Extending the American Century: Revisiting the Social Contract Jahara Matisek, Travis Robison, Buddhika Jayamaha

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 20, Fall 2019, pp. 5-15 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/gia.2019.0018

For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/741047

[ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ] clusion of this conflict ushered the begin- Forum: 100 ning of the and what came to be called the “American Century.” The ’ efforts during the Cold War focused Years Past, on protecting itself and its allies without compromising America’s democratic sys- 100 Years tem, values, and ideals.1 The US was gener- ally successful at achieving these ends.2 Forward Following the Cold War, the US enjoyed a brief period of primacy. The US was the sole global hegemon and exerted its ideolog- Extending the ical, political, economic, and military might to expand the world order it created after American Century World War II. Three decades after the Cold Revisiting the Social War ended, American primacy is eroding and its influence is contested by revisionist Contract powers. America’s combat credibility is not in question, and rising powers could only Jahara Matisek, Travis Robison, threaten US leadership if American power and Buddhika Jayamaha is weakened on an absolute basis. The true challenge to continuing 21st-century Amer- ican leadership therefore comes from within. Americans today resent seemingly endless s the guns fell silent at the end of military deployments across the globe with , the US could no no discernible security benefits, feel aban- longer deny its sta- doned by the supposed economic benefits tus.A Though abdicating the responsibilities of globalization that have not accrued to a inherent to this status during the interwar majority, and are suspicious of laissez-faire years, the US eventually fought on a global capitalism. A vocal minority of Americans scale again during World War II. The con- actively oppose US foreign engagements

major jahara “franky” matisek, us air force, is an assistant professor in the Department of military and strategic studies at the us air force academy and is a non-resident fellow at the modern war institute at west Point. He was an instructor pilot on the c-17 and t-6 with over 700 combat hours and holds a PhD in political science from northwestern university. lieutenant colonel travis robison, us army, served in Kosovo, iraq, and afghanistan and completed his PhD in politi- cal science at the university of Pennsylvania. He is currently the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 11th field artillery regiment, 25th infantry Division.

Buddhika jayamaha is a former us army airborne infantryman and veteran of the 82nd airborne Division with numerous deployments to iraq. He holds a PhD in political science from northwestern university and is an assistant professor in the Department of military and strategic studies at the us air force academy. the views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the us military academy, us air force academy, Department of the army, Department of the air force, Department of Defense, us government, or any organization or institution with which the authors are affiliated.

fall 2019, Volume XX 5 jaHara matiseK, traVis roBison, anD BuDDHiKa jayamaHa

and aim to tear down the global economic and military architecture their forbear- This indictment of America’s 3 ers sacrificed to create. Americans are also foreign policy elites is the result of electing representatives that espouse once a fundamental breakdown of the fringe views that fundamentally undermine social contract that undergirded the American economic and military global domestic legitimacy of American global leadership. It would be erroneous and self- engagement during the 20th century. serving to interpret this shift as a “populist anomaly.” Instead, a more accurate perspec- tive is that the shift is a democratic response for maintaining American leadership in the to failed foreign and domestic policies and . an indictment of policy elites.4 This article reflects on the history of US primacy and projects its uncertain future. Reluctant Great Power We argue that the US role in world affairs is Though the United States had become a fundamentally shaped by its democratic sys- leading by the 1890s, few tem of governance. US foreign engagements realized that it was taking the first steps to- historically depended on the government’s ward defining the American Century. When ability to maintain an implicit and explicit American military forces landed in France social contract with the American public in 1917, the American public did not seem that guaranteed domestic prosperity in ex- to realize the United States’ great power sta- change for supporting foreign policy goals. tus and was eager to “bring the boys home” The social contract remained legitimate to after the war.6 When the Allied Powers the extent that the government fulfilled its emerged victorious, America’s economic obligation to pursue foreign goals that con- and military power was comparable to Eu- tributed to the public interest. When the rope’s on a global scale. However, the US government failed to do so, the public with- was not the preeminent European power— drew its support by demanding new policies it played a decisive but not the defining and electing new leadership to act in accor- role in the war.7 This became clear during dance with the public’s will.5 We see this the Paris Conference when the war’s happening in America today. victors debated over key provisions of the This indictment of America’s foreign postwar settlement. policy elites is the result of a fundamental President Wilson misread the situation breakdown of the social contract that under- and attempted to negotiate a settlement at girded the domestic legitimacy of American odds with the will of the American public global engagement during the 20th century. and its representatives. He sought to pro- The following sections highlight the nature vide a liberal solution centered on a rules- of the social contract and explain how it based order that would check the European frayed through decades of political neglect. tradition of . European pow- We conclude by highlighting the need to re- ers outflanked Wilson’s idealism by crafting assess the social contract by suggesting that a postwar peace in favor of power arrange- strategic retrenchment may provide an op- ments with which they were familiar. They portunity for reevaluation that will con- accomplished this because the US public did tribute to the strategic solvency necessary not support extensive engagement abroad

