the again location would However, Poland’s geography states. burgeoning with of each these (Sanford 1999,p.84).Polandit consideredessential establish to solid diplomaticrelations advantage apeculiar and opportunity” historic to our created situation Poland’s geopolitical independent states aiming at a democratic political and economic transformation has changed of number of anda emergence USSR the of the “The disintegration that, when hestated that the MSZ began to construct a lucid of a coherent eastern inway little leftwith them had Germany with concern initial Poland’s its boarder. on eastern policy. It was not until fourstates altered newlyindependent by was radically geopolitical of emergence position the after Poland’s rapprochementforeign policy In environment. fewthe years short following independence, Poland’s its with Germany materialized that sovereign instates late1989,Polandfaced undoubtedly the most daunting newly the all Of domination. Soviet of themselves had freed states these later ayear than Less domestic policies. pursue their own freebe Union to Sovietof would the states satellite In December United 1988Mikhail Gorbachev indicatedtothe Nations thatthe In the role of would In be on roleof the future basis of the aspiring determined Poland’s European, Skubiszewski Poland’s illustrated circumstanceunique totheSejm Aprilon 29 1993 Russia: Managing the East-West Balance CHAPTER 6: CHAPTER Ostpolitik 33 . CEU eTD Collection Visegrád states reasonedthat it asecurity interest states was in Visegrád topursue best theirpolicy as the neo-imperialism, Russian Fearing intentions. long-term Russia’s of uncertain still were that countries Visegrád other the and Poland of motivations the to counter ran neutrality of the concept However, Europe. Western between Russia and states neutral of a region (EU). structures Western economic andbridge ato States Independent of Commonwealth into the penetration Western a bufferagainst providing of purpose the dual serve would European states andEastern Central unaligned of a zone perspective Russian the From proposal. short-lived Walesa’s notablysimilarto p.136), 2004, Blackbeltneutrality (Bugajski Sea of Baltic to prevent Central joining the Western from Europeans institutionssecurity and promotinga Moscow’s “Kozyrev Doctrine” of 1992 proclaimed that6.1: NATO the strategic task of Russia was to complexity to the alreadymultifaceted the complexity to Independentsuspicion of Poland’s supposedquasi-imperialist motivations towards Commonthe Wealth of States (CIS).quell Russian to joinalso worked They NATO. to quest Poland VisegrádGroup’s the and Managing over Moscow from emanating concerns dispel continually hadto MSZ The sovereignty. Moscow’sthey sensitivities by nosupporting and in democratizing Russia’sinclusion Europe the developingbutregional order, means added importance of the Warsawappease Russian understood apprehensions. to aspirations could yet another allow layerUSSR. solvent still the of republics western Moscow’sin the materializing ofmovements independence the encouraging simultaneously while Moscow with ties closer for striving of policy “two-track” neo-imperialist drift to threaten their own Bugajski (2004) further illustrates that it was also the initial position of NATO to have The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 left Poland in a security grey zone. It is vital hadintentionIt Polandforeign notethat subjugating its no of own to policy Ostpolitik 34 of Warsaw . CEU eTD Collection (Prizel inAugust 1993 broughtadramatic breakthrough 1998, p.138). the stalemate NATO, Warsaw, Prague,and Budapestmore became apprehensiveever Russian intentionsof join NATO. to attempts Visegrád’s the and finalcollapse the Union of Sovietthe in even Decemberof emphasis 1991 put on greater in August 1991 The failed2004, p.133). Soviet coup (Spero between GermanyandRussia” ultimately Poland’supholdits recognized sovereignty to right and security as abridge power neighbors “Both great asserts, (2004) as Spero cooperation from derived regional withdrawals from their own The p.261). PolesCzechoslovaks maintained and negotiations until their positions on troop territories were complete.2004, p.148; Spero Czechoslovakia 1998, (Prizel deniedtroops transitacross too Soviet This exemplifies as they secure of Prague to support the Group Visegrád within the and theirthe position utilized benefits Poland policy. ThePoles barred entry Sovietto forces attempting tocross the Polish-German border were still more than willing to neglect Poland’s sovereignty in matters of their own foreign Bonn Polesthe Moscow and that to demonstrated clearly would territory. transitPolish This leavingGermany for Russia troops East participation the decided,Poland, that of without 2004, Duringwithdrawals Germany from p.120). it(Spero East was negotiations these had metsecretly the “2+negotiateduring on16July 4” talks Soviettroop 1990 to guarantees. security absent anygenuine Russianantagonism inor vulnerable eventof German the be still would Poland but rapprochement, Polish-German the given negligible been have may This threat structures. in trans-Atlanticsecurity with alignment rested interests bestfelt their and neighbors hostile historically two between situated themselves found they as neutrality of concept with the concerned wereespecially Poles aspossible. The Moscow of independent As Moscow became more resolute in denying approval of joiningany Visegrád state fearsPoland’s appeared justified in1991 whenitwas that Bonn revealed and Moscow 35 CEU eTD Collection Central Central membershipEuropean’s NATOquest for wasundoubtedly psychological. deal the Russia’sover reservation p.303).A great 2004, of military (Spero sponsored exercise exercisesheld on Polishsend soil alsowhile offering Polish toany to troops Russian in by reached toMoscow topartake military any out joint opportunities Russia offering leftto acquiesce inevitable. was themselves little The tothe choicebut Poles Moscow with by WhenbecamebePoland it clear expanded of end the apartof would 1997that an NATO, from West,objectionsthe from overPolishMoscow membershipNATO slowly diminished. (Sanford Withp.93). a of NATO threat 1999,outreach subduedactive Russian paranoia a permanentvoicefurtherestablished Moscow NATO-RussiaCouncilgiving in the NATO, forActand NATO-RussianConsultation ParisFounding 27May1997,which the on structures. security European from isolated being of concerns Moscow’s 2004, p.273).itself Inthe NATOnon-imperial could only Russia”(Spero dissipate end ofa interests to the “cannot be asathreat viewed integration for western quest Visegrád’s influencewould haveagood on security,”Russia’s hefurther stressed thatPoland and the Alliance the in presence Poland’s while NATO, with cooperation good have to is going that “Russia is by and furtherNATO that Polishapower declaring the position Moscow towards alliance. the expand to decision NATO’s for wait to needed only now they that Poles the to signaled p.197).