Agbiboa, D 2013 The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in : Boko stability Haram versus the State. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(3): 52, pp. 1-18, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.cl

RESEARCH ARTICLE The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria: versus the State Daniel Agbiboa*

Boko Haram remains arguably the biggest problem confronting Nigeria today, with consequences going beyond security into the political and socio-economic aspects of governance. This Islamist group from northeastern Nigeria has killed at least 3,500 people since 2009 when it first launched its Islamic insurgency to wrest power from the Nigerian government and create an Islamic state under the supreme law of sharia. The group’s active gnawing at the religious, ethnic, and regional fault-lines of Nigeria not only threatens the country’s peace and unity, but holds serious transnational implications. The objective of this paper is to answer three fundamental questions about the extremist group: Who is Boko Haram? Why does the group rebel? How has the Nigerian State responded? The paper also touches on Boko Haram’s growing connection to transnational terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab as a form of survival strategy.

Introduction coordinated attacks have targeted Nige- There is an ongoing campaign of terror in ria’s ethno-religious fault lines and secu- Nigeria. Since July 2009, Boko Haram, an rity agents in an attempt to wrest power extremist Islamist group from the northeast- from the Nigerian government and create ern part of Nigeria, began a violent campaign an Islamic state governed by strict sharia that has resulted in the deaths of 3,500 peo- (Forest 2012; Mustapha 2012). Since Janu- ple, with the death toll rising on an almost ary 2013, Boko Haram has taken control of daily basis (Agbiboa 2013a). The group has Marte, Mobbar, Gubio, Guzamala, Abadam, carried out frequent attacks and bombings, Kukawa, Kala Balge, and Gamboru in some cases using suicide bombers. Tar- local government areas in northern Borno, get locations have included police stations, chasing out local government officials, tak- military facilities, churches, schools, beer ing over government buildings and impos- halls, newspaper offices, and the United ing its will (Premium Times 2013). So critical Nations building in (Uzodike 2012: is the threat posed by Boko Haram that in 91). In addition, the group has assassinated January 2012 Nigerian President Goodluck Muslim clerics and traditional leaders in the Jonathan lamented, ‘The situation we have north for allegedly cooperating with state in our hands is even worse than the civil war authorities (Agbiboa 2013b; HRW 2012). [1967–1970] that we fought’ (Agbiboa 2013c: Boko Haram’s increasingly sophisticated and 65). Unfortunately, numerous attempts at negotiating with the Islamist group, includ- ing the recent presidential amnesty offer * Department of International Development, University of Oxford, United Kingdom extended to its members, have stalled due [email protected] to gross distrust on both sides, and the fac- Art. 52, page 2 of 18 Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria tionalized leadership of the group’s different ticians have always prided themselves as sol- cells (ibid). diers for the defense of the faith’ (Udoidem The central goal of this paper is to under- 1997: 156). stand who Boko Haram is, why the group Some authors have argued that the British rebels, and how the Nigerian state has conquest of the Caliphate in 1903, responded. The paper also seeks to briefly and its subsequent dealings with colonial explore Boko Haram’s growing connec- and post-colonial states, opened it up to tion to transnational terrorist groups like the corrupting influence of secular political al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab as a form of sur- power (Agbiboa 2013b; Falola 1998). Ever vival strategy. The paper is divided into four since, ‘there has been resistance among the main sections. The first provides a historical area’s Muslims to Western education’ (Mar- background to religious militancy in north- chal 2012: 2). For example, in the first two ern Nigeria. The second section seeks to decades following Nigeria’s independence in answer the question: Who is Boko Haram? October 1960, northern Nigeria experienced This involves exploring Boko Haram’s ori- a violent confrontation between a radical gins, ideology, demands, modus operandi, Islamist sect known as Maitatsine and the and sources of funding. The third section Nigerian Police Force in (December looks closely at why Boko Haram rebels. The 1980) and (October 1982). Hickey fourth section explores how the Nigerian (1984: 251) argues that the Maitatsine upris- state has responded to the threat of Boko ings had their roots in the ‘deeply conserva- Haram; this section involves a critical exami- tive practice of Islam’ which has been domi- nation of the soft-handed and heavy-handed nant in the region since Usman Dan Fodio’s approaches of the Nigerian state. holy war. Muhammed Marwa (also known as Maitatsine/‘the one who curses’), leader Background: Militant Religiosity in of Maitatsine, was an Islamic scholar who Northern Nigeria migrated from the town of Marwa in north- Northern Nigeria, a region with a predomi- ern Cameroon to the city of Kano in 1945. nantly Muslim population, has a well-docu- In Kano, Marwa became an Islamic zealot mented history of militant religiosity dating preoccupied with the purification of Islam. back to the highly successful holy war (jihad) He believed that Islam had come under fought by Sheik Uthman dan Fodio (1754– the corrupting influence of modernization 1817) in the early 19th century (Hickey (Westernization) and the formation of the 1984: 251). Usman dan Fodio launched a modern state (Agbiboa 2013d). The Nigerian jihad against what he saw as the hopelessly historian Toyin Falola (1998: 146) describes corrupt and apostate Hausa ruling elite of Marwa thus: the time and established the sharia-gov- erned Sokoto Caliphate – one of the largest He was a Qur’anic teacher and and most powerful empires in sub-Saharan preacher. Forceful, persuasive, and Africa – across much of northern Nigeria, charismatic, he rebelled against many although it is important to note that much popular opinions among Kano Islamic of the area now known as the middle belt circles, denouncing certain parts of or North Central State resisted the jihad- the Holy Qur’an and even criticizing ists (Marchal 2012: 2; Agbiboa 2013c). What Prophet Mohammed…He was opposed began as a search for religious purification to most aspects of modernization and soon became a search for a political king- to all Western influence. He decried dom (Crowder 1978; ICG 2010), with the such technological commonplace as outcome being that ‘Islam has remained the radios, wrist watches, automobiles, focal veneer for the legitimacy of the north- motorcycles, and even bicycles. Those ern ruling class’, and consequently, ‘its poli- who use these things or who read Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria Art. 52, page 3 of 18