6 georgetown journal of international affairs eXtenDing tHe american century

and rejected Wilson’s proposals, thereby The reluctance of American politicians preventing America from becoming the de- was not due to irresponsibility, naïveté, or fining arbiter of European affairs.8 provincial outlook. Opposition to interven- The American public and its representa- tion was due to the democratically elected tives were firmly entrenched in the Jeffer- Congress faithfully representing the domi- sonian tradition of avoiding costly foreign nant will of their constituents.16 American engagements in favor of protecting Ameri- political and military leadership understood can interests and democracy at home.9 They the growing risk of war. But they also un- were deeply disdainful of European power derstood that they needed domestic support politics and had no stomach to bear the to mobilize the level of resources necessary costs of being the global policeman.10 Wil- to simultaneously fight Nazi Germany, fas- son’s attempt to inaugurate a new American cist Italy, and Imperial Japan.17 It took the foreign policy tradition based on the pro- surprise Japanese tection of American democracy and val- and Germany’s declaration of war on the ues by actively promoting American ideals US for most of the American public to rally abroad ran counter to the dominant public in support of the war. Once committed, sentiment at that time.11 Wilson vigorously the American public was resolute in pur- promoted his agenda, but US legislators, re- suing the unconditional surrender of their flecting the democratic will of the elector- adversaries. More importantly, public sup- ate, rejected Wilson’s policies. The existing port helped the Western liberal democra- social contract—predicated on the notion cies mobilize human and material resources that America “goes not abroad, in search of more effectively than their authoritarian ri- monsters to destroy” —prevailed.12 vals.18 America was on its way to becoming America’s foreign policy behavior during the preeminent world power—but it was the interwar years reflected this deep-rooted contingent upon the public’s willingness to reluctance to wield military power abroad for leverage economic and military power to ad- its own sake with no discernible returns.13 vance American interests abroad.19 This did not mean the US refrained from en- The domestic economic boom enabled gaging in political or economic diplomacy by full mobilization benefited most Ameri- to advance its interests—in fact, it was quite cans and positioned the US as the economic active in European affairs.14 Public reluc- world leader. War mobilization improved tance figured prominently into US prepa- America’s living standards and advanced rations for World War II. By the summer racial and gender relations.20 At the war’s of 1941, Nazi Germany controlled most of end, the US economy made up half of the continental Europe and Francophone Af- world’s gross product, and America held 60 rica, and the Pacific had largely fallen un- percent of world’s gold reserves.21 This rise der Japanese imperial control. Despite the to preeminence did not mean that Ameri- growing prospect of war, President Franklin cans suddenly embraced a Wilsonian per- D. Roosevelt could only provide war ma- spective or wanted to remake the world in terials to Britain in utmost secrecy. When their image. Instead, American citizens and FDR requested an extension to the term of their representatives reverted to their Jeffer- enlistment for draftees, the House of Repre- sonian tendencies and demanded demobi- sentatives approved the measure by a single lization. They wanted a return to pre-war vote, 203–202.15 normalcy to enjoy the fruits of their wartime

