Fac. Ltrs. Rev. (34), Otemon Gakuin Univ, Dec. 30,1998
The Battleof Midway from the Standpoint ofHistoricalPsychology Part H
Jiro Anzai
Conclusion
Thus, the precious battle lessons that should have been obtained from the Battle
of Midway's, halfa century before. the turning point of the Imperial Japanese Navy's
war conduct as in the annals of the PacificWar, not only have not faded, but increased
in their importance to the Japanese now engaging in the reciprocal trade enterprises and international interactions as well. The facts that tribes,nations and many
culturally integrated groups tend to show or betray unmistakably indegenous
behaviors, unique Archetypus (archaic type)actions expounded by Swiss psychologist
Carl Jung, 0r as Wiederholungen (Recapitulations)compulsion by Sigmund Freud had
been vindicated even at the Midway, some halfa century before. Yes, indeed, when in crisis,where there the UN had taken cognizance of their being in crisis,almost
unexceptionally the ancient "Archety)us" or archaic type of images had appeared for
their psychic and psychological support.
This tendency kept popping up even in the pre-PHA situation,in that the Nagumo
force's Commander Masuda's diary entry indicates. While standing aboard the flaghoisted carrier Aだagi, amidst snow flakes from overcast skies over the Kurile
islands chain's Hittoka)pu bay, aboard the assembled PHA striking forces, Flight
Commander Masuda wrote as follows:“……remind me of that 47 Ronins assembled
on the second floor ofa noodle shop for the coup …" Moreover, the first stick of bombs that would go, the 250 -kilo sharpnel bomb
thrung under the belly of a Type 99 divebomber got chalked with the words
“Remember……the accumulated grudges of ours!" They were the same words
uttered by Lord Asano as he resorted to arms for his revenge on Lord Kira,in the Edo
period, had been chalked sprawlingly.
- 43 - The Battle of Midway from the Standpoint of Historical Psychology Part H
Toadd further, the PHA originator Yamamoto himself had written : seeing not a chance for winning, he had come to choose the possible execution of daring
simultaneous attacks that would remind him of the Okehazama, Hiyodorigoe, and
Kawanakajima (allof these had been daring surprise attacks executed by our historic heroes)。
Furthermore, when pressed for mere survivals in the post-Midway Guadalcanal
struggles, where chances for survivals had dwindled, out of the hard-pressed destroyer
men, the word “Nagurikomi" (Gofor broke) became their common clichS,and when in later phase, even the Yamato had been forced to go in one-way sortie for Okinawa, the
designated name for the special operation was The Kiku-Shui (Chrysanthemum/water) op in the traditionallegacy of Kusunoki Masashige's one-way sortie the very name
Chrysanthemum-water telling the pre- and wartime Japanese mind set on their sui-
cidal mission for His majesty's service.
Againstall these, almost one eχception was the Battle of Midway, June 4th, 1942, in which all the cautions were forgotten by us.
Now that l have eχamined all these tragic behaviors of ours in the past in the
twenty chapters, I feel all the more, the battle lessons should be most heeded to,now,
by us of the peaceful time, that because of our chances for survival are dependent so
much more on the goodwill of other nations, including the American people's; yes inded, facts reveal more than any other period before in our history, the fate of Japan
and Japanese nation's are locked with the welfares of not just the American people but with all the rest of other nations of the world。
Infact, only with others we can survive, as the prosperous exporting country,
with such limited amount of natural resources. The predicamental situations under
which we are in now are much more complicated, but in our reciprocality,entirely peace-loving. But problems increase in their difficultyand delicateness,inasmuch as
our post-war products are far more welcomed by Americans. Thus, our enterpreneurs
who are willing to utilizethe American market but refuse to meet the job supplying
oversaeas, can incur the recurrent memories of the Kidobutai.
Thus,our enterprises who would refuse the job opportunities overseas, resemble so much as the UN's HQ aboard Yamato and Admiral Yamamoto himself who had kept
off the Kidobutai (Nagumo's First Air Fleet) on the time-map distanced so far off that
even at twenty knots one day and a half be needed to catch up and assist the
- 44 ― JiroAnZA!
Kidobutai, so very afraid of their getting damages that even when they tried to rescue, the Kidobutai had been reduced to shambling ruins. Indeed, so engrossedly concerned about their own security,they had kept their own in the shroud of complete silence. No doubt that the Battle of Midway was indeed the multi-phased, multi-angled air- sea battle of the grand order. These advancing 100.000 or more men in the overall man power, and more than a hundred in men-of-wars, became uselessin half a day !
Amidst this gigantic procession. aboard the Yamato, Operations Officer Com- mander Miwa had entered into his diary as follows:
This is indeed our Navy's hithertounfathomed campaign grandiose overseas. And the pushed and pushers alikeeχpectnothing but victoriesforus.
