The Aspin-Brown Intelligence Inquiry: Behind the Closed Doors of a Blue Ribbon Commission

Assessing an Earlier Panel on Intelligence The Aspin-Brown Intelligence Inquiry: Behind the Closed Doors of a Blue Ribbon Commission

Loch K. Johnson

During 1995–96, the United of cooperation (or resistance) it States conducted a major inquiry received from outside institu- into the status of the nation’s tions and individuals. It will also intelligence agencies. Carried out offer conclusions about the com- by a high-level commission, mission’s influence on chaired in succession by former intelligence. secretaries of defense Les Aspin and Harold Brown, the inquiry’s METHODOLOGY The inquiry’s avowed avowed purpose was to deter- This article is the result of purpose was to mine how best to adapt the archival research, interviews, and determine how best to Intelligence Community to the the personal observations and adapt the Intelligence challenging new world that had notes of the author, who served Community to the emerged following the end of the on the commission staff. The Cold War. The inquiry served archival research included challenging new world examination of public docu- other purposes as well, some hav- ments on intelligence; the that had emerged ing more to do with domestic interviews with commission following the end of politics than national security. members and staff took place the Cold War. The experience of the Aspin- during the inquiry and in the Brown commission sheds light on months after the commission issued its report. The author, the the state of intelligence in the only academic on the staff, United States in the years imme- attended every formal com- diately following the end of the mission meeting and most of its Cold War and provides insights informal staff sessions and spent into why this nation was taken many hours privately with Chairman Aspin in the planning by surprise in the attacks of 9/11. and startup of the inquiry. It is, in Its history also offers lessons effect, an eyewitness account of a about the policy value of indepen- significant political event.1 dent panels.

Despite the frequency of such commissions of inquiry, the schol- arly literature on them is thin, especially in the realm of national security, where commis- 1The author expresses his sion doors have generally been appreciation to the members and Loch K. Johnson is Regents locked tight against scholars and staff of the Aspin-Brown commission for discussing with him their views on Professor of Public and reporters. What follows is a the panel’s work. He thanks the CIA International Affairs in the detailed, behind-the-scenes look Publication Review Board for its prompt and helpful reading of the School of Public and into the Aspin-Brown inquiry. It manuscript; he is grateful to Leena International Affairs of the will describe the commission’s Johnson for her perceptive editorial University of Georgia. internal dynamics and the kind suggestions and encouragement.

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The idea of an Aspin- led intelligence commission did not sit Creation of the Commission Besides, conservative lawmakers well in some corners of had a different intelligence The incident that initially drove Capitol Hill. agenda. When it came to the CIA, the establishment of the Aspin- what most concerned them was Brown commission in 1994 was not so much the quality of intelli- the military encounter in Mogad- gence. That was a cerebral ishu, Somalia, in October 1993 in debate tailor-made for the brainy which the soldiers of a Somali Les Aspin, “The Secretary of bureaucratic reform” and with warlord killed 18 US Special Analysis,” with a summa cum “only a passing interest” in the Forces soldiers in an intense fire- laude degree in history from Yale nation’s intelligence agencies— fight. With US troops surprised University, a Ph.D. in economics gained permission from Clinton by the sophisticated firepower from the Massachusetts Insti- to pursue a major probe into the and determination of ragtag tute of Technology (MIT), and a intelligence deficiencies that had Somali forces and Americans tendency “to look at all five sides contributed to the Somali trag- shocked by the humiliating, tele- of a triangle.” 3 Rather, they wor- edy.2 In June, the media reported vised display of killed soldiers in ried about the hemorrhaging of the prospect of a presidential the city, the tragedy suggested America’s secrets to the Rus- commission on intelligence, led yet another intelligence failure, sians. In 1994, CIA investigators by Aspin in his capacity as coming on top of the surprising discovered that one of their own PFIAB chairman. terrorist detonation of explosives officers, Aldridge H. Ames, had at the base of the World Trade spied first for the Soviet Union Center in February that year. The idea of an Aspin-led intelli- and then for Russia for more gence commission did not sit well than a decade, revealing to the Vice President Al Gore, national in some corners of Capitol Hill, Kremlin details of hundreds of security adviser Anthony Lake, where Aspin had served in the CIA operations and the names of and Secretary of Defense Les House of Representatives for 22 US agents in Moscow. If the CIA Aspin sought an explanation for years (D-WI) and developed a were to be a subject of an investi- the debacle in Somalia. So did reputation as a sharp-tongued gation, this counterintelligence members of Congress, who were critic of the CIA. Aspin had been failure (conservatives reasoned) quick to blame the Clinton a member of a controversial should be the focus. administration for the defeat. As House committee that briefly criticism of the administration investigated the CIA in 1975, The leader of the effort to block mounted on Capitol Hill and in and, subsequently, he became an the Aspin initiative was the for- the media, President Clinton unabashed critic of the Agency as midable Republican senator from fired Aspin in December, less a member of the House Perma- Virginia, John W. Warner, the than a year into his job, forcing nent Select Committee on ranking minority member and the secretary of defense to take Intelligence (HPSCI, created in vice chairman of the Senate the hit for the administration. To 1977). Already distrusted by con- Select Committee on Intelligence soften Aspin’s fall, Clinton in servatives, Aspin had become (SSCI). In February 1994, he had April 1994 appointed him chair- doubly suspect because of the written a letter to President Clin- man of the President’s Foreign losses in Somalia. ton asking him to establish a Intelligence Advisory Board task force to investigate the (PFIAB), a group of civilian advisers to the White House on 2 James Bennet, “Thinking About the Day 3 intelligence matters. In this After Tomorrow,” New York Times (24 De- Bob Woodward, “The Secretary of Analy- cember 2000): A14; Donna Cassata, “Con- sis,” Washington Post, 21 February 1993: capacity, Aspin—backed by Gore gress Jumps to ClA’s Aid in Its Quest for W8 and R. W. Apple Jr., “Vietnam’s Stu- and Lake, with the president Identity,” CQ Weekly Report (7 January dent,” New York Times Magazine, 31 De- himself “largely indifferent to 1995): 41. cember 1995: 9.

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In frustration, Aspin proposed in Ames case and, at the same time, September a combined Indeed, Woolsey’s cocksure per- reassure the public that the CIA presidential- sonality, interpreted by some as remained a vital organization in congressional arrogance, had managed to alien- the nation’s security. Clinton ate key lawmakers—notably replied that he saw no need for a commission. . . DeConcini, who accused him of special investigation. Unhappy “total obstructionism” with with Aspin’s role in the Somalia respect to the Congress.7 The incident to begin with, the Vir- DCI had been widely admon- ginia senator pushed Congress to Senator Daniel Patrick Moyni- ished on the Hill, too, for merely create its own panel to serve as a han (D-NY) for the outright reprimanding 11 CIA officers in counterweight to what might abolition of the Agency, on supervisory capacities over Ames become an overly negative report grounds that it had demon- rather than dispensing harsher by Aspin. Hearing about strated its uselessness by failing penalties. As for PFIAB’s inquiry, Warner’s plans, Aspin went to to forecast the fall of the Soviet some lawmakers were of the the senator’s office in an attempt Union in 1991. Reflecting mind that since this panel was to dissuade him. He greeted the Warner’s orientation, the SSCI part of a White House already senator with a big grin and his staff director told the press that tarred by intelligence mistakes in standard Wisconsin salutation, an alternative commission was Somalia, Congress could provide “Hey, whadda ya know?” This needed to “rebuild the political a better perspective. So ran the stab at charm often worked, but consensus” in support of the arguments for a second intelli- seemed to have no effect on CIA.5 gence inquiry. Try as he might Warner, so Aspin went straight to with several more visits to the point: two investigations Warner and his colleagues, Aspin would be redundant and waste- Lawmakers also questioned could not get this horse back into ful. PFIAB could do the job. As a whether the CIA had adequately the barn. bargaining chip, he offered seats pondered its post–Cold War mission. Director of Central on the PFIAB commission to In frustration, Aspin proposed in Intelligence (DCI) R. James individuals of Warner’s choos- September 1994 a combined pres- Woolsey had been unable to coming—including the senator idential-congressional 4 municate a vision of the role himself. commission, with the president intelligence should play in the choosing nine members “from pri- new era—at least, to the satisfac- vate life” and the leaders of Warner rejected the offer and tion of SSCI members. “Warner’s Congress selecting eight mem- moved ahead with plans for a commission proposal is the only bers (four “from private life” and separate inquiry. He had an way to get [the CIA] back on four from Congress). It was a agenda in mind rather different track, because Woolsey hasn’t put take-it-or-leave-it proposal: either from Aspin’s. The senator viewed it there,” declared SSCI Chair- this hybrid or two separate a congressional inquiry as an man Dennis DeConcini, (D-AZ).6 opportunity to buoy up the CIA inquiries. Satisfied that he would (based in Langley, Virginia, a have enough clout on the pro- part of his constituency), whose 5 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “Do We Still posed commission (including his morale had dipped dramatically Need the C.I.A? The State Dept. Can Do own membership) to rein in the with the revelation of the Ames the Job,” New York Times, 19 May 1991: Aspin faction, Warner agreed to treachery. Warner was also con- E17; John J. Fialka, “Congress Is Set to the deal, sweetened further when Approve Big Review of Costly U.S. Intelli- Aspin agreed to name the SSCI’s cerned about the public calls of gence Community,” Wall Street Journal, 26 September 1994: A6. general counsel, L. Britt Snider— 6 Steven Komarow, “In Turnabout, the CIA 4 Author telephone conversation with Les Finds Itself under a Microscope,” USA To- Aspin, 21 February 1995. day, 15 July 1994: 5A. 7 Ibid.