fall 2019, Volume XX 7 jaHara matiseK, traVis roBison, anD BuDDHiKa jayamaHa

labor.22 With victory in 1945, there were no and Programs for National Security.” The plans for a US grand strategy that required authors argued the post–World War II de- a global military presence. American leaders cline of Western European powers and Japan knew that no grand strategy could survive left the US and Soviets as the two remain- without buy-in from a public willing to bear ing dominant powers. Therefore, the “hos- associated costs and burdens.23 Thus, with tile designs” of the represented the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the US one of the most pressing threats confronting military rapidly demobilized from 12 mil- the United States. NSC-68 outlined multi- lion to about 2 million military personnel, ple courses of action to confront the threat, sending a clear signal that the US would not and settled on active containment and the maintain a global military presence.24 buildup of American power as the preferred way to counter Soviet threat.27 The US Cold War strategy rested on Engaging in Hegemonic making the homeland secure and prosper- Competition ous to demonstrate the appeal of democracy The American response to communism was over communism, and it required helping the turning point for the social contract. Af- friendly nations achieve the same. Such mu- ter 1945, the Soviet Union (USSR) quickly tually assured cooperation meant that the imposed authoritarian systems throughout success of the American-anchored system Eastern Europe, blockaded Berlin, sup- was dependent on protection and prosperity ported proxy wars abroad, and engaged in for all, so that the US and all allies would ben- covert campaigns to undermine Western efit. The strategy was intuitively simple but democracies.25 At this time, however, most operationally complex. It required the US Americans clung to the view that US inter- to prioritize its objectives and accordingly ests resided at home rather than abroad. Pol- apportion its —diplomatic, icymakers had to not only overcome rising informational, military, and economic— Soviet aggression, they had to convince the to undermine the appeal and strength of American people that countering the USSR communism. This forced the US to view was the best means to protect American in- the world in overlapping circles of allies, terests. Instead of waiting for an attack to partners, friends, and a necessary “pack of rouse the public, as happened in World War bastards” that would cooperate against the II, US leaders had to alter Americans’ views Soviet threat.28 It also required a sustained to support a proactive response against the effort to generate and retain enough public USSR. Soviet aggression in Europe and support to ensure US leaders could continue abroad provided the rationale American to engage in muscular diplomacy backed by leaders needed. Convincing the public that substantial military force. this Soviet threat required an American re- Militarily, America engaged in cold cal- sponse compelled policymakers to demon- culations of to contain and coun- strate to the citizenry that American security ter communist threats.29 Politically, the US and prosperity was ineluctably bound with supported democracy but made pragmatic that of its allies.26 exceptions for some dictators that enabled In 1950, the US Department of US grand strategy. Countries emerging Policy Planning Staff completed a top-secret from colonialism that sought American sup- National Security Council (NSC) Paper, port were rewarded economically, militarily, NSC-68, titled “United States Objectives and diplomatically. America became a lib-

8 georgetown journal of international affairs eXtenDing tHe american century

eral hegemon vis-à-vis its allies, locking in dend coming from an activist foreign policy. institutional self-constraints so that its allies Though average Americans bore the brunt could expect US cooperation, not oppres- of the personalized cost of providing global sion of the kind Eastern European countries public goods, such as security, the cost was faced from the USSR.30 framed as one Americans must bear to main- Economically, the US built the finan- tain continued prosperity for America and cial architecture needed for global coordi- its closest allies. Continued domestic eco- nation (and dominance) of trade. This was nomic prosperity allowed the expansion of manifested through incentives for interna- social reform and deepening of social safety tional trade in the 1947 General Agreement nets. There were trials, errors, and catastro- on Tariffs and Trade that complemented phes in operationalizing the strategy, but the Bretton Woods financial architecture. the US emerged victorious from the Cold American allies and partners were subsi- War with the world’s most powerful mili- dized, in the form of preferential access to tary, largest economy, and strongest network the US economy, and in exchange these of allies. countries engaged in export-led growth that advanced their economies and undercut the The hubris of Victory and Fraying of appeal of communism. This strategy of eco- the Social Contract nomic liberalization rested upon a strong Americans were cautious about taking ad- military foundation that allowed the US to vantage of their strategic primacy at the end take responsibility for protecting friendly of the Cold War. This sense of discretion was nations, and the success of the liberal order ultimately displaced by a growing sense of was contingent on American vis- strategic hubris.34 After the September 11 à-vis a global military architecture to hold it attacks on the US, an improbable coalition together.31 The quid pro quo nature of the of liberal interventionists and conservative military and economic arrangements cen- hawks supplanted a grand strategy that tered on the US framework in which mu- balanced objectives and resources with an tual market access greatly benefitted allies, unbridled belief in the benefits of global- American corporations, and consumers. At ization, vigorous promotion of democracy the same time, it required domestic sacri- and human rights, and a conceited view of fice on the American home front. Manufac- the utility of force. This new foreign policy turing in Europe and Japan were allowed to based on military activism to promote de- prosper at the expense of the average blue- mocracy and recast illiberal states in Ameri- collar American job because it supported ca’s image essentially invalidated the existing the grand strategic aims of an American-led social contract. Americans were now being liberal world order.32 asked to bear foreign policy costs that ben- American grand strategy, premised on an efited others with no discernable return for activist foreign policy, was predicated on a domestic prosperity. Political elites ignored social contract necessitating an active dis- this fact as the active measures necessary to course with the American public. As Presi- maintain strategic solvency were replaced dent Eisenhower explicitly stated, “We must with beliefs instead of coherent policies. achieve both security and solvency. In fact, The belief in globalization driving US the foundation of military strength is eco- economic policy was based on an assump- nomic strength.”33 American citizens were tion, not an empirical certainty, that when made aware of the explicit economic divi- economies advanced and became glob-