This should have been indeed the true confession of his, but the reversal of the hitherto much envied object and objective so one-sidedly expressed by the USN in the pre-war days, or the dead copy of the much-publicized “Ring Formation" tactic the
very tactics had been so much propagandized in the pre-war publications in almost
every martitime nations。 The gist of the ring formation is comparable in its schematic design to that of
compounded decoration cake whose top is composed of sophisticated concerntric
designs, the center piece of which is the huge battleship row, of especially the flagship,
and those creams of crops are heavily defended by cordons of destroyers in huge
concentric, ring formations, thus acquiring the name, “Ring Formation." Had l been permitted to add, this procession is an extension of "Westwards, ho !”tradition where
there the origin is directlytraceable to that Caravan fashion.
Had there not been the presence of the loudly advocating USA and USN on the
other side of the Pacific ocean rim. the Japanese would not have awakened from their self-induldgent isolation that had lasted 250 years under the Tokugawa goverment;
and in the end, the worst fate might have been lying for their future, and in that case
Japan with its limited natural resources and obsolete industry and economy in what
Wittfogel(1896 -1988)calledAsiatic stagnation or Asiatische Stockung.
Thiswould naturally bring up another illuminating angle : even though historians used to refrain themselves from “had it been " inferences, psycho historians'job is
not in the execution of the straight jacketting of such the non-if inference that has
-45- The Battle of Midway from the standpoint of Historical Psychology Part H been hindering possible breakthroughs into historic enigmas. On the other hand, had there not been the Yamamoto/Kuroshima team that beated all other alternatives off the planning board at the UN's HQ. prior to the Midway op, and the offensive strategy had not been adapted for the neχt phase of operations, the natural end result would have been the adaption of attritionsstrategy. But even here, what's been plaguing us and our post-war Japanese thinking. that stereotyped way of thinking would have recurred.
We recall the Ermattungsstrategie or that strategy based on the Attritions Warfare concept had brought nothing but stopgapping means fora series of disarmaments con- ferences and their strict demands (in the 1921 -1922)Washington and (1930)London arms reduction conferences, placed in front of us, we seized that“Have and Have-not Nations" doctrine。
One after another, the fully developed countries' navies threw a hurdle after another before the newly developing Japanese navy ; so many they had thrown that they had in essence hobbled the UN to the ratio of 60 percent to the Anglo-American fullstrengths. In essence, the UN with the unfair ratio had been forced to the level 0f nil admiral.
The only plausible answer should have been the perseverance extreme to the existing impass6 or overwhelming realitiesto which persevering warrior spiritswould have stood most effectively,by means of Wiederholungen recapitulations of the pattern practice,of tea ceremonial legacies。 Inthe wise-only-after-the-event way. these miss-chanced tactics and very strate- gics had even as the fittestone for the viscous type of persons whose kinds had been abundant in our most warriors. at least,at the Showa ages. But the course of history took the other direction,leaving the UN in the dazed stupor and their once proud first- line carrierair arms wiped offin a day. off the Midway, such a littleisle that they had thought they could have taken in a whiff.
The real tragedy brewed out in the victory disease is that,instead of treating the opponent in a tea-ceremonial master Rikyu's modest Wabi-cha style,they had tried to dwarf the then small forced us navy with guilded utensils that would have awed even the friendly force's men and officersin a blinding Potlatch (Tribal Indians' big feast throwing so as to awe all the opponent.)! Inversely speaking the very tragedy had been cooked up at the start,by our own lack of empathy into the pressed enemy's
- 46- Jiro Anzai
mind as to what they would do when we ourselves were in their shoes.
Thus,trying to catch the USN in surprise, the UN had been completely surprised
at Midway・
Inmy view, arrogancy of ours and devaluating the Anglo-American capabilities by us, are essentially history-old recapitulating phenomena, about which Captain
Fuchida and Commander Okumiya had been deploring as the Victory Disease.
Asour re-considerations deepen. we are bound to infer that not only America,
England and Europe but even our Asiatic neighbors have been countering, using the
Midway as the best manuel to crash the post-war Japanese attacks or what they had come to term economic agressions.
Who indeed can deny the pre-scientificfeels of the US's cartwheeling offensives,
just on the brink of theirlaunching ?
Even about the British,there are more than the past records of antisubmarine measures including Sonar, OR's, and Rolls-Royce engines of the ww II innovations
that would have taught us.
Itshould be recalled, with references to the above statement, that while we were
self-praisingly lulled in the so-called 1970 Eχposition held at Osaka, Japan, Queen
Elizabeth IFs figure had been absent from the said expo's dignitarieslist; where had
she been ? She was absent ;not because she had been ill,but because she had been present at the starting ceremonies of the under-sea oil recovery attempt called the
North Sea Oil,off Scotland !
Asto the sharpness of eyes. no one could have eχcelledpilot-goggled Genda's that
had ben the gem among fighter pilotofficers.
Asto Kusaka, we know that he had been known for his striking out in the pre- war days twenty-four corpsed plan by which he had proposed the setup of the early
warning system with big flying boats and twin-engined scout planes of eχceedingly long distanced range・
And yet the fact remains that the same Kusaka off Midway had been so slow and
almost dragging his feet in the cold. As we recall,the laurel had come to crown Admiral Spruance's head, the steady strolling walker.
