NO. 8 FEBRUARY 2019 Introduction

Libya’s Conflicts Enter a Dangerous New Phase Wolfram Lacher

Recent advances by Khalifa Haftar’s “Libyan Arab Armed Forces” in southern are changing power relations in Libya in ways that undermine the UN’s ongoing attempts at brokering a political solution. Haftar’s increasing influence implies he will be less open to concessions, while key forces in western Libya now perceive him as an existential threat. The -based Government of National Accord (GNA), which has, to date, remained ambivalent towards Haftar despite his open opposition towards it, will come under increasing pressure from both adversaries and allies of Haftar to clarify its stance. The new configuration raises the risk of escalation on multiple fronts. Only the emergence of a stable balance of power can create the con- ditions for a political settlement.

In January and February 2019, Haftar’s threatened to provoke a political rift in the forces entered the southern cities of Sabha south just as Haftar’s forces were promising and Ubari and took over one of Libya’s to bring long-awaited stability. biggest oilfields, Sharara. They received Haftar’s takeover of the heartland of widespread popular support and encoun- the region represents the first real tered no meaningful resistance. Local change in the balance of power since his armed groups either defected to Haftar or June 2017 expansion into the Jufra region, lay low. Haftar’s stunning success in the in central Libya. Thereafter, a fragile status south was enabled first and foremost by quo had prevailed in which Haftar appeared the region’s long neglect at the hands of unable to advance, while the GNA was the Tripoli-based GNA. Amid pervasive in- hamstrung by rivalries between the – security and a widespread shutdown of mostly western Libyan – factions associated public services, residents eagerly welcomed with it. During this period, many ambiva- Haftar’s vow to re-establish order. Haftar’s lent or informal relations bridged Libya’s moves provoked a scramble by the GNA formal political division between two rival to appoint a commander for the southern governments, each with its respective military region and deploy forces from the central bank and army leadership. Haftar north to protect Sharara. But these belated, allowed oil exports to be shipped from rash steps ultimately backfired, since they eastern ports under his control even though

the revenues would be accrued to the Tripoli The single biggest obstacle to Haftar’s central bank. The GNA paid out salaries to establishment of full control over southern many employees of the eastern government, Libya emanates from parts of the Tubu including to soldiers of Haftar’s forces. ethnic group. In a gesture of goodwill, Tubu All the while, international efforts to nego- armed groups had handed over their posi- tiate a unified executive structure that tions in Sabha to Haftar’s forces before would include Haftar remained stuck be- withdrawing south. But pro-Haftar media tween Haftar’s maximalist demands and outlets then portrayed this as “the army” the GNA’s certainty that it alone enjoyed having “captured” these locations. More- international recognition. over, to take control of Sabha, Haftar’s Haftar’s expansion in the south has forces relied on armed groups recruited shattered that status quo. He can now claim from the Awlad Suleiman tribe, which had control over the overwhelming bulk of been fighting several bloody wars with Libyan oil production and most territory Tubu armed groups in the city since 2012. outside Tripolitania. Local and internation- Tubu leaders were also wary of the narra- al actors are reassessing his chances of tive accompanying Haftar’s operations taking power in Tripoli. At the same time, in the south, which emphasised the aim the new configuration all but upends the of fighting “Chadian gangs”. Although long-faltering, UN-led political process. Chadian and Sudanese combatants have Previously, a key obstacle to any political indeed become a major source of insecurity deal had been Haftar’s refusal to submit to in the south over the past years, “Chadian civilian authority, and he is now even less gangs” had already been serving as code likely to make concessions, given the pros- language for Tubu fighters – both Libyan pect of further military advances on the and Chadian – in the Sabha conflicts since back of the current momentum. Western 2012. Clearly, this choice of language was Libyan forces that see the prospect of Haftar not innocent, given that Haftar has him- seizing power as an existential threat will self been Libya’s single largest employer of now be even more wary of his integration Chadian and Sudanese fighters. into a unified government. After all, this Haftar’s strategy for taking over Sabha would allow Haftar greater access to state therefore alienated even many Tubu who resources with which to further expand had previously been supportive or ambiva- his military might; in the current situation, lent towards him. Tubu forces have, to date, no written agreement can credibly limit offered tenacious resistance to the attempts Haftar’s power. In sum, the focus will now of Haftar’s troops at moving south to Mur- be on military developments rather than zuq. It currently remains unclear whether negotiations. Haftar can exploit divisions among the Tubu to overcome such opposition. If he gains the support of powerful Tubu com- Ongoing Conflict in the South manders, his opponents and associated Chadian combatants may be forced to seek Despite Haftar’s successes, the south re- a way out, with possible repercussions for mains a highly contested region. Haftar’s neighbouring Chad and . If, on the authority is still shaky in the southern areas contrary, the current rift cements along he has taken over. He has sent only limited ethnic lines, this would increase the inten- forces south and has primarily relied on sity of the conflict and block Haftar’s moves the cooperation or venality of local armed towards the southern borders. Haftar’s groups. Southern communities are heavily opponents in western Libya could support armed. Haftar will therefore have to tread Tubu resistance; Misratan commanders, more carefully in persecuting political for example, are discussing a move into opponents in the south than he has done the Jufra region in central Libya to cut off in the east. Haftar’s supply lines to the south. A move