(Spero 2004,Moscow quickly but thisYeltsin’sreversed position, approval tacit join NATO…does not go against the interests of other states, including the interest of Russia” Polish-Russiandeclared “… inwritingof 25 August intentionDeclaration to thatPoland’s Yeltsin and Polish President Lech Walesa reached a consensus on the NATO issue. The Joint Boris President Russian drinking, of night long a after when, Moscow and Warsaw between Russia’s participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program Russia’sforin Partnership participationinNATO’s beginning Peace 1994 program Atease NATOSummitthe inJanuary soughttensionsto 1994 Skubiszewski with 36 CEU eTD Collection security. helped toeaseRussian andapprehensions gainherin support Poland’s bidfor regional joiningfor towardsMoscowby motives with NATO, together This, the alliance. efforts inparticipation military provide in activities Poland andsoughtto in transparency their They ease fearsofWarsawjoining by alliance. Moscow’s the this Russian did offering et al.(Cooper p.25). Throughout NATOadmissions 1993, the to Poland process, worked workspower tobuild credibility through measuresand trust andfacilities toresolve disputes al.Cooper et middle (1993)outline confidence-building bywhich asbeingaprocess the theRussiain focus confidence-building. regard to NATO Poland’s membership was on and multifaceted mostthe of behaviorsmiddle power itselfand presents inmany ways.With West. burgeoningindependence barriers asthey republics of Soviet with former the in the dealt the they once had absolute control. Moscow would need to navigate regions in the many moreinfluence psychologicalRussian limit to threatened now and ideology Soviet the to opposition for decadeshadbeenin jointhat direct theirbids tovery security structure support the to Moscow pressuring now were satellites era. These former they had Soviet the during Moscow no longer maintained absolute control over a vast empire of satellite states as The final characteristic that typifies a middle power is its management role. This is This role. management isits power middle a typifies that characteristic final The 37 CEU eTD Collection Belarus, andmarked Ukraine. This the endof also policy MSZ’sthe two-track balancingof Lithuania, including states sovereign newly many of formation in the resulted and Union Polandpost-1989 would pursue. background, easternneighbors Poland’s see waited anxiouslymodewhat to offoreign policy Communism the Poles and lost all disputeopportunity borders. Givento their current this by subjugated Soviet sovereignty quickly was Poland’s and war, the After Ukraine. post-war settlement turned most of the in Pact 1939.The War bytheMolotov-Ribbentrop Worldand theGermany Second during kresy independent Polandirredentist policies pursued aimed at former regaining its frontiers in the Polish state partitions between its dividing territories andPrussia, Russia, Austria wiping effectively the from the map until afterKiev. except states mentioned day previously of the capitals present the First the of all encircled and Warsaw than Moscow nearer was border western WorldCommonwealth’s War. Polish-Lithuanian The Ukraine. modern of majority Duringa and Belarus, of all nearly the interwarPolish-Lithuanian Commonwealth all encompassed of present day Poland and Lithuania, period16 itscentury peakwhenand reached with united Grandthe Poland in Duchy Lithuania of the 15 the of era Jagiellonian the during began continent European the on power to ascendance Poland’s policy. foreign Polish in history of salience inescapable the clarify help will east th century to create the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Prazmowska 2004). The 2004). Commonwealth (Prazmowska Polish-Lithuanian the create to century Ostpolitik , which it limited, which accomplished Poland with success. wasagain between splitRussia The Belovezha accords of 8 December 1991 marked the official end of official Soviet the marked end of of 8 December 1991 accords The Belovezha In 1772,1793,and Polish-Lithuanian 1795the a seriesCommonwealth of underwent A brief overview of Poland’s historical relationships with the emergent states to its : Legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth CHAPTER 7: CHAPTER kresy into the Sovietrepublics ofLithuania, Belarus, 38 th CEU eTD Collection strategy strategy by MSZservedthe the dual of encouraging thepurpose independence of Eastern the This standards. these infactconsolidating were Poles European the standards, promote to Poland’s effort personalthrough security the liberty. (2003)observes that of Snyder human promotion of ideals,and of rights, standards presume theprotection also democratic These p.257). of andstates” 2003, of rights minorities” “cultural protection the (Snyder the nation- of integrity “territorial of the preservation arethe standards of European tenets these implemented aforeign policy based on promotion the of standards.European The basic p.50). moral 1990, Poland’s foreign imperialistdimension addeda policy to (Kostrzewa plans, toabandon a freedom, alongside all guarantee and idealspromotingself-determination of by p.48-49). furtherMieroszewski that 1990, Poland recognized (Kostrzewa and Russia” be pawns Ukrainians, and Lithuanians, Byelorussians inahistoricalcannot gamebetween “the future, in the but ULB, in the imperialism” Russian or Polish between choice the only “therehistorically was that ULB.Henoted for the givingPolishof designs theimpression avoid to Moscow and ULB the between policy their manage and Belarus) and Lithuania, (Ukraine, ULB region the whathetermed of perspective Russian acknowledge the needed to intimate with the ideals articulated in ideals articulated with the intimate in states. interest these maintain a great still would “new”the Russia The MSZ that Moscow. recognized belieu of couldwith policy pursuedin not these states with reduced anxietyEastern Europe. Poland was thus free to pursue diplomaticof ties with these infantoffending nation-states Moscow.Republics of Lithuania, Belarus,and Ukraine joined theRepublic of Polandin new the However, the The republics. western of Soviet’s the individual capitals and the Moscow between Poles realized that policy with In its effort to encourage the independence of encourage former the independenceto In itsRepublics,Poland of Soviet the effort The policy aims of The policy were again MSZin Skubiszewski and the aims noticeably of East the Kultura 39 . As Juliusz Mieroszewski outlined, the Poles the outlined, Mieroszewski Juliusz As . CEU eTD Collection Polish autonomy in regions where they were a majority (Snyder 2003, p.240). voters, but the Union of Poles in Lithuania became evenmore emboldened by pressing for by independencereaffirmed with theirareferendum of of 90 percent declaration supported surrounding areas(Snyder During 2003,p.240). theLithuanian chaos this parliament partitioning being with Lithuania Polishthe minority of the beneficiaries andVilnius Lithuania’s bidindependence for seizing byviolently parts of Vilnius and proposing forces responded to In Soviet January 2004, p.159). 