Though paradoxical to mention of this. the real starter that came to crown
Spruance at Midway is Admiral Halsey and his skin rashes that forced him to be
hospitalized. The truth of the matter is during that criticaltime, both Nimitz and his
- 47 - The Battle of Midway from the standpoint of Historical Psychology Part H
Fleet's Cheif Surgeon Captain Gendreau feared for the possible rise of miss judgements by that otherwise dauntless Halsey due to his skin-rashed irritations,but none had ever doubted Halsey's recommendation of Spruance for his right successor! Indeed,
the same Halsey's word had underlined assuredly the oncoming victory, even if this statement of mine would have smelled of that wise-after-the-event kind of comment.
Nevertheless, the very Halsey's piece of advice or what is the most thought-out quality for the good task force'scommander was the serene non-self losing selfthat would not
disintegrate even in the midst of ordeals and my colleague Ray Spruance would be the
man for it。
There are, to be sure, too many shallow thinkers who, seeing Admiral Halsey's sporadic temper-losings, have pronounced him and his whole person as a fiery bull-run
fighter with no brains, no hind sight, not to speak of prescientificcautions;but the
facts prove otherwise, indicating Admiral Halsey as the most cautious, foremost
thought-through sailor,in the us Navy in the Pacific. In my view, Admiral Halsey
who had overthrown the order by CincPac fixing for his Task Force's sortie on the Friday 13th,is one such the proof that this Admiral had been a true psychologist of
the firstorder. Furthermore, Halsey had not left Spruance alone in his Carrier Task
Force's commanding post;he had provided for his comrade, a real super weapon : the
man about his capabilities can be classed navy's “Capability Brown," Captain Miles
Browning, of whom Prof Morison spoke as“Human Slide Ruler!" Although the Prof had not hesitated to add a comment that Browning had been the most emotionally
unsteady one, among all the USN's captains. Be that as it had been, this Browning
was true-to-goodness real brown-shoed fleetairman, and air staff chief at that.
Thus, not only the Porter Gesit like super dreadnought Yamato and but also Admirals Yamamoto and Koga followed in their wakes, and the “small vesseled
surprize attacker doctrine or destroyer flotilladoctrine uplifter" Admiral Makaroff's legacy (materialized) by Tokugata (Special Type) destroyers such as Hatsuyuki and
Yugiri had gone down to the sea bottom. though not at the Midway, but in the Pacific
ocean as the direct result of the obsolete Wiederholungen or Recapitulations in the stereotyped minds in the entire UN's. As pronounced in Part l ,and Part n, the
unbelievable fiasco and debacle of the Imperial Japanese Navy, was neither a chance
failurenor the incredible victory of a dwarf force set against the giant Japanese Navy.
Thus, the famed w equation-wise. the Nagumo's victorious aircraft carrier striking
- 48- JiroAnzai force alone would have won the battle;alas. they not only blundered in their basic operation, but brought about the beginning of the ends for the UN and the Empire of
Japan。
Aspropounded in Part l ,and Part 皿,the unbelievable fiasco and debacle of the
Imperial Japanese Navy, was neither achance failurenor aresult of aforce set against the inferior American Navy. The famous N^ equation wise,the Nagumo's Carrier striking Force alone would have ensured the victory. Had they acted or reacted according to the prewarning by Vice-admiral Yamaguchi's double warnings ? Alas! the victory disease or psychological case of overcompensation had come to ruin not only Nagumo's vain glories but the entire UN's.
Psychicas well as psychological lessons the author has endeavored in the fore- mentioned 19 chapters are indeed many, but the very fact that more than a passage of half a century the self glorifying post-WW II Japanese industry and business and financial quarters and even Japanese Government functions that seem to be over- confident, are the things to be most refrained。
For essentially the same psyche- and psychologically deep-rooted arrogant and unhealthy attitude had been prevailing in the nation's been amply pointed out in my original text (The Battle of Midway-A Psychological Account, PHP Publications, 1986)!
Essentially the same psychic and psychologicaly deeprooted arrogancies and unhealthy attitudes had been prevailing in this nation's in the post-war booms in industrial and economic fieldshad been pointed out。
Utilizeingnot only Dr. Ernst Kretschmer (1888 -1964)'sKorperbau und Charakter theory but also Adlerian Doctrine of Minderwertigkeitsg好此l (Inferiority Complex) theory, and above all Carl Jung's Umbewuβtes kollektive (Collective Unconscious) theory, I have tried to interpreat all the enigmas pertaining to the Midway Battle,but that success at the PHA and the subsequent. simultaneous operations all over the
Pacific theaters had been the accelerated reactions out of his inner psyche, that resort to the Wiederholungsz切ang (Recapitulations Compulsion or Repetition Compulsion)。
What indeed should have been lying at the depths ? As l explored at, l have discovered the unexpected “Fall" of which seems to have alead.
Overmy retrospection, it would link with my personal experience in that l have been told by Admiral Kusaka and Captain Fuchida in person.
