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Hooking Windows API - Technics of Hooking API Functions on Windows

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Hooking Windows API - Technics of Hooking API Functions on Windows The CodeBreakers-Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2004) http://www.CodeBreakers-Journal.com Hooking Windows API - Technics of hooking API functions on Windows Author: Holy Father <holy [email protected]> Version: 1.1 english Date: 6.10.2002 Original paper is available at http://rootkit.host.sk Abstract This text is about hooking API functions on OS Windows. All examples here completely works on Windows systems based on NT technology version NT 4.0 and higher (Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP). Probably will also work on others Windows systems.You should be familiar with processes on Windows, assembler, PE files structure and some API functions to understand whole text. When using term ”Hooking API” here, I mean the full change of API. So, when calling hooked API, our code is run immediately. I do not deal with cases of API monitoring only. I will write about complete hooking. Contents I Introduction 2 II Hooking methods 2 II-A Hooking before running . ......................................... 2 II-B Hooking during running . ......................................... 2 II-B.1 Own process hooking using IAT . .............................. 3 II-B.2 Own process hooking using entry point rewriting . ................... 6 II-B.3 Original function saving . .................................. 9 II-B.4 Other process hooking . .................................. 28 III Ending 30 The CodeBreakers-Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2004) I. Introduction This text is about hooking API functions on OS Windows. All examples here completely works on Windows systems based on NT technology version NT 4.0 and higher (Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP). Probably will also work on others Windows systems. You should be familiar with processes on Windows, assembler, PE files structure and some API functions to understand whole text. When using term ”Hooking API” here, I mean the full change of API. So, when calling hooked API, our code is run immediately. I do not deal with cases of API monitoring only. I will write about complete hooking. II. Hooking methods Our goal is generally to replace the code of some function with our code. This problem can be sometimes solved before running the process. This can be done mostly with user level process which are run by us and the goal is e.g. to change the program behaviour. Example of this can be application crack. E.g. program which wants original CD-ROM during startup (this was in the game Atlantis) and we want to run it without CDs. If we change the function for getting a drive type we would be able to run this program from the hard drive. This can not be done or we do not want to do this when want to hook system process (e.g. services) or in the case we do not know which process will be the target. Then we will use hooking during running technic. Example of using this can be rootkit or virus with anti-antivirus technics. A. Hooking before running This is about physical module change (mostly .exe or .dll) when the function, which we want to change, is. We’ve got three possibilities at least here on how to do this. The first is to find entry point of that function and basically to rewrite its code. This is limited by the function size but we can load some other modules dynamically (API LoadLibrary), so it could be enought. Kernel functions (kernel32.dll) can be used in all cases because each process in windows has its own copy of this module. Other advantage is if we know on which OS will be changed module run. We can use direct pointers in this case for e.g. API LoadLibraryA. This is because the address of kernel module in memory is static in the scope of one OS Windows version. We can also use behaviour of dynamically loaded module. In this case its initialization part is run immediately after loading to the memory. We are not limited in initialization part of new module. Second possibility of replacing function in module is its extension. Then we have to choose between replacing first 5 bytes by relative jump or rewriting IAT. In the case of relative jump, this will redirect the code execution to our code. When calling function which IAT record is changed, our code will be executed directly after this call. But extension of the module is not so easy because we have to care about DLL header. Next one is replacing the whole module. That means we create own version of the module which can load the original one and call original functions which we are not interested in. But important functions will be totally new. This method is not so good for big modules which can contain hundreds of exports. B. Hooking during running Hooking before running is mostly very special and intimately oriented for concrete application (or module). If we replace function in kernel32.dll or in ntdll.dll (only on NT OS) we will get perfect replace of this function in all processes which will be run later, but it is so difficult to make it because we have to take care about accuracy and code prefection of new functions or whole new modules, but the main problem is that only process which will be run later will be hooked (so for all process we have to reboot system). Next problem could be access to these files because NT OS tries to protect them. Much more pretty solution is to hook process during running. This method require more knowledge but the result is perfect. Hooking during running can be done only on process for which we have writing access to their memory. For the writing in itself we will use API function WriteProcessMemory. We will start from hooking our own process during running. 