1991 Lithuanialiving (Spero within Poles the of aspirations nationalist the from Poland distance and independence Lithuania’s of Warsaw’ssupport symbolic offer to theopportunity Poland Skubiszewski giving to reclaim its formerlands in eastthe (Snyder 2003,p.240). organizations Lithuania,“Union within such of in as the Lithuania,” for the PolishPoles state irredentistinSovietfrom minority declaration an Union.Polishresulted clamor This becameindependenceof state when CIStodeclare Lithuania thefirst from future the the Polish-Lithuania relations on the state level. The first instance of this came on 12 March 1990 population (Snyder 2003,p.240).This Polish minority sizable hamperwould continually themselves ethnic Poles. In the Šal Poles. Inthe themselves ethnic region, whichincludesthe city percentof 63.8 Vilnius, population the of considered Snyderpopulation. the1989Soviet incensus According (2003), to showedthat Vilnius the amajority the of constituted in actually some regions that minority with a largePolish Lithuania 7.1: institutions Western into integration their of likelihood the increasing thereby state, West Western asastable inthe image Poland’s andstates advancing In April and May of In April minister foreign 1990, Lithuanian and May AlgirdasSaudargas’visited of Four centuries of federation with a Polish state in one form or another left Lithuania left another form inor one state a Polish with federation of centuries Four þ ininkai region, Poles represented 79.8 percent of percentof the 79.8 represented Poles region, ininkai 40 CEU eTD Collection Treaty of Riga on 18 March 1921 (Prazmowska 2004, p.164-165). Skubiszewski appealedto p.164-165). March 1921(Prazmowska 2004, Treaty 18 Riga on of century. Vilnius andmuch of Lithuania was returned to Polesthe by in greatpowers the the military campaigns to reclaim the to campaigns military Warsaw apologize for interwartheir occupation Vilniusof in 1920. Lithuanianbe relationsto were further bytheLithuanian’s soon undermined that demand holdLithuania Polish-free intheseregions 1992,p.72). (Michta elections to promised Skubiszewski’svisit original plan inNovember Vilnius January to 1991until 1992, after 269). This action delayed 2003, p. these (Snyder concentration areas of Polish Šal and Vilnius of governments regional the Septembermoments of Lithuanians dissolved4 subdued on when werequickly optimism the USSR and Poland officially Lithuanian independencerecognized on 26 August 1991. These “Long live afree Lithuania” (Snyder 2003,p.254). Vilniusby of under ralliedof Lithuaniasending truckloads cry insupport supplies to the of sending in Lithuania’s bidindependence for bycondemning the Soviet’s forceuse in of Vilnius and demands ofPoles inLithuania. Union comingthe from offered theirsupport MSZalso The territorial all opposed and state Polish the of boundary irrevocable the as borders existing fromPolish state Polishthe minority in by Lithuania that Polandreiterating recognizedits philosophy interests of puttingstate ahead ofnational interests and todistance worked the his to Skubiszewski 2003,p.253). stuck Soviet)(Snyder (Lithuanian, or Polish and Vilnian, for aflag, anarmy, independence,citizenship andtriple calling of declaration minority “Wilno-Polish National-Territorial inAuthority” May 1991 which a amounted to Polish The issue at hand was Generals Jozef Pilsudski and Lucjan Želigowski’s interwar Želigowski’s andLucjan Pilsudski Jozef The issueathand wasGenerals The August 1991putsch in SovietUnionthe signaled theinevitable demise of the The Lithuanian-Poles’ drive for autonomy reached its apex with the proposal its apexwith a of proposal the drive autonomy reached for The Lithuanian-Poles’ Solidarnosc activists to Vilnius to offer their support. The Polish people themselves The people Polish support. Vilnius offer their activists to to Kresy that had been lost in the partitions of the 18 41 þ ininkai, implementing administrative rule in rule administrative implementing ininkai, th CEU eTD Collection into NATOinto and EUalso the allowed the MSZ keep continuedto pressure Lithuaniansthe on (Snyderp.285). Poland’sas the accession roadtoEurope avidsupport of Lithuanian 2003, was seen For Lithuania, Poland journey. on this them assist could Poles the recognized that integration Western Polandbenefits Lithuania, finally the displayed of andVilnius to revanchism. ThePolish-Lithuanian flourished.relationship European Byvalues appealing to friendshipnew their Vilnius’ phobiaPoles of completely Polish and eliminated took with a vote of 295-0 (Snyderp.273). 2003, both parliaments on the same day in October 1994. The Polishlater Poland andLithuania signed friendship atreaty of andcooperation which was ratified by parliament ratified the treaty formembership, NATO it which did on 4 January 1994 (Snyder 2003,p.272). Three months apply government the that and recommended threat alegitimate as neo-imperialism Russian marked awatershed in The relations. Polish-Lithuanian Lithuanian recognizedparliament 1993 in late by However, actions Vilnius state. direction Lithuanian on future the of the divided increasingly became Vilnius and cooperation, of treaty official an reaching impede entire region. states therebynot onlybut creating situationalso fora dangerous thePoland, Lithuania and of by number claimsany lead territorial could to Such debate historical many actions. other legality of Poland’s apologize. Polandpoints2003, p.271). not (2003) outthat torenounce Snyder did the interwar claim on VilniusPolish-Lithuanians with reconstitute desirethe to a new federation Polish-Lithuanian (Snyder would lead to questionsin interwar represented an mindset period andŽeligowskiatavistic Pilsudski acted as which over the legalityput Lithuaniansthe pastbehind to the future.toward look them Heindicated the and the that of The unanimity of the Polish vote signaled to Lithuania the seriousness with which the The 1920Vilnius over dispute and of the Union Poles inLithuania continued to 42 CEU eTD Collection majority of Belarusians. makes independent forof the ofbeing provincialism that Russia idea difficultthe a state lack issue The in isits identity greatest Belarus of anda national utter deep-rooted butfurther1999, p.103), hinder problems Warsaw’s towardMinsk.would continue to efforts only sovereign state apartfrom Russia willing with to work leadersthe of Belarus (Sanford inNeighborliness June1992(Sanfordp.103). Throughout 1999, periodthis Poland wasthe diplomatic relations with in Minsk March 1992,andratify a full Treaty Good- of August officiallyafter 1991.Warsawwould declaringindependence on25 establish inMinsk 1991 October (Snyder 2003,p.249). with sign ajointdeclaration Warsaw wasable to year,next the over Belarusian antagonism over minorities,territory, and supposedPolish Belarus. aggression towards Despite ensuing Skubiszewski’s Minsk visit of to a inOctober 1990 brought throng of complaintsBelarusian (Spero 2004,p.167). Poles ethnicwere aminority to in Belarusians lands.these from the Soviets sovereignty 27July1990Belarusdeclared Belarus.On with project Warsaw facedadifficult and quickly becameit apparent onset From the al. p.346). 