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MEMBERS OF THE ASPIN- a Warner protégé—as staff direc- citizens. The presidential side of BROWN COMMISSION tor of the joint inquiry. the new commission got off to a slower start. After more than two (presidential appointees in On 30 September, Congress months of jockeying over who italics) approved the creation of the would be among the chosen few, Les Aspin, first chairman bipartisan “Commission on the the Clinton administration man- Roles and Capabilities of the aged in December to present the Harold Brown, second chairman United States Intelligence Com- names of its eight appointees to munity” and the president signed join the already announced com- Warren B. Rudman, vice the bill on 14 October, setting a mission chairman, Les Aspin. chairman 1 March 1996 deadline for the The administration’s slowness Lew Allen Jr. panel’s report. “I have warned for prompted the New York Times to the last several years that if the warn in an editorial in January Zöe Baird Intelligence Community did not 1995 that unless the panel got move boldly and publicly to moving it would soon be “road- Ann Z. Caracristi change, that change would be kill,” run over by HPSCI, which Tony Coelho forced upon it. That has now hap- was gearing up under Combest’s pened,” observed Woolsey’s leadership to conduct a House David H. Dewhurst predecessor, DCI Robert M. probe into the state of intelli- Gates.8 DeConcini predicted the gence.11 The House committee Norman D. Dicks panel could be of tremendous planned a set of hearings labeled J. James Exon help—“if it doesn’t get co-opted “IC21,” short for the “Intelli- by the Intelligence Community.”9 gence Community in the 21st Wyche Fowler Jr. His counterpart in the House, Century.” HPSCI Chairman Larry Comb- Stephen Friedman est (R-TX), had a different In addition to a few individuals Porter J. Goss concern: that “partisans” might who were already members of “hijack” the commission “to vali- PFIAB, the presidential side of Anthony S. Harrington date their efforts to dismantle the commission’s roster included 10 Robert J. Hermann the Intelligence Community.” two former managers from a single intelligence agency (out of the Robert E. Pursley then 13 in the Intelligence Com- Starting Up the Commission munity): the National Security John W. Warner Agency (NSA). Aspin’s original Membership. The Congress was Paul D. Wolfowitz quick to name its eight commis- plan of an exclusively White sion members: two incumbent House inquiry had been to assemble a staff. In the final senators, two incumbent repre- swamped by “outsiders,” with compilation, nine of the 17 staff sentatives, and four private only five PFIAB people making it onto the 17-member panel. members had served in the intelligence agencies (six retired); six 8 Tim Weiner, “Commission Begins Its As the White House sauntered had worked on intelligence issues Task to Redefine Role of C.I.A.,” New York toward the selection of its quota as Capitol Hill aides; one came Times, 18 March 1995: Al. of commissioners, Aspin sifted from the Office of Management 9 Elizabeth A. Palmer, “Congress Creates through piles of curriculum vitae and Budget; and one from Commission to Study ClA’s Performance,” academe. CQ Weekly Report, 1 October 1994: 2824. 10 Walter Pincus, “Politics Marks Intelli- gence Study Panel,” Washington Post, 11 “Mr. Aspin: Pick up the Pace,” New York Planning. During January 1 November 1994: A5. Times, 16 January 1995: A16. 1995, as the FBI established

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As always with commissions, this one was constantly security clearances, the staff As the commissioners discussed began to trickle into the commis- buffeted by external the panel’s objectives and likely sion’s quarters in the New events. witnesses, national security Executive Office Building, across adviser Anthony Lake arrived at Pennsylvania Avenue from the the meeting by invitation of the White House. As PFIAB chair- chairman. He offered a list of top- man, Aspin already had a ics he thought important to spacious suite of offices in the the president. Deteriorating rela- study. At the top: Do we have the Old Executive Office Building, tions with Congress doubtless right structure for the Intelli- adjacent to the White House. In added to the DCI’s frustration in gence Community? Are we these early weeks, the staff lead- keeping up with technological ers shuttled between the two his job. So, as the commission change? He observed that the buildings for planning sessions began its work, the Intelligence administration would soon name with Aspin. Between meetings, Community was without a direc- a new DCI, as well as issue a the chairman placed calls around tor. After the administration presidential decision directive Washington, DC, and the coun- finally picked an Air Force gen- try, consulting on intelligence eral to replace Woolsey, the (PDD) on intelligence that would topics with his wide network of candidate was forced to with- lay out the president’s priorities. government and academic spe- draw amid innuendos that he Most likely, the new DCI would cialists. The questions poured had suffered ethical lapses. The come up with his own plan for out: “What topics should we focus next prospect, John M. Deutch, a reform, Lake said, rather than be on?” “In what sequence?” “Whom former MIT chemistry professor “brain dead” until the commis- should we call as witnesses?” and provost, and at the time dep- sion completed its work. “Should we hold public uty secretary of defense, publicly hearings?” balked at leaving his job at the Aspin’s main concern in these Department of Defense (DOD). start-up weeks was to think The chairman maintained a through how to organize the com- steady flow of press releases on On 3 February 1995, more than mission’s work. For help, he commission activities. He also three months after its creation, turned to his associates at made himself available for media the commission held its first RAND, the government-funded interviews and lectures to organi- meeting in the staff conference think tank that carries out zations interested in intelligence room. Two members were absent, research primarily on defense issues, beginning with an Ameri- issues. It was a perfect symbiotic can Bar Association breakfast in but the others visited amiably relationship: RAND saw the com- January. There he told the attor- and with an air of excitement neys that the number one about the challenge before them. mission as a source of funding, question facing the commission Aspin, looking rumpled as and Aspin respected the exper- was “What is the Intelligence always, called the meeting to tise inside RAND that could help Community for?” He vowed to order and gave a brief history of him structure the commission’s examine closely America’s intelli- the commission’s origins, skating work. He asked RAND to set up a gence “targets, organizations, over his early run-ins with Sena- series of strategy sessions; the costs.” tor Warner. Staking out a search was on for an analytic position in favor of the status framework to guide the commis- As always with commissions, this quo, Warner expressed his con- sion. “What should the Intelli- one was constantly buffeted by cern that some lawmakers were gence Community be doing now external events. In December out to cut the intelligence bud- that the Cold War is over?” Here 1994, DCI Woolsey resigned, get. This would be unwise, he was the central question Aspin grumbling about lack of access to cautioned. posed to the RAND experts.