The gist of revealing hints especially by Fuchida is as follows : Had the UN been
-49- The Battle of Midway from the Standpoint of Historical Psychology Part H succeeded in the Midway Ops and come out as the victors, even the flag-hoisting carrierAkagi should have been de-classed to the decisive Night Fighting Second Fleet's auxiliary arms !
Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue (1889-1975)'s now revealing anticipatory pronounce- ment that the Japano-American warfare would not be fought in the Fleet versus Fleet encounter, but be fought in a succession of airbased islands taking or losing between the two ……" The fact remains not just Yamamoto in the Midway Ops, but his C-in-C successor
Koga could not disengage himself from the spells of the now obsolete Battleship
Fleets'decisve encountering in the midst of the Pacific Ocean. Behind this existed the presence in his or even in Koga's mind of categorizing the aircraft carriers as the auxiliary ships, the most surprisingly backwarded tunnel vision even, despite Admiral
Yamamoto's premature death.
Inmy view, this underlined clich6 seems to now have clinched the following pronouncement by Admiral Koga, Yamamoto's very successor and his one-time colleague, ex-Naval General Staffs member.
The above-mentioned “Decisive Night Action's Force" would come to complement the enigmatic strategic principle over-em phasized by Koga・
Asthe component of the Second Fleet…(Night Engagement Forces)made up of with heavy cruisers,light cruisers and screen destroyers and fast battleships. And in her wakes, come the armor-decked Taiho and other Yamato-class sized super carriers which would take up the screening positions around the Main Body (11 0r more of battle-ships),Yamato and Musashi included.
Significantmessages can be read in the above,in that this Second Fleet had been entitled“Decisive Night Engagement Battle Forces'! Even at thislate stage!
Now back to the eχamination of Commander Spruance's career, after the Midway victory Spruance was put ashore. and became Chief of staff for Admiral Nimitz, also a known stroller. Thus, enjoying the land-based life.in unison. For all that his daugh- ter had observed ; all her life this victorious father and now Vice Admiral kept the same habit or saving use of paper tissues.splitting them into halves and using only one half at atime!
Thishabit, however, can be a symbol of his saving parsimonious economics in his psyche, partly witnessing of his glutinous or VISCOUS temperament, but also of his
- 50- Tiro Anzai psychic trauma (he had seen his once rich grand father lose all his possessions overnight). Spruance's wife came to him. with a modest amount of Mitgift, but when widowed she was astounded to find the original had been multiplied by Admiral's careful manipulations, into what could be called fortunes, that reminded her of his exceeding love.
Justhow much of this psychic hysteresis. had played in his decisive victory over
Nagumo, can hardly be measured, not to speak of judging. But Spruance's careful withholding the so-called let-loose by attackers until the last moment, thus made his Air Chief of staff Captain Miles Browning in a furious uproar, should have betrayed the essentially same parsimonous psyche and temper, as confided in his daughter's anecdotal episode.
Having observed the wakes or courses of the Midway operations in history one might be led to believe that long-drawned out hours of attacks, which resembled the ancient Japanese tactics of “Wheeled-out Pattern of Attacks called Kuruma-gakari tactic.
Itlooked at firstsight the USN's been thrown everything they could get hands on, so sophisticatedly timed as in “wheeled-out pattern of tactic",but the truth had been they had been forced to attack the Nagumo forces,so sporadically from the lack of coordinations, and due to disparitiesin their equipments and pilot trainings as to the performances, he could not have possibly effected the hundred-percent coordinationed attacks, but this basic strategy that intended to catch Admiral Nagumo's four carriers in the midst of re-fuellingand re-arming for the decisve second attacks had been fully paid off,because of Spruance's calculated risk taking principle that would betray even now the presence of the Anglo-Saxon objectivity even in their gambles ;compared to this, the Japanese attitude of ours. or Nagumo's been subjectivity period. In re- considering we have to admit as follows; the very defeat colossal had been brought about by the subjective psychology of none but Yamamoto's the person that had been so proud of his knowing the American industrial as well as fighting capabilitiesand very tenacities,not to speak of his bragging internationally minded ! So grossly stumbled on his own blinding success. So overwhelmed by his own “Sneak" attak that was not all,l have fullyeχplicateda number of points which l have discovered in each and every chapter of my nineteen chaptered assay. and came up with novel inter- pretations of mine, such as capturing the Nagumo as the chronical thumb sucker, and
- 51 - The Battle of Midway from the Standpoint of Historical Psychology Part H interpreting Yamamoto and Kuroshima team's operational planning as the very roots of the unconscious defeatism, despite the existence of their daring pusher images.
And finally, as early as the day of my PHP bublication, that happened to have been the June 10th, 1986, I have predicated the downfall of Japan's booming financial market and exporting industries as well. so long as they had been recapitulating essentially the same Nagumo-Kusaka or Yamamoto-Kuroshima-branded inferority- turned-superiority compleχway, we are bound to lose.
Yes, indeed it had been the Anglo-American and Dutch ingenuities that had uncovered the trapped oil and gas layers situated deep under the icy North Sea bottoms.
