Fides: Remote Anomaly-Based Cheat Detection Using Client Emulation*
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Advance Dynamic Malware Analysis Using Api Hooking
www.ijecs.in International Journal Of Engineering And Computer Science ISSN:2319-7242 Volume – 5 Issue -03 March, 2016 Page No. 16038-16040 Advance Dynamic Malware Analysis Using Api Hooking Ajay Kumar , Shubham Goyal Department of computer science Shivaji College, University of Delhi, Delhi, India [email protected] [email protected] Abstract— As in real world, in virtual world also there are type of Analysis is ineffective against many sophisticated people who want to take advantage of you by exploiting you software. Advanced static analysis consists of reverse- whether it would be your money, your status or your personal engineering the malware’s internals by loading the executable information etc. MALWARE helps these people into a disassembler and looking at the program instructions in accomplishing their goals. The security of modern computer order to discover what the program does. Advanced static systems depends on the ability by the users to keep software, analysis tells you exactly what the program does. OS and antivirus products up-to-date. To protect legitimate users from these threats, I made a tool B. Dynamic Malware Analysis (ADVANCE DYNAMIC MALWARE ANAYSIS USING API This is done by watching and monitoring the behavior of the HOOKING) that will inform you about every task that malware while running on the host. Virtual machines and software (malware) is doing over your machine at run-time Sandboxes are extensively used for this type of analysis. The Index Terms— API Hooking, Hooking, DLL injection, Detour malware is debugged while running using a debugger to watch the behavior of the malware step by step while its instructions are being processed by the processor and their live effects on I. -
Userland Hooking in Windows
Your texte here …. Userland Hooking in Windows 03 August 2011 Brian MARIANI SeniorORIGINAL Security SWISS ETHICAL Consultant HACKING ©2011 High-Tech Bridge SA – www.htbridge.ch SOME IMPORTANT POINTS Your texte here …. This document is the first of a series of five articles relating to the art of hooking. As a test environment we will use an english Windows Seven SP1 operating system distribution. ORIGINAL SWISS ETHICAL HACKING ©2011 High-Tech Bridge SA – www.htbridge.ch WHAT IS HOOKING? Your texte here …. In the sphere of computer security, the term hooking enclose a range of different techniques. These methods are used to alter the behavior of an operating system by intercepting function calls, messages or events passed between software components. A piece of code that handles intercepted function calls, is called a hook. ORIGINAL SWISS ETHICAL HACKING ©2011 High-Tech Bridge SA – www.htbridge.ch THE WHITE SIDE OF HOOKING TECHNIQUES? YourThe texte control here …. of an Application programming interface (API) call is very useful and enables programmers to track invisible actions that occur during the applications calls. It contributes to comprehensive validation of parameters. Reports issues that frequently remain unnoticed. API hooking has merited a reputation for being one of the most widespread debugging techniques. Hooking is also quite advantageous technique for interpreting poorly documented APIs. ORIGINAL SWISS ETHICAL HACKING ©2011 High-Tech Bridge SA – www.htbridge.ch THE BLACK SIDE OF HOOKING TECHNIQUES? YourHooking texte here can …. alter the normal code execution of Windows APIs by injecting hooks. This technique is often used to change the behavior of well known Windows APIs. -
(12) Patent Application Publication (10) Pub. No.: US 2012/0214567 A1 Snow (43) Pub