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‘We’ve got to establish intelligence targeting priorities,’ Aspin “There’s good news and bad New Executive Office Building in news,” Aspin told the RAND staff insisted. search of government contracts, in February. The good news was armed with fancy, four-color that reform was likely to happen briefing books on how they would since so many people had an organize the panel’s work. Many interest in it, as demonstrated by of their ideas were good, but none HPSCI’s “IC21” project and a of these policy entrepreneurs had lively interest in the subject the close ties to Aspin enjoyed by would have to define more pre- inside the White House—if not in RAND, which ended up supply- cisely the universe of subjects for the Oval Office, at least with ing the commission its chief set of which the Intelligence Commu- Gore and Lake. The bad news outside consultants. nity would be responsible, was that all of these different instead of the vague targeting parties might go off in sundry Prestigious study groups inter- list currently used. directions, bringing chaos to the ested in intelligence reform reform efforts. Taking on the col- sprang up, too, including forums oration of an advanced graduate Of concern, too, was another at Georgetown University in seminar on intelligence (punctu- first-order issue: how to organize Washington, DC, and at the ated with quintessential RAND the intelligence agencies—and, Council of Foreign Relations in jargon like “tilting the matrix” especially, how to overcome the New York City.12 In March, the and “force multiplier”), Aspin and problem of “gorillas in the stove- Georgetown group offered an his senior staff entered into an pipes.” Here was more jargon, impressive checklist of recom- all-morning exchange of views referring to the individual intelli- mended reforms, high among with RAND specialists on how gence agencies acting separately them the consolidation of the to proceed. For RAND, it was (as if in isolated stovepipes) nation’s military intelligence imperative that the commission under the leadership of their own agencies. establish a “baseline”—a firm strong program managers (the understanding of how the gorillas, such as the NSA direc- By the end of February, the com- intelligence agencies currently do tor) and beyond the control of the mission staff had drafted a “scope their work. Then commissioners DCI. The RAND “seminar” ended paper” meant to plot out the could consider what changes with clear marching orders from boundaries of the inquiry and, were necessary and then Aspin: build a baseline for the working in harness with RAND, appraise a wide range of reform commissioners. had set down the “baseline” that proposals against the baseline. Aspin sought. The framework RAND was not the only source of consisted of four guiding “We’ve got to establish intelli- advice pouring into the commis- questions: gence targeting priorities,” Aspin sion. In January and February, insisted. Here was a “first order” the panel averaged 600 tele- 1. What are the intelligence issue. The RAND experts pushed phone calls a day from needs of the United States in the idea that the CIA had to be individuals (frequently job seek- the post–Cold War world? able to mobilize information in a ers) offering guidance on how the hurry, having access to the tele- commission should proceed. A 2. What are the intelligence phone numbers of the nation’s similar deluge of letters fell on capabilities required to col- top experts: agile resources able the commission, some from to respond to “flavors of the retired generals and admirals, 12 month,” like the unexpected cri- others from citizens concerned For a report on the Georgetown colloqi- um, see “The Intelligence Community: Is it sis in Rwanda that had suddenly about civil liberties, a few from Broken? How to Fix It?” Studies in Intelli- popped up when Aspin was secre- cranks. Think tanks and “belt- gence 39, no. 5 (Annual Unclassified Edi- tary of defense. The commission way bandits” descended on the tion, 1996): 11–18.

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lect, analyze, and disseminate Truman had sought when he cre- staff meetings were often free- such information? ated a Central Intelligence wheeling debates about impor- Agency. tant intelligence issues, no holds 3. To what extent do the exist- barred. “NSA is like a huge vac- ing capabilities compare with uum cleaner,” opined one staffer those needed to satisfy future Interviews and Task Forces at a meeting, “it collects way too requirements for intelligence? much information.” “Which is to On 1 March 1995, the staff held say ‘NSA sucks,’” chimed in 4. To the extent that existing its first formal meeting, with another before the former NSA capabilities fall short, what Chairman Aspin presiding (and officers on the staff came to their changes—organizational, the only commissioner present). agency’s defense. During a ses- managerial, programmatic, After reviewing the origins of the sion early into the inquiry, the or budgetary—should be hybrid panel, he reprised the staff director evoked Warner’s made? good news/bad news remarks he chief objective for the commis- had made to RAND. His grey- sion: Moynihan’s call for the Finding answers to these ques- flecked eyes sparkling with intel- abolition of the CIA had to be tions became the staff’s abiding ligence, Aspin ended what had rebuffed. “Our goal is to sell interest, which, in turn, led them become a pep talk with the pre- intelligence,” Snider declared. to prepare long lists of special- diction that “we are going to “We have to establish a political ists inside and outside the learn a great deal as individuals consensus in the country favor- government who could help. The and do some good things.” ing intelligence.” staff also initiated requests to each of the intelligence agencies The staff director, L. Britt Snider, By the end of April, the staff had asking them to provide docu- announced that questions of conducted 66 interviews, mostly ments that explained their oversight—keeping the secret with intelligence officers, but also “baseline” activities and budgets. agencies accountable—were off with a wide range of policymak- And RAND forwarded the first of the table. That challenge would ers, academics, Hill staffers, and many “project memoranda” be left to others (presumably businesspeople (given the inter- designed to help the commission SSCI and HPSCI) to work out; est in economic intelligence that in its planning. This opening instead, the commission was had become a fashionable topic in memo suggested that the key going to concentrate on how to Washington). The staff recom- question the commission should improve intelligence gathering, mended to Aspin, and he agreed, keep coming back to as it worked analysis, and dissemination. that—instead of all the staff and through its agenda was “how to Turning to the anticipated sched- commissioners working on every- make intelligence both more use- ule, he said that for the rest of thing—the commission’s tasks be ful to customers, and more used the year the commission would distributed to 11 task forces: by them.” RAND also came go through a “discovery phase” quickly to the crux of the organi- that would include a series of • Collection Priorities zational dilemma facing the DCI. interviews, briefings, and formal “The current intelligence system hearings with experts. • Macro-Organizational Issues is organized and dominated by the owners of collection sys- Thus began a series of staff meet- • Military Intelligence tems,” noted the memorandum— ings, usually once a week, Restructuring “that is, by the suppliers.” Here occasionally with Aspin presid- were the gorillas in the stove- ing, but more often with Snider • Analysis and Production pipes undermining the more in charge. Now and then, RAND centralized coordination of intel- experts would sit in. In the • Programmatic Changes in ligence that President Harry S. absence of commissioners, the Imagery

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‘Major heart attack at the DOD!’ Aspin answered for • Programmatic Changes in Sig- business,” he said. “Our cus- nals Intelligence Studeman. tomer relations are terrible.”