Though having no immediate relations to the Midway of half a century's past UN operations, it had been the end product of the relentless joint ventures, especially those of the us Marine Corps air-minded officers and of British innovations that came to result in the creation of the wholy novel VTOL concepted aircraft, which was to assure another case of the turning point victory at the Battle of the Fauklands. Re- considering of this Harrier creation makes us aware that when about the world outside
Anglo-Saxon nations is beginning to take the Anglo-American cheap and diseased, the tables are about to turn. Reconsiderations keep us aware of these most eloquently telling that the British ingenuities and for that matter even Americans are to show themselves most eloquently just about the time people outside the Anglo-Saxon countries began to chorus of either the British or American weakling, that British had been afflicted with British disease, and Americans likewise enthralled in twin deficits。
But our people have once again erred in evaluating the Anglo-American tenacity, not because they did not have daily contacts with either England or America, but because they are lacking in the studies of the past histories of other nations and cultural groups and their techno-cultural implications。
The facts re-eχamined by the author of this thesis, prove to the effect that the
Imperial Navy had not lost that Battle of Midway due to the simple level of Inferiority
Compleχor Self-centered Inferiority-turned Overflowing Suprriority Compleχes,but they have lost the war, because they had taken the American guts and their kind of patriotism cheap ; as facts have been shown the follies of Admiral Yamamoto and
Kuroshima had thus so devastatingly undermined 、the basic psychology of the
Japanese nation's, especially the moralistic legacies cultivated and handed down by
- 52- Jiro Anzai
Admiral Togo/Nimitz's line of Chivalry/Bushido principles。
Ifanyone challenged for the proofs of these psychic, psychological and psychiatric interpretations of history, especially those of Midway ops as l have just finished,just how both the nations've been observing this date June 4th are the most eloquent testimonies. The Japanese have suppressed almost all these painful and humiliating defeat experiences ;as the result The Battle of Midway had been observed only by the American forces on the June 5th on Japan, the day remembered very feebly by us as the day in which the Americans have been much fussed over the triflething of the past.
Aswe recall,0nJune second, the Nagumo's striking force had run into the thick soupy fog and they had been forced to make medium-wave radio contacts with other forces to effect the necessary turns. Ironically the fogs lifted soon after the radio propagation had been effected. Much to teeth-gnawed chagrin of the Commander Genda, but for some reasons, the American listening posts of not only on land but aboard the surface forces failed to pick them up.
Forall that, had we taken a second look into the Midway debacle, the course of what seemed to have been the inevitable destiny had been the end results of individuals and groups, who had played not just cardinal roles but also hitherto seemingly insignificant parts, all of which had been playing categorically psycho- logical effectsupon both opponents.
0n the other hand,to the victory-crowned us Navy and its successive generations, June 4th, 1942, the historic date's been repeatedly observed on the day, as betraying on frequent visitationsin the past of the now friendly us Navy's carrier force'sperfect-timed Yokosuka arrivals,but to most Japanese whose memory had been deliberately shanned the past records until the avergae post-war generations think nothing of the Midway。
Forall these, l would like to point out the fact that on June 10th, 1942 l had seen on the Mainihci News in the original Japanese version that the UN's sweeping victory over the USN had been flashed on the front pages, with block lettersthat the Japanese
Navy's won the gigantic victory on the Midway, and eastern Pacific theater. It was complete to the oiled picture of at least one American carrierin flames, and its caption declared the control of the Pacific ocean had been forced to flee from the Pacific……
-53- TheBattleof Midway from the Standpointof HistoricalPsychology Part Ⅱ
This had been more than plain lies。
The author remembers somewhat resembling case had been flashed over 1938
Nomonhan incident in which the proud Imperial Japanese Army had been thrown into humiliating fiascos of defeat in which thousands of men and equipments including tanks and artillerybeen crashed under the Russian mechanized troops. Rumors that our tanks had been crashed by the Russian armored forces like a tofu (bean curd),or burned to theirinfernal deaths and destructions by means of flame thrower came to us, even the patrioticschool kid's ears.
In both cases these inglorious defeats and their facts had been washed off as if they had been minor errors or mistakes that can be corrected by and with the rise of our patrioticspiritsand morale uplifting.
For all that, the feats meeted out to the junior officers and most men had been more than harsh and cruel。
As Captain Fuchida's and Commander Okumiya's Midway accounts tell,a number of the survivors had been locked up inside various domestic barracks as if prisoners, and later ordered to various outlying posts or surface fleet to die. But the facts that how the Midway debacle had been handled by the late Admiral Nagumo until the last day of his inglorious life after the Midway at the Island of Saipan, betray beyond any room for doubting how the admiral had been thinking himself of the Midway.
He kept saying to the effect what had shocked him most was not from the Battle of Midway, but the fact his PHA striking Forces had been seen in clear and sure within the distance of some 8,000 meters by a hammer-and-sickle-insignia funneled
Russian ship on the open sea. on the 6th (5th in American day)December, 1941, some 800 miles due north of the Oahu, Hawaii.