2002, declared et (Balmaceda a national tragedy that theimperialism Redthe when Army invadedin Poland 1939. For Polesthe day this symbolizes Polish region as from September day gaineditsthe 27iscelebrated independence Polish Belarus of Bialystok holds inLithuania, towards historical Poles.the In strong Belarus animosities Belarus belonged to itregion during this period, the Polish-Belarusian relationship represents the polar opposite. As 7.2: Belarus Vilnius. from to appreciate the plight of the Polish minority living within their state without much recoil This declaration was Belarus’ first act of international politics as a sovereign state a sovereign as politics international of act first Belarus’ was declaration This If Polish-Lithuanian theconstructive potential the within typified relationship the 43 CEU eTD Collection implemented in years firstthe independence,of andevents in springthe of 1995 would leave of Belarus in 1994. Lukashenko quickly reversed identity Minsk’s building efforts weresoon Alaksandarefforts, overshadowed by presidency to the Lukashenkoof election the shake. “thebeing wouldGate attitude of Western Union,”befor Sovietthat the Belarus an hard to (2003) points out,decades of Russian leftassimilation Belarus maintaining the self-image of However, p.112). of flag asKorosteleva a national 2003, (Korosteleva andacoat arms official language (previously Russian) important andsymbols adopted including of statehood promote measures 1990s Minskofficial nationalmaking identity to by took the Belarusian early In the forces. of victims on based being identity outside national a sense Belarusian of built national tragedies These fellBelarus. on disaster from Chernobyl the fallout radioactive of the quarters nearly three revelation that the second was andthe Forest, Kurapaty cohesion. The first was the discovery massof graves of Belarusian victims of Stalinism in the in thelate 1980’s marked founding in moments developmentthe of Belarusian national p.116). possessing asufficient language understanding of Belarusian by the 2003, 1989 (Korosteleva population with a reasonable knowledge of their national history and only percenttwenty-five national Belarusian history leaving and language from ascantfive curricula the of percent the was rebuilt by the Soviets in an environment of tireless Russification. The Russians removedBelarusian souls were lost to the atrocities of the war (Snyder 2003, p.283). Post-war Belarus 1930s. DuringWar theSecondWorld Minsk Germans the obliterated andonein four late the of purges Stalinist in the murdered were intelligentsia Belarusian the of all Nearly Belarus’ search for identity national isindisputably hampered by history.recent Warsaw’s accomplishments in Belarus, and Minsk’s own national identity building identity national own Minsk’s and in Belarus, accomplishments Warsaw’s KorostelevaBelarus’ (2003)observes lack events dueto that of history,a usable two 44 CEU eTD Collection 2002, p.350). The Polish state organization, Polish Commonwealth is concerned with is with culture concerned Commonwealth organization, Polish The state Polish 2002, p.350). (Balmaceda government Belarusian the to concerns their voice to in efforts elections regional in opposition party Front National with Belarusian the candidates presents newspaper and The Union of inPoles Belarus,in established 1991,publishes its own language Polish minority living in Belarus made work the of minority organizations increasingly important. opposition inside and outside of Belarus. minority of support the non-governmental (NGOs),organizations, political organizations and level relationsdiplomatic Minsk with and focus their efforts on Belarusian society through principles (Korosteleva 2003,p.175).Within Poland contextthis end wasforced to high condoneand highlightingundemocraticLibya, further to the government’swillingness with The diplomatic relations Cuba, Iraq, alsoestablished dictatorship p.259). Lukashenko human and liberties of in civil accordance with principles the democracy rights 2002, (Lewis Novemberfor Lukashenko’s 1996condemning and respect Minsk policies despotic calling to extendedhis president fiveterm another yearsas (Lewis 2002, p.39). Lukashenko’s the to also referenda opposition futurepolicy. fromparliamentcourts or The approval in Belarus and further referenda in November 1996 effectively ended legal minus hammerand All sickle (Lewis2002,p.37). measures majority of these metwith a replicaflag, Minsk from flag changingthe in1944),and national of Nazis to the Soviet the second official language, change thenational 3 Julyto day day (the Sovietsthe liberated court. increaseBelarusian constitution his vis-à-visto powers theConstitutional parliament and change little Lukashenko’s hebegan doubtover authoritarianism using referendaas the to The absence of official guarantees from Minsk to protect the interest of the Polish the of interest the protect to Minsk from guarantees official of absence The Poland’s response was to initiate a joint declaration with Lithuania and Ukraine on 20 Among his proposals were the ability to dissolve parliament, elevate Russian to the 45 CEU eTD Collection Poland. This opportunity Poland.for Thisopportunity is especially important youngerthe generation who stands to in democracy of effects positive the firsthand witness to travelers Belarusian allowing p.257). The opening of Polishborderin the early the 1990s alsoplayed amajor role in Lukashenko provide the voicewith regimeagainst 2002, of (Lewis NGOsto a dissentPolish Refugees in Poland hasorganized various seminars and training in programs coordination Belarusian political2001 the Since opposition. December Union Belarusian of Political freeand political from of commentary regime.censorship Lukashenko the Thep.257). station Belarusianprovides citizens thevaluableindependent commodity news of incan Racja, beRadio that Bialystok parts of upin picked Belarus 2002, western (Lewis NGOs. One of their successes was the establishment2002, p.364). The promotion of independentmediaan inBelarus is priority top the of Polish of a Belarusian-language radioseminars (Balmaceda training and conferences, workshops, and organize press andmedia, station, subsidize equipment, supply to NGOs Belarusian with in conjunction work Many society. (Korosteleva Polish 2003,p.121). been NGOs have also active in of their support Belarusian participateMinsk in to activities tocoordinate their social, cultural, andpolitical goals a NGOcongressin metat representatives hundred NGO Belarusian two December 2000over numberthat toincrease1.35 tomillion inzloty 2001 (Wood2004, p.148). providedmillion overfor Polishin 1.2 theBelarusian zloty funding minority and projected Polandis by actively supported In Polishthe state. 