US 20120214567A1 (19) United States (12) Patent Application Publication (10) Pub. No.: US 2012/0214567 A1 Snow (43) Pub. Date: Aug. 23, 2012 (54) METHOD AND APPARATUS FORVARIANT Publication Classification OF TEXAS HOLDEM POKER (51) Int. Cl. A63F I3/00 (2006.01) (75) Inventor: Roger M. Snow, Las Vegas, NV A63F I/00 (2006.01) (US) (52) U.S. Cl. ........................................... 463/13; 273/292 57 ABSTRACT (73) Assignee: SHUFFLE MASTER, INC., Las (57) Vegas, NV (US) A variant game of Hold Empoker allows for rules of play of one or all of players being allowed to remain in game with an option of checking or making specific wagering amounts in (21) Appl. No.: 13/455.742 first play wagers, being limited in the size of Subsequent available play wagers or prohibited from making additional (22) Filed: Apr. 25, 2012 play wagers ifa first play wager has been made, being limited in the size of available laterplay wagers ifa first or earlier play Related U.S. Application Data wager has been made, and having the opportunity for at least two and as many as three or four distinct opportunities in the (62) Division of application No. 1 1/156.352, filed on Jun. stages in the play of a hand to be able to make one or more 17, 2005. play wagers. 110 Patent Application Publication Aug. 23, 2012 Sheet 1 of 10 US 2012/0214567 A1 Patent Application Publication Aug. 23, 2012 Sheet 2 of 10 US 2012/0214567 A1 a. s&Os Patent Application Publication Aug. 23, 2012 Sheet 3 of 10 US 2012/0214567 A1 Patent Application Publication Aug. -
Approximating Game-Theoretic Optimal Strategies for Full-Scale Poker
Approximating Game-Theoretic Optimal Strategies for Full-scale Poker D. Billings, N. Burch, A. Davidson, R. Holte, J. Schaeffer, T. Schauenberg, and D. Szafron Department of Computing Science, University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta, T6G 2E8, Canada Email: {darse,burch,davidson,holte,jonathan,terence,duane}@cs.ualberta.ca Abstract Due to the computational limitations involved, only simpli• fied poker variations have been solved in the past (e.g. [Kuhn, The computation of the first complete approxima• 1950; Sakaguchi and Sakai, 19921). While these are of the• tions of game-theoretic optimal strategies for full- oretical interest, the same methods are not feasible for real scale poker is addressed. Several abstraction tech• games, which are too large by many orders of magnitude niques are combined to represent the game of 2- ([Roller and Pfeffer, 1997J). player Texas Hold'em, having size O(1018), using 7 [Shi and Littman, 2001] investigated abstraction tech• closely related models each having size 0(1O ). niques to reduce the large search space and complexity of the Despite the reduction in size by a factor of 100 problem, using a simplified variant of poker. [Takusagawa, billion, the resulting models retain the key prop• 2000] created near-optimal strategies for the play of three erties and structure of the real game. Linear pro• specific Hold'em flops and betting sequences. [Selby, 1999] gramming solutions to the abstracted game are used computed an optimal solution for the abbreviated game of to create substantially improved poker-playing pro• 1 pre flop Hold em. grams, able to defeat strong human players and be Using new abstraction techniques, we have produced vi• competitive against world-class opponents. -
Contents in This Issue
APRIL 2006 The International Publication on Computer Virus Prevention, Recognition and Removal CONTENTS IN THIS ISSUE 2 COMMENT LEAP YEAR Problems for AV vendors: some thoughts Although the hype surrounding OSX/Leap-A far outweighs the number of reported infections, the 3 NEWS virus does present a number of new ideas that we may well see again. Glyn Kennington investigates. More updating woes page 4 Spy couple sentenced ‘Real’ computer virus MR AND MRS ROOTKIT Viewers of the German version of the Mr. and Mrs. Smith movie DVD were surprised to find a little 3 VIRUS PREVALENCE TABLE more than they had bargained for on their DVDs thanks to the presence of a new protection system. VIRUS ANALYSES The protection software was found to be using 4 A small step for Mac OS X rootkit-like techniques to hide itself. Elia Florio discusses the security issues associated with the 6 Not a feeble attempt Settec DRM case. page 10 10 FEATURE LINUX COMPARATIVE Stories from the DRM world: the Settec case The main competition amongst products this month seemed to be to determine 13 COMPARATIVE REVIEW which could have the least useful Red Hat Linux 9 documentation – find out which products redeemed themselves by achieving a VB 100%. page 13 20 END NOTES & NEWS This month: anti-spam news & events and Sorin Mustaca takes an indepth look at PayPal phishing. ISSN 1749-7027 COMMENT ‘I see drowning in • Analysing proactive technologies, including heuristics and behaviour blockers so as to penetrate new malware as systems despite these barriers. one of the main • Interfering with anti-virus solutions, for instance, by issues facing the blocking automatic updates. -
