208 TOPICOS arabe y judia (especialmente Galileo Galilei y Juan de Santo Maimonides y Averroes) como Tomas entre otros autores. un reconocimiento del valor de En definitiva, solo nos queda esta filosofia de cara a la cons- agradecer al profesor Saranyana titucion del patrimonio filosofi- esta nueva edicion de un manual co medieval, Asimismo, se trata que, gracias a las nuevas correc- mas detenidamente la incipiente ciones y actualizaciones realiza- filosofia renacentista (Erasmo de das servira sin duda para seguir Rotterdam, Luis Vives, Tomas conociendo cada vez mejor las Moro, Francisco de Vitoria) raices medievales del pensa- destacando xm extenso epigrafe miento moderno, nuevo centrado a la figura de Domingo de Soto, haciendo Jose Angel Garcia Cuadrado justicia a sus aportaciones en el Universidad de Navarra campo de la logica siendo ade- mas uno de los precursores de la J. B. SCHNEEWIND: The In- ciencia modema, Es preciso vention of Autonomy: A His- destacar tambien, como noveda- tory of Modern Moral Philoso- des significativas, los paragrafos phy, Cambridge: Cambridge dedicados a algunas escritoras University Press 1998, 624 pp. medievales del siglo XII y XIII surgidas en los ambitos cultura- The Invention of Autonomy is les centroeuropeos, a superb book. The main goal of Por lo demas, el ultimo capi- Schneewind's systematic re- tulo, que lleva por titulo "La constmction of the history of Filosofia renacentista en vispe- moral philosophy firom Aquinas ras de la Revolucion modema", to Kant is to distinguish two es totalmente nuevo y nos tras- rival understandings of morality lada a la conjuncion de la filoso- —morality as obedience versus fia renacentista con la filosofia morality as self-govemance— moderna: alli se encuentran tra- and to chronicle the emergence tados los grandes teologos y of the latter conception, which filosofos del Barroco espanol, culminates in Kant's "invention" como Luis de Molina, Domingo of autonomy. As we travel the Bafiez y Francisco Suarez; se long road leading from the anaden tambien unos breves Summa Theologiae to the apuntes sobre Miguel Bayo, Groundwork for the Metaphy- sics of Morals, we are introdu- RESENAS 209

ced to a staggeringly large cast century theorist of natural law; of characters, some of whom are the second, the gradual triumph household names, most of whom of volimtarism over intellectua- are recognizable but considera- lism. bly less well-known, and a few The Grotian problematic starts of whom are positively obscure. off from the frank acknowle- All in all, more than forty thin- dgement that there is an endu- kers —everyone from Duns ring tension between two facets Scotus to the Marquis de Sade— of human nature: our deeply find a place in Schneewind's rooted selfishness, on the one pages. hand, and, on the other, our need Given its ambitious scope, it of society. According to Grotius, might well be wondered how we can resolve this conflict such a book could avoid being between egoism and sociability chaotically eclectic and appa- by following natural law, whose llingly superficial. However, prescriptions (i) are not innate or there are no worries on that sco- a priori, but empirically disco- re here: we are in the hands of a verable; and (ii) are .not to be master with a gift for lucid and derived from a substantive con- disciplined exposition. The book ception of the highest good. falls neatly into four sections, in Schneewind uses the framework which a coherent and highly of the Grotian problematic to unified narrative slowly unfolds. illuminate the writings of some Part I deals with natural law key figures in the modern natu- theories; Part II, with perfectio- ral law tradition (Suarez, nism; Part III, with the attempt Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke), to secure morality's indepen- as well as some dissenters and dence from revealed religion; sceptics (Machiavelli and Mon- and Part IV, with Kant and his taigne). immediate predecessors. Let us The second thread running now look briefly at each of these through Part I is the conflict sections. between intellectualism and Part I ("The Rise and Fall of voluntarism. According to inte- Modem Natural Law") centers llectualism, morality is not around two topics. The first is created by, or dependent upon, the so-called "Grotian proble- God; on the contrary, God is matic", named after Hugo Gro- bound to acknowledge moral tius, the influential seventeenth norms or standards that possess 210 T6PIC0S validity independently of His matic. Perfectionists understood will. According to