2000 the Polish Culture Ministry in minority Belarusian the hand, other the On regime. Lukashenko the under discrimination However, havefacedincreasing these groups (Balmaceda2002,p.350). for Belarusian-Poles andinstruction anumberofschoolslanguageand education hasestablished Polish offering Poland has also increasingly served as a refuge, and base of operations, for andbasehasincreasingly Poland asarefuge, served the alsooperations, of NGOs also play a critical roleIn incountering Lukashenko. the authoritarian of rule 46 CEU eTD Collection the Volhynia territory from the Germans in 1943, the UPA began slaughterto ethnic Poles en Ukrainian Partisan Army the by out (UPA) carried incleansing the ethnic the Volhynia remember Poles The after. regionsoon and War World of western Ukraine. After regaining hadthat plagued Warsaw’s relations with Vilnius and Minsk. Skubiszewski and the MSZ were soon confronted once again with the impediments of history The initial momentous, but Polish-the of Ukrainerelationshipprogress wasquite treaty Friendly Relations, (Hajda 1998,p.312). Cooperation of Good-Neighborliness, and The Polish-Ukrainian becamedeclaration on official 18 May 1992 with signingthe of a full and protection provided minoritiesof on both sides in 1990(WolczukOctober 2002,p.9). borders state confirmed that Relations Ukrainian-Polish of Development the of Directions foundationsmeetings thesigning for laid the of and Declaration the Basic Principles on Ukraine’s in independence Thesesupport (Snyder2003,p.242). declaration run-upto of the movement, Solidarnosc nationalists. Poland and Ukrainian between wasenabledinteractions that by earlier This recognitionprompt marked asignificantmoment in Ukrainian-Polishthe relationship on2December1998,p.9). (Hajda 1991 state newUkrainian state toofficially recognize the successful independencereferendum on on1December 1991and Poland became thefirst August 1991andmade visit theirfirst state to Warsawafter. soon The Ukrainians held a 7.3: Ukraine ideas. of exchange free this hampering an putting borders eastern their tighten significantly shape the future of Belarus. However, Poland’s admission to the EU has forced them to The focal point of these debates centered on events that took place during theSecond thattook centered on events debates of The focal pointthese when 1989 September in began actually collaboration Polish-Ukrainian The Ukraine independencesovereignty declared on 16 July1990,officially declared on24 Ruhk activists turned statesmen attended the founding congress of founding of attended the national Ukraine the statesmen congress turned activists , and met repeatedly , andmetrepeatedly with Ruhk 47 activists to offer their technical and moral and technical their offer to activists CEU eTD Collection membership intheVisegrád inMay1991.Then Leonid Ukrainian Triangle President for Warsaw lobby to began Kiev when evident became inclination western Ukraine’s Europe reallyWePoland” lead pathto knowthe (Snyder through does 2003,p.263). twenty-firstcentury (Hajda 1998, p.4-5). in the become will it nation of sort what decides it as identity own its with confronted is itself Ukraine importantly Most dominance. through influence on bent policies neo-imperialist must (HajdaEuropean Moscow order 1998,p.4-5). nowfocus onself-relianceto asopposed in the itsplace own to reconsider Moscow requires Russia with integration to opposition Ukraine alsoenhances security the itfrom Poland, by of distancing Russia and Ukraine’s Thepresenceearly equallyaltering of 1990s, configuration the geopolitical Europe. of isEurope to unified tantamount Germany’s integration into the European incommunity the “Ukraine intheWorld” (1998).Brzezinski believes the existence of Ukraine onthemap of independent course determine future the of Ukraine. to were that issues on more concentrate to able then was diplomacy Polish-Ukrainian After inReconciliation 1998,p.59). acknowledging May 1997 (Hajda theirpasts, difficult signingDeclaration of by of Agreement Joint the and Presidents the Poland andUkraine on Polandmany andUkraine for years until tensions were significantly with alleviated the between disagreements frequent Thesepresented issues state. Polish demands the against collective and associate present further ability to their prevented Poles effectively the (Snyder minority scattering By across Poland theUkrainian parts of 2003,p.198). state the northern and western in to Poland southeastern minority concentrated Ukrainian the relocated (Snyder 2003,p.169). The Ukrainians rememberPoland’s Operation Vistula in 1947 which thousand fifty hundred one and between killed number putting the estimates some masse with In the words early of words the In the Ukraine inHajda’s thean independent importance of delineates Zbigniew Brzezinski Ruhk leader, Ivan Drach, “We want to travel the Polish path. Polish the travel to want “We Drach, Ivan leader, 48 CEU eTD Collection built on this initiative by broadening theirmilitary alliance in 1997 by proposing and placetook onPolish in territory September 1994 (Spero2004,p.302). Poland and Ukraine notably which Bridge, Cooperative Operation military exercise, (PfP) for Peace Partnership first in the part in taking states Pact Warsaw former and NATO other ten and Germany Central InitiativeEuropean in June 1996(Hadja 1998,p.56). Ukraine in efforts, becameamemberof Council the of the 1995and Europe September assumefor Ukraine. PolandinPoland’s to promotion large amore Due of active partto door the andopened in Europe, Eastern Western interest about optimism created Statement TheWestern for Trilateral boost (Wolczuk Kiev’spossiblep.12). orientation 2002, aneeded Russia,January 1994 provided on and Ukraine 14 by StatementStates, United the The signingof Trilateral betweenits memberthe states. projects andcultural transportation, This