A Brief Survey on Rootkit Techniques in Malicious Codes
A Brief Survey on Rootkit Techniques in Malicious Codes Sungkwan Kim, Junyoung Park, Kyungroul Lee Ilsun You Soonchunhyang University Korean Bible University Shinchang-myun, Asan-si, Republic of Korea Seoul, Republic of Korea fcarpedm, wwkim3, [email protected] [email protected] Kangbin Yim∗ Soonchunhyang University Shinchang-myun, Asan-si, Republic of Korea [email protected] Abstract Nowadays, malicious codes are significantly increasing, leading to serious damages to information systems. It is worth to note that these codes generally depend on the rootkit techniques to make it more difficult for themselves to be analyzed and detected. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to research the rootkits to effectively defend against malicious codes. In this paper, we explore and survey the rootkit techniques both in user-level and kernel-level. Several rootkit samples are also utilized for the test and verification purpose. Keywords: rootkit, malicious codes, keyboard security 1 Introduction The superlative invention of the Internet in the 20th century has generated innovative developments in the computer industry. While internet speed is increasing, adverse effects are also increasing. A com- puter virus, which would have taken a long time to propagate in former days, can now spread throughout the world currently in a few seconds or minutes. In the past, the spreading technology was very simple and the path was limited, thus enabling an account technician sufficient time to protect against the virus. However, malicious codes have been intelligently armed with self-deformation and concealment, cre- ating many problems such as Distributed Denial of Services Attacks (DDoS), SPAM, and hijacking of personal information[2]. -
Captain Hook: Pirating AVS to Bypass Exploit Mitigations WHO?
Captain Hook: Pirating AVS to Bypass Exploit Mitigations WHO? Udi Yavo . CTO and Co-Founder, enSilo . Former CTO, Rafael Cyber Security Division . Researcher . Author on BreakingMalware Tomer Bitton . VP Research and Co-Founder, enSilo . Low Level Researcher, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems . Malware Researcher . Author on BreakingMalware AGENDA . Hooking In a Nutshell . Scope of Research . Inline Hooking – Under the hood - 32-bit function hooking - 64-bit function hooking . Hooking Engine Injection Techniques . The 6 Security Issues of Hooking . Demo – Bypassing exploit mitigations . 3rd Party Hooking Engines . Affected Products . Research Tools . Summary HOOKING IN A NUTSHELL . Hooking is used to intercept function calls in order to alter or augment their behavior . Used in most endpoint security products: • Anti-Exploitation – EMET, Palo-Alto Traps, … • Anti-Virus – Almost all of them • Personal Firewalls – Comodo, Zone-Alarm,… • … . Also used in non-security products for various purposes: • Application Performance Monitoring (APM) • Application Virtualization (Microsoft App-V) . Used in Malware: • Man-In-The-Browser (MITB) SCOPE OF RESEARCH . Our research encompassed about a dozen security products . Focused on user-mode inline hooks – The most common hooking method in real-life products . Hooks are commonly set by an injected DLL. We’ll refer to this DLL as the “Hooking Engine” . Kernel-To-User DLL injection techniques • Used by most vendors to inject their hooking engine • Complex and leads security issues Inline Hooking INLINE HOOKING – 32-BIT FUNCTION HOOKING Straight forward most of the time: Patch the Disassemble Allocate Copy Prolog Prolog with a Prolog Code Stub Instructions JMP INLINE HOOKING – 32-BIT FUNCTION HOOKING InternetConnectW before the hook is set: InternetConnectW After the hook is set: INLINE HOOKING – 32-BIT FUNCTION HOOKING The hooking function (0x178940) The Copied Instructions Original Function Code INLINE HOOKING – 32-BIT FUNCTION HOOKING . -
Towards a General Defense Against Kernel Queue Hooking Attacks