books other than the Qur’an were under sharia law (Agbiboa 2013a). He once viewed as hell-bound ‘pagans’. openly declared that ‘once you are a Muslim, you cannot accept to choose a non-Mus- Marwa attracted the urban poor in the lim as a leader’ (Aguwa 1997: 338). Sheik’s northern city of Kano with his message that speeches and ideas radicalized many Mus- ‘denounced the affluent elites as infidels, lims in Nigeria and led to increased tensions opposed Western Influence, and refused to between Muslims and Christians, especially recognize secular authorities’ (HRW 2012: in northern Nigeria. The burning of eight 22; see also Lubeck 1985). The urban Muslim prominent churches in Kano by Muslims poor were attracted to Marwa because ‘he in October 1982 signaled the beginning of condemned the hypocrisy and ostentation a religious war. According to a government of the nouveau riche and promised redemp- tribunal, the violent act was caused by two tion and salvation to God’s righteous peo- factors. First, Kano was predominantly an ple’ (Hickey 1984: 253). Among the groups Islamic city where the growing influence of attracted by Marwa were the ‘Almajiris’ - that Christianity was a constant source of worry is, a group of young itinerant students of the for Muslims. Second, the tribunal argued Qur’an who had a very simple lifestyle and that the radical Islamic literature imported earned their daily bread begging on the city from Iran motivated Muslims to begin fight- streets (ibid). Maitatsine extremists, rejecting ing (Falola 1998: 169). Muslims who had, in their eyes, gone astray, Notably, since the early days of Nigeria’s lived in secluded areas to avoid mixing with political sovereignty in 1960 power has mainstream Muslims and rejected material shifted from the Muslim north to the Chris- wealth on the grounds that it was associated tian south. The Iranian revolution of 1979 with Western values. resulted in growing demand for sharia law to The Maitatsine uprisings led to eleven days be adopted across Nigeria. In addition, Saudi- of violent confrontations with state security sponsored missionaries from Saudi Arabia, forces in Kano in December 1980. A tribunal Sudan, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, and other coun- inquiry set up by the federal government in tries were sent to Nigeria to promote Wah- 1981 found that 4,177 people were killed habi1 doctrine and orthodoxy beginning in the violence, excluding members of the in the 1990s. This helped lead to the adop- police force who also lost their lives (Agbiboa tion of sharia law in twelve northern states 2013c). Although the Nigerian government between 1999 and 2001, beginning with used its military might to crush the Maitat- . The then-Zamfara governor, sine uprisings and kill its leader, hundreds Ahmed Sani, once said, ‘Whoever administers more people lost their lives in reprisal attacks or governs any society not based on Sharia is between remnants of the Maitatsine move- an unbeliever’ (Agbiboa 2013a). Following ment in the north and government security his example, many northern governors also forces over the next five years (HRW 2012). introduced Sharia, reinforcing the move- Sheik Abubaka Mahmoud Gumi (1922– ment of restoration pioneered by Usman dan 1992) was another noteworthy Muslim that Fodio’s Sokoto Caliphate two centuries ear- promoted militant Islam during the 1980s. lier. However, there was a strong resistance in He was renowned as the most distinguished , where half of the population Islamic scholar in Nigeria of the 1980s (Agbi- is Christian. In February 2000, protests by boa 2013c; Falola 1998). Sheik campaigned Christians against Sharia in the ancient city against sorcery and witchcraft and promoted of Kaduna resulted in clashes that resulted in Islamic education for women (Marchal 2012: over 2,000 deaths (Ekot 2009). 3). He further promoted the implementation In light of the above facts, this paper of Sharia courts in Nigeria’s Christian south, argues that extremist Islamic movements arguing that Nigeria should be brought in northern Nigeria should be considered a Art. 52, page 4 of 18 Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria movement of restoration since their over- in Salafi radicalism and was greatly influ- riding goal continues to be the enforcement enced by Ibn Taymiyyah, an Islamic scholar of Sharia in the spirit of earlier times as (alim) born 1263 CE in the town of Harran inspired by Usman dan Fodio and the sharia- in Upper Mesopotamia, into an Arabophone governed Sokoto Caliphate. Boko Haram, family. Boko Haram was led by Yusuf until which this paper considers next, is the latest he was killed by Nigerian security forces fol- and most violent manifestation of this resto- lowing sectarian violence that broke out in ration movement. July 2009 and during which over 700 people were killed. At the time of his death, Yusuf Who is Boko Haram? was the commander-in-chief (Amir ul-Aam) of Boko Haram. He had two deputies (Na’ib We want to reiterate that we are war- Amir ul-Aam I & II) and each state and local riors who are carrying out Jihad (reli- government where Boko Haram existed had gious war) in Nigeria and our strug- its own commander (amir). Yusuf established gle is based on the traditions of the a religious complex in his hometown that holy prophet. We will never accept included a mosque and a school where many any system of government apart from poor families from across Nigeria and from the one stipulated by Islam because neighboring countries enrolled their chil- that is the only way that the Muslims dren. However, the center had ulterior politi- can be liberated. We do not believe in cal goals and soon it was also working as a any system of government, be it tradi- recruiting ground for future jihadists (Agbi- tional or orthodox, except the Islamic boa 2013c). Boko Haram thus includes mem- system which is why we will keep on bers who came from neighboring Chad and fighting against democracy, capital- Niger and speak only Arabic. The sect was ism, socialism and whatever. We will able to attract more than 280,000 members not allow the Nigerian Constitution across northern Nigeria and these two coun- to replace the laws that have been tries (Umar 2011; Agbiboa 2013c). enshrined in the Holy Qur’an, we will Boko Haram’s membership comprises not allow adulterated conventional university lecturers, bankers, political elites, education (Boko) to replace Islamic drug addicts, unemployed graduates, alma- teachings. We will not respect the jiris, and migrants from neighboring coun- Nigerian government because it is tries. Members are drawn primarily from illegal. We will continue to fight its the Kanuri tribe, which makes up roughly 4 military and the police because they percent of the Nigerian population, and is are not protecting Islam. We do not concentrated in the northeastern states of believe in the Nigerian judicial sys- Nigeria, including Bauchi and Borno, as well tem and we will fight anyone who as from the Hausa-Fulani 29 percent of the assists the government in perpetrat- population, who are spread throughout most ing illegalities. of the northern states (Agbiboa 2013c). -Boko Haram statement Recent reports have also revealed that (Leadership 2011) some members in the Nigerian security sec- tor have strong links to Boko Haram. In Feb- Mohammed Yusuf, born on January 29, 1970, ruary 2012, the commissioner of police in in the village of Girgir in , founded charge of criminal investigations in Abuja, Boko Haram in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri Zakari Biu, was dismissed from the Nige- with the goal of establishing sharia govern- rian police force for his role in the escape of ment in under then-Senator Ali Boko Haram suspect Kabiru Sokoto. Sokoto Modu Sheriff (Adesoji 2010). As a student is believed to be the mastermind of the of Sheik Gumi, Yusuf received instruction bombing of St. Theresa’s Catholic Church in Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria Art. 52, page 5 of 18