To this reseracher, this case, had it been true,seems a startling one and makes a case of what Dr. Sigmund Freud termed Covering Memory or the working of covering the unwelcome memory with a pleasurable one. In eχplicatingthings in dreams,
Freud had told us of the almost un-consious working of one's memories, that of substituting some bright-faced memory to inhibit the unpleasant memory ; in
Nagumo's case, covering memory is the victorious PHA with the spine-chillingthrill0f being discovered by a Russian ship. Important is a thing that needs a further exploration; that was Admiral Nagumo's washing off the stigma of Sneak Attack charge of his PHA as though these accusations were water drops on the Vinylite rain
-54- Jiro Anzai coat.
Covering memory had been a lid-placing behavior in one's mind that works almost unconsciously in human psyche. In reconsidering. three generationed (Meiji, Taisho, and Showa)recordsof the UN's past acts and deeds. are but epics and lyrics as well of our emotion- and sentiments-laden national history, but as the years went by, the memories of the ww II had taken sprirally diminishing course, unitl they had become of no moralistic self-searching material。
The facts remain in that the historical and historic courses of the UN as the modern day version of the ancient Tale of the Heike clan or acts of Lord Yoshitsune's as in the ancient story。
In retrospecting, we must reconsider the existence of Admiral Togo, along with hosts of true heroes as in the Meiji-period Russo-Japanese war. Of the said Admiral
Togo, even Admiral Nimitz had never tired of eχpressing deep-seated love and professional respect to this senior Admiral. Admiral Nimitz's love and admiration to
Togo seem not to have diminished even after the Midway and the total Defunction of the UN under his command.
The very facts that the UN represented by the British legacied Admiral Togo's time and American Mahan-influenced Senior staff Officer Akiyama's time had acted blamelessly ; not one case of torturing prisoners-of-war had occurred ! Their Bushido code and morale as well as moral had matched their deeds。
The facts so saddening as to make us deeply ashamed happened to the prisoners of war caught at the Midway, not one of the survived American airmen had come out alive from the hands of the First Air Fleet's but some fifty Japanese captured off the
Midway, came out alive, well-treated just like prisoners of war in the 1905 Russian
POW's at Tsushima ! The point had been uncovered by the famous woman writer
Hisae Sawachi for the first time. In my last chapter, l took up this problem and reasoned that we have no right to equate this unfair treatment by us with the atomic bombing.
Itwas facts of history that we had terrorized the world with Zero fighters' and
First striking forces' strength. but due to the hollow-outing of the Bushido in our
Showa officers and men, there can be no mistaking that we have been defeated, our
Bushido had been disintegrated. no matter how eloquently Dr. Inazo Nitobe had preached in his Busido book, nor Okakur in his Book of Tea, they had come to no avail
-55- The Battle of Midway from the standpoint of Historical Psychology Part n
under the feeble influence of the shallow-seated Buddhistic philosoophy ; when
compared to Admiral Togo and his righ-hand man Akiyama, even though materially
much advancedly equipped with Zero fighters or super battlewagon Yamato, they
could not possibly command other peoples' respect. Why this has occurred ;because these supposed-to-be Bushido equipped officersand men had been long since hollowed in their warrior mind ;in their ever growing dependency on their material strengths
and equip-ment-wise selfglorificationsthey have forgotten the importance of Bus in a word, they have come to ignore the quality of men's spiritsbehind guns !
Tothe author, so much similarity can be observed between the slack attitudes and
arrogancy in the Heike clan's warriors and those of the UN's Showa period ones. Indeed,to this thesis author, acts and actions taken by the UN's very personnel
drunken in the Victory-diseased spiritsin the First-phase ops, so much resemble to the
unhealthy acts and actions of the Heike clan's men. as toldin the Tale of Heike, in that
the young and robust Kiyomori, on his pilgrimed seaward journey to Kumano shrine,
ate a huge fish that had jumped into his boat, as good omen (though the Buddhistic
doctrine forbade killingeven a fish during the religious pilgrimage)。 The Nagumo's officers and men, most of all,had been wrapped up in such
optimistic moods, never doubting the on-coming success at Midway, such a speck-of-a-
foam-like a couple of isletsin the vast Pacific ocean.
But far more had been waiting for the doomed Nagumo and Yamamoto.
Yamamoto that had distanced himself from all his subordinates and even his staff
officers,in his estimations of the Anglo-American might, had so blundered in his handling the Nagumo and his men. as though the latter'sforce had been the hapless
half-brothered Yoshitsune, younger brother. to Yoritomo, the elder,and sent him and
his force on the constant runs as depicted in the Gikei or even in the Tale of the Heike
Clan. That subordinates-loving Yamamoto would have mistreated Admiral Nagumo
and his staff;quite discriminatingly. Yamamoto's right-hand man Kuroshima acting as though the dead copy of the sinisterKajiwara, that agent-like supervisory man to the
young but heroic warrior Yoshitsune. Moreover, how comes, that all-knowing
Yamamoto should have slighted Nagumo, the earnest-to-goodness Commander, of the
crack 1st Air Fleet,and kicked him up to the silent galley or attic even. In a word, it
had been discovered that the C-in-C Admiral Yamamoto and his senior staff officer Kuroshima's set had been dictating all the war plans and battle phases to the complete
- 56- Jiro Anzai
neglect of other officers' initiative. especially of his Chief-of-the staff Admiral Ugaki's.