volimtarism, our predicament quite diffe- however, God created morality rently, however. Instead of and imposed it "by an arbitrary viewing the central problems of fiat of his will" (p, 8), morality as resulting ftom civil Schneewind perceptively exa- strife a la Grotius, they were mines how the intellectualist inclined to see the root of the account of natural law defended problem as epistemological, by Aquinas gradually lost inasmuch as they insisted that ground to different versions of "ignorance and error resulting voluntarism (whose diverse from failure to use our reason array of defenders included properly are what stand between Scotus, Ockham, Luther, Calvin, us and a life of harmony and and Pufendorf), Voluntarism's virtue" (p, 169), Furthermore, defenders carried the day by whereas natural law theorists arguing that only their doctrine directed their attention to resol- was capable of preserving God's ving problems in the community omnipotence, since it imposed at large, perfectionists tended to no limitations or restrictions on focus on how an individual mo- the divine will. The result was a ral agent can achieve a state of theory which understood mora- tranquility and peace. Finally, lity primarily in terms of a hum- perfectionism eschewed the ble and unquestioning sub- empiricism of the natural law mission to the arbitrary tradition in favour of rationa- commands of a Supreme Being, hsm. Perfectionists maintained, Accordingly, then, the volunta- in other words, that the first rism that came to dominate the principles of morality are to be modem natural law tradition found by examining the human constituted a powerful formula- mind (especially its relation to tion of the idea that morality is the divine intellect), not by re- first and foremost a matter of lying on observation and expe- obedience, as opposed to self- rience. government. In Part II Schneewind insigh- Part II ("Perfectionism and tfiilly discusses these and other Rationality") We have seen that leading themes of perfectionism, the modem natural law tradition especially as they are articulated was largely defined by its ac- by the Christian neo-Stoicism of ceptance of the Grotian proble- the sixteenth century, by the RESENAS 211

Cambridge Platonists, as well as book, I trust the reader will for- by Spinoza and Malebranche. . give me if I mention only two of But arguably the most intriguing the many topics explored in it. thing here is the treatment of the First, there was a growing neglected moral philosophies of controversy over whether the Descartes and Leibniz. foundation of morality lies in Schneewind offers a fascinating sentiment or in reason. Hume account of how the former drew famously argued that the dis- heavily (but selectively) on tinction between right and Stoic ideas to articulate a mora- wrong was derived not from lity of self-governance, and how reason but from sentiment, so the latter sought to refute vo- that morality is "more properly luntarism without denying that felt than judg'd of (cfi:. A Trea- God was central to morality. tise of Human Nature. Book III, Part III ('Toward a World on Part I, Section II). His simple its Own"). For the most part, but powerful argument —that both the defenders of natural law morals must affect our conduct; and the champions of perfectio- but reason, being inert, cannot nism tended to link morality do so— seemed a clincher. with religion, typically by affir- However, the rationalism cham- ming that morally good conduct pioned by the perfectionists and was a necessary condition of by Clarke did not fade away: it salvation. However, this set of received new formulations at the assumptions eventually came hands of Price and Reid, both of under fire. whom were staunch defenders of Surprisingly enough, the as- intuitionism. sault came primarily not from Secondly, we witness the rise unbelievers, but from thinkers of a novel idea: that of morality who were far from hostile to the as self-govemance. The attempts cause of religion: Pascal, Nicole, to understand morality in its Gassendi, Clarke, Hutcheson, own terms, without divine Butler, and Reid, among others. commands or supernatural sanc- These philosophers, who sought tions, resulted in the conception to secure morality's indepen- of morality as obedience losing dence fi-om religion, are the its stranglehold on the philoso- subject of Part III. Since this is phical imagination. This tenden- the longest (and, to be frank, the cy is nicely exemplified in the most tedious) section of the writings of Shaflesbury, who 212 T6PIC0S denied