Madalla, , in which over 40 people 19). Tell magazine (Nigeria) describes the ide- died. Sokoto’s escape also led to the sacking ology and philosophy of Boko Haram thus: of the former Inspector General of Police, Hafiz Ringim (Elombah 2012). The mission of the sect was to estab- Like the Maitatsine movement, many of lish an Islamic state where ‘orthodox the members attracted by Boko Haram are Islam’ is practiced. Orthodox Islam motivated by deep-seated socio-economic according to [Muhammed Yusuf] and political grievances such as corruption frowns at Western education and and poor governance (Kukah 2012). Already, working in the civil service because Campbell noted, ‘Boko Haram, once an it is sinful. Hence, for their aim to be obscure, radical Islamic cult in the North, achieved, all institutions represent- is evolving into an insurrection with sup- ing the government including secu- port among the impoverished and alienated rity agencies like police, military and Northern population’ (Campbell 2011). other uniformed personnel should be Boko Haram’s main affiliation is the crushed (Thurston 2011). Jama’tIzalat al Bida’aWaIqamat as Sunna (Society of Removal of Innovation and Rees- The Boko Haram Revolt tablishment of the Sunna). This movement Boko Haram became a full-fledged insur- is a Wahhabi, anti-Sufi movement estab- gency following confrontations between the lished in 1978 in Jos by Sheikh Ismaila Idris group and ’s security agency, (1937–2000). It was one of the fast-grow- charged with enforcing a newly introduced ing Islamic reform movements in Nigeria, law that required motorcyclists in the entire shaped by the teachings of Sheikh Abubakar country to wear crash-helmets (Uzodike Gumi (Marchal 2012: 3). Boko Haram’s ideol- 2012; USIP 2012). Members of Boko Haram ogy is embedded in deeply traditional Islam- refused to obey this law. This led to a vio- ism and is but one of several variants of radi- lent clash between the state’s enforcement cal Islamism to have emerged in northern agency and the group which left 17 Boko Nigeria. Its adherents are reportedly influ- Haram members dead. The group’s hide- enced by the Qur’anic phrase: ‘Anyone who out in Bauchi State was also ransacked and is not governed by what Allah has revealed materials for making explosives were confis- is among the transgressors’ (Thurston 2011). cated. Following this crackdown, the group As its name suggests, Boko Haram (which in mobilized its members for reprisal attacks the Hausa language means ‘Western edu- which led to the deaths of several police- cation is unlawful’) is strongly opposed to men and civilians (Agbiboa 2013c). The riot what it sees as a Western-based incursion was temporarily quelled after Nigerian forces that threatens traditional values, beliefs, captured and killed the Boko Haram leader, and customs among Muslim communities Yusuf. Following the death of Yusuf, and the in northern Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf told arrest of several of Boko Haram members, the BBC in 2009, ‘Western-style education is the group retreated for a while, but only to mixed with issues that run contrary to our recuperate. According to Marchal, ‘this major beliefs in Islam’ (Boyle 2009). Elsewhere, blow [the killing of their founder] pushed the the charismatic leader argued, ‘Our land was movement to transform itself into a network an Islamic state before the colonial masters of underground cells with a hidden leader- turned it to a kafir (infidel) land. The current ship – a situation that today makes any mili- system is contrary to true Islamic beliefs’ tary solution illusory’ (2012: 3). Boko Haram (BBC MIR 2009). In an audiotape posted soon announced its re-emergence with more online in January 2012, a spokesman for the advanced tactics and devastating attacks, group, Abubakar Shekau, even accused the e.g. the bombing of police headquarters in US of waging war on Islam (Agbiboa 2013b: Abuja in June 2011 and the UN Headquar- Art. 52, page 6 of 18 Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria ters in August 2011. In the first ten months the movement who disagree about tactics of 2012 alone more than 900 people died in and strategic directions, competing at times attacks perpetrated by the group - more than for attention and followers (Forest 2012). in 2010 and 2011 combined (Reuters 2011). According to a recent US House of Repre- Boko Haram’s modus operandi has involved sentatives report on Boko Haram, one faction the use of gunmen on motorbikes, assassinat- of the group might be focused on domestic ing policemen, politicians, or anyone critical issues while another on violent international of the group, including Muslim clerics who extremism (Agbiboa 2013c). Another report disclose information regarding their wherea- indicated that the group may have even bouts to state security services (HRW 2012). split into three factions: one that remains Increasingly, suicide bombing has become moderate and welcomes an end to the vio- a major strategy for Boko Haram. For many lence, another that wants a peace agreement, members, the extrajudicial killing of their and a third that refuses to negotiate, want- founder served to foment pre-existing ani- ing instead to implement strict sharia law mosities toward the Nigerian government across Nigeria by force (ibid). In July 2011, and its security forces. In the group’s bid to a group calling itself the Yusufiyya Islamic avenge the death of its founder, almost every Movement distributed leaflets throughout individual and group outside Boko Haram’s Maiduguri denouncing other Boko Haram network was impacted, particularly the Nige- factions as ‘evil’ (Agbiboa 2013d: 151). Invok- rian police and army. Boko Haram’s most ing the legacy of founder Mohammed Yusuf, frequent targets have been police stations, the authors of the leaflets distanced them- patrols, and individual policemen at home selves from violent attacks on civilians and or in public including those who were off- on churches (ibid). Against this backdrop, duty or retired (Agbiboa 2013d). They have a jihadist splinter group, commonly known used petrol bombs, improvised explosive as Ansaru, has emerged in northern Nigeria, devices, and armed assaults in