Inasmuch as all the operations had been issued out from the Yamamoto/Kuroshima
combination, the Midway debacle had also been the end-product of these two men's or
the paired folie. As a master piece that had reached into the depths of Dostoevski's
character, I would be permitted to make a mention of Fijlop-Miller's Dostoiewski und
die Vatertotung (PP. 339-418, Gesammelt Werke、Vol.χIV, Fischer Verlag). Our man
Yamamoto had been relentlessly pushing himself into chess, chequer, shogi and go
games, so engulfedly enthralled had he been that he had often at a loss : one anecdote
has it that he had been kicked out of the casion in Monaco, for his straight winning
runs.
To the fatty physiqued Admiral Kusaka that did not hesitate to tell him of its
vulnerability, Admiral Yamamoto had been recorded to tell: you should not say too
risky a gamble just because l have been being fond of playing bridges or pokers。
Yamamoto's later year muscular physique nearing the fatty, was hiding beneath
the mask, his glucous temperament, miχed with rather asthenic, schizophrenic tern-
perament, all of which fix him as miχed type. His steadfast observances in saluting
back at the subordinates so contrary to his Cheif of staff Vice-admiral Ugaki's。
For all that Yamamoto was of very selective in his selection of friends. Despite his
constant wholesale service to the populace so eχpressive in such acts as spending
hours in replying for even grade-school kids' fan-letters ; he had been eχtremely
choosy in his friends and foes. There were many indications that would taletelling of
his inner psyche or nucleus as the typical viscous type.
As to this viscous temperament, the resounding success of Quality Control method
that had been introduced by Dr. Deming in the post World War H Japan (thepre-
Korean war Japan), had its basic stratum, in the Japanese love of viscous
recapitulations !
Despite this episode had been so well known now, all the published books and
articles have glossed over as though this habit of Yamamoto'sbeen a sort of psychic
appendiχ ; but under the magnifying glass of depths psychology, these never-ceasing
movable and moving finger tips are but the very indeχ into his inner psyche. and
Overall Commander Admiral Yamamoto's itchy finger tips are no less tale-telling than
his subordinate Nagumo's the Sonde (exploring implement)into his inner psyche, are
all too plain now.
- 57 - TheBattleof Midway from the standpoint of HistoricalPsychology Part n
Hisnot-a-moment's resting finger tips were but the betrayal of his lifelong Lebens- formen (lifestyles),with his yen willpower to fight. But then, why he had succumbed so fast to his death, as early as April 18th, 1943。
AsI've been dwelt on in the main text.using Dr. Kretschmer's character/body type
(Kor)erbau und Charakter) theory for reference. we could say many warriors and fighters could have been categorized into the muscularly strong physiqued, viscous,
persevering temperament.After getting middle aged, one's physique tends to stay.
Yamamoto'smuscular and strong physique in his later years seems to be tale-telling
his basic temperament as that of viscous type. but also of asthenic thin bodied. His stead-fast observances in saluting back at subordinate's, (so unlike his nominal Cheif
of staff Vice-dmiral Ugaki's),is becoming the correspondoing love of the well-dressed
orderliness in parlances and manners. As the very indication of glucous type of temperament.His love of the carefully selected men and friends,oddly offensive and sporadic bursts of anger that often materialized in his practical jokings all seem to be
tale-tellingof his inner psyche as the typical viscous type。
Repeating again, the resounding success of Quality Control method in the post-
war Japan (introduced by the American authority Dr. Deming just before the Korean War)had succeeded so amazingly because not only the seeds were sown rightly on the
minds of the Japanese workers, (many of them. working girls) who had been of the
glucous, repetitions-loving type, the spiritsof which go wel卜n harmony with the tea
ceremonies lover. Repetitive actions that fitin harmony with Wiederholungenzwang
that betray the existence of complex and often sophisticated love of complicated
process coupled with the yen for the purified and orderly atmosphere. These tactics
are in a word also those of a typical tea people's。
The next issue is how to add a grain of salt creativity(laden most heavily with schizoid or schizopherenic temperamented) so symbolically vindicated in a thin or
asthenic physiqued. That fatty manic-depressive tempered Churchill/Yamaguchi
types, who despite their bulky forms. often gifted with fast-revolving brains and ready
for actions on the instant attitude, gifted in multi-channeled receptiveness, as in
Yamaguchi at Midway, come as panacea ! Finally,we had to make mention of the workings of propaganda and publicity
departements of both navies. It is said that to the retreating ears of the survived UN
men, the American broadcast in perfect Japanese told them that the ghosts of the dead
-58- JiroAnzai incurred at the Midway would haunt the UN, as told in the ancient Noh-play's Funa
Benkei. Amazing seizure of the situation by the victors had made the defeated to take their hats off。 The author of this thesis has not ben committing himself and his endeavors in the self-criticalironies alone. He has only wished to emphasize the point to the effect that now is the time for us to re-consider German Historian Ranke's saying that every age is in a close relation to the almighty God. The present generation may laugh him off, pushing off this kind of the Romantic wist-fulness, but l have to admit, the present generation has to seriously reconsider this Rankian epigram.