fall 2019, Volume XX 9 jaHara matiseK, traVis roBison, anD BuDDHiKa jayamaHa

ally integrated, governments and societ- generate bills that eventually come due, yet ies would adapt their behavior to America’s US policy elites actively hide this fact from preferred liberal democratic ideal.35 Hope the American public through diversionary replaced strategy as there were neither in- discourse on social issues (e.g., abortion, centives to change, nor penalties for bad be- LGBT rights, etc.). havior for states as long as they agreed to America’s all-volunteer military created America’s economic terms. Post–Cold War a professional force that relies on a small American leaders forgot that the US was a subset of Americans, which increases the benign liberal hegemon only for its allies, civil-military divide and alters the public’s while it remained a determined realist vis-à- sense of duty and civic obligation.40 The ci- vis its adversaries. As a result, authoritarian vilian-military disconnect helps to insulate states like China took economic advantage the public from the costs of activist foreign of the American trade system while insulat- policy, but it cannot do so forever. Ameri- ing themselves against liberal ideals to which cans are beginning to feel the negative rami- China’s leaders remained hostile.36 fications of globalization-induced structural In the meantime, America’s activist for- shifts in the American economy coupled eign policy, based on neoconservative hu- with the impacts of technological advances bris and messianic liberalism, turned the that affect wages and livelihoods. Instead of US military into a “global discount security addressing globalization’s negative externali- shop.”37 The US armed forces were deployed ties on the American public, political elites to fulfill security tasks, like Iraq and Libya, campaign for the masses and rule for the that had no direct strategic security inter- elite. This has led to regressive economic ests and little return on the strategic invest- policies that contribute to increasing eco- ment.38 These foreign military interventions, nomic stagnation and inequalities for most however eloquently justified, entrenched of the American people.41 Over time, the the reality that the US military was being traditional American virtues of economic used to subsidize global security regardless and social mobility have become more dif- of the costs borne by American citizens. ficult to achieve. Today, Americans on both Instead of renewing the social contract sides of the political spectrum look suspi- for the new reality, US decision makers ei- ciously at US foreign military and economic ther ignored the necessity of one or hoped to policies that seemingly only benefit elites.42 deceive the public that the old contract re- mained valid. For example, American lead- ers made a deliberate choice to finance US The civilian-military disconnect helps foreign policy through debt rather than raise to insulate the public from the costs of taxes to pay for expanding security goals.39 activist foreign policy, but it cannot do Increasing the national debt to fund wars so forever. and defense spending was pursued so Amer- icans did not perceive the growing eco- nomic burden. Whereas former policy elites This bait-and-switch political formula spoke of the necessity of economic solvency became clear during the 2008 financial cri- and maintained an active public discourse, sis, when Americans were forced to provide present-day elites invalidated the social bailouts to the people responsible for the contact through expediency and political crisis. These bailouts violated axioms of the cynicism. Foreign military interventions liberal economic model and made visible its