these violent headed by a man that goes by the pseudonym attacks (Forest 2012; HRW 2012). From early Abu Usamatul Ansar. The group has pledged 2012, Boko Haram began targeting telecom- to defend the interests of Muslims in Africa, munication infrastructure, especially around claiming a different understanding of Jihad. Mubi, Gongola State. The group believes Ansaru, which officially calls itself Jama’atu that GSM (Global System for Mobile Com- Ansarul Musilimina fi Biladin Sudan (or Sup- munications) companies are aiding security porters of Islam in the Land of Sudan), has agencies by providing them with call infor- said in a video recently posted on the inter- mation (HRW 2012). In 2012, Boko Haram net that they will not target non-Muslims launched several attacks against police offic- except ‘in self-defense or if they attack Mus- ers, Christians, and perceived moderate or lims’ (Al Arabiya 2013). Ansar noted that the liberal Muslims who allegedly cooperated ‘rampant massacre of Muslims in Nigeria will with the government or opposed the group no longer be tolerated’ (ibid). Elsewhere, the (Forest 2012). leader stated that one of the group’s main Among the demands of Boko Haram are goals is ‘restoring the dignity of the Muslims the release of its imprisoned members and as it was in the time of the Caliphate…[and] the prosecution of those responsible for the the method of achieving these aims and killing of their founder. However, Boko Har- goals is “jihad”’ (ibid). am’s number one aim is the overthrow of the On February 17, 2012, Ansaru kidnapped, Nigerian government and the creation of an and later killed, seven foreigners from Brit- Islamic state (Uzodike 2012). ain, Italy, Greece, Lebanon, and the Philip- It is important to note that Boko Haram pines. According to a statement released is not a monolithic entity with a unified by the group, the kidnappings were in purpose. There are separate factions within response to alleged transgressions perpe- Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria Art. 52, page 7 of 18 trated against Islam by European countries bia and the UK (Agbiboa 2013b). Further- in ‘many places such as Afghanistan and more, the arrested officials divulged that Mali’ (Roggio 2013). On November 26, 2012, other sources of funding included the Al 40 Ansaru fighters stormed the Special Anti- Muntada Trust Fund and the Islamic World Robbery Squad prison in Abuja and freed Society. Additionally, a spokesman of Boko senior Boko Haram commanders, an action Haram claimed that Governor praised by Shekau, Boko Haram’s current and Bauchi State Governor supreme leader. According to Jacob Zenn had placed them (as members of (2013: 3–4), ‘Ansaru’s freeing of Boko Haram the Boko Haram group) on a monthly salary prisoners suggested that despite the circum- (Aziken 2012). Boko Haram also self-finances stances surrounding Ansaru’s formation, the by robbing local banks. For example, on Jan- two groups were capable of supporting each uary 12, 2010, four Boko Haram members other’s mutual objectives.’ But these mutual attempted to rob a bank in Bakori, Katsina objectives go beyond Nigeria to include State, according to local Police Commissioner global jihadist organizations like al-Qaeda Umaru Abubakar (Leigh 2011). On Decem- and al-Shabaab. ber 4, 2011, Bauchi Police Commissioner Indeed, one of Boko Haram’s main ambi- Ikechukwu Aduba claimed that members tions is to become a key player in the global of Boko Haram had robbed local branches jihad. In one of its early statements, the group of Guaranty Trust Bank PLC and Intercon- declared that ‘Boko Haram is just a version tinental Bank PLC (Ibrahim 2011). And on of al-Qaeda which we align with and respect. December 10, 2011, Mohammed Abdullahi We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry of the Central Bank of Nigeria claimed that out his command in Nigeria until the coun- ‘At least 30 bank attacks attributed to Boko try is totally Islamized which is according to Haram have been reported this year’ (Onu the wish of Allah’ (Vanguard 2009). Members 2011). Beyond bank robberies and individual of Boko Haram are known to have fought in financiers, some sources have linked Boko Mali alongside groups affiliated to al-Qaeda. Haram to illicit weapon trafficking (Agbi- Its members have also received training with boa 2013c). In August 2011, General Carter Somali-based al-Shabaab. Boko Haram mem- Ham, Commander of the US Africa Com- bers were reportedly significantly involved mand (AFRICOM), claimed that al-Qaeda and in the April 2012 invasion of the Algerian al-Shabaab were financing Boko Haram and embassy in the Malian city of Gao, which also said that both global Jihadist terrorist resulted in the hostage-taking of seven groups shared training facilities and fight- Algerian diplomats. A local official in Mali ers with Boko Haram. He described it as ‘the confirmed that ‘there are a good 100 Boko most dangerous thing to happen not only Haram fighters in Gao. They are Nigerians to the Africans, but to us as well’ (IISS 2011: and from Nigeria… they’re not hiding. Some 3). This is all the more likely as Boko Haram are even able to speak in the local tongue, has expanded its propaganda efforts to show explaining that they are Boko Haram’ (The solidarity with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Punch 2012). In July 2010, Shekau reportedly released In the past, Nigerian officials have been an online statement praising al-Qaeda and criticized for being unable to trace much of offering condolences to al-Qaeda of Iraq the funding that Boko Haram has received. for its loss of Abu Ayyub al Masri and Abu However, in February 2012, recently arrested Omar al Baghdadi, two top al-Qaeda opera- Boko Haram officials revealed that while tives in Iraq. In another video released in the organization initially relied on dona- November 2012, Shekau said that he and tions from members, its links with al-Qaeda his fighters supported the ongoing jihads in in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) opened it up Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, to more funding from groups in Saudi Ara- Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, Art. 52, page 8 of 18 Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria

Libya, and Mali. Shekau’s speech, which was tionally, since Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil received and translated by the SITE Intel- producer. The increasing sophistication of ligence Group, was issued in Arabic, which Boko Haram’s attacks and its adoption of suggests that the Boko Haram leader is suicide car bombings may be a sign that the seeking to appeal to both the wider jihadist group is indeed receiving tactical and opera- community and al-Qaeda’s leaders. The 39 tional assistance from a foreign militant minute-long videotape includes various clips group. Since AQIM has attacked UN targets of Boko Haram men in training, as well as in Algeria, and al-Shabaab has attacked UN video of weapons seized by the group during targets in Somalia, Boko Haram’s decision to raids (Roggio 2013). Shekau also repeatedly attack the UN building in Abuja is unlikely refers to the fighters in the jihadist theat- to be a coincidence. According to Forest, ers as his ‘brothers’. He directly addresses ‘this attack on a distinctly non-Nigerian tar- ‘the soldiers of the Islamic State in Mali… our get was a first for Boko Haram, and may indi- brothers and sheikhs in beloved Somalia…our cate a major shift in its ideology and strate- brothers and sheikhs in Libya…our brothers gic goals’ (2012: 81). and sheikhs in oppressed Afghanistan…our Awakened to the threat posed by Boko brothers and sheikhs in wounded Iraq…our Haram to the international community, the brothers and sheikhs in Pakistan…our broth- US State Department in 2012 added Shekau, ers and sheikhs in blessed Yemen…our broth- Boko Haram’s most visible leader, to its list of ers and sheikhs in usurped Palestine, and specially designated global terrorists. Khalid other places where our brothers are doing al-Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kambar were jihad in the Cause of Allah’ (Roggio 2013: 4). also included in the list, because of their ties Shekau warned the US that jihad is far from to Boko Haram and close links with AQIM. over and is quoted as saying: ‘O America, die (US State Department 2012) The US also with your fury’ (ibid). Early in its violent cam- recently announced a USD 7 million bounty paign, Boko Haram had warned that: ‘[The] for the capture of Shekau, putting him in the United States is the number one target for its top echelon of wanted jihadist leaders (BBC oppression and aggression against Muslim News June 5, 2013). Four al-Qaeda leaders in nations particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan Africa where also included in the ‘Rewards and its blind support to Israel in its killings for Justice’ list. The State Department noted of our Palestine brethren’ (Abubakar 2010). that that Boko Haram and al-Qaeda’s affiliate Given the increased frequency of bomb in Yemen and Saudi Arabia are cooperating attacks and shootings carried out by Boko to ‘strengthen Boko Haram’s capacity to con- Haram, the prospect for human security duct terrorist attacks’ (Roggio 2013). remains grim in Nigeria, with potentially serious ramifications for the international Why does Boko Haram Rebel? community. For one thing, Boko Haram pro- vides al-Qaeda with an avenue to expand its Religion is not the cause of religious operations in Africa, should the two groups conflict; rather for many… it frequently become affiliated. Leaders of both organi- supplies the fault line along which zations have publicly pledged mutual sup- intergroup identity and resource com- port (Uzodike 2012). Shekau, current head petition occurs (Seul 1999: 58). of Boko Haram, has linked the jihad being fought by Boko Haram with the global jihad. The extent of relative poverty and inequal- He has threatened attacks not only in Nige- ity in the north has led several analysts and ria but also against ‘outposts of Western organizations to argue that socio-economic culture’ (Radin 2012). In association with deprivation is the main factor behind Boko al-Qaeda, Boko Haram could pose a major Haram’s campaign of violence in northern threat not only to Nigeria, but also transna- Nigeria (Agbiboa 2013d, 2013b; Mustapha Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria Art. 52, page 9 of 18

2012; Kukah 2012; Agbiboa 2013b; HRW With Rev. Fr. Kukah (2012: 3), a scholarly 2012; ICG 2010). Isa, for example, argues northern clergyman, we observe a somewhat that Boko Haram communities are wrecked nuanced analysis from the poverty-conflict by ‘poverty, deteriorating social services and nexus to the bad governance-conflict nexus. infrastructure, educational backwardness, Kukah argues that religion is used to mobi- rising numbers of unemployed graduates, lize against modernity, which is seen as the massive numbers of unemployed youths, root cause of social anomalies. In his words, dwindling fortunes in agriculture…and the ‘The evil effects of bad governance, corrup- weak and dwindling productive base of tion, total lack of security and welfare have the northern economy’ (2010: 329). Kwaja all become part of our daily lives. Clearly, in toes a similar line in arguing that ‘religious the eyes of the sect members, the persistence dimensions of the conflict have been mis- of corruption, collapse of public morality, construed as the primary driver of violence injustice and so on could only be attributed when, in fact, disenfranchisement and ine- to those who govern. In their reasoning, quality are the root causes’ (2011: 1). Sope those who govern us do so because they have Elegbe, research director at the Nigerian acquired their tools by gaining Western edu- Economic Summit Group (NESG), argues, cation’ (ibid). Kukah finds an ally in scholars ‘The increasing poverty in Nigeria is accom- like Clapham who argues more broadly that panied by increasing unemployment. Unem- ‘the breakdown of law and order in African ployment is higher in the north than in the states was basically the result of the legacy south. Mix this situation with radical Islam, of bad governance’ (2004: 200). During her which promises a better life for martyrs, and visit to Nigeria in 2009, then-US Secretary you can understand the growing violence in of State Hillary Clinton reiterated this same the north’ (cited in Oxford Research Group reasoning when she noted that ‘[t]he most 2011: 4). In his recent personal account of immediate source of the disconnect between the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), the late Nigeria’s wealth and its poverty is the failure Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe described of governance at the federal, state, and local Boko Haram as a product of economic dep- levels… Lack of transparency and accountabil- rivation and corruption in northern Nigeria. ity has eroded the legitimacy of the govern- In his words, ‘economic deprivation and cor- ment and contributed to the rise of groups ruption produce and exacerbate financial that embrace violence and reject the author- and social inequities in a population, which ity of the state’ (Clinton 2009: 1). in turn fuel political instability’ (2012). In Other scholars like Evans argue that ‘a the final analysis, says A. R. Mustapha of downward spiral of economic decline, often Oxford University, ‘Boko Haram is the symp- exacerbated by official corruption and mis- tom of the failure of nation-building and management, has created governments that democratic politics in Nigeria. It is the mis- are at or near the point of collapse and that guided cry of a disgruntled youth crushed are being challenged, often violently, by by the socio-economic system on the one their own citizens. Economic decline has has- hand and then repressed by the state on tened the process of national disintegration the other’ (2012). Marchal highlights the and vice versa’ (1994: 3). Furthermore, he issue of the divergent (and largely unequal) argues that ‘it is no accident that those coun- economic and social dynamics of northern tries whose economies are declining…should versus southern states in Nigeria as a main