Euroregion in (Hajda1998,p.48). Carpathian the Eastern Euroregion Hungary, Slovakia Poland, and was created by Warsaw (Hajda Pact 1998,p.47). the Council the of disbanding the and withdrawals troop negotiating still were they when Moscow of EuropeUnion officiallywas still solvent at that Visegrádthe timeafford and could not tooffend in an effort the Soviet Furthermore, integration. Western for drive Visegrád’s the threaten would further to facilitateUkraine alsolagged far behindin these states its political and economic transitions which trade, identity European Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and sodiligently had fashion.worked to fit not Central the republic did Sovietformer identity as a Ukraine’s Foremost, membership. bidfor Ukraine’s rejected Visegrád reasonswhy the numerous explains the (1998) Steven figure than 1998,p.47). providesmore(Hajda Buranta triangle and possibilities” geometrical complete is amore a “quadrilateral Walesa that President to appealed Kravchuk Kiev and Warsaw also made significant ground in areas of security when they joined they when security of in areas ground significant made also Warsaw and Kiev Ukraine truly its began integration European on 14 February 1993 byjoining 49 CEU eTD Collection stated, “this is not solely a political issue…We are allies with Ukraine, but we mustlook after Kwasniewski President congeniality 2001 economictrumpas realismwould diplomatic into Western Polandas itconspicuously By Ukraine. Europe route October sidestepped an revenueswhenthey to run pipeline a pipeline through from early rejected proposal Belarus state (Wolczuk 2002,p.23). chosen yearfor the in per revenue million dollars extra ninehundred is anestimated stake At between Poland and Ukraine as possible routes for the future gas pipeline Westernto Europe. states by to divide hasattempted WarsawKiev,two oscillating these Moscow between and supplies (Wolczuk 2002,p.23). Aware of increasingly the strategic relationship developing Brussels reached a twenty-year andMoscow Inlate2000 Moscow. with policy energy of importance establishing strategic agreement in which Russia is Polandto provide EU states andwith gas Ukraine are membership requirements. both heavily mandatory own relationshipUnion European EUandcompliance with Poland’s with the dependent.achieved relationship in of wouldbelimited Polish-Ukrainian byRussia’sareas the security, The EU hasUkraine,will p.25). Outside asusual”support (Wolczuk 2002, positivethe of results also takenKiev’s seek official NATOmembershipdeclaration to on 23 May 2003 whenhe “We said, notice of the Ukraine in matters of security as evidenced by Polish President Kwa by President ofsecurity Polish matters evidenced as Ukraine in Kosovo campaignsupportNATOrevealed wereto forces when in operations sent POLUKRBAT 1999 the (Spero2002, p.18). Polandsupport Westernto andUkraine’s willingness initiatives was further 2004, p.303). 14 Przemysl andRegiment the Mechanized Border Warsaw Ukrainian the combined battalion The POLUKRBAT. called battalion joint a implementing has consistently been a champion of At the outset Poland explicitly chose their relationship with Kiev over immense The vast territories of Russia contain an enormous wealth of oil reserves on which 50 th Tank Brigade from Poland (Wolczuk Ğ niewski’s responseto niewski’s CEU eTD Collection stations for Poles the livingin region southeastern the of Poland 2002,p.126). (Wolczuk andmarkets, petrol inwarehouses, ventures entrepreneurial small of awealth creating supportthis inflow of Ukrainian borderthe havesprungtraders upto centers economic oblasts of On Lviv, Chernivtsi,and Transcarpathia(Wolczuk side 2002,p.125). Polish the of western in three Polandthe reside into coming Ukrainians of forty-three percent fact that by is demonstrated the trade scale ofthe this (Wolczuk Further evidence 2002,p.124). and isavital component of survivalstrategy the many familiesof living in region the border regioninformal haveshown that official is in trade roughly equal to trade region the Poland.Lviv the of Studies south-eastern Ukraine betweenthe regionsand of trade” western twelve million with nearly million 12.7 crossings in 2001 (Wolczuk 2002,p.82). over between 1997and2001averaged crossings number the boarder, of Polish-Ukrainian agreement(Hajda After 1998,p.57). apeakin 1997 of over 15.8million crossings atthe in 1996 when Ukraine became the first CIS state with whom Poland reached a visa-free travel began that Poland and Ukraine between people of movement easy the of end the marked This states. Poland on1July2003(Wolczuk EUdemands 2002,p.113). agreed to grudgingly Agreementof Treaty the Amsterdam of (1998) Poles were obligated to adopt the non-negotiable Schengen adopt non-negotiable the to Poles wereobligated Kaliningrad oblast (Bugajski 2004, p.146). the to access Russian which reduced itsgreatly borders across visa-free travel eliminated suspendedMoscow route energy all future plans to supplies through Poland whenWarsaw to reconsiderUkraine apipelinethrough In (Wolczuk routed 2002, p.23). June 2003 its energy supplies asastrategic foreign and Moscowchangedpolicy begantool when course interests”our own (Wolczuk It 2002,p.23). became evidentin Russian 2002 that would use The porous border between between a border “suitcaseUkrainethriving hadThe porous andPoland supported In route In route to Poland’s European Union the successful accession to 1 May on 2004, the 51 requiring strict border controls on non-EU acquis contained in the Schengen in the contained CEU eTD Collection democracy and freedom of ideals the bring to sought have state Polish the and NGOs Polish ideas, market policies that is vitalso to their own transitions. In the absence of the free exchange of ofdemocraticfirsthand positiveeasilydeprived andfree effects see the of ability the to are Ukrainians that fact is the detrimental Most democracy. style Western of fundamentals the of two are that movement of freedom and ideas of exchange the from isolated essentially Ukraineon The (Wolczuk Ukrainians 2002,p.118). arevirtual captives of state, their own impose visahad to RomaniaBulgariaand andrequirements evenHungary Poland (2001) and meetSlovakia The Czech required EUvisa (2000), tothe (1999), Republic requirements. longer travel no can as they isolating as well as to humiliating a requirements visa number found has Ukraine states. of states within involved from EU states visastotravel into in application theprocedures obtaining non-EU region as other neighboring describes (2002) curtain.”The papercurtainisas a“paper of aproduct rigorous the states were also itself” (Wolczuk 2002,p.117). communism. peopleBut nowand ideas–[the this he“ThisWest] declared is fordid what westruggleabsurd; free Forthe with communism?! flow of was the mottoshifts of the 2002, p.110).OneWest Ukrainian commentators’ perspective isin Kwasniewski line with when to andthe under position this flag (Wolczuk will of servetheinterests Europe” new not in The creation of divisions Europe it won ofthe warcommunism, with Europe… of division new deal a with to fact have weshallin boarder, eastern EU’s seal the which separated Poland, both states suffer under the strict visa requirements of the Schengen Agreement. isThough largely trade this result pooreconomicof Ukraine’s the in transition to comparison There is little doubt the Iron Curtain has indeed been replaced by what Wolczuk by what replaced indeed been has Curtain Iron the doubt is little There Critical of the EU visa requirements, Polish President Kwasniewski argued that “if we to Ukraine. 