10 georgetown journal of international affairs eXtenDing tHe american century

hollow assumptions. While the bailouts di- phenomenon and will continue to spread if rectly benefited the rich, the majority of cit- political elites do not revisit the social con- izens faced an uncertain financial future of tract. home foreclosures and lost pensions.43 Even Sustainable foreign policy balances a more cynical, budget hawks sought “sav- state’s security commitments with its do- ings” by cutting social entitlements to pro- mestic resources—one of which is public tect increased defense spending.44 The social support.47 At times, however, rising foreign contract was supplanted by politics of rhe- competition and declining political support torical expediency, which now faces popular unbalances a state’s foreign policy, constrain- backlash as the true cost of the profligacy of ing its .48 History shows US foreign military and economic policies that if these conditions persist, then leaders comes due. must respond or risk jeopardizing national security. A majority of the American public currently supports defense spending levels Today, Americans on both sides of 49 the political spectrum look suspiciously and an active role in foreign affairs. How- at US foreign military and ever, policymakers should not take this for economic policies that seemingly granted. They must stem the growing sen- only benefit elites. timent of disengagement on both sides of the political spectrum by remembering their freedom of policy action relies on demo- cratic support, and this political willpower Revisiting the Social Contract translates directly into military strength and American elites have forgotten the funda- power projection. mental principal necessary to maintain a US military and economic power remain resolute grand strategy in a democracy: citi- unequalled for the near term. American soft zen engagement and buy-in.45 Three decades power remains alluring despite recent do- after the Cold War and more than seven de- mestic political turmoil. When catastrophes cades since America stepped onto the global occur, those fleeing do not go to China, stage, Americans look inward as they see seg- Russia, or Iran; they turn to the US and ments of their country abandoned by both other Western democracies. America and political parties. They feel left out of global- the West remain beacons of hope that serve ization’s purported benefits, and ostensibly as an example worthy of emulation. China endless military deployments and national uses its economic might to co-opt, Russia security threats entail real costs for intangi- uses violence to coerce, and Iran seeks a soci- ble benefits. This leads many people to ques- ety based on conformity and subservience.50 tion the value of American leadership. An These actions provide them strategic space increasingly vocal minority of Americans to maneuver but beget no primacy, region- oppose US global engagement and seek to ally or globally. True primacy results when dismantle American-built global institu- people identify with the ideals of a global tions. However, as during the interwar years, power as if they were their own. Therefore, it is tempting to see this isolationist segment if the US wants to maintain its primacy in of the public as merely “a voluble and ve- the face of an increasingly complex strate- hement minority which on occasion [can] gic environment, it must develop a coher- make its influence effective.”46 Trends sug- ent grand strategy that balances objectives gest that these sentiments are not a passing with resources. Thus, a social contract must

fall 2019, Volume XX 11 jaHara matiseK, traVis roBison, anD BuDDHiKa jayamaHa

be reestablished with the American people. nal and external threats. Confronting these The question is how to do so. One way is threats to preserve and advance these orders through strategic retrenchment and reorien- will leave the US and its allies better off than tation.51 if left to authoritarian strategic competi- Retrenchment is an effective response to tors upholding fundamentally contrasting relative decline, and it can provide US lead- principles. However, maintaining Ameri- ers with time and space to strategically re- can primacy requires US political leadership orient and rebuild the social contract.52 to clearly outline the how and why of such Ultimately, states implementing retrench- ambitions, orienting public discourse on ment have less active, ambitious, and bur- how they contribute to American prosper- densome foreign policies relative to the ity. Anything less than this will likely gen- status quo.53 By reducing the costs associ- erate a critical mass of citizens advocating ated with US foreign policy, American de- for global disengagement and the end of the cision-makers can work to generate public American Century. support by explaining how achieving the re- maining goals will benefit the public.54 Cost savings can also be redirected toward do- Notes mestic priorities. This will require a funda- 1. Henry R. Luce, “The American Century,” Dip- mental reevaluation of how military power lomatic History 23, no. 2 (1999): 159–71. animates American strategy and the recog- 2. The US pragmatically managed to balance its nition that in most circumstances the use of strategic priorities with its values and ideals. military power is a means of last resort, not a Sometimes strategic priorities triumphed over first response. Revisiting the social contract values and ideals. For example, alliances with will also require honest discourse about the Franco’s Spain, Salazar’s Portugal, military dic- costs of a grand strategy in terms of security tatorships in Greece and Turkey, and a host of expenses, risks, and burdens.55 Retrench- unsavory but necessary strategic allies across the developing world. ment that reduces risks, shifts burdens, or 3. Stephen M. Walt, “America’s Anxiety of Influ- economizes expenses will alleviate the “di- ence,” Foreign Policy, August 17, 2018, https:// lemma of rising demands and insufficient foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/17/americas-anx resources” and provide American leaders iety-of-influence/. For a diverse set of articles with an opportunity to improve their politi- presenting differing analyses of populism and cal and strategic solvency.56 Such actions are nationalism refer to this special issue: “The needed to rebuild the social contract with New Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 2 the American public. (March/April 2019). Revisiting the social contract is needed to 4. Sun Woo Lee, “Populism Is Bigger Than convince the public that sacrifices are nec- Trump,” Stanford Sphere, October 28, 2017, essary for continuing US global leadership https://stanfordsphere.com/2017/10/28/pop in pursuit of advancing domestic prosperity. ulism-is-bigger-than-trump/. 5. Patrick Riley, “The Social Contract and Its Crit- Without a renewed social contract, Ameri- ics,” in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth- can leaders will increasingly find it difficult Century Political Thought, ed. Mark Goldie to garner domestic support for engagements and Robert Wokler (New York: Cambridge abroad, thereby constraining diplomatic University Press, 2006), 347–75. flexibility. The global rules-based economic, 6. Everett Titsworth Tomlinson, The Story of Gen- political, and security orders that served eral Pershing (New York: D. Appleton, 1919), America and its allies so well now face inter- 1; Kori Schake, Safe Passage: The Transition