• New Methods of Management Terrorism at Home •Budget Process In March, the president man- • International Issues aged to persuade John Deutch to of information, deep and wide. accept the DCI nomination after • Personnel Policies We receive thousands of intelli- all, with the hint that he might gence reports every day.” After be favorably considered as a can- • Cats and Dogs (a catchall the admiral had outlined the var- didate for secretary of defense including covert action and ious threats facing the United down the road. During his Sen- counterintelligence) States, Aspin opened the floor for ate confirmation hearings, questions. Deutch said that he would “move immediately to consolidate the The Briefings Begin “What if we placed the entire management of all imagery collection, analysis, and On 16 March, the commissioners intelligence budget under the distribution.” He intended to convened for a series of briefings control of the DCI?” former Dem- streamline the way in which the by a panel of intelligence officers ocratic House majority whip Tony United States used satellites to on the nuts-and-bolts of the spy Coelho (CA) asked. photograph intelligence targets, trade. After greeting the group, interpreted the pictures Aspin—a listener and a thinker “Major heart attack at the DOD!” (“images”), and disseminated the more than a talker—turned the Aspin answered for Studeman. information to policymakers. He meeting over to Rudman, the vice The biggest of all the gorillas— vowed as well to rid the CIA of chairman. A barrel-chested man the secretary of defense—would its old, cold warriors and change with an air of confident com- not passively accept a DCI’s the Agency “all the way down to mand honed as a battlefield encroachment on military intelli- the bare bones.” soldier in the Korean War, Rud- gence spending. The admiral man had gained some national smiled in recognition of the ten- If the commission and the public notice since retiring from the sion between the DCI and the needed any reminding of the Senate for his cochairmanship of secretary of defense. The DCI importance of intelligence, they the Concord Coalition, a group of had, in fact, only clear authority got it—tragically—on 19 April, private citizens interested in over the CIA and had to rely on when a truck filled with explo- trimming the federal budget. He the soft power of persuasion to sives blew up the federal building told the commission forcefully convince other agencies to follow in Oklahoma City. “I think we are that they needed first to estab- his lead. going to see more of this,” Stude- lish the “threshold questions.” man warned.13 Security Aspin nodded, “There are six to tightened around the White ten really critical questions. We The briefings spilled over into the House and the Executive Office need to talk those out.” next day when the commission Buildings, with the Secret Ser- convened again to hear from vice now inspecting each vehicle The commission welcomed its more intelligence managers, one entering underground parking first briefer. Adm. William Stude- of whom observed that the ties man, the deputy director of between intelligence officers and central intelligence and (for the policymakers were strained and 13 Craig Gilbert, "Expect More Terrorism," moment) acting DCI. He sometimes nonexistent. “If we Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 21 April described intelligence as a “river were a business, we’d be out of 1995: A12.

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‘Our mission is to explain to the and prohibiting any trucks or American people that stop that—and it has succeeded. vans from idling in front of the intelligence is Our mission is to explain to the buildings. Aspin asked a commis- important,’ said John American people that intelli- sion staffer to prepare a study on Warner. gence is important.” the US counterterrorism capabil- ity. “‘Aerial terrorism’ seems likely at some point,” a CIA coun- Deutch as DCI terterrorism specialist informed the aide—“filling an airplane DCI Gates. He reiterated the The following week, Aspin had with explosives and dive-bomb- theme that CIA was over- dinner with Deutch on the eve of ing a target.” American was still whelmed by all the intelligence his confirmation hearings, and six years away from comprehend- targets that had emerged since the DCI nominee, an old friend of ing the full implications of this the end of the Cold War. He rec- Aspin’s, asked for changes in the warning, and how the right kind ommended that the commission commission’s “scope paper” (now of passenger airplane—loaded establish a pared down list of in its third iteration). Deutch with highly volatile aviation intelligence priorities and pro- wanted the commission to focus fuel—would serve well enough as pose a method by which more on technical improvements a bomb. policymakers could communicate in intelligence gathering. Clearly, their needs to intelligence man- he intended to take an active role agers with greater clarity. He in intelligence reform and, draw- At the Farm urged, too, enhanced authority ing on his cordial ties with Aspin, was not going to be shy about try- for the DCI over communitywide To attempt some bonding of the ing to shape the commission’s budgets and personnel, in order diverse commissioners, Aspin recommendations. In private to overcome the centrifugal forces decided to have the panel escape asides during breaks in the com- in the Intelligence Community. the hectic pace of Washington for mission’s meetings over the next On his checklist were these addi- a couple of days. The retreat took month, some commissioners tional proposals: reduced place in early May at the CIA began to question what they redundancy among the eight mil- facility in Virginia known famil- feared was too close a relation- itary intelligence agencies; the iarly as “the Farm” and used ship between the DCI and Aspin. construction of better connec- chiefly as a training site. The The commission, they whis- tions among the “stovepipes” that atmosphere had the desired pered, had to ensure a proper the 13 agencies had become; con- effect. Open collars replaced balance between independence solidation of counterintelligence starched white shirts and ties, and cooperation in its dealings operations (Ames was the ghost and commissioners joked easily with the new intelligence in the room at many commission with one another. Almost all director. stayed for the full two days of meetings); and greater attention to reform within the Directorate briefings and discussions. On May 9, a couple of days after of Operations (DO). the Deutch dinner, Aspin showed The sessions began with a panel up late for a staff meeting. “I’m of “case officers,” the foot soldiers During Q and A, Warner took the not feeling well,” he mentioned to of the CIA who lived abroad and opportunity to underscore his an aide, a worrisome comment recruited indigenous spies. They philosophy about the commis- since Aspin had a long history of had a primary message: the CIA sion’s charge. “A few of us were heart problems (surgeons had was being asked to do too many desperately concerned that some- implanted a pacemaker in 1993). things. “Just say no!” seemed to one was going to go in and cut up But he was able to rally enough be the theme. The featured the intelligence budget,” he said. to listen attentively to the day’s speaker at the retreat was former “This commission was meant to witnesses. After their departure,

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he summarized for the staff his around the country, and was con- Rudman at the Rudder dinner conversation with Deutch tinuously on the telephone, and asked them to strengthen asking experts for their thoughts Despite the loss, the commission the technical side of the commis- on intelligence reform. He said had to move on. Rudman dropped sion’s scope paper, which would nothing more about feeling his other obligations for a while soon be distributed for comment unwell. Then, on the morning of and met with the staff leaders to to the White House, the intelli- keep the work on track. The 19 May he tried to rise from bed gence agencies, and congressional briefings were now turning officials. only to slump to the floor, the left toward the testimony of policy- side of his body paralyzed. Aspin makers—those on the receiving That same day, without dissent, had suffered a major stroke. Liv- end of intelligence. What were the Senate confirmed Deutch’s ing alone, he somehow managed their information needs? How appointment as DCI and he left to telephone for help and was well were they being served? the Pentagon to take up his post rushed by ambulance to the Rudman assumed the position of at CIA Headquarters, soon Georgetown University Medical acting chairman officially on dubbed “Deutchland” by insid- Center. He could still speak 1 June, beginning a commission ers. After a four-month quietus, lucidly when carried on a meeting with a moment of silence for Aspin. “There can be no bet- the Intelligence Community at stretcher into the hospital, and ter monument to Les than to last had a director again initially there was hope he would (although Adm. Studeman had move this work forward,” survive; but, later in the day, his filled in effectively). Deutch remarked Commissioner Coelho. brain began to swell and he fell immediately called a “Town Meeting,” and the CIA’s top brass into a coma. The next evening, The star witnesses for the day assembled in the 600-seat audito- death claimed the chairman at were Secretary of Defense Will- rium known as “the Bubble.” age 56. iam J. Perry and former national Reflecting his concentration on security adviser Lt. Gen. Brent technical issues at DOD, Deutch A cloud of despondency settled Scowcroft. Perry said that halt- spoke of “a new system for the over the commission staff. Aspin ing the proliferation of nuclear management of both our mili- and other weapons of mass had been the primary source of tary and intelligence satellite destruction had become the fore- energy and direction for the acquisition systems.” He pre- most intelligence and defense dicted that “there would be no inquiry, and, while his haphaz- priority for the United States. He seam, in my view, between our ard administrative style could be dwelled on the need for better efforts and the efforts of the vexing at times, he had a HUMINT (“We focused too much [Aspin] commission...I don’t warmth, intellect, and knowl- on the Soviet Union, at the regard them as a problem; I edge about national security expense of places like Iraq, Iran, regard them as an opportunity— affairs that had won over the and North Korea”), and for bet- as a help.” staff’s respect and devotion. ter all-source coordination of There was a feeling of great loss. intelligence gathering and analy- Senator Rudman took over as sis (“Nothing exists to bring it all The Loss of a Chairman together”). Many a witness interim chairman while the lamented the woeful state of White House considered Aspin’s Between commission meetings, HUMINT, especially the lack of Aspin attended plays at the replacement. Rudman met with precise tasking (that is, carefully Kennedy Center and profes- the staff on 22 May and assured focused requests for information) sional basketball games, played them the commission would “con- from policymakers and the tennis once or twice a week, tinue on the same path that absence of good foreign language spoke at forums in DC and Chairman Aspin laid out.” skills among case officers and