SWP Comment 8 February 2019

2 on Jufra, in turn, would carry risks of a driven by a palpable sense of alarm at broader escalation. Haftar’s expansion in the south. But it is by no means a straightforward proposition, given that the Tripoli militias, in particular, Western Libya and the GNA’s Fate have been engaged in intense rivalry with Misratan factions over the distribution of Continued progress by Haftar in the south spoils in the capital. A catalyst for such a would trigger major repercussions in west- closing of ranks could be Haftar gaining ern Libya. Haftar has yet to make major control over a city – such as Tarhuna or inroads into the large population centres of Zawiya – from which he could directly the northwest, and he has yet to face any threaten the capital. The political conse- of Libya’s military heavyweights: the forces quences could be far-reaching. If Tripoli- of and , those of the Amazigh tanian forces were to reach an anti-Haftar towns, as well as the militias that control consensus, this would force the GNA to the capital. These forces, and most of the adopt a more hardline position towards local constituencies from which they are him, which, in turn, could cause Haftar drawn, remain overwhelmingly hostile to retaliate – for example, by blocking oil to the prospect of a military strongman exports, and therefore the Tripoli-based seizing power. Many have watched Haftar’s central bank’s revenues. advances in the south with growing alarm, The second scenario would involve an and they now increasingly see the need to increasing range of players in western prepare their defences against the possibil- Libyan cities bandwagoning behind Haftar ity of Haftar expanding into Tripolitania. because they expect him to seize power and However, western Libyan cities are seek to gain a privileged position in a new politically divided. Each one hosts several power structure. This could occur if forces different armed groups. Such rival factions newly loyal to Haftar simultaneously emerge will define their positions towards Haftar into the open in several cities – possibly not only according to how they assess his including Tripoli – without immediately chances of seizing power, but also accord- seizing all-out control of them. This sce- ing to the potential advantage their align- nario would lead to increasing confronta- ment will accord them locally. Realign- tions within and between local communi- ments at the local level could have major ties. It would also make it more difficult for consequences: In Zintan, for example, the the GNA to adopt a clear position against bulk of forces are currently aligned against Haftar; the GNA would likely lose the sup- Haftar, but public opinion in the town is port of key military forces in Tripolitania. much more ambivalent. In addition to such Haftar will seek to initiate dynamics local divides, factions from different cities along the lines of the second scenario. continue to vie for influence in Tripoli, Judging from his moves over the past two where alliances change constantly and the years, he will advance gradually, exploiting risk of escalation is never far. Political and divisions among his adversaries and buying military actors are closely watching each local loyalties. Outside eastern Libya, Haftar other’s moves, suspicious that some may has shown much care to avoid directly con- be conspiring with Haftar against their fronting other forces while expanding, plac- opponents. ing the onus on his opponents to respond From here, two basic scenarios are con- and appear as the aggressors. ceivable. First, western Libyan forces could However, a largely peaceful takeover of close ranks against the looming threat of entire swathes of territory, as in the south- Haftar’s forces moving towards Tripoli. In ern operation, is not a possibility in western interviews with political and military actors Libya. In the south, alignments of armed in Tripoli and Misrata, in February 2019, groups with rival camps have been largely this tendency was already perceptible, opportunistic since 2011, and Haftar’s take-