also be the ones experiencing the great- factor in the Boko Haram rebellion: ‘Boko est amounts of violence and turmoil’ (ibid). Haram is an ultra-violent social movement Similarly, in their book entitled Breaking that has deep roots in the social and eco- the Conflict Trap, Collier et al. adopt an eco- nomic marginalization of a large section of nomic approach to the causes of intrastate Nigeria’s northern population’ (2012: 2). conflict. They argue that, ‘[c]ountries with Art. 52, page 10 of 18 Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria low, stagnant, and unequally distributed per institutional order, and identity conflict capita incomes that have remained depend- among other factors. Following a detailed ent on primary commodities for exports face review of the relevant empirical literature on dangerously high risks of prolonged conflict. what causes terrorism, they concluded that In the absence of economic development, ‘there is only limited evidence to support the neither good political institutions, nor eth- hypothesis that economic deprivation causes nic and religious homogeneity or high mili- terrorism…poor economic conditions mat- tary spending, provide significant defenses ter less to terrorism once it is controlled for against large scale violence’ (2003: 53). institutional and political factors’ (2011: 3). Explanations such as these often draw on the Instead, they argue that ‘terrorism is closely human needs theory of social conflicts which linked to political instability, sharp divides holds that all human beings have basic needs within the populace, country size, and fur- which they seek to fulfill and failure to meet ther demographic, institutional, and interna- these needs could lead to the outbreak of vio- tional factors’ (ibid). lent conflict (Rosati 1990). The human needs In addition to the history of militant Islam theory resonates with the frustration-aggres- and relative deprivation in northern Nigeria, sion theory of violence which argues that the this paper argues that the ultra-violent turn occurrence of aggressive behavior presup- of Boko Haram must be traced back to the poses the existence of frustration (Pear 1950; extrajudicial killing of its charismatic leader, McNeil 1959). The frustration-aggression Muhammed Yusuf, and the bloodletting of theory, in turn, provides the psychological its members. One of the most important ele- dynamic for the relative deprivation theory - ments in understanding the psychology of the proposed nexus between the intensity of why people become extremists is an appre- deprivation and the potential for collective ciation of the psychology of vengeance. Cata- violence (Gurr 1970; Birrel 1972). Drawing lyst events (violent acts that are perceived on his studies of relative deprivation and con- to be unjust) provide a strong sense of out- flict in Northern Ireland, Birrel argues that rage and a powerful psychological desire group tensions develop from a discrepancy for revenge and retribution. For many Boko between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective Haram members, the killing (without trial) value satisfaction. According to Davies, ‘this of their founder was the catalyst event that discrepancy is a frustrating experience that is served to foment pre-existing animosities sufficiently intense and focused to result in that stemmed from arbitrary arrests as well either rebellion or revolution’ (1962: 5). as the torture and killing of group members Despite the above socio-economic expla- by state security forces. Until 2009 Boko nations, it is important to emphasize that Haram was seen as radical, but not ultra- the link between terrorism and poverty violent (Onuoha 2012). The killing of the remains unclear and the debate unsettled. group’s leader ‘provoked a staunch reaction In fact, in recent years the poverty-conflict from Boko Haram members who primarily thesis has been criticized as overly simplis- want to settle their scores with the police and tic. This is largely because it fails to explain army’ (Marchal 2012: 2). In a video released why some poor people or places do not par- in June 2010, Shekau vowed to avenge the ticipate in violence, and because it offers deaths of its members at the hands of the very little in the way of clear recommenda- Nigerian police and army (Agbiboa 2013b). tions for policy-makers (Agbiboa 2013a). In In September 2010, a Boko Haram member their work entitled ‘What Causes Terrorism?’ told the BBC’s Hausa radio service, ‘We are Krieger and Meierriek (2011) examine a host on a revenge mission as most of our mem- of possible influences on terrorism includ- bers were killed by the police’ (HRW 2012). In ing global order, contagion, modernization, November 2011, during the trial of six Boko Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria Art. 52, page 11 of 18

Haram suspects, one group member told the social integration (IRIN 2013). According court that their mission was to avenge the to a presidential statement, the committee death of their founder (ibid). Not surprising, ‘has been given the task of identifying and since 2010 Boko Haram fighters have raided constructively engaging key leaders of Boko over 60 police facilities in at least 10 north- Haram, and developing a workable frame- ern and central states, as well as in Abuja, work for amnesty and disarmament of mem- and killed at least 211 police officers (Agbi- bers of the group’ (Agbiboa 2013d). The com- boa 2013a). Between January and September mittee was composed of former and current 2012, at least 119 police officers lost their government officials, religious authorities, lives in suspected Boko Haram attacks, more and human rights activists (ibid). than in all of 2010 and 2011 combined. However, Shekau responded to the amnesty entreaties by saying that his group had done How has the Nigerian State no wrong and that an amnesty would not be Responded and How have Nigerians applicable to them, arguing that it was the Reacted? Nigerian government committing atrocities. The Nigerian state has responded to the Boko In his words: ‘Surprisingly, the Nigerian gov- Haram crisis with what this paper describes ernment is talking about granting us amnesty. as a both a soft-hand and a heavy-hand, two What wrong have we done? On the contrary, approaches best understood as running con- it is we that should grant you pardon’ (Chiles currently rather than sequentially. The soft- 2013; Agbiboa 2013c). In a video released on hand approach has involved an attempt to May 13, 2013, Shekau vowed not to cease his engage Boko Haram members in political group’s violent campaigns to establish an negotiations or dialogue. At the state level, Islamic state in Nigeria (IRIN 2013). Barely the soft-hand approach has involved over- a week after Boko Haram refused Nigeria’s tures and rapprochements to Boko Haram amnesty offer the group launched two dev- insurgents. For example, the former gover- astating back-to-back attacks in the north of nor of Borno State, , alleg- the country. In the first attack, members of edly paid the sum of N100 million, or USD Boko Haram, disguised in military uniforms 