10 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 Earlier Panel on Intelligence

Joe Nye . . . informed the commission that, despite his interest in analysts. “We only have 26 Farsi would continue to meet with speakers in the Intelligence Com- intelligence, he rarely experts periodically, but most of munity right now,” a retired had more than 40 its attention was now concen- military intelligence manager minutes to read each trated on report writing and informed the commission, “and day and only five interactions with commissioners only three are able to under- minutes or so for to make sure their views were stand excited Muslims talking to intelligence reports. well reflected in the drafts. each other.” Rudman played an important Scowcroft criticized the imbal- role during June in “working the ance in intelligence spending Hill,” meeting with key legisla- that favored the military. “Now tors (particularly on SSCI and political intelligence is more all around the world, and spy sat- HPSCI) to keep them informed of important,” he argued. “What ellites crisscrossing the heavens the commission’s progress. His makes North Korea tick? What to provide information to Nye (an busy law practice prevented him about the leaders of Iran?” Com- avid reader) and policymakers from giving the commission the missioner Zoe Baird asked like him, he had only a few min- steady attention that Aspin had Scowcroft how it was that some utes to look at the intelligence invested, however, and it was commissions succeeded and some product each day! It was sober- clear a more fully engaged chair- failed. “It depends on the subject ing testimony. Nye also man was desperately needed. Yet and the circumstances,” he complained that he got “a lot of the White House had failed to replied. “President Reagan and information, but not a lot of come up with a replacement for the Congress were at logger- insight” from the intelligence Aspin. For a month, from mid- heads over the Commission on reports he received. June to mid-July, the commis- Strategic Forces in 1983. It went sion had little direction from the nowhere. There was another com- By mid-June, the commission top. mission on defense management had brought its discovery phase during the Reagan years that to an end and had entered a During a brief burst of interest in attracted little public interest, phase of analysis—trying to fig- the subject of intelligence, on 13 because the subject didn’t seem ure out what all the information July the White House picked a that urgent. Your commission it had gathered meant in terms replacement for Aspin: Harold suffers from that same lack of of possible reforms. This Brown, secretary of defense dur- interest.” Still, Scowcroft viewed endeavor would last through the ing the Carter administration. the Aspin inquiry as an “unusual summer. The centerpiece for The next day Clinton made a opportunity” to sit down with the moving the work forward was the rare presidential visit to CIA DCI and focus on his problems. task force. More motivated com- Headquarters. Under a sizzling missioners attended task force noon-day sun, he stood between Joseph S. Nye Jr., the thoughtful meetings of interest to them and Deutch and the First Lady on a assistant secretary of defense, some asked for the creation of platform set up in the courtyard followed Scowcroft on the agenda additional task forces, including in front of the Original Head- and informed the commission one on intelligence and law quarters Building and addressed that, despite his interest in intel- enforcement (of special interest the Agency’s VIPs. As if written ligence, he rarely had more than to Baird). The staff decided to by Senator Warner, the speech 40 minutes to read each day prepare special “options papers” was a rallying cry to boost morale (between meetings) and only five as well, so the commissioners among intelligence officers, still minutes or so for intelligence could select which of several pos- reeling from the Ames spy case. reports. With a reported annual sible reform directions they The president reminded the audi- budget near $30 billion, agents would like to pursue. The staff ence that Ames’s deceit was a

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 11 Earlier Panel on Intelligence

ics. Brown needed only to preside, give authoritative backup for staff decisions, and, above all, pull the report together by March and sell it to Congress. Yet, clearly he intended to preside with a strong hand—at least when he was around. It soon became clear that Brown would not match Aspin’s steady presence. Aspin had thrived on the work of the commission; here was the joy of high policy—and a chance to win back his good reputation, sullied by Somalia and his forced resignation. In contrast, the Washington rumor mill sug- Commission at work under Chairman Brown. (Photo: Studies in Intelligence) gested that DCI Deutch had twisted Brown’s arm to take the “terrible exception to a proud tra- and the panel soon found itself job. The commission had inher- dition of service” at the CIA. under quite a different style of ited a forceful, yet reluctant, “Every morning I start my day leadership than Aspin’s. chairman, whose hectic consult- with an intelligence report,” he ing schedule would keep him said, adding a further reassur- Brown wasted no time in estab- away from the nation’s capital ance: “I believe that making deep lishing a commanding presence. most of the time, including the cuts in intelligence in peacetime While Aspin had been informal entire month of November. is comparable to canceling your and casual, with his tie askew health insurance when you’re and his body hunched over the A Second Retreat. Before feeling fine.” table, Brown sported cufflinks Brown arrived, Rudman and the and a tie pin, and sat erect. staff had already decided to hold Aspin was soft-spoken and con- another retreat to corral the com- Brown Takes Over tent to let others talk; Brown had missioners for an intensive a persuasive, even intimidating, workshop on the composition of In addition to his service as sec- way of expressing himself and the final report, especially retary of defense, Harold Brown soon began to dominate commis- regarding the recommendations had been director of defense sion meetings (see Figure 1). the commissioners wanted to research and engineering in the Aspin was exceptionally smart, make. “This retreat will proba- Pentagon during 1961–65 and but Brown had a reputation for bly be our most important president of the California Insti- brilliance—perhaps the bright- meeting,” Rudman told the staff. tute of Technology during 1969– est of all the secretaries of Then, near the end of the com- 77. Like Deutch (who had recom- defense—with a flypaper mem- mission’s inquiry, would come one mended him to the White House), ory for facts and figures. day of public hearings. “Les he was a bona fide “techie” with a wanted the public to have a strong interest in intelligence For the most part, though, it was chance to be heard and I agree,” “hardware,” from surveillance business as usual on the commis- Rudman said to the staff before satellites to reconnaissance air- sion. Most of its schedule had Brown took over. “Besides,” he craft. He held the commission already been worked out under noted, “this will be a self-protec- gavel for the first time on 14 July, Aspin, as had the task force top- tive exercise.” That is, the

12 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 Earlier Panel on Intelligence

commission would be able to claim a certain degree of open- Commission Member Participation (U) ness to outside views—an opportunity to offer symbolic Number of comments and questions reassurance to the public (a com- 350 mon role of commissions) that the intelligence agencies were 300 Aspin back on track. Brown Rudman 250 Commission Average Ironically, in August just before the retreat and long into its life, 200 the commission finally addressed one of the major drivers of its cre- 150 ation: the Ames affair. A CIA officer who had helped crack the 100 case warned commissioners that “we’re never going to stop people 50 from ‘volunteering’ [i.e., spying for the enemy]. We just have to 0 learn how to catch them earlier, Feb Apr Jun Aug Oct Dec Feb 1995 1996 and to encourage people to report Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan on those engaged in suspicious activities.” DI/MPG Design Center 395657AI 7-04

In September, the commission convened for the retreat at a con- putting up something that is techie commissioner who balked ference center in Leesburg, going to go nowhere.” at lumping together photo- Virginia, near Dulles Airport. graphic intelligence with tele- The staff realized they were The commissioners went in a phone intercepts. One thing was unlikely to gain a consensus dozen different directions, spend- certain: with three commission- around every issue, but the ses- ing most of the first morning on a ers on the panel and two senior sions would provide them with a topic that was not even on the staffers on the commission, the valuable sense of where the com- main agenda: economic intelli- NSA was unlikely to lose its con- missioners stood. For two days, gence, weighing whether the CIA trol over signals intelligence. the staff presented options to the should spy on behalf of US busi- Discussion of the intelligence commissioners (sans Warner and ness (with widespread opposition budget also produced sparks, Senator James J. Exon [D-NE]) to the idea). Covert action—from with different factions in favor of and received a good reading on propaganda to paramilitary oper- downsizing, increasing, or hold- what topics and recommenda- ations—caused the most ing spending exactly where it tions they wanted to include in fireworks, with little consensus was. Brown grew fidgety during the final report. No votes were for or against. “It’s a dirty diaper these clashes, his right fist dou- taken; the idea was to identify pail,” a commissioner concluded. bled and pumping up and down worthy recommendations Disputatious, too, was an idea on the arm of his chair. through discussion. “We should floated to consolidate all techni- say the honest thing,” Rudman cal intelligence under one “We are in danger of becoming a said, “not pull any punches. But command. “Wait, IMINT is differ- status quo commission,” Coelho let’s also be realistic. No sense ent from SIGINT!” objected a warned.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 13 Earlier Panel on Intelligence