We know the Meiji-bred Akiyama had been a devout believer in religion,but we also know our Showa warriors had behaved as if a bunch of born atheists;moreover, they allowed atrocitiesprevail. We, the Showa men, had succeeded in terrorizing the world over. Had our Showa-aged soldiers and sailors and General Staffs,and for that matter had High Command officersstood up like Meiji-warriors Nogi and Togo, even if the Japan had been defeated, the world over should have come in our defense in the same International Tribunal Court. Had our Showa-era sailors and soldiers been upright as the Meiji bred Togo and
Nogi, and their everyday philosophy been guided in the Heike story depicted human and humane spirits,lined with the Buddhistic concept of mercy and uncertainty of human lifeand prosperity, or the short periodness of victories,the world all around us had been behaving differently。 Inthe end, l stressed upon the importances of break-through to today's Japanese problems, and suggested the future Japan, learning from the past lessons at the
Midway should be bent upon educational reforms, techno cultural innovations, and above all enlarging domestic demands. All these l had spoken in the book published twelve years before, June 10th, 1986.
Bibliography
1. Agawa, H. Gunkan-N・'agato-no-Shogai (Shlncho-sha, 1978). 2. , .Isoroku Yamamoto {Shincho, 1965). 3. Anzai, J.Psychology of Teaism (Tanko, 1997). 4. Defense Research Inst.Midway Kaisen (Asagumo, 1971). 5. Bruell,T. B. Admiral Spn(nce, trans.Nango (Yomiuri, 1979). 6 . Chihaya, M. Nippon-Kaigun-no-Senryaku-Hasso (President, 1982).
- 59- The Battle of Midway from the Standpoint of Historical Psychology Part H
7 . Farago,L. War of Wits (Greenwood, 1976). 8 . Fuchida, M. & Okumiya, M. Midway (US Naval Insstitute,1981). , .& 。Midway (Asahi-Sonorama, 1982). 一 - 9 . Fukuchi, K. Kubo-Shokaku-Kaisen-Ki (Shuppankyodo, 1962). 10. Frank, P. & Harrington, J.D. Rendezvous at Midway (Paperback, 1967). 11. Genda, M. Shinjuwan Kaikor)ku (Yomiuri, 1992). 12. Horigoshi, J.& Okumiya, M. Zero Fighter (Asahi-Sonorama, 1982). 13. Ikude, H, Yudan Teitoku Yamaguchi Tamon (Tokuma, 1985) 14. Kahn,D. The Code Breakers (Macmillan, 1967). 15. Kapp, E、Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik (1877). 16. Kojima, J. Tragic Admiral (Chuokoron, 1967). 17. Kusaka, R.Ichi-Gunjin-no-Shosai (Kowado, 1985). 18. Layton et al“'Andl Was There" (Morrow, 1982). 19. Lord, W. Incredible Victory(Harper & Row, 1967). 20. Makishima, T. Midway Kaisen (Kawade, 1967). 21. Miyauchi,K. Niitaka-Yama Nobore (Rokko, 1975). 22. Morison, S.E. History of the US Naval operations in WW //, Vol.4. Coral Sea, Midway & Submarine Actions. 23. Okumiya, M. Saraba Kaigun-Kokutai (Asahi-Sonorama, 1979). 24. Prange, G. W. At Dawn We Slept (McGrat-Hill, 1981). 25. , _._.Miracle at Midway (Penguine, 1991). 26. Rusbridger, J. & Nave, Eric. Betrayal at Pearl Harbor (Summit, 1991). 27. Smith, C. B. Evidence in Camera (Chatto & Wind, 1958). 28. Stevenson, W. A Man Called Intrepid (Ballentine,1976). 29. Takagi, S. Takagi-Sokichi Nikki (Mainichi,1985). 30. Toyoda, J.Namimakura Ikutabizo (Kodansha, 1973). 31. Ugaki, M. Sensoroku Volsl & II (Shuppan-kyodo,1952). 32. Winterbotham, F. W. The Ultra Secret (Dell,1974). 33. Yardley, H.O、The American Blackchamber (Bobbs-Merill, 1931). 34. Yokoi, T. Kaigun-Kimitsushitsu (Shinseisha, 1953).
Magazines and Periodicals
Koser, R. Die )reussische Kriegesfuhrung im siebenjahrigen Kriege (Hist. Zeitshcrift, Bd. 92, 1904).
Anzai, J. The UN. or the Ill-omened Navy (Bungeishunjyu's Sept. 1966 issue, Vol. 44, No. 9).
_._、Midway (A Case of Psycho-historicalApproach or theInfluences of Psychological Factors upon the Battle of Midway, June 4th, 1942) (Otemon-gakuin University's10th Anniversary Bulletin,Oct.,1976,pp.573-604).
In addition,Gesammelte W&rka (CollectedWorks) or the works of Freud, Jung and Kretschmer have been liberallymade use.
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