2 The CodeBreakers-Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2004) 1) Own process hooking using IAT: There are many possibilities here. At first I will show you how to hook function by rewriting IAT. Following picture shows structure of PE file: +-------------------------------+ - offset 0 | MS DOS Header ("MZ") and stub | +-------------------------------+ | PE signature ("PE") | +-------------------------------+ | .text | - module code | Program Code | || +-------------------------------+ | .data | - initialized (global static) data | Initialized Data | || +-------------------------------+ | .idata | - information for imported functions | Import Table | and data || +-------------------------------+ | .edata | - information for exported functions | Export Table | and data || +-------------------------------+ | Debug symbols | +-------------------------------+ Important part for us here is Import Address Table (IAT) in the .idata part. This part contains description of imports and mainly imported functions addresses. Now it is important to know how are PE files created. When calling arbitrary API indirectly in programming language (that means we call it using its name, no using its OS specific address) the compiler does not link direct calls to the module but it links call to IAT on jmp instruction which will be filled by process loader while OS is loading process to the memory. This is why we can use the same binary on two different version os Windows where modules can be loaded to another addresses. Process loader will fill out direct jmp instructions in IAT which is used by our calls from the program code. So, if we are able to find out specific function in IAT which we want to hook, we can easily change jmp instruction there and redirect code to our address. Every call after doing this will execute our code. Advantage of this method is its perfection. Disadvantage is often amount of functions which should be hooked (e.g. if we want to change program behaviour in the file searching APIs we will have to change functions FindFirstFile and FindNextFile, but we have to know that these functions have its ANSI and WIDE version, so we have to change IAT address for FindFirstFileA, FindFirstFileW, FindNextFileA and also FileNextFileW. But there still some others like FindFirstFileExA and its WIDE version FindFirstFileExW which are called by previous mentioned functions. We know that FindFirstFileW calls FindFirstFileExW but this is done directly - not usinig IAT. And still some others to go. There are e.g. ShellAPI functions like SHGetDesktopFolder which also directly calls FindFirstFileW or FindFirstFileExW). But if we will get all of them, the result will be perfect. We can use ImageDirectoryEntryToData from imagehlp.dll to find out IAT easily. 3 The CodeBreakers-Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2004) PVOID ImageDirectoryEntryToData( IN LPVOID Base, IN BOOLEAN MappedAsImage, IN USHORT DirectoryEntry, OUT PULONG Size ); We will use Instance of our application as Base (Instance can be get by calling GetModuleHandle: hInstance = GetModuleHandleA(NULL); ), and as DirectoryEntry we will use constant IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT. #define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT 1 Result of this function is pointer to the first IAT record. IAT records are structures which are defined by I IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR. So, the result is a pointer on IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR. typedef struct _IMAGE_THUNK_DATA { union { PBYTE ForwarderString; PDWORD Function; DWORD Ordinal; PIMAGE_IMPORT_BY_NAME AddressOfData; }; } IMAGE_THUNK_DATA,*PIMAGE_THUNK_DATA; typedef struct _IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR { union { DWORD Characteristics; PIMAGE_THUNK_DATA OriginalFirstThunk; }; DWORD TimeDateStamp; DWORD ForwarderChain; DWORD Name; PIMAGE_THUNK_DATA FirstThunk; } IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR,*PIMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR; The Name value in IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR is a relative reference to the name of module. If we want to hook a function e.g. from kernel32.dll we have to find out in imports which belongs to the descriptor with name kernel32.dll. We will call ImageDirectoryEntryToData at first and than we will try to find descriptor with name ”kernel32.dll” (there can be more than one descriptor with this name). Finally we will have to find our function in the list of all functions in the record (address of our function can be get by GetProcAddress function). If we find it we must use VirtualProtect to change memory page protection and after then we can write to this part of memory.
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