[Moynihan] singled out ‘analysis’ for “We will have some changes.” special criticism, funding, misleading the Con- Brown replied, with an edge to complaining that gress on how its money was being his voice. the process had ‘too spent.14 much bureaucratic “According to whom? The DCI? layering.’ Also in October, Brown and Rud- The SecDef?” man visited Congress to bring key legislators up-to-date—an The chairman’s jaw hardened. unsubtle form of lobbying—and “Let’s put this discussion off to to solicit their opinions. Brown later.” defense how to run his shop; so told the lawmakers that the com- as a member of the club, I’m of mission would make four or five On the last day of the retreat, two minds about that.... I would significant recommendations, Brown reviewed the topics the not want to write this into legis- related to the DCI’s authority, commission had decided were lation, but,” he added lamely, law enforcement, satellites, per- most important. The list “rather urge the secretary of sonnel, and military intelligence. included: economic intelligence; defense to make those changes.” “By significant, I refer to the the relationship between law number of persons who will be enforcement and national secu- “I think we’ve made a very upset,” he joked: “the more out- rity; covert action; whether the important start,” Rudman con- cry, the more significant the office of DCI should be strength- cluded at the end of the fourth recommendation.” The lawmak- ened; whether to consolidate the day, “but there is a lot more to be ers kept their cards close to their military intelligence agencies; done.” vests, although HPSCI Chair- personnel issues; improving the man Combest said he would not management of space surveil- Preparing the Final Report. release his “IC21” report until lance (Deutch’s pet project); The glamorous activities were April 1996 (a month after the whether to declassify the aggre- now over; no more government planned publication of the com- gate annual intelligence budget celebrities visiting the premises, mission’s report). Senator figure; whether to trim the bud- no more retreats, no more for- Moynihan was as feisty as ever get; whether policy departments eign trips (commissioners and and, while he backed away from and agencies that wanted intelli- staff had traveled to consult his earlier public statement that gence should be charged a fee by intelligence services in Europe, the CIA should be dismantled, he the DCI; oversight (revived as a Israel, Canada, Australia, and offered a spate of reform propos- commission subject, at the insis- the Far East). Now it was time als. He singled out “analysis” for tence of Representative Porter for the staff to prepare the final special criticism, complaining Goss [R-FL]); counterintelligence report, in continual dialogue with that the process had “too much (the Ames problem); and the those commissioners who had bureaucratic layering.” state of HUMINT. Commissioner shown an interest in specific top- Paul Wolfowitz saw these last ics. In October, the staff huddled To satisfy the staff’s ongoing two issues as “the most spectacu- with clusters of commissioners in quest for directions on how com- lar failures going into this the conference room, trying to missioners wanted the report inquiry.” hammer out exactly what lan- written, the commission assem- guage and recommendations the bled once a month during the Brown was leery of trying to pass members desired. Goss’s concern winter to hear staff briefings on a new law to increase the DCI’s about oversight received added authority at the expense of the attention when newspaper 800-pound gorilla in the Penta- reports revealed that the 14 Robert Pear, “Disclosure of Spy Agency’s gon: the secretary of defense. “It National Reconnaissance Office $1.5 Billion Fund,” New York Times, is really telling the secretary of had played shell games with its 25 September1995: A12.

14 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 Earlier Panel on Intelligence

specific topics. Only the techies— clear that the Dicks-Goss faction was prepared, though—however plus Democratic fundraiser and had the votes on the commission reluctantly—to allow disclosure now commissioner Stephen if it came to a formal division, of the aggregate intelligence- Friedman, who had begun to dis- including most importantly spending figure, but without fur- play a voracious interest in all Chairman Brown’s. Gen. Allen ther budget details. Several of topics before the commission— eventually threw in the towel: “If the commissioners thought the showed up for the technical brief- I can’t convince you to save staff language in the report was ings, like one on the possible money, then, okay, I’ll go along.” too critical of the intelligence consolidation of imagery opera- agencies. “Remember the under- tions. More understandable and These meetings made it clear lying reason for the commission,” sexier subjects, such as covert that on a good many issues the Warner stressed: “to restore con- action, drew larger crowds of staff would face challenges try- fidence in intelligence.” Goss commissioners. At one session, in ing to find common ground agreed: “We shouldn’t paint such an uncommon conservative-lib- among commissioners for the a black picture. I’m not trying to eral alliance, Goss emphasized, final report. Moreover, when the whitewash, but let’s tone this seconded by former Senator report was finished, the commis- down.” Wyche Fowler (D-GA), that “We sioners would need to build a need strong language on over- consensus outside the panel. “We The commissioners often got sight.” “We haven’t spent enough have to sell this report to the sidetracked, at one point spend- time on counterintelligence,” public and the media,” Rudman ing 20 minutes on how to define Friedman complained, as around reminded his colleagues in intelligence. A senior staffer and around the table flew a bevy December. “And to the DCI,” whispered to a colleague: “This of policy pleas, caveats, and Dicks added. declarations. will be like drafting a National Intelligence Estimate: we’ll get In the midst of partisan wars the lowest common denomina- At another session the prickly that had broken out in the tor.” The wide range of views on issue of budget cuts came up nation’s capital—this was the the commission and the hope for again. Representative Norman D. autumn in which the president consensus did seem to have the Dicks (D-WA) and Goss opposed closed down federal agencies and effect of blurring important the 15 percent spending reduc- departments in a budget feud issues—a common criticism of tion over 10 years recommended with House Speaker Newt Ging- commissions.15 “This will be by a commission subcommittee rich (R-GA)—the commission viewed as an extraordinary apo- led by former NSA director Gen. staff continued to polish drafts of logia for the Intelligence Lew Allen. “We ought to stabilize the final report. Then, on 18 Jan- Community,” Fowler cautioned, intelligence, not cut it,” argued uary 1996, the panel convened to Dicks, who represented a district prepare for its public hearing the drawing grimaces from Goss and in the state of Washington where next day. The commissioners Warner. “We don’t say enough spy satellites were built. “That went through the report chapter about counterintelligence,” kind of cut wouldn’t muster 100 by chapter. Warner opposed per- Fowler continued. “What about votes on the Hill.” Coelho and sonnel downsizing, since the covert action? What about envi- Fowler countered that the com- CIA’s “morale is very low,” he ronmental intelligence? And the mission should do what is right, warned. He also advised the com- stuff on economic intelligence not what might be politically pal- mission to drop most of the strains credulity.” atable; cuts were the right thing language about enhancing the to do, since (in Fowler’s words) intelligence role of the United 15 Joseph A. Pika, John A. Maltese, Nor- “appetites [for more money] are Nations, a “hot button” issue man C. Thomas, The Politics of the Presi- insatiable...the public expects that, in his opinion, would dis- dency, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, savings.” The debate made it credit the report on the Hill. He 2002).