52 CEU eTD Collection for assistance and guidance in achieving these goals. Itwill be largely up toPoland toensure seek NATOand EUmembershipandlooks to Poland,much like Poland toGermany, looked to decisions made the policy has Ukraine become of Europe. part to quest influenced Kiev’s initiatives have had profound effects on shaping Ukraine’s self-identity and greatly jointbattalion in 1997. These non-governmental and governmental institution building the military security sphere, as was discussed above, with the formation of the POLUKRBAT Worldthe Organization p.18). (Wolczuk 2002, Trade in, agenda itsets the interested is areas including agriculture most and bydiscussing policy of in began work European has which Integration, been asKiev 1998, particularly productive The Standing in Conferenceon (Wolczuk Polish-Ukrainian works 2002,p.18). West the see give how democracy established Ukrainians an to in1999 allserve opportunity the Group Parliamentary Ukrainian Polish- the and Forum Government Local Ukrainian Council for Interregional both Cooperation, established in 1993 as as well Polish-the Coordinating Intergovernmental Polish-Ukrainian the Committee, Consultative Presidential The institutions. Western into integration and transformation political and economic governmental institutions designed help to by Ukraine sharing the Poles’ own experiences in (Wolczukleaders 2002, p.49). Ukrainians byfacilitating youth exchanges, for and provideyoung training programs political counterpart, localwork on reforms.government The Polish Batory Foundation,its and Ukrainian the Renaissance work inInitiative, started small- which medium-sized1999, helpdevelop businesses, and and Foundation, seek to create societal ties between Poles and Non-governmental Cooperation Non-governmental Poland-America-Ukraine such as the programs The most remarkable example of Polish-Ukrainian institutional cooperation came in came cooperation institutional Polish-Ukrainian of example remarkable most The through relations Polish-Ukrainian facilitates also government Polish The 53 CEU eTD Collection from Europe by the EU. that Kiev continues to look west and not turn toward Moscow as it is perceivably isolated 54 CEU eTD Collection foundation necessary to successfully accomplish future policy in the East. Western provided the rapprochement asthePolish-German justified was ultimately but time, the at concerns policy foreign pressing other of expense the at came Germany with membership in beforeNATO, even NATOitself considered such an fixation Poland’s option. formerof the Union. Soviet Polandalsoinitiative the took promote unified to Germany’s states newborn the and states European Central the with agendas policy foreign their in state anchored itself to the joined Central soon states the European joint inreturnPoles pursuit a to Europe. Poland to west through Germany other the and integration seek western to intention their declare openly to Bloc former Soviet enabling them to act PolandCooper etal. in (1993). servedasa first bybeing state regional catalyst the the as a sovereign Western middle presented Polandthat behavedbased by on asa framework the undeniably power leadership. for Poland and the rest of the region given general lack of any source of hegemonic in importance distinguishitself was asamiddlepower This wasof able to great region.the Poland in CEE order of development the in play might it role important the acknowledging and surroundings international its in occurred that changes significant the recognizing advantages. Poland was thereforeallowed it to turn the former disadvantages of itsable geopolitical and geostrategicto locationovercome into politicalfind idealism. to middle Poland wasable ground which between extremes athe the entrapments of either its between historical and political Polandovercome realism able to wassuccessfully quarrel extreme. By The preceding analysis of Poland’s post-1989 foreignThe preceding analysis that of Poland’s post-1989 policy agenda demonstrates A comprehensive investigation of demonstrates towardA behavior investigation othercomprehensive Poland’s states of CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER 8: CHAPTER 55 CEU eTD Collection alliance with NATO would not threaten Russian interests. Poland confronted an obstinate an confronted Poland interests. Russian threaten not would NATO with alliance theirgain that confidence to support Moscow’s onWestern Russia capitalizing toward and for the MSZ. The Poles successfully attained NATO membershipby taking inclusive actions presentedchallenge foreign policy aunique Eachstate andRussia. Republics former Soviet ideals Europe. restof as the same democratic shared the West Poles the to the forby Western integration Poland’s that demonstrating furthered push buildingbilateral region.was the throughout essential soundapproachalso to relations This that trust of atmosphere anoverall created and policies Poland’s to legitimacy of gave asense ideals.Theseefforts basedRepublics standards anddemocratic promotion of on the European former the Soviet embarka policy towards to on Poles the freed Union of Soviet the collapse governments in Minsk,Vilnius, andKiev theUSSRremained as an official entity. The and Moscow policy the between emergent balancing multifaceted managingof a of difficulties MSZwith the the policy presented eastern Poland’s When addressed, states first intoNATO and then the EU. dissolution of the Warsawcooperative Pact, and ultimately the The culmination influence in VisegrádGroup’s itsthe collectivedemands. of obtaining simultaneous efforts admissionVisegrádgive andhelped summits to theVisegrád its Group unified voice and greater of the Visegrádcame and Bratislava the between interim inthe program policy foreign lucid a formulated with Poland the removalplagued by obstinacythe oflingeringleaders communist and anincoherentpolicy agenda. ofsummitwas firstthe but Czechoslovaks, by initiated the was Visegrád The objectives. Soviet common achieve to neighbors like-minded with by collaborating troops facilitator regional from Central Europe, the The functioning of Poland’s demonstrates Visegrádthe Group actas a ability to History presented a multitude of difficulties for Polish foreign policy toward the Poland’s Ostpolitik wasinitially slowed bymore pressing concerns with Germany. 