that we needed to look The second main issue in Part outside ourselves to some exter- rV concerns Kant's originality: nal authority for moral guidance; the so-called "invention of auto- and it culminates in Hume, for nomy". Although Kant was un- whom "morality calls for no- questionably influenced by the thing that transcends the natural ideas of others, Schneewind world in which we live; and urges that his conception of within it, our common human morality as autonomy —^his nature makes us all self- thesis, that is, "that morality governing" (p. 369). centers on a law that human Part IV ("Autonomy and Di- beings impose on themselves, vine Order") deals with two necessarily providing themsel- main topics, the first of which is ves, in doing so, with a motive Kant's considerable indebte- to obey" (p. 483)— represents a dness to his predecessors. As creative achievement of the first Schneewind points out, the order. For Kant thought that Kantian conception of morality replacing the time-honoured as autonomy "was not invented idea of morality as obedience just out of the blue" (p. 509), but with his development of the idea drew heavily on ideas articulated of morality as rational self- by others. So here we learn how govemance would resolve some Kant's moral thought was sha- problems that had long vexed ped by the Grotian problematic; and perplexed his predecessors. by the British Moralists' con- How so? Oversimplifying im- ception of morality as self- pardonably, we might sum up govemance; by the Wolffian things as follows. Kant's formi- idea that it is knowledge that dable defence of rationalism makes us self-goveming; by —the thesis that only reason can Cmsius's conviction that people serve as the foundation of a uni- should be seen not as means, but versally valid morality— un- as ends; by the sentimentalism dermined, in one fell swoop, of Hutcheson and Hume; and, both Humean sentimentalism most of all, by Rousseau, whose and theological voluntarism understanding of freedom as (whose morality of abject servi- "obedience to the law one has lity —the most influential em- prescribed for oneself influen- bodiment of the conception of ced Kant deeply. morality of obedience— Kant RESENAS 213 foimd positively abhorrent). To admire his creative achievement be sure, there were rationalists (though it goes without saying before Kant (just as there were that sympathetic appreciation brave men living biefore Aga- need not breed agreement). We memnon); but what made Kant's also learn to look on the work of stance so strikingly novel was Kant's most illustrious prede- his willingness to question what cessors —^Machiavelli, Hobbes, earlier, more traditional critics Locke, Hume, Smith, Rousseau, of sentimentalism (such as Price Bentham— in a different way: and Reid) had never doubted we see them wrestling with pro- —namely, the assumption that blems they inherited from each we do not give ourselves the other as well as from lesser- moral principles we are to fo- known figures who were in- llow. This Kant absolutely re- fiuential in their day. The result jects: under the influence of is profoundly illuminating. Hume and Rousseau, both of This is not to say that the book whom urged that morality is a does not have some minor human creation, he broke with shortcomings, two of which I the idea that morality meant shall mention briefly. (1) conformity to an external order Schneewind thinks that we need that is independent of our rea- to understand Kantian ethics son. Instead, the moral law is better than we do, not merely in something we make and freely order to keep the historical (or impose on ourselves: it is a exegetical) record straight, but construction of reason, not so- because Kant's conception of mething given to us by an exter- morality as autonomy "provides nal authority. As a result, Kan- a better place to start working tian moral agents are not merely out a contemporary philosophi- self-governing but fiilly auto- cal understanding of morality nomous (self-legislating) as than anything we can get from well. other past philosophers" (p. xiv). This, then, is the story of The But Schneewind never explains Invention of Autonomy, and it is why he regards Kantian ethics as a tale splendidly told. After mo- a live option, but feels entitled to re than 550 pages, we find our- dismiss the three other approa- selves in a much better position ches discussed as exploded or to understand Kant's conception pass^. (This would include natu- of morality as autonomy, and to ral law theory, which has expe- 214 T6PIC0S rienced