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 15 Earlier Panel on Intelligence

Other commissioners advanced their favorite proposals, “We’ve got to move along,” Brown The commission’s last meeting to insisted. “I plead for self- most of which Brown gather testimony took place on 2 restraint,” Rudman seconded. dismissed brusquely. February, with only a single wit- “We’d all write this differently.” ness: DCI Deutch, who was being given an opportunity to present “Yes, but we need to be comfort- his own reform plans, many of able with this report if our names forces pulling in opposite direc- which paralleled those of the are going to be on it,” retorted tions seemed to leave the commission. After his departure, Coelho. commission stuck in the middle the commissioners returned to with the status quo. One of the their discussion of the final Nerves frayed, the commission- few budget matters most commis- report. Brown sarcastically punc- ers took a break. When they sioners could agree on was the tured the idea of increased returned, Friedman raised the release of the aggregate annual funding for environmental intelli- subject of consumer-producer budget figure. “Nothing will give gence, an idea advanced by relationships. “There seems to be us more credibility than releas- Fowler. “While there are hard a high correlation between con- ing the top figure,” said Rudman. targets [dangerous states and sumer satisfaction [with intelli- “We’ll look silly if we don’t,” terrorist groups],” he scoffed, “we gence] and a close personal rela- Brown agreed. should spend time on the tionship between intelligence environment?” officers and policymakers,” he By the time the commissioners observed. The implication was had worked their way through Moving through each chapter, that the commission needed to the full draft, they looked commissioners commented as find ways to get the two groups to exhausted. “My head is explod- they saw fit. If their suggestions interact more frequently. Other ing,” Fowler commented to a perked interest from other mem- commissioners advanced their staffer on the way out of the con- bers, discussion led to changes in favorite proposals, most of which ference room. “These people [the wording, unless Brown or Rud- Brown dismissed brusquely. commissioners] don’t understand man expressed opposition—the These included Fowler’s ideas for that the press and the public are kiss of death. Late in the after- more extensive economic intelli- going to be interested mainly in noon, Brown called for a formal gence gathering, as well as accountability, covert action, and vote on the report. There were no tighter restrictions over paramili- counterintelligence, not dry, ster- dissenters. The smiles on the tary action. ile treatises on bureaucratic faces of staffers lit up the confer- changes—moving boxes from ence room. The budget received the most here to there.” His face was a por- attention. “We better try to cut trait of dismay. The Commission Reports. 5 percent if we are going to have After several more weeks of fine- any credibility—except with the The next day, the commission tuning, with drafts sent out to defense contractors,” Rudman held its only public session in a commissioners for comments, the suggested. Goss was not con- grand Senate hearing room. One report was ready for printing in vinced. “It’s more difficult to of the witnesses, Assistant Secre- mid-February. Though some were track a bunch of snakes [emerg- tary Nye, repeated his realistic unhappy with the compromises ing world threats] than one impressions of life as a harried that had been made, each com- dragon [the Soviet Union during intelligence consumer; and Rich- missioner signed the report and, the Cold War],” he said, para- ard N. Haass, with the Council on the morning of 1 March, gath- phrasing a metaphor made on Foreign Relations, reviewed ered in the Oval Office to brief popular by Woolsey. “Therefore, the findings of his study group on the president. Even Senator we need more money for intelli- intelligence, emphasizing the Exon—normally AWOL—miracu- gence, not less.” Once again, need to create a stronger DCI. lously appeared for the occasion.

16 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 Earlier Panel on Intelligence

When it came to the powers of the DCI, In an amusing denouement to Brown had cope with the fragmentation of the commission’s many months of successfully blocked the Intelligence Community. In labor, the president turned to any effort to turn the this same spirit, the commission Exon and asked about the report DCI into an 800-pound recommended that the DCI be and how it was likely to play on given a little more say over who Capitol Hill. The senator came gorilla. would be appointed to head each up with a vague reply that may of the dozen other intelligence have puzzled the president, but agencies beyond the CIA (led by was not unexpected among those the DCI), but only in concur- who knew he had skipped almost sumers, notably by creating rence with—that is, with the every panel meeting. The presi- better liaison ties between policy- possible veto of—the relevant dent, who had arrived 45 makers and intelligence officers. cabinet secretary, in contrast to minutes late, quickly departed, In addition, the commissioners the DCI having the final say over leaving Vice President Gore to advocated the creation of a For- the selections. Nor would the DCI hear the full briefing. eign Intelligence Committee have final say over the budgets within the framework of the for each of the intelligence agen- Later that day, the 200-page National Security Council (NSC), cies. Some Director of Central report—dedicated to Les Aspin to highlight targeting priorities Intelligence! and to intelligence officers who for the president and to review had given their lives in the ser- the propriety of intelligence ties Brown spoke of the personnel vice of their country—was ready to particularly unsavory foreign changes the commission had in for release to the public.16 At a agents; and another NSC com- mind, whereby the secretary of press conference, attended by 11 mittee to review disputes defense and the DCI would be commissioners but dominated by between the DCI and law given a brief period of time to Brown, the chairman summed up enforcement officials over the weed out people through gener- the main recommendations. The best way to share the handling of ous retirement benefits. As panel had looked at some radical individuals suspected of endan- Brown would explain to the proposals, he noted, like taking gering the nation’s security—all American Bar Association later the DO out of the CIA, engaging efforts to seek ways through the in the month, this proposal could in industrial espionage, making often tangled lines of existing be “the toughest one of all to get the DCI an intelligence czar, or bureaucracy. through, because people don’t putting all of intelligence in like their rice bowls cracked.” DOD; but, he concluded, “we When it came to the powers of Brown referred to some technical decided that whatever their vir- the DCI, Brown had successfully reforms as well, including a mea- tues, the deficiencies of the blocked any effort to turn the sure to sell spy satellites to proposals were greater.” DCI into an 800-pound gorilla friendly nations with an arrange- capable of standing up to the sec- ment to share the product. His checklist of reforms the com- retary of defense. Instead, the mission had embraced featured commission proposed creation of As for saving money, the commis- steps to make the intelligence special intelligence deputies to sion took the easy way out, agencies more responsive to con- assist the DCI—a modest suggesting that Congress and the attempt to offset the strong cen- executive branch should think of trifugal forces in the Intelligence ways to trim overlap and waste— 16 Commission on the Roles and Capabili- Community and to provide a as if that responsibility had not ties of the United States Intelligence Com- modicum of symbolic reassur- been part of the commission’s munity, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (Washing- ance to reformers that at least charge in the first place. The ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, something was being done to help commission leaders gave a nod to 1996). the nation’s intelligence chief the need for better oversight,

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 17 Earlier Panel on Intelligence