56 CEU eTD Collection manager in theirforeign policy behavior toward their diverse array neighbors.of However, as Poland has established andintegration. Ukraine’s transitions own accelerate itselfto meant are Poland of part the on efforts These integration. Western as for bid own their from a middle power gleaned they experiences asthe aswell transitions economic and democratic with experience Poland’s Kiev with share institutions by These movement. acting of freedom the to restrictions as a catalyst,Polish-Ukrainian State relationship. institutions and NGOs are filling the voidleft by facilitator,hinderfuture visa to implementpolicy a detrimental border control threatens the and that andUkrainians over transit rights for EU energy supplies. EU requirements forced Poland to identity forof aEuropean todivide quest Moscow’sefforts Ukraine’s Polesand despite the support of Belarusianpoliticalthe opposition. attention of with work the establishing relations Belarusian on NGOs and through society focused then Poland democracy. of tenets basic the and rights human of recognition the for called and regime the condemning Ukraine and Lithuania with declaration joint a initiating by answered Poles The Poland Belarus. between and level contact state all ended ultimately Western loneto maintainMinsk, state diplomacy despotism butLukashenko’s with the was Poland Belarus. of presidency the to Lukashenko Alaksandar of election the with Polish minority rights within Lithuania with little consequent recourse from Vilnius. for press of Western integration avid enabledLithuania’s state. Poland’s to support the Poles concerns Poles livingoutsideof of of Poland infavor longthe term of interests Polishthe eschewed thenationalist that approach wasan enlightened response Lithuania. MSZ’s The and Poland between diplomacy level state on strain great put that inVilnius minority Polish The analysis of Poland’s post-1989 foreign policy agenda clearly demonstrates that In Ukraine, Poland was able to overcome an atrocious history to become a champion Poland’s withrelationship was Belarus difficultfrom beginningthe further andsoured 57 CEU eTD Collection unavoidable of restraints EU membership. under neighbors the theirachieve towards eastern to and their goals niche diplomacy Poland’s middle powerauthority, they will again needtorely on their entrepreneurial abilities of limitations inherent the Given policy. foreign independent an maintain to seek and policy foreign EU a common to resistant are Poles the why explain also might This p.28). knows well,intofails“thatall Russiawill fill” step anyvacuumtheWesttoo to (Wolczuk, cooperation with the Eastern European states also shows that they fail to realize what Polandoffermeaningful to Union’s reluctance European haveimposed.The requirements these difficulties the of understanding lacks agenuine EU the that demonstrates states European issues Eastern with the border compromisevisaregard to on unwillingness and to maybut infact EUitself. Brussels’ Belarusand Eastern policy Russia guide also the of the Brussels. not development Subsequently, the of only policy Poland’s Eastern Ukraine,toward Poland willfacemanyyears Ukrainewithin imposeduponit confines by with of working the opportunities toadvance theirmiddle powerdiplomacy. has considerable in with lonewhom Poland region the state leaving asthe Ukraine thus influence, of sphere Polish the outside increasingly them leaves Russia with federation states will be maintained decidedly within the constructs of Brussels. progressing Belarus’ these with relations bilateral Union, European the of members all Hungary and Slovakia, Lithuania,Czech Republic, neighbors Germany, the European With Union. Poland’s being amiddle of distinction power. retain the actmustas continuea middle to powerin foreign evolvingthe inpolicy environment to order Poland Therefore, environment. international contemporary the accommodate to shiftmust Robert Cox (1989) states, the concept of middle power is not stationary and the definition With Ukraine’s admission into the European Union likely to be generations away, be generations to likely Union European the into admission Ukraine’s With The future of middle Poland power isinseparableits from membership in the 58 CEU eTD Collection be the object of futurebe study. objectof the maintain could period,post-1989 whetheriscertainly Poland post-EU todistinction that able has It been shown Poland inthat wassuccessful exhibiting middle powerbehaviorin the of in future trans-Atlantic relations. player Poland the beakey ally Unitedthe will States, of Likewise,asastaunch Europe. restof Eastern Russiaandthe within actor EUtowards the important an remain to likely is Poland isthat certain is What EU. the within role nascent behavior,andcurrent lack foreign of a clear policy, aconsequence its of adjusting as to Poland’s view also might one However, policy. foreign coherent a lacking for criticized Poland late been behavior. has Of power middle fit characteristics they not whether the or between relationship andPolandRussia Voice (Warsaw Online 5/25/2007). already tense the missile strained hasfurther the shield Byproposed accounts all in nature. shield asanoffensivewhile threat Poland andthe maintainUS is shield the strictly defensive missile onPolish viewsUS proposed be constructed Moscow soil.the wouldthat shield Another pointVoiceof is between 5/28/2007). Online contention the Russia Poland and on importationthe meatwhichof Polish products has been in sinceeffect 2005 late (Warsaw block Russia’sintoentry theWorld TradeOrganization, agrees until Moscow to liftits ban even and Agreement, Partnership EU-Russia the of renewal the vetoing continue to vowed Poland’s voting position Voice thewithin EU(Warsaw Online 5/31/07). Polandhas also law,votingnamely which system, square would significantly Penrose the root strengthen largely of EU reforms the unpopular haveproposed Pole’s makers.The as being trouble To date, superficial assessments of Poland’s role within the EU might regard the Poles Such actions by be in needto moreanalyzedPoland would much determine depth to 59 CEU eTD Collection Martin’s Press. Martin’s Holbraad, and Security Structure Relations Carsten. of a Newly Independent International State.in the Cambridge,Studies MA: HarvardWorld: in the University Ukraine Press. (1998) A. 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