12 georgetown journal of international affairs eXtenDing tHe american century

from British to American (Cam- of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). Gender Relations and Welfare States,” American 7. Edward M. Coffman,The War to End All Wars: Sociological Review 58, no. 3 (1993): 303–28. The American Military Experience in World War I 21. John F. Walker and Harold G. Vatter, History (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, of US Economy since World War II (New York: 2014). Routledge, 2015). 8. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 22. G. John. Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of In- Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order ternational Relations (London: Palgrave Mac- after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton millan, 2001 [1946]). University Press, 2001). 9. Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: Ameri- 23. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: can Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World National Security, the Truman Administration, (New York: Alford A. Knopf, 2001), 174–217. and the Cold War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 10. John Kane and Haig Patapan, The Democratic University Press, 1992). Leader: How Democracy Defines, Empowers and 24. John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel Demo- Limits Its Leaders (New York: Oxford Univer- bilization in the United States Army (Washing- sity Press, 2012), 116–42. ton, DC: Center of Military History, 1951). 11. Mead, Special Providence, 132–73. 25. Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold 12. John Quincy Adams, “An Address, Delivered War, 1945–1990 (New York: McGraw-Hill, at the Request of the Committee of Arrange- 1991). ments for Celebrating the Anniversary of In- 26. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: dependence, at the City of Washington on A Critical Appraisal of American National Secu- the Fourth of July 1821 upon the Occasion rity Policy during the Cold War (New York: Ox- of Reading the Declaration of Independence,” ford University Press, 2005); George F. Kennan, Washington, DC, July 4, 1821, 32, https:// “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Af- babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mou.01050701 fairs 25, no. 4 (1947): 575–76; Charles Kraut- 7283;view=1up;seq=31. hammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Af- 13. Melvin Small, Democracy and Diplomacy: The fairs 70 (1990): 23–33. Impact of Domestic Politics in US Foreign Policy, 27. US Department of State, Office of the His- 1789–1994 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins torian, Milestones: 1945–1952, “NSC-68, University Press, 1996). 1950,” https://history.state.gov/milestones 14. Bear F. Braumoeller, “The Myth of American /1945-1952/NSC68; National Security Coun- ,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 4 cil, “United States Objectives and Programs (2010), 349–71. for National Security,” Washington, DC, April 15. Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to Congress 7, 1950, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whis (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), 228. tlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents 16. Justus D. Doenecke, “US Policy and the Euro- /pdf/10-1.pdf. pean War, 1939–1941,” Diplomatic History 19, 28. Paul Burka, “The Man Who Saved LBJ,” Texas no. 4 (1995): 669–98. Monthly, August 2000, https://www.texas 17. Colin Dueck, “Realism, Culture and Grand monthly.com/politics/the-man-who-saved Strategy: Explaining America’s Peculiar Path -lbj/. to World Power,” Security Studies 14, no. 2 29. Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New (2005): 195–231. York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 760–62. 18. Michael Mann, Fascists (New York: Cambridge 30. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism University Press, 2004). (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 19. Michael Mann, “The Roots and Contradic- 31. Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World His- tions of Modern Militarism,” New Left Re- tory (New York: Basic Books, 2017); William view 162 (1987): 35–50. A. Lovett, Alfred E. Eckes Jr., and Richard L. 20. Ann Shola Orloff, “Gender and the Social Rights Brinkman, US Trade Policy: History, Theory,