620,000, to mollify the anger of the group driving buses and machine gun-mounted when their leader was killed in 2009. Current trucks, laid siege to the town of Bama, Borno Governor called on Boko State, killing 55 people, mostly police and Haram to come forward for dialogue on July security forces, and freeing over 100 prison 16, 2011 (Aghedo 2012: 866). In 2012, Datti inmates (Fox News 2013). In the second wave Ahmad, president of the National Supreme of attacks that came days later, Boko Haram Council on Sharia, who is believed to have members killed 53 people and burnt down had the respect of Yusuf, attempted to reach 13 villages in central Nigeria’s out to the group. But contact was broken off where violent confrontations between pasto- by Boko Haram who accused the Nigerian ralists and nomads had been commonplace state of bad faith after the media got wind of (BBC News 2013). the talks (IRIN 2012). The violent attacks led the Nigerian presi- Most recently, Nigerian President Goodluck dent to declare a state of emergency (on May Jonathan established a 26-member amnesty 15, 2013) in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe – ‘Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Reso- three northern states where Boko Haram has lution of Security Challenges in the North’ been most active – in an attempt to restore (headed by Nigerian Special Duties Minister order and reclaim control of the territories Kabiru Tanimu) with a three-month mandate (Agbiboa 2013a). In a pre-recorded address to try to convince Boko Haram to surrender broadcast to the Nigerian public on May 14, its arms in exchange for a state pardon and 2013, President Jonathan said, ‘What we are Art. 52, page 12 of 18 Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria facing is not just militancy or criminality, intimidation of the hapless Borno residents but a rebellion and insurgency by terrorist (HRW 2012). As noted by Solomon, ‘Far from groups which pose a very serious threat to conducting intelligence-driven operations, national unity and territorial integrity’ (BBC the JTF simply cordoned off areas and car- News 2013). Jonathan further stated that ‘it ried out house-to-house searches, at times would appear that there is a systematic effort shooting young men in these homes’ (2012: by insurgents and terrorists to destabilize the 9). In a series of interviews with residents in Nigerian state and test our collective resolve’ the city of Maiduguri, Human Rights Watch (Fox News 2013). Jonathan’s speech threw reported that, the ongoing Islamic insurgency into stark relief, at one point describing how fighters During raids in communities, often in had laid waste to state buildings and ‘had the aftermath of Boko Haram attacks, taken women and children hostage’ (Agbiboa members of the security forces have 2013c: 65). According to Jonathan, ‘These executed men in front of their fami- actions amount to a declaration of war and a lies; arbitrarily arrested or beaten deliberate attempt to undermine the author- members of the community; burned ity of the Nigerian state and threaten [its] houses, shops, and cars; stolen money territorial integrity. As a responsible govern- while searching homes; and, in at ment, we will not tolerate this’ (ibid). least one case, raped a woman. [In Against this backdrop, the Nigerian presi- addition] Government security agen- dent vowed to ‘take all necessary action… cies routinely hold suspects incom- to put an end to the impunity of insur- municado without charge or trial in gents and terrorists,’ including the arrest secret detention facilities and have and detention of suspects, assaults on Boko subjected detainees to torture or Haram hideouts, the lockdown of suspected other physical abuse (HRW 2012: 58). Boko Haram enclaves, raids, and the arrests of anyone possessing illegal weapons’ (IRIN In a firefight between the JTF and Boko 2013). This brings us to the second response Haram in Baga, a village on Lake Chad near of the Nigerian state - the heavy-hand. A Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, reportedly heavy-handed approach has always been the up to 187 people were killed, and 77 oth- preferred option, involving the use of state ers were injured (Premium Times 2013). At security forces to ‘mount aggressive pursuit least 2,000 houses, 64 motorcycles, and 40 and crackdown of [Boko Haram] members’ cars were burnt in the wake of the attack (Onuoha 2012: 5). To this end, the Nigerian (ibid). Baga residents have accused the JTF, government established a special Joint Task not Boko Haram, of firing indiscriminately at Force (JTF), known as Operations Restore civilians and setting fire to much of the fish- Order (JTORO). In the biggest campaign to ing town (Chiles 2013). According to Mar- date against Boko Haram, President Jona- chal, the Nigerian state apparatus ‘kills even than ordered some 8,000 soldiers to the more civilians than Boko Haram does’ (2012: region in a direct military offensive against 1). Recently, US Secretary of State John Kerry Boko Haram members (Agbiboa 2013a), the issued a strongly-worded statement say- largest military deployment since Nigeria’s ing: ‘We are…deeply concerned by credible Civil War. allegations that Nigerian security forces are However, far too often, members of the committing gross human rights violations, JTF have been accused of killing innocent which, in turn, only escalate the violence people in the name of counter-terrorism. In and fuel extremism’ (Al Jazeera 2013). Yet Borno State, for example, the JTF resorted some have argued that the US is in no cred- to extralegal killings, dragnet arrests, and ible position to be ‘deeply concerned’ about Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria Art. 52, page 13 of 18 the use of violence and disrespect for human and launch guerrilla war, which is deadlier’ rights in Nigeria since the US itself continues (ibid). Tijani’s statement seemed prophetic to apply an arguably similar (or even worse) when, on July 6, 2013, alleged Boko Haram strategy in its self-declared ‘global war on fighters attacked a boarding school in Potis- terror’ in regions like Africa and the Mid- kum (a small city in northeast Nigeria) before dle East, especially since the epochal 9/11 dawn, killing 41 people (29 students were attacks (Gow 2013). In the final section, this burned alive) and torching university admin- paper argues that a declared war on terror istrative blocks and hostels. The alleged has only a limited capacity to make a real Boko Haram gunmen were reported to have difference because it can never address the emerged from caves in rocky mountains underlying conditions that shape groups like (Adamu 2013). Following this latest strike, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda who reject the Shekau released a 15-minute video on You- prevailing order and develop radical posi- Tube expressing ‘full support’ for the violent tions, or opt to use extreme violence in the attacks, denying that Boko Haram fighters first place. It is therefore necessary to appre- killed children. Wagging his finger, Shekau ciate the broader context in which radicaliza- warned, ‘School teachers who are teach- tion occurs. ing Western education: We will kill them! It is important to note that the soft and We will kill them!’ In the video, received by heavy-handed approaches of the Nigerian the Associated Press through intermediar- government have divided Nigerians into two ies, Shekau also denied he is negotiating a groups: those who support the use of coer- ceasefire with the Nigerian government, ‘We cion on the one hand and supporters of con- will not enter into any agreement with non- ciliation on the other. Advocates of a coercive believers or the Nigerian government,’ he approach to tackling terrorism argue that said, speaking in his native Hausa language. force rather than dialogue is more effective Shekau added that ‘The Qur’an teaches that in dealing with terrorist organizations. Some we must shun democracy, we must shun argue that the Nigerian government had no Western education, and we must shun the choice but to take military actions against constitution.’ At the end he speaks in Eng- Boko Haram. As argued by a prominent Nige- lish to denounce the West, accusing it of rian constitutional lawyer, Yahaya Mahmud, trying to destroy Islam and working ‘to tac- ‘No government anywhere will allow a group tically make the Qur’an insignificant and to usurp part of its territorial sovereignty. unimportant’ (Elombah 2013). The declaration of a state of emergency was necessitated by the constitutional obliga- Conclusion tion to restore a portion of Nigeria’s territory This paper has addressed three fundamental taken over by [Boko Haram] which involves questions regarding Boko Haram’s ongoing the suspension of constitutional provisions campaign of terror in Nigeria: Who is Boko relating to civic rights’ (IRIN July 16, 2012). Haram? Why does the group rebel? How has Other observers, however, worry that the the Nigerian state responded? The paper stick response of the Nigerian government has also touched on Boko Haram’s grow- will force Boko Haram to shift their bases, ing connection with transnational terrorist with grave consequences for Nigeria and groups like al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab and the neighboring countries. As Nigerian political transnational ramifications. In addition, the scientist Kyari Tijani argues, ‘Boko Haram paper showed that the emergence of Boko cannot face Nigerian troops in conventional Haram is not sui generis but rather a reflec- war; the troop deployment to northern tion of a long history of militant Islam in Borno means they will move out to other northern Nigeria which forms a core part of towns and cities with less military presence the movement of restoration. Boko Haram Art. 52, page 14 of 18 Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria remains a major security problem confront- state which is low in legitimacy and des- ing the Nigerian state today, stretching its perately struggling to survive, but also in security apparatuses to their limits. Already, the long run can do more to threaten state the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees coherence than to aid it’ (1983: 274). (UNHCR) has announced that over 6,200 refugees have arrived in Niger from north- Notes ern Nigeria fearing retaliatory attacks and 1 An ultra-conservative branch of Sunni the general insecurity plaguing the region Islam, with aspirations to return to the as a result of the intensified military offen- earliest fundamental Islamic sources of sive against Boko Haram (Agbiboa 2013b). Qur’an and Hadith (Umar 2011). The frustration of the Nigerian government with the worsening security situation in References northern Nigeria is evidenced in its declara- Abubakar, A 2010 ‘Nigeria Islamist Sect tion of a state of emergency and its ‘flip-flop’ Threatens to Widen Attacks’. AFP, March approach from a soft hand (amnesty talks) 29. Available at: www.google.com/host- to a heavy hand (deployment of troops and ednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j1FA1NJrS- the declaration of outright war against Boko ES89YWeX4f--kcQGmA. Haram) in less than two weeks. These factors Achebe, C 2012 There Was a Country: A Per- have coalesced to further complicate the task sonal History of Biafra, London: Allen Lane. of the Amnesty Committee - that is, winning Adamu, A and Faul, M 2013 ‘29 Board- the trust of Boko Haram, crucial in bringing ing School Students Burned Alive, Shot them to the negotiating table. Dead by Islamists Militants in Nige- At present, the questions facing the ria’. The Associated Press, July 6. Avail- Amnesty Committee are serious: How will able at: http://worldnews.nbc.news. the new Committee on Dialogue identify com/_news/2013/07/06/19318588-29- credible interlocutors? Can anyone speak for Nigeria?lite. Boko Haram particularly if the group is prov- Adesoji, A 2010 ‘The Boko Haram Uprising ing increasingly fragmented and prone to and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria’. Africa splinter groups? If Boko Haram has already Spectrum, 45(2): 95–108. rejected the Amnesty offer, what conditions Agbiboa, D E 2013a ‘Boko Haram, the would induce a change of mind? Will the state Nigerian State, and Spiraling Violence of emergency and efforts towards amnesty in Nigeria’. The African Executive, June prove mutually reinforcing, constituting a 2–12. Available at: www.africanexecu- soft-hand and heavy-hand approach to Boko tive.com/modules/magazine/articles. Haram, or does the state of emergency signal php?article=7259. that Nigeria lacks a clear response strategy? Agbiboa, D E 2013b ‘The Nigerian Burden: While military crackdowns on Boko Haram Religious Identity, Conflict and the Cur- have the potential to significantly degrade rent Terrorism of Boko Haram’. Conflict, the group’s operational capability to mount Security and Development, 13(1): 1–29. devastating attacks on a large-scale, it must DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/146788 be considered that such an approach may 02.2013.770257 increasingly force ultra-radical elements Agbiboa, D E 2013c ‘No Retreat, No Surren- within Boko Haram to establish terrorist net- der: Understanding the Religious Terror- works with AQIM and al-Shabaab as a form of ism of Boko Haram in Nigeria’. African survival strategy, with serious ramifications Study Monographs, 34(2): 65–84. for the international community. Moreover, Agbiboa, D E 2013d ‘Why Boko Haram as Edmond Keller argued three decades ago, Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspec- ‘an overreliance on intimidation techniques tive’. African Conflict and Peacebuilding not only presents the image of a [Nigerian] Review, 3(1): 146–159. Agbiboa: The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria Art. 52, page 15 of 18

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How to cite this article: Agbiboa, D 2013 The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram versus the State. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(3): 52, pp. 1-18, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.cl

Published: 10 October 2013

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