Towards a General Defense against Kernel Queue Hooking Attacks Jinpeng Wei 1 and Calton Pu 2 1Florida International University, 11200 SW 8th Street, Miami, FL, 33199 USA, [email protected] 2Georgia Institute of Technology, 266 Ferst Dr, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA, [email protected] Abstract Kernel queue hooking (KQH) attacks achieve stealthy malicious function execution by embedding malicious hooks in dynamic kernel schedulable queues (K-Queues). Because they keep kernel code and persistent hooks intact, they can evade detection of state-of-the-art kernel integrity monitors. Moreover, they have been used by advanced malware such as the Rustock spam bot to achieve malicious goals. In this paper, we present a systematic defense against such novel attacks. We propose the Precise Lookahead Checking of function Pointers approach that checks the legitimacy of pending K-Queue callback requests by proactively checking function pointers that may be invoked by the callback function. To facilitate the derivation of specifications for any K-Queue, we build a unified static analysis framework and a toolset that can derive from kernel source code properties of legitimate K-Queue requests and turn them into source code for the runtime checker. We implement proof-of-concept runtime checkers for four K-Queues in Linux and perform a comprehensive experimental evaluation of these checkers, which shows that our defense is effective against KQH attacks. Keywords : control flow integrity; kernel queue hooking; rootkits; runtime defense; static analysis 1 Introduction Rootkits have become one of the most dangerous threats to systems security. Because they run at the same privilege level as the operating systems kernel, they can modify the OS behavior 1 in arbitrary ways. -
Evasive Internet Protocol: End to End Performance
EVASIVE INTERNET PROTOCOL: END TO END PERFORMANCE By Maaz Khan Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science Thesis Advisor: Prof. Michael Rabinovich Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY August 2011 CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES We hereby approve the thesis/dissertation of Maaz Khan ______________________________________________________ Masters candidate for the ________________________________degree *. Michael Rabinovich (signed)_______________________________________________ (chair of the committee) Mehmet Koyuturk ________________________________________________ Vincenzo Liberatore ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ 06/09/2011 (date) _______________________ *We also certify that written approval has been obtained for any proprietary material contained therein. Contents Contents i List of Figures iii Abstract iv Chapter 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Basic Approach . 2 1.2 Security and feasibility . 3 Chapter 2 Architecture 6 2.1 Delegation of Authority . 6 2.2 T-Address . .8 2.3 Datagrams . 9 2.4 Obtaining a Destination T-address. 13 Chapter 3 Packet Modification using Netfilter Framework 15 3.1 The Packet Buffer . 15 3.1.1 SKB basic management functiuons . 18 3.2 The Netfilter API . .20 i 3.2.1 Netfilter Hooks . .21 3.2.2 Registering and Unregistering hook functions . .23 Chapter 4 Implementation 27 4.1 Components . 28 4.2 Changing the MSS . 31 Chapter 5 Performance 33 5.1 Experiment Setup . 33 5.2 TCP v/s EIP Performance . ..35 5.3 UDP v/s EIP Performance . .39 Chapter 6 Conclusion 43 References 44 ii List of Figures 1. T-Address . .. .. .. .. 9 2. Type-1 Datagram . .. .. .. 11 3. Type-2 Datagram . 11 4. -
Countering Kernel Rootkits with Lightweight Hook Protection
Countering Kernel Rootkits with Lightweight Hook Protection ZhiWang XuxianJiang WeidongCui PengNing NC State University NC State University Microsoft Research NC State University [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT stealing private information, escalating privileges of malicious pro- Kernel rootkits have posed serious security threats due to their stealthy cesses, and disabling defense mechanisms. manner. To hide their presence and activities, many rootkits hi- Given the serious security threats, there has been a long line of jack control flows by modifying control data or hooks in the kernel research on rootkit defense. Specifically, prior research efforts can space. A critical step towards eliminating rootkits is to protect such be roughly classified into three categories. In the first category, hooks from being