fall 2019, Volume XX 13 jaHara matiseK, traVis roBison, anD BuDDHiKa jayamaHa

and the WTO: History, Theory, and the WTO ences of Wealthy Americans,” Perspectives on (New York: Routledge, 2015), 4–6. Politics 11, no. 1 (2013): 51–73. 32. Robert Kagan, “The New German Question: 43. Neil Barofsky, Bailout: How Washington Aban- What Happens When Europe Comes Apart?” doned Main Street While Rescuing Foreign Affairs, April 2, 2019, https://www.for (New York: Free Press, 2012). eignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2019-04-02 44. Nikki Wentling, “VA Secretary Has Begun /new-german-question. Planning Budget Cuts Requested by Trump,” 33. Dwight Eisenhower stated this during a presi- Stripes, November 9, 2018, https://www.stripes dential campaign speech in Baltimore, MD, .com/news/veterans/va-secretary-has-begun September 25, 1952. -planning-budget-cuts-requested-by-trump 34. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” Na- -1.556017. tional Interest 16 (1989): 3–18. 45. Mark Mykleby, Patrick Doherty, and Joel 35. Helen V. Milner and Bumba Mukherjee, “De- Makower, The New Grand Strategy: Restoring mocratization and Economic Globalization,” America’s Prosperity, Security, and Sustainabil- Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): ity in the 21st Century (New York: St. Martin’s 163–81. Press, 2016). 36. Evan Osnos, “Making China Great Again,” 46. Whitney H. Shepardson and William O. New Yorker, January 1, 2018, https://www.new Scroggs, The United States in World Affairs: An yorker.com/magazine/2018/01/08/making Account of American Foreign Relations, 1938 -china-great-again; Jake Warner, “China Is (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), 127. Cheating at a Rigged Game,” Foreign Policy, Au- 47. International commitments are obligations gust, 8, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018 outside a state’s borders that may have to be de- /08/08/china-is-cheating-at-a-rigged-game/. fended, and “foreign policy consists in bring- 37. Buddhika Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek, ing into balance, with a comfortable surplus “The Strategic Crisis in the American Way of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments of War: A Global Discount Security Shop?” and . . . power.” Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Strategy Bridge, October 23, 2018, https://the Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, strategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/10/23/the Brown, 1950), 9. -strategic-crisis-in-the-american-way-of-war-a 48. This is often referred to as the “Lippmann Gap.” -global-discount-security-shop. See Samuel Huntington, “Coping with the 38. Rosa Brooks, How Everything Became War Lippmann Gap,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 3 and the Military Became Everything: Tales from (1987): 453–77. the Pentagon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 49. Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, and Craig Kafura, 2017). Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment: Re- 39. Sarah Kreps, Taxing Wars: The American Way sults of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey of of War Finance and the Decline of Democracy American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). (Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 40. Andrew J. Bacevich, Breach of Trust: How 2014), 7, 9, and 34. Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Coun- 50. We use the word “seek” intentionally. It is not try (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013). the “veil” itself that is at issue but its political 41. Tyler Cowen, Average Is Over: Powering Amer- significance as an issue of individual freedom ica beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation (New and choice. Manifesting authoritarian state York: Penguin, 2013); Jacob S. Hacker and power turns women’s bodies and choices into Paul Pierson, Winner Take All Politics—How an ideational and political battle space. See Ma- Washington Made the Rich Richer and Turned sih Alinejad and Roya Hakakian, “There Are Its Back on the Middle Class (Simon & Schus- Two Types of Hijabs. The Difference Is Huge,” ter, 2011). The Washington Post, April 7, 2019, https:// 42. Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels, and Jason www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global Seawright, “Democracy and the Policy Prefer- -opinions/there-are-two-types-of-hijabs-the

14 georgetown journal of international affairs eXtenDing tHe american century

-difference-is-huge/2019/04/07/50a44574 55. For similar definitions see Barry Posen, Sources -57f0-11e9-814f-e2f46684196e_story.html. of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Ger- 51. Travis Robison, “Security with Solvency: Re- many between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: trenchment and Strategic Reorientation” (PhD Cornell University Press, 1984), 13; Richard diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2019), 9–10. Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds., The Domes- 52. Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, tic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and University Press, 1993), 4; Christopher Layne, Retrenchment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy Press, 2018), 5; Alex Weisiger, Logics of War from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), University Press, 2006), 13; Hal Brands, What 54–85; Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to 2000), 41; Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: George W. Bush (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, Press, 2014), 2–6. 1895–1905 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer- 56. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, “The sity Press, 1988), 17. Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient 53. MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 8. Resources,” World Politics 20, no. 4 (1968): 54. Robison, “Security with Solvency,” 11–12. 660–61.

fall 2019, Volume XX 15