SWP Comment 8 February 2019

3 over represented an existential threat for pathway towards stabilisation: Haftar is 75, few local actors. In the west, a number and the structure he has established is likely of cities host major forces that are deeply to disintegrate with his demise, given its embedded in the social fabric, strongly highly personalised nature and the conflict- committed to the rejection of authoritarian ing interests Haftar balances within it – in- rule due to their experience in 2011, and cluding those of his sons, who have gained justifiably worried that they would face key positions in Haftar’s forces but are violent repression if Haftar seized power. widely unpopular in them. With Haftar’s Moreover, whereas Haftar’s advances in departure, the deep rifts his campaign has the south could be construed as a welcome inflicted on the social fabric, particularly © Stiftung Wissenschaft effort at stabilising a neglected region, in the east, are also certain to return to the und Politik, 2019 any progress into Tripolitania immediately fore. All rights reserved raises the question of power. The most At the same time, a negotiated settle- likely outcome of any attempt by Haftar to ment is currently almost as unlikely as a This Comment reflects seize Tripoli would therefore be protracted, military victory. This is because all actors – the author’s views. large-scale conflict. but most importantly Haftar – now expect The online version of continued changes in the military balance this publication contains of power. To improve the prospects for a functioning links to other What Now? negotiated way out, international actors SWP texts and other relevant would need to help stabilise the balance sources. Western governments have remained of power by exerting serious pressure on SWP Comments are subject noticeably silent as the latest events have all sides to refrain from further attempts to internal peer review, fact- unfolded, anxious not to strain relations at expansion and provocation. This would checking and copy-editing. with Haftar at a moment when, for the first require not only a fresh effort at curbing For further information on time, he appears to have a credible chance at foreign military assistance to Haftar; West- our quality control pro- seizing power. France has lent political – ern states would also have to revisit their cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- and most likely other forms of – support support to the GNA if the latter becomes berlin.org/en/about-swp/ to Haftar’s operation in the south and pre- engaged in an escalating struggle with quality-management-for- vented its Western partners from issuing Haftar. Given Haftar’s increased weight, a swp-publications/ joint statements on the issue. The UN Sup- settlement would need to include robust port Mission in Libya has veered between sub- guarantees by foreign actors. SWP dued expressions of concern and outright In other words, returning to a negotiating Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik support for Haftar’s southern operation. process would require a complete reversal German Institute for This permissive attitude towards major of Western governments’ current stance. A International and changes in the military balance of forces key challenge in negotiating such a reversal Security Affairs risks encouraging broader escalation in is the disunity between Western govern- western Libya. It further reduces the chances ments on Libya – particularly US disengage- Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin for a deal by severely undermining trust in ment; the diplomatic spats between Italy Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 the ability of international actors to func- and France, for which Libya is one arena; Fax +49 30 880 07-100 tion as neutral arbiters and enforcers of an and the unilateral French support for Haf- www.swp-berlin.org agreement. It is also driven by a misguided tar’s southern operation. Given the poten- [email protected] sense of realpolitik. A military victory for tial consequences of conflict in western Haftar remains unlikely and would, if at Libya, the stakes are sufficiently high to ISSN 1861-1761 doi: 10.18449/2019C08 all, only come about after violent conflict in warrant much greater effort by European western Libya of an intensity and duration states to agree on a common policy with that would likely surpass anything Libya the aim to prevent escalation. has witnessed since 2011. And even if Haftar succeeds in seizing power at such massive cost, this would not offer a credible

Dr Wolfram Lacher is a Senior Associate in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP.

SWP Comment 8 February 2019

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