something of a renais- deed, one of the most appecding sance in the writings of John features of The Invention of Finnis and Germain Grisez). His Autonomy is Schneewind's wi- silence on this point is surpri- llingness to ask why we ought to sing, especially in light of the bother studying the history of recent critiques of Kantian moral philosophy at all. Having led us philosophy advanced by Bemard through five centuries of moral Williams, Martha Nussbaum, thought, he is refreshingly una- Alasdair Maclntyre, and others. fiaid to ponder what we have (2) Nor is there any mention of gained from following him on autonomy's history after Kant. his joumey. His answer, rou- What about existentialists such ghly, is that history yields a as Nietzsche and Sartre, who meta-philosophical moral urged that the unconstrained will —namely, that there are really creates values freely and arbitra- no perennial problems in moral rily? Surely the influence of the philosophy, since what counts as Kantian notion of self- a problem is very much a func- legislation can be discemed here tion of changing cultural and (though no doubt Kant would historical conditions. What the have rightly disowned their study of history reveals, views as an irrationalist perver- Schneewind suggests, is that the sion of his own ideas). This history of moral philosophy is radical notion of self-goverance not the story of different solu- —^autonomy run wild— can be tions to the same fixed set of formulated only if certain Kan- stock or 'etemal' problems. tian presuppositions are dro- Instead, it is the story of how pped; but which and why? What new problems about morality made this shift possible? It is a emerge —often because of poli- shame Schneewind does not tical, social, or reUgious crises— consider these questions, since and come to dominate the philo- his answers would no doubt sophical agenda for a time, befo- have further enhanced our un- re they eventually drift to the derstanding of Kant's moral periphery, and get replaced by theory. more urgent concems. But these are relatively minor The moral Schneewind wants complaints, and in no way obs- to draw from this is obvious: we cure the fact that there is a great should drop the assumption that deal to admire in this book. In- RESENAS 215 everyone from Socrates (or Whatever the single aim assig- Pythagoras —^it depends whom ned to the enterprise, we would you ask) to Habermas has been be forced to deny the status of trying to address the same basic moral philosopher to many thin- core of issues. He makes this kers usually included in the ca- point clearly and powerfully in a tegory (p. 549). lengthy passage worth citing in Schneewind's goal is clear: he fiill: "If we look historically at wants to navigate between the what moral philosophers have Scylla of a radical anti- said they were trying to do, we historicism (as if the history of do not come up with a single moral philosophy were simply aim imiting them all. Compare, the story of increasingly sophis- for instance, Aristotle s claim ticated answers to the same old that moral philosophy should problems) and the Charybdis of improve the lives of those who an extreme historicism (as if the study it with Sidgwick's belief history of moral philosophy that 'a desire to edify has impe- were chaos incarnate, utterly ded the real progress of ethical devoid of continuity). On his science'. Recall the Stoic aim of view, there are continuities as finding the way to personal well as discontinuities in the tranquility; Hobbes's aim of history of moral philosophy; and stablizing a society put in danger neither must be exaggerated at by religious fanaticism; Ben- the expense of the other. This tham's aim of locating a princi- sane and generous moderation ple to show everyone the need —this desire to avoid unpalata- for major political, social, and ble extremes without ignoring moral reform; Parfit's aim of what is valid in them— is one of developing a new, wholly secu- the many things that makes The lar, scientific understanding of Invention of Autonomy such a morality. Unless we leave the remarkable achievement and so statement of the aim quite va- deserving of a wide audience. In gue, it will be difficult to fmd its way, it is a felicitous illustra- one on which these thinker tion of the dictum that only the agree. If we are more definite, exhaustive can be truly interes- then it seems that we will be ting. required to say that anyone not sharing the favored aim is not Douglas James McDermid really doing moral philosophy. St. Francis Xavier University