hijacked. However, it remains a challenge be- systems such as Panorama [33], HookFinder [32], K-Tracer [15], cause there exist a large number of widely-scattered kernel hooks and PoKeR [24] focus on analyzing rootkit behaviors. Systems and many of them could be dynamically allocated from kernel heap in the second category are primarily designed for detecting rootk- and co-located together with other kernel data. In addition, there is its based on certain symptoms exhibited by rootkit infection. Ex- a lack of flexible commodity hardware support, leading to the so- amples are Copilot [20], SBCFI [21], and VMwatcher [13]. In called protection granularity gap – kernel hook protection requires the third category, systems such as SecVisor [26], Patagonix [16], byte-level granularity but commodity hardware only provides page- and NICKLE [23] have been developed to preserve kernel code level protection. -
Poker Phases: Draw, Stud and Hold’Em As Play-Forms of Capitalism
the author(s) 2011 ephemera articles ISSN 1473-2866 www.ephemeraweb.org theory & politics in organization volume 11(4): 450-465 Poker phases: Draw, Stud and Hold’Em as play-forms of capitalism Ole Bjerg abstract The subject of the article is the history of poker. It explores how different structural variations of the game have evolved and how different types of poker have been dominant at different periods in history. There are three main forms of poker: Draw, Stud and Hold’Em. In the article, it is demonstrated how the three forms emerge and become the most popular form of poker at three different periods in history. It identifies structural homologies between the historical development of poker and key elements in the manifestation of capitalism at different times in history. Introduction Poker is the laboratory of capitalism. (McDonald, 1950: 23) When we look at a piece of art, read a piece of literature, watch a film, or listen to a piece of music, it is commonplace to think of these as cultural expressions of the social and historical context in which they are created. Art, literature, film and music are readily recognized as mediums of the Zeitgeist. Poker and other gambling games are rarely thought of in the same fashion. At best, they are considered to be meaningless entertainment, at worst self-destructive vices. I would, however, argue that poker is a cultural expression in line with art, literature, film, etc. The sudden popularity of poker in recent years demonstrates the rich cultural resonance of the game. Poker is a game of money. -
Subverting Operating System Properties Through Evolutionary DKOM Attacks
Subverting Operating System Properties through Evolutionary DKOM Attacks Mariano Graziano1;3, Lorenzo Flore2, Andrea Lanzi2, and Davide Balzarotti1 1 Eurecom 2 Universit`adegli Studi di Milano 3 Cisco Systems, Inc. Abstract Modern rootkits have moved their focus on the exploitation of dynamic memory struc- tures, which allows them to tamper with the behavior of the system without modifying or injecting any additional code. In this paper we discuss a new class of Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) attacks that we call Evolutionary DKOM (E-DKOM). The goal of this attack is to alter the way some data structures \evolve" over time. As case study, we designed and im- plemented an instance of Evolutionary DKOM attack that targets the OS scheduler for both userspace programs and kernel threads. Moreover, we discuss the implementation of a hypervisor-based data protection system that mimics the behavior of an OS com- ponent (in our case the scheduling system) and detect any unauthorized modification. We finally discuss the challenges related to the design of a general detection system for this class of attacks. 1 Introduction Rootkits are a particular type of malicious software designed to maintain a hidden access to a compromised machine by targeting the running kernel. To mitigate this severe threat, several defense techniques for code protection and attestation have been proposed in the literature [27, 37, 39, 46]. These mechanisms try to protect the appli- cations and the kernel code against any illicit modification of its instructions. This also prevents hooking techniques that attempt to divert the control flow to a routine controlled by the attacker.