and, introducing the proposal Rudman’s hopeful handwritten gence and counterterrorism meant to be the climax of the inscription on HSPCI Chairman received little attention; the lim- press conference, they endorsed Combest’s copy of the report: its of covert action were never release of the aggregate budget “Get it done!” In the Intelligence defined; the weaknesses in figure. After all, Brown Authorization Act for FY 1997, accountability went largely unad- explained, as he glanced wryly lawmakers granted the DCI his dressed; and the DCI’s powers around the assembled press new deputies, but their roles remained stunted. It would take corps, “you’ve got to throw meat have remained limited. The act the tragic events of 11 Septem- to the lions every once in a also provided the DCI’s Commu- ber 2001 to bring about stronger while—otherwise, they’ll eat nity Management Staff with a demands for intelligence reform. people.” larger staff and more funding; however, the Pentagon, along Conclusion Public Reaction. with the Senate and House The editors of the New York Armed Services Committees, ganged up to halt more serious Notwithstanding its negligible Times quickly dismissed the immediate effects on the Intelli- “anodyne” report for its lack of measures to give the DCI real muscle, such as transferring the gence Community, the “imagination and courage.” The commission did lead to tangible commission had displayed the DOD’s HUMINT assets to the CIA. Even DCI Deutch, now eye- results. Presidential commis- “the spine of a rag doll,” accord- sions have a multiplicity of ing to the newspaper, by leaving ing the top Pentagon office himself, backed away from the functions. Traditionally, they “a flawed system essentially offer symbolic reassurance, pro- 17 idea of giving too many powers to intact.” Intelligence officers vide information to shape policy, interviewed by the Times said the DCI, powers he might later want to have for himself. educate experts and the general the report was “underwhelm- public, and allow delay—a “cool- 18 ing.” Nor were intelligence ing-off” period—as a problem is Dispirited, Deutch left the CIA in scholars impressed; the report further studied.22 While the offered only limited insight or December 1996, observing that Somali disaster had prompted reform, according to the widely the DCI position had been so Aspin’s interest in an intelli- shared assessment. One critic frustrating that he should have gence inquiry, most members of berated the commission for argu- followed his initial instinct not to the commission initially were 20 ing “that we need everything and be “pushed into” the job. He fell concerned chiefly with the Ames since everything is expensive, we short in his bid to become secre- case and—in light of Moynihan’s need to spend just as much as tary of defense, having alienated widely reported attack against 19 before.” the White House over a public the CIA for failing to predict the disagreement about the effects of fall of the USSR—with providing Nor did these limited reforms Clinton’s policies toward Iraq. legitimacy to the intelligence travel far in the hurly-burly poli- mission. The commission’s final tics of Washington, despite The Intelligence Community was, report reassured the public on in sum, largely unaffected by the Aspin-Brown inquiry—or, for 17 New York Times, “Spy Pablum,” 2 March that matter, the similar reform 21 Abraham H. Miller and Brian Alex- 1996: E14. proposals of “IC21.”21 The Intelli- ander, “Structural Quiescence in the Fail- 18 Tim Weiner, “Presidential Commission gence Community’s budget ure of IC21 and Intelligence Reform,” Recommends Shrinking Intelligence International Journal of Intelligence and Agencies,” New York Times, 1 March 1996: remained intact; counterintelli- Counterintelligence 14 (Summer 2001): A17. 234–61. 19 John Prados, “No Reform Here,” Bulletin 22 David Flitner Jr., The Politics of Presi- of the Atomic Scientist (September/October 20 R. Jeffrey Smith, “The CIA,” Washington dential Commissions (Dobbs Ferry, NY: 1996): 56. Post, 26 December 1996: 11. Transnational, 1986).

18 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 Earlier Panel on Intelligence

The commission also shaped intelligence both counts, recommending policy by publicizing final report; and scholars were closer attention to counterintelli- and giving legitimacy handed an important archive in a gence and extolling the to the idea of field where data are difficult to importance of the nation’s intelli- strengthening the acquire. gence agencies. Warner had DCI’s authority. achieved his original goal: lifting The goal of delaying decisions the CIA’s sagging reputation in about intelligence was a factor, the wake of Ames’s treason and too. A senior staffer on the com- Moynihan’s perorations. mission remarked to a colleague helped intelligence managers midway through the investiga- The commission also shaped understand and address weak- tion that the Aspin-Brown panel intelligence policy to some mod- nesses in their operations. was all about “gaining time.” est extent by publicizing and While the Clinton administra- giving legitimacy to the idea of Certainly the commission helped tion searched for a new DCI, strengthening the DCI’s author- educate experts and the public considered how to prevent ity, a notion that began to gain alike on intelligence issues, even another Ames, and tried to head currency in reform circles despite if the Times and other critics off Moynihan’s calls for shutting ongoing objections from the Pen- remained unimpressed. The down the CIA, the creation of a tagon. In 2002, following the 9/11 serious debates held by the com- commission gave the public a attacks, a special PFIAB task mission allowed members and sense that something was being force on intelligence created to staff to learn more about the done about these issues. “The advise President George W. Bush intricacies of intelligence. In this irresponsible cries for cuts in (led by Brent Scowcroft) adopted sense, the commission served as intelligence have faded,” Senator this view, and creation of a cabi- an advanced leadership training Warner observed happily at a net-level director of national ground for participants. When commission meeting just before intelligence is the center piece of Fowler became US ambassador to release of the final report. As he intelligence reform in the Kean Saudi Arabia soon after the rose to leave for another appoint- commission report released in inquiry, his expanded knowledge ment, he turned to Brown, July 2004. of intelligence proved useful. This smiled, and said, “The commis- was true, as well, for Dicks and sion has fulfilled the original And while many of the commis- Goss in their intelligence over- objective; I commend you.” sion’s reform proposals sight duties in HPSCI (whose languished, some did become pol- chairmanship Goss assumed in It should be emphasized, too, icy. For example, Deutch’s 1997). Wolfowitz became deputy that the DCI and the intelli- replacement as DCI, George J. secretary of defense in 2001; gence agencies were hardly Tenet, announced the aggregate David H. Dewhurst, the head of passive players before, during, or intelligence budget figure for the Texas Office of Homeland after the commission’s existence. 1998: $26.6 billion (although he Security in 2002; and staff direc- The first post–Cold War DCI, stopped making annual disclo- tor Snider, the CIA’s inspector Robert Gates, as early as 1991, sures in subsequent years). general—all better in their jobs had already made dramatic Moreover, as proposed by the (and perhaps helped into those changes in the orientation of the commission, the intelligence jobs) by their experience on the CIA by shifting resources away agencies carried out long over- commission. Further, largely from Russia as a target and due personnel decisions to through media reprises, the pub- toward new threats—especially downsize staffs. Even when for- lic acquired a better compre- global weapons proliferation. mal policy change was not the hension of intelligence organiza- Similarly, the NSA director took end result, the commission’s tions, budgets, and activities, as steps to prepare his agency for highlighting of the key issues presented in the commission’s changes in technology affecting

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 19 Earlier Panel on Intelligence

...this case study stands as a reminder of electronic surveillance (notably the limitations of ing). Still, the commission did the trend toward the use of fiber- commissions as shift the debate among national optic transmissions); the CIA’s instruments of policy security experts toward consider- Counterintelligence Staff adopted change. . . ing that point-of-view more important reforms to lessen the seriously. The groundwork done likelihood of another Ames; by the Aspin-Brown commission, Deutch pursued his consolida- along with the terrorist attacks of tion of space surveillance; and recommendations (as did the 9/11, made it more palatable for Tenet moved to expand the members of the Armed Services PFIAB under Scowcroft’s leader- nation’s HUMINT capabilities in Committees, who supported the ship in 2002 and the Kean panel regions of the world largely secretary of defense’s position in 2004 to advance the cause of a ignored during the Cold War. against augmenting the DCI’s stronger DCI and a more cohe- authority). sive Intelligence Community. Yet, DCIs found change difficult President Truman’s elusive goal in some areas and this case study Overcoming the fragmentation of of a genuinely central intelli- stands as a reminder of the limi- the Intelligence Community gence is, thus, nearer at hand tations of commissions as posed the greatest challenge to than ever before and the commis- instruments of policy change, the Aspin-Brown commission. It sion deserves a place alongside especially in a political system fell short of achieving the all- other key moments in the mod- characterized by the sharing of source integration of intelligence ern history of US intelligence power among institutions and that some reformers, on and off from the creation of the Intelli- the existence of well-placed the commission, hoped to see gence Community in 1947 to the defenders of the status quo who (and that might have prevented just-concluded work of the Kean are able to thwart unwelcome the 9/11 attacks from succeed- commission.

LITERATURE ON US COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

For more on the work of US government-sponsored commissions, see the following:

W. Craig Bledsoe, “Presidential commissions,” in Michael Nelson, ed., Guide to the Presidency, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1996): 1253-67.

Thomas E. Cronin and Sanford D. Greenberg, The Presidential Advisory System (New York: Harper&Row, 1969).

David J. Flitner, The Politics of Presidential Commissions (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y: Transnational, 1986).

Morton H. Halperin, “The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process,” World Politics 13 (April 1961): 360-84.

Joseph A. Pika, John Anthony Maltese, and Norman C. Thomas, The Politics of the Presidency, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002).

Frank Popper, The President’s Commissions (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1970).

Thomas R. Wolanin, Presidential Advisory Commissions (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995).

For a contemporaneous perspective on the Aspin-Brown commission from other commission staff members, see:

“A Roundtable Discussion: The Brown Commission and the Future of Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence 39, no. 5 (